Chiesacontingency.pdf

7/24/2019 Chiesacontingency.pdf

1/19

S: J J E C L I C 3 (2010): 159-177

L C

H Y P E R S R U C U R A L I S M S N E C E S S I Y O FC O N I N G E N C Y

Neessity and Contingeny oday

During he las decade, philosophy has experienced a dramaic resurgence o iner-es in he quesion concerning necessiy and coningency, which prooundly un-dermines he very possibiliy o coninuing o conceive hese radiional noionsin a dual manner. Such rehinking has affeced some among he mos diverse fieldso coninenal and analyic speculaion. Ineresingly enough, his convergence oheme evidences major heoreical dividing lines which are, by and large, inernalo he wo allegedly opposie sides, raher han direcly amenable o heir conron-

aion. On he one hand, philosophy o minds growing inauaion wih issues ocausaliy and probabiliy boh reflecs and disavows he virulen batle ha is cur-renly aking place in cogniive science beween hose who claim, in a Bayesianashion, ha i seems increasingly plausible ha human cogniion may be expli-cable in raional probabilisic erms since human cogniion approaches an opi-mal level o perormance,1and he supporers o he so-called accidenal mind orkluge heory, whose main Darwinian ene is subopimal evoluion, ha is, heac ha he brain is no an opimized, generic problem-solving machine, bu rahera weird agglomeraion o ad hoc soluions ha have accumulaed hroughou mil-lions o years o evoluionary hisory.2

On he oher hand, odays amalgamaion o (pos-)pos-srucuralis hough un-der he banner o a maerialis onology capable o susaining a renewed poliics

o emancipaion conceals a more basic heoreical disagreemen wih regard o hesraegic uncion o debaes on necessiy and coningency. Even a cursory com-parison o Giorgio Agambens and Slavoj ieks respecive posiions on his mater

1. G. Marcus, Kluge: Te Haphazard Evolution o the Human Mind (London: Faber and Faber,2008) 7. Marcus, a Proessor o Psychology a New York Universiy whose research on heorigins o he human mind inegraes psychology, linguisics, and molecular biology,srongly criicizes his approach.2. D. J. Linden,Te Aidental Mind. How Brain Evolution Has Given Us Love, Memory,Dreams, and God(Cambridge MA: Belknap Harvard, 2007) 3. Linden is Proessor o Neuro-science a he Johns Hopkins School o Medicine


2/19

C: Hyperstruturalisms Neessity o Contingeny S3 (2010): 160

proves revealing. While boh acknowledge he imporance o a criical discussiono hese noions, hey develop i or conflicing purposes (genealogical in he firscase, programmaic in he second). According o Agamben, he merging ino oneanoher o necessiy and coningency provides an exhausive explanaion or someo he mos blaan maniesaions o conemporary governmenal biopoliicssuchas he implemenaion o he inamous heory o war collaeral damagesin ermso a hisorical-onological ulfilmen o he Chrisian docrine o Providence.3Forhe same reason, we are also invied o abandon alogeher his equivocal vocabu-lary insoar as i would inherenly perpeuae, in spie o secularisms osensibleriumph, he inabiliy o modern poliical philosophyand o poliics tout ourto

overcome he paradoxes o Wesern heology.Conrary o his sance, ieks re-launching o a communis hypohesis remainsinexricable rom an original recuperaion o Hegels hough on necessiy andconingency, and, more o he poin, o his philosophy o Chrisianiy. Te latershould uncion as nohing less han a model or maerialism. Only a reurn o herue implicaions o he dialecical gap beween he necessiy o coningency andhe coningency o necessiy would allow conemporary aheiss o appropriaelydefine heir poliical agenda.4

In his disoriening scenario, he work o wo French hinkers, Jean-Claude Milnerand Qenin Meillassoux, deserve paricular atenion. Te laters 2006 book, AferFinitudewhose subile is, significanly enough, An Essay on the Neessity o theContingenyhas ignied passionae discussions abou he obsoleeness o he splibeween analyic and coninenal speculaion, as well he dubious moives or ispreservaion. Meillassouxs unsetling relevance o he philosophy o causaliy andhe oundaions o probabiliy can immediaely be grasped as soon as we ocuson his innovaive reamen o wha he calls Humes problem; as he pus i, hequesion is no longer exclusively wheher or no i is possible o urnish a reasonor causal necessiy bu raher wheher causal necessiy acually exiss or no.5In parallel, he demonsraion o he relaed principle according o which conin-gency alone is necessary reues he very presupposiions on which he enireyo pos-Kanian philosophy ress, boh is coninenal and linguisic/philosophy omind varians; i i can be shown ha coningency is absoluely necessary, henhough can access an in-iselabsolue coningencyha exiss independenlyrom hough. In shor, Meillassouxs invesigaion o necessiy and coningency

3. Giorgio Agamben,Il Regno e la Gloria(Vicenza: Neri Pozza, 2007) 3144. See especially, Slavoj iek, Te Fear o Four Words: A Modes Plea or he HegelianReading o Chrisianiy, in S. iek & J. Milbank (eds.), Te Monstrosity o Christ(Cam-bridge MA: MI Press, 2009). For a close reading o his ex aimed a challenging ieksappropriaion o Hegels philosophy o religion, see Lorenzo Chiesa, Chrisianisme oucommunisme? Lhglianisme marxien e le marxisme hglien de iek, in R. Moai (ed.),Autour de Slavoj iek: Psycanalyse, Marxisme, Idalisme Allemand [Acuel Marx Conron-aion series] (Presses Universiaires de France, 2010) 44-67.5. . Meillassoux, Afer Finitude(London: Coninuum, 2008) 90.


3/19


builds a solid bridge beween analyic and coninenal philosophies while, wihhe very same move, i disqualifies some o heir deepes assumpions. Las bu noleas, i uncovers heir inadequacy beore conemporary science, which is pereclycapable o advancing saemens on boh he acausal universe and evens anerioro he adven o lie as well as consciousness.6

