Chiapas: A Glimpse Into the Consequences of Short-Sighted Economic Policy

8/14/2019 Chiapas: A Glimpse Into the Consequences of Short-Sighted Economic Policy

1/31

CHIAPAS :A Glimpse into the Consequences o Short-Sighted Economic PolicySarah Lynch


2/31

5 CHAPTER 1 : the message

9 CHAPTER 2 : mexicos history o labor and land re orm

10 CHAPTER 3 : the evolution o capitalism

13 CHAPTER 4 : a deal too good to be true

17 CHAPTER 5 : ree market capitalism to the rescue

21 CHAPTER 6 : resisting the tides o imperialist economics

24 CHAPTER 7 : i you deregulate it, they will come

27 CHAPTER 8 : na tas big winners and total losers

31 CHPATER 9 : the price o co ee

35 CHAPTER 10 : the perks o trading air

37 CHAPTER 11 : the cost o being cooperative

40 CHAPTER 12 : is air trade enough?

41 CHAPTER 13 : the great immigration debate

43 CHAPTER 14 : deep integration and private policymaking

46 CHAPTER 15 : militarization and the merida initiative

50 CHAPTER 16 : mexico today and tomorrow

53 CHAPTER 17 : re lection and conclusion

54 how you can get involved

56 bibliography

contents :


3/31

5

the message : CHAPTER 1In January 2009, I p articipated in a delegation to study the impact o ree trade and air trade onsmall co ee armers in Chiapas, Mexico. Chiapas is Mexicos southernmost state and is also one o its poorest. Te education I gained rom this trip has provided me with a wealth o in ormation andinsight into the realities o how lives o rural producers are impacted by United States trade policiesand global nancial powers. Yet, the truth was never as sobering than when it came directly rom the

armers themselves.

We traveled hours o winding roads through the lush mountains o northern Chiapas to stay with a community o co ee armers in Chavajeval. It is home to indigenous Mayans who have

ought to establish an autonomous community, receiving no aid orservices rom the Mexican government. Tese armers are members o aproducer-run cooperative that sells their organic co ee at air trade prices.

Te living conditions in Chavajeval are typical or most ruralcommunities in this region. Houses are small by American standards andare constructed with corrugated metal roo s, cement or wooden sidings,and are usually dirt oored. Tey are equipped with electricity, basicwater and latrine systems, and cooking is typically done over an open re.

A er spending a night in the homes o our host amilies (besieged by the constant howl o roosters), we met with a group o armers to discusstheir communitys history and current situation. Some men hung theirheads, sitting on low benches with arms crossed. Dressed in cowboy hats, baseball caps and tall rubber boots, many o the armers seemedtired but listened to the exchange intently.

Tey expressed that their loyalty remains with the cooperative andit eels wrong to sell to intermediary buyers (k nown as coyotes) instead.However, at the end o the season when they take into account thecosts o running their organization, the rates o ered by the coyotes aresometimes higher than those o air trade. Tey eel as i they do nothave much o a choice. 1

Te armers have ound that a er paying or air trade and organiccerti cations, there are not enough unds in the organization to providebasic necessities or their communities such as clothing, education,or medicine. 2 Tough there is unding set aside or social projects,Chavajeval does not have a unctioning health center o its own. Whenabsolutely necessary, they sometimes borrow money and travel severalhours to see a private doctor in the larger town o Simojovel. 3

About 20 members o the community have le to nd work in theUnited States in order to support their amilies. 4 For instance, an older

Lorenzo and Antonio, o Chavajeval A cluster o buildings in the community o Chavajeval (previous) Employees o the co ee cooperative, Te Indigenous Ecological Federation o Chiapas (FIECH)


4/31

6

son o the amily who hosted me is now a bricklayer in exas. Tis is not what I had expected tohear. Perhaps I had unreasonably envisioned the lives o air trade organic co ee armers to beideal. I had read so many stories o success, o prosperous, sel -governed people building strongcommunities through meaning ul work. But across the world they ace di erent struggles underdi erent conditions.

Tough our conversation was translated rom the native language o sotsil to Spanish and then

English, the message was clear: the air trade price armers o Chavajeval receive is not enough, and it doesnot seem air to them. 5

Te house o my host amily in Chavajeval (right) Apalonia and Catalina, daughter and mother o my host amily making tortillas


5/31

8 9

Te community o Chavajeval is located within these mountain ranges in northern Chiapas

mexicos history o labor and land re orm : CHAPTER 2Mexico has a long history o social hierarchy, conquest, and racial, social and religious oppression.Te early indigenous populations had greatly success ul agricultural bases and some ormedhierarchical tribute systems which contributed to the development o large state-level societies suchas the Aztec and Mayans. Since t he arrival o the Spanish in 1519, these civilizations have diminishedand the indigenous people have been aced with subordination. Te Colonial period brought aboutmajor issues o uneven distribution o wealth and power, particularly

over land rights, which have plagued Mexico to the present day.Spanish colonists established the encomienda system, a caste system

based on ethnicity which granted Spanish landowners the right toindigenous land and slave labor. 6 Tis was later replaced by the hacienda system, which allocated land under a hierarchy, similar to a plantation.Indigenous people worked small holdings o land and owed a portion o their income to the owner. Tis employment was not ar rom slavery,and the agricultural land which had sustained Mexico or thousandso years was converted to monocrops or exportation under a capitalistmodel. 7 Tis system o land appropriation and its subjugation o theindigenous people was harshly criticized by Fray Bartlome de las Casas,a Spanish priest. He became a central gure in the movement or justicewhich would eventually abolish the encomienda system.

Te Mexican government created the ejido system in 1934, whichpurchased land rom wealthy owners and granted agrarian communitiesand individuals use-rights to the parcels. Tis was a critical part o a

long history o political changes which redistributed the ownershipo land and in uenced labor re orm. 8 Samuel Ruiz Garcia, a RomanCatholic prelate who served as bishop o San Cristobal de las Casas rom1959 to 1999, was also a major player in the struggle or indigenousrights and land re orm.

Since the ejidos were ormed and land right policies have continuedto trans orm the rural landscape, Mexico has shi ed under the in uenceo an increasingly globalized and integrated economy. Corporationshave taken the place o colonial encomiendas and the local market small

armers have made their living at has been replaced with the largest a ndarguably most disadvantageous market in the world.

Nearly a thousand indigenous Mexicans travled to attend mass or Samuel Ruiz Garcia at the Cathedral in San Cristobal de las Casas


6/31

10 11

CHAPTER 3 : the evolution o capitalismSince its beginnings around the 15th century, capitalism has taken on di erent orms as it evolvesover time. Adam Smith, the ounding ather o capitalism built this model on the t heory that

ree interplay o market orces o supply and demand will create a just price. According to thisphilosophy, markets work best when ree o outside inter erence and will be guided independently by an invisible hand to a state o equilibrium.

