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Surface Forces Naval Aviation Coastal Defense Forces Marine Corps

hip Political System Doctrine Submarine Forces Surface Forces Na Chinas Navy2007

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The PLA Navy is responsible for safeguarding Chinas maritime securityand maintaining the sovereignty of its territorial seas along with its maritimerights and interests. Preparation for the maritime battleeld has been intensiedand improved while the integrated combat capabilities are being enhanced toconduct offshore campaigns. The capability of nuclear counter-attacks has also

been enhanced. In accordance with the principle of smaller but more efcienttroops, the PLA Navy has compressed the chain of command and reorganizedthe combat forces in a more scientic way while giving prominence to buildingmaritime combat forces, especially amphibious combat forces. The PLA Navy hasalso sped up the process of updating its weaponry and equipment with prioritygiven to the development of new combat ships as well as various kinds of special-purpose aircraft and relevant equipment. At the same time, the weaponry isincreasingly informationalized and long-range precision strike capability raised.

Chinas 2004 Defense White Paper

The Navy aims at gradual extension of the strategic depth for offshoredefensive operations and enhancing its capabilities in integrated maritimeoperations and nuclear counterattacks. The Navy is working to build itself intoa modern maritime force of operation consisting of combined arms with bothnuclear and conventional means of operations. Taking informationization as thegoal and strategic focus in its modernization drive, the Navy gives high priorityto the development of maritime information systems, and new-generationweaponry and equipment. Efforts are being made to improve maritime battleeldcapabilities, with emphasis on the construction of relevant facilities for new

equipment and the development of combat support capabilities. The Navy isendeavoring to build mobile maritime troops capable of conducting operationsunder conditions of informationization, and strengthen its overall capabilities of operations in coastal waters, joint operations and integrated maritime support.Efforts are being made to improve and reform training programs and methods tointensify training in joint integrated maritime operations.

Chinas 2006 Defense White Paper


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PrefaceOver the past decade, the Chinese Navy has embarked on a modernization program with thegoal of being the preeminent regional power in East Asia. By acquiring some of the worlds mostimpressive naval technologies from abroad while simultaneously building advanced indigenoussubmarines, combatants, and naval aircraft, China is positioning itself to play a growing role inregional and trans-regional affairs.

This enhanced naval power sought by Beijing is meant to answer global changes in the natureof warfare and domestic concerns about continued economic prosperity. Responding to globaltrends, this modernization program is meant to address what China terms the generation gap inmilitary technology brought on by the revolution in military affairs (RMA) and the RMAs associ-ated application of information and technology to the means of warfare. As such, this moderniza-tion effort is driven by Chinas strategic requirement to maintain the effectiveness of its militaryagainst a backdrop of global changes in military weaponry and doctrine. Domestically, this mod-ernization effort aims to ensure access to trade routes and economic resources throughout theregion. This drive to build a military component to protect the means of economic developmentis one of the most prevalent historical reasons for building a blue water naval capability.

Chinas Navy is in a state of transition as it strives to ll these new goals and objectives. Justas Chinas sailors are learning to operate this new equipment, Chinas leaders are learning themeans of employing a navy with modern capabilities to support national objectives. During thisperiod of learning, many opportunities will be presented to China as well other parties in theregion. In order to better understand the worlds fastest growing maritime power and its meansof naval action and thereby foster a better understanding of Chinas Navy, the Ofce of Naval

Intelligence has prepared this study with the goal of educating and informing those who may becalled upon to aid during this time of greater contact between the United States Navy and thePeoples Liberation Army Navy (PLAN).

The rst ve chapters provide detailed background into the history, doctrine, leadership, struc-ture, and politics of the PLAN. The next ve chapters provide information on the operating forcesof the PLAN submarines, surface ships, naval aviation, coastal defense forces, and marines. Thefollowing section deals with the people who make up the PLAN, with chapters on manpower, theofcer corps, the enlisted force, training, and the quality of life of PLAN personnel. Finally, thelast two chapters regarding the PLANs foreign relations and the development process for major

weapon systems and equipment conclude the handbook.

WILLIAM E. TARRY, Jr.Director, Naval Analysis DirectorateOfce of Naval Intelligence


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Acronyms and Abbreviations

MWR Morale, welfare, and recreationNCO Noncommissioned ofcerNDU National Defense University

nm Nautical milesNPC National Peoples CongressNRC Navy Equipment Proving

Research CenterNRI Naval Research InstituteNSF North Sea FleetOJT On-the-job trainingOMTE Outline of Military Training and

Evaluation ( Dagang )PAFD Peoples Armed Forces

DepartmentPAP Peoples Armed PolicePC Political commissarPLA Peoples Liberation ArmyPLAAF PLA Air ForcePLAN PLA NavyPME Professional military educationPRC Peoples Republic of ChinaR&D Research and developmentRADM Rear AdmiralRMB RenminbiROTC Reserve Ofcer Training CorpsSAM Surface-to-air missileSCAPT Senior captainSCOL Senior colonelSLOC Sea lines of communicationSSBN Ballistic missile submarineSSF South Sea FleetSSM Surface-to-surface missileSSN Nuclear powered attack

submarineTUD True unit designatorUAV Unmanned aerial vehicleUS United StatesUSD US dollarUSG US governmentUSN US Navy

USSR Union of Soviet SocialistRepublics

VADM Vice AdmiralVIP Very important personWPNS Western Pacic Naval

SymposiumXO Executive ofcer

AAA Antiaircraft artilleryAAM Air-to-air missileADM Admiral

AFVAB Armed Forces VocationalAptitude BatteryAMS Academy of Military ScienceASCM Antiship cruise missileASM Antiship missileASW Antisubmarine warfareCAPT CaptainCCP Chinese Communist PartyCDR CommanderCMC Central Military CommissionCO Commanding ofcerCOL ColonelCOSTIND Commission for Science

Technology and Industry forNational Defense

CPT CaptainCPX Command post exerciseCSSC China State Shipbuilding Corp.CYL Communist Youth LeagueEEZ Exclusive economic zoneELINT Electronic intelligenceENS EnsignESF East Sea FleetFTX Field training exerciseGAD General Armament DepartmentGED General Equipment DepartmentGLD General Logistics DepartmentGPD General Political DepartmentGPS Global positioning systemGSD General Staff DepartmentICBM Intercontinental ballistic missileIFR Instrument ight rulesIOC Initial Operational Capabilitykg Kilogramskm Kilometerskm/h Kilometers per hourkt Knots

LCDR Lieutenant commanderLT LieutenantLTC Lieutenant colonelLTJG Lieutenant junior gradem MetersMAJ MajorMR Military RegionMRAF Military Region Air ForceMUCD Military unit cover designator


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Chapter 1Organizational Structure

This chapter addresses the Peoples LiberationArmy Navys (PLANs) organizational structure,to include the use of unit designators, the PLAsand PLANs grade and rank structure, and theleadership, administrative, and operational or-ganizational structure.

Brief History

The PLAN considers its founding day as 23April 1949, when the East China MilitaryRegion Navy was created. In January 1950,the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) CentralCommittees Military Commission, common-ly known as the Central Military Commission(CMC), appointed an Army general, Xiao

Jinguang, as the rst PLAN commander. On 14April 1950, PLAN Headquarters was ofciallyestablished in Beijing.

Today, the PLAN is composed of ve branch-essubmarine, surface forces, naval aviation,coastal defense, and marine corps. It also has10 subordinate academies and schools, as wellas various research institutes, specialized sup-port forces, and a political, logistics, and main-tenance structure. These forces are organizedinto three eetsNorth Sea Fleet (NSF), EastSea Fleet (ESF), and South Sea Fleet (SSF).

The PLANs primary missions are to guardagainst enemy invasion from the sea, defendthe states sovereignty over its territorial wa-ters, and safeguard the states maritime rightsand interests.

Unit Designators

Every PLAN platoon and above unit has a trueunit designator or TUD ( ), such as the62 nd Submarine Zhidui or the Qingdao SupportBase. However, the PLAN rarely provides thesedesignators to the public in speeches or news-paper articles, on letterhead, or on Internetsites. Instead, the PLAN identies them as acertain ( ) unit, such as a certain NorthSea Fleet submarine zhidui . In some cases, thePLAN identies regiment level and above unitswith what it calls a unit designator code( ). Outside China, this is known as aMilitary Unit Cover Designator, or MUCD.

The PLAs Grade and RankStructure

The PLA is organized into an administrative

structure and an operational structure. Both of these are based on the PLAs ofcer personnelstructure, which is composed of 15 grades and10 ranks. Therefore, a basic knowledge of thePLAs ofcer grade and rank structure is essentialto understanding the organizational structure.

Since the Red Army was founded in 1927, thePLA has always had a grade system for its of-cers, who are usually referred to as cadre.The rst rank system was not introduced until

1955. Changes in the grade and rank systemare shown below:

1927: A simple grade structure was intro-duced

1952: A revised structure of 21 grades wasimplemented


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1955: A system with 20 grades and 15ranks was introduced

1965: At the beginning of the CulturalRevolution, the rank system was abol-ished and ofcers used the governmentsNational Administrative Cadre system of 27 grades

1972: Four grades were abolished, leaving23 grades

1979: 23 grades were reduced to 15

1988: New rank system with 10 ranks wasimplemented

Today, all PLA ofcers and organizations areassigned one of these 15 grades. Figure 1 showsthe current system with 10 ranks and 15 gradesas it applies to the PLAN.

