Cierres y Abriciones Democratizacion Sin Democracia

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Democratization without Democracy: Political Openings and Closures in Modern Morocco

Author(s): Catherine SweetSource: Middle East Report, No. 218 (Spring, 2001), pp. 22-25Published by: Middle East Research and Information ProjectStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1559306.

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emocratizationi thout emocracyP o l i t i c a l Open ing s n d losures n o d e r n Morocco

a t h e r i n e w e e t

When King Mohammed VI succeededthe late HassanII in the summerof 1999, expectationssoared.Theyoung king's investiture seemed to be the final stepin a series of political changes that would set Morocco onthe road to democracy.Along with a new bicamerallegisla-ture and an opposition governmentled by the much-reveredsocialist AbderrahmaneYoussoufi, the change in regimeraised hopes that Morocco was at last moving away fromauthoritarianism. uchhopeswerebolsteredbyMohammed'searly actions, which clearly set him apart from his father.The new king permittedthe unconditional return of severalopposition figures, notably Abraham Serfaty, who wasstrippedof his citizenshipafterquestioningMorocco'sclaimover the Western Sahara.At home, he lifted the ban on co-median Ahmed Snoussi,whose sardoniccritiquesof the sys-tem went too farfor King Hassan's aste. More recently,theking freed Islamist sheikh AbdeslamYassineafter more thana decade of house arrest.But the most important indicator that Mohammedwould chart his own course came when he fired the om-nipotent interior minister Driss Basri in October 1999.The speed of Basri'sfiring surprised Moroccans and for-eign observersalike, and heralded a sense that a new era ofgreater freedom had begun. Indeed, the early reign ofMohammed VI has been unlike that of any of his prede-cessors. He has dispensed with the royalprotocol that sug-gests he keep physical distance from ordinaryMoroccans,preferring nstead to minister to the poor, the disabled andthe dispossessed. With the royal seal of approval,activistsbegan to tackle formerly taboo topics like sexual traffick-ing in women and children. His subjectshave received thesechanges enthusiastically.Dubbed theking of the poor orsimply M6, Mohammed has fundamentally alteredper-ceptions of the monarchy. In some ways, his image is likethat of Britain's late Princess Diana: an advocate for theCatherine Sweet is a Ph.D. candidate npoliticalscience t the University f California,LosAngeles.

underdog, who brings the monarchy closer to the peopleand gives the office of king a human face.Yet despite all of the progress that occurred duringMohammed's first yearon the throne, the last few monthshave witnessed a substantial reversal.The permanent banimposed on threeupstartpublicationsand the government'sharshcrackdown on human rightsdemonstrators are morereminiscent of Morocco under Hassan'srule than the headyfirst months under his son. This sudden reversal of for-tune reveals the superficiality of recent political reforms,and shows the necessity of drawing a distinction betweenpolitical liberalization and true democratization. Moroccohas unquestionably seen improvements in civil liberties inthe past severalyears, notably with regardto freedom ofexpression and association, but the expansion of politicalliberties has lagged far behind. In spite of the impressivearrayof democratic-looking institutions-a bicameralpar-liament, multiparty electoral competition and an opposi-tion government-no significant power has devolvedoutside the regime.LiberalizationrDemocratization?The Moroccan politicalsystem,with its awkwardcombina-tion of moderate civil liberties and continued politicalauthoritarianism, s not unique. It is an authoritariansub-type-pseudodemocracy-that has emerged in the wake ofthe vaunted thirdwave of democracy.1Born of a globalenvironment hostile toward overt authoritarianism,pseudodemocratic regimeshide classic authoritarianbehav-ior behind a democraticfacade.Authoritarian leaders-who are fully cognizant of theimportance now imputed to democracyworldwide-havedevised methods of creatingdemocratic-looking nstitutionsthat will satisfytheir foreign patrons, but have little appre-ciable effecton theirdomesticpolitical power.These regimescan call themselves democratic because political liberal-