Te newest phase capitalism has taken is neoliberalism, which developed in the early 1980s and

was rst notably applied t hrough the economic policies o Ronald Regan and Margaret Tatcher. Ithas come to occupy virtually all international economic institutions such as the World Bank and theInternational Monetary Fund (IMF). 9 It is important to distinguish the vast di erence in meaningsthat the term liberal has in economics and politics. In this case, liberal means un ettered,unregulated, or ree. Under pure neoliberal capitalistic policies, the ideal global market iscompletely unregulated, without tari s, quotas, subsidies, or other barriers to trade. Within nations,neoliberal philosophy would shrink governments to practically nothing, as it holds that the privatesector can unction better and more e ciently than government.

A er the all o the Soviet Bloc, which was amed to be the t riumph o capitalism, supportersincreased their assertions that the ree market was tantamount to democracy and reedom. 10 Te

United States has enthusiastically supported a global ree market as wellas the privatization o goods and services throughout the world. Tistrend is considered to be the primary driving orce behind globalization.

Although they have consistantly aced criticism, discredit o neoliberal capitalistic policies has been increasing over the past ew years. In t he United States we have witnessed economic orces le

uncontrolled, unregulated and unsupervised, come crashing downinto an economic crisis. Te logic o the ree market model has beenquestioned as it becomes apparent that the causes o these market

ailures were not only human but systematic as well. Some believethat capitalist policies treat the economy as i it were a machine andignore the evidence that economies do not tend to reach equilibriumby themselves. Instead, critics note, ree markets o en avor minority interests at the expense o the majority. 11

As will be discussed through the case o Mexicos enlistment intoneoliberal capitalist policies, it is evident that this line o thinking hasproven disastrous to many people in Mexico as well as the stability o the global economy. In the wake o its ailures, perhaps neoliberalismhas opened the door o opportunity or a new phase o economicphilosophy to emerge.

Coca-Colas advertisements have reached some o the most remote areas o Chiapas and is an incredibly popular beverage. A road side store in rural Chiapas


7/31

13

a deal too good to be true : CHAPTER 4In order to ully understand how we have arrived at t he current policies governing the highly integrated global economy and ree trade between the United States and Mexico, we must examinethe trade-related crisis which began in the 1980s. Tis is signi cant because it was during this timethat neoliberalism was rst being imposed upon developing nations. Tis crisis laid the groundwork

or NAF A, a ree trade policy which has caused the marginalization o Mexicos poor, especially its agriculturalists. In addition, this debt crisis is very similar to the recent housing loan crisis in the

U.S. and can serve as a pre-cursor to the e ects o neoliberalism which we are presently experiencing.Tis crisis was made possible by the Cold War. Te planet had become polarized on political and

ideological lines, viewed by some as the Christian Capitalists verses Ungodly Communists. TeUnited States eared that Castro would gain power i Communism appealed to the poor o Centraland South America. During the 1960s the U.S. government unded hundreds o rural health careclinics throughout Latin America in an attempt to win support o the people. 12

During this time the U.S. was also involved in the Vietnam War, which was paid or by printingdollars instead o raising taxes. 13 Te country experienced an economic boom, while othercurrencies dropped in value, eventually leading to a worldwide recession.

Oil producing countries were particularly hurt by in ation becausemost oil was purchased in dollars. In 1972, OPEC (the Organizationo Petroleum Exporting Countries) called or huge price increases,quadrupling the cost o oil. Tese countries experienced an abundance-o -money problem, literally having di culty storing or spending theirmoney. Tis was solved by investing in banks o wealthy countries,primarily in the United States and Europe.

However, the U.S. could not loan to a country in recession becauseew people wanted to borrow. Ten a new idea was introduced which

signi cantly changed the ace o international nance; loaning tosovereign governments. Tis practice was a very rare occurrence untilthen, and the scale to which it was pursued had never been seen be ore.Hundreds o banks backed by petrodollars began pushing loans onpoor countries at an incredible rate. Tese loans had extremely low (but variable) interest rates, and some even had negative real interest rates. 14

Tis program was called the doctrine o debt as the path towardsaccelerated development. 15 It was believed that as a country acquireddebt, it would respond with an increase in exports, thus increasing itsincome, which in turn would increase standards o living. Once t he loanwas paid back it would emerge a rst world country.

Tis kind o indiscriminate loaning without oversight, aggressively pushed onto borrowers whether or not it had been requested, is quite

A busy street o San Cristobal de las Casas A view between buildings in San Cristobal de las Casas, Chiapas


8/31

14 15

similar to the recent housing loan crisis in 2008. In both cases, loanswith variable interest rates were given to borrowers who were nancially incapable o paying them back. Both ared a similar and un avorableconsequence or most parties involved.

Many borrowing countries did not know what to do with theirincome, and while some governments used it wisely many others did

not. For example, Brazil was success ul in raising its average incomeand providing jobs through its spending. Columbia spent its loan onwaste ul projects and its average income decreased. 16 Mexico initially used the money it received to produce or itsel , but because banks gaveout loans in U.S. dollars, it needed dollars to pay it back. Tis demandedthat the country reorient its economy rom production or internalconsumption to production or export to oreign countries. In essence,a number o banks turned much o the developing world into an exportplat orm or U.S. consumption.

Some countries were paying about 60% o their annual income oninterest alone, sapping the resources needed to pay or basic humanservices, such as education or health, which are critical to a country sstability. 17 Mexico ared slightly better than most borrowing countriesat rst when it discovered signi cant oil reserves in the mid-70s. Tisprovided it a temporary wind all, which it could have spent on its

in rastructure, programs to support agriculture or to develop its economy. However, Mexico used its

oil revenues to make loan payments and continued to borrow or national projects.Te severity o its nancial troubles was not realized until 1982 when the price o oil crashed

and Mexico lost its income to pay back its debts. At the same time, the U.S. ound itsel inrecession, making it more di cult or Mexico to export its commodities. o make matters worse,the U.S. Federal Reserve increased interest rates in order to combat in ation and stagnation o theeconomy. 18 Rates shot up dramatically, most rom approximately 2% to 18%, and some rising to35%. 19 Te combination o rising interest rates and waning income rom exports hit countries hard,as their ability to make payments decreased and the a mount they needed to pay increased.