Wih regard o Milner, I would argue ha his grea meri is o have auonomous-ly resumed he enquiry ino necessiy and coningency a a ime whenhe mid-1990si had almos compleely disappeared rom European hough. Ever since,especially in books such as Luvre laire (1995) and Le priple strutural(2002; 2008),his research has been guided by a reflecion on he necessiy o thesei, he neces-siy o convenions as differen rom he necessiy o phusei (or hings ha areaccording o naure)7and irreducible o i; he ac ha, o pu i simply, men cre-ae necessiy as well as develop a scienific discourse on i.8More specifically, orMilner, i was struturalismand, in paricular, Lacanian psychoanalysis as hyper-srucuralism, ha horoughly problemaized he radiional philosophical rela-ion beween naure and convenions, necessiy and coningency, as inheried romhe Greek world and mediaed by Gali lean science. In his own words, he greanesso srucuralism consiss in he ollowing: i ormulaed a hypohesis according owhich he dilemma [beweenphuseiand thesei] no longer exised. I claimed in isdocrine and demonsraed in is pracice ha vas secions o wha had alwaysbeen atribued o theseicould be he objec o a science in he Galilean sense ohe erm. And i did his wihou bringing theseiback ophusei, which is where is

rue novely lies.9Furhermore and mos imporanly, by hinking scienificallyhe necessiy o pure thesis, he srucural is programme operaed a redisribuiono he proporion beween physisand necessiy, on he one hand, and hesis andconingency, on he oher, which gave rise o a modal paradox while, a he sameime, providing an answer o i. Wih srucuralism and hanks o i, i becomesimperaive o accep he necessiy o theseias a given which combines ogeherwo modaliies ha are apparenly opposed: a necessiy ha is as binding as henecessiy o naure and a coningency ha is as subjec o variaions o place andime as he hesis o he Anciens.10

Milners conenion is ha pos-srucuralism, negaively defined as ha whichollowed in hough he collapse o srucuralism in he lae 1960s, would no philo-sophically live up o he challenges opened up by is predecessor; i has so ar

proved unable no only o cogiae urher on he necessiy o thesei bu also oully appreciae wha he srucuraliss and, especially, Lacan achieved heorei-cally by means o he modal paradox. Alhough I canno dwell on i here, Milners

6. Afer Finitude, 9; 92.7. Jean-Claude Milner,Le priple strutural (Lagrasse: Verdier, 2008) 280.8. Le priple strutural, 362.9. Le priple strutural, 300.10. Le priple strutural, 301.


4/19


evaluaion o lae 20h cenury analyic philosophy, which given his background inlinguisics he ofen brings ino play, urns ou o be equally severe.

I should be clear by now ha Milners and Meillassouxs converging criiques oall modes o conemporary philosophy presuppose and, a he same ime, oser acommon ineres in science. I would claim ha wha is primarily a sake, or boh,by means o a resumpion o he quesion concerning necessiy and coningencyis he promoion o a new orm o hough ha could hink heoreically wha sci-encenaural and socialalready hinks a he empirical level. And ye heir simi-lar projecs seem o be aimed a opposie objecives. Meillassoux unequivocallypromps or a new alliance beween philosophy and naural science; he ormershould be able o conceive he meaning o he later as a discourse which consrueshe relaion o he worldha o hinking and/or livingas a ac inscribed in aemporaliy wihin which his relaion is jus one even among ohers, inscribed inan order o succession in which i is merely a sage, raher han an origin. 11o pui briefly, philosophy should hink he relaiviy o hough as he main assumpionon which science operaes and produces resuls. On he conrary, Milner deemsphilosophy o be boh resisan o modern science and consiuively incompaiblewih i. Following closely Lacans own pronouncemens, he claims ha psychoa-nalysis aloneundersood as ani-philosophycan speculae on modern science,andas praxisexpand and challenge i rom wihin. Srucuralism and, a ortiori,Lacanian psychoanalysis quahypersrucuralism amouns o an exended Gali-leanism12[galilisme tendu] ha, while suspending he schism beween he social

and he naural because o is inherence o he naura l, also prevens he reduciono thesisophysis.

For Milner, he whole discourse o psychoanalysis revolves around a crucial is-sue, namely, he passage rom he momen in which he speaking being could beinfiniely differen rom wha he isin his body and hougho he momen inwhich, on he basis o his very coningency, he has become similar o an eernalnecessiy;13alhough Milner does no menion i, we should reer here especiallyo he onogeneic impor o he Oedipus complex. Mos imporanly, unlike phi-losophy, which is isel primarily concerned wih anhropogenesis (in erms o heemergence o he ranscendenal), psychoanalysis rules ou he possibiliy o ab-sracing onesel rom his hreshold; here is no ouside-universe14[hors-univers],hence mans passage rom coningency o necessiy canno be oalized adoping an

exernal pacified perspecive, nor can i be undersood chronologically. Psychoa-nalysis hinks he absolute ontingenyo he speaking being. I is or his reasonha, along wih he necessiy o thesei, onological non-oalizaionhe ac hahe One and Being mus be separaedand synchronic emporaliyas differen

11.Afer Finitude, 10.12. See or insance, Jean-Claude Milner, Luvre laire (Paris: Seuil, 1995) 111.13. Luvre laire,152.14. Luvre laire,153.


5/19


rom conemporarinessconsiue he hree major legacies o srucuralism, inparicular o Lacanian psychoanalysis, o conemporary hough.

My overall claim is ha, despie heir seemingly conrasing predicions abou heuure o philosophy, Meillassouxs speculaive realism relies on an appropriaionand (or he mos par unsuccessul) resoluion o he hreeold legacy o srucur-alism as undersood by Milner.15 In his paper I will, however, ocus only on henoion o he necessiy o thesei as developed by Lacans psychoanalyic hyper-srucuralism and he role played by science in such conex.

Struturalism as Extended Galileanism

According o Milner, srucuralism amouns o he ulfilmen o he scienific para-digm ha originaes rom he Galilean revoluion; srucuralism brings Galilean-ism o is exreme consequences, rendering explici some o he mos ar-reachingpresupposiions on which modern science has always acily ounded isel. Firsand oremos, hese concern he noion o naure, he scope o mahemaics, ogeh-er wih he redisribuion o he uncions o necessiy and coningency. Galilean-ism replaces he ancien noion o naure asphysisi.e. he order o he world haexiss independenly o mans convenionswih he modern noion according owhich i is nohing else han he empirical objec o science. Te ormal precondi-ion o his change lies in he complee mahemaizaion o science. In oher words,

afer Galileo, naure does no have any oher sensible subsance [substane sensible]han ha which is necessary o he righ uncioning o sciences mahemaicalormulas.16Tis leads o an epochal shif in he way in which he superimposiiono he or-us ono he in-isel is being undersood. On he one hand, or ancienscience,physisis as such sensible and qualiaive, bu mans own percepion is none-heless required o disinguish beween wha is eernally necessaryand conse-quenly mahemaicaland wha is ransiorily coningenand only occasionallymahemaizable. Te in-isel inherenly gives isel o us while, a he same ime,as consiuive componens o he in-isel, we are needed o discern in i wha isnecessary rom wha is coningen. On he oher hand, modern science eliminaesnaures perceivable qualiies in avour o an absrac noion o mater, ye his alsoparadoxically resuls in he ac ha he naural objec liable o be mahemaizedis now undersood as mans mere orrelative. Givenness is no a propery o he

in-isel while, a he same ime, he discourse o mahemaical necessiy mus berelegaed o he field o wha is ontingently giveno us. o pu i differenly, modernscience does no conemplae esablishing wheher somehing is as such neces-sary or coningen. Milner insiss on his poin: unlike ancien science, or modernscience, here can be mahemaizaion o wha is [as such] imperec, emporal,

15. A ull discussion o his will appear in Lorenzo Chiesa, For Laan: Siene, Logi, Politis(Cambridge MA: MI Press, orhcoming 2012).16. Le priple strutural, 287-8.