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ization is conflated with political democratization.The twoare emphaticallynot the same. Regimes will often liberal-ize-relaxing restrictions on individual rights and associa-tional life and creatinglegislatures,multipartysystems andostensibly independent judiciaries, but without devolvingpower outside the ruling bloc-when confronted with so-cial upheavalor demands for change. But unless the demo-cratically styled institutions can effect political changeindependent of the regime,no move towardgreaterdemoc-racyhas taken place.Moroccan institutions arecertainlymore liberal than be-fore. But none of the changesunderthe late King Hassan orKing Mohammed has affected the king's prerogatives-themonarchy retains supra-institutional power. There is nomechanism forremovingthe king fromoffice, short of revo-lution. His poweris not subjectto modification by the masspublic or elected officials. It would be incorrect, then, tocharacterizeMorocco's recent political evolution as democ-ratization. To the contrary, many of these democraticchanges have instead solidified the monarchy'sposition asthe firstamong institutions. 2CatalystsorChangeWhen Morocco switched from a unicameralto a bicamerallegislature n 1996 and swore in an opposition governmentin 1998, many Moroccansand international observerscon-sideredthe changesproofof democratization.Sincethe early1990s, the king had been callingfor alternance-or alterna-tion in power-recognizing that the longer he kept the leftin the opposition, the stronger heywould become. Bybring-ing the left into government, the king sought to strip themof theirmystique, and to preventthe formation of a unifiedfront between the legal opposition and the burgeoning Is-lamist movement. The opposition, however, declined toparticipate in Hassan's plans for alternancein 1993, forseveral reasons.

First, the opposition bloc (or Koutla) refusedto sit in agovernment emanating from the 1993 legislativeelections.These elections, marredby widespreadcorruption and re-gime interference,yieldedaparliamentaryarrangement hatdiffered greatly from the popular vote.3 At the time, Mo-rocco had a unicamerallegislaturein which two-thirds ofthe representatives222) weredirectlyelectedand one-third(111) wereindirectlychosen.Although the center-rightpar-ties received only slightly more seats than the oppositionpartiesin the direct elections (116 versus99), they capturedover five times more seats than the opposition in the indi-rect elections that followed (79 versus 15).To form a governmentalmajority, he Koutla would havehad to ally with one of the center-rightparties,whom theyconsideredto be fully complicit with the regime in creatinga poisonous, corrupt political atmosphere.Instead, the op-position preferredto wait for real alternance,issued fromthe ballot boxes rather than from the king. The oppositionfurtherrefusedto accede to King Hassan'sdemand that heappointthe primeminister(whowould not necessarily ome

from the parliamentarymajority)and the ministersof jus-tice, interior,Islamicaffairsandforeignaffairs.But the king'sretention of Interior Minister Driss Basri was, in theopposition's view, the most egregious affront to the pros-pects foralternance, ince they held Basripersonally respon-sibleforriggingthe municipalandlegislative lectionsagainstthe Koutla. For the time being, then, the opposition hadscuttled the king'splans for alternance.Then severalimportant international and domestic de-velopments dramaticallyraised the stakes in the game forboth the king and the opposition. As the bloody civil warbetween Islamists and the military worsened in neighbor-ing Algeria, Islamist activity in Morocco became increas-ingly more difficult to ignore. Violent clashes betweenIslamist and leftist students on university campuses brokeout repeatedly,causing concern about the inroads such or-ganizations had made among the general population. Aseriesof bloody attacksblamed on Islamists culminated inthe August 1994 fatal shooting of two Spanish touristsvacationing in Marrakesh.A secondcatalyst orchangewas the deterioratingMoroc-can economy and the resultingsocial unrest.In 1996, Mo-rocco had suffered evenyearsof severedroughtout of fifteen.Drought underscored the dependence of the Moroccaneconomy on agricultureand the dependence of Moroccanagricultureon beneficialmeteorologicalconditions.4Whilesome improvements n irrigationhad beenmade,most of thecountrywasnot prepared o dealwith scantrainfall.Droughtforced the ruralpopulationsinto the cities to look forwork,compoundingthe high unemploymentrate.As of 1995, over50 percent of the Moroccanpopulation had migratedintourbanareas,exacerbating lreadymiserablelivingconditionsin poorer neighborhoods.The clash between urbandwellersand rural intruders dded anotherlayerof hostility to anexplosivesocioeconomic mix, where the disparitiesbetweenrichand poor became more blatantwith eachpassingday.Because of the deterioratingeconomic, political and so-cialsituationin Morocco, two important opposition figuresreturned to Morocco from France to convince the opposi-tion to forge ahead-unilaterally, if necessary-to effectchange. On April 10, 1995, AbderrahmaneYoussoufi, theleader of the opposition Socialist Union of PopularForces(USFP), ended his 18 months of self-imposedexile that be-gan after the 1993 elections, and resumedhis role as partychief.Two months later,one of the leadersof the Moroccannational resistancemovement during the Frenchprotector-ateperiod,Mohamed Fqih Basri(whom KingHassanhadcalled a renegade, nd who had been sentenced to deathfour separate imes), came home after29 yearsof exile. TheFqihandother radicals ad established heNationalUnionof Popular Forces (UNFP) in 1959, after splitting withMorocco'sfoundingnationalistparty, stiqlal; heUNFP laterspawnedthe USFP.Their returnsignaledto the regimethatthe opposition would abandon their confrontational stanceand move towardgreatercooperation.Just months later, the king was hospitalizedwith bron-chialpneumonia duringan October visit to the US. At once,