In September o 1982, Mexico declared that it would cease making payments and would de aulton its loans, sending a shockwave throughout the international nance system. Te crucial issue arosethat unlike an individual who cannot a ord to make loan payments, and thus les or bankruptcy,there is no international mechanism o bank ruptcy or sovereign nations. Debt will continue toaccumulate and nations will spiral downward until banks and nancial institutions intervene.

A basketball court in rural Chiapas, which appears to be sponsored by Sprite

Te Central Independiente de Obreros Agricolas y Campesinos, (CIOAC) has sought to organizerural workers and improve the standard o living or agricultural laborers.


9/31

17

ree market capitalism to the rescue : CHAPTER 5Tere have been several attempted strategies to mitigate Mexicos debt crisis. Some have beenrelatively success ul, while others have actually worsened the situation. Tese strategies have laid thegroundwork or Mexicos entrance into a ree trade agreement and adherence to neoliberal policieswhich have ultimately created poverty and undermined its ability to govern itsel .

Te IMF responded to the 1982 crisis by calling a meeting o all nations, banks, and multilateralnancial institutions to arrange a bailout package or Mexico. 20 It amounted to $8 billion, and

included a package o new loans, extensions, and restructures that postponed the collapse.21

However, this plan did not address the cause o Mexicos inability to dig itsel out o debt, but only insured that the banks would be repaid. Tis is similar to the rstresponse o nancial institutions during the bailout o commercialbanks during the housing loan crisis. Within a year, Mexico signed asecond agreement borrowing another $7 billion rom commercial banks.

Mexico su ered a second nancial crisis during 1986 due to anotherplunge in global oil prices. Once again, it an nounced that it could notmake its loan payments. Te IMF, World Bank, and the Paris Club (agroup o nancial o cials rom 19 o the worlds richest nations) createdanother bailout plan totaling $5.6 billion. 22 It included ree marketdemands which are now re erred to as structural adjustment programsand a trade deal which would later become NAF A. Tese were sold as away to help Mexico create wealth and pay o its debts.

Te manner in which the IMF granted Mexico (as well as many othercountries in debt) nancial aid on condition that it con orms to a set

o policies, is considered to be Disaster Capitalism. Tis occurs wheneconomic aid given by conservative economic powers conditionsthe acceptance o radical ree market policies like privatization o basicnecessities and services- which have shown to drive some to extremewealth and many to extreme poverty. 23

Structural adjustment programs were largely based on MiltonFreidmans political philosophy that avors privatization overgovernment control or taxation. 24 Te IMF pressured many countriesoverwhelmed with external debt that in order to quali y or debtcancellation or nancial aid they adhere to a number o policies:

A man works on the construction o a new building

A great deal o workers in the in ormal sector are yo ung children, likethis boy, who o en accompany their parents selling goods to tourists.


10/31

18 19

Tese policies did not simply change the ocus o the economy or government structure, they changed the daily lives o the Mexican people and their ability to support themselves. Tey demandedthat the government cut bene ts or the poor such as minimum wage. Workers unions were weakenedand sometime bought out. Mexicos social in rastructure and sa ety net or poverty was gone. 28

As it became harder to a ord basic goods and services, it also became harder to sell theirproducts in a national market now opened to oreign competition. Structural adjustment removed

agricultural subsidies and price stabilizers. A nation rich in agricultural diversity began to importsustenance crops rom the United States. Tis threatened the livelihoods o armers as well as theidentity and culture o the Mexican people.

While some o these are sound policies or a healthy economy, such as getting in ation undercontrol, devaluing currency to do so was devastating to the poor in Mexico. 29 Te country lostincome in the long run when it produced a greater quantity o goods or less. Te pro ts rom anincrease in oreign investment went directly to the elite, bene ting very ew and did not t ypically remain within the nations markets.

Tis plan o restructuring the economy may have been success ul i the income received hadbeen redistributed more e ectively. A great deal o wealth actually le the country t hrough theprivatization o national industries and the elimination o national market protections. In this case,the distribution o income is more important to the stability o the country than the rate at which itcreates income.

Deregulate labor markets: Tis makes it harder to unionize andeliminates minimum wage protections.Devalue currency: Tis makes it ea sier or oreigners to invest, but moredi cult or citizens to purchase commodities such as ood.Cut public sector jobs: State positions are terminated without creating jobs to replace them, or creating an economic sa ety net to catch the

unemployed.Cut price supports or armers: Tis abolishes price controls such assubsidies which make it harder to produce and purchase staple ood items.Lower barriers to imports: Tis orces local producers to competeagainst large oreign corporations who are able to sell their goods or less.End protections against oreign ownership and i nvestment: Cappingwages makes the country more attractive to investors and moves proftsout o the country.Sell of state industries to private owners: With ew wealthy investors in thecountry, purchasing these businesses is a bargain deal or oreign investorswho can raise the costs o their services and proft at citizens expense.Raise prices or basic commodities and basic social services: Tis cuts

unding or public support systems which provide quality o li e andkeeps society unctioning.Export-oriented production: Tis causes the loss o jobs, land, andnatural resources to large corporations. Producing less or national

consumption makes the country dependent on more costly imports andthreatens ood-sovereignty.

Te reasoning behind making these changes was that thegovernment could not a ord spending on virtually anything butproduction or export. Te adjustment programs also cut taxes or therich so they would invest in the economy. However, the di erence thismade was negligible. 25 On the other hand, removing the social andeconomic protections or the poor had extreme consequences upon themost volatile part o the economy.

Under structural adjustment policies, the country was orced toprivatize as much as possible. Tis included terminating government jobs without creating positions to absorb the wave o unemployment,dissolving state credit, state marketing boards, and extension services. 26 One example o such privatization is the sale o Mexicos state telephonecompany. Rates rose rom 16 pesos per minute to 115, which theoretically should have decreased through competition but never did. 27

A patchwork o agricultural plots on the outskirts o San Cristobal

Young men ride on top o cargo, possibly agricultural crops, in Simojovel, Chiaps


11/31

20 21

resisting the tides o imperialist economics : CHAPTER 6When NAF A was signed it made North America into the largest ree trade zone in the world. 34 From the beginning, this agreement has aced tremendous opposition in the orm o protests andeven violent reprisals. 35 U.S. armers, economists, social justice and human rights organizations,environmental groups and labor unions eared the repercussions o NAF A and spoke out againstits enactment. ens o thousands o Mexicans took to the street in opposition, some belonging to theZapatista rebellion.

