Circling Self-Interest and Democracy

7/30/2019 Circling Self-Interest and Democracy

1/5

Circling self-interest and democracy

Dec 22, 2010

Restorative Justice, Self-interest and Responsible Citizenship. Lode Walgrave (2008).Culumpton, UK: Willan Publishing. 240 pages.Doing Democracy with Circles: Engaging Communities in Public Planning. J ennifer Ball,Wayne Caldwell and Kay Pranis (2010). St Paul, MN: Living Justice Press. 187 pages.

reviewed by Dan Van Ness

Lode Walgrave begins his exceptional 2008 bookRestorative Justice, Self-interest andResponsible Citizenship like many writers on restorative justice. He reviews the ancient andrecent history of restorative approaches, proposes and explains a definition of restorativejustice, and outlines various restorative schemes. He then contrasts restorative approaches

from contemporary criminal practice and identifies ways in which the former resolvespractical and ethical problems of the latter.

The person who crosses this familiar territory with Lode is well rewarded because he writeswith analytical precision, a scholars restraint, and the passion of someone with conviction.He has much to say that is worth hearing. He once again explains clearly why he favours amaximalist definition of restorative justice, one that is not limited to deliberative schemes butwhich applies only to harm caused by crime. He carefully and thoroughly builds his caseagainst punishment and against restorative justice being considered an alternativepunishment rather than an alternative to punishment.

He then moves into less traveled terrain by exploringthe socio-ethical foundations of restorative justice.Why is it right to prefer restorative justice even if itturned out to offer no instrumental advantages overcriminal justice? He considers Boutelliers suggestionthat rather than linking ethical demands to eitherGod or a collectivity of the kind Durkheim has in mind, todays secular and pluralisticculture appeals for guidance to the position of the victim, what he calls the victimalizationof morality (p. 72). While the needs of victims are a central concern of restorative justice,Walgrave concludes that victimalization does not provide an adequate ethical basis forrestorative justice. Similarly, Gilligans ethics of care justifies a one-sided responsibility that

seeks to rehabilitate the offender and care for the victim whereas restorative justicepromotes double-sided responsibility in that both victims and offenders must take activeresponsibility for some things as well as receive care.

Some propose community as an ethical foundation. This word is often used in restorativejustice literature and presentations, but it is one that Walgrave finds wanting. First, it isspoken of as though it were a particular area there are people in and outside thecommunity but in actuality community seems to be a subjective psychological entity tothose who speak of it. My community is made up of those whom I count as part of mynetwork of important relationships. Someone elses community is similarly subjectivelyconstructed. So the notion of community is too amorphous to form the foundation of a

robust theory. Second, it is spoken of as though communities are everywhere. But their verysubjectivity means that they may not really have an objective existence. I may consider twopeople as part of my community while one of them does not consider me part of hers.Where precisely is the community in that case? Can we even say that there is acommunity? Third, if they do exist, there is no reason to suppose that communities are

ling self-interest and democracy http://www.restorativejustice.org/RJOB/circling-self-interest-and-dem...

5 5/21/2013 5:30 PM


2/5

always and necessarily the heavens of reciprocity and mutuality nor the utopias ofegalitarianism that some might wish, as Crawford points out (77).

Yet there is something to the intuition that has led restorative justice proponents to referpositively to the idea of community. That intuition is captured well, Walgrave says, bycommunitarianism, which speaks of the ethics and values that should shape our livestogether rather than of areas or locations. And communitarianism appeals to Walgravebecause he believes that those values are in his self-interest. He therefore proposes what

he calls common self-interest as the ethical foundation for restorative justice. Commonself-interest posits that individuals are best off where there is both [c]oncern for the qualityof social life and belief in the potential of ordinary people to find solutions (75), rather thanwhere achieving social order is the guiding value. In the former, relationships andopportunities for individuals in those relationships to achieve their potential are valued morehighly than is simply following rules. In the latter, the reverse is the case.

If common self-interest is the norm, then sympathy or empathy offers a way of developingan internal commitment to that norm. The latter is an emotional intuition and the former is amore cognitive, more socially constructed vision (86).