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Bankandsupportedbythepalace.The implementation f theseeconomicprinciplesnecessarilyequiredhe USFP and its left-ist allies o abandon heirsocialistcampaignpromises,much tothe dismayof theirpartybases.Nevertheless,most MoroccansgreetedYoussoufi'sappointmentwith greatjoy and expecta-tion.His opposition redentialswereimpeccable,havingbeenpersecutedby the regimefor his leftistpoliticalbeliefs. Givenhis longhistoryof resistance,manyargued, t wasunlikely hatYoussoufiwould be coopted.These hopes soon faded. Neither the government'spro-gram nor its budget differedmuch from those of previousgovernments.As time wore on and the governmentshoweditself to be largely ncapableof implementing even symbolicchange, expectations turned to bitterness and disenchant-ment. Calls for a cabinet reshufflingat least, or Youssoufi'sresignation at most, abounded. Critics inside and outsidethe prime minister'sparty accused the government of sell-ing out. At the time of Hassan'sdeath in July of 1999, theking-who had sentenced Youssoufi o death severaldecadesearlier-was the prime minister'sprimaryadvocate.King Hassan'sseeminglybold embraceof alternancenowappearsto have been a cleverlycalculated maneuver.Allow-ing Youssoufi to lead the governmentseemed to presagethedevolution of political power,and perhapsthe emergenceofa democratic space. But Youssoufi's imited mandate para-lyzed the new government. Rather than blame the regimefor engineering the gridlock, most Moroccans fault theYoussoufigovernmentfor its impotence. Clearly,despitethenew democratic nstitutions, the monarchis still the finalarbiter of power in Morocco.Workinggainst imeUnlike the opposition government, the young MohammedVI proved capableof rapidlyimplementing change-firingBasri,softening royalprotocols and permitting freerpublicdiscourse. Morocco is undoubtedly a more liberal nationunder Mohammed than it was under his father.Still, in theyearand a half since his ascension, the new king has takenno action to delegatemonarchicalpowerto electedofficials.In contrast to the first several months of his reign,Mohammed VI's Morocco is now rolling back civil liber-ties. On December 2, 2000, the government announced apermanent ban on two independent weekly publications,Le Journal and Assahifa. Under the bold direction ofAboubakr Jamai, Le Journal has repeatedly tested theboundaries of what is acceptablefor publication. But whenhe published a letter that Fqih Basri allegedly wrote toAbderrahmaneYoussoufiand the late AbderrahimBouabidin 1974, the government said he had gone too far.7 Theletter showed that the UNFP leadership-notably currentPrime Minister Youssoufi-was involved in the 1972 failedcoup d'etat. To justify the ban, the minister of communi-cations invoked Article 77 of the Moroccan press code,which allows the government to halt publications attack-ing the constitutional foundations-political or religious-of the Kingdom. A thirdpaper,Demain, which published

