Transportation Research Part D 34 (2015) 116–121

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Transportation Research Part D

journal homepage: www.elsevier .com/ locate / t rd

China’s electric car frustrations

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.trd.2014.10.0141361-9209/� 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

⇑ Corresponding author at: College of Transport and Communications, Shanghai Maritime University, Shanghai 201306, China.E-mail address: mrwan@ucdavis.edu (Z. Wan).

Zheng Wan a,b,⇑, Daniel Sperling b, Yunshi Wang b

a College of Transport and Communications, Shanghai Maritime University, Shanghai 201306, Chinab Institute of Transportation Studies, University of California Davis, Davis, CA 95616, USA

a r t i c l e i n f o

Keywords:Plug-in electric vehicleAuto industryLocal protectionismCharging infrastructure

a b s t r a c t

By 2020, the vehicle population in China will likely exceed 280 million—exacerbatingnational energy security, urban air pollution, and traffic congestion. In response, many localand regional governments in China are pursuing an expanding array of measures torestrain growth in personal vehicle ownership and, along with the central government,reducing emissions and energy use of vehicles. One prominent strategy is the promotionof new energy vehicles, especially plug-in electric vehicles (PEVs). Large subsidies wereoffered—up to $27,600 (171,000 RMB) per vehicle in some regions, including almost$9200 (57,000 RMB) from the central government—which suggests that China is makinga major commitment to PEVs. But sales have been meager. In 2013, only 17,600 PEVs,mostly buses and utility trucks, were sold, less than 0.1% of total civilian vehicle sales.Several factors explain the failure of PEV sales to take off: (1) protectionism by localgovernments; (2) uncertainty over which electric-drive vehicle technologies to promoteand what consumers are willing to pay, (3) lagging investments in charging infrastructure,and (4) conservative investment behavior by automakers and battery manufacturers. Thecentral government issued directives to local governments in late 2013 to reduce barriersto out-of-town companies, resulting in modest sales increases in early 2014, but a morecoherent, broader, and effective set of policies, incentives, and strategies are needed toovercome consumer and industry resistance and the lack of charging infrastructure.

� 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Introduction

China’s automotive sales soared to number one in the world in 2009, with total registered vehicles on the road on track tomatch the US around 2020 (Wang et al., 2011). This rapid increase in vehicles will bring economic benefits and jobs, but willalso continue to threaten urban air pollution (Yan and Crookes, 2010), increase oil imports and greenhouse gas emissions,increase traffic congestion, and lead to more traffic-related deaths. The tension between these benefits and costs is a rootcause underlying the failure of government to accelerate PEV sales in China.

Plug-in electric vehicles (PEVs) (and other New Energy Vehicles (NEVs) such as fuel cell electric vehicles) provide thepromise of major reductions in air pollution, oil use, and greenhouse gas emissions (Delucchi et al., 2014). PEVs also providepotential for the Chinese automotive industry to leapfrog auto industries of other countries (Chu, 2011; Wang and Kimble,2011). Indeed, a wide variety of Chinese government agencies have embraced PEVs, providing large incentives to buyers andsellers of the vehicles. The central government launched the ‘‘Ten Cities, Thousand Vehicles’’ (TCTV) program in 2009 to greatfanfare, with a PEV sales goal of 10% of automotive sales by 2012 nationwide (Xinhua News Agency, 2010). The central

Z. Wan et al. / Transportation Research Part D 34 (2015) 116–121 117

government subsequently adopted a target of 500,000 cumulative PEV sales by 2015, and 5 million by 2020 (we refer toNEVs as PEVs since fuel cell vehicles are not included in recent policy initiatives) (State Council, 2012). In 2013, only17,600 PEVs were sold nationwide, less than 0.1% of total civilian vehicle sales (Sohu, 2014).