On New Years Day in 1994, when NAF A rst came into e ect,a guerilla army o indigenous men, women and children came out o hiding in the Lacandon mountain jungles o Chiapas. Tey took sixtowns by storm masked in bandannas and balaclavas, or sk i masks. Teuprising was armed, although some o their guns were only gun-shapedchunks o wood, and many others wielded arm tools and machetes. 36

Te con ict lasted 12 days, with a demand rom the Zapatista civilsociety as well as cal ls rom national and international communities toput down arms leading to a cease re. 37 It is estimated that somewhere

rom 45 to 1000 lost their lives during the con ict, depending on thesource o the gures; the governments being much lower. 38

A er organizing and training or roughly ten years be ore theuprising, the Zapatistas decided to go public in protest o NAF A, whichthey eared would certainly enlarge the gap between t he rich and poorin Mexico. Tey saw this agreement as an economic death sentence orhundreds o thousands o small-scale Mexican armers and with them,

something o rural and traditional li e.39

Named a er Emiliano Zapata, a leading gure in the MexicanRevolution and symbol o the agrarian re orm movement, the Zapatistasare also known as the Zapatista Army o National Liberation, orEZLN. Teir ideology, re erred to as Zapatismo, is considered to be acombination o libertarian socialism, libertarian municipalism andlibertarian Marxism. It may be more accurately described as a movement o indigenous Mayanscombating political and economic marginalization and ghting to maintain rights o indigenouspeople to their land and establish an autonomous democratic society o their own.

Zapatismo rejects the idea o an authoritative gure leading the people. Instead it is ana rmation o communal p eoples power, or grassroots autonomy. 40 In this sense the Zapatistauprising was not an attempt to take power but to demonstrate the power o civil society to struggleagainst a government which was unresponsive to the needs o its people. One common dictum o theEZLN is, odo para todos, nada para nosotros , which means everything or everyone, nothing orourselves. Tis exempli es the value o communal interests over personal gains.

Tere is much criticism o the perceived value o structural adjustment programs. Somehave accused the IMF and other international nancial institutions o intentionally giving thegovernments o various countries the k ind o nancial advice that ultimately (and intentionally)destroys the states ability to govern. 30 Supporters hail the 2.3% growth o the Mexican economy during the 1980s as grounds or success. 31 Others would claim that a better indicator o positivegrowth is distribution o wealth within the country which raises the average income.

Tose receiving aid were slipping urther into debt because o compounding interest, and 66other countries who had been given loans had also ailed to pay t hem back. 32 Negotiations beganin 1988 to address the issue o debt which would eventually become NAF A. Te United States andCanada already held a ree trade agreement, and it was believed that including Mexico would createwealth within the country and address the rising rate o immigration into the U.S. However, therewere great disparities between the culture and economy o Mexico and that o the US and Canadawhich made the impartiality o this agreement questionable. 33

NAF A was sold as a way or Mexico to escape its crushing debt, but it is evident that the urgency o the Mexican government to take action outweighed the great risks that this agreement wouldmake the country vulnerable to exploitation and impoverishment.

Many people make a living selling goods in locations such as the cathedral o San Cristobal de las Casas.

Tis building is located in Chavajeval, a Zapatista community


12/31

22 23

While the orm o Zapatista governance is participatory and democratic in nature, it isunique in its bottom-up rather than typical top-down style o command. Te philosophy guiding its organization is Govern by Obeying, which insists that what the civil society demands, the government obeys. 41 Villages are organized into municipalities which sendrepresentatives to a center o governance called Caracoles. Literally meaning conch shell, thelevels o governance become more intense and pro ound at t he center. 42 Here, the Zapatistasociety is overseen by Good Governance Councils which make decisions based on the concernso each municipality.

While the Zapatistas still maintain an armed military, it exists in an undisclosed locationwithin the Lacandon jungle. Tis sector o the EZLN is not included in its governance andabides by the wishes o the civil society. Tis separation o the militar y and civil society is atwo-prong strategy. Without arms, the Mexican militar y should have no reason to violently overthrow Zapatista civil society. In addition, the lack o military in uence in decision-makinggives legitimacy to their governing power as a participatory communal democracy as opposed toa dictatorship. 43

Te Zapatista communicates through Subcomandante Marcos, their o cial spokesman whois known or his eloquence and the pipe he smokes through a black balaclava he has never beenseen without. Marcos remains pseudonymous, and claims that his words do not express his ideasalone, but those o a community bringing into being what those words propose. 44

A er the 1994 uprising, the Zapatistas pursued a policy o negotiation and enteredinto conversation with the world rom communities in the jungle through Encuentros, orencounters. Tey had also issued a series o Declarations o the Lacandon Jungle which were

both public mani estos and demands made o the government. During this time o dialogbetween the EZLN and the government, the President o Mexico had ordered attacks againstZapatista bases. 45

Tese government talks culminated to a signing o the San Andrs Accords in 1996 whichpledged autonomy to the indigenous Mexicans. However, this agreement was never carriedout into law and has only been upheld by the Zapatistas. 46 Te EZLN has stated that it will notdisarm until the Mexican government upholds its end o the agreements it signed and there is nolonger a threat to the security o the Zapatista communities.

Since the allout o the San Andrs Accords, the EZLN has launched what is known as LaOtra Compana , or the Other C ampaign. It is a political campaign in essence but attempts toreconceptualize how politics should unction. In this model, the representative does not speak but lets the community speak through them. 47

oday the Zapatistas have more survived than won their quarrel with the Mexicangovernment. 48 Tey have success ully organized autonomous communities and have usedno armed orces since the initial uprising. However, the Mexican government has increased

militarization since 2006, and has been cracking down on social movements by increasing security around Zapatista communities. 49

Te government has also implemented tactics to create con ict among indigenous communities.Because the Zapatistas re use government aid and because many rural communities are diverse(politically and ethnically), the government will stop providing aid to entire communities, Zapatistaor not. Tis has created divides among indigenous people and many who would accept the help o government programs su er because o it. 50

Overall, the struggle o the Zapatistas is primarily about preserving the land which their identity isrooted in. It is less about ghting to gain power over the Mexican government than it is about ghtingto keep their communities ree o its dominance, as well as the in uence o global capitalistic policies.

Gra ti in the city o San Cristobal de las Casas

Te primary school in Chavajeval depicts a Zapatista leader alongside Che Guevara and Emiliano Zapata


13/31

24 25

CHAPTER 7 : i you deregulate it, they will comeTe objective o NAF A is to open up trade between the United States, Mexico and Canada andcreate an even playing eld. Te theory behind doing so is that one country could ourishthrough its comparative advantage in e ciency or cost o production over another country. 51 By deregulating the market and removing barriers to trade, it was believed that Mexico could bene t

rom the increase in international trade. However, this allowed giant U.S. corporations to competewith smaller labor-intensive actories and arms in Mexico.