detailsofdrug raffickingctivitiespurportedlyakingplacewith the knowledgeof highlyplaced ndividuals, ufferedthe same fate.Although he contentsof FqihBasri'setterhavegener-atedmuch buzzof their own accord, he government'se-sponseto the chargeshas incited evengreaterdebate.Thesamepoliticoswho repeatedly enounced he regimeforinvokingthe repressive ress aw to silence theirpublica-tionswhiletheywere n theopposition,who maderevoca-tion of thatvery awpartof theircampaign latform,havenow usedArticle77 to mute criticismof themselves.Theban followson the heels of severaleizures f controversial

publicationsndthe revocation f theAgenceFrancePressebureau hief'scredentials. he regimehas likewisebecomemuchless tolerantof publicdemonstrations,iolently er-minatingaprotestbyhumanrightsadvocatesn December.Thereare wopossiblenterpretationsf what shappen-ing in Morocco.One interpretations that the closures e-flectapitchedbattleunderway etweenapro-liberalizationfactionandthoseopposed o change.The alternative,er-hapsmorecynical, nterpretations thatthe sunnyprojec-tionsabout heyoungking'sommitmentodemocracy ereoverlyoptimistic.Thoseprojections enerallyeferredackto one oft-repeatedbutunconfirmed) uoteattributed oMohammed hatSpain'seformistking,JuanCarlos-andnot his own father-was his rolemodel.Inhis firstmonthson the throne,perhapsMohammedwasfollowing hepat-ternof hisforebears,urginghe courtof thosewith uncer-tainloyaltiesand establishing is own style.Whatever hecase, ime sworking gainstheking,muchas tdidagainstPrimeMinisterYoussoufi.WhileMohammed Ienjoys reatsupport rom the public,manyMoroccans avebeguntocomplainquietlyaboutthe lackof progressowarddemoc-racy.Morocco s suffering etanother everedrought,driv-ingunemploymentloser o the30 percentmark ndaddingmore uel o analreadymolderingocioeconomicire.Thosewith vested nterestsn maintaininghe statusquoaretry-ing their utmostto stymieanymovetowarddecentraliza-tion. It remains o be seenwhether his newkingwillfulfillthehopesof aspiringMoroccandemocrats. lEndnotes1 The termpseudodemocracyirstappearedn LarryDiamond,JuanJ. LinzandSeymourMartinLipset, Introduction:WhatMakes orDemocracy, n PoliticsnDeveloping ountries:Comparing xperiencesithDemocracy, iamondet al., eds. (Boulder,CO: LynneRiennerPublishers,995),pp.8-9. SeealsoDiamond, Is heThirdWaveOver? ournal fDemocracy7 (1996) and DevelopingDemocracy: owardConsolidationBaltimore: ohns HopkinsUniversityPress,1999).2 KingHassanII referred o the monarchy s such in his ThroneDay speechof March3,1992.3 See HenryMunson,Jr., International lectionMonitoring:A CritiqueBasedon OneMonitor'sExperiencen Morocco, MiddleEastReport 09 (Winter1998).4 Agriculture ccounts or about20 percentof Morocco'sgrossdomesticproduct.5 Forexample,US Department f State,Bureau f Democracy,HumanRightsandLabor,MoroccoCountry eport n HumanRights racticesfor 1997 (Washington,DC: Departmentof State, 1998).6 FouadNejjar, Reformes t assainissementur fond de consensus, La VieEconomique3899 (January-9, 1997).7 The banned ssueof LeJournal,ncluding he textof Basri'setter, s currently vailablenthe Maghreb/Moyen-Orientection of the ReportersWithout Borderswebsite:http://www.press-freedom.org/home.html.he article n question rom Demainmaybe foundonthe Courrier nternationalwebsite:http://www.courrierinternational.com/numeros/528052804901 asp?TYPE=archives.

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