As evidence of the failure of subsidies to motivate PEV purchases, note that the national government offered up to $9200(57,000 RMB) per vehicle (Xinhua News Agency, 2014a) and many local governments offered even greater incentives.Consider the case of Shanghai, which provides cash subsidies of �$6450 (40,000 RMB) plus free private vehicle registrationplates to buyers of selected EV models, allowing them to bypass the auction. Given that a vehicle registration plate inShanghai was worth �$12,000 (74,000 RMB) in April 2014, the effective subsidy provided to each battery EV consumer inShanghai could be worth over $27,600 (171,000 RMB).

Beijing, Guangzhou and Tianjin have also instituted lotteries and auctions to slow the purchase of new vehicles, also withspecial provisions that favor NEVs. In Beijing’s lotteries for new car registrations, the probability of winning a license plate fora conventional car is only 0.8% (China Daily, 2013). But Beijing gave 1666 free PEV license plates during the city’s first PEVlicense bid on Feb, 26, 2014. Only 1428 individuals applied for those plates, indicating very little interest in PEVs (Bloomberg,2014). Similarly, Guangzhou and Tianjin conducted a hybrid of the auction and lottery system, also with a special provisionfor PEVs. Car buyers in these two cities had a 2–3% chance of winning a license plate for a conventional car through the lot-tery, or could pay $2100–$2600 (13,085–16,340 RMB) to buy a plate—or they get a free plate if they purchase a qualified PEV.Again, few consumers were interested, with only 100 applications for a free PEV plate each month (Dayoo News, 2014;Xinhua News Agency, 2014b).

Overcoming local protectionism

The central government’s ‘‘Fuel-efficiency and New Energy Vehicle Development Plan’’ (2012) stipulates that the countrywill invest in the industrial development of fuel-efficient cars and NEVs and create subsidies for NEVs. But many localgovernments undermine this national initiative by using the NEV program to support local auto industries against outsidecompetitors. They do so by purchasing vehicles from local companies for government fleets, directing subsides to them, andsometimes allowing them to avoid bans (for example, helping a truck manufacturing company expand into building passen-ger vehicles). These local actions can greatly constrain the growth of the market.

One policy tool used by larger cities is to offer large cash subsidies to buyers of PEVs (up to $10,000 per vehicle), but withconditions that favor local producers and block producers from other cities and provinces.

Shanghai, for instance, made vehicles from BYD, China’s largest and perhaps most competitive PEV producer, ineligible forthe local RMB 40,000 financial subsidy and also ineligible for the waiver of an auctioned license plate. Shanghai finallyapproved BYD’s new Qin model to receive a free registration in late February 2014, but to date have not allowed them toreceive the cash subsidy. Shanghai maintains this effective discrimination by (as of March, 1, 2014) only allowing threePEV models, all manufactured in Shanghai, to be eligible to receive the local cash subsidies—out of at least 13 modelscommercially available in China from major automakers (Phoenix News, 2014; Gasgoo Automobile Research Institute,2014). Beijing takes a different approach, with the same effect. They exclude Plug-in Hybrid Electric Vehicles (PHEVs) fromthe list of NEVs that it will support, effectively shutting out BYD’s Qin, which has an all-electric range of 70 km but is not pureelectric. Not surprisingly, no Beijing-based automaker produces PHEVs.

Guangzhou and Chongqing take another approach to favor local automakers. Guangzhou extended local subsidies tohybrid gasoline-electric vehicles (which do not operate on electricity) while Chongqing only offered local subsidies to itslocal hybrid brands, even though they did not qualify for subsidies from the central government. The explanation is thatGuangzhou’s local joint ventures with Honda and Toyota produce hybrids, but not PEVs (Xinhua News Agency, 2014a),and Chongqing’s local Changan brand focuses on hybrids. Chongqing offered a local subsidy of 36,000 RMB and waived tollcharges for three years to local hybrid brands (Chongqing Wanbao, 2010).

