The Fukushima disaster:

political reactions & consequences

in Europe

updated version, May 2012

Peter Bossew

Privatier, Vienna – Berlin

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content

• national & supranational reactions

• the “stress tests”

• the “political fallout”

• general considerations on hazard, risk & human factor

from Confucius temple,

Naha (Okinawa, Japan)

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reactions on various levels

• Immediate questions: - Can it happen in Europe too? - Residual risk acceptable? - If it happens: disaster management? - Alternatives to nuclear? (current share 30-35% el.)

• EU reaction: - “stress tests” - screening of food imported from Japan, implementation of limits

• IAEA reaction: - first reactions: slow, partly confusing, complacent - blaming Japan for not delivering data, but not taking action itself - “its performance was sluggish and sometimes confusing…” - “The IAEA … simply repeated official statements from Japanese government authorities” G. Brumfiel, Nature, 26.4.11, http://www.nature.com/news/2011/110426/full/472397a.html - later in 2011-2012: extensive reports, very informative

(which I cannot answer !)

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immediate national reactions, Europe

Public sensitive and sceptic to different degrees! - Several countries (Austria, Germany, Finland, Bulgaria) evacuated their embassy staff from Tokyo to other cities.

- Several countries advised their nationals to leave Tokyo: AT, CH, DE, FI, FR, IT, UK

- monitoring in Japan: FR

- to different degrees: intensified monitoring, establishing web-pages with results and interpretations (almost all countries);

very detailed: e.g. DE (BfS, GRS), FR (IRSN), IT (Isprambiente); others to different degrees; some with main emphasize on scientific accuracy (PL-Clor), others more qualitative)

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national reactions, Europe: nuclear policy

country nucl. share (2011) policy post-Fukushima

Austria 0 trade of nucl. electricity shall be made illegal

Belgium ~54% decision Oct. 2011: phase out 2015-2025

France ~78% Hollande: reduction to ca. 50%

Germany ~18% 30.6.11: „13. Gesetz zur Änderung des

Atomgesetzes“: phase-out until 2020 (*)

Italy 0 referendum 13.6.11: no new NPPs

Switzerland ~41% 25.5.11: Bundesrat decision for phase out

until ca. 2034

ES, HU, NL, RO,

SE, SI, UK

apparently no change

BG,BY,CZ,FI,LT,

RU,SK,TR,UA

plans for new NPPs confirmed

(*) a political 180° turn within a few days – regional elections were ahead!

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share of nuclear energy, Europe

source: NEI (USA), values for 2011, update March 2012.

www.nei.org/resourcesandstats/graphicsandcharts/generationstatistics/

also: www.world-nuclear.org/info/reactors.html

www-pub.iaea.org/books/IAEABooks/8752/Nuclear-Power-Reactors-in-the-World-2011-Edition

http://pris.iaea.org/public/

www.euronuclear.org/info/encyclopedia/n/nuclear-power-plant-europe.htm

2011

percentage of nuclear of generated

electricity; if considering import and

export the picture may be different!

E.g. Italy imports large quantities of

FR nuclear electricity.

Copyright @ European Commission. DG. JRC, REM 2009-2012

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national reactions, Europe:

reports & studies

• Comprehensive Fukushima reports:

ENSI (CH), www.ensi.ch/de/2011/08/29/analyse-fukushima-11032011/

BfS (DE), http://doris.bfs.de/jspui/bitstream/urn:nbn:de:0221-201203027611/3/BfS_2012-SK-18-12.pdf

IRSN (FR), www.irsn.fr/FR/expertise/rapports_expertise/surete/Pages/Rapport-Fukushima-1-an-apres_032012.aspx

AGES & ZAMG (AT), www.lebensministerium.at/umwelt/strahlen-atom/strahlenschutz/fukushima-bericht.html

RPII (IE), www.rpii.ie/site/Publications.aspx

Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Nucl. Installations (UK),

www.hse.gov.uk/nuclear/fukushima/final-report.pdf

• Studies about consequences of similarly severe beyond

design accidents initiated: IRSN, BfS

Fukushima reports, IAEA:

2.report of Japanese government to IAEA: www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/fukushima/japan-report2/

Fukushima status reports: www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/fukushima/status-reports.html

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reactions: public, NGOs, www

• NGOs: serious to different degrees. Good examples: CRII-RAD (FR), Austrian Ecology Institute.