6/19


and coningen jus as much as o wha is [as such] perec, eernal, necessary. 17More precisely, we could say ha, or modern science o be able o operae, i isneessaryo regard naure qua he mahemaizable objec o science as indiffereno he supposed difference beween necessiy and coningency in he in-isel.Tus, wih specific regard o he role o mahemaics, or beter mahemaical neces-siy, modern science requireshe mahemaizaion o he objec; i does no requireha he objec be a mahemaical essence. Tereore, i does no require ha i beeernal and perec; raher, we could go as ar as suggesing ha, on he conrary,i aims a grasping, by means o mahemaizaion, ha which in i [objec] mighbe differen rom wha i is; ha which i has o empirical, coningen, repeaable

and hus emporal.18

Independenly o wheher he objec is in-isel necessary orconingen, modern sciences mahemaical necessiy ocuses on he coningency ohe objecs or-us.

On he basis o his discussion o he paradigmaic change rom ancien o mod-ern science, Milner draws an imporan conclusion: he greaes achievemen ohe Gali lean revoluion consiss in he ac ha, insoar as science reduces naureo nohing else han is objecive correlaive, he later can no longer simply beinscribed wihin he dichoomy physis/thesis, wha is according o naural neces-siies and wha is according o mans convenions. A his sage, he nea divisionbeween he wo poles (naural and culural) has already been compromised. Anyscienific discourse on naure isor, a leas, migh hypoheically beisel con-venional. However, modern science, has never really acceped his sae o affairs;

i has no ye renounced he ancien division beween physisand thesis, in spie ohe ac ha i has isel empiedphysiso any significaion. Convenions, cusomsand radiionsha is, in shor, he sphere o manare sill deemed o be, by defi-niion, un-mahemaizable. Bu, evenually, he only way in which modern sciencecould domesicae he ani-dualisic impac o he Galilean revoluion was by pro-moing a orm o nauralis reducionism which, precisely in order o preserve hepolariyphysis/thesis, has conradicorily ended up submiting i o he physispole.o pu i simply, oday, convenions are by and large deemed o be naural; theseican be inegraed inophusei; here is a possible definiion o man ha poeniallymahemaizes him in his enirey, ye only a he cos o ransorming him inoa segmen o naure.19Milner convincingly suggess ha he curren success osaisics and geneicsas well as, we could add, he increasing endency o urn

poliics ino (saisical and geneic) bio-poliicswinesses o he pragmaic effi-ciency o his soluion.

In his ongoing scenario, or a couple o decades in he second hal o he weniehcenury, srucuralism offered a plausible alernaive o nauralis reducionism,one ha uncovered he real roos o he Galilean revoluion. I rejeced alogeherhephysis/thesis conundrum demonsraing ha theseicould hemselves be he ob-

17. Le priple strutural,291.18. Le priple strutural, 289 (my emphasis).19. Le priple strutural,299.


7/19


jec o a mahemaized science in a Galilean sense. Milners main argumen hereis ha, in ocusing on he necessiy o thesis without, lierally, incorporaing i ino

physis, srucuralism extendedGalileanism. Because o his, he necessiy o thesisshould be considered as he crucial heoreical innovaion o srucuralism and di-recly provides us wih is five key hypoheses.20Firs, he necessiy o thesisneedso be assumed as a given; as he social sciences o he nineeenh cenury, in primisMarxism, already concluded, man creaes necessiies which are boh imposed onhim and modifiable by him. Second, he necessiy o thesisis no only a given bumus also become a scienific objec; he noion o srucure designaes i in hisregard. Tird, he necessiy o language (as convenion) is he mos eviden neces-

siy o thesis, hence linguisics should work as a model or he oher sciences oman; insoar as he later are all based on linguisic necessiy, hey presen com-mon rais which can be analysed hrough a common mehodology. Fourh, he ne-cessiy o thesisis scienific only insoar as i is no reduced ophysis. Fifh, we musno enquire ino he origins o a given necessiy o thesis; as we have seen earlier,he modal paradox suspends chronology.

Following closely Milners own reasoning, I would add hree more basic proposi-ions as corollaries o he second, hird, and fifh hypoheses; hey are al l derivedrom he cenral ene o he necessiy o thesisand help us o pave he way o ourdiscussion o Lacans hyper-srucuralism. In relaion o he second hypohesis, weshould speciy ha srucuralism, undersood as an exended Galileanism, enailsan exended use o mahemaizaion, one which is no usually acknowledged as

mahemaical by mahemaicians. More precisely, such exension o mahemai-zaion amouns o an indiscriminae handling o leters. Pure lieraliy: letersare posed wihou a subsanial definiion; rules are posed which define wha oneis allowed o do wih hese leters; and, on his basis, deducions are possible owhich empirical predicions can be relaed.21Wih regard o he hird hypohesis,i is imporan o emphasize ha he sciences o man ha rely on srucuralismare, properly speaking, heories o differene. A he level o boh inra- and iner-disciplinary empirical knowledge, elemens are individuaed hrough opposiionssaring rom a clear-cu separaion o he noions o ideniy and resemblance,which are, on he conrary, always coupled by radiional episemologies. Finally,concerning he fifh hypohesis, he ormal idea o origins is o be subsiued wihha o break [oupure]. I scienific srucuralism, in all is varians, always iner-

rogaes he a-chronological hreshold beween theseiandphusei, hen he necessiyo thesisi encouners on his very hreshold as a given presens isel in he pureorm o he break.22

Milner also believes ha he basic hypoheses o srucuralism conain a series oinheren impasses which, once again, involve primarily he role o mahemaicsand he noion o science. We can summarize hem by means o wo relaed ques-

20. Le priple strutural, 301.21. Le priple strutural, 305-6.22. Le priple strutural, 335-6.


8/19


ions: isn srucuralisms innovaive use o mahemaizaion evenually a orm ode-mahemaizaion, which would auomaically exclude rom he field o modernscience he very endeavour o extendingGalileanism? Conversely, isn srucural-isms episemological minimalismis insisence on he uniciy and specificiy ohe objec23(i.e. he necessiy o thesischaracerizing each human science, whichis finally always reducible o linguisic necessiy)an endorsemen o an ancienmodel o ideal science? Ineresingly enough, while he firs quesion insinuaesha he innovaions inroduced by exended Galileanism are as ye less han sci-enific, he second reors he same accusaion o radiional (non-exended) Gali-lean science. We could sugges ha srucuralism compromises isel by posing,

a he same ime, as boh oo ground-breaking and oo conservaive or modernscience. Les dwell on each o hese problems. On he one hand, no only has hekind o mahemaizaion adoped by srucuralism no been recognized as mah-emaical by mahemaicians, bu also is use o leters pars ways wih any ac-cepable mahemaical logic. o pu i simply, srucuralism canno be inscribedin any kind o ormalism which migh currenly be regarded as scienific. On heoher hand, srucura lisms episemology aims a he ormulaion o a minimal axi-omaic sysembased in he end upon he axiom o he primacy o difference overideniywhich ignores he ac ha, especially afer Popper, Galilean science hasconsidered isel as resoluely ani-minimalis. In shor, science requires empiricalalsificaionhe logical possibiliy ha a saemen could be demonsraed o bealse by a paricular observaionand hereore a muliplicaion, no a reducion,o is hypoheses.24