Local protectionism is even more extreme in the purchase of government fleet vehicles, where non-local cars and busesare usually excluded in the procurement rules. For example, Hangzhou City in Zhejiang Province purchased electric buses in2013 from Youngman Automobile Group and electric taxis from Zotye Auto, both local companies (Xinhua News Agency,2013). BYD has been chosen as a strategic PEV supplier for local taxis in Huizhou, because it has invested 5 billion RMBlocally to construct a new factory (D1ev, 2013).

This protectionist behavior by local governments is not irrational. Local governments’ fiscal revenues mostly come fromlocal business taxes, and thus local governments have little incentive to subsidize non-local manufacturers (Wu, 2013).Protectionism is not, however, in the larger interest of the country. It reduces the market for NEVs, undermines nationalNEV policy, and slows efforts to reduce pollution and oil imports.

The central government began to address local protectionism in 2013 by requiring NEV pilot cities to include at least 30%non-local brands. However, such a demand is controversial because the local government cannot dictate consumer purchasebehavior. This requirement has been gradually interpreted as adding 30% non-local brands to the list of car models eligible toreceive local subsidies, though the vehicle selection criteria for this list are not transparent. Additional measures can bedeployed to prohibit the government fleet purchase of local NEV vehicles of more than 50 percent, eliminate the local vehi-cles eligible list for subsidies because such list tends to favor local brands as revealed in our article. The central governmentalso needs to continuously monitor and evaluate local NEV success by emphasizing the importance of the total number of

118 Z. Wan et al. / Transportation Research Part D 34 (2015) 116–121

non-local brand NEVs sold. On a positive note, Shanghai gradually relaxed its restrictions on non-local brand NEVs recently,and according to Shanghai International Automotive City, the registration of NEVs more than quadrupled in the secondquarter of 2014 over the previous quarter (1185 vs 251).1

Uncertain vehicle technology strategies

The current emphasis of Chinese officials on the development of NEVs originally stemmed from a desire for Chineseindustry to leapfrog conventional automotive technology. It was believed that the new Chinese car companies could nothope to gain supremacy with hundred-year-old internal combustion engine vehicle technology, but did have a chance todo so with emerging electric-drive technology.

In 2001, the first year of its 10th Five Year Plan, China launched the Electric Vehicle Major Special Program under the‘‘863’’ Plan administered by the Ministry of Science and Technology. It was under this plan that the country formalizedits New Energy Vehicles Strategy, also known as the ‘‘Three-Vertical and Three-Horizontal Strategy.’’ The Three Verticalswere the development of three vehicle technologies: fuel cell electric vehicles, hybrid electric vehicles, and pure batteryelectric vehicles. The Three Horizontals were research efforts in multi-energy drivetrain control, electric motors controls,and motive batteries and battery management.

Initially, Chinese advanced vehicle technology policies, including the 863 program, gave equal importance to hybrid,battery electric, and fuel cell vehicles. Wan Gang, Minister of Science and Technology, when he had been President of TongjiUniversity, had led the research team that built China’s first fuel cell vehicles, but the leap to fuel cells (powered byhydrogen) proved too ambitious and premature. As Chinese researchers better appreciated the difficulties in commercializ-ing fuel cells, they realized that U.S. policy had already shifted in favor of PEVs; Chinese policy makers and engineersfollowed suit, focusing more on PEVs (CAERC, 2012).

During the ‘‘11th Five Year Plan’’ and current ‘‘12th Five Year Plan’’, China updated the original strategy, adding PEV dem-onstration programs in 10 cities and gradually expanding the number to 25 (as part of the ‘‘Ten Cities, Thousand Vehicles’’TCTV program.

Squeeze from Two Ends

It soon became apparent to Chinese policy makers that even battery EVs were difficult to commercialize. There werechallenges to perfecting the technology, but equally daunting were policy, marketing, and infrastructure challenges: whattype of PEVs would be most compelling; how, when and where to create a charging infrastructure; and what incentivesor regulations would be most effective at accelerating the launch of a PEV industry?