• Greenpeace: little helpful first, later useful contributions: summary of stress test results etc., interesting report (mis-management of evacuations, lack of liability and responsibility of TEPCO etc.) : www.greenpeace.org/international/Global/international/publications/nuclear/2012/Fukushima/Lessons-from-Fukushima.pdf

• mainly US: quack doctors and panic makers; to lesser degree in Europe.

• Wikipedia: very useful and comprehensive Fukushima pages

• Media: mostly very badly informed, most only interested in alarmism ( money).

a promising recent development:

“crowd sourcing / mapping” e.g. Safecast, http://blog.safecast.org/maps/

https://sites.google.com/site/radmonitor311/top_english#11

social media, blogs:

immense variety between the good, the bad & the ugly

I have no overview! a science blog, among others: http://fukushima.physikblog.eu/discussion/41/sammlung-guter-dokumentationen/p1

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a short note on the role of NGOs

• typically: Greenpeace

• Often one may disagree with their conclusions;

• One may be sceptical about their business model (depending on contributions depending on the mood of the public bias)

• But: they stimulate & instigate discussions, are a challenge for lazy & complacent scientists and authorities

• Their role is “political QA” very important in an open society! As an overall effect contribute to safety culture.

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The stress tests, 1

rationale:

assess how European NPPs would perform

in “extraordinary” situations, i.e. beyond design events.

Two “tracks”:

(1) “Safety track”: Technical safety reserves against extraordinary events;

Verification of preventive & mitigation measures chosen following

initial events loss of safety functions accident management.

- Initial events: Earthquakes, flooding

- Consequences: station black out, loss of heat sink

- Accident management: means to protect from and to manage loss of

-- core cooling;

-- fuel storage pool cooling;

-- containment integrity

- Not covered: statuses of the plants, licenses, off-site civil defence.

(2) “Security track”: Malevolent or terrorist acts

deterministic approach! (i.e. irrespective probability)

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The stress tests, 2

Procedure:

1) Self assessment by licensee / operator,

2) review by national regulators; country reports

3) European peer review by other regulators.

4) (hopefully) Public discussions incl. all stakeholders, also NGOs

To be reported:

- response of the plant, effectiveness of preventive measures;

- weak points, “cliff-edge” effects,

in order to evaluate:

- robustness of defense-in-depth;

- adequacy of accident management measures;

- identify potential for improvements:

country reports, all finished by 31.12.11, published 5.1.12 (CH: 10.1.), peer

review: end April 2012:

- EU countries & Switzerland + Ukraine

- some more, some less technically detailed, up to several 100 pages !

Documents: Background and country results:

www.ensreg.eu/EU-Stress-Tests, www.ensreg.eu/EU-Stress-Tests/Country-Specific-Reports

http://ec.europa.eu/energy/nuclear/safety/stress_tests_en.htm

• technical

• organisational

reports are

public !

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The stress tests, 3

• First results (based on country interim / progress reports) source: SEC(2011) 1395 final (Brussels, 24.11.2011); Commission Staff working paper: Technical Summary of the national progress reports on the implementation etc. <com_2011_0784.pdf, com_2011_0784_technical_summary.pdf> - “Some national regulators … considered revising safety margins…”: Flooding, loss of power, loss of ultimate heat sink, heavy earthquakes. - Potential of improvement and “challenges” identified by some. - Differences between countries: e.g. how to assess earthquakes; - Some meet scope of stress tests more, some less closely; - Different levels of self-critique; - In several cases additional technical information given in the peer review stage.

• Compact summary on interactive map by Greenpeace: www.greenpeace.org/eu-unit/en/stress-tests-map/

• Critique of stress tests (also by NGOs etc.): - pol. and admin. conditions not addressed (only on the level of accident management), e.g. independence of regulators, level of corruption, etc.; - in phase 2+3: will in-depth technical information be available? - implementation of results assured ??

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The stress tests, 4

Preliminary conclusions of the EC (early 2012): The EC sees scope for improving the legal framework at EU and national level in the following areas:

1) improving technical measures for safety, and improving the necessary oversight to ensure full implementation,

2) improving the governance as well as the legal framework of nuclear safety,

3) improving emergency preparedness and response,

4) reinforcing the EU nuclear liability regime and

5) enhancing scientific and technological competence.

