Citations for Fukushima: The Story of a Nuclear Disaster

Fukushima: The Story of a Nuclear Disaster | 1

Citations for Fukushima: The Story of a

Nuclear Disaster

Chapter 1. “A Situation That We Had Never Imagined” Page

1 uncertain where safety actually lay: The Guardian, ‘Earthquake shakes MPs in Japan’s parliament – video,” March 11, 2011.

http://www.theguardian.com/world/video/2011/mar/11/earthquake-mps-japan-parliament-video

1 televising the Kan hearing: C21 Media, “NHK’s Rapid Response,” (no date).

http://www.nhk.or.jp/japan311/c21-01-nhks.html 1 along the northeastern coast: Hiroo Kanamori, “Earthquake Hazards: Putting seismic

research to the most effective use,” Nature 483, 147-148 (March 8, 2012). http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v483/n7388/full/483147a.html and Jean Kumagai, “In Japan Earthquake, Early Warnings Helped,” IEEE Spectrum, posted

March 15, 2011. http://spectrum.ieee.org/tech-talk/computing/networks/japans-earthquake-earlywarning-system-worked

2 world’s largest earthquakes: Richard Monastersky, “Giant shock rattles ideas about

quake behaviour,” Nature 471, 271 (2011). http://www.nature.com/news/2011/110315/full/471274a.html

3 seam of more than 180 miles: Earthquake Engineering Research Institute, Special

Earthquake Report , “The Japan Tohoku Tsunami of March 11, 2011” (November 2011). http://www.eqclearinghouse.org/2011-03-11-sendai/files/2011/11/Japan-eq-report-tsunami2.pdf

4 estimate its magnitude as fast: Kanomori, “Earthquake Hazards: Putting seismic research

to the most effective use.” http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v483/n7388/full/483147a.html

4 underestimate the size of an earthquake: David Cyranoski, “Japan’s earthquake warning

system fails again,” Nature, (May 14, 2008). http://www.nature.com/news/2008/080514/full/news.2008.824.html

2 | UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS

Chapter 1. “A Situation That We Had Never Imagined” Page

4 David Cyranoski, “Japan Faces Up to Failure of Its Earthquake Preparations,” Scientific

American (March 29, 2011). http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=japan-faces-up-to-failure-of-earthquake 4 Michael Reilly and Andy Coghlan, “A measured disaster: Following quakes in fine detail,”

New Scientist (March 16, 2011). http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn20251-a-measured-disaster-following-quakes-in-

fine-detail.html 4 power a city the size of Los Angeles: CBS News, “Japan quake aftershocks could go on

`for years,’” (March 12, 2011). http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-500188_162-20042429/japan-quake-aftershocks-could-go-on-for-years-/

5 shutdown done by the book: David Lochbaum, “Fukushima Dai-Ichi Unit 1: The first 30

minutes,” Union of Concerned Scientists (May 24, 2011). http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/nuclear_power/fukushima-daiichi-ucs-analysis-unit-1-first-30-minutes.pdf

9 nature’s first assault: A wide range of videos of the earthquake and tsunami are available

online. Among them is a collection of videos posted in April 2011 by the American Geophysical Union. (http://blogs.agu.org/tremblingearth/2011/04/18/japanese-videos-of-the-tohoku-earthquake-and-tsunami/)

9 swept away entire villages: Julyan H.E. Cartwright and Hisami Makamura, “Tsunami: a

history of the term and of scientific understanding of the phenomenon in Japanese and Western culture,” Notes & Records of The Royal Society, vol. 62, no. 2, 151-166 (June 2008).

http://rsnr.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/62/2/151.full 9 twice the area of Manhattan: Joanna M. Foster, “Japan’s Tsunami Gave Birth to Faraway

Icebergs,” New York Times, August 10, 2011. http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/08/10/japans-tsunami-gave-birth-to-faraway-icebergs/

10 attributed to the tsunami: Earthquake Engineering Research Institute, Special Earthquake

Report, “The Japan Tohhoku Tsunami of March 11, 2011” (November 2011). http://www.eqclearinghouse.org/2011-03-11-sendai/files/2011/11/Japan-eq-report-tsunami2.pdf

13 Yoshida would say later: Investigation Committee on the Accident at the Fukushima

Nuclear Power Stations of Tokyo Electric Power Company, Interim Report (December 26, 2011), p. 141.

http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/icanps/eng/interim-report.html


Chapter 1. “A Situation That We Had Never Imagined” Page 14 dangerous vulnerability: U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, memo from S.H. Hanauer to

J.F. O’Leary, F.E. Kruesi, and L. Rogers, September 20, 1972, “Pressure-Suppression Containments.”

16 clearly spelled out: Phred Dvorak and Peter Landers, “Japanese Plant Had Barebones Risk

Plan,” Wall Street Journal, March 31, 2011. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703712504576232961004646464.html 16 it is practically unthinkable: Phred Dvorak and Peter Landers, “Japanese Plant Had

Barebones Risk Plan,” Wall Street Journal, March 31, 2011. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703712504576232961004646464.html 18 TEPCO issued a press release: Tokyo Electric Power Company, “The Effect of

Earthquake Occurred in the Northern Part of Japan (as of 4:30 pm today)” (March 11, 2011).

http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/release/11031101-e.html 18 TEPCO officially notified the government: Investigation Committee on the Accident at

the Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations of the Tokyo Electric Power Company (Interim Report, December 26, 2011), p. 114-115.

http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/icanps/eng/interim-report.html The Investigation Committee on the Accident at the Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations of

the Tokyo Electric Power Company, established by the Cabinet in May, 2011, and chaired by Yotaro Hatamura, professor emeritus of the University of Tokyo, released two reports, an interim report, issued December 26, 2011, and a final report, issued July 23, 2012.

http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/icanps/eng/final-report.html As noted in the final report (p. 4), the interim report reflects what was known to date and

should be regarded as complementary to the final, report, which includes additional information obtained after December, 2011.

20 without the benefit of training or instructions: Yoichi Funabashi and Kay Kitazawa,

“Fukushima in review: A complex disaster, a disastrous response,” Bulletin of the Atomic

Scientists, 68:9-21 (March/April 2012). 22 no safety provisions remaining: Investigation Committee on the Accident at the

Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations of Tokyo Electric Power Company, Interim Report, December 26, 2011, p. 407.

http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/icanps/eng/interim-report.html 22 There have been no confirmed radioactivity: Tokyo Electric Power Company,

“Occurrence of a Specific Incident Stipulated in Article 10, Clause 1 of the Act on Special Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency Preparedness (Fukushima Daiichi)” (March 11, 2011).

http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/release/11031102-e.html


Chapter 1. “A Situation That We Had Never Imagined”

Page 23 focus was on saving lives: “Naoto Kan: `Japan Was Invaded by an Invisible Enemy,”

Frontline, “Inside Japan’s Nuclear Meltdown,” February 28, 2012. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/health-science-technology/japans-nuclear-

meltdown/naoto-kan-japan-was-invaded-by-an-invisible-enemy/ 23 there is no radiation leak: Eric Talmadge and Mari Yamaguchi, “How first 24 hours

shaped Japan’s nuclear crisis,” Associated Press, July 3, 2011. http://news.yahoo.com/first-24-hours-shaped-japans-nuclear-crisis-060035933.html 24 core now was exposed and most likely melting: Investigation Committee on the Accident

at the Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations of the Tokyo Electric Power Company (Interim Report, December 26, 2011), p. 165.

http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/icanps/eng/interim-report.html 24 told to leave immediately: Investigation Committee on the Accident at the Fukushima

Nuclear Power Stations of the Tokyo Electric Power Company (Interim Report, December 26, 2011), p. 302.

http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/icanps/eng/interim-report.html 24 adequate time to decide a course of action: “Yotaro Hatamura: Was Fukushima an

Accident Waiting to Happen?” Frontline, February 28, 2012. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/health-science-technology/japans-nuclear-meltdown/yotaro-hatamura-was-fukushima-an-accident-waiting-to-happen/

25 a scenario no accident drill had covered: Investigation Committee on the Accident at the

Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations of the Tokyo Electric Power Company (Interim Report, December 26, 2011), p. 163.

http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/icanps/eng/interim-report.html 26 choosing their words carefully: “Naoto Kan: `Japan was Invaded by an Invisible Enemy,”

Frontline, February 28, 2012. http://www.pbs.org/whttp://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/nn20110620a2.htmlgbh/pages/frontl

ine/health-science-technology/japans-nuclear-meltdown/naoto-kan-japan-was-invaded-by-an-invisible-enemy/

30 I don’t know the reason: “Naoto Kan: `Japan was Invaded by an Invisible Enemy,”

Frontline, February 28, 2012. http://www.pbs.org/whttp://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/nn20110620a2.htmlgbh/pages/frontline/health-science-technology/japans-nuclear-meltdown/naoto-kan-japan-was-invaded-by-an-invisible-enemy/

31 venting could now begin: Investigation Committee on the Accident at the Fukushima

Nuclear Power Stations of the Tokyo Electric Power Company (Interim Report, December 26, 2011), p. 175-176.



Chapter 1. “A Situation That We Had Never Imagined”

Page

33 not sure exactly what had blown up: Investigation Committee on the Accident at the Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations of the Tokyo Electric Power Company (Interim Report, December 26, 2011), p. 244-246.

http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/icanps/eng/interim-report.html Chapter 2. “This may get really ugly…” Page

34 Monitoring Mode: Gregory B. Jaczko, “Communications Challenges and the Japan Response,” U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (January 10, 2012). http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1201/ML120110038.pdf

35 safe and lucky this time: Email from S. Lu to J. Donoghue, A. Ulses, A. Mendiola, F.

Asktulewicz, C. Ader, M. Lombard, W. Ruland, S. Bahadur, R. Landry, P. Clifford, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (March 11, 2011), p. 8.

http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1123/ML11238A092.pdf 35 really big deal: Email from A. Hoffman to B. Wagner, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission (March 11, 2011), p. 25. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1118/ML11186A916.pdf 36 really ugly in the next few days: email from P. Qualls to E. McCann, U.S. Nuclear

Regulatory Commission (March 11, 2011), p. 74. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1117/ML11175A278.pdf 36 Is this safety bad or economics bad? Email from M. Eddy to B. Wagner, U.S. Nuclear

Regulatory Commission (March 11, 2011), p. 24. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1118/ML11186A916.pdf 36 Both: Email from B. Wagner to M. Eddy, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (March

11, 2011), p 24. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML11186A916 37 This wasn’t the first time: There are several accounts of the 1999 accident in Tokaimura. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “NRC Review of the Tokai-Mura Criticality

Accident” (April 2000). (http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/commission/secys/2000/secy2000-0085/attachment1.pdf)

International Atomic Energy Agency, 1999, “Report on the preliminary fact finding

mission following the accident at the nuclear fuel processing facility in Tokaimura, Japan” (1999). (http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/TOAC_web.pdf)

Edwin Lyman and Steven Dolley, “Accident Prone: The Trouble at Tokai-Mura” Bulletin

of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 56, Issue 2 (March/April 2000), p. 42-46.


Chapter 2. “This may get really ugly…” Page

Koichi Hasegawa and Yuko Takubo, Citizens’ Nuclear Information Center, “JCO Criticality Accident and Local Residents: Damages, Symptoms and Changing Attitudes,” The JCO Criticality Accident Comprehensive Assessment Committee (June 2001). (http://www.cnic.jp/english/publications/pdffiles/jco_residents_font.pdf)

38 safety of nuclear power: “Perils of inadequacies in safety regulation,” Nature, 401 Issue

no. 6753 (October 7, 1999), p. 513. 38 enormous sums from Treasury coffers: Laura E. Hein, “Fuelling Growth: The Energy

Revolution and Economic Policy in Japan,” Harvard University Asia Center, (1990), p. 52. 39 too cheap to meter: Lewis Strauss, president, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, speech to

National Association of Science Writers, New York , New York (September 16, 1954). 39 lasting monument to our technology: “Nuclear Reactor Urged for Japan,” New York

Times, September 22, 1954. 39 two manufacturers had loaned Japan $6.1 million: “International Bank to Lend Japan

$40,200,000 for Power Growth,” New York Times, October 16, 1953. 40 In 1958, the governor of Fukushima Prefecture: Hiroshi Onitsuka, “Hooked on Nuclear

Power: Japanese State-Local Relations and the Vicious Cycle of Nuclear Dependence,” The

Asia Pacific Journal, Vol. 10, Issue 3 No. 1 (January 16, 2012). http://www.japanfocus.org/-Hiroshi-Onitsuka/3677 40 world’s largest privately owned utility: Peter Pringle and James Spigelman, “The

Nuclear Barons,” Holt, Rinehart & Winston (New York), 1981. 40 a financial bonanza: Hiroshi Onitsuka, “Hooked on Nuclear Power: Japanese State-Local

Relations and the Vicious Cycle of Nuclear Dependence,” The Asia Pacific Journal: Japan

Focus, Vol. 10, Issue 3 No. 1 (January 16, 2012). http://www.japanfocus.org/-Hiroshi-Onitsuka/3677 41 lose their function simultaneously: Katsuhiko Ishibashi, “Genpatsu-Shinsai: Catastrophic