The central government soon adopted a manufacturing strategy of ‘‘Squeezed from Two Ends’’, aimed at promoting small,low-speed, market-ready EVs on the one hand and large transit buses and utility trucks on the other, with the hope that, asthe technologies and markets matured at both ends of the spectrum, they would eventually converge and embrace regular-size electric passenger cars.

In principle, the strategy made good sense. Large vehicles use large batteries—a bus uses about 11 times more batteriesthan a car in terms of kWh (DRC, 2012)—which facilitates creation of supplier industries for making vehicle-size batteriesand electric drivetrain systems (especially because China has a huge number of buses and urban trucks). Moreover, busesand trucks are bought in quantity by local governments and companies, facilitating sales and easing the challenge of provid-ing maintenance and charging infrastructure.

Promoting small EVs was also a plausible strategy. China was home to a huge domestic electric bike industry (Weinertet al., 2008) and a large ‘‘rural vehicle’’ industry (Sperling et al., 2005). The e-bike companies could move upscale to smallelectric cars, just as the US car industry evolved from bike manufacturing around the turn of the 20th century. And the ruralvehicle industry could expand to electric drive. Indeed, many rural vehicle companies did expand to small electric vehicles(Sperling et al., 2005), as did some electric bike companies. Moreover, batteries are the most expensive component in an EV.Thus, focusing on small vehicles meant that the high cost associated with EVs would, hopefully, be minimized, since small,low-speed electric vehicles (LSEVs) use much smaller batteries.

It did not evolve that way. Sales of e-buses and e-trucks did indeed expand at a good pace, largely because local govern-ments compelled local transit companies to purchase such vehicles for their fleets and offered protective local subsides forboth buses and trucks. Independent research by Sinohyfleet (2013) found that during the TCTV program (2009–2012), 82% ofPEV sales in Beijing (about 4000 vehicles) and 88% of PEV sales in Shanghai (2131 vehicles) were e-buses and e-trucks.

In contrast, small, short-range low speed EVs (LSEVs) have not taken off. The explanation is not entirely clear. There seemsto be a huge potential market for LSEVs. Shandong Province alone sold over 200,000 LSEVs in 2013; most of them with leadacid batteries, but some with lithium-ion batteries. The Provincial Government’s target is 300,000 by the end of 2015(Auto.qq.com 2014). Chinese government officials and advisors responsible for NEVs have recently flocked to LSEV-produc-ing provinces to investigate. A new policy is expected to be announced before the end of 2014 and LSEVs could be allowed to

1 The sales data is provided by Shanghai International Automotive City upon a recent request by the Institute of Transportation Studies, University ofCalifornia Davis.

Z. Wan et al. / Transportation Research Part D 34 (2015) 116–121 119

operate on local roads in a few pilot provinces, but why have sales of LSEVs not already taken off, like electric two-wheelers?Was it related to the attributes of the vehicle, public policies, or infrastructure supply? Would potential LSEV buyers embracethe more expensive LSEVs with lithium batteries? No market research has been conducted to answer these questions.

This same lack of knowledge of consumer behavior applies to all PEVs in China (and elsewhere). Is lack of consumerenthusiasm for PEVs explained by the limited number of electric chargers, the price of the vehicles, restrictions on wherelow-speed vehicles could be operated, limited driving ranges per charge, lack of social status associated with the vehicles,or quality of the vehicles? Under what conditions would Chinese consumers purchase low-speed EVs, full size batteryEVs, plug-in hybrids with small batteries, or plug-in hybrids with large batteries (giving more range per charge but at highercost)? And how might the effectiveness of different incentives vary across demographic and socio-economic groups, citiesand suburbs, big cities and small?

In the end, the weakness of the ‘‘Ten cities, thousand car’’ demonstration program was a lack of focus on the manychallenges involved in building a consumer market for a new car technology. Many stakeholders have pointed out thatthe NEV demonstration program did not coordinate the interests of all parties and did not closely monitor and evaluatethe program (Zheng et al., 2012; Gong et al., 2013)—apparently because there were no legally binding action plans imposedon them. The result was a low commitment from bureaucratic policy entrepreneurs. There has not been much effort to poolresources and connect the interests of all parties, including automobile manufacturers, local governments, battery fabrica-tors, electric power companies, and consumers.