Understanding the Two Systems

In the US military system, grades and ranks aresynonymous. US military ofcers are assignedone of 10 ranks and each rank has an equalgrade of O-1 to O-10 (i.e., a US Navy com-mander is an O-5).

Figure 1PLAN Ofcer Grades, Retirement Ages, and RanksEach Grade has 2 Ranks (Primary and Secondary)

Grade # GradeRetirement

Age

PLAN Rank(USN Equivalent Grade)

Primary Secondary

1CMC Chairman ( )

Vice Chairman ( )N/A

None ADM (O-10)

None

2 CMC Member ( ) N/A ADM (O-10) None

3Military Region Leader

( )65 ADM (O-10) VADM (O-9)

4 Military Region Deputy Leader ( )

63 VADM (O-9) RADM (O-8)

5 Jun Leader ( )*55

RADM (O-8) VADM (O-9)6 Jun Deputy Leader ( ) RADM (O-8) SCAPT (O-7)7 Division Leader ( )

50SCAPT (O-7) RADM (O-8)

8Division Deputy Leader ( )

(Brigade Leader)CAPT (O-6) SCAPT (O-7)

9 Regiment Leader ( )45

CAPT (O-6) CDR (O-5)10 Regiment Deputy Leader ( ) CDR (O-5) CAPT (O-6)11 Battalion Leader ( )

40

LCDR (O-4) CDR (O-5)

12 Battalion Deputy Leader ( ) LT (O-3) LCDR (O-4)13 Company Leader ( )

35LT (O-3) LTJG (O-2)

14 Company Deputy Leader ( ) LTJG (O-2) ENS (O-1)15 Platoon Leader ( ) 30 ENS (O-1) LTJG (O-2)

* The Chinese term jun is usually translated as army or corps, but the Handbook will use jun .


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The PLA also has 10 ofcer ranks, but it has 15ofcer grades, which are identied by the typeof organization and whether it is a leader ordeputy leader position (i.e., division leader ordivision deputy leader). Each named grade hasan associated number. However, when refer-ring to ofcers or organizations, the PLA usesthe name, not the number. For example, a di-vision leader is not called a Grade-7 ofcer.

Each grade has both a primary rank and a sec-ondary rank. For example, a eet commandercan have the primary rank of vice admiral or thesecondary rank of rear admiral. Furthermore,as shown in Figure 2, each rank can have fromone to four grades associated with it. For exam-ple, a PLA Navy commander can be assigned

the grade of regiment leader, regiment deputyleader, or battalion leader.

Promotions

Within the PLA, the grade, not the rank, hasalways reected authority and responsibilityacross service, branch, and organizational lines.Thus, although rank is a key indicator of posi-tion within the hierarchy of foreign militar-ies, grade is the key indicator within the PLA.

One must make a clear distinction about whatconstitutes a promotion in the PLA. Withinthe PLA, promotions in grade are what count.Moving forward from one grade to the next

Figure 2PLA Ranks and Grade RelationshipEach Rank Has 1-4 Grades Associated With It

Rank (Army/Navy) Grade Grade Grade GradeGEN/ADM CMC Vice Chairman CMC Member MR Leader

LTG/VADM MR Leader MR Deputy

Leader Jun Leader

MG/RADM MR Deputy Leader Jun Leader Jun Deputy

Leader DivisionLeader

SCOL/SCAPT Jun Deputy Leader Division Leader Division Deputy

Leader (Brigade Leader)

COL/CAPTDivision Deputy

Leader (Brigade Leader)

Regiment Leader Regiment

Deputy Leader

LTC/CDR Regiment Leader Regiment

Deputy Leader Battalion Leader

MAJ/LCDR Battalion Leader Battalion Deputy

Leader

CPT/LTBattalion Deputy

Leader Company Leader

CompanyDeputy Leader

1LT/LTJG Company Leader Company

Deputy Leader Platoon Leader

2LT/ENS Platoon Leader


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is a promotion. For example, from a regimentleader to a division deputy leader is a gradepromotion. Moving from one position to an-other in the same grade is a lateral transfer. Forexample, moving from the chief of staff to bea deputy commander in PLAN Headquarters isnot a grade promotion, because both of thesepositions are MR deputy leaders.

Furthermore, one should not equate a promo-tion in rank to a promotion in grade. For ex-ample, the commander and political ofcer atevery level in the PLAs chain of command holdthe same grade, but they often do not have thesame rank. The reason for this is that ofcersmust serve in a particular grade for a set periodof time before they are promoted in rank.

PLA regulations specify the time-in-rank andtime-in-grade requirements for ofcers beforethey are promoted to the next rank and grade.For all ranks except second lieutenant to rstlieutenant, the time-in-rank requirement isfour years. However, the time-in-grade require-ment is three years. Furthermore, in the PLA,time in service begins the rst day as a cadetin an academy, not the day of commissioning

upon graduation. As shown in Figure 3, thepromotion cycle for grades and ranks is nota 1:1 ratio.

Military Pay Criteria and Retirement

Military pay is calculated on the basis of timein rank, time in grade, and time in service.Unlike the US military, the PLA includes thethree or four years served as an academy cadetin their total time in service. Finally, regula-tions regarding retirement ages are based ongrade, not rank.

Key OrganizationalTerminology

For purposes of the Handbook , three specicterms relating to the PLANs organizationalstructure zhidui , dadui , zhongdui will be not-ed in Chinese rather than English as follows:

Zhidui ( ): A PLAN zhidui is a divisionleader-grade vessel headquarters organiza-tion, which various dictionaries translate

Figure 3Rank and Grade Promotion Cycle

Rank Time in Rank Grade Time in Grade

Cadet 3-4 years Cadet 4 years

2LT/ENS 2 years Platoon Leader 3 years

Company Deputy Leader 3 years1LT/LTJG 4 years

Company Leader 3 yearsCPT/LT 4 yearsBattalion Deputy Leader 3 years

MAJ/LCDR 4 years Battalion Leader 3 years

LTC/CDR 4 years Minimum of 3 years for promotion to each next higher gradeCOL/CAPT 4 years


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as a otilla or division. The PLAN hasseven types of zhidui: Submarine Destroyer Frigate Speedboat Combat support vessel Submarine chaser and frigate Landing ship

Some zhidui are combined-vessel zhidui that are composed of several types of ves-sels. For example, the PLAN has destroyerand frigate zhidui , nuclear and conven-tional submarine zhidui , and speedboatzhidui that consist of missile boats, mine-sweeper boats, submarine chasers, andtorpedo boats. Vessel zhidui normallyhave a set number of support vessels.

Dadui ( ): A PLAN dadui can be either aregiment-leader or battalion-leader gradeorganization, depending on which branchand type of unit is being discussed. Whenapplied to naval vessels, a dadui is a regi-ment leader-grade vessel headquartersorganization and is most often translatedas a squadron. Training dadui are alsoregiment leader-grade organizations. ForPLAN aviation, coastal defense, MarineCorps, and maintenance troops, a dadui isa battalion leader-grade headquarters or-ganization, which is sometimes translatedas a group.

Zhongdui ( ): This level of organiza-tion for vessels is generally not discussedin English-language articles about thePLAN. For PLAN vessels and training orga-nizations, this is a battalion leader-gradeorganization. For PLAN aviation, coastal

defense, Marine Corps, and maintenancetroops, this is a company leader-grade or-ganization.

The PLAN has the following ve specic termsfor its vessels, ships, and boats, each with aspecic meaning and organizational grade lev-

el. To avoid confusion, the Handbook uses thegeneric term vessels. Within the PLAN, eachtype of vessel is assigned one of the PLAs 15grades. The vessel terms and their grades areshown below:

Jianting ( ) and jianchuan ( ) are ge-neric terms that refer to boats, ships, andvessels.

Chuan ( ) is best translated as a ship.Within the PLAN, a chuan is a non-com-bat support vessel that can be of any sizeor type. Therefore, there is no set gradelevel for a chuan . In fact, the commanderfor some chuan are noncommissioned of-

cers (NCOs). Jian ( ) is best translated as a ship.

Within the PLAN, a jian is a combat vesselthat is more than 400 tons. A jian is a regi-ment leader-grade organization.

Ting ( ) is best translated as a boat.Within the PLAN, a ting is a vessel that isless than 400 tons. Certain types of ting are now more than 400 tons, especially af-ter they have been upgraded with heavierweapon systems, but the designation has

remained based on historical precedence.The highest grade for a ting is battalionleader-grade, but some ting can be lowerthan battalion leader-grade. For example,a 125-ton escort boat ( ) is a com-pany leader-grade organization; a guided-missile boat ( ) is a company deputyleader-grade or platoon leader-grade or-ganization; and a landing craft ( ),which has an NCO as the commander,does not have a grade.

In the PLAN, a submarine ( ) is classiedas a boat. However, nuclear submarines areconsidered a division deputy-grade organiza-tion, and conventional-powered submarinesare considered regiment deputy-leader gradeorganizations.


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Figure 4 shows the grade structure for the threetypes of vessel headquarters and vessel typesthat are subordinate to the headquarters. Forexample, destroyers, which are a regimentleader-grade organization, are subordinate to azhidui headquarters, and frigates, which are aregiment deputy leader-grade organization, aresubordinate to a dadui headquarters.