Multiple Disaster of Earthquake and Quake-induced Nuclear Accident Anticipated in the Japanese Islands,” presented to the 23rd General Assembly of the International Union of Geodesy and Geophysics, 2003, Sapporo, Japan, p. 9. docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&q=cache:03SSMZ241KIJ:historical.seismology.jp/ishibashi/opinion/0307IUGG_slides.pdf+&hl=en&gl=us&pid=bl&srcid=ADGEESiWVzN3Rsi4Qb6mhuRiJb0USRBqc6CFE_4X0Mc2_WLASgtQ-gnKz592YVgZFx9rjcrNz3G-HxHy1ZkiZ5Gdfv7IS9ta4PIuMZ5potzNLU51wGivgl1f9Fp55jjWMQI9859pVxeD&sig=AHIEtbTZTpf1UE_c87bsl_zO96nN7RI_Rw&pli=1

Jason Clenfield, “Vindicated Seismologist Says Japan Still Underestimates Threat to

Reactors,” Bloomberg News, November 21, 2011. (http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-11-21/nuclear-regulator-dismissed-seismologist-

on-japan-quake-threat.html)



42 make it impossible to ever build anything: Norimitsu Onishi and Martin Fackler,

“Japanese Officials Ignored or Concealed Dangers,” New York Times, May 16, 2011. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/17/world/asia/17japan.html?pagewanted=all 42 not be described as “unexpected”: Ishibashi Katsuhiko, “Why Worry? Japan’s Nuclear

Plants at Grave Risk from Quake Damage,” published in the International Herald Tribune and Asahi Shimbun, August 11, 2007, posted on The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan

Focus, August 11, 2007. http://www.japanfocus.org/-Ishibashi-Katsuhiko/2495 42 decisions were overturned: Norimitsu Onishi and Martin Fackler, “Japanese Officials

Ignored or Concealed Dangers,” New York Times, May 16, 2011. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/17/world/asia/17japan.html?pagewanted=all 42 we could have prevented Fukushima: Hiroko Tabuchi, “Japan Asks Another Nuclear

Plant to Shut Down Its Reactors,” New York Times, May 6, 2011. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/07/world/asia/07japan.html?_r=1 42 Ever since seismology has been studied: Robert J. Geller, “Earthquake Prediction: A

critical review,” Geophysical Journal International, 131, 425-450 (1997), p. 425. 43 like hogs to a full trough: Letter from C.F. Richter, published in the Bulletin of the

Seismological Society of America, Vol. 67 (August, 1977), p. 1244-1247. 43 directed toward a single event: Kiyoo Mogi, “Two grave issues concerning the expected

Tokai Earthquake,” Earth Planets Space, Vol. 56, li-lxvi (2004). http://www.terrapub.co.jp/journals/EPS/pdf/2004/5608/5608li.pdf 44 occur at predictable intervals: Johannis Nöggerath, Robert J. Geller, Viacheslav K.

Gusiakov, “Fukushima: the myth of safety, the reality of geoscience,” Bulletin of the

Atomic Scientists, September 1, 2011. http://thebulletin.org/2011/september/fukushima-myth-safety-reality-geoscience 44 concept of hazard mapping: Joel Achenbach, “Seismic hazards: Japan earthquake and

other tectonic surprises challenge scientific assumptions,” by Joel Achenbach, Washington

Post, March 9, 2012. http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/seismic-hazards-japan-earthquake-

and-other-tectonic-surprises-challenge-scientific-assumptions/2012/03/09/gIQAoV291R_story.html

45 accident at Three Mile Island Unit 2: An account of events at Three Mile Island,

“Backgrounder on the Three Mile Island Accident,” prepared by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, can be found here: http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/3mile-isle.html (2013)



45 safety test on the Unit 4 reactor: An account of events at the Chernobyl plant, “Chernobyl Accident 1986,” prepared by the World Nuclear Association, can be found here: http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Safety-and-Security/Safety-of-Plants/Chernobyl-Accident/#.Ulf0OGRUMrg (2013)

Additional information, “Backgrounder on Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant Accident,

prepared by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, can be found here: http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/chernobyl-bg.html (2013)

46 no perfect technology: “Learn lessons from world’s worse nuclear disaster,” Daily

Yomiuri, April 27, 2011. http://editorialscollections24.blogspot.com/2011/04/editorial-daily-yomiuri-japan_27.html 47 national policy run by the private sector: “Nuclear Crisis: How It Happened: `Nuclear

power village’ a cozy, closed community,” Daily Yomiuri, June 16, 2011. http://archive.is/niIyv 47 thirteen former officials: “Nuclear Crisis: How It Happened: `Nuclear power village’ a

cozy, closed community,” Daily Yomiuri, June 16, 2011. http://archive.is/niIyv 47 Japan’s Asahi Shimbun reported: “Nuclear watchdog members received donations from

energy sector,” Asahi Shimbun, January 2, 2012. http://ajw.asahi.com/article/0311disaster/fukushima/AJ201201020044 47 caught seismologists by surprise: Joel Achenback, “Seismic hazards: Japan earthquake

and other tectonic surprises challenge scientific assumptions,” Washington Post, March 9, 2012.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/seismic-hazards-japan-earthquake-and-other-tectonic-surprises-challenge-scientific-assumptions/2012/03/09/gIQAoV291R_story.html

48 guidelines were full of loopholes: Jason Clenfield and Shigeru Sato, “Japan Nuclear

Energy Drive Compromised by Conflicts of Interest,” Bloomberg News, December 12, 2007.

http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=awR8KsLlAcSo 48 Sugaoka was fired: Norimitsu Onishi and Ken Belson, “Culture of Complicity Tied to

Stricken Nuclear Plant,” New York Times, April 26, 2011. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/27/world/asia/27collusion.html?pagewanted=all 48 falsifying safety records for years: “Revelation of Endless N-damage Cover-ups: the

`TEPCO scandal’ and the adverse trend of easing inspection standards,” Citizens’ Nuclear Information Center, No. 92 (November/December, 2002).

http://www.nirs.org/reactorwatch/accidents/nit92.pdf



48 gravest crisis since the company was established: “Tepco admits leak tightness test falsification,” Nuclear Engineering International, November 3, 2002.

http://www.neimagazine.com/news/newstepco-admits-leaktightness-test-falsification 49 “Not again!”: “`Not again’: Yet Another TEPCO Scandal,” Citizens’ Nuclear Information

Center, Tokyo (no date) http://www.cnic.jp/english/newsletter/nit117/nit117articles/nit117tepco.html 49 unreported safety problems: Jason Clenfield and Shigeru Sato, “Japan Nuclear Energy

Drive Compromised by Conflicts of Interest,” Bloomberg News, December 12, 2007. http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=awR8KsLlAcSo 49 passing the inspections became the objective: “`Not again’: Yet Another TEPCO

Scandal,” Citizens’ Nuclear Information Center, Tokyo (no date). http://www.cnic.jp/english/newsletter/nit117/nit117articles/nit117tepco.html 50 built to withstand a smaller quake: David Cyranoski, “Japanese nuclear reactor under-

designed for earthquake?” Nature, July 17, 2007. http://www.nature.com/news/2007/070716/full/news070716-3.html 50 Nuclear power can only operate: Martin Fackler, “Japan Shuts Nuclear Plant After

Leak,” New York Times, July 18, 2007. http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9F00E0DC1731F93BA25754C0A9619C8

B63 50 less than expected: IAEA Issues Report on Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Plant,

International Atomic Energy Agency, August 17, 2007. http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/2007/kashiwazaki-kariwa_report.html (link to full report available here)

50 an earthquake large enough to threaten the reactors: “TEPCO: Active fault found in

seabed of nuclear plant,” Daily Yomiuri, December 7, 2007. 51 Reducing the frequency of inspections: Tokyo Electric Power Company Annual Report

2010. http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/corpinfo/ir/tool/annual/pdf/ar2010-e.pdf 51 lowered the height of the bluff: Chester Dawson and Yuka Hayashi, “Fateful Move

Exposed Japan Plant,” Wall Street Journal, July 12, 2011. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303982504576425312941820794.html 51 This is all we saw: Yuri Kageyama and Justin Pritchard, “Fukushima tsunami plan a single

page,” Associated Press, May 27, 2011. http://www.salon.com/2011/05/27/as_japan_earthquake_tsunami_risk/



52 TEPCO paid no attention: David Nakamura and Chico Harlan, “Japanese nuclear plant’s safety analysts brushed off risk of tsunami,” Washington Post, March 23, 2011.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/japanese-nuclear-plants-evaluators-cast-aside-threat-of-tsunami/2011/03/22/AB7Rf2KB_story.html

53 socially acceptable: Investigation Committee on the Accident at the Fukushima Nuclear

Power Stations of Tokyo Electric Power Company, Interim Report, (December 26, 2011) p. 469.

http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/icanps/eng/interim-report.html 54 This is not our event: Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission, March 11, 2011, p. 216. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A099.pdf 54 initial short duration pulse: Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File, March 12, 2011,

p. 32. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A100.pdf 54 My dog woke me up: Email from R. Hardies to M. Mitchell, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission, March 12, 2011, p. 94. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1117/ML11175A275.pdf

Chapter 3. “What the hell is going on?” Page

55 another earthquake: Investigation Committee on the Accident at the Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations of Tokyo Electric Power Company, interim report, p. 244

http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/icanps/eng/120224Honbun04Eng.pdf 55 explosion replayed on TV screens: NHK World, “Explosion at Japan’s Fukushima

Daiichi Nuclear Plant,” March 12, 2011. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j1dHwc476SQ 55 The fuel had started melting: Investigation Committee on the Accident at the Fukushima

Nuclear Power Stations of Tokyo Electric Power Company, interim report, p. 169 http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/icanps/eng/120224Honbun04Eng.pdf 57 finally reached safety: Eric Talmadge and Mari Yamaguchi, “AP Impact: Japan ignored

own radiation forecasts,” Associated Press, August 9, 2011. http://news.yahoo.com/ap-impact-japan-ignored-own-radiation-forecasts-045726583.html 58 ominous predictions about the danger: Yuka Hayashi, “How Japan Stumbled in

Forecasting Fallout in One Town,” Wall Street Journal, August 16, 2011. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304567604576453342206030686.html



58 a release of the predictions: Investigation Committee on the Accident at the Fukushima

Nuclear Power Stations of Tokyo Electric Power Company, Interim Report, (December 26, 2011), p. 302.

http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/icanps/eng/interim-report.html 59 a mere weather report: Eric Talmadge and Mari Yamaguchi, “Japan ignored own

radiation forecasts,” Associated Press, August 8, 2011. http://news.yahoo.com/ap-impact-japan-ignored-own-radiation-forecasts-045726583.html 59 no inkling they were at risk: Yuka Hayashi, “How Japan Stumbled in Forecasting Fallout

in One Town,” Wall Street Journal, August 16, 2011. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304567604576453342206030686.html

59 struggling to figure out what was happening: Investigation Committee on the Accident

at the Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations of the Tokyo Electric Power Company (Interim Report, December 26, 2011), p. 306.

http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/icanps/eng/interim-report.html 59 “unprecedented crisis”: Prime Minister Naoto Kan, press conference (video), Tokyo,

March 12, 2011. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nE3j3FLeJxM&feature=relmfu 59 “Please remain calm”: Chief Cabinet Secretary Yukio Edano, press conference (video),

Tokyo March 12, 2011. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BOAywW6ODAc 59 Absent from this briefing: Investigation Committee on the Accident at the Fukushima

Nuclear Power Stations of Tokyo Electric Power Company, Interim Report (December 26, 2011), p. 415-418.

http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/icanps/eng/interim-report.html 59 The condition of the core: Investigation Committee on the Accident at the Fukushima

Nuclear Power Stations of Tokyo Electric Power Company, Interim Report (December 26, 2011), p. 417.

http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/icanps/eng/interim-report.html 60 The likelihood cannot be denied: Investigation Committee on the Accident at the

Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations of Tokyo Electric Power Company, Interim Report (December 26, 2011), p. 417-418.

http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/icanps/eng/interim-report.html 60 the news never made it upstairs to Kan’s office: Investigation Committee on the

Accident at the Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations of the Tokyo Electric Power Company (Interim Report, December 26, 2011), p. 194.