The State of California provides an example of what is needed. In that case, the governor worked with stakeholders todevelop a ZEV Action Plan (Office of Governor Edmund Brown Jr, 2013), which specifies the actions that should be takenby various government agencies in various years to complete needed infrastructure and planning. California and its localgovernments also adopted a set of incentives and subsidies for charging and vehicle purchases, imposed sales mandates,and pursued myriad other symbolic and substantive actions, all leading to more regulatory certainty for companies and mar-ket confidence for consumers (Witt et al., 2012). California PEV sales are not huge, reaching 1.3% of the car market in 2013,but are on a steep upward trajectory (CNCDA, 2014)—and much higher than in China.

In summary, the focus on fleet-operated e-buses and trucks was good in building the manufacturing base for PEVs, butnot in building a car market. In 2012, only 16% of PEVs were operated by individual consumers (Chinese Ministry of Scienceand Technology, 2013). The ‘‘middle’’ electric car market has stagnated.

Charging infrastructure

The most commonly cited barrier to PEV adoption everywhere in the world is lack of an extensive charging infrastructure(Sathaye and Kelley, 2013). The challenge for China is exacerbated by the fact that few buyers have the space to install charg-ers at their homes. In the US, for instance, most car buyers own a single-family detached house, making it easy to install acharger in or adjacent to their house. A 2010 survey found that only half the car owners in Beijing had a fixed parking spot,and few of those were physically on land of the car owner (Wang and Yuan, 2013). In interviews, officials from Beijing Muni-cipal Commission of Housing and Urban–Rural Development confirm that many property management companies wouldnot allow potential PEV owners to install chargers at their fixed parking spaces.

The business of selling electricity to cars is challenging because the cost of electricity to charge a vehicle is less than onetenth the revenue from a gasoline fill-up. The difficult business model is exacerbated in the early years of the PEV marketswhen few PEVs are in use. In most cases, the initial charging infrastructure needs to be subsidized, or managed by a companywith deep pockets and a long term commitment.

Compounding the challenges is uncertainty over what type of charging technology to provide. Three charging technolo-gies are being deployed in Chinese cities: (1) Low-voltage charging, (2) high-voltage charging at designated stations, and (3)battery swapping.

China has an advantage relative to the US in that it uses 220 volts, which allows faster charging than the standard 110 voltoutlets in the US. The equipment for this low-voltage charging is relatively inexpensive, but a full charge requires 3–6 h. Howdoes one manage such charging for apartment buildings? One could install chargers at many of the parking spaces, but thecost of wiring a substantial part of the parking garages could be expensive. And charging for the electricity would involveinstalling meters which involves still more cost and complexity.

High-voltage charging has the attraction of requiring only 20–40 min for a charge, but it requires special equipment andspecial safety precautions, and is very expensive—in the tens of thousands of dollars in Japan and the US. Without assurancesthat many customers would be willing to pay high charges and use the stations—which is difficult to forecast—the financialrisk is large.

Battery swapping, the third option, has been largely abandoned outside China, but has the attraction of being the fastestway to recharge (2–4 min). The largest electric utility in China, the State Grid, has piloted this approach in Hangzhou City(Cai et al., 2013). The disadvantage of battery swapping is that it requires standardized batteries and battery chambers invehicles, and substantial investment in swap stations and the inventory of batteries at the stations. In addition to the highinitial investment for the stations, one must deal with the variability in battery costs and quality across battery companies,and the need to standardize batteries across car models. The startup challenges are great, which explains why the BetterPlace company went bankrupt after spending a reported $850 million on battery swapping in Israel, Denmark, the US,

120 Z. Wan et al. / Transportation Research Part D 34 (2015) 116–121

and other countries. Battery swapping is easiest for fleets. A large company such as the State Grid benefits from deep pockets,but its monopoly position threatens automakers and competitors, which could discourage the necessary partnerships.