Overall Structure

The PLANs overall structure can be viewedfrom four perspectives:

Tiered structure Administrative structure Leadership and command structure Logistics and technical support structure

Tiered Structure

The PLANs tiered structure consists of thefollowing ve levels:

PLAN Headquarters is an MR leader-gradeorganization. Until 2004, both the PLANcommander and political commissarwere grade-3 ofcers. This issue becamesomewhat blurred in mid-2004, when thePLAN commander was elevated as a mem-ber of the Military Commission, whichis a grade-2 billet. Even though the com-mander was elevated to a grade-2 ofcer,the PLAN as an organization remaineda grade-3 organization. Furthermore,the commander and political commissarare still considered co-equals within thePLAN, even though the political commis-sar is still a grade-3 ofcer.

Figure 4Grade Structure for Vessel Headquarters and Vessel Types

Grade Headquarters Vessel Types

(3) MR Leader PLAN HQ

(4) MR DeputyLeader

Fleet HQ

(6) Jun DeputyLeader

Support Bases

(7) Division Leader Zhidui

Garrisons

(8) Division DeputyLeader

(Brigade Leader)Nuclear-powered submarines

(9) Regiment Leader Dadui Destroyers, conventional-powered submarines

(10) Regiment

Deputy Leader Frigates, service ships, conventional-powered submarines

(11) Battalion Leader ZhongduiEscort boats, submarine chasers, minesweeper ships,

service ships, landing ships (3-digit hull numbers)

(13) CompanyLeader

Escort boats, minesweeper boats, service ships, landingcraft, missile speedboats, missile boats

(4-digit hull numbers)


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The PLAN has three Fleet Headquarters(North Sea, East Sea, and South Sea), eachof which is an MR deputy leader-gradeorganization. Therefore, since the late

1980s, each eet commander has beenconcurrently assigned as an MR deputycommander.

Each eet has several subordinate bases,which are jun deputy leader-grade organi-zations, and can be categorized into threetypes: support bases, test bases, and train-ing bases. Fleet aviation is at the samelevel. Of the total number of bases, the fol-

lowing eight are considered major

support bases: North Sea Fleet (NSF) Qingdao Lushun

East Sea Fleet (ESF) Zhoushan Fujian Shanghai

South Sea Fleet (SSF) Guangzhou Yulin Zhanjiang

The PLAN also has other specializedbases as follows: Huludao is a missile test, research

and development (R&D), andtraining base

Jianggezhuang is for the PLANsnuclear powered submarines only

A third type of base, which mayor may not be co-located with asupport base, is a training base ortraining center

Some support bases have subordinatedivision leader-grade garrisons ( ),which are responsible primarily for coastalpatrol, coastal defense, and protectingshing boats. The PLAN has six subordi-nate garrisons: NSF: Dalian and Weihai

ESF: Xiamen SSF: Shantou, Beihai, and Xisha

(Paracel Islands) Vessel zhidui , which are usually subordi-

nate to a support base, and dadui , whichcan be subordinate to a support base ora zhidui .

Administrative Structure

The PLANs administrative structure at each lev-el throughout the chain-of-command consistsof four rst-level departments: Headquarters,Political, Logistics, and Equipment.

Each rst-level department has several sec-ond-level departments that have adminis-trative and/or functional responsibilities forsubordinate organizations within the head-quarters and throughout the PLAN. It is notalways clear what the differences between thetwo responsibilities are, but some administra-tive responsibilities include housing, food, andtransportation support, while functional re-sponsibilities include plans and budgeting.

PLAN Headquarters

When the PLAN Headquarters was estab-lished in Beijing in 1949, it had three rst-level departmentsHeadquarters, Political,and Logistics. In April 1952, Naval Aviationwas added as a fourth rst-level department.During the 1950s, the PLAN also formed vari-ous other rst-level departments, but they wereeventually reorganized, abolished, or mergedwith other departments.

During the 1960s to 1990s, the PLAN estab-lished different departments to manage vesselequipment and technical issues. Following theestablishment of the PLAs General Equipment


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Department (GED) in 1998, the PLAN mergedthese departments into the EquipmentDepartment. 1

Since then, the PLANs administrative orga-nization has included four rst-level depart-mentsHeadquarters, Political, Logistics, andEquipment. The directors are the same grade asthe PLAN deputy commanders and the threeeet commanders.

PLAN Headquarters Department

The PLAN Headquarters Department is themilitary command organization for the Navysleaders. The director is the Chief of Staff. TheHeadquarters Department consists of severalfunctional departments and military studiesresearch organizations. The primary function-al departments, listed in alphabetical order, areas follows:

Communications

Intelligence

Military Affairs

Operations Training

PLAN Political Department

The Political Department is the leading orga-nization responsible for political work. It con-sists of several functional departments, plusthe military court and procuratorate (i.e., theInspector General). The primary functional de-partments are as follows:

Cadre (Ofcer)

Discipline Inspection

Organization

Propaganda Security

PLAN Logistics Department

In 1985, the PLAN changed the existingfour-tiered logistics supply structurePLANHeadquarters, Fleet Headquarters, supportbase, and unitsto a three-tiered structurePLAN Headquarters, support base, and units.As such, the three eet headquarters no longerhave a logistics administrative structure.

The Logistics Department is the leading organi-zation responsible for managing logistics sup-

port. Because it is the largest component of thePLAN, the Logistics Department is organizedmore like a command than a department. Assuch, it has a director and a political commis-sar. The primary second-level functional de-partments are as follows:

Audit Engineering Design Finance Health

Military Transportation Port, Aireld, and Barracks Management Quartermaster, Materials, and Fuel

The PLAN has some second-level departmentswithin the logistics organizational structurethat are unique to the Navy. The rst organiza-tion is the Engineering Command Department,and the second is the Vessel On-Shore ServiceDepartment. The Engineering Command

Department is responsible for construction of all naval facilities, including airelds, ports, airdefense, and buildings. The Vessel On-ShoreService Departments are responsible for lo-

1 The General Equipment Department is sometimes noted as the General Armament Department (GAD) andthe services Equipment Department is sometimes referred to as the Armament Department.


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gistics and technical support for naval vesselunits while they are in port.

The logistics support system is primarily re-sponsible for supporting personnel livingconditions, port and shore base facilities con-struction, plus supply and technical supportfor all types of munitions (including vesselgun shells, missiles, torpedoes, and mines) andland-based common-use weapons and equip-ment. Although the PLAN supplies units withspecial-use materials, the military regions sup-ply them with common-use materials.

PLAN Equipment Department

The Equipment Department is primarily re-sponsible for technical support for all PLANequipment and weapon systems from con-cept development to retirement. As such, theEquipment Department is responsible for thePLANs special-use equipment throughout thefollowing seven steps:

Plans and theoretical evaluation

Technical design Construction design

Inspection during construction

Test and evaluation

Delivery of the vessel to the unit

Lifetime repair support

The Equipment Department has subordinatefactories, repair facilities, depots, warehous-es, and purchasing stations. Because it is oneof the largest components of the PLAN, theEquipment Department is organized more likea command than a department. As such, ithas a director and a political commissar. Theprimary second-level functional departmentsare as follows:

Armament Comprehensive Plans Defense Industry Regional Representative

Bureaus Electronics Equipment Inspection and Management Vessel Technology

Leadership and CommandStructure

The PLAN has a four-tiered on-shore verticaland lateral leadership and command structure.

Within the PLANs vertical structure:

PLAN Headquarters is the highest tier,is the services supreme command staff,and is the CMCs and Four GeneralDepartments functional department thatimplements leadership over PLAN units.

The three eet headquarters make up thesecond tier. They are the campaign com-ponent and constitute the leadership andcommand staff for a certain strategic di-rection. Furthermore, the three eet head-quarters receive leadership not only fromPLAN Headquarters but also from theirrespective military region headquarters.

Support bases make up the third tier andare primarily responsible for the compre-hensive support of all naval forces withintheir area of responsibility.

Garrisons and zhidui make up the fourthtier.

When the eets conduct mobile task-force op-erations, the PLAN employs only a three-tieredat-sea command structure:

PLAN Headquarters Fleet Headquarters Zhidui


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Within the PLANs lateral leadership and com-mand structure, all four tiers have fairly equiv-alent staffs and functional departments, eventhough the names may be slightly different:

PLAN Headquarters, support bases, andgarrisons have four rst-level depart-mentsHeadquarters, Political, Logistics,and Equipment

The Fleet Headquarters have only tworst-level departmentsHeadquarters andPolitical. They do not have a Logistics orEquipment Department

Support bases and garrisons have fourrst-level departmentsHeadquarters,

Political, Logistics, and Equipment

Zhidui have three rst-level departmentsHeadquarters, Political, and an On-ShoreService Department, which is equivalentto a Logistics Department

Logistics and TechnicalSupport Structure

Finally, the PLAN also has a three-tiered on-shore logistics and technical support structurethat skips the eet headquarters:

PLAN Headquarters

Support bases

Garrisons and zhidui


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Chapter 2Leadership

Leadership is implemented at all levels in thePLAN as a shared responsibility through theCCP Party committee system. In general, everyheadquarters organization in the PLAN downto the company level has a commander and aco-equal political ofcer. The commander andpolitical ofcer, along with the deputy com-manders, deputy political ofcers, and the di-rectors of the four departments (Headquarters,

Political, Logistics, and Equipment), composethe Party committees standing committee,where all major decisions are discussed and de-cided upon for implementation. The politicalofcer usually serves as the Party secretary andthe commander as the deputy secretary. TheParty committee system is discussed in moredetail in Chapter 3.