61 do not stop it: Investigation Committee on the Accident at the Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations of Tokyo Electric Power Company, Interim Report (December 26, 2011), p. 198.

http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/icanps/eng/interim-report.html 61 laboring to learn more: Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File, U.S. Nuclear

Regulatory Commission, March 12, p. 23. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A100.pdf 62 It was a significant detail: Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File, U.S. Nuclear

Regulatory Commission, March 12, 2011, p. 37. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A100.pdf 63 Nuclear power plants are built: “NRC continues to track earthquake and tsunami issues,”

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission press release No. 11-043, March 11, 2011. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1107/ML110700697.pdf 63 slippery slope: Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission, March 12, 2011, p. 155. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A100.pdf 63 sanitize our Q’s and A’s and keep it within the federal family: Japan’s Fukushima

Daiichi ET Audio File, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March 12, 2011, p. 170. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A100.pdf 64 tell their labs to cool it: Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File, U.S. Nuclear

Regulatory Commission, March 12, 2011, p. 160. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A100.pdf 64 do more with the states: Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File, U.S. Nuclear

Regulatory Commission, March 12, 2011, p. 181. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A100.pdf 64 I think…it’s inevitable: Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File, U.S. Nuclear

Regulatory Commission, March 12, 2011, p. 182. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A100.pdf 64 [I]f we’re trying to restrict the information: Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File,

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March 12, 2011, p. 205. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A100.pdf 64 And avoid answering questions: Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File, U.S. Nuclear

Regulatory Commission, March 12, 2011, p. 206. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A100.pdf 65 Don’t…scratch the itch: Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File, U.S. Nuclear

Regulatory Commission, March 12, 2011, p. 207. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A100.pdf



65 could not be restarted: INPO “Special Report on the Nuclear Accident at the Fukushima

Daiichi Nuclear Power Station,” November, 2011, p. 29. http://www.nei.org/corporatesite/media/filefolder/11_005_Special_Report_on_Fukushima_

Daiichi_MASTER_11_08_11_1.pdf 66 None of this was reported to Yoshida: Investigation Committee on the Accident at the

Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations of the Tokyo Electric Power Company (Interim Report, December 26, 2011), p. 204.

http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/icanps/eng/interim-report.html 66 pressures were rising fast: INPO “Special Report on the Nuclear Accident at the

Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station,” November, 2011, p. 30. http://www.nei.org/corporatesite/media/filefolder/11_005_Special_Report_on_Fukushima_

Daiichi_MASTER_11_08_11_1.pdf 67 Another reactor now appeared to be doomed: Tokyo Electric Power Company,

Fukushima Nuclear Accident Analysis Report, June 20, 2012, p. 235 http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/release/betu12_e/images/120620e0104.pdf 67 Three hours passed: INPO “Special Report on the Nuclear Accident at the Fukushima

Daiichi Nuclear Power Station,” November, 2011, p. 31. http://www.nei.org/corporatesite/media/filefolder/11_005_Special_Report_on_Fukushima_

Daiichi_MASTER_11_08_11_1.pdf 67 exceeded our expectations: Andrew Higgins, “Vanishing act by Japanese executive during

nuclear crisis raises questions,” Washington Post, March 28, 2011. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/vanishing-act-by-japanese-executive-during-

nuclear-crisis-raises-questions/2011/03/28/AFDnHNpB_story.html 67 If anyone could lend us money: “Inside Fukushima: How workers tried but failed to avert

a nuclear disaster,” Asahi Shimbun, October 14, 2012. http://ajw.asahi.com/article/0311disaster/fukushima/AJ201210140034 68 I’m a bit too beat: “Inside Fukushima: How workers tried but failed to avert a nuclear

disaster,” Asahi Shimbun, October 14, 2012. http://ajw.asahi.com/article/0311disaster/fukushima/AJ201210140034 68 picked up some activity: Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File, U.S. Nuclear

Regulatory Commission, March 13, 2011, p. 81. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A107.pdf 68 readings two and a half times normal: Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File, U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March 13, 2011, p. 85, 88. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A107.pdf



68 Radiation was also detected: Jon Rabiroff, “7th Fleet moves ships, aircraft away from stricken Fukushima plant,” Stars and Stripes, March 14, 2011.

http://www.stripes.com/news/pacific/earthquake-disaster-in-japan/7th-fleet-moves-ships-aircraft-away-from-stricken-fukushima-plant-1.137657

68 Approximately 160,000 U.S. citizens: Embassy of the United States, “Fact Sheet on the

Current Situation,” March 13, 2011. http://japan.usembassy.gov/e/p/tp-20110313-72.html 69 specially equipped aircraft to identify and measure radiation in an emergency:

National Nuclear Security Administration “Aerial Measuring System.” http://nnsa.energy.gov/aboutus/ourprograms/emergencyoperationscounterterrorism/respondingtoemergencies/consequencemanagem-0

and http://www.flickr.com/photos/nnsanews/sets/72157626150030007/ 70 relatively “hot” in terms of both temperature and radiation levels: David Wright,

“More on Spent fuel Pools at Fukushima,” Union of Concerned Scientists, March 21, 2011. http://allthingsnuclear.org/more-on-spent-fuel-pools-at-fukushima/ 72 hours of painstaking work were undone: INPO “Special Report on the Nuclear Accident

at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station,” November, 2011, p. 25. http://www.nei.org/corporatesite/media/filefolder/11_005_Special_Report_on_Fukushima_

Daiichi_MASTER_11_08_11_1.pdf 74 The water level continued to drop: INPO “Special Report on the Nuclear Accident at the

Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station,” November, 2011, p. 26. http://www.nei.org/corporatesite/media/filefolder/11_005_Special_Report_on_Fukushima_

Daiichi_MASTER_11_08_11_1.pdf 76 exceed the existing exposure limit: Investigation Committee on the Accident at the

Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations of the Tokyo Electric Power Company (Interim Report, December 26, 2011), p. 337-339.

http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/icanps/eng/interim-report.html 76 an angry Kan summoned Shimuzu to his office: Investigation Committee on the

Accident at the Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations of Tokyo Electric Power Company, July 23, 2012, p. 232

http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/icanps/eng/04IIIfinal.pdf 77 What the hell is going on?: “Japan PM to nuclear power firm: `What the hell’s going on?’

– Kyodo,” Reuters, March 15, 2011. http://www.trust.org/item/?map=japan-pm-to-nuclear-power-firm-what-the-hells-going-on-

kyodo



77 he considered a worst-case scenario: “Inside Japan’s Nuclear Meltdown,” interview with Naoto Kan, “Japan was invaded by an invisible enemy,” Frontline, February 28, 2012.

http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/health-science-technology/japans-nuclear-meltdown/naoto-kan-japan-was-invaded-by-an-invisible-enemy/

77 mass evacuations might have been necessary: Yoichi Funabashi and Kay Kitazawa,

“Fukushima in review: A complex disaster, a disastrous response,” Bulletin of the Atomic

Scientists, Vol. 68, Issue 2, March 1, 2012. http://www.thebulletin.org/2012/march/fukushima-review-complex-disaster-disastrous-

response (abstract) 77 that changes the dynamic: Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File, U.S. Nuclear

Regulatory Commission, March 14, 2011, p. 213. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A105.pdf 78 beginning to feel like an emergency drill: Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File,

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March 14, 2011, p. 242. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A105.pdf 78 breached the primary containment: Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File, U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March 14, 2011, p. 255. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A105.pdf 78 core went X-up: Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission, March 14, 2011, p. 276. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A105.pdf 78 we’re telling you the good news: Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File, U.S. Nuclear

Regulatory Commission, March 14, 2011, p. 280. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A105.pdf 78 more bodies to have to get back out of here: Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File,

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March 14, 2011, p. 284. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A105.pdf

Chapter 4. “It’s Going to Get Worse….” Page

79 we thought we had a big problem: Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March 15, 2011, p. 64.

http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A106.pdf



80 U.S. citizens evacuate: Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File, U.S. Nuclear

Regulatory Commission, March 15, 2011, p. 42. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A106.pdf 81 “keep an eye on” them: ET Chronology Descending, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission, p. 7. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1212/ML12122A950.pdf 84 It’s been extremely frustrating: Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File, U.S. Nuclear

Regulatory Commission, March 15, 2011, p. 153. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A106.pdf 84 a huge benefit: Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission, March 15, 2011, p. 154. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A106.pdf 85 I don’t anticipate a need for that: Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File, U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March 15, 2011, p. 157. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A106.pdf 85 Unit 4 is in shambles: Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission, March 15, 2011, p. 178. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A106.pdf 85 We just had an earthquake here: Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File, U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March 15, 2011, p. 182. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A106.pdf 85 I really felt we might die: Rick Wallace, “Fukushima boss Masao Yoshida breaks silence

on disaster,” Australian, August 11, 2012. http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/fukushima-boss-masao-yoshida-breaks-

silence-on-disaster/story-fnb1brze-1226448211757# 86 it was clear from the beginning that we couldn’t run: Rich Wallace, “Fukushima boss

Masao Yoshida breaks silence on disaster,” Australian, August 11, 2012. http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/fukushima-boss-masao-yoshida-breaks-

silence-on-disaster/story-fnb1brze-1226448211757# 86 Tapes from the videoconference link: NHK World, “TEPCO Video Released,” August 6,

2012. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WCA8MYRuXR0 86 My people have been working day and night: Naoya Kon, “Fukushima plant chief defied

TEPCO headquarters to protect workers,” Asahi Shimbun, December 1, 2012. http://ajw.asahi.com/article/0311disaster/fukushima/AJ201212010043



87 the communications channels are very limited: Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio

File, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March 16, 2011, pp. 22-24. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A108.pdf 87 [T]he top priority: Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission, March 16, 2011, p. 24. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A108.pdf 87 It was like trying to investigate a homicide: Author interview with Charles Casto,

September 24, 2012. 88 the worse one of all the containments we have: Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio

File, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March 16, 2011, p. 41. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A108.pdf 88 leveled the walls, leveled the structure: Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File, U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March 16, 2011, p. 62. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A108.pdf 88 [I]f we end up losing one of these plants: Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File, U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March 16, 2011, p. 115. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A108.pdf 88 follow the instructions: “A Message from Ambassador Roos to American Citizens in

Japan, Embassy of the United States, Tokyo Japan, March 13, 2011. http://japan.usembassy.gov/e/p/tp-20110313-71.html 89 There was significant concern: Author interview with Charles Casto, September 24,

2012. 89 [D]o we think this is going to get better or get worse: Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi ET

Audio File, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March 16, 2011, p. 132-133. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A108.pdf 89 I agree with you: Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission, March 16, 2011, p. 137. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A108.pdf 89 we would go out to fifty miles: Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File, U.S. Nuclear

Regulatory Commission, March 16, 2011, p. 140. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A108.pdf 89 I would still go with the fifty miles right now: Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File,




90 I just want to make sure: Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March 16, 2011, p. 216.

http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A108.pdf 90 I don’t know what they’re waiting for: Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File, U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March 16, 2011, p. 224. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A108.pdf 90 One thing, we went back and forth on: Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File, U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March 16, 2011, p. 246. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A108.pdf 91 So the potential is solely to refill the pool: Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File,

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March 16, 2011, p. 255. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A108.pdf 92 White House Press Secretary Jay Carney alerted reporters: Press Briefing by Press

Secretary Jay Carney, 3/16/2011. http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/03/16/press-briefing-press-secretary-jay-

carney-3162011 93 [J]ust to repeat, we believe pool No. 4 is dry: Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File,

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March 16, 2011, p. 316. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A108.pdf 93 When Jaczko took his seat: Gregory Jaczko at the House Energy and Commerce

Subcommittee, March 16, 2011, as broadcast by C-Span. http://www.c-spanvideo.org/program/298523-5 94 The chairman was grilled: Full Committee Briefing on Nuclear Plant Crisis in Japan and

Implications for the United States, U.S. Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works, March 16, 2011.

http://www.epw.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Hearings.Hearing&Hearing_ID=bb6c78e6-802a-23ad-4c7b-9aa7a3bb0c31

94 I think I understand your concern: Full Committee Briefing on Nuclear Plant Crisis in

Japan and Implications for the United States, U.S. Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works, March 16, 2011.


94 We have plants that are just as old: Full Committee Briefing on Nuclear Plant Crisis in

Japan and Implications for the United States, U.S. Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works, March 16, 2011.