I hink Milner is a his bes when he illusraes he way in which hese ensionsconverge on he very noion o srucure and make i vacillae, i no implodealogeher. Te later is characerized by boh maximal exension (he necessiyo thesisoriginally developed ino a scienific srucure by linguisics should beapplied o allhuman sciences) and minimal comprehension (all human sciencesare a las dependen on jus oneundamenal axiom o linguisic necessiy predi-caing he differenial and opposiionali.e. ulimaely non-linguisicnaure olanguage). As Milner righly conends, he inersecion o hese wo coordinaesexposes he Achilles heel o srucuralism: i he comprehension o he noion[o srucure] is reduced o excess, in oher words, as I would pu i, i exension ishe only conen o comprehension, he risk o he void hreaens i [srucure].25

In order o ry o avoid such risk, srucuralism needs o ask isel one crucialquesion, namely, is i possible o enumerae he necessary and sufficien condi-ions or here o be a srucure?26According o Milner, one o he ew, i no heonly, hinker who offered a posiive and persuasive answer o his query, and husemporarily prolonged and reinorced he srucuralis projec, was Lacan. I is

23. Le priple strutural, 340.24. Le priple strutural, 338-40.25. Le priple strutural, 341.26. Le priple strutural, 341.


9/19


precisely in his sense ha Lacanian psychoanalysis should be undersood as ahyper-srucuralism.

Hyper-struturalism, or, Te Subjet as Strutures External Inlusion

A he core o his redevelopmen o Freudian psychoanalysis, Lacan posulaes haany srucureha is any necessiy o thesis as ulimaely reducible o linguis-ic necessiymus have minimal properies which are hemselves neessary.27Teemergence o he subjetis one o hese essenial properies o any srucure. WhileMilner does no ackle his poin openly, we are also led o believe ha, or Lacan,such emergence is no only necessary bu also sufficien or here o be a srucure.Unsurprisingly, he ac ha he subjec as suchwhose uncion srucuralism isusually supposed o have marginalized or even eliminaedshould be regarded asthesrucuralpropery o srucure creaes a paradox, o which I shall reurn laerin greaer deail, and which we could enaively phrase as ollows: any minimalsrucure conains he subjec hrough a relaion o exernal inclusion.28

For he ime being, i is worh dwelling on he way in which Lacan comes o con-jecure he reciprociy o srucure and subjec. His basic operaion consiss o aurher developmen and complicaion o srucural linguisics minimalism. WhaMilner calls he risk o he void pending on he later could be beter appreciaedby means o a riparie division. As we have already parly explained, rom he

poin o view o is heory, srucural linguisics aims a ormulaing a minimalnumber o undamenal axioms (and hus remains pre-modern); rom ha o isobjec, i considers language only as a differenial sysem o opposiions (and hussomehow empies i ou); finally, rom ha o he properies o is objecor beter,o he properies o he objecs elemenshese are reduced o relaions o di-erence which are enirely deermined by he sysem isel (and hus canno behough as discree properies). In oher words, in srucural linguisics, differenceis given firs, i is ha which auhorizes properies,29which are hen jus differen-ial relaions. Bu, as a consequence o his, difference alone canno be posied ashe necessary and sufficien onditionor here o be a srucure, since i canno beconsidered o be a srucural propery in he firs place. Raher, difference ishesrucure tout-ourt, which hus remains compleely undeermined as a noion.

Lacans hypersrucuralism originaes precisely in a conronaion wih his im-passe. I would claim ha i supplemens srucural linguisics equaion o sruc-ure wih difference wih he heory o he reciprociy o srucure and subjecaccording o which he subjec is he necessary propery o srucure while, a he

27. Milners ormulaion o his poin in French is exremely effecive: La srucure quel-Milners ormulaion o his poin in French is exremely effecive: La srucure quel-La srucure quel-La srucure quel-conque a des propris non-quelconques (Le priple strutural, 346; Luvre laire,104).28. Luvre laire, 105. Milner is hus righ in emphasizing ha Lacans own relaion osrucuralism is isel, given his idenificaion o he subjec as thesrucural propery osrucure, one o paradoxical exernal inclusion (Luvre laire, 9).29. Luvre laire, 99.


10/19


same ime, he remains distinguishablerom i. I, on he one hand, Lacan does nopronounce judgemen on srucural linguisics axiomaic minimalism, on he oh-er, he boh preserves and radicalizes is conceps o minimalism o he objec and oproperies in an atemp o aver he disappearance o he very noion o srucure.More specifically, rom he sandpoin o he objec, psychoanalysis conceives heunconscious as a minimal differenial sysem, a unidimensionalchain ha is alwaysin praesentia, or, as Milner clearly explains, can be grasped a one glance, in oneinsan,30wihou any need or sraificaion. Going beyond Saussures division olanguage ino wo axessynagmaic and paradigmaic; acual and virualhis isprecisely wha Lacan ries o convey wih he moto here is no mea-language:

he unconscious should no be reified ino an absen eniy, no even i he lateris undersood linguisically; raher, he unconscious perecly coincides wih islinguisic ormaions (sympoms, jokes, slips o he ongue, ec.).31Te same kindo exreme minimalism is developed a he level o properies. No only does La-can ollow srucural linguisics in reducing he properies o he elemens o hechaincalled signifierso differenial relaions induced by he srucure, bu alsoacknowledges ha, in doing so, he srucure as such is conceived as a auseo isown properies. In oher words, he signifier does no haveproperies, bu makeshem: i is acion,32he very unolding o he chain.