For all these uncertainties and because of all these challenges, the rollout of charging infrastructure has been slow inChina (and elsewhere). By the end of 2012, there were only 174 charging and battery swap stations and 8107 charging polesin the 25 TCTV cities in China, and many have not been used (CATARC, 2014). Because of China’s preponderance of highdensity apartment buildings, new approaches need to be pioneered. Where should charging equipment be installed? Canpermission be gained to build chargers at apartments? What is the business model? How would they be operated? Andshould workplace charging be aggressively pursued? Should employers be subsidized or required to provide charging?How many fast chargers should be built and where? Could they be placed at gasoline retail stations? None of these questionsare easily answered. Investments in charging infrastructure in China continue to lag.

Risky investments by automakers and battery manufacturers

Batteries are the single most expensive components of PEVs. Battery costs will fall as engineers learn how to improve thetechnology and the processes for manufacturing them, and as scale economies are gained. Because the technology is evolvingand the market is so uncertain, many established battery factories in China have adopted a ‘‘wait-and-see’’ attitude towardvehicle batteries.

State-owned battery enterprises like Tianjin Lishen enjoy government subsidies and get preferential orders from state-owned PEV manufacturers (Tillemann, 2012), but most established battery companies do not have those benefits. Givenmarket and technology uncertainty and the large capital investment required to build a factory for propulsion batteries, mostbattery companies prefer to focus on small batteries used in mobile phones and computing devices, and other electronicproducts.

For all the reasons cited throughout this paper, automakers also are cautious. The market for PEVs is uncertain and, so far,very weak. The lack of charging infrastructure intensifies the doubts. The high cost of making a major commitment to PEVsmakes companies even more cautious. It is not just the large capital cost to build or retrofit factories, but also the need totransform the core capabilities of the company to embrace electric propulsion—batteries, electric motors, and so on. Andthere is also the risk to the brand. New products receive additional scrutiny. If the vehicles have flaws, catch on fire, orare perceived as inferior, then the cost to the company could be huge in terms of bad publicity (and thus reduced sales ofall their products).

A company could take a risk and try to elevate itself above the entire industry, as Toyota did with the Prius hybrid andNissan did with electric cars. But these are risky strategies, and apparently no automotive company in China is willing togamble in this way. BYD has perhaps made the biggest commitment, but even they have devoted far more resources toelectric buses. They have moved cautiously and slowly with their electric car lines, investing over 80% of their researchand development capital in conventional vehicle technology from 2011 (China Business News, 2011).

In summary, battery manufacturers and automakers see large risks with PEVs. So far, major automakers have largely lim-ited themselves to building only enough PEVs to meet the requirements of government-sponsored R&D funding programs.

Conclusion

The ambitions of the central government to build a large PEV industry and market are not being realized as fast as hoped.Large vehicle incentives, urban TCTV demonstration programs, and government encouragement have had limited effect.Even when some cities offered very large additional incentives to consumers, few sales resulted. The explanations are clear:local protectionism, uncertain and shifting vehicle technology strategies, limited charging infrastructure, and conservativebehavior of battery and automotive manufacturers. It is uncertain which are more important and exactly which policiesand initiatives would be most effective in advancing industry investments and consumer demand. Underlying all theseexplanations is the lack of knowledge about consumers. What is it that holds them back, even when large subsidies areavailable?

Some policy actions are obvious: somehow reduce local protectionism and streamline and accelerate the installation ofcharging infrastructure (at least in targeted cities)—though the details of how to do so can be challenging. Stronger leader-ship is needed in the central government and local governments to overcome these challenges. Subsidies help, but in thiscase the challenges go far deeper and broader.