95 We think the reason: Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission, March 16, 2011, p. 389. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A108.pdf 95 You know, it’s not very clear: Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File, U.S. Nuclear

Regulatory Commission, March 16, 2011, p. 402. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A108.pdf 96 So, at this point: Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission, March 16, 2011, p. 411. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A108.pdf 96 The best science person: Author interview with Charles Casto, September 24, 2012. 97 The pumping strategy may not be useful: Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File,


98 [Y]ou know there are lethal dose rates: Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File, U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March 17, 2011, p. 51. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A109.pdf

98 [I]t’s hell over here for that government: Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File,


98 We are not getting any takers: Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File, U.S. Nuclear

Regulatory Commission, March 17, 2011, p. 141. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A109.pdf

99 Events have moved both Unit 4 and Unit 2 down the list of concerns: Japan’s

Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March 17, 2011, p. 179. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A109.pdf

99 We’re going to own this thing if we do: Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File, U.S.


99 The DOE was also running simulations to estimate possible doses to the public:

Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March 17, 2011, p. 248. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A109.pdf

100 a pumping system the United States had proposed: Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi ET

Audio File, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March 18, 2011, pp. 189 ff. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A114.pdf



101 We’re in such never-never land: Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March 18, 2011, p. 252.

http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A114.pdf 101 average Americans had no shortage of ideas: Email correspondence from the public and

among NRC staff has been collected here: http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1122/ML11229A100.pdf

102 That wasn’t Beck’s only prop: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ps4285oykWg 102 We’re going to start working through diplomatic channels: Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi

ET Audio File, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March 18, 2011, p. 319. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A114.pdf

Chapter 5. Interlude – Searching for Answers: “People are reaching the limit of anxiety and anger” Page

103 marvels of nature: Tokyo Electric Power Company, “Assessment of INES (International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale on the incident at Fukushima Daiichi and Fukushima Daini Nuclear Power Station,” March 18, 2011.

http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/release/11031808-e.html 104 level 7 ranking: International Atomic Energy Agency, Fukushima Nuclear Accident

Update Log, Updates of 12 April 2011. http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/2011/fukushima120411.html

104 no “immediate risk to health”: Press Conference by the Chief Cabinet Secretary, March

19 at 04:00pm, 2011. http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/incident/110319_1600.html 105 “the limit of anxiety and anger”: Yuka Hayashi, “Critics Focus on Accuracy of Nuclear-

Plant Information, Wall Street Journal, March 17, 2011. http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052748704360404576206444054284946 105 “standing by Japan”: International Atomic Energy Agency, “Japan Prime Minister

Assures IAEA Chief of Increased Information Exchange, March 29, 2011. http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/2011/japan-visit.html

105 “exemplary”: IAEA International Fact Finding Expert Mission of the Nuclear Accident

Following the Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami, 24 May-1 June 2011, Preliminary Summary, p. 2. http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/fukushima/missionsummary010611.pdf



106 unavailable elsewhere: Nicola Liscutin, “Indignez-Vous! `Fukushima,’ New Media and

Anti-Nuclear Activism in Japan,” The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus, Vol. 9, Issue 46 No 1, November 21, 2011.

http://www.japanfocus.org/-Nicola-Liscutin/3649 106 One of the most compelling accounts: “SOS from Mayor of Minami Soma City,” March

26, 2011 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=70ZHQ--cK40 107 cornerstone of corporate Japan: The Economist, “The Troubles of TEPCO,” June 30,

2011. http://www.economist.com/node/18899008 107 building more reactors at home and overseas: K. Steiner-Dicks, Nuclear Energy Insider,

Weekly Intelligence Brief, 27 June-4 July 2012, July 4, 2012. http://analysis.nuclearenergyinsider.com/operations-maintenance/weekly-intelligence-brief-

27-june-%E2%80%93-4-july-2012 and Tokyo Electric Power Company, “TEPCO to Invest in South Texas Project expansion (STP

3&4) – First Japanese utility to invest in the overseas nuclear power project,” May 10, 2010.

http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/release/10051001-e.html 107 causing inconvenience: David Pilling, “Public patience wears thin at TEPCO’s bungling”

by David Pilling, Financial Times, March 15, 2011. http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/7d73a59a-4f2a-11e0-9038-00144feab49a.html#axzz2kSiRaRhS 107 a sophisticated and expensive public relations program: Norimitsu Onishi, “`Safety

Myth’ Left Japan Ripe for Nuclear Crisis,” New York Times, June 24, 2011. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/25/world/asia/25myth.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 107 TEPCO ranked alongside Japan’s internationally known corporations: Nikkei

Advertising Research Institute, Advertising Expenditure of Leading Corporations (FY 2010).

http://www.nikkei-koken.com/surveys/survey14.html 108 “unnecessary fear among the nation”: Investigation Committee on the Accident at the

Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations of Tokyo Electric Power Company, Executive Summary, p. 33.

http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/icanps/eng/finalgaiyou.pdf 109 officials publicly acknowledged meltdowns: Norimitsu Onishi and Martin Fackler,

“Japan Held Nuclear Data, Leaving Evacuees in Peril,” New York Times, August 8, 2011. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/09/world/asia/09japan.html?pagewanted=all



110 a system of press clubs: Martin Fackler, “New Leaders in Japan Seek to End Cozy Ties to

Press Clubs,” New York Times, November 20, 2009. http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/21/world/asia/21japan.html and Yoshio Sugimoto, “An Introduction of Japanese Society,” Third Edition, Cambridge

University Press, New York (2010), pp. 245-246 110 “effective at keeping nuclear news out of mainstream media”: Gar Smith, “Nuclear

Roulette, The Case Against a `Nuclear Renaissance,’” publication No. 5 in the International Forum on Globalization series focused on False Solutions to the Global Climate Crisis, June 2011, p. x

http://ifg.org/pdf/Nuclear_Roulette_book.pdf 111 “There is a sense of betrayal”: Author interview with Dr. Evelyn Bromet, July 11, 2012. 111 “[T]he government chose to release information purely from a subjective

perspective”: The National Diet of Japan Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission, Executive Summary, July 5, 2012, p. 36.

http://warp.da.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/3856371/naiic.go.jp/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/NAIIC_report_lo_res10.pdf

111 Construction had resumed: World Nuclear Association, “Nuclear Power in the USA,”

(updated November 2013) http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf41.html 111 NRC was well on its way: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “Issued Design

Certification – Advanced Passive 1000 (AP 1000)” (updated April 18, 2013). http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/new-reactors/design-cert/ap1000.html 112 “Always interesting to wake up”: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, internal emails

and correspondence. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1226/ML12268A073.pdf, p. 34 112 Thirty-one aging carbon copies: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, U.S. boiling-

water reactors with “Mark 1” and Mark 2” containments. http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/ops-experience/japan/us-boiling-water-reactors.html 112 first set of talking points: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, internal emails and

correspondence, p. 30. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1226/ML12268A073.pdf 112 A list of likely questions and their answers: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,

internal emails and correspondence, pp. 69, 75-76, 361. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1226/ML12268A073.pdf,



113 “Talk from but do not distribute”: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, internal emails

and correspondence, pp. 63, 193. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1226/ML12268A073.pdf 113 “additional, technical non-public information”: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,

internal emails and correspondence, pp. 359-361. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1226/ML12268A073.pdf 114 a nearly verbatim reassurance on risks: Nuclear Regulatory Commission, The Fiscal

Year 2012 Department of Energy and Nuclear Regulatory Commission Budget, testimony of Gregory B. Jaczko, chairman of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March 17, 2011 (appearance before the House Energy and Commerce Committee), p. 2.

http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/organization/commission/comm-gregory-jaczko/0317nrc-transcript-jaczko.pdf

114 “This is a marathon, not a 50-yard dash” and “we’re sticking to this story for now”:

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, internal emails and correspondence, pp. 51, 46. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1226/ML12268A073.pdf 114 “could reduce available safety margins”: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,

“Resolution of Generic Safety Issues: Issue 199: Implications of Updated Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Estimates in Central and Eastern U.S. for Existing Plants (NUREG-0933, Main Report with Supplements 1-34) (updated March 29, 2012)

http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr0933/sec3/199.html 115 “Frankly, it is not a good story for us”: Email from Annie Kammerer to Joseph Glitter

and Roger Rihm, March 15, 2011, p. 236. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1226/ML12268A073.pdf 115 Appendix D of the report: Appendix D Seismic Core-Damage Frequencies http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1002/ML100270756.pdf 115 Hearing nothing back from his initial e-mail inquiry: Correspondence and author

interview will Bill Dedman, November 16, 2012. 115 “What are the odds?”: Bill Dedman, “What are the odds? US Nuke plants ranked by

quake risk,” NBC News.com, March 17, 2011. http://www.nbcnews.com/id/42103936/ 116 The NRC’s immediate reaction was to discredit Dedman’s story: Email from Scott

Burnell to Annie Kammerer, Jon Ake and Kamal Manoly, March 16, 2011, p. 32. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1226/ML12268A071.pdf



116 “jaw-flapping”: Email from Scott Burnell to Diane Screnci, Neil Sheehan, Roger Hannah,

Joey Ledford, Prema Chandrathil, Viktoria Mitlyng, Lara Uselding, Victor Dricks, Holly Harrington, David McIntyre, Ivonne Couret, Mindy Landau, Eliot Brenner, March 16, 2011, p. 453.

http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1226/ML12268A073.pdf 116 “We need a better response ASAP!”: Email from Scott Burnell to Kamal Manoly, Patrick

Hiland, David Skeen, Martin Stutzke, Benjamin Beasley, March 16, 2011, p. 447. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1226/ML12268A073.pdf 116 a safety review of the Indian Point plant: Bill Dedman, “Gov. Cuomo orders review of

N.Y. reactor after report on quake data,” NBC News, March 17. 2011. http://openchannel.nbcnews.com/_news/2011/03/17/6285997-gov-cuomo-orders-review-

of-ny-reactor-after-report-on-quake-data 116 “I have received no concerns or corrections”: Email from Benjamin Beasley to Scott

Burnell, Kamal Manoly, Patrick Hiland, David Skeen, Martin Stutzke, March 26, 2011, p. 446

http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1226/ML12268A073.pdf 116 “That’s our job”: Email from Bill Dedman to Eliot Brenner, March 22, 2011.

(Correspondence from Bill Dedman). 117 “they lost credibility for their organization”: Author interview with Bill Dedman, March

16, 2012. 117 crowded into makeshift quarters: Martin Fackler, “In Japan’s Danger zone, the Stranded

Await the Merciful,” New York Times, March 18, 2011. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/19/world/asia/19stranded.html?pagewanted=all

118 preparations got under way to move the two hundred and nine ambulatory patients

and staff out of Futaba Hospital: Noriyoshi Otsuki, “Government Probe: Many Fukushima patients died during botched rescue operation,” Asahi Shimbun, July 24, 2012.

http://ajw.asahi.com/article/0311disaster/life_and_death/AJ201207240092 118 those left to fend for themselves: Hiroko Tabuchi, “Inquiry Sees Chaos in Evacuations

After Japan Tsunami,” New York Tiimes, July 23, 2012. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/24/world/asia/inquiry-sees-chaos-in-evacuations-after-

japan-tsunami.html 118 dismissed the data as unreliable: Yuka Hayashi, “How Japan Stumbled in Forecasting

Fallout in One Town,” Wall Street Journal, August 16, 2011. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304567604576453342206030686.html



119 “We have been sacrificed”: Martin Fackler, “Crisis Saddles Village With Unwanted

Notoriety,” New York Times, April 5, 2011. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/06/world/asia/06village.html?pagewanted=all 120 “Anyone who thinks about the future” Koji Fujita, “Nuclear Refugees, the people of

Iitate Village, one year later,” June 23, 2012. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YXocjiKU-Vk 120 Iitate’s farmers saw no choice: Shingo Ito, “Nothing Stirs in Japan’s nuclear ghost town,”

Agence France Press, March 10, 2012. http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5iJF2jk7wuv9BuuFXnao3MeOqj5o

Q?docId=CNG.021643a1997cfcf12caab6cd2135bf41.31

Chapter 6. “Give me the worst case” Page

121 convinced that the pool…was dry: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Transition report for March 19, 2011 7 a.m., p. 47.

http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1212/ML12128A334.pdf 122 ten rem of radiation in just two minutes: Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File, U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March 18, 2011, p. 240. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A114.pdf 124 trucks from China, Germany, and the United States: “Concrete pumps to Fukushima,”

World Nuclear News, April 1, 2011. http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/RS_Concrete_pumps_to_Fukushima_0104111.html 124 “We don’t see where the power thing is any solution at all”: Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi

ET Audio File, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March 18, 2011, p. 8. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A114.pdf 124 “Right now he’s basically a 24/7 individual”: Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File,

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March 18, 2011, p. 100. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A114.pdf 124 Casto was being pressured: Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File, U.S. Nuclear

Regulatory Commission, March 18, 2011, pp. 75-80. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A114.pdf 125 “one of those pretty-face things again”: Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File, U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March 18, 2011, pp. 9-10. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A114.pdf



125 “[T]hey said they didn’t need any help”: Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File, U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March 18, 2011, p. 159. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A114.pdf 125 “They have one priority: Unit 3”: Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File, U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March 18, 2011, p. 158. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A114.pdf 128 “We do not expect harmful levels of radiation”: The White House, Office of the Press

Secretary, Remarks by the President on the Situation in Japan, March 17, 2011. http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/03/17/remarks-president-situation-japan 128 experts were still debating the numbers: Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File, U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March 20, 2011, pp. 119ff. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A111.pdf 128 “the minimal detectable activity level”: Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File, U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March 18, 2011, p. 266. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A114.pdf 129 NRC was confident it had made the right call: Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio

File, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March 18, 2011, p. 266. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A114.pdf 129 the Nuclear Energy Institute contacted the NRC to complain: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission, ET Chronology Descending, p. 24. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1212/ML12122A950.pdf 129 “So we eliminated that dose”: Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File, U.S. Nuclear

Regulatory Commission, March 18, 2011, p. 220. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A114.pdf 130 “plan around the worst case possibilities,”: Email from Admiral Michael G. Mullen to

John P. Holdren, director, Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), April 1, 2011, 18:33 EDT.