A his sage, Lacans radical srucuralismhis radicalizaion o srucural mini-malismsummons he subjec as a deerminable srucural propery o pure unde-ermined acion and, as a resul, urns ino hypersrucuralism. Te differenial and

acive chain suppors isel hanks o an exernal erm, he subjec, which susainshe irreducible differenialiy (or non-ideniy wih isel) o each o he chainserms, including is own. Te subjec hus becomes isel one o he erms o hechain: inasmuch as, in he minimal chain, any hierarchy beween sysem, erm andpropery has disappeared, he propery o a erm is isel a erm.33Milner is veryaccurae on his poin: Te subjec becomes an inheren propery o he chain []:every signiying chain, as such, includes he subjec; bu he subjec himsel canonly be defined as he erm Y in a ernary relaion where X is a signifier and Z isanoher signifier.34In Lacanian jargon, his means ha he subjec is simply hawhich a signifier represens or anoher signifier, and, as such, always vanishing.Here, we should also be able o appreciae beter in which sense he reciprociy osrucure and subjec in Lacans hyper-srucuralism gives rise o a paradox: he

subjec allows represenaioni.e. he possibiliy o conceiving each differenialerm o he chain as idenical wih iselby remaining included externallyin hechainor, ollowing Jacques-Alain Millers ormulaion in his seminal 1966 aricle

30. Le priple strutural, 216-7.31. See Le priple strutural, 216-7.32. Luvre laire, 103.33. SeeSee Le priple strutural, 228-9.34. Luvre laire, 105-6.


11/19


Suure, by figuring [in he chain] as he elemen which is lacking, in he orm o asand-in; or, while here lacking, i is no purely and simply absen. 35

Having said his, as Milner noices, hypersrucuralisms overcoming o he risk ohe void inheren o srucuralism comes a a high cos. Te reciprociy o srucureand subjec, he exernal inclusion ino srucure o he subjec as srucural prop-ery o srucure, is, in he end, auological. o pu i simply, he subjec amounso he srucural propery o srucure because, as we have jus seen, he can bededuedrom i: he could no be differen rom wha [he] is wihou srucure ceas-ing o be a srucure, and his by logical necessiy (he logic o he signifier).36Tislogically necessary relaion beween srucure and subjec, he ac ha he subjecmus always be a subjec o he signifier and he minimal srucure can never havenon-subjecive properies, is wha Milner calls he vaniy37o Lacans hypersruc-uralis re-elaboraion o Saussure, bu also he cornersone o is legacy, whichChomskyan linguisicsand also, more generally, pos-srucuralis houghhasignored. Agains srucuralisms heory o he homology o srucures, Chomskyinsiss on he specificiy o language, ha hrough which language does no re-semble o anyhing else;38a he same ime, in diamerical opposiion o Lacan, heassumes ha is essenial characers should no be deduced rom an alleged noiono srucure and regarded as necessary, bu raher considered as coningen, ha is,empirically alsifiablehey could be differen rom wha hey are wihou logicalconradicion.39Tis evenually leads Chomsky o a complee re-nauralizaion olanguage (is well-known equaion wih an organ) which in addiion o confining

he srucuralis speculaion on he necessiy o thesis o he field o physisalso,and more imporanly, begs he quesion posed by hypersrucuralisms innova-ive idenificaion o srucure (he necessiy o thesis) wih he real as suchais o say, a real which is irreducible o he concep o naure aken as he objec oempirical science. As Lacan unequivocally pus i in he second lesson o SeminarXVI, srucure is o be undersood in he sense ha i is ha which is mos real, iis he real isel [] I sress ha his is in no way a meaphor.40

Tis is a crucial mater ha needs o be approached wih cauion. For now, I willlimi mysel o suggesing ha, according o Lacan, he reciprociy beween sruc-ure and subjec is logically necessary only because i direcly expresses he realo be disinguished ye no separaed rom he realiy wih which empirical scienceoperaesas absoluteconingency. Milner ails o make his connecion when, op-

posing Chomskys empirical coningency o Lacans logical necessiy, he simply

35. J.-A. Miller, Suure: Elemens o he Logic o he Signifier, in Sreen18 (Winer 1978):24-34.36. Le priple strutural, 347.37. Le priple strutural, 352.38. Le priple strutural, 351.39. Le priple strutural, 352.40. Lacan, Le sminaire. Livre XVI. Dun Autre lautre(Paris: Seuil, 2006) 30.


12/19


argues ha, or he later, logic is he science o he real,41a saemen which couldeasily be misaken as an indicaor o subjecive idealism. Ye, Lacan is cerainlyno an advocae o radical necessiy. Tere are counless insances in which hebinds he subjec o he signifier o he subjec o modern empirical science, andas a consequence o ha, undersands him as a correlae o coningency in an-oher conex, Milner himsel coins his expression o hrow ligh on Lacans debo Popper.42Noneheless, such definiion o he subjec urns ou o be insufficieno couner he accusaion ha hypersrucuralism amouns o a orm o idealism:correlaional coningency could sill well denoe a dialecical sage o absolue ne-cessiys sel-deploymen. Wha remains o be explored o ully rebu i is he di-

erence beween he absolue coningency o he real on which he logical necessiyo he subjec as srucural propery ress and he noion o empirical coningencyadoped by modern sciences subjec/objec correlaionalism.

Psycoanalysis and Siene

In wha sense can Lacan overlap he unconscious subjec o he signifier (as sruc-ural propery) wih he subjec o modern science (as hisorical figure)? Wha doeshe phrase subjec o science mean more precisely? In he las hree decades, heimpor o his noion has been invesigaed rom several conflicing perspecivesand wih various degrees o clariy.43I hink Milners conribuion remains amonghe mos commendable or wo main reasons: firs o all, he convincingly shows

how Lacans pronouncemens on modern science do no simply consiue a heoryo science or an episemology bu wha he calls a dotrinal de siene, ha is, a con-

juncion o proposiions on science and on he subjec;44secondly, he dispels hewidespread opinion ha such conjuncion promoes hisoricism. Milner believesha Lacan ormulaes a basic axiomo he subjechere is a subjec, disinc romany orm o empirical individualiywhich should no be conused wih he hy-

pothesishe pus orward concerning he subjec o sienemodern science, insoaras i is a science and insoar as i is modern, deermines a modaliy o consiuion ohe subjecsince he later resuls rom he ormer, o which i is a specificaion.45In brie, his means ha hedotrinal de sienedoes no aim a reducing he subjectout-ourto he subjec o modern science; raher, i inends o delimi he field ooperaion o hypersrucuralis psychoanalysis as he discourse which boh ully

mees he original demands o modern science and remains he mos aihul ohe axiom o he subjec. Lacans well-known claim according o which he subjec

41. Le priple strutural, 353.42. Luvre laire, 61.43. For a general inroducion o his debae, see J. Glynos & Y. Savrakakis (eds.), Laanand Siene(London: Karnac, 2002). In a non-Anglophone conex, i is worh singling ouor is originaliy Rado R ihas work on he relaion beween Lacanian psychoanalysis,Kanian phi losophy and he ehical d imension o science.44. Luvre laire, 42.45. Luvre laire, 33-4.