In September 2004, the commander of thePLAN, Admiral Zhang Dingfa, became the rst

PLAN commander ever to serve concurrentlyas a member of the CCP Central CommitteesMilitary Commission (CMC). His promotionin grade and appointment to the CMC provid-ed a unique challenge for the PLAN within thePLA hierarchy.

As is discussed in Chapter 1, all organizationswithin the PLA are assigned one of 15 grades.In addition, the commander and political of-cer are assigned the same grade. However,

when Zhang Dingfa was promoted one gradeas a CMC member, neither the grade for thePLAN as an organization nor the grade of thePLAN political commissar was raised to thesame level. Therefore, although Zhang and hissuccessors will hold the same grade as the Chief of the General Staff and the directors of the

General Political Department (GPD), GeneralLogistics Department (GLD), and GeneralEquipment Department (GED), the PLAN as anorganization is not equal to the four GeneralDepartments and is still at the same grade asthe seven Military Regions.

Commanders and Political

CommissarsFrom 1949 to 2006, the PLAN has had a totalof 7 commanders and 11 political commissars,as shown in Figure 5 (below) and Figure 6 (topof the next page).

Commanders

Wu Shengli (2006-Present): Wu was born inWuqiao, Hebei Province, in August 1945. Asa senior ofcer, he served as chief of staff of the PLANs Fujian Base, commandant of theDalian Naval Vessel Academy, commander of

Figure 5PLAN Commanders

Commander Command Period Wu Shengli ( ) Aug 2006 Present

Zhang Dingfa( )

Jun 2003 Aug 2006

Shi Yunsheng ( ) Nov 1996 Jun 2003

Zhang Lianzhong( )

Jan 1988 Nov 1996

Liu Huaqing ( ) Aug 1982 Jan 1988 Ye Fei ( ) Jan 1980 Aug 1982Xiao Jinguang

( )Jan 1950 Dec 1979


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the Fujian Base, deputy commander of theEast Sea Fleet, and commander of the SouthSea Fleet and concurrently deputy commanderof the Guangzhou Military Region. In 2004, hewas appointed as one of the deputy chiefs of the general staff. In August 2006, Wu replacedZhang Dingfa as the PLAN commander.

Zhang Dingfa (2003-2006): Zhang was bornin December 1943 in Shanghai and joined

the PLAN in 1960. From 1960-1964, he wasa cadet at a PLAN submarine academy. Aftergraduating, he served as a submarine CO, sub-marine zhidui deputy commander, assistantto the chief of staff of the NSF, and chief of staff of the Qingdao Base. He then successivelybecame the chief of staff, deputy command-er, and commander of the NSF. In November2002, Zhang was assigned as the rst naval of-cer to be the president of the PLAs Academyof Military Science (AMS). In June 2003, he re-placed Shi Yunsheng as the PLAN commander.In September 2004, Zhang was selected as aconcurrent member of the CMC, making himthe rst PLAN commander to hold this posi-

tion. Zhang became seriously ill in January2006 and was replaced in August 2006.

Shi Yunsheng (1996-2003): Shi was born in

Liaoning Province in January 1940 and joinedthe PLA in 1956. In 1958, he graduated froman aviation preparatory school. He then at-tended the PLAAFs 7 th Aviation School inChangchun, graduating in 1962. After grad-uating, he served as a Naval Aviation pilot,zhongdui commander, dadui commander, anddeputy regiment commander. In 1976, he wasappointed as the deputy commander of NSFNaval Aviation. In 1981, he became a NavalAviation division commander. In 1983, he wasappointed as the SSF Naval Aviation command-er. In 1990, he became a deputy commander of Naval Aviation. In November 1992, he was as-signed as a PLAN deputy commander and waspromoted to commander in November 1996.Shi served as the commander until he was re-lieved of duty in June 2003 as a result of thedeath of the entire crew on a Ming submarinetwo months earlier.

Zhang Lianzhong (1988-1996): Zhang wasborn in June 1931 in Shandong Province andjoined the PLA in 1947. During 1948, he par-ticipated in several campaigns against theNationalists. Beginning in 1949, he served inseveral junior ofcer positions in the ThirdField Armys 273 rd Regiment. After attendingan infantry school in 1956, he served in sev-eral ground-force billets until he enrolled in aPLAN submarine school in August 1960. Aftergraduating in 1965, he served in various billets,including a submarine CO, deputy zhidui com-mander, zhidui commander, NSF deputy chief of staff, Lushun Base commander, and PLANdeputy commander. He succeeded Liu Huaqingas commander of the PLAN in January 1988,

Figure 6PLAN Political Commissars

Political Commissar Command PeriodHu Yanlin ( ) Jun 2003Present

Yang Huaiqing ( ) Jul 1995Jun 2003Zhou Kunren ( ) Dec 1993Jul 1995 Wei Jinshan ( ) Apr 1990Dec 1993

Li Yaowen ( ) Oct 1980Apr 1990 Ye Fei ( ) Feb 1979Jan 1980

Du Yide ( ) Oct 1977Dec 1978Su Zhenhua ( ) Sep 1971Sep 1977Li Zuopeng ( ) Jun 1967Sep 1971

Wang Hongkun ( ) Mar 1966Jun 1967Su Zhenhua ( ) Feb 1957Mar 1966


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serving in that post until November 1996. Asa submariner, Zhang was the rst PLAN com-mander to have served at sea.

Liu Huaqing (1982-1988): Liu was born inOctober 1916 in Hubei Province and joinedthe Red Army at age 14 in 1930. He partici-pated in the Long March, where he establishedpersonal relations that would serve him well inthe future. For the next 15 years, he served inpolitical commissar positions with various RedArmy and PLA units.

His naval career began when he was appoint-ed as the deputy political commissar of the 1 st Naval College in 1952. From 1954-1958, heattended the Voroshilov Naval Academy inLeningrad, where he was inuenced by thewritings of Admiral Sergei Gorshkov. After re-turning to China in 1958, he served as rstdeputy-commander, chief of staff, and com-mander of the PLANs Lushun base, and depu-ty commander of the NSF.

The second phase of his naval career beganin 1961, when he was assigned as the presi-dent of the Ministry of National Defenses 7 th Research Academy, which was established in1958 to manage naval ship development. In1965, Liu became a vice minister of the 6 th Ministry of Machine Building (shipbuilding).The following year, he became a vice ministerof the Commission for Science, Technology,and Industry of National Defense (COSTIND),which was responsible for guiding develop-ment of the militarys weapon systems.

In 1970, he returned to the PLAN as a depu-ty chief of staff. It was during this time thathe also broadened his inuence by becominga member of the Party leading group of theChinese Academy of Sciences, assistant to Deng

Xiaoping (who at the time was the PLAs chief of the general staff), and then deputy chief of the general staff. In August 1982, he was as-signed as the third PLA Navy commander.This position also included being selected as amember of the CCPs 12 th Central Committee.

In November 1987, Liu moved from the navyto the nal phase of his military career in theCMC, where he eventually became the seniorvice chairman and one of the most powerfulmen in the PLA behind Deng, who was the CMCchairman. In 1992, he also became a memberof the 10 th CCP Central Committees Politburoand the Politburo Standing Committee, wherehe helped shape the future of the PLA as a whole.

Ye Fei (1980-1982): Ye was born in thePhilippines and his family returned to Chinawhen he was four years old. He joined theCommunist Youth League in 1928 and theCCP in 1932. During the 1930s and 1940s, Yewas involved in CCP activities in southeasternChina and as a political commissar and com-mander of various Red Army units. In 1953,he held several concurrent positions, includ-ing the governor of Fujian Province, deputycommander of the Nanjing Military Region,and commander and political commissar of the Fujian Military District. At age 40, Ye Feireceived the rank of general when ranks wererst given to the PLA in 1955. In 1975, he be-came the Peoples Republic of Chinas (PRCs)Minister of Transportation. In February 1979,Deng Xiaoping appointed Ye, who had nev-er served in the PLAN, as the Navys politicalcommissar for one year. Deng then appoint-ed him as the commander until August 1982.After leaving his position as PLAN commander,he served as the vice-chairman of the standingcommittee of the 6 th and 7 th National PeoplesCongress (1983-1993).


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Xiao Jinguang (1950-1979): Xiao was bornin January 1903 in Hunan Province. At age16, Xiao became involved in political activi-ties and joined the Communist Party at age17. He studied in Moscow from 1921-1924. In1925, he served as a political ofcer during theNorthern Expedition and was given the rank of lieutenant general. He went back to Moscow in1927 and studied there until 1930. From thenuntil 1949, he served in various Red Army andPLA command and political commissar posi-tions. At the age of 46, Xiao Jinguang becamethe Navys rst commander. Technically, heheld the position until December 1979. In1962, however, Xiao came under attack fromDefense Minister Lin Biao, and Lin relieved himof his PLAN duties in January 1967. When Linsplane went down over Mongolia in September1971, Xiao was reinstated but came under im-mediate attack from Mao Zedongs wife, JiangQing. For all practical purposes, the PLANspolitical commissar, Li Zuopeng, ran the Navyfrom 1962 until he was arrested immediatelyafter Lins plane crash.