130 The White House wanted the NRC to provide: Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio

File, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March 18, 2011, p. 223. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A114.pdf 130 “certain things just cannot happen”: Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File, U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March 18, 2011, pp. 223-226. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A114.pdf 131 “We have a tremendous opportunity here now”: Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio

File, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March 18, 2011, p. 162. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A114.pdf



131 “It was a cordial meeting”: Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File, U.S. Nuclear

Regulatory Commission, March 18, 2011, p. 280. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A114.pdf 131 “I think this is a major change in the mission”: Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio

File, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March 18, 2011, p. 285. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A114.pdf 132 “It’s not a good situation”: Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File, U.S. Nuclear

Regulatory Commission, March 18, 2011, p. 320. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A114.pdf 132 “I’m just trying to figure out who the power player is over here”: Japan’s Fukushima

Daiichi ET Audio File, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March 19-20, 2011, p. 3, p. 7.

http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A110.pdf 132 he felt “blindsided”: Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission, March 19-20, 2011, p. 9. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A110.pdf 133 “we’re trying to do a worst-case that really makes sense”: Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March

19-20, 2011, pp. 15-16. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A110.pdf 133 “even if the extreme happens – it’s safe to be in Tokyo”: Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi ET

Audio File, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March 19-20, 2011, p. 14, http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A110.pdf 133 “there’s about five worst cases” Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File, U.S. Nuclear

Regulatory Commission, March 20, 2011, p. 14. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A111.pdf 134 “A post-accident evaluation.” Terry Kraus and Brian Hunt, Sandia National Laboratories,

“Overview of the Department of Energy’s Radiological Dose Assessment of the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Station Releases,” SAND Report 2012-1226C (Powerpoint presentation)

https://astarnmjss.nmcourts.gov/speakernotes/Japan_CM_Overview_Brief.pdf (accessed December 9, 2013.)

134 “Here’s today’s crisis”: Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File, U.S. Nuclear

Regulatory Commission, March 19-20, 2011, pp. 241-242. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A110.pdf



134 “[W]e’re not working the logistics stuff”: Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March 19-20, 2011, p. 251.

http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A110.pdf 135 “The bottom line is get water”: Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File, U.S. Nuclear

Regulatory Commission, March 19-20, 2011, p. 258. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A110.pdf 135 “let me make it clear”: Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File, U.S. Nuclear

Regulatory Commission, March 19-20, 2011, p. 274. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A110.pdf 135 “100 hours of sleep”: Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission, March 18, 2011, p. 198. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A114.pdf 135 same design and vintage as those at Fukushima Daiichi: Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi ET

Audio File, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March 12, 2011, pp. 147, 198-199. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A100.pdf 135 this information did not prove very useful: Untitled document, “What do we know as of

10 am 3/12/2011,” p. 36. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1209/ML12096A068.pdf 136 access to valuable information the NRC didn’t have: Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi ET

Audio File, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March 20, 2011, pp. 123-124. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A111.pdf 136 “It’s amazing how people know this stuff and we can’t seem to get it”: Japan’s

Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March 20, 2011, p. 188.

http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A111.pdf 136 The status of the Unit 4 spent fuel pool: Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File, U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March 20, 2011, p. 71. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A111.pdf 136 “it isn’t really that effective”: Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File, U.S. Nuclear

Regulatory Commission, March 20, 2011, p. 82. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A111.pdf 136 “We’ve got to be very careful with that” Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File, U.S.




136 A computer simulation the next day: Email from Jennifer Uhle to Gregory Jaczko,

March 21, 2011, pp. 221-222. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1123/ML11235A560.pdf 136 “This place was massive”: Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File, U.S. Nuclear

Regulatory Commission, March 20, 2011, p. 92. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A111.pdf 136 “There’s huge [numbers of] protesters”: Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File, U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March 20, 2011, p. 101. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A111.pdf 137 “One of the concerns is they turn the site into a swamp”: Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi ET

Audio File, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March 20, 2011, p. 113. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A111.pdf 138 “nose to nose”: Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission, March 20, 2011, p. 148. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A111.pdf 138 “bang their heads”: Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission, March 20, 2011, p. 151. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A111.pdf 138 “probably what you’re going to find”: Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File, U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March 20, 2011, p. 162. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A111.pdf 138 “DOD wants to know where to move their ships”: Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio

File, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March 20, 2011, p. 150. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12052A111.pdf 139 “Do we have any idea how we got it in there?”: Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio

File, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March 21, 2011, p. 92. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1300/ML13008A108.pdf 139 “It took two days to negotiate this source term”: Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio

File, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March 23, 2011, p. 145. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1300/ML13008A112.pdf 139 one disturbing finding: E-mail message from Steve Fetter to John Holdren, March 31,

2011. Subject: West Coast Summary. OSTP FOIA 13-03, Union of Concerned Scientists’ Freedom of Information Act request,

October 23, 2012.



139 “You’ve got to evacuate [Tokyo} and everything else”: Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March 26, 2011, p. 121.

http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1300/ML13008A115.pdf 139 “[W]e ought to just have realistic models”: Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File,

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March 26, 2011, p. 122. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1300/ML13008A115.pdf 140 Its “plausible” source term was too low, even for the “realistic” case: Japan’s

Fukushima Daiichi ET Audio File, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March 27, 2011, p. 8.

http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1300/ML13008A116.pdf

Chapter 7. “Another March, Another Nation, Another Meltdown” Page

141 a series of regulatory reforms, with varying degrees of effectiveness: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “Backgrounder on the Three Mile Island Accident,” (updated February 11, 2013)

http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/3mile-isle.html 142 just thirty-six minutes shy of its first birthday: Report prepared by the Subcommittee on

Nuclear Regulation for the Committee on Environment and Public works, U.S. Senate, “Nuclear Accident and Recovery at Three Mile Island, A Special Investigation,” June, 1980, pp. 63ff

http://archive.org/stream/nuclearaccidentr00unitrich/nuclearaccidentr00unitrich_djvu.txt and Union of Concerned Scientists, “Cleanup Lessons from TMI for Fukushima?” by David

Lochbaum, April 15, 2011. http://allthingsnuclear.org/cleanup-lessons-from-tmi-for-fukushima/

143 This was not a scenario without precedent: Report of the President’s Commission on the

Accident at Three Mile Island: The Need for Change: The Legacy of TMI, 1979, p. 29. http://www.threemileisland.org/downloads//188.pdf 144 Design weaknesses further impaired the operators’ response to the unfolding

calamity: Report of the President’s Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island: The Need for Change: The Legacy of TMI, 1979, p. 30.

http://www.threemileisland.org/downloads//188.pdf 144 one hundred alarms were sounding in the control room: Report of the President’s

Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island: The Need for Change: The Legacy of TMI, 1979, pp. 91-93.

http://www.threemileisland.org/downloads//188.pdf



145 “like a couple of blind men staggering around making decisions”: The President’s

Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island: Report of the Office of Chief Counsel on Emergency Preparedness, Emergency Response, 1979, p. 117.

http://books.google.com/books/about/Reports_of_the_Office_of_Chief_Counsel_o.html?id=ccFYf4tNdnIC

145 They were too late to prevent about half the core from melting: U.S. Nuclear

Regulatory Commission, “Backgrounder on the Three Mile Island Accident,” updated February 11, 2013.

http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/3mile-isle.html 147 “I can’t talk now, we’ve got a problem”: Report of the President’s Commission on the

Accident at Three Mile Island: The Need for Change: The Legacy of TMI, 1979, p. 103. http://www.threemileisland.org/downloads//188.pdf 147 a “red tape” type of thing: Report of the President’s Commission on the Accident at

Three Mile Island: The Need for Change: The Legacy of TMI, 1979, p. 103. http://www.threemileisland.org/downloads//188.pdf 147 Met Ed issued a brief press release: Kemeny Commission Report of Public’s right to

Information, p. 90. http://www.threemileisland.org/downloads//192.pdf 147 “What emergency?”: Report of the President’s Commission on the Accident at Three

Mile Island: The Need for Change: The Legacy of TMI, 1979, p. 104. http://www.threemileisland.org/downloads//188.pdf 147 “The response to the emergency was dominated by an atmosphere of almost total

confusion”: Report of the President’s Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island: The Need for Change: The Legacy of TMI, 1979, p. 17.

http://www.threemileisland.org/downloads//188.pdf 148 “The situation is more complex than the company first led us to believe”: Report of the

President’s Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island: The Need for Change: The Legacy of TMI, 1979, p. 109.

http://www.threemileisland.org/downloads//188.pdf 149 eager to put distance between themselves and the troubled reactor: The American

Experience, “Meltdown at Three Mile Island,” 1999. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/three/peopleevents/pandeAMEX97.html 150 “[T]he fundamental problems are people-related problems”: Report of the President’s

Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island: The Need for Change: The Legacy of TMI, 1979, p. 8.

http://www.threemileisland.org/downloads//188.pdf



150 “an accident like Three Mile Island was eventually inevitable”: Report of the

President’s Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island: The Need for Change: The Legacy of TMI, 1979, p. 11.

http://www.threemileisland.org/downloads//188.pdf 151 U.S. nuclear plants operate on average at about a 90 percent capacity factor: Nuclear

Energy Institute: US Nuclear Capacity Factors, 2012. http://www.nei.org/Knowledge-Center/Nuclear-Statistics/US-Nuclear-Power-Plants/US-

Nuclear-Capacity-Factors 152 confidential INPO safety reports for all U.S. nuclear plants: H. Josef Hebert,

“Government nuclear plant reports too rosy, group charges,” Associated Press, December 15, 1993.

http://www.apnewsarchive.com/1993/Government-Nuclear-Plant-Reports-Too-Rosy-Group-Charges/id-9ccd61cc6b3c2c32516fa31c277c9fd6

153 if Class 9 accidents are considered `credible,’ this may preclude the construction of

reactors in the Northeast United States: David Okrent, “On the History of the Evolution of Light Water Reactor Safety in the United States,” 1975, p 2-464 to 2-466.

http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML0906/ML090630275.pdf 153 “The lessons learned from the TMI accident should be viewed in a broader

perspective”: Hossein P. Nourbakhsh,“Insights and Perspectives on Severe Accident Regulatory Decisions,” American Nuclear Society International Meeting on Severe Accident Assessment and Management, Lessons Learned from Fukushima Daiichi,” San Diego, CA, November 11-15, 2012, p.3.

Chapter 8. “The Safety Measures…Are Inadequate” Page

155 “You need that middle layer of people”: Author interview with Charles Casto, September 24, 2012.

155 a troubling sign that the plant had sprung a new leak: Tokyo Electric Power Company,

“Status of TEPCO’s facilities and its services after Tohoku-Taiheiyo-Oki Earthquake (as of 0:00 PM),” March 22, 2011.

http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/release/11032204-e.html 157 Fears that the nation’s food supply and its agricultural regions might be threatened:

Ken Belson and Hiroko Tabuchi, “Japan Finds Tainted Food Up to 90 Miles from Nuclear Sites,” New York Times, March 19, 2011.

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/20/world/asia/20japan.html?pagewanted=all



157 “The levels are not high enough to have an effect on humans”: “Radiation checks stepped up on Japanese food imports,” Asahi Shimbun, March 17, 2011.

http://ajw.asahi.com/article/0311disaster/fukushima/AJ201103173026 158 -159 Contaminated water was also found in trenches outside both Units 1 and 3:

International Atomic Energy Agency, Fukushima Nuclear Accident Update Log, updates of 29 March 2011.

http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/2011/fukushima290311.html 160 “an adequate explanation to convince the general public”: Investigation Committee on

the Accident at the Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations of the Tokyo Electric Power Company (Interim Report, December 26, 2011), p. 392-395.

http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/icanps/eng/interim-report.html 162 “I cannot possibly accept such a [dose] level to be applied to babies, infants and

primary school students”: “20 Millisieverts for Children and Kosako Toshiso’s Resignation,” The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus, May 1, 2011.

http://www.japanfocus.org/events/view/83 163 TEPCO announced a recovery plan: Tokyo Electric Power Company, “Roadmap

towards Restoration from the Accident at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station,” April 17, 2011.

http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/release/11041707-e.html 163 “It served so many purposes to get that roadmap”: Author interview with Charles

Casto, September 24, 2012. 164 The cleanup at Three Mile Island Unit 2 took fourteen years: “14-year Cleanup at

Three Mile Island Concludes,” New York Times, August 15, 1993. http://www.nytimes.com/1993/08/15/us/14-year-cleanup-at-three-mile-island-

concludes.html 165 “exclusion zone”: International Atomic Energy Agency, “In Focus Chernobyl” (undated)

http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/chernobyl/ see: Feature Stories: Frequently Asked Chernobyl Questions”

http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/features/chernobyl-15/cherno-faq.shtml 165 TEPCO announced it would pay “temporary compensation”: Tokyo Electric Power

Company, “Payment of Temporary Compensation for damages caused by evacuation,” April 15, 2011.

http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/release/11041501-e.html 165 “This is just the start”: Hiroko Tabuchi, “Head of Japanese Utility Steps down After

Nuclear Crisis,” New York Times, May 20, 2011. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/21/business/global/21iht-tepco21.html?pagewanted=all



166 “jump into a nuclear reactor and die”: Hiroko Tabuchi, “Tepco Quells Push by Shareholders to End Nuclear Program,” New York Times, June 28, 2011.