13/19


upon whom we operae in psychoanalysis can only be he subjec o science shouldbe inerpreed in his conex.46On he one hand, hypersrucuralism resiss anyatemp o reduce he subjec o he ego as an empirical individualiy: he subjec ohe unconscious discovered by Freud and remodelled by Lacans heory o he signi-fier is an impersonal i hinks deprived o any qualiy. Precisely or his reason,on he oher hand, hypersrucuralism also mainains isel wihin he Galilean-Caresian revoluionary programme o a minimalis mahemaized physics whicheliminaes he sensible rom naure and hus requires a corresponding minimalsubjec wihou qualiies. Philosophy berayed his agenda as soon as Descareshimsel deermined his ogitoas a uniy o onological sel-consciousness.

Moving rom hese premises, I would argue ha Milner is correc in claiming hahe only perinen scienific quesion concerning psychoanalysis is no is psychoa-nalysis a science? bu raher wha is a science ha includes psychoanalysis?,47or also, I sugges, wha would conemporary empirical science look like i i pre-servedand developedis original Galilean minimalism? As parly anicipaed inhe previous secion, my claim is ha Lacans succinc answer o such query is: ascience able o include psychoanalysis mus be a science ha acknowledges he realas he absolue coningency presupposed by he minimal logic o he signifier. Tisis precisely wha he grea majoriy o curren sciencebased as i is on probabil-isic causaliy and he ani-minimalis mehod o alsificaioncanno afford o doand, consequenly, also he reason why i excludes psychoanalysis rom is sphere.In his regard, Milner seems srangely hesian: he ac ha he coningency o he

subjec o science can also be derived rom Poppers mehodological model shouldno lead us o suppose ha coningency as such is reducible o empirical coningen-cy or ha, conversely, Popperian science could regard hypersrucuralisms heoryo he subjec as a orm o empiricism. I he axiom o he subjec exceeds he hy-pohesis abou he subjec o science, hen he subjec as disinc rom any orm oempirical individualiy is no enirely explainable as he coningen correlae o heobjec o science.

Wha is even more surprising is Milners avoidance o any direc engagemen wihLacans virulen criique o he discourse o empirical science, especially as ex-posed in Science and ruh (1966). I is accurae ye no sufficien o observe hahypersrucuralis psychoanalysis fighs agains he ideal o sciencescience asan unreachable paradigmaic poin o reerence a which scieniss aim asymp-

oicallyas well as, even more fiercely, is concree embodimen ino he variableprescripive norms o ideal science, and subsiues boh or an ideal o psychoa-nalysis or science (epiomized, as we have remarked, by he quesion wha is ascience ha includes psychoanalysis?).48Beyond all ha, or Lacan, science goes asar as oreclosing he subjec as ruhi.e. he subjec as suspension o all knowl-edgewhich is anoher way o say ha i repudiaes he absolue coningency o

46. J. Lacan, Science and ruh, in rits(New York/London: Noron, 2006) 729.47. Luvre laire, 37.48. Luvre laire, 35-6.


14/19


he logic o he signifier (as ruh o he subjec). Le me dwell on his delicae is-sue by reurning o he moto he subjec on whom we operae in psychoanalysiscan only be he subjec o science. Alhough Milner exensively commens on ia he very beginning o his discussion o he dotrinal de sieneand he axiomo he subjec, he omis o repor an imporan specificaion, hus underraing isbroades consequences. Lacans ex reads as ollows:o say ha he subjec uponwhom we operae in psychoanalysis can only be he subjec o science may seem

paradoxial.49Wha is he apparentparadox Lacan is reerring o? On he one hand,psychoanalysis uncovers he srucural division o he subjec o modern sciencehe subjec ha originaes hisorically rom he Galilean revoluion and he Car-

esian ogitobeween knowledge and ruh. On he oher hand, i aims o oundisel as a non-hisoricis science (hypersrucuralism), and, wih he same move,reound science as such on he very basis o he hisorically deermined subjec oscience as a (more generally) divided subjec. Te apparen paradox is hereorewoold: i involves no only he relaion beween psychoanalysis and science, bualso ha beween srucure and hisory. We should explore his in more deph.

According o Lacan, modern science atemps o suure he subjec o science,uniy him empirically as a closed se o knowledge, bu i ails, as demonsraed,or insance, by he very possibiliy o ormulaing Gdels heorem o incomplee-ness or Canors noion o he ransinfinie. Consequenly, he subjec [o science]remains a correlae o science, bu an aninomic correlae since science urns ou obe defined by he deadlocked endeavour o suure he subjec.50Tis passage rom

Science and ruh, which Milner does no ake ino consideraion, is possibly evenmore significan han he one we have jus scruinized: he subjec o science as asrucural propery ha surpasses he way in which he is deermined by modernscience is an antinomi orrelate o science, or, more precisely, o is empiricallyconingen objec. In oher words, i is precisely sciences ailure o suure is sub-

jec, or beter o saurae himLacan uses boh verbs in Science and ruhhaallows he emergence o he subjec o psychoanalysis. Te later is hereore hesubjec o science insoar as he is no sauraed. Te subjec o psychoanalysis, hais, he subjec o he unconscious, and he subjec o science are boh he conse-quence o a hisorically definable division beween knowledge and ruh, whichisel presupposes a more srucural exernal inclusion o he subjec ino he logico he signifier. Tey are he wo sides o he same coin: modern science orecloses

ruh in hisory, ye ruh hen re-emerges hisorically a he level o srucure inhe signiying consrucions ha psychoanalysis finds in sympoms and he oherormaions o he unconscious.51Tis means ha psychoanalysis has o quesionhe condiions o he ruhul52i.e. re-enac he Caresian doub as a reusal o

49. Science and ruh, 729 (my emphasis).50. Science and ruh, 731.51. See J. Lacan, Seminar XII, Problmes cruciaux pour la psychanalyse, 1964-1965, unpub-lished, lesson o June 9, 1965.52. J. Lacan, Seminar IX, Idenificaion, 1961-1962, unpublished, lesson o November 29,1961.