Political Commissars

Of the PLANs 11 political commissars, therst 8 spent most of their career in the Armyand moved into the PLAN political commis-sar position without much, if any, naval expe-rience. Zhou Kunren, who was appointed tothe position in 1993, was the rst PLAN politi-cal commissar to spend most of his career inthe Navy. His successor, Yang Huaiqing, spentmost of his career in PLAN political ofcer bil-lets, but his replacement, Hu Yanlin, spentmost of his career in PLAAF and Army politicalofcer positions.

Li Zuopeng (1967-1971): Although the PLANhas had 11 political commissars, Li Zuopeng

probably had the most signicant impact onPLAN development, because, for all practicalpurposes, he ran the Navy from 1962 until1971. He was born in 1914 in Jiangxi Provinceand joined the Red Army in 1930. In 1935, hebegan working in the General Staff Departmentand participated in the Long March. From 1939to the early 1950s, he served in various Armystaff, training, school, and command posi-tions, including the commander of the 4 th FieldArmys 43 rd Army. In 1962, he was assigned tohis rst Navy position as a PLAN deputy com-mander. In 1967, he became the PLAN politicalcommissar and was later assigned as a concur-rent deputy chief of the general staff. Li wasthe last PLAN ag ofcer to serve as a deputychief of the general staff until the early 1990s.

The PLA Navys encyclopedia states that, un-der Minister of Defense Lin Biaos tutelage asvice chairman of the CMC, Li Zuopeng essen-tially took over command of the navy, whichnegatively affected the PLANs direction of development. After the Cultural Revolutionwas launched, this battle became more bit-ter, especially during the period from January1967 to September 1971. During this time,Li advocated politics above all else, and hebrutally persecuted ofcers who disagreed withhim, thus destroying unit development.

From 1965-1971, Naval Aviation ghter andbomber pilots averaged 26 ying hours annual-ly, with a low of 12.5 hours in 1968. In November1969, Li abolished Naval Aviation headquar-ters and its entire command staff. It was not re-established until May 1978. Therefore, aviationunits within the eets were left to themselveswithout guidance from PLAN Headquarters.From 1969-1978, Naval Aviation had more than70 aircraft accidents that resulted in total lossof the aircraft and 62 pilot deaths. The seriousaccident rate in Naval Aviation was quite high.


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When Lin Biaos plane crashed in September1971, Li was immediately arrested. Ten yearslater, the PRCs highest court tried and sen-tenced him to 17 years. Although he wasarrested in 1971, his policies continued to neg-atively affect PLAN development through theend of the decade.

Deputy Commanders

Since 1949, the PLAN has had about 40 dep-uty commanders, with an average of threeserving at the same time. Each deputy has hisown broad portfolio of responsibilities that cutacross the four major departments. Whereasmany of the early deputies were transferredfrom Army positions, almost all the deputiesfrom the 1970s on rose up through the PLAN.

Of the deputy commanders, 12 previous-ly served as eet commanders (2 NSF, 3 ESF,and 7 SSF) and 7 served as PLAN Headquarterschiefs of staff (i.e., director of the HeadquartersDepartment). The remaining 19 deputies camefrom a wide variety of positions in the four ma-

jor departments within PLAN Headquarters.Of the deputies, three were later promotedas the plan commander.

Deputy Political Commissars

Since 1949, the PLAN has also had about 25deputy political commissars, with an averageof two serving at the same time. Of the depu-ties, 10 previously served as eet political com-

missars (3 NSF, 2 ESF, and 5 SSF) and 5 servedas the director of the Political Departmentin PLAN Headquarters. The remaining dep-uties came from a wide variety of politicalpositions within the PLAN, Army, and fourGeneral Departments. Six of the deputy

political commissars have been promoted as thePLAN political commissar.

Chiefs of Staff Since 1949, the PLAN has had at least 14chiefs of staff, who serve as the director of the Headquarters Department within PLANHeadquarters. Of these, 7 have received lateralpromotions in grade as a deputy commander.

Political Department

DirectorsSince 1949, the PLAN has had at least 15 di-rectors of the Political Department withinPLAN Headquarters. Of these, 5 have receivedlateral promotions in grade as a deputypolitical commissar.

Fleet Commanders andPolitical Commissars

Each of the PLANs three eets has a com-mander and political commissar, who holdthe same grade as the deputy commanders,deputy political commissars, chief of staff and Political Department director at PLANHeadquarters. Since the late 1980s, the NSF,ESF, and SSF eet commanders have also beenconcurrently appointed as a deputy com-mander of the Jinan, Nanjing, and GuangzhouMilitary Regions, respectively.

Since the three eets were established, the NSFhas had 11 commanders and 11 political com-missars, the ESF has had 11 commanders and13 political commissars, and the SSF has had14 commanders and 12 political commissars.


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Of these, only the former commander of theNSF, Zhang Dingfa, and the commander of theSSF, Wu Shengli, have become the PLAN com-mander. In addition, only one eet political

commissar, Zhou Kunren, who served as theSSF political commissar, has become the PLANpolitical commissar.


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Chapter 3Political System

According to PLA writings, the PLAs politicalwork system is the means through which theChinese Communist Party (CCP) guaranteesabsolute control over the military. Every organi-zation in the PLA, including headquarters, op-erational units, academies, research institutes,and factories, has one or more components of the political work system, which consists of the following six main components:

Party committee system

Political administrative system

Discipline inspection system

Party congresses

Political ofcer system

Judicial system

The PLANs political work system is identicalto the larger PLAs political work system.

Party Committee System

The PLA has ve types of Party committeesthat can be established in organizations at alllevels of the PLA. The type of Party committeeestablished depends on three factors:

The level at which the organization re-sides

The organizations responsibilities, such asthe Operations Department having greaterresponsibilities than the ManagementBureau, even though they are at the samelevel

The number of Party members

Each Party committee is responsible to a high-er-level committee and ultimately through theCentral Military Commission (CMC) to theCCPs Central Committee. The ve types of Party committees, which are discussed in moredetail later, are shown below:

Party Committee ( ) Grassroots Party Committee ( ) Party general branch ( ) Party branch ( ) Party small group ( )

Every organization in the PLA is composed of two basic components:

A headquarters element Administrative departments

Every headquarters element has one of the

three types of Party committees shown below:

A Party committee established in everyregiment-level and above organizationheadquarters

A grassroots Party committee establishedin each battalion-level organization head-quarters

A Party branch established in each com-pany-level organization headquarters

Every administrative department has one of the four types of Party committees shown be-low:

Party committee Party general branch


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Party branch Party small group

Figure 7 provides an example of the dif-ferent types of Party committees withinPLAN Headquarters structure, includingthe Operations Division of the OperationsDepartment in the Headquarters Department.

Party Committees

A Party committee is established in eachheadquarters element for all PLA regiment-level and above organizations. The PLANhas a Party committee for each regiment and

above organization. At the regiment level,this includes vessel dadui , aviation regiments,coastal defense regiments, and all regiment-equivalent organizations.

Each of these Party committees has a stand-ing committee ( ) consisting of thecommander, political commissar, deputycommanders, deputy political commissars,and directors of the four rst-level adminis-trative departmentsHeadquarters, Political,

Logistics, and Equipment. In most cases, thepolitical commissar is the Party secretary andthe commander is the deputy secretary. Insome situations, however, the commander isthe secretary and the political ofcer is thedeputy secretary.

In addition to the headquarters elementsParty committee, each of the four rst-leveladministrative departments has its own Partycommittee. In addition, some second-level de-partments for regiment and above organiza-tions have their own Party committee if there

are enough Party members for one.

Grassroots Party Committees

A grassroots Party committee is assigned to theheadquarters element for all battalion-level or-ganizations. Although these committees areformally identied as grassroots Party commit-tees, the PLA often omits the term grassrootsand identies them just as Party committees.

Grassroots Party committees are not assignedto administrative departments.

Party General Branches

Party general branches are established only with-in administrative departments that are not largeenough to have a Party committee but are toolarge for a Party branch. Party general branchesare not established in headquarters elements.

Party Branches

Party branches are assigned to all company-lev-el organization headquarters and to all second-

Figure 7PLAN Headquarters Party Committees

Organization Level Organization Party CommitteeHeadquarters element PLAN Headquarters Party Committee

First-level department Headquarters Department Party CommitteeSecond-level department Operations Department Party General BranchThird-level department Operations Division Party Branch


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and third-level administrative departments.For example, the second-level OperationsDivision subordinate to PLAN North Sea FleetsHeadquarters Department has a Party branch.Furthermore, each administrative branch onPLAN vessels, such as a destroyers radar andsonar branch, has its own Party branch. 2

Party Small Groups

All PLA Party members must belong to sometype of Party organization. Party small groupsare established at the platoon level, where onlya few ofcers are present, and at the squad level,which is composed solely of enlisted personnel.

In addition, when the PLA establishes ad hocworking groups, the members, regardless of their grade or rank, are organized into a Partysmall group or a Party branch. Which type of Party committee is established, such as a Partysmall group or Party branch, depends on thenumber of Party members involved.