It may be use ul to explain how this argument works through a hypothetical situation. A Mexicantelevision actory can sell their products in the national market or $350. Be ore NAF A, the productshad a $50 tari when sold in the United States, bringing the cost to $400. Once NAF A is enacted,tari s are eliminated. As a result, the lower price creates a higher demand or the product. Tis isexpected to lead to an increase in production which in turn creates jobs in Mexico. 52 Tis is a simplisticportrayal o how the theory that NAF A will lower the rate o migration to the U.S. would work.

Although this strategy creates jobs, many more are destroyedthan made in total. 53 Tis is known as the Wal-Mart e ect, when acompany shuts down its competition and many more jobs are lost inthe surrounding area than that company provides. Over the past decadethe U.S. has witnessed large corporations run local competitors out o business because o their size allows or a more cost-e ective means o production. Part o this e ciency is decreasing the number o workers topay in relation to its output.

NAF A includes 900 pages o rules and provisions, the majority o which concern the changing o , or potentially overriding o , domesticlaws within each o the three countries. 54 According to Joseph Stiglitz,Nobel Economics prize winner, these provisions give businesses anexcessive amount o rights and privileges which, in turn, take t hemaway rom individuals. He argues t hat doing so potentially weakeneddemocracy throughout North America. 55

One section, the Chapter 11 Provision, is par ticularly worrisome.It allows corporations to sue a country i it claims that a law or judicialruling will adversely a ect its potential pro ts. Tis means companiesare given the right to override laws passed by legislative bodies, anextraordinary amount o power delegated or the sake o corporatepro t. By 2008 this provision had been used to le $14 billion in claims. 56

Tere are some provisions o NAF A which limit the extent o its

powers. During negotiation the Clinton administration added two sideagreements which established commissions and sub-commissions toaddress environmental and labor issues. Tese commissions were giventhe power to levy nes against governments which ailed to imposeits own preexisting laws. 57 But with poor unding and little power toen orce these agreements, they have had little impact.

Provisions which have received the most attention rom the publicare those concerning the elimination o tari s, quotas, and bar riers toexports and imports between countries. Tese regulations have certainly had the most signi cant impact, as we have seen since NAF Asenactment in 1994 and its repercussions which ollowed.

Roo ops o San Cristobal de las Casas

A young boy by the side o the road


14/31

26 27

na tas big winners and total losers : CHAPTER 8Te most pro ound impact o NAF A is un ortunately the most disadvantageous to the people o Mexico. Its neoliberal ree tr ade policies have created poverty and unemployment and have weakenedthe ability o Mexico to sustain itsel independently. Te loss o protection or domestic producersby lowering subsidies and tari s has been coupled with the greater problem that this did not occuruni ormly across all three nations. Each had a di erent phase-out plan and list o products whichwould remain protected. 58

Tis market inequality has proven to be extremely pro table to large corporations, but or thosewho de end ree-market capitalism, it appears to be downright hypocritical. Subsidizing goods andselling them in a market with unsubsidized competition is contradictory to neoliberal capitalist and

ree trade principles.Be ore NAF A, Mexico imposed high tari s on imported corn,

practically excluding it rom national markets. Now that these tari sare gone, the country is ooded with inexpensive corn rom the UnitedStates. 59 Tis is because corn rom the U.S. is subsidized and sold ata price cheaper than it cost to produce it. Mexican armers are beingundersold in their local markets and cannot a ord to spend more ongrowing crops than what they could be sold or.

It is important to note, however, that Mexican armers are not simply competing with U.S. armers, but with the United States reasury. 60 Subsidizing corn began during the Great Depression. Te reasury usedtaxes to pay cultivators a higher rate and ensure that the price o cornwould be stable. 61 Now that large corporations have taken over the U.S.

arming industry, they have been able to spend billions on lobbying tokeep their subsidies. 62

On the other side o the border, Mexico is not only sapped o nancialbacking to provide subsidies or corn, but also prevented rom doing soby NAF A. 63 Tese circumstances work out avorably or monopolisticMexican companies who purchase cheap corn rom the U.S., speci cally Maseca and Minsa. Corporate owners o these companies rotate inand out o prominent government positions, in a similar patter as U.S.o cials. Tey make sure that Mexico does not oppose NAF A just asU.S. corporations ensure that their subsidies will not be revoked. 64

A wide variety o produce is grown in Chiapas, as seen in this road-side stall

A cluster o homes in rural Chiapas. Even steepmountainsides are used or the cultivation o crops

such as co ee, corn, beans and gourds.


15/31

28 29

Tis hypothetical situation may clari y how prices are a ected by unequal subsidization in the U.S. and Mexico. Monsanto, an Americancorporation, can grow corn which costs $80 to produce. With the $50subsidy that Monsanto receives rom the government, it can sell cornin the U.S. or any price over $80 and make a pro t, as it competesnationally with other subsidized corn. It could also sell its corn inMexico at any price over $30 and still make a pro t. 65 Tis is calleddumping, when a company sells subsidized goods or less than theircost o production. 66

Supporters o NAF A argue that this trade agreement wouldmake ood cheaper or consumers in Mexico. However, while it hassuccess ully driven the market price o staple crops such as corn, thecost o basic ood items increased in Mexico 257% rom 1994 to 2002. 67 Mexicans are at a disadvantage whether they grow or buy their ood.

Te loss o income within arming communities has caused a greatdeal o rural Mexicans to be displaced rom their land. Many o themeither move or send amily members to urban areas, where it is equally di cult to nd employment. Factories which had relocated rom theUnited States to Mexico created some jobs but destroyed many moreoverall, ollowing the Wal-Mart e ect previously mentioned. 69 Be oreNAF A, Mexico had a pre-existing problem with unemployment. Tisissue has deepened as many Mexican companies cannot compete in an

open market.70

It is estimated that NAF A has directly caused the losso millions o jobs throughout Mexico. 71

Since North America opened its borders to ree trade, the globalmarket has grown increasingly integrated and expansive. One majorchange to the international trade scene occurred when emerging Asiancountries such as China joined the global economy through the World

rade Organization (W O). Tey provided a huge labor market withlower regulations, and ollowing standard market logic, it created agreat incentive or corporations to move to where it would be cheaper toproduce. Tis is known as a race to the bottom e ect.