Walgrave then argues that there are three key values or attitudes that offer ethical guidance

in living out common self-interest. The first is respect, which is based on the recognition ofthe others intrinsic value. Respect for human dignity is a bottom-line obligation for allsocial institutions. Disrespect is actively rejected (89). The second is solidarity, whichinvolves more commitment to the others than does respect. It carries with it a sense ofreciprocity that encourages us to bundl[e] our individual self-interests into the project ofcommon self-interest 89. But we must have solidarity even with those who cannotreciprocate, with the weak and powerless, in order to prevent the expansion of the gapbetween haves and have nots, a gap that will lead to competition rather than cooperation.The third is active, as opposed to passive, responsibility as the linkage between people andtheir actions. Responsibility requires that we address the consequences of our actions, and

criminal justice and other top-down systems satisfy this by forcing the offender to do so.This is better than no responsibility at all, but it is better still for the offender to take activeresponsibility because of an inner sense of duty.

Walgrave then considers the research that has been done of restorative practices,concluding cautiously that it appears that victims are more satisfied with restorative justicethan criminal justice, as are offenders. What about repeat offending? Lode reviews recentstudies and finds them confusing and sometimes contradictory. However, there is reason forcautious optimism in that research on both what works in changing people and whathelps in assisting people to change (the latter from Ward and Marunas Good Lives Model)seem to indicate that the sort of processes found in restorative justice should lead to lowerrecidivism. Why is this? Walgrave suggests that restorative justice takes offenders throughexperiences that may generate a sequence of moral emotions and behaviours such asempathy and compassion, remorse and guilt, apology, forgiveness, and restoration ofdignity. These provide motivation for change for both victims and offenders.

Walgrave makes a number of interesting and worthwhile suggestions for how restorativejustice might be institutionalized in a criminal justice system. He begins with Braithwaiteand Pettits notion of dominion, which is a collective, not individual, approach to freedom.Under this notion, freedom means non-domination rather than the liberal idea of freedom asnon-interference. Dominion is politically speaking what Walgrave has described as the ethicof common self-interest. Crime harms the assurance that citizens have of dominion. Theyhave been told that others will respect the safety of their home, for example, and this

confidence is threatened when a burglar breaks in, whether it is to anothers home or evenworse, their own. A restorative criminal justice system seeks to restore the assurance ofdominion while respecting the rights and freedoms of the individuals involved. This shouldbe done using restorative processes with cooperative offenders, reparative sanctions for


5 5/21/2013 5:30 PM


3/5

those offenders who have weighted the benefits and burdens of crime, and incapacitationof serious offenders who are irrational or incompetent. But for each of these groups, thereshould be opportunities provided for freely chosen participation in restorative deliberation.

Walgrave concludes his book by locating restorative justice in the larger project ofparticipatory democracy. He looks first at the threats confronting democracy, including theshrinking participation of citizens, a view within the social sciences that crime is a normalresponse to injustice and oppression in society, and the increasing domination of large

multi-national corporations as they become more powerful than governments, thusincreasing uncertainty among their citizens. These uncertainties could be confronteddirectly, but that is both costly and complex. Instead, politicians are tempted to follow a kindof populist penology: if the public is increasingly afraid of crime, then pick a strategy withwhich the voters resonate, such as getting tougher through longer sentences. It does notmatter whether there is evidence that crime is worsening or that toughness brings downcrime. Nor is it important whether that is an ethical response. The important feature of penalpopulism is that it quickly garners the support of large numbers of people. Penal populism,Walgrave reminds us, does not make us more secure. In fact, it makes the problems worse.

This is not the sort of environment in which restorative justice can thrive for several reasons.

First, restorative justice may be too complex an idea to compete with simplistic appeals.Second, restorative justice may be reformulated to fit populist rhetoric, by referring torestorative punishment or by using restorative practices in a very selective way. Third, whenthe goal is to reduce crime, the actual victims and offenders lose influence. The broad goalof safety trumps the specific objective of restoration.