Party Congresses

By regulation, every regiment-level and aboveorganization in the PLA holds a Party Congress( ) once every ve years, but a PartyCongress can be held on an ad hoc basis if necessary. For example, from 1956 to 2004,the PLAN held 10 Party Congresses. Althoughthey were held sporadically through the 1960s,they have been held every ve years since. ThePLAN holds plenary sessions for each congressabout twice a year.

Party Congresses are composed of elected repre-sentatives from the Party committee at each level.They are the top-level organizations responsiblefor supervising lower-level Party committees.

In addition, every administrative depart-ment that has a Party committee with morethan 200 Party members holds its own PartyCongress every ve years. The Party Congressreviews the departments activities for the pre-vious ve years and selects new members forthe next Party committee.

Battalion- and company-level organizationsand administrative departments that have few-er than 200 Party members convene a Congressof Military Party Members ( ).

All of these Party Congresses are responsiblefor approving the Party Committees report,the report for that levels discipline inspectioncommission, discussing key issues and makingdecisions based on those issues, and selectingand approving the members for the next Partycommittee and that organizations disciplineinspection commission.

Political Ofcer System

Party committees are the decision-making andguidance bodies for all key issues, includingtraining, at each level in the chain of command.

The political ofcer system consists of politi-cal ofcers at every level in the chain of com-mand from the company level up to the four

General Departments. Platoons and squads do

2 PLAN vessels are organized into bumen ( ), which the PLA translates as branch. In the US Navy, theyare called departments, each of which has subordinate divisions.


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Party organizations and ensuring that Partydiscipline is maintained. This system is mir-rored after the CCPs discipline inspection sys-tem on the civilian side.

The components comprising the PLAs disci-pline inspection system can be divided intothree groups:

Party discipline inspection commissions( )

The CMC Discipline InspectionCommission is the top-level militaryorganization that oversees the PLAsdiscipline inspection system

CCP discipline inspection commis-sions are established in all PLA unitsat the regiment-level and above

Discipline inspection departments (), which include:

The General Political DepartmentsDiscipline Inspection Department

The PLANs Political DepartmentsDiscipline Inspection Department

The political department in each jun -level and above headquarters has asubordinate Discipline InspectionDepartment

Below the jun level, the OrganizationDepartment within the PoliticalDepartment is responsible for carryingout discipline inspection tasks

At battalion- and company-level units,the Party committee or branch assignsParty members to undertake discipline in-spection tasks

Members of the discipline inspection com-mission at each level are selected by the PartyCongress, which is held every ve years.

Judicial System

Chinas armed forces have a military judicialsystem composed of the military courts (

), military procuratorates ( ),

and security departments ( ), whichexercise the trial, procuratorial, and investigat-ing powers, respectively, in accordance withthe laws regarding criminal cases within thearmed forces. The military courts and mili-tary procuratorates are established within thearmed forces as part of the State judicial sys-tem, meaning that they adhere to State laws.

Within the PLAN, military courts and procura-torates have been created in PLAN Headquartersand each of the three eet headquarters. Theyare considered administratively subordinateunits within PLAN Headquarters and the threeeet headquarters, but exercise independentjudgment. Although neither organization isdirectly subordinate to the Party Committee

Figure 8PLAN Propaganda and Security Administrative Structure

Organization Level Propaganda SecurityPLAN Headquarters Propaganda Department Security Department

Fleet Headquarters Propaganda Division Security DivisionSupport Base Propaganda Division Security Division Vessel Zhidui Propaganda Ofce Security OfceMarine Brigade Propaganda Ofce Security Ofce Vessel Dadui Propaganda and Security Branch


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or Political Department in PLAN Headquartersor the eet headquarters, the PLA incorporatesjudicial system work as part of the politicalwork system.

The military courts accept criminal cases withinthe armed forces and may accept other cases withauthorization from the Supreme Peoples Court.

The military procuratorates serve the role of anInspector General and judge advocate organi-zation. Their responsibilities are as follows:

Examining criminal cases investigated bythe internal security organs and decidingwhether to approve an arrest or to initiatea prosecution

Directly accepting and investigating crim-inal cases involving crimes committed

Deciding whether to make an arrest or toinitiate a prosecution

Exercising supervision over the legality of the investigatory and judicial activities of the internal security organs and the mili-tary courts.

The security departments, which are estab-lished in the political departments of PLAunits at or above the regiment level, investi-gate criminal cases within the armed forces inaccordance with the provisions of the CriminalProcedures Law.


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Chapter 4Doctrine

Doctrine, Theory, and Practice

The PLA does not have one specic word fordoctrine, and it does not use a word substitutefor doctrine in referring to its own opera-tional theory or operational concepts. Whatthe PLA does write about is operational the-ory and operational practice. Therefore,understanding the linkage between opera-tional theory and operational practice inthe PLA is an important tool for identifyingoperational concepts.

In the PLA, the eld of military science,which is the link between theory and practice,has two broad components: basic militarytheory and applied military theory.

Basic military theory articulates thefundamental laws that govern modernmilitary operations for the PLA. The PLApresents these fundamental laws in its pro-fessional institutions, textbooks, doctrinalliterature, and training as strategic guide-lines, operational concepts, and tacticalguiding principles.

Applied military theory is the practicalapplication of those fundamental laws,

guidelines, concepts, and principles.Whereas basic military theory articulateswhat will guide the PLA in the application of military force at each level of warfare in broadconceptual terms, applied military theoryaddresses the specics of how to do it.

The PLAs Three Levels of

ConictThe PLA writes that warfare consists of threelevels of armed conict and combat: war, cam-paigns, and battles. Wars can be either localor total. Wars are fought to achieve a nationsoverall political objectives. Campaigns serve asthe operational link between the conduct of battles, which are tactical engagements, andthe achievement of the nations overall objec-tives in a war. Each of the three levels of con-

ict is informed by a different level of basicmilitary theory as shown in Figure 9.

Active Defense StrategicGuidelines

As a component of the greater PLA, muchof the strategic and operational jargon of thePLAN, its constructs for the analysis of warfareand operations, and the basics of Chinese na-

val military science reect the universally ap-plicable PLA approach. In other words, it iscouched in Army terminology. It is arguablethat the PLANs theory does not start resem-bling a distinctly naval organization until onegoes down to the tactical level of warfare.

Figure 9The PLAs Three Levels of Conict

Level of Conict Informed by War ( ) Strategy ( )

Campaigns ( )Campaign Methods

( )Battles ( ) Tactics ( )


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Therefore, all of the PLAs major strategic andoperational concepts apply equally to thePLA Navy. The near equivalent in China of the USs National Military Strategy is calledThe National Military Strategic Guidelines forthe New Period. These guidelines have twomajor components.

The rst is a reform and modernization com-ponent, referred to as Army Building. Itprovides direction to the totality of the PLAsmodernization efforts: equipment develop-ment and procurement, and institutional andorganizational reforms. The current guidancefor Army Building for the entire PLA is theTwo Transformations program, which callsfor the PLA to transform itself:

From an army preparing to ght localwars under ordinary conditions to anarmy preparing to ght and win localwars under modern, high-tech condi-tions

From an army based on quantity to anarmy based on quality.

A corollary that usually accompanies

these two imperatives in PLA literatureis that the PLA must also transform itself from an army that is personnel intensive toone that is science and technology intensive

Since the early 2000s, the PLA has also begunfocusing on building a military based on infor-mationalization and mechanization. 4

The second component is operational, whichprovides a broad and overarching set of fun-

damental approaches to the conduct of war.These national-level operational guidelinesare general. They are not intended to providespecic direction for campaign- or tactical-lev-

el operations or even specic contingencies.They are always keyed to an assessment of themost likely type of conict China will face inthe near term (total war or local war, nuclearwar or conventional war).

The current operational component of theNational Military Strategic Guidelines for theNew Period is known as Active Defense (

) as adjusted for the conduct of LocalWars Under Modern High-Tech Conditions.Active Defense, therefore, is the highest levelof strategic guidance for all PLA military opera-tions during war and preparation for war dur-ing peacetime. It applies to all PLA services andbranches, including the PLAN.

Offshore Defense

In 1985, the CMC approved a PLAN compo-nent of the Active Defense strategic guide-lines known as Offshore Defense (

). The PLAN also refers to this concept as theOffshore Defense Strategy. Operationally,Offshore Defense adheres to the following

basic tenets of Active Defense:

Overall, our military strategy is defen-sive. We attack only after being attacked.

But our operations are offensive .

Space or time will not limit our counter-offensive.

We will not put boundaries on the limitsof our offensives.

We will wait for the time and conditionsthat favor our forces when we do initiateoffensive operations.

We will focus on the opposing forcesweaknesses.

4 The Chinese term xinxihua ( ) is translated as either informationalization or informatization.


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We will use our own forces to eliminatethe enemys forces

Offensive operations against the enemyand defensive operations for our ownforce protection will be conducted simul-taneously

Offshore Defense as aStrategic Paradigm Shift

Adopting Offshore Defense represented a sig-nicant strategic paradigm shift for both PLANoperations and naval modernization. It revisedthe strategic-level operational guidance to the

PLAN, directing it to shift from preparing foroperations close to Chinese shores to prepar-ing for maritime operations in the seas off theChinese littoral.