One sector o Mexicos industry that su ered rom the growth o the global market was the maquiladoras near the border o the U.S.Maquila actories take advantage o the lack o tari s on importing

A busy street o San Cristobal de las Casas

materials and use poorly-paid workers to assemble or manu acture goods. Tese products aretypically exported to the United States. Te number o these boomed a er NAF A went into e ect.Tey hit their peak and started to decline by 2000. By 2002 more than a hundred had closed and600,000 people had lost their jobs, almost entirely to competition with China. 72

It does not help that in addition to this, there have been a line o Mexican governments whichhave shown little more than indi erence to the plight o its poorest citizens. 73 None have ollowedthrough on promises to aid those who have su ered rom NAF As policies with projects such asrural assistance programs. Te trade policies implemented by NAF A have not only marginalized agreat deal o Mexican citizens, but have threatened to practically extinguish a cultures identity andway o li e by taking away their ability to sel -sustain.

Maseca is a large ranchise corporation which has pro ted greatly rom NAF As policies


16/31

30 31

the price o co ee : CHAPTER 9Co ee is more than a beverage. It is more than a cultural convention, a symbol or daily routine. Itis the oundation o the lives o armers throughout the world. Te cultivation o co ee not only provides them with a hard-earned and o en insu cient income, but it is woven into the culture andidentity o those indigenous to the land.

For the co ee armers o Chiapas, the consequences o Mexicos debt, the implications o structural adjustment programs, and the devastation caused by NAF A are experienced rsthandevery day. Co ee is the primary source o income in many regions in Chiapas, and 80% o theirproduction goes to the international market. 74 Faced with an unjust system o trade and a p oliticalsystem which suppressed worker organization, the small armers o Chiapas ought to create a airway to sell their crops and support themselves. It was here in remote villages that air trade began, asillustrated through the story o the armers in Chavajeval.

Co ee is handled by hal a billion people on its way rom production to the consumer. 75 Secondto oil, it is the most requently traded commodity in t he world. 76 An estimated twenty million ruralpeople work on co ee plantations throughout the world, producing 13.6 billion pounds o it per year(1996 gure). 77 Te United States is the worlds largest consumer country, drinking one h o the2.25 billion cups consumed daily, 78 79

Grown throughout the world in primarily undeveloped nations, co ee is a time and labor-intensive crop, without the help o mechanized harvesting. Co ee trees produce a small cherry-like

ruit with two hard seeds at its center. Te berries are picked by hand, de-pulped o its outer ruit,and dried in the sun. In some areas o Chiapas, nearly all households have an area to dry their co ee,either on a roo or the ground. When dr y, the co ee is known as pergamino, and is later sorted androasted, which gives it its dark brown color and aroma.

Co ee producers ace a multitude o challenges and disadvantageswhich leave them subject to manipulation and make them easily takenadvantage o . In some countries, large landowners produce most o thenations crop, but more than hal o t he worlds co ee is grown by small-scale producers on amily arms or collectives. 80 Tese communities aretypically isolated and have di culty accessing education and healthcare.Rural producers sometimes lack thorough knowledge o t he co eemarket, which uctuates dramatically in spikes. 81

Because they lack the ability to a ord their own processing, storing andmarketing in rastructure, small producers nd themselves at the mercy o larger producers with their own acilities. Most o en, small producershave no choice but to sell to larger arms and are orced to accept muchlower prices. 82 Co ee growers are paid only once per year at the end o theharvest, and have little access to credit. It is common or small armers tosell their unharvested crops at lower-than-market prices in exchange or ananticipio , or cash advance to make it through the growing season. 83

Co ee beans grow inside these berries, which turn red when ripened Bags o co ee are inspected or quality at FIECH


17/31

32 33

It was little over thirty years ago that the indigenous Mayans o Chiapas were laborers onhacienda plantations. Tey had virtually no rights as workers and had to sell their crops throughthe landowner, or which they were paid in tokens only to be used in the landowners store. 84

In 1981 the land was sold to the armers, where they planted co ee as a cash crop and builta number o communities. Tey sold their co ee in the small city o Simojovel to plantationowners, the only available buyers who set their own prices. Global co ee prices had been setby the International Co ee Agreement since the 1960s. It was ormed in an attempt to keepCommunism rom appealing to the poor. 85 It wasnt until the 1970s and 80s that peasantmovements and political organization became a orce in Central and South A merica. 86 It wasaround this time that the armers in C hiapas began to orm co-ops through collective action.

With little access to outside in ormation, organizing was a di cult task and had to be donesecretly in the jungles at night. 87 Eventually arming communities ound others in the area toshare knowledge o the market, including where they could sell their co ee or higher prices. 88 Organizers were repeatedly arrested and a number o protests and marches were held throughoutthe region during this time. 89

Small co ee armers struggled up until the 1980s but were still able to make a living.However, as t he debt crisis exploded in Mexico, an international co ee crisis began almostsimultaneously. While both had a number o complex causes, a similar approach to internationalpolicy lay at the root o each crisis.

Te International Co ee Agreement kept prices relatively stable until the all o the SovietUnion. Once Communism was not deemed as great a threat, t he United States changed policy and pulled out o the agreement, rendering it ine ective. Once again trade policy was guided by political and ideological motivations. As hundreds o new producers jumped into the market, itmoved rom a managed system to a ooded system and prices crashed. 90

During the 1990s the IMF gave enormous loans to countries to develop co eeplantations. 91 Vietnam was one recipient to enter into the co ee market, and within a decadethe minor producer had developed into the second largest in the world. However, the more co eethat was produced, the less it could be sold or.

Te Vietnam government even burned hundreds o thousands o hectares o co ee tohelp drive prices back up but it made little di erence by that point. 92 It is estimated by theWorld Bank that the crisis caused between thirty to sixty million co ee armers to lose theirlivelihoods worldwide. 93

Co ee prices are now determined by the New York Board o rade whose members includethe owners o Nestle, Folgers, SaraLee, and Kra . 94 Since the crisis, the price o co ee hascontinued to decline, and is currently at what Ox am UK estimates to be a one-hundred-year-low. 95 Few producers promote sel -consumption projects which provide ood security and guarantee the ability to sel -sustain. 96 With a market as uncertain as co ee, subject to thedecisions o large corporations and international nancial institutions, small producers need

alternatives to all back upon.

Co ee trees grow in the shade o a canopy o other vegetation, including banana trees


18/31

34 35

the perks o trading air : CHAPTER 10Te uncertainty o the market and u n air wages lead armers to develop cooperatives through whichthey could avoid relying on large producers. Fair trade organizations and companies have alsoreached out to purchase rom co-ops and local producers at a guaranteed higher price.