15/19


acquired knowledgefirs and oremos because i is he hisorical produc o hesubjec o sciences ownrenewed ques or ruh: o pu i blunly, i is he analy-sand who demands o know he ruh abou his sympom, a ormaion ha ofendoes no make any sense or scienific knowledge. Here we encouner he apparenparadox o psychoanalysis relaion wih science in is pures orm: he sieneopsychoanalysis, as Lacan ofen defines i, canno be equaed wih scienific knowl-edge. On he conrary, he very objec o psychoanalyic science, he objec ao beundersood as he inexricable correlae o he divided subjecand as he concepby way o which hypersrucuralism ormalizes wha resiss sciences endeavour osaurae he subjecis precisely wha challenges he noion o scienific knowledge

as such.53

Bu how should we undersand such division beween knowledge and ruh in re-laion o he idenificaion o srucure wih he real I evoked earlier? Crucially,Lacan concludes ha, i science a las does no manage o saurae he subjec, iis because here is no mea-language, no oalizing ruh o language, since lan-guage and he symbolic srucures i creaes are srucurally incomplee. In oherwords, he emergence o he differenial logic o he signifier is concomian wihhe inroducion o a void. Tis is he only ruh, whose consequence is nohing elsehan he Spaltung beween consciousness and he unconscious. Mos imporanly,as boh Milner and Miller promply noice in heir discussions o he signifiersacion,54Lacan inerpres he ruh o incompleeness in causal erms: he ruh ascause, as he calls i, is co-subsanial wih he exisence o srucure. Lacan speci-

fies ha his causei.e. he logical necessiy o srucural causaliyis no a merelogical caegory bu ha which caus[es] he whole effec:55in shor, i is real. Andhis is valid boh in he ordinary sense ha, on some level, he cause belongs ohe exernal world as a maerial subsraum o he signiying srucure,56inde-pendenly rom he laters exisence, as well as in he more specifically Lacanianaccepaion o he erm or which i marks he illogical limi, or aninomy, o helogic o he signifier (i.e. he exernal inclusion o he subjec); he wo meaningsare here inseparable.

53. See Science and ruh, 733. Having said his, psychoanalysis canno do wihou or-ganizing isel ino knowledge: as Lacan has i, Freud and Lacan are proper names hauncioning as Maser-Signifiers ineviably end up advancing a new ruh abou ruh.Psychoanalysis hus repeas he twooscillaions o he Caresian ogito. Having uncoveredhe sore or breaking poin o ruh, psychoanalysis ormulaes a knowledgeha, likeDescares, knows ha ruh canno be reduced o knowledge (Science and ruh, 737).Obviously, psychoanalysis no longer anchors such knowledge on he mea-Maser-SignifierGod.54. Millers mos imporan conribuion o his quesion remains his 1968 aricle Acion ohe Srucure, now in Te Symptom 10, Spring 2009.55. Science and ruh, 738.56. I is in his sense ha Lacan can claim elsewhere ha natureprovides us wih [] sig-nifiers, and hese signifiers organize in an inaugural manner human relaionships, givingheir srucures, and shape hem (J. Lacan, Te Four Fundamental Conepts o Psycoanaly-sis[London: Vinage, 1998] 28, my emphasis).


16/19


I is precisely in his conex ha Lacan also ounds his heory o discourses: in aew words, a discourse amouns o he paricular configuraion assumed by sruc-urehe signifiers represenaion o he subjec or anoher signifierwih regardo is inheren real causaliy. I, on he one hand, ruh as srucural cause (or realvoid o srucure) is o be regarded as he basis o every hisorically deermined dis-course, on he oher, he knowledge promoed by specific discourses opposes ruhas srucura l cause in differen ways. Tis means ha oreclosure is no a necessaryoucome o hisory, bu he paricular produc o he discourse o modern sciencesconronaion wih incompleeness, he real void o srucure. Science considersruh only as aormalcause, ha is o say, i reduces ruh o he knowledge o he

laws ha are supposed o accoun or i. Tus, he subjec o science as a dividedsubjec caused by ruh aims o exclude himsel rom his symbolizaions, which areideally deemed o be oalizable (wha Milner aply names he perspecive o ou-side-universe);57Lacan emphasizes ha, or his reason, modern sciences reusal oacknowledge he incommensurabiliy o ruh wih knowledge is even more radicalhan ha o magic and religion58On he oher hand, in conceiving o ruh as a ma-terialcause, psychoanalyic discourse keeps i separae rom knowledge. Psychoa-nalysis recognizes ha he emergence o he signiying srucure in concomiancewih a real void which is inheren ye irreducible o i should be conceived o asa maerial process: as Lacan wries in Science and ruh, h[e] maerial causeis properly speaking he orm o impac [inidene] o he signifier.59Or, as he re-phrases i more lucidly in a conemporary aricle dedicaed o philosophy sudens,he signifier is mater ha ranscends isel ino language.60

A his sage, we sill need o show how his noion o a maerially real causaliy,as such indiscernible rom he logical necessiy o he minimal srucure, is associ-aed wih and susained by an absolue coningency ha mus be nealy separaedrom he empirical coningency o probabilisic causaliy wih which science op-eraes. We have already argued ha sciences empiricism relies on a rejecion oincompleeness, he adopion o he perspecive o ouside-universe ha allegedlyallows one o oalize naure by means o knowledge. Bu, precisely or his reason,as Meillassoux righly remarks in a chaper o Afer Finitude ha begins wih a cri-ique o Poppers alsificaionism,61science uncions on he basis o cane, no con-ingency; i proceeds by extending the probabilisti reasoning [] ha is internal oour universe (he hrow o he dice and is resul) o the universe as suc,62couning

i as one.In doing so, i already presupposes ha he laws o naure are unchange-able, ha is, i acily replaces heir apparen sabiliy, which can be observed em-

57. See Science and ruh, 739-4058. Indeed, he religious man knows ha he does notknow wha he ruhul God knows,while, as anhropologiss have shown, he shaman knows ha he efficacy o his acionrelies on a deeptive pracice.59.Science and ruh, 743.60. Rponses des udians en philosophie, inRponses des udians en philosophie, in inin Autres rits(Paris: Seuil, 2001) 209.61. Afer Finitude, 85.62. Afer Finitude, 97.


17/19


pirically, wih a priori necessiy. In oher words, science does no ever ask isel hequesion Is here such hing as causal necessiy in naure?,63i orecloses i.

Lacan develops he disincion beween chance (i.e. empirical coningency) andabsolue coningency in a couple o well-known lessons o Seminar XI ha, moregenerally, aim a insiuing psychoanalysis as ani-idealis realism. Drawing romchapers our and five o Arisoles Physis, he claims ha here are wo kinds oconingency, automaton and tyce. Te firs belongs o he logic o he signifiera which level arbirariness is ulimaely always apparen since he synchronicsrucure promoes preerenial effecs in he diachrony o he subjec, i makeshim play wih a saed deck [arte ore].64Te second should insead be associaedwih he real, or beter is irrupion ino he symbolic srucure, and is pure anduncondiional. However, unlike science, psychoanalysis posis ha language is no-all, canno be oalized, and consequenly ha automatonas probabilisic chancewihin he nework o signifiers is made possible, susained, and, a he same ime,consanly undermined by tyce, he absolue coningency o he void o srucureo be undersood as is maerial cause. I believe ha wha is a sake here is no jusa confirmaion o Meillassouxs and Milners converging criique o he scienificobuscaion o coningency by means o (saisical) probabiliyas Ray Brassierwries, or he ormer, a he logical level, possibiliy is governed by ontingeny,noprobability65bu also a more explici hemaizaion o he very ondition o pos-sibility o possibility as suc, wha Lacan called, in Science and ruh, he cause ohe whole effec and, in Seminar XI, he acciden saring rom which develop-