The PLANs previous strategic concept of Coastal Defense ( ) focused planningand operations on a close-in defense of Chinascoast in support of a major land war. Specically,Coastal Defense addressed an anticipatedSoviet land invasion from the north support-ed by operations against the Chinese coast bythe Soviet Pacic Fleet. Hence, the PLAN waslandward-focused and was expected to play asupporting role in Chinas most likely assessedfuture contingency.

As a result, with the promulgation of OffshoreDefense in 1985, the PLANs strategic orienta-tion was redirectedout to sea. As is usuallythe case in China, this major shift in mari-time strategic reorientation was a response toa changed assessment of the internationalsecurity environment and changes in globalmilitary capabilities.

By 1985, Beijing no longer believed that aSoviet land invasion was likely. Furthermore,Chinese assessments of the changes in na-

val warfare, especially the increasing reach of modern naval weapons, led to requirementsfor a naval service that could defend China byoperating credibly further out at sea.

The adoption of Offshore Defense alsomatched Chinas changing priorities, speci-cally Dengs focus on economic modernizationand the realization that ocean resourcesfoodand energy sourceswould be of increasingimportance to Chinas future development.Moreover, the need for greater strategic depthfor the maritime defense of Chinas coastlinewas clear given that the PRCs economic cen-ter of gravity was quickly shifting from deep inthe interior to Chinas eastern seaboard.

Finally, Offshore Defense and the PLANsmove out to sea coincided with increased in-ternational focus on the growing importanceof ocean resources, issues associated with thesovereignty of territorial waters, and, equallyimportant, competing maritime claims amongthe nations of Asia.

Offshore Defense as aBroad Strategic Concept

According to PLAN writings, OffshoreDefense is simply an overarching strategicconcept that directs the PLAN to be preparedto accomplish its three key missions for thenew period by engaging in maritime opera-tions out at sea and building a naval servicethat is capable of sustaining operations out atsea. Those three key missions are to:

Keep the enemy within limits and resistinvasion from the sea

Protect the nations territorial sovereignty Safeguard the motherlands unity and

maritime rights


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The Changing Denition of Offshore

Among many foreign specialists of the PLAN,the meaning behind Offshore Defense as abroad strategic-level operational concept hasoften become enmeshed with the associatedquestions of operational reach, strategic in-tentions, and PLAN modernization programs.An example is the idea of operating within thetwo island chains or out to the 200-nautical-mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).

The rst island chain is usually described asa line through the Kurile Islands, Japan, theRyukyu Islands, Taiwan, the Philippines, and

Indonesia (Borneo to Natuna Besar). The sec-ond island chain runs from a north-south linefrom the Kuriles through Japan, the Bonins,the Marianas, the Carolines, and Indonesia.Together, they encompass maritime areas outto approximately 1,800 nm from Chinas coast,including most of the East China Sea and EastAsian SLOCs.

Most commonly, the discussion aboutOffshore Defense has used terms that link it

to geographic boundaries out at sea, future as-pirations to control various zones of ocean, orintentions to dominate island chains. Whenthe Offshore Defense concept was rst beingformulated in the late 1970s and early 1980s,and for some time after its formal adoptionin 1985, the PLAN engaged in a good deal of debate and produced a good number of stud-ies on the issue of how far offshore OffshoreDefense should be. Many of the internal de-bates did in fact argue in terms of geography.

Moreover, PLAN ofcers have often explainedthe Offshore Defense concept to foreign-ers in terms that are justied by the right of China to defend its claims of sovereignty overits EEZ, thus confusing the issue by implying a200-nm limit on the concept.

It is clear, however, that Offshore Defensehas evolved beyond the question of geographyor geographic reach. Research strongly suggeststhat, today , the term Offshore Defense doesnot imply any geographic limits or boundar-ies. It does not appear that there is today, infact, any ofcial minimum or maximum dis-tances out into the oceans associated with theOffshore Defense concept.

According to the PLAs Academy of MilitaryScience, Prior to the 1980s, the PLAN consid-ered offshore to mean 200 nm from Chinascoast. Under Deng Xiaopings guidance in the1980s, Chinas offshore included the YellowSea, East China Sea, South China Sea, theSpratly Islands, the sea area inside and outsideof Taiwan and the Ryukyu Islands, and the seaarea in the northern Pacic Ocean.

In 1997, Jiang Zemin provided guidance tothe PLAN that it should focus on raising itsoffshore comprehensive combat capabilitieswithin the rst island chain, should increasenuclear and conventional deterrence andcounterattack capabilities, and should gradu-

ally develop combat capabilities for distantocean defense.

So, how far offshore will Offshore Defensetake the PLA Navy? According to PLAN of-cers, and implied in some PLAN publications,the answer appears to be

as far as the PLA Navys capabilitieswill allow it to operate task forces out at sea

with the requisite amount of support and security.

For many PLAN ofcers, this is still a functionof the operational reach of the PLAs land-based aircraft and the PLANs antisubmarinewarfare capabilities.


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PLAN Campaigns

The PLA has identied 22 types of campaignsit could conduct during a conict. Of these,the PLAN has six key types of campaigns thatit may be called upon to engage in, either aspart of a larger joint campaign or as a single-service affair. They include:

Sea Blockade Campaign: A campaignaimed at blocking or reducing the sealinks between the enemy and the rest of the world.

Anti-Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC)Campaign: A campaign to damage andparalyze enemy sea lines of communica-tion.

Sea-to-Land Attack Campaign: A cam-paign aimed at attacking enemy navalbases, ports, and other important land-based targets. These campaigns caninvolve either the use of conventionalweapons or sea-based nuclear weapons.

Antiship Campaign: A campaign to de-stroy or damage large surface warships.It is the most typical of all naval cam-paigns.

Sea Transportation Protection Campaign:A Navy campaign to defend the safety of sea transportation and sea lines of com-munication.

Naval Base Defense Campaign: A cam-paign to resist large-scale enemy attack,blockade, or occupation of friendly navalbases. This includes defense against a vari-ety of attacks, including attacks with sub-marines, surface warships, water mines,air and land attacks, and attacks with nu-clear, biological, or chemical weapons.

Three Attacks and ThreeDefenses

Within its 22 campaigns, the PLA conductstraining on specic types of combat methodsfor what it calls the Three Attacks and ThreeDefenses. Originally, the Three Attacks re-ferred to attacks against tanks, aircraft, andairborne forces, and the Three Defenses re-ferred to defense against chemical, biological,and nuclear attack. In 1999, the PLA initiatedthe concept of New Three Attacks, whichrefers to attacks against stealth aircraft, cruisemissiles, and armed helicopters, and the New

Three Defenses, which refers to defense againstprecision strikes, electronic jamming, and elec-tronic reconnaissance and surveillance. 5 ThePLAN is actively involved in developing andtraining with its own combat methods for thenew Three Attacks and Three Defenses.

Key Guidance Documents

The PLAN disseminates its operational andtraining guidance via ofcial documents, slo-gans, and books. The highest-level campaignguidance documents are known as gangyao (

).6 Other layers in the process include theOutline of Military Training and Evaluation,military training guidance concepts, regula-tions, and teaching materials. What is signi-cant is that the PLAN has published an entirelynew set of revised guidance documents sincethe end of the 9 th Five-Year Plan (1996-2000).

5 The word new is usually dropped, so it is not always clear which 3 defenses is being discussed, but intodays context, it generally means the program initiated in 1999.

6 Gangyao can be translated as outline, essentials, or compendium, but is best left untranslated.


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The Gangyao

Campaign gangyao are an authoritative and of-cial set of guidelines, often classied, whichhave a relatively long shelf life (5 to 10 years)and from which other more granular guid-ance, such as specic regulations, are derived.Comparable US Navy documents would be aclassied Naval Doctrine Publication .

In 1999, the PLAN reissued its CampaignGangyao at the same time the PLA reissued re-vised campaign gangyao for the Army, Air Force,and Second Artillery. At that time, the PLA alsoissued its rst ever Joint Campaign Gangyao and

Joint Logistics Campaign Gangyao .

Outline of Military Trainingand Evaluation

In June 2001, the General Staff Department is-sued a completely revised Outline of MilitaryTraining and Evaluation or OMTE (

) for the ground forces, which, as a set

of classied documents, is simply identied inPLA writings as dagang ( ). After three yearsof research and writing, the PLAN publishedits own completely revised set of OMTE in

January 2002. In April 2002, the PLAAF reis-sued all of its OMTE. Of note, the word eval-uation was not included until the revisedOMTE were issued.

According to PLAN writings, the OMTE con-sists of the standardized documents used by

each branch and type of vessel unit to organizeand conduct military training. The OMTE aredivided according to branch, vessel type, spe-cialized function, and specialized technology.Their content includes the guiding thought,training subjects, content, timing, and objec-tives of training.

The OMTE stipulate the procedures for imple-menting training, the drafting of plans, thetopics and programs, the training organiza-tion, and the examination and assessmentof training. Some examples of PLAN OMTEare as follows:

Units Equipped with Each Class of NavalSubmarine and Surface Vessel

Units Equipped with Each Type of NavalAviation Aircraft, AAA, and SAM

Naval Coastal Defense Artillery andMissile Units

Marine Corps Logistics Units Chemical Defense Units

Military Training GuidanceConcepts

Based on specic military training guidanceconcepts ( ) established bythe four general departments, the PLA Navyhas identied similar, if not the same, conceptsas the basic principles for its military training.