Nevertheless, Walgrave suggests that restorative justice can contribute to the revitalizationof democracy because its values (respect, solidarity and active responsibility) lie at the coreof healthy democracies. These values are not self-evident; they need to be taught. Familiesare one place where this may happen; schools are another. But, Walgrave says,

Being involved in a restorative justice process is a revealing learning experience.Participants face their opponents, who appear not to be enemies but fellowtravellers; they experience the power of mutually respectful deliberation, andthey feel satisfaction in an outcome that may be less materially profitable butmore personally and relationally beneficial. They understand that promoting thecommon interest can be rewarding for self-interest. They also experience thatwhat they say matters and really makes a difference in the decision. (195)

The authors ofDoing Democracy with Circles: Engaging Communities in Public Planningagree that democracy needs help, particularly in addressing local issues. The book iswritten for public planners and argues that circles, a technique used in some restorative

justice programmes, offer distinct advantages over the typical public hearing at whichpeople make speech after speech with little real dialogue or mutual understanding.

The book was written by J ennifer Ball, Wayne Caldwell and Kay Pranis. Ball and Caldwellare both members of the Canadian Institute of Planners with experience in rural planning.Pranis is well-known in the field of restorative justice for her groundbreaking work withcircles. The publisher is Living J ustice Press, which continues to make wonderful resourcesabout circles available to the rest of us.

The authors of the book place this use of circles squarely in the tradition of the democraticproject in the US. They note that democracy is an ideal, but that too often the results aremuch less than ideal. An African American circle keeper, when she learned what about the

title of the book, said ...From what I have experienced, democracy is where people whospeak the loudest win, where people who have the most power, money or privilege win. It isa feel-good word that doesnt actually mean what people say it means. It just creates moreharm.(6) Representational democracy means that the marginalized and minoritypopulations will not be taken seriously.


5 5/21/2013 5:30 PM


4/5

A good deal of the book outlines circle processes and will be familiar to many RJ OBreaders. But it is nonetheless instructive to observe how the authors present thisdeliberative process to public planners. While public hearings often produce great emotionand seem to entrench people in their positions, circle processes are different. Everyone sitsin a circle and each speaks as a talking piece is passed around the circle. This disciplinegives everyone the opportunity to say what they want and, perhaps more importantly, giveseveryone else the opportunity to truly listen. Where in a different sort of meetingparticipants might use the time when others are speaking to formulate what they are going

to say, talking around a circle means that there is no point in doing that. So participants aremore likely to listen to what the others are saying.

In addition, at many public hearings each speaker gets one opportunity to say his or herpiece, and a limited time in which to do that. There is often no chance to respond to othersor to identify points of agreement or difference. Circles allow both to happen, although thepurpose is not simply to allow everyone to speak and listen, but to begin find a way forwardthrough the application of common values and the wisdom, training and experiences of thepeople in the circle.

One of the strengths of the book is that it presents case studies. A remarkable story

concerns the attempt by the Oregon Department of Corrections to establish in a particularneighborhood a transition home for male sex offenders coming out of prison. A circlefacilitator offered to convene a circle of the neighbors if the Corrections planner agreed toaccept the communitys decision. Her account of what happened during the circle processalone is worth the price of the book. Suffice it to say that attitudes about the transition homechanged so dramatically that when the state closed the home three months later,community members were upset!

Not all case studies had this kind of result. But in each instance there was improvedcommunication and increased understanding. Conflicts and difficult issues did notdisappear, but the participants who gathered for the circles had a deeper appreciation of

the values that all of them shared. Each was able to experience a process that encouragedrespectful communication. And in some instances they were given opportunities toparticipate in implementing agreed-upon changes.

Solidarity, respect and active responsibility. Ball, Caldwell and Pranis compellinglydemonstrate the point that Walgrave made as well: restorative processes such as circlescan help build the foundational values essential to true democracy.

Filed under: Definition, Theory, Correspondent:Dan Van Ness, Distinguishing, Conceptual,Circle

About RJ OnlineContact RJSite mapFull-Text DocumentsLogin

What is RJRJ Library

RJ WebtourRJ OBConferences

Support RJ Online


5 5/21/2013 5:30 PM


5/5

RJ around the worldPrevious EditionsSubmit an Article

RJ Online on FacebookCenter for J ustice and Reconcilliation @ PFIRJ in FrenchRJ in Spanish

RJ City

Sign up for free monthly updates on restorative developments around the world.

Copyright 1996 - 2013 PFI Centre for J ustice and Reconciliation - Reprint Policy Site by

Mooball IT