Fair trade prices commit to a guaranteed minimum o $1.35 per pound o co ee ready to roast,and $1.55 per pound i it is organic. 97 Fair trade also remains 5 cents above the global market whenit rises above the minimum. Troughout Chiapas, many producers rely on intermediary buyerscalled coyotesto sell their co ee. Te price these buyers o er varies dramatically and can changealmost daily. It is sometimes higher than the air tr ade price, but thenext day they may be much lower and relying on them is a gamble. Tese

uctuations are caused by the New York stock exchange as well as theexchange rate o the peso to the U.S. dollar.

Co ee travels through transporters, millers, baggers, roasters, anda number o other steps on its way to t he consumer. Each transaction isexpected to have a low markup price at about 2 to 11%. Final marketerssuch as Nestle or Sara Lee mark up prices as high as 25 to 30%. 98 Fairtrade buys directly rom cooperatives, enabling them to provide morepro t back to the armers. It can double, triple, and quadruple theincomes o the people at the lower levels o production. 99

Fair trade also intends to create long-term direct buyingrelationships. Fair trade buyers do not drop producers i they havedi culty getting their crops to market on time, and are committedto providing market access or growers. 100 Tey also provide support

or democratically organized co-ops or groups and ecologically soundarming practices. 101

Forming cooperatives are incredibly bene cial to local producers asit o ers them more political power as a group and cuts down on theircosts o production. Cooperatives share expenses such as certi cation

ees and in rastructure costs. Owning and sharing the means o production keeps pro ts within the local economy. Cooperatives alsoset aside unds to provide education and social programs or theircommunities as well as initiatives to improve the quality o their cropsand their ecosystems. 102

Although air trade and producer-owned cooperatives are certainly an improvement upon the market small producers aced in the past,these systems are not per ect. Fair tr ade goods make up only a small

raction o the global market and as t he armers in Chavajeval testi y,air trade prices are sometimes not enough.

Bags o co ee rom many di erent arming communities throughout Chiapas are stacked in the FIECH warehouse Pedro Lopez Ruiz, the president o CIRSA


19/31

36 37

the cost o being cooperative : CHAPTER 11Te armers o Chavajeval are part o a air trade cooperative called CIRSA. Tere are about 53producers in the community, each owning up to three hectares o organically cultivated land. 103 Ahectare is roughly 2 and a hal acres. Co ee is harvested once per year and each armer producesabout 8 to 10 bags, weighing 132 pounds each. 104 CIRSA pays their producers about 1,500 pesos perbag, which is little more than $100 in the U.S.

When we met with these producers they shared with us their biggest challenges. Tey explainedthat competition is high among producers. While the price or air trade is reliable, they do notunderstand why it remains the same and those o ered by the coyotes have changed. 105 Sometimes theintermediary prices are higher and although they are loyal to the co-op, it is di cult to turn downmore income when their amilies are struggling. 106 Te armers also expressed that they must work even harder to grow organically and meet the high quality standards o CIRSA. In return, t hey had expected air trade prices to rise. 107

Chavajeval is one o 27 communities which deliver to CIRSA, acooperative ormed and run by small producers. Practically all CIRSAemployees arm their own plots o land, and working or the cooperativeis a ul ll ment o their commitment to the organization which iscollectively owned by the communities. 114 CIRSA pays producers 18pesos per kilo o pergamino co ee upon delivery, and the remaindero their payment is determined a er the cooperatives overall costs arecalculated. 115 CIRSA also provides armers with access to credit, and cano er loans at reasonable rates. 116 Te size o loans CIRSA is able to givedepend upon the amount o co ee the producer is expected to harvest.

In order or the cooperative to sell under a air trade or organic label,they must become certi ed by a number o organizations, dependingon where the product is sold. Teir land, cultivation methods andprocessing acility must all be inspected. Certi cation ees are very expensive, costing CIRSA $24,000 every year. 117 Tis comes out o CIRSAs unds, which a er overall costs are deducted, is divided amongstproducers as the remainder o their payment at the end o the harvest. 118

Cooperative members believe that there are many othercommunities who have the potential to join them, and the organizationgives others an incentive to grow organically. 119 Upon joining, memberspay a ee o 500 pesos, either up ront or over time, which helps tocover development costs such as warehouses and tr ucks to acilitate theogranizations growth. CIRSA is currently working on a project whichutilizes worms to improve the soil, and is al so experimenting with new

ertilization techniques using the pulp o the beans. 120

On July 10, 1998, the Mexican armyaccompanied by paramilitary, entered thecommunity o Chavajeval ully armed anddriving 85 trucks as well as military tanks. 108 They killed three people and raped manywomen. The rest o the village led into themountains as the military robbed the entirecommunity, ate their ood and destroyedmany o their houses. 109 Families were le twith only what they were wearing. Themilitary also captured 35 people who weretaken to prison in Tuxtla, the capital city o Chiapas. 110 Many community members wentto protest their detainment, and while twentypeople we released a ter three days, i teenremained imprisoned or 11 months. 111

One man, Mateo, shared his story. Ashe was captured, the army demanded Areyou armed? Are you a Zapatista? 112 He wasbrutally attacked and su ered a number o broken bones. He was also tortured as themilitary brought him to prison, piled on top o several other men who had been detained.

Grappling with his pain ul memories,Mateo stated, Here it is a war againstthe people. 113 Chvajeval is a Zapatistacommunity, but it has remained unarmedand peace ul. Their story is tragic, andun ortunately it is only one o many like it.

(See Militarization, pg. 46)

A batch o roasted co ee at FIECH

Chavajevals somber history


20/31

38 39

CIRSA has the processing capability to produce a small line o co ee itsel which is sold inlocal markets, but it primarily sends its co ee to FIECH or the nal steps o production, includingsorting, roasting, and packaging. FIECH is also a cooperative organization which was ormed in1993 by a group o producers. Like most armers in Chiapas, they were aced with problems o low prices, lack o technical assistance, and burdensome costs o chemical ertilizers and pesticides.

Now the organization includes 3,089 producers who work a total o 7,766 hectares o land. 121 FIECH is also required to pay certi cation ees, which cost $10,000 per year or organic certi cationand $3,000 to $4,000 per year or air trade. 122 Tey sell directly to air trade cooperatives such as EqualExchange and have their own line o co ees. FIECH is currently involved in projects like the buildingo schools and housing or students to counteract the trend o migration o producers sons anddaughters to the United States. Many do not nish primary school because o a shortage o resourcesand these projects provide them the opportunity to stay in Chiapas and receive an education. 123

Co ee is stacked and sorted inside o FIECHs warehouseBags o co ee at CIRSA are tagged to record which producer it comes rom

Members o CIRSA receive $2.40 (U.S.) per kilo o pergamino co ee. A ter deducting the costs o production they invest in their crop be ore it gets tothe warehouse, (which includes the costs to maintaintheir trees, cultivation and planting o new trees, pestcontrol, disease prevention, harvesting, de -pulpingand transportation) as well as commercializationcosts, (which are used to run the cooperative, paycerti ication ees, and is put into a social support und

or communities) producers are le t with a net income o $0.80 (U.S.) per kilo o co ee.