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/29/business/global/29tepco.html?pagewanted=all 168 `Is it really only four hours that nuclear power plants have to cope?’: U.S. Nuclear

Regulatory Commission, “Briefing on the Status of NRC Response to Events in Japan and Briefing on Station Blackout,” transcript, April 28, 2011, p. 36.

http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/commission/tr/2011/20110428a.pdf 168 “[H]ow I’ve answered is that we’ve only had one station blackout in the United

States”: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “Briefing on the Status of NRC Response to Events in Japan and Briefing on Station Blackout,” transcript, April 28, 2011, p. 37.

http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/commission/tr/2011/20110428a.pdf 168 the NTTF turned over its first findings: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,

“Recommendations for Enhancing Reactor Safety in the 21st Century, The Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident,” July 12, 2011

http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1118/ML111861807.pdf 168 the commission gave its task force a very specific scope of inquiry: U.S. Nuclear

Regulatory Commission, “Recommendations for Enhancing Reactor Safety in the 21st Century, The Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident,” July 12, 2011, p. 1

http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1118/ML111861807.pdf 170 “patchwork of regulatory requirements”: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,

“NRC’s Japan Task Force Recommends Changes to Defense in Depth Measures at Nuclear Plants; Cites Station Blackout, Seismic, Flooding and Spent Fuel Pools as Areas for Improvement,” July 13, 2011.

http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1119/ML11194A079.pdf 170 “enhanced regulatory framework intended to establish a coherent and transparent

basis for treatment of Fukushima insights”: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “Recommendations for Enhancing Reactor Safety in the 21st Century, The Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident,” July 12, 2011, p. viii.

http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1118/ML111861807.pdf 170 “continued operation and continued licensing activities [for new reactors] do not pose

an imminent risk to public health and safety”: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “Recommendations for Enhancing Reactor Safety in the 21st Century, The Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident,” July 12, 2011, p. vii.

http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1118/ML111861807.pdf 170 the most dangerous plant site in Japan: Daniel Cressey, “Japan to shut down `dangerous’

Hamaoka nuclear reactors,” Nature.com Newsblog, May 9, 2011. http://blogs.nature.com/news/2011/05/japan_to_shut_down_dangerous_h_1.html



171 “Japan should aim for a society that does not depend on nuclear energy,”: Hiroko

Tabuchi, “Japan Premier Wants Shift Away from Nuclear Power,” New York Times, July 13, 2011.

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/14/world/asia/14japan.html?_r=0 171 nuclear power “worked for a while, until, of course, it no longer worked”: “A less

nuclear future,” Japan Times, May 22, 2011. http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2011/05/22/editorials/a-less-nuclear-

future/#.Uo5vamRUMrg 172 “It’s still too early to say if we can get to that stage”: Yuka Hayashi, George Nishiyama

and Toko Sekiguchi, “Noda Pushes for Nuclear-Plant Restarts,” Wall Street Journal, 9/21/11.

172 “Well, we’ll see”: Gregory Jaczko, speech to the National Press Club, Washington, D.C.,

July 18, 2011. http://www.c-spanvideo.org/program/300563-1 173 “repudiation” of the NRC’s increasing reliance on “risk-informed regulation”: U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Briefing on the Task Force Review of NRC Processes and Regulations Following the Events in Japan,” July 19, 2011, p. 42.

http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/commission/tr/2011/20110719.pdf 173 “I personally do not believe that our exiting regulatory framework is broken”: U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Briefing on the Task Force Review of NRC Processes and Regulations Following the Events in Japan,” July 19, 2011, p. 8.

http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/commission/tr/2011/20110719.pdf 173 The industry’s answer to Fukushima was a plan it called FLEX: NEI Nuclear Notes,

“Industry Presents New Strategy to Increase Safety, Address NRC’s Post-Fukushima Recommendations,” January 13, 2013.

http://neinuclearnotes.blogspot.com/2012/01/industry-presents-new-strategy-to.html 173 “B.5.b on steroids”: David Lochbaum and Edwin Lyman, “U.S. Nuclear Power Safety

One Year After Fukushima,” Union of Concerned Scientists, March 2012, p. 15. http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/nuclear_power/fukushima-anniversary-report-3-5-

12.pdf 174 “it’s going to cheaper to buy three [pumps] than one and a heckuva big building [to

put it in]”: David Lochbaum and Edwin Lyman, “U.S. Nuclear Power Safety One Year After Fukushima,” Union of Concerned Scientists, March 2012, p. 16.

http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/nuclear_power/fukushima-anniversary-report-3-5-12.pdf



175 The Fort Calhoun Nuclear Generating Station: David Lochbaum, “The NRC and Nuclear Power Plant Safety in 2011: Living on Borrowed Time,” Union of Concerned Scientists, March 2012, p. 36.

http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/nuclear_power/nrc-nuclear-safety-2011-full-report.pdf

175 The North Anna Power Station: David Lochbaum, “The NRC and Nuclear Power Plant

Safety in 2011: Living on Borrowed Time,” Union of Concerned Scientists, March 2012, p. 19.

http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/nuclear_power/nrc-nuclear-safety-2011-full-report.pdf

176 “hazard limits just above recorded human experience is turning out to be really

shortsighted”: Steven Mufson, “Experts, activists debate nuclear power safety following earthquake,” Washington Post, August 24, 2011.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/experts-activists-debate-nuclear-power-safety-following-earthquake/2011/08/24/gIQAUG7OcJ_story.html

177 the infighting at the NRC became public: Ed O’Keefe, “Hearing exposes conflict at

Nuclear Regulatory Commission,” Washington Post, December 14, 2011. http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/hearing-exposes-conflict-at-nuclear-regulatory-

commission/2011/12/14/gIQAGBNquO_story.html and George Jornick, “Meltdown at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission,” The Nation,

December 12, 2011. http://www.thenation.com/blog/165109/meltdown-nuclear-regulatory-commission 177 “intimidated and bullied” staff: Letter to William L. Daley, chief of staff, The White

House, from Darrell Issa, chairman, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, U.S. House of Representatives, December 9, 2011.

http://www.eenews.net/assets/2011/12/12/document_daily_02.pdf 177 “cooperative and collegial manner”: Kasia Klimasinska, “New NRC Chief Tells

Congress She’ll run Agency in Collegial Way, Bloomberg News, July 23, 2013. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-07-23/new-nrc-chief-tells-congress-she-ll-run-

agency-in-collegial-way.html 177 “[W]ith enough government funding and effort, it can be done”: Shinichi Saoshiro,

“Japan aims to halve radiation in affected areas in 2 years,” Reuters, August 26, 2011. http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/26/us-japan-nuclear-idUSTRE77P1CD20110826 178 “Some places may have to be kept off-limits to residents for a long period of time”:

Mitsuru Obe, “Tokyo Says Evacuations Near Plant to Be Extended,” Wall Street Journal, August 23, 2011.

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111903327904576524122257910948.html



178 $6,500 bathtub: Yoree Koh, “Radiation worries spur `quackery’ cures; contamination fears have led many Japanese to turn to questionable products for detection and treatment,” Wall Street Journal, April 15, 2012.

http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052970204062704577222500350096534 179 “Only the government can save TEPCO from bankruptcy”: “The troubles of TEPCO,”

The Economist, June 30, 2011. http://www.economist.com/node/18899008 179 “belong to the landowners and not TEPCO”: James Simms, “Tepco Swings and

Misses,” Wall Street Journal, November 30, 2011. http://blogs.wsj.com/overheard/2011/11/30/tepco-swings-and-misses/ 179 “We are flabbergasted at TEPCO’s argument”: Asahi Shimbun, “Tepco: Radioactive

substances belong to landowners, not us,” by Tomohiro Iwata, November 24, 2011. http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/social_affairs/AJ201111240030 179 joked to reporters that communities near Fukushima Daiichi were “dead towns”:

“Economy minister Hachiro resigns over joke about radiation,” Asahi Shimbun, September 10, 2011.

http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/politics/AJ201109109987 179 Using computer simulations, TEPCO estimated: Tokyo Electric Power Company, “The

Evaluation Status of Reactor Core Damage at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station Units 1 to 3,” November 30, 2011.

http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/nu/fukushima-np/images/handouts_111130_04-e.pdf 180 the utility released its own assessment of its performance during the disaster: The

Tokyo Electric Power Company, Inc., “Fukushima Nuclear accident Analysis Report (Interim Report), December 2, 2011.

http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/release/betu11_e/images/111202e14.pdf 180 the situation at Fukushima Daiichi was “under control”: “Prime minister declares

nuclear crisis under control,” Asahi Shimbun, December 16, 2011. http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/politics/AJ201112160059 180 “The plant is like a black box”: Hiroko Tabuchi, “Japan’s Prime Minister Declares

Fukushima Plant Stable,” New York Times, December 16, 2011. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/17/world/asia/japans-prime-minister-declares-

fukushima-plant-stable.html?_r=0


Chapter 9. Unreasonable Assurances Page

182 “Lessons from Fukushima: One Year Later:” Committee on Environment and Public Works, U.S. Senate.

Full and Subcommittee on Clean Air and Nuclear Safety joint hearing entitled, “Lessons from Fukushima One Year Later: NRC’s Implementation of Recommendations for Enhancing Nuclear Reactor Safety in the 21st Century.” Thursday, March 15, 2012. Hearing transcript.

183 It could happen here: Richard H. Perkins et al., “Screening Analysis Report for the

Proposed Generic Issue on Flooding of Nuclear Power Plant Sites Following Upstream Dam Failures,” U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, July 2011. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1218/ML12188A239.pdf

185 Five days after the tsunami struck: e-mail from J. Mitman to E. Riggs, U.S. Nuclear

Regulatory Commission, March 16, 2011, p. 258. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1121/ML11216A196.pdf 186 Back in 1989, the NRC staff: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “Mark I Containment

Performance Improvement Program,” SECY-89-017, January 1989. 187 Chairman Joseph Hendrie said in a speech: as quoted in U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission, “Chairman Jaczko’s Comments on SECY-11-0032, ‘Consideration of the Cumulative Effects of Regulation in the Rulemaking Process,’” August 29, 2011.

187 In a 2011 speech, Commissioner Ostendorff: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,

Commissioner William C. Ostendorff, “NRC Report Recommendations and the Path Forward for Nuclear Energy Regulatory Reform,” December 6, 2011.

187 series of highly stylized events: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “A Proposed Risk

Management Regulatory Framework,” NUREG-2150, April 2012, p. xvi. 188 “not necessary for public safety”: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Advance Notice

of Proposed Rulemaking, “Severe Accident Design Criteria,” Federal Register, 45 FR 65474 (1980).

188 “We have come far beyond the point”: J. Samuel Walker, Three Mile Island, A Nuclear

Crisis in Historical Perspective. University of California Press, Berkeley, CA (2004) 217-218.

188 To set that process in motion: U.S. NRC, “Severe Accident Design Criteria” (1980), op

cit. 189 installation of costly new systems: C.L. Herzenberg, J.R. Ball and D. Ramaswami,

“Source-Term Reevaluation for U.S. Commercial Nuclear Power Reactors: A Status Report,” Argonne National Laboratory, ANL/EES-TM-275, December 1984, p. 32.

189 “would be acceptable to the nuclear industry”: Herzenberg, Ball and Ramaswami,

(1984) p. 32.



189 marched towards its foregone conclusion: Margaret L. Ryan, “IDCOR Chooses

ENERGEX Over TEC to Lead Fight to Lower Source Terms,” Nucleonics Week, January 31, 1985.

189 would not be released to the environment: Margaret L. Ryan, “New Project Manager

Considered as IDCOR Stays in Business Another Year,” Nucleonics Week, December 20, 1984.

190 “snake oil salesmen”: Corie Brown, “Battle Grows Over Industry Clamor to Reduce

Source Term,” Inside N.R.C., September 5, 1983. 190 no basis for the “sweeping generalization”: R. Wilson et al., "Report to The American

Physical Society of the Study Group on Radionuclide Release from Severe Accidents at Nuclear Power Plants," Reviews of Modern Physics, Vol. 57, No. 3, Part II, July 1985.

190 issuing a Severe Accident Policy Statement: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,

“Policy Statement on Severe Reactor Accidents Regarding Future Designs and Existing Plants,” Federal Register, 50 FR 32138 (1985).

191 When the smoke cleared: . U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “Individual Plant

Examination for Severe Accident Vulnerabilities,” Generic Letter 88-20. November 23, 1988.

191 recently revised backfit rule: A “backfit” is a modification of or addition to systems,

structures, components, or the design of an existing nuclear plant resulting from changes in the NRC’s rules or re-interpretations of old ones. http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/cfr/part050/part050-0109.html.

191 a majority of commissioners: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “Regulatory

Analysis Guidelines of the U.S Nuclear Regulatory Commission,” NUREG/BR-0058, Revision 4, September 2004, p.1.

191 the resultant backfits were costly. U.S. General Accounting Office, “Process for

Backfitting Changes in Nuclear Plants Has Improved,” GAO/RCED-86-27, December 1985, p 16.

191 “risks that are real and significant”: Congressional Research Service, Risk Analysis and

Cost-Benefit Analysis of Environmental Regulations, Report 94-961 ENR (1994). 192 struck by a meteor: Frank von Hippel, Citizen Scientist. Touchstone/Simon and Schuster,

New York, 1991, p. 19-21. 192 “so uncertain as to be virtually meaningless”. Frank von Hippel (1991), op cit. 192 an independent review panel: Harold Lewis et al., “Risk Assessment Review Group

Report to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,” NUREG/CR-0400, September 1978, p. xi.