Acknowledgments

This analysis was aided by interviews of representatives of automobile manufacturers, local governments, battery man-ufacturers, electric power companies, and consumer groups between September 2013 and January 2014, conducted byMarco Wan on behalf of the Shanghai office of the China Energy Fund Committee. We would like to thank the CEFC Shanghaioffice for arranging PEV discussion sessions. This study is sponsored by the Shanghai Pujiang Program (14PJC058) and theNational Natural Science Foundation of China (71402096). The authors thank the reviewers and editors for their valuablecomments and kind help with this paper.

Z. Wan et al. / Transportation Research Part D 34 (2015) 116–121 121

References

Auto.qq.com, 2014. Is low speed electric vehicles entering the season of ‘‘Spring’’ or ‘‘Winter? Available in Chinese at: <http://auto.qq.com/a/20140912/019184.htm> (accessed 05.10.14.).

Bloomberg, 2014. Beijing auto-license lottery sees few electric-car takers. Bloomberg. [online] Available at: <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-02-26/beijing-license-plate-lottery-sees-few-takers-for-electric-cars.html> (accessed 20.03.14.).

Cai, Y., Wang, H., Ye, Q., Ouyang, M., 2013. Business patterns of charging or swapping battery service for EV taxis in Shenzhen and Hangzhou in China. J.Automot. Saf. Energy 1, 54–60.

CAERC (China Automotive Energy Research Center), 2012. China Automotive Energy Outlook. Scientific Press, Beijing.CATARC (China Automotive Technology and Research Center), 2014. Blue Book of New Energy Vehicles.Chinese Ministry of Science and Technology, 2013. Demonstration applications and commercialization model. [online] Available at: <http://

www.most.gov.cn/ztzl/kjzjbxsh/kjzjbxxnyqc/201301/t20130107_98930.htm> (Accessed 20.02.14.).China Business News, 2011. BYD increases the share of traditional automotive business. China Business News, [online] Available at: <http://news.cheshi.com/

fenxi/201105/334091.shtml> (accessed 20.03.14.).China Daily, 2013. Beijing: 0.8% chance of winning a license plate for conventional car. China Daily, [online] Available at: <http://zghb.chinadaily.com.cn/

dfzx/20131128/29550.html> (accessed 20.03.14.).Chongqing Wanbao, 2010. Chongqing becomes the first pilot city to enjoy state subsidies for new energy vehicles. Chongqing Wanbao. [online] Available at:

<http://www.cqwb.com.cn/cqwb/html/2010-05/26/content_214275.htm> (accessed 20.02.14.).Chu, W.W., 2011. How the Chinese government promoted a global automobile industry. Ind. Corporate Change 20 (5), 1235–1276.CNCDA (California New Car Dealers Association), 2014. California Auto Outlook: Fourth Quarter 2013, 10 (1).D1ev, 2013. Local protectionism is serious and BYD spends 35 billion RMB to enter 5 markets. [online] Available at: <http://www.d1ev.com/news/company/

2013100722458.html> (accessed 20.03.14.).Dayoo News, 2014. Guangzhou’s personal license plate costs 13,085 Yuan in March 2014. Dayoo News. [online] Available at: <http://news.dayoo.com/

guangzhou/201403/26/73437_35662991.htm> (accessed 20.03.14.).Delucchi, M.A., Yang, C., Burke, A.F., Ogden, J.M., Kurani, K., Kessler, J., Sperling, D., 2014. An assessment of electric vehicles: technology, infrastructure

requirements, greenhouse-gas emissions, petroleum use, material use, lifetime cost, consumer acceptance and policy initiatives. Philos. Trans. R. Soc. A372 (2006), 20120325.

DRC (Research Department of Industrial Economy, Development Research Center of the State Council), 2012. Annual Report on Automotive Industry inChina. Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press.

Gasgoo Automobile Research Institute, 2014. The status quo of China’s new energy vehicle development in 2013. [online] Available at: <http://auto.gasgoo.com/News/2014/03/1008110111160286834752ALL.shtml> (accessed 20.03.14.).

Gong, H., Wang, M.Q., Wang, H., 2013. New energy vehicles in China: policies, demonstration, and progress. Mitigation Adaptation Strateg. Global Change 18(2), 207–228.