0) However, the starting point is the full implementation of existing EU rules.

To be understood as implicit critique of the current statuses in these fields ?! In any case: reasonable conclusions, a good start I think!

does not exist so

far --- will there

ever be one ??

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stress tests 5: some results of peer review

• Exercise generally complied with ENSREG specifications

• External hazards: - assessment of margins diverse & inconsistent; - few countries assessed cliff-edges in a manner requested by ENSREG; - particularly unsatisfactory: extreme weather conditions.

• Cliff-edge effects, related to loss of power & heat sink: numerous improvements identified, some implemented, some planned.

• Robustness: all countries identified improvements that would enhance robustness. Provisions for improving containment integrity should be implemented urgently.

• Severe accident management: in general prevention better developed than mitigation. To do: in cases of extreme natural conditions; equipment, training, logistics to be improved.

• “Hardened core” concept suggested (maintaining basic functionality in extreme conditions)

• Periodic safety review important! In particular for natural hazards (at least every 10 y.)

• Follow-up inspections, evaluations recommended.

source: <EU Stress Test Peer Review Final Report_0.pdf>

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stress tests 6, so far final

• Statement of ENSREG + EC: www.ensreg.eu/node/389

• report approved by EU council

• BUT: energy commissary Öttinger (26.4.12): report not sufficient: - only a fraction of NPPs checked (1 of 9 in DE, 4 of 58 in FR) - particularly problematic ones not checked (Fessenheim) - stress test rationale not fulfilled. - therefore: considered only as interim report, tests to be continued.

• Decision (among others): - Additional visits of NPPs - Implementation of the recommendation of the ENSREG report - Information on every single NPP will be available on the website. (Press release, IP/12/429, 26.4.2012 )

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Screening of imported goods

• food; ship containers; cosmetics (!); etc. etc.

• only few findings - essentially a few green tea samples

documents: legal background, data lists, reports:

http://ec.europa.eu/energy/nuclear/radiation_protection/fukushima_en.htm overview on imports into EU until 31.12.2011:

http://ec.europa.eu/energy/nuclear/radiation_protection/doc/emergencypreparedness/overview_import_2011_12_31.pdf

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Hazard, risk, human factor

(A)

natural hazard

can initiate

detrimental event

(B)

technical system

has an inherent

risk potential

understanding A & B + sci. qualification, resources, institutional independence

- corruption, public disinterest, lack of public (non-industrial) funding

setting regulations

implementing & controlling regulations

+ political culture, critical public, NGOs, transparency

- corruption, nepotism, censorship

+ independent regulatory authorities

- corruption, nepotism, censorship

RISK

(C)

“human factor”

sets the conditions,

how and to which degree

hazard & risk potential

become risk

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Fukushima as a tragic example (1)

• mostly based on:

- the Swiss ENSI report,

- conclusions by JAEC (Japan Atomic Energy Commission),

- article of Z. Stošič (AREVA): Nuclear fundamentals remain. Thermal Science 16, Suppl.1, 2012 (www.doiserbia.nb.rs/img/doi/0354-9836/2012%20OnLine-First/0354-98361200059S.pdf )

which discuss political factors very critically

• (A, nat. hazard)

existing knowledge of frequency and height of tsunamis ignored

• (B, risk potential)

not accounting for known risk potential: e.g.

- no diversification of vital safety and backup systems,

- no hydrogen mitigation;

- blocks not sufficiently separated;

- common cause scenarios insufficiently considered;

- not sufficiently equipped with emergency ‘hardware’ (e.g. missing

emergency water inlets);

- staff little prepared & trained to handle severe accidents;

- altogether “defence-in-depth” concept largely missing

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Fukushima as a tragic example (2) • (C, human factor)

- “The root cause … seems to be operator’s and regulator’s weakness in the

establishment of safety culture” (Stošič)

- “flawed organisation and communication, while the site was inadequately prepared

and operators made mistakes” (JAEC; after Stošič)

- bad communication with the public: “The Japanese government’s failure to speculate

alarmingly didn’t ‘protect’ the public from alarming speculation.” (Stošič)

- regulatory authority not independent, clawless:

-- implementation of regulations left to deliberation of operators;

-- no compulsory regular emergency exercises;

-- no compulsory technical upgrades acc. state of knowledge;

-- NISA (regul. authority) < METI (Ministry of economy): violation of

international requirements of independence.