193 the monetary value of a human life: E. Lyman, “The NRC and the Value of Life,” All

Things Nuclear (blog), February 28, 2011. http://allthingsnuclear.org/the-nrc-and-the-value-of-life/

193 the NRC revised its rules: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “Revision of Backfitting

Process for Power Reactors,” Final Rule, Federal Register, 50 FR 38097 (1985). 194 wrote a withering dissent: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, op. cit, 50 FR 38106

(1985). 194 threw out the backfit rule: Union of Concerned Scientists vs. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission, Nos. 85-1757; 86-1219 (824 F.2d 108) (D.C. Cir. August 4, 1987). 196 “the total risk from severe core melt accidents”: “NUMARC Says Plant-Specific Studies

Needed to Identify Potential Fixes,” Inside N.R.C., February 29, 1988, p.13. 196 “job security and research funding:: Brian Jordan, “Stello, Senior Staff Retreat in Effort

to End Mark I Impasse,” Inside N.R.C. February 15, 1988, p.1. 197 blocked by the backfit rule: Brian Jordan, “Backfit Rule Likely to Prevent Mark I Fixes,

Internal Memo Says,” Inside N.R.C., March 14, 1988, p 13. 198 opposed the staff and supported the industry: “NRC Staff, ACRS At Odds Over Mark I

Venting Need,” Nuclear News, March 1989, p 31. 198 put off for another five years: Brian Jordan, “Industry One Vote Short of Delaying Mark I

Fixes for Five Years,” Inside NRC, May 22, 1989, p.1. 199 “do not identify the recommendations as commitments”: U.S. NRC, “Independent Plant

Examination Program: Perspectives on Reactor Safety and Plant Performance,” NUREG-1560, Draft Report, Volume 2, December 1996, p. 9-32.

200 the future of the containment improvement program: Kenneth D. Bergeron, Tritium on

Ice. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 2002, p. 58. This book provides an excellent account of the history of the NRC’s severe accident research programs at that time.

200 stubborn issues under the rug: Kenneth Bergeron (2002) op cit., p 57. 202 adoption in Japan’s own safety regulations: Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO),

Fukushima Nuclear Accident Analysis Report, June 20, 2012, p. 48. http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/release/betu12_e/images/120620e0104.pdf

202 loss of DC power: TEPCO (2012), op cit., p. 48-50 http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/release/betu12_e/images/120620e0104.pdf


Chapter 10. “This is a closed meeting. Right?” Page 204 more than three thousand people: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission blog, February 16,

2011. http://public-blog.nrc-gateway.gov/2011/02/16/nrc%E2%80%99s-upcoming-regulatory-conference-expected-to-draw-3000-attendees/

205 Interest remained high among many: Dave Levinthal, Open Secrets (blog), March 14,

2011. http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2011/03/nuclear-primed-for-fight.html

205 The goal was to supplant: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “State-of-the-Art Reactor

Consequence Analyses (SOARCA).” http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/regulatory/research/soar.html

206 for every nuclear power plant site: Milton R. Benjamin, “Nuclear Study Raises Estimates

of Accident Tolls,” Washington Post, November 1, 1982. 208 “less than the possibility of a jumbo jet”: Milton R. Benjamin, “NRC Issues Report,

Withholds Worst-Case Estimates,” Washington Post, November 2, 1982. 208 also had to refer to probabilities: Edwin S. Lyman, Union of Concerned Scientists,

“Chernobyl-on-the-Hudson?” report commissioned by Riverkeeper, Inc., September 2004, p. 15. http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/nuclear_power/indianpointhealthstudy.pdf

209 no credible way to calculate the probability: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,

“Protection Against Malevolent Use of Vehicles at Nuclear Power Plants,” final rule, Federal Register, 59 FR 38889 (1994).

209 the NRC also had to concede: Cat Lazaroff, “Nuclear Plants Called Vulnerable to Terrorist

Attack,” Environment News Service, September 26, 2011. 211 the respected journal Science and Global Security: R. Alvarez et al., “Reducing the

Hazards from Stored Spent Power-Reactor Fuel in the United States,” Science and Global

Security 11 (2003) 1-51. One of us (Lyman), and current NRC Chairman Allison Macfarlane, were among the several co-authors of this study.

211 inappropriate influence on the research staff: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,

Office of the Inspector General, “Improper Communications by NRC Commissioner to NRC Staff and Licensees,” Case No. 04-14I, April 15, 2004. Greenpeace FOIA/PA-2008-0312.

212 presenting the “complex” results: Brian Sheron, “State-of-the-Art Reactor Consequence

Analyses—Peach Bottom and Surry Results,”SECY-09-0045, March 25, 2009, p 2. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1122/ML11228A233.pdf

212 performed by its contractor personnel: Kenneth Bergeron, Tritium on Ice. MIT Press,

Cambridge, MA, 2002.


Chapter 10. “This is a closed meeting. Right?” Page 214 staff had carried out such calculations: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “The

Evolution of Mitigating Measures for Large Fires and Explosions,” p. 53. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1117/ML11179A120.pdf

214 damage estimates were unrealistically high: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

“Consideration of Economic Consequences Within the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s Regulatory Framework,” SECY-12-0110, August 14, 2012, p. 49. http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/commission/secys/2012/2012-0110scy.pdf

215 “changes in the scope of the calculation”: William J. Shack, Chairman, NRC Advisory

Committee on Reactor Safeguards, letter to Luis A. Reyes, April 21, 2008. 215 conclusions its bosses wanted: Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, US. NRC, ”State-of-

the-Art Reactor Consequence Analyses,” Briefing for the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, November 16, 2007.

216 “This is a closed meeting. Right?” NRC Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards,

Meeting of the Subcommittee on Regulatory Policies and Practices (closed meeting), November 16, 2007, p. 83. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1136/11363A102.pdf

217 “[I]f we miss this date”: Brian Sheron, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, e-mail,

Tuesday, January 25, 2011. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1131/ML11312A108

217 a rather prescient letter: Letter from Shawn Burns, Sandia National Laboratories, to R.

Prato, NRC Office of Research, November 6, 2007. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1212/ML12124A080.pdf

218 The committee asked whether the project staff: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, e-

mail exchange, June 3-4, 2010. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1203/ML12033A232.pdf 218 Internal dissent continued U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, e-mail exchange, K.

Gibson and J. Uhle, June 30, 2010. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1131/ML11313A136

219 Within fifty miles of Peach Bottom: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of

Nuclear Regulatory Research, “State-of-the-Art Reactor Consequences Project Volume 1: Peach Bottom Integrated Analysis,” May 2013, Table 7-15, p. 7-25.

220 Two years earlier: http://www.nrc.gov/public-involve/conference-

symposia/ric/past/2009/slides/presentations/wed-400-530-state-of-art-reactor/handout-format/tinkler-joint-slides-handout.pdf

220 The statement had subtly changed: http://www.nrc.gov/public-involve/conference-

symposia/ric/past/2011/docs/abstracts/santiagop-h.pdf


Chapter 10. “This is a closed meeting. Right?” Page 220 “they said no release”: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, e-mail exchange, J.

Schaperow and P. Santiago, p. 1. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1121/ML11216A196.pdf

Chapter 11. “The Government Owes the Public a Clear and Convincing Answer” Page

222 arrived to quell the scuffle: “NISA approves results of stress tests for 2 Oi reactors,” Asahi Shimbun, January 19, 2012.

http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/social_affairs/AJ201201190035 222 Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda had made his views clear: Policy Speech by Prime

Minister Yoshihiko Noda to the 178th Session of the Diet, September 13, 2011. http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/noda/statement/201109/13syosin_e.html 223 protestors took to the streets of Tokyo: Justin McCurry, “Fukushima protesters urge

Japan to abandon nuclear power,” The Guardian, September 19, 2011. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/sep/19/fukushima-protesters-japan-nuclear-power 224 Noda and several of his cabinet members would have the final say: Mitsuru Obe and

Chester Dawson, “Nuclear-Restart Plans Divide Japan,” Wall Street Journal, June 18, 2012.

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303444204577460272545747302.html 224 the IAEA reported: Hiroko Tabuchi, “Atomic Agency Backs Safety Tests for Japan’s

Reactors,” New York Times, January 31, 2012. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/01/world/asia/united-nations-tentatively-backs-japans-

nuclear-stress-tests.html 225 “nothing but an optimistic desk simulation”: Yurly Humber, “Japan Post-Fukushima

Reactor Checks `Insufficient,’ Advisers Say,” Bloomberg News, January 27, 2012. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-01-27/japan-post-fukushima-reactor-checks-

insufficient-advisers-say.html 225 accused the IAEA of simply rubberstamping: Sophie Knight, “Nuclear safety advisers

slam stress tests,” Asahi Shimbun, February 1, 2012. http://ajw.asahi.com/article/0311disaster/fukushima/AJ201202010057 225 Madarame asserted forcefully: Mari Yamaguchi, “Japan’s nuclear safety standards called

flawed,” AP, February 15, 2012. http://news.yahoo.com/japans-nuclear-safety-standards-called-flawed-104604884.html



225 Japan had become overly confident: Hiroko Tabuchi, “Japan Ignored Nuclear Risks,

Official Says,” New York Times, February 16, 2012. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/16/world/asia/japanese-official-says-nations-atomic-

rules-are-flawed.html 225 “I hope there is an evaluation of more realistic actual figures”: “Noda to put full weight

behind campaign for Oi nuclear restart,” Asahi Shimbun, March 24, 2012. http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/social_affairs/AJ201203240040 226 “willingness to acknowledge that accidents can happen”: Mitsuru Obe, “Nuclear

Experts Examine Japan’s Lax Safety Culture,” Wall Street Journal, February 25, 2012. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203918304577244810322327428.html 226 The plunge in the company’s stock price: Tsuyoshi Inajima and Yuji Okada, “Tepco

Goes to Government for $12 Billion in Rescue Funds,” Bloomberg News, March 29, 2012. http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-03-29/tepco-requests-12-billion-in-public-funds-

to-avert-insolvency 226 almost certainly would collapse: Tsuyoshi Inajima and Yuji Okada, “Tepco Plunges to

Lowest Since 1974 as Edano Suggests Government Takeover,” Bloomberg News, December 28, 2011.

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-12-28/tepco-shares-plunge-as-edano-suggests-japan-should-take-control-of-company.html

and Mitsuru Obe and Phred Dvorak, “Tepco Chairman’s Power Posts Test for Tokyo,” Wall

Street Journal, March 21, 2012. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303863404577283073123016712.html 226 rebuffed by Trade Minister Yukio Edano: “Japan’s Yukio Edano rebuffs Tepco bailout

claim,” BBC News, December 8, 2011. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-16082349 227 corporate culture “hasn’t changed at all”: Mitsuru Obe and Phred Dvorak, “Tepco

Chairman’s Power Posts Test for Tokyo,” Wall Street Journal, March 21, 2012. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303863404577283073123016712.html 227 “Since the 1980s the utilities have looked”: “State Power,” The Economist, May 11,

2012. http://www.economist.com/blogs/schumpeter/2012/05/tepco%E2%80%99s-nationalisation 227 An analysis by Bloomberg News: Tsuyoshi Inajima and Yuji Okada, “Tepco Goes to

Government for $12 Billion in Rescue Funds,” Bloomberg News, March 29, 2012. http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-03-29/tepco-requests-12-billion-in-public-funds-to-avert-insolvency



227 night baseball games were switched to daytime: Ken Belson, “Delaying First Pitch Debated in Baseball-Loving Japan,” New York Times, March 20, 2011.