Office of Governor Edmund G. Brown Jr., 2013. 2013 ZEV Action Plan. [online] Available at: <http://opr.ca.gov/docs/Governor’s_Office_ZEV_Action_Plan_(02-13).pdf> (accessed 2.05.14.).

Phoenix News, 2014. BYD’s new energy vehicle enters in Shanghai’s subsidy list. Phoenix News. [online] Available at: <http://finance.ifeng.com/a/20140226/11750519_0.shtml> (accessed 20.03.14.).

Sathaye, N., Kelley, S., 2013. An approach for the optimal planning of electric vehicle infrastructure for highway corridors. Transport. Res. Part E 59, 15–33.Sinohyfleet, 2013. Progress of China’s Major Cities to Promote New Energy Vehicles. Sinohyfleet, Beijing.Sohu, 2014. 2013 Chinese new energy vehicle sales data. [online] Available at: <http://auto.sohu.com/20140110/n393300678.shtml> (accessed 20.03.14.).Sperling, D., Lin, Z., Hamilton, P., 2005. Rural vehicles in China: appropriate policy for appropriate technology. Transport Policy 12 (2), 105–119.State Council, 2012. Notice of the state council on issuing the planning for the development of the energy-saving and new energy automobile industry

(2012–2020). [online] Available at: <http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2012-07/09/content_2179032.htm> (accessed 20.02.14.).Tillemann, L., 2012. Building the new leviathan: electric vehicles, industrial strategy and the future of the new energy economy. Dissertation. Johns Hopkins

School of Advanced International Studies.Xinhua News Agency, 2010. How can China’s new energy vehicles to catch up with developed countries. Xinhua News Agency. [online] Available at: <http://

news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2010-02/02/content_12917966.htm> (accessed 20.03.14.).Xinhua News Agency, 2013. Anti monopoly for the auto industry in China. Xinhua News Agency. [online] Available at: <http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/

2013-09/13/c_125382718.htm> (accessed 20.03.14.).Xinhua News Agency, 2014a. Interpretation on the subsidy policy of new energy vehicles. Xinhua News Agency. [online] Available at: <http://

www.he.xinhuanet.com/2014-02/24/c_119466297_2.htm> (accessed 20.03.14.).Xinhua News Agency, 2014b. Tianjin’s personal license plate costs 16,340 Yuan. Xinhua News Agency, [online] Available at: <http://www.tj.xinhuanet.com/

tt/rdzz/2014-02/26/c_119503796.htm> (accessed 20.03.14.).Wang, H., Kimble, C., 2011. Leapfrogging to electric vehicles: patterns and scenarios for China’s automobile industry. Int. J. Automot. Technol. Manag. 11 (4),

312–325.Wang, R., Yuan, Q., 2013. Parking practices and policies under rapid motorization: the case of China. Transport Policy 30, 109–116.Wang, Y., Teter, J., Sperling, D., 2011. China’s soaring vehicle population: even greater than forecasted? Energy Policy 39 (6), 3296–3306.Weinert, J., Ogden, J., Sperling, D., Burke, A., 2008. The future of electric two-wheelers and electric vehicles in China. Energy Policy 36 (7), 2544–2555.Witt, M., Bomberg, M., Lipman, T., Williams, B., 2012. Plug-in electric vehicles in California. Transport. Res. Rec. 2287 (1), 155–162.Wu, A.M., 2013. Richard Schiere, China’s development challenges: economic vulnerability and public sector reform. J. Chin. Political Sci. 18 (1), 95–96.Yan, X., Crookes, R.J., 2010. Energy demand and emissions from road transportation vehicles in China. Prog. Energy Combust. Sci. 36 (6), 651–676.Zheng, J., Mehndiratta, S., Guo, J.Y., Liu, Z., 2012. Strategic policies and demonstration program of electric vehicle in China. Transport Policy 9 (1), 17–25.