They are merely a set of 16 characters orga-nized into four sets of four characters. A reviewof the PLAN writings identied the followingPLAN military training guidance concepts:

Closely adhere to actual combat situations( )

Stress training against opposition forces( )

Implement strict discipline during train-ing ( )

Apply science and technology duringtraining ( )

PLAN Regulations

The PLAN has a wide range of documentswith different names that can all be trans-


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lated in English as rules and regulations.Different headquarters can issue differenttypes of rules and regulations. Only the fourgeneral departments and service headquarterscan issue certain types of regulations. Unitsas low as a regiment can issue various typesof regulations.

Teaching Materials

The PLAN uses teaching materials based on thedocuments and training guidance concepts,which are written by organizations such asthe PLAN Command Academy and the PLAsAcademy of Military Science (AMS).

Doctrine Development

PLA Doctrinal Development

Because the PLA is a conservative organization,it takes time to enact major institutional,systemic, or operational changes. This alsoincludes the internal resistance such changesoften encounter. When the PLA does movetoward making major doctrinal, administra-tive, or operational reforms, the evidencesuggests it undertakes a methodical pro-cess. Based on an understanding of theorganization, roles, and missions of the PLA ingeneral, it is apparent that most major reformsgo through a thorough and sequential 10-stepprocess as follows:

Recognize there is a problem Conduct research and theoretical work to

look for solutions Experiment with new concepts Make adjustments to theories and

experiments based on results

Establish limited prototypes or conductlarger exercises to validate adjustments

Promulgate regulations or directives tocodify changes

Study the new procedures PLA- or service-wide

Execute the new procedures Inspect from the center for compliance Declare success or identify contradic-

tions

Merely getting to the point of a codication of what the new changes should be on any majorissue requires a good deal of ad-hoc committee

work and consensus building within the PLAcommunity responsible for the particularchange, reform, or adjustment to practice.

Not surprisingly, major reforms in the PLAalso require a political imprimatur. Mostdirectives, policies, and regulations are issuedunder the authority of the CMC. However,when potentially signicant (and potentiallydislocating) change is required or a completelynew direction is taken, the reforms are further

justied by the invocation of the ideologicalcorrectness of the policy. Ideological cor-rectness is a function of invoking a body of military theories, thinking, or thoughtthat is tied to the original military think-ing of one of Chinas past (or present) lead-ers. This invocation of such high-levelideological justication is continually referredto even after the fact of the change in orderto reinforce the seriousness of the need withinthe PLA to carry through with the intent of the

change or reform.

As such, each doctrinal reform can take a dif-ferent amount of time, depending on the scopeof the changes. In some cases, however, thechanges take place in conjunction with one of Chinas Five-Year Plans. They are identied for


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implementation either at the end of one plan forthe next plan, or at the beginning of the plan.

PLAN Doctrine

The Navy Military Studies Research Institute isthe single most important center in the PLANfor the development of national-level navalstrategy, the development of navy operation-al-level (campaign-level) warghting concepts,naval tactics, and research and studies thatlook to the future of naval warfare and the de-velopment of foreign naval issues. Establishedin August 1985, the PLAN refers to it in Englishas the Navy Research Institute (NRI).

Tactics, Combat Methods,and Training ConceptDevelopment

The PLAN follows a basic seven-step process indeveloping new tactics, combat methods, andtraining concepts, which can take several years

to complete. Although the PLAN has a NavalTactics Department in NRI, it often tasks spe-cic operational units as test points to develop

certain tactics and combat methods and to testnew concepts. For example, the PLAN identi-ed several different units as test points for thenew OMTE up to two years before it was nallypublished. The eight steps are as follows:

Study the theory. This can be done bybringing in specialists from PLAN and ci-vilian institutions. In addition, the projectparticipants at the unit usually visit PLANacademies and research institutes, as wellas the civilian production facilities for theequipment being studied.

Begin developing the concepts on paperand receive theoretical evaluation ap-

proval from higher headquarters for them. Begin using the specic equipment or

weapon system to develop and revise theconcepts.

Test the concepts at a PLAN test facility.

Receive a technical evaluation and ap-proval from higher headquarters.

PLAN Headquarters authorizes them foruse throughout the force.

Demonstrate the tactics, combat methods,or training concepts to VIPs and the restof the force.

Units begin to implement the changes.


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Chapter 5Submarine Forces

The PLA Navys submarine forces ( )are generally listed as rst in protocol orderamong the PLANs ve branches. This chapterprovides a brief history of the submarine forc-es, followed by information on the branchsorganizational structure and training.

Brief History

The Soviet Union played a key role in the ear-ly development of Chinas submarine forces.Although the PLAN was founded in April 1949,it was not until April 1951 that it organized275 personnel into a submarine study teamthat studied at the Soviet Pacic Fleets subma-rine unit stationed at Lushun.

The PLAN chose Qingdao on the ShandongPeninsula as its base for its submarine train-ing and operations. In May 1952, the PLAN setup its rst submarine base in Qingdao, and, in

June 1954, the PLAN established its rst inde-pendent submarine dadui in Qingdao and pur-chased four old submarines from the SovietUnion. The two medium-class submarineswere named New China ( ) 11 and 12 andthe two small-class submarines were designat-ed National Defense ( ) 21 and 22.

The PLAN also chose Qingdao as the site for itssubmarine school, which was created in August

1953 as the 4 th Naval School ( ). InSeptember 1957, the PLAN changed the nameto the Naval Submarine School (

). In June 1983, the school again changedits name to the Naval Submarine Academy( ).

In January 1956, China began assembling therst type-03 submarine from parts providedby the Soviet Union at Shanghais JiangnanShipyard, which was then deployed to thePLAN in June 1957 and named New China 15 .

The Sino-Soviet rift that began in 1959 andthe Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) markedmajor setbacks for the PLAN submarine forces,as both events resulted in the loss of essentialtechnological expertise. During the CulturalRevolution, the Naval Submarine Schoolwas closed in 1969 and not reopened untilDecember 1973. As a result of these setbacks,though production was begun in 1959, therst submarine (type 33 Romeo class) producedfrom domestic components was not commis-sioned in the PLAN until June 1969.

In the early 1970s, the PLAN began organiz-ing several division-grade submarine zhidui ,which, at that time, were subordinate to eacheet headquarters. In addition, the PLAN orga-nized its rst nuclear submarine unit in 1975,which, at that time, was directly subordinateto PLAN Headquarters. Today, each subma-rine zhidui is administratively subordinate to aeet support base.

In 1982, the PLAN successfully red a subma-rine-launched ballistic missile, thus markingthe emergence of Chinas submarine forcesinto a new phase of modern development.

Organizational Structure

Today, the PLAN has one nuclear submarinebase and six conventional submarine zhidui . It


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is also building a nuclear submarine base onHainan. As shown in Figures 10 & 11, eachPLAN submarine is assigned a specic grade,which is lower than the higher-level headquar-ters to which it is subordinate. For example:

Some conventional-powered submarines(Golf , Ming , Romeo, and Wuhan ) are regi-ment deputy leader-grade organizationsand are directly subordinate to a regimentleader-grade submarine dadui , which issubordinate to a submarine zhidui . The

primary rank for the submarine CO andpolitical commissar is commander.

Some conventional-powered subma-rines ( Kilo, Song , and Yuan ) are regiment

leader-grade organizations and are directlysubordinate to a submarine zhidui . Theprimary rank for the submarine CO andpolitical commissar is captain.

Nuclear-powered submarines are divisiondeputy leader-grade organizations and aresubordinate to division leader-grade subma-rine zhidui . The primary rank for the subma-rine CO and political commissar is captain.

Figure 10Submarine Forces Headquarters, Vessel Grades, and Ranks

Grade # Grade PLAN Submarine Structure Primary Rank3 Military Region Leader Navy HQ Admiral

4Military Region Deputy

Leader Fleet HQ Vice Admiral

5 Jun Leader Rear Admiral6 Jun Deputy Leader Support Base Rear Admiral7 Division Leader Zhidui Senior Captain8 Division Deputy Leader Nuclear-powered submarines Captain

9 Regiment Leader Dadui;

Conventional-poweredsubmarines

Captain

10 Regiment Deputy Leader Conventional-powered

submarinesCommander

11 Battalion Leader Zhongdui Lieutenant Commander

Figure 11PLA Navy Submarine Organizational Structure


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Each submarine zhidui is, in turn, subordi-nate to a jun deputy leader-grade supportbase. The primary rank for the supportbase commander and political commissar

is rear admiral. Each submarine zhidui may also have a

subordinate service ship zhongdui and anauxiliary ship zhongdui . Each vessel hasits own grade, depending on the size andfunction.

Nuclear-powered submarines each havemore than one crew, compared to onecrew for each conventional-poweredsubmarine.

Submarine Force HullNumbers

The PLAN assigns 3-digit hull numbers to itssubmarines as follows:

Nuclear submarines have 4xx hull num-bers

Conventional submarines have 2xx or3xx hull numbers

Submarine Force TrainingThe PLAN states that the objective of subma-rine unit training is to increase the organiza-tional command capabilities of submarinecommand personnel at all levels, as well asincrease the technical and tactics level of submarine units.

Training is conducted so submarine units cancarry out their combat responsibilities, eitherindividually or in coordination with another

naval branch.

Types of Training

During the 1950s, PLAN submarines beganconducting predominantly technical training,