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/21/world/asia/21nippon.html?_r=0 227 TEPCO requested $12 billion: Tsuyoshi Inajima and Yuji Okada, “Tepco Goes to

Government for $12 Billion in Rescue Funds,” Bloomberg News, March 29, 2012. http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-03-29/tepco-requests-12-billion-in-public-funds-

to-avert-insolvency 228 “This is the last chance to restore TEPCO”: Tsuyoshi Inajima, “Japan to Seize Tepco on

Same Terms as 2003 Resona Rescue,” Bloomberg News, April 29, 2012. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-04-28/japan-to-model-trillion-yen-tepco-bailout-

on-2003-bank-rescue.html 228 “pie-in-the-sky blueprint”: “TEPCO faces major challenges in avoiding bankruptcy,”

Asahi Shimbun, May 10, 2012. http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/social_affairs/AJ201205100046 228 “made to pay the price for their own mistakes”: “TEPCO bailout plan riddled with

problems,” Asahi Shimbun, May 10, 2012. http://ajw.asahi.com/article/views/editorial/AJ201205100061 228 International Energy Agency estimates: Jacob Adelman, “Japan’s Use of Oil May Surge

by 300,000 Barrels a Day,” Bloomberg News, April 12, 2012. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-04-12/japan-s-use-of-oil-may-surge-by-300-000-

barrels-a-day-1-.html 229 “[I]s it really possible to ensure the safety of operating these reactors”: “Government

must answer nuclear risk questions,” Asahi Shimbun, July 23, 2012. http://ajw.asahi.com/article/views/editorial/AJ201207230070 230 catapulted him into the national spotlight: Martin Fackler, “Japan’s Leaders, Pressed by

Public, Fret as Nuclear Shutdown Nears,” New York Times, May 3, 2012. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/05/world/asia/japans-leaders-fret-as-nuclear-shutdown-

nears.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 231 “Japanese society cannot survive”: Linda Sieg and Aaron Sheldrick, “Japan PM says two

reactors must restart for “survival of society,” Reuters, June 8, 2012. http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/06/08/us-japan-nuclear-reactors-idUSBRE8570GO20120608

231 “We understand that we have not obtained all of the nation’s understanding”: Linda

Seig and Kiyoshi Takenaka, “Japan approves two reactor restarts, more seen ahead,” Reuters, June 16, 2012.

http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/06/16/us-japan-nuclear-idUSBRE85F02720120616



231 “They’re making lots of noise”: Martin Fackler,“In Tokyo, thousands Protest the

Restarting of a Nuclear Power Plant,” New York Times, June 29, 2012. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/30/world/asia/thousands-in-tokyo-protest-the-restarting-of-a-nuclear-plant.html?_r=1

231 “It’s just a big step forward to start raising our voices”: Martin Fackler, “In Tokyo,

thousands Protest the Restarting of a Nuclear Power Plant,” New York Times, June 29, 2012. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/30/world/asia/thousands-in-tokyo-protest-the-restarting-of-a-nuclear-plant.html?_r=1

232 “I used to say the one thing that kept me up at night”: “Departing NRC chief fears

safety focus could fade,” Platts Inside Energy, July 9, 2012. 232 “the industry agrees with many of the issues”: Letter from Marvin Fertel, Nuclear

Energy Institute, to Gregory Jaczko, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, July 15, 2011. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1120/ML11208C469.pdf 234 “should be started without unnecessary delay”: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,

“Prioritization of Recommended Actions to be Taken in Response to Fukushima Lessons Learned,” SECY-11-0037, October 3, 2011, p. 9

http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/commission/secys/2011/2011-0137scy.pdf 234 “assuring or redefining the level of protection”: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,

op cit., p. 6 http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/cmmission/secys/2011/2011-0137scy.pdf 234 “swimming in the waters of backfit”: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “Briefing on

the Progress of the Task Force Review of NRC Processes and Regulations Following the Events in Japan,” June 15, 2011, p. 24.

http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/commission/tr/2011/20110615.pdf 234 “decisions on adequate protection”: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Commission

Voting Record, “Prioritization of Recommended Actions to be Taken In Response to Fukushima Lessons Learned,” December 15, 2011. http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/commission/cvr/2011/2011-0137vtr.pdf

235 “performance-based”: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Commission Voting

Record, “Recommended Actions To Be Taken Without Delay from the Near-Term Task Force Report,” October 18, 2011.

http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/commission/cvr/2011/2011-0124vtr.pdf 236 shortcomings of the FLEX approach: Exelon Generation, “Overall Integrated Plan in

Response to March 12, 2012 Commission Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events,” February 28, 2013.

http://pbadpws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1305/ML13059A305.pdf



239 “Time is of the essence”: “NEI: FLEX Fukushima Response Strategy Requires reactor

Operators to buy Emergency Equipment,” Power, March 14, 2012. http://www.powermag.com/nei-flex-fukushima-response-strategy-requires-reactor-

operators-to-buy-emergency-equipment/ 239 NRC largely endorsed NEI’s approach: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “Japan

Lessons-Learned Project Directorate,” Interim Staff Guidance, August 29, 2012. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1222/ML12229A174.pdf 239 “We can say with certainty: “Government acknowledges most Japanese favor nuclear-

free society,” Japan Times, August 29, 2012. http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2012/08/29/news/government-acknowledges-most-

japanese-favor-nuclear-free-society/#.Uo_m1WRUMrg 240 “a somewhat messy compromise that will delight nobody”: “Noda’s nuclear phase-out

is decisive – but not final,” Financial Times, September 17, 2012. 240 “It is highly regrettable”: “Japan’s no-nuke pledge is already fraying at the edges,” Asahi

Shimbun, September 19, 2012. http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/politics/AJ201209190076

240 “No matter how difficult it is”: Mari Yamaguchi, “Cabinet panel wants Japan to end

nuclear power use,” AP, September 14, 2012. http://finance.yahoo.com/news/cabinet-panel-wants-japan-end-nuclear-power-123350767--

finance.html 240 “take it into consideration”: Hiroko Tabuchi, “Japan, Under Pressure, Backs Off Goal to

Phase Out Nuclear Power by 2040,” New York Times, September 19, 2012. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/20/world/asia/japan-backs-off-of-goal-to-phase-out-

nuclear-power-by-2040.html 240 “The government’s commitment to abandon nuclear power”: “Japan’s no-nuke pledge

is already fraying at the edges,” Asahi Shimbun, September 19, 2012. http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/politics/AJ201209190076 243 “We have been living there for 1,000 years” Martin Fackler, “Hopes of Home Fade

Among Japan’s Displaced,” New York Times, November 25, 2012. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/26/world/asia/hopes-of-home-fade-among-japans-

displaced.html?_r=0 243 “Many [people] view us as the perpetrators”: “Quiet heroes speak of Japan’s nuclear

tragedy,” The Economist (reprinted in the Chronicle Herald, Halifax, Nova Scotia), October 28, 2012. http://thechronicleherald.ca/business/156024-quiet-heroes-speak-of-japan-s-nuclear-tragedy



243 “I had no intention of dying”: Reiji Yoshida, “`Fukushima 50’ recount quiet heroism,” Japan Times, October 11, 2012.

http://info.japantimes.co.jp/text/nn20121011f2.html Chapter 12. A Rapidly Closing Window of Opportunity Page

244 the utility also blamed Japanese government regulators: See, e.g.,

https://www.kiviniria.net/media/Techniekpromotie/Thema_sKIVINIRIA/Energie/kivi_rooijen_20121123.pdf, p. 20

244 “an extremely massive earthquake”: Government of Japan Nuclear Emergency Response

Headquarters, “Report of Japanese Government to the IAEA Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Safety, The Accident at TEPCO’s Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations,” June 2011, p. XIII-1

http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1117/ML11178A383.pdf 244 no nuclear plant design could have survived: Matt Smith, “U.S. nuclear plants similar to

Fukushima spark concerns,” CNN, February 17, 2012. http://www.cnn.com/2012/02/17/us/us-nuclear-reactor-concerns/ 244 The Japanese Diet Independent Investigation Commission laid blame: The National

Diet of Japan Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission (executive summary), July 5, 2012.

http://warp.da.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/3856371/naiic.go.jp/en/blog/reports/es-1/#toc-conclusions (full report is available here: http://warp.da.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/3856371/naiic.go.jp/en/)

245 Soon after Fukushima, Aris Candris said: ABC News, “Could New Nuclear Reactor

Have Prevented Fukushima?” http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/headlines/2011/12/could-new-nuclear-reactor-have-

prevented-fukushima/ 245 NRC commissioners voted 4-1: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “NRC Concludes

Hearing on Vogtle New Reactors, First-ever Combined Licenses to be Issued,” February 9, 2012.

http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1204/ML120410133.pdf 245 “I cannot support issuing this license as if Fukushima had never happened”: U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, affirmation session, February 9, 2012. http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/commission/tr/2012/20120209b.pdf


Chapter 12. A Rapidly Closing Window of Opportunity Page

245 Advocates are also promoting development of small modular reactors: Wendy Koch,

“Nuclear industry looks toward smaller reactors,” USA Today, November 27, 2012. http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2012/11/26/nuclear-small-modular-

reactors/1727001/ E. Lyman, “Small Isn’t Always Beautiful: Safety, Security and Cost Concerns About Small

Modular Reactors,” Union of Concerned Scientists report, September 2013. http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/nuclear_power/small-isnt-always-beautiful.pdf 246 the vendors in 2003 successfully lobbied Congress: United States Senate,

Reauthorization of the Price-Anderson Act, December 9, 2003. http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-108srpt218/html/CRPT-108srpt218.htm and http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/clientissues_spec.php?id=D000000555&year=2001&spe

c=ENG 247 Senator Al Franken joked: Hearing of Senate Committee on Energy and Natural

Resources, Subject: “S. 512, the Nuclear Power 2021 Act,” June 7, 2011. http://www.c-spanvideo.org/program/S51 248 The threat of fires remains a major contributor to the risk of core damage: U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Briefing on Fire Protection Issues, July 17, 2008, pp. 58-59.

http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/commission/tr/2008/20080717.pdf 249 a severe tornado disconnected the Browns Ferry plant from the electrical grid:

Tennessee Valley Authority, Power Restoration Updates, April 27, 2011-May 20, 2011. http://www.tva.gov/news/releases/aprjun11/storm_past.htm 252 The NTTF started its report with a recommendation for fundamental change: U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “Recommendations for Enhancing Reactor Safety in the 21st Century.” http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1118/ML111861807.pdf

252 redefine its historical safety threshold of “adequate protection”: U.S. Nuclear

Regulatory Commission, “Recommendations for Enhancing Reactor Safety in the 21st Century,” p. ix. http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1118/ML111861807.pdf

253 order for mitigation strategies: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “Issuance of Order

to Modify Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events,” March 12, 2012.

http://pbadupnws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1205/ML12054A735.pdf 254 the NRC staff recommended that filters be installed: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission, “Consideration of Additional Requirements for Containment Venting Systems for Boiling Water Reactors With Mark I And Mark II Containments, SECY-12-0157, November 26, 2012.

http://nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/commission/secys/2012/2012-0157scy.pdf


Chapter 12. A Rapidly Closing Window of Opportunity Page

255 In March 2013, they voted 3-2 to delay a requirement that filters be installed: U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “Staff Requirements: SECY-12-0157,” March 19, 2013. http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/commission/srm/2012/2012-0157srm.pdf 255 The NRC later notified Congress: Allison Macfarlane, Chairman, U.S. Nuclear

Regulatory Commission, letter to the Honorable Fred Upton, February 15, 2013. http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/congress-docs/correspondence/2013/upton-

02-15-2013.pdf 257 “it is acceptable, from the standpoint of safety, to maintain the existing regulatory

processes”: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “NRC Staff Working Group Evaluation of Alternatives for the Disposition of Recommendation 1 of the Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Report,” draft, February 15, 2013.

http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1305/ML13053A142.pdf 258 regulatory “skepticism”: Author interview with Peter Bradford, December 19, 2012. 261 Casto was eager to offer some words of advice: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,

RIC 2012 “Regional Administrators’ Session on Current Regional Issues,” March 14, 2012. http://video.nrc.gov/ Appendix. The Fukushima Postmortem: What Happened? Page 263 a meeting of the American Nuclear Society: Proceedings of the American Nuclear

Society International Meeting on Severe Accident Assessment and Management: Lessons Learned from Fukushima Dai-ichi,” November 11-15, 2012, San Diego, California.

264 the computer code called MELCOR: Randall Gauntt et al., “Fukushima Daiichi Accident

Study (Status as of April 2012), SAND2012-6173, Sandia National Laboratories, August 2012. http://melcor.sandia.gov/docs/Fukushima_SAND_Report_final.pdf

264 For Unit 1: Randall Gauntt et al., “MELCOR Simulations of the Severe Accident at the

Fukushima 1F1 Reactor,” Proceedings of the American Nuclear Society International Meeting,” op cit. p. 212.

264 But even a straightforward “hands-off” blackout: Gauntt et al., “MELCOR

Simulations,” op cit. p. 219. 264 A U.S. industry consultant: D.L. Luxat et al., “EPRI Fukushima Technical Evaluation

Project MAAP5 Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident Simulations,” Proceedings of the American Nuclear Society, op cit.,p. 243.


Appendix. The Fukushima Postmortem: What Happened? Page 265 In the final analysis: K. Robb, M. Francis and L. Ott, “Fukushima Daiichi Unit 3

MELCOR Investigation,” Proceedings of the American Nuclear Society, op cit., http://info.ornl.gov/sites/publications/files/Pub37640.pdf

265 The analysis of Unit 2: K. Ross et al., “Interim Melcor Simulation of the Fukushima

Daiichi Unit 2 Accident Reactor Core Isolation Cooling Operation,” SAND2013-9956, Sandia National Laboratories, November 2013.

266 As for the Unit 4 explosion: TEPCO (2012), op cit., p. 344-352.

http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/release/betu12_e/images/120620e0104.pdf 267 The Unit 2 spent fuel pool: E-mail from Steve Fetter to John Holdren,et al, “High

Concentration of Cs-137 Found in Unit 2 Pool,” April 11, 2011, OSTP FOIA. 267 TEPCO has argued that the venting operations: TEPCO (2012), op cit., p. 367-368.

http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/release/betu12_e/images/120620e0104.pdf 267 However, other analysts have looked: M. Hirano, Japan Nuclear Energy Safety

Organization, “Post-Fukushima Research in Japan,” U.S. NRC Regulatory Information Conference, March 12, 2011.

268 released to the atmosphere: H. Hoshi, Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization,

“Source Term Analysis Using the MELCOR Code,” Technical Workshop on TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station Accident, July 23-24, 2012, Tokyo, Japan. http://www.nsr.go.jp/archive/nisa/shingikai/700/14/240723/AM-3-1.pdf.

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