men is animaed in is enirey.66

Tis examinaion o coningency is resumed and urher complicaed in he verylesson o Seminar XVI in which Lacan inroduces he equaion beween srucureand he real we quoed earlier. In a ew dense pages, mos o wha I have discussedso ar comes ogeher, hough in a raher convolued manner: we are provided wiha definiion o srucuralism; a criical evaluaion o sciences posiioning wih re-gard o causaliy; a renewed disancing o (srucuralis) psychoanalysis rom bohidealism and nave realism; an accoun o he relaion beween he maerialiy olanguage, is non-oalizabiliy, and he uncion o mahemaical logic. Firs o all,mainaining ha, as we have seen, srucure as linguisic srucure is ha whichis he mos real means, according o Lacan, aiming a he cause o discourse assuch.67Tere is no oherpuaively realisvalid discourse ouside o such ask,

i is no worh alking o anyhing else han he real wihin which discourse assuch has consequences: one could call such alking srucuralism.68Tis concerns

63. Afer Finitude, 90.64. Te Four Fundamental Conepts o Psycoanalysis, 79.65. Ray Brassier, Nihil Unbound: Enlightenment and Extintion (Basingsoke: Palgrave, 2007)81.66.Te Four Fundamental Conepts o Psycoanalysis, 74 (my ranslaion).67. Le sminaire. Livre XVI, 30.68. Le sminaire. Livre XVI, 31.


18/19


especially science, which acquires meaning as a discourse abou he real o heexen ha i leaves aside he nave realis and maerialis argumen or whichnaure is always here, independenly o wheher we are here or no.69While hisac canno be conesed easily, i is also he case ha science does no have anyconsequence on naure as such bu only wihin a discourse abou i. For insance,energeics is no even conceivable i no as a consequence o [he] discourse ophysics. Tis o course enails ha physics as a discourse on naure ha has con-sequences is inexricable rom he exisence o physiciss, which is no o embraceidealism as long as we assume ha i is he discourse o physics ha deermineshe physicis, no he opposie.70

Alhough hese grandiose saemens would need o be urher unpackedi provesdifficul o suppor hem as hey sand beyond he auological level or which adiscourse abou he real is really a discourse only insoar as i involves discur-sive realiyI would like o dwell on he cursory ye incisive consideraions Lacanmakes in his very conex abou coningency and necessiy. We should no losesigh o he ac ha srucure, he real wihin which discourse has onsequenes,such as hose sudied by science, remains a he same ime he mos real [] realin isel in a non-meaphorical way.71 In oher words, he very noion o conse-quence wih is varieies, o he necessary and he coningeni.e. he automatonas probabilisic chanceis coexensive wih a cerain reducion o he maerialo language operaed by scienific discourse (in primis linguisics), ha is o say,wih he orgeting o is naural realiy, which i noneheless ontinues o pre-

serve in toto.72We are offered here wih a new and unexpeced perspecive on whaScience and ruh defined as sciences oreclosure o he maerial dimension ocausaliy and psychoanalysis complici unmasking o i. Tere is no consequenceas such, and hereore no disincion beween necessiy and coningency, no onlyin non-linguisic naure bu also a he level o language as naturallanguage; hais o say, henon-discursive anddiscursiveuniverse is a-causal. In ac such dis-incion, Lacan specifies, requires he inroducion o a oalizing mtalangue, i.e.mahemaical logic, ha, by atemping o compensae or wha appears o be helack o a mtalanguage in language as naural language, ends up carrying ou adiscursive cleavage, since no logic can encircle all language.73

Bu, developing Lacans ragmened argumens urher, we should add ha heabsence o consequence (he revocaion o he principle o causaliy) and he sub-

sequen indisincion beween necessiy and coningencyas opposed o heir dis-cernabiliy in he automatonshould not hemselves be ineviably considered asan index o absolue coningency quanecessiy o coningency alone. Te a-causaluniverse could hypoheically also issue rom absolue necessiy; as Lacan saes

69. Le sminaire. Livre XVI, 33.70. Le sminaire. Livre XVI,32-3.71. Le sminaire. Livre XVI, 30-1 (my emphases).72. Le sminaire. Livre XVI, 34.73. Le sminaire. Livre XVI. 34.


19/19


once in a laer seminar, alhough i is more han improbable ha he Universe isconsiued [as] One, wewill simply never know i or cerain.74 Non-oalizabiliymightbe oalizable rom outsideuniverse; eliminaing his possibiliyas Meillas-soux doesamouns o a supreme orm o oalizaion, hi et nun, operaed rominside universe as i one were ouside o i. o pu i differenly, absolue conin-gency quanecessiy o coningency alone is no o be locaed in naure as such buraher corresponds o he emergence o linguisic necessiy, he very possibiliy oconsequenial, or logical, srucures arising ou o a (seemingly) a-causal naure.However, everyhing is complicaed by he ac ha languageand hence also ab-solue coningency as well as he difference beween empirical coningency and

empirical necessiy in he automatonremains isel, as we have jus seen, naural.Perhaps, pushing Lacans reasoning o is limi, we could advance ha only naurallanguageas logical necessiy can be said o be absoluely coningen, no naturallanguage as real srucure; or, also, rom ye anoher differen angle, ha he iden-ificaion o srucure wih he real reers o he maerially coningen causaliy ohe emergence o srucure (and is mainenance), while i does no insinuae (or,conversely, rule ou) ha naure is as such srucured. o sum up, Lacan seemso be replacing he a priori o he ruh o he causal necessiy on which sci-ence acily ress,75wih he ruh as cause, he absolue coningency o srucuresnecessiy. Beter said, he posis he coningency o he necessiy o coningency(he necessiy o thesis)i.e. he coningency o logialnecessiytout-ourtas heonly possible necessiy ha does no enail he adopion o (he deceiving) Godsouside-universe poin o view; because o all his, such real logic o he signifier,he only maerialis logic able o updae Descares via Canor, has pah-breakingonological and emporal implicaions, which I inend o address in he near uure.

74. J. Lacan, Le sminaire. Livre XXIII. Le sinthome (Paris: Seuil, 2005) 64. Anoher passagerom he same Seminar sheds urher ligh on his poin: I would say ha naure presensisel as no being one. From his hen ollows he problem o which logical procedure [weshould adop] in order o approach i (Le sinthome, 12). I evenually he Universe wereOne, his means ha here would be a mealanguage o language as naural language;I hink Lacan is evoking his unlikely hypohesis when, in Seminar XVI, he wonderswheher, beore is hisorical invenion, mahemaical logic resided in divine undersand-ing [omprenoire divine] (Le sminaire. Livre XVI,36).75. Afer Finitude, 90.

Documents

Chiesacontingency.pdf