- corporate culture of TEPCO:

notorious for falsifications, obfuscation, cover-ups; “group-think”

- scientific / technical community: ‘rationalization’ of risk, ‘Verdrängung’

(Freud; engl. repression) of problems; again “group-think”;

- Echo chamber effect: “tendency for beliefs to be amplified … in an environment

where …similarly interested actors fail to challenge each other’s ideas”(Greenpeace-report, p.38)

- amakudari

Purpose of this list: NOT blaming Japan, BUT: check what the conditions are in Europe!

Investigation of these factors is missing in the stress tests! “political stress tests”

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structure of nucl. responsibilities in Japan

source: Swiss ENSI report, part 2:

“Vertiefende Analyse”, p.9

Japan has announced re-structuring

acc. requirements of clear separation

of powers and independence of

regulatory authority

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Public attitude

It is hypocritical to blame the public for a sceptical, often irrational attitude, as long as

• Politics shies away from honest risk-benefit discussion on energy systems;

• Most politicians first & only think on their re-election and subsidies of theirs & their cronies;

• Corporate lobbying largely happens in the dark, lack of transparency about links industry-politics (German Filz Japanese Amakudari)

• Politics increasingly appears to be an inside-job of “The Markets” (who??);

• EU has no original political ideas but instead appears a puppet of these obscure interests;

• Science is under-financed and rather considered an annoyance by politics & administrations;

• Scientists themselves are often lazy, complacent, unwilling to communicate;

• Most media are little informed and cynical, information to them means what earns money.

about Amakudari:

google “amakudari fukushima”

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Corruption, lack of transparency, loss of credibility of

political institutions inevitably leads to obscurantism,

quack science and de-legitimation of politics altogether.

Danger for democracy!

examples from the US

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What if… in Europe ??

• Monitoring will probably work; will it? next slide

(in some countries capacities may not yet be sufficient; systems still not sufficiently harmonized)

• Public reactions: probably chaos – people in Europe are not disciplined like in Japan!

• EU reactions: - efficient on political level ? doubts! (see current € crisis!) - on technical level: probably ok, but: EU bureaucracy !!, often inefficient & clumsy information policy !!

• National reactions: Whether authorities will react in a coordinated and rational way as they should: ???? Current emergency plans and accident management plans sufficient: ????

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Will monitoring work?

• Automatic systems: (e.g. >4000 doserate monitors across Europe): - what in case of electricity black-out? - servicing monitors in contaminated areas?

• Laboratories: - sampling logistics? - sufficient number of sufficiently trained lab. staff available? - handling of large amounts of (possibly or really) contaminated samples? (receiving, storing, packing, measuring, disposing) - in emergency: enough qualified staff for fast evaluation, interpretation, transmission to authorities + public ? - working under stress conditions ?

DE: de-centralized: “Länder”, but these appear not to have the capacities

FR: centralized (mostly Vesinet, Paris): big logistic problem

Discussions about these aspects in Germany indicate problems!

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a few results of BfS and IRSN studies

• “sheltering” advice (stay at home, close windows) not realistic for scenario with releases longer than a few days

• radii for action bigger than previously thought

• iodine administration longer than previously assessed logistics?

• possibly capacities for evaluating monitoring results insufficient

• possibly logistic capacities for emergency response insufficient

A basic problem of disaster preparedness: extensive preparations required,

laboratory capacities, staff training, etc. --- all in idle, but expensive stand-by mode

for events which perhaps never occur.

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Some conclusions:

1. While it is necessary to analyze technical + human aspects of the

disaster: We should be very careful before criticizing Japan, where

the Fukushima accident was only small part of the disaster !

2. Taking the current technical stress test seriously ! Public pressure &

control to really implement the findings !

3. To do: Political stress tests: independence of authorities?

corruption? ‘Filz’, ‘Amakudari’ ?

4. To do: More studies on beyond design accidents, accident

management capacities: on national + European level!

5. To do: More transparency about balance of risks & benefits of

energy supply systems!

6. Honest communication with the public: Appeasement & placation is

not only immoral, but also leads to the opposite effect!!

7. Prepare for chaos !!

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Thank you !

contact: peter.bossew@reflex.at