The average producers annual income is $977.33(U.S.), which means they make $2.67 (U.S.) per day. Thisis not even close to a minimum wage in Mexico, and istypically the only source o income used to sustain andprovide basic care or an entire amily. 124

fair trade producers make $2.67 per day


21/31

40 41

CHAPTER 12 : is air trade enough?Fair trade has been a great success or many arming communities and cooperatives and it shouldcontinue to receive the avid support o consumers. However, one cannot hear the testimony o

armers, such as those in Chavajeval, that they are barely making a living and not critically examinethe system it operates under. Tere are several questions we must consider:

Is air trade paying enough or premium co ee? It is already expensive enough that it only holdsa niche market and increasing prices even more may turn away more buyers. On the other hand, aslight increase in price may have a much more pro ound e ect at t he other end o the exchange. How much would it have to be increased to reach a livable wage or producers?

Should air trade be using world market prices as a basis? It maintains a pr ice which is alwaysslightly higher than what most buyers pay, but on the ground armers can sometimes sell theirco ee to coyotes at a higher rate. Using world market prices is also relying upon the same capitalisticprinciples which guide the prices set by large corporations air trade denounces or exploitingproducers, instead o determining its own air price.

Should armers receive di erent prices depending upon their cost o living? A livable wage ismuch di erent among co ee-producing countries, and some armers are better o than others

nancially, although they may produce the same amount. While it would be ideal to ensure everyonea livable wage, would it be reasonable to try and pay many di erent rates? A livable wage is also anincredibly relative term, and how easily can we determine what income a person needs?

Despite these criticisms, air trade is a big step in the right direction towards an economy wherepeople come be ore pro ts. Fair trade cannot be expected to allev iate poverty on its own. It may secure producers with a steady income but their livelihood needs to be part o the development o their local economy as well. It can however, provide communities with a means to orm sel -governedorganizations. Tese are invaluable to reaching a position o autonomy and economic independence.

the great immigration debate : CHAPTER 13One o the most highly visible and controversial issues in the United States is immigration. However,when much o the debate over immigration takes place, it is usually concentrated on the appropriateresponse to the issue and not over why it occurs. Te U.S. has witnessed the ailure o its reactionary policymaking which ocuses on combating immigration and treats this debate as i it could becontained within the country instead o as an international dialog.

It can be argued that immigration is not only an e ect o the ree market policy governing theNorth American economy, but is an inevitable consequence o it. People who can no longer make aliving in rural areas have no choice but to move to cities already lackingemployment opportunities, resort to illegal sources o income such asdrugs, or migrate outside o t he country.

Immigration rom Mexico to the United States has increased about300% over the last ten to een years. 125 Up to 2007 there were between500,000 to 600,000 success ul crossings per year. 126 It is the largesthuman migration anywhere in the world, outnumbering migrants

rom countries o much larger populations such as India or China. 127 In the past 6 years, 3.2 million Mexicans crossed illegally into theU.S. 128 Now that the U.S. is aced with an economic crisis, there hasbeen an increase in hostility towards migrants as they pose a perceivedthreat to Americans access to jobs. However, it is the inexpensive andunregulated labor provided by Mexico that makes many industries inthe U.S. more pro table.

Despite the attempts o the United States government to increaseborder control, immigration and drug tra cking still occur regularly.Te demand or drugs in the U.S. has slowly increased, and Mexico haspro ted a great deal rom the cultivation and transportation o thesesubstances. 129 Te United States has treated this issue as a security problem instead o a undamentally systematic one. Until Mexicans nolonger nd it necessary to take such risks as crossing the border illegally,the U.S. will continue to expend a tremendous amount o resources onpreventing immigration.

Co ee is grown o n these mountainsides in northern Chiapas

A store ront in San Cristobal de las Casas


22/31

42 43

deep integration and private policymaking : CHAPTER 14en years a er NAF A was passed a number o panels and orums were hosted by the business worlds

elite deeming the agreement a success. 131 Tis was based on statistics showing that both Mexicanexports and oreign investment in Mexico had increased. 132 Some export markets had becomesuccess ul in competition with the U.S. such as cement, glass, tequila, beer and car industries. 133

Now that NAF As intellectual authors can claim victory since advancing t heir economic modelin the world, the same agenda is currently being pushed through by the Security and Prosperity Partnership to deepen and extend NAF A. 134 Te SPP is a little-known initiative being advanced at

the executive level to continue integrating the North American economies as well as policies whichspread the U.S. Security Councils agenda. 135

Te SPP is not an agreement, which is publicly negotiated among countries and passes t hrough thelegislative body. It is a partnership and there ore eliminates the necessity to take those steps. 136 TeSPP is also re erred to as NAF A+ because o its objective to urtherincrease integration. However, critics claim that it is simply a cover-up

or a new policy under the guise o the name NAF A. 137

Some are even calling it the new phase o neoliberalism becauseit directly ties an economic relationship to one which guides politicalinterests as well. It is based on t he principle that our prosperity isdependent on our security. 138

Te SPP was ormed in March o 2005, when the U.S. PresidentGeorge W. Bush, Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper, andMexican President Vicente Fox signed the rst resolutions which haveyet to be ully disclosed to the public o its contents. 139 Because o itslack o transparency, it is di cult to discern the real objectives o thispartnership. Its initiatives are piecemealed and passed through theWhite House in conjunction with larger legislation instead o beingreleased as a whole. 140 Tis method o governing behind closed doorsis criticized by many to be a serious t hreat to democracy in NorthAmerica. Tere is no congressional oversight and no public access oroutside participation in its hearings.

At a summit meeting in Ban , Canada in 2006, the SPP ormeda council composed o 30 representatives rom the private sector andCEOs o major corporations rom each country. 141 Some o thesecompanies include Chevron, Ford, General Electric, Procter & Gambleand Wal-Mart. 142 Tese individuals make recommendations to thePartnership which guide the economic policies to be endorsed. 143

It is believed that the Bush Administration had three undamentalobjectives embodied in its SPP. 144 Tese include urther acilitating

Gra ti on the streets o San Cristobal de las Casas

minimum wage and the cost of living

Only 40% o the work orce in Chiapas is guaranteed at least aminimum wage, as the other 60% works in the in ormal sector,at sel -employed, unregulated and o ten dangerous jobs. 130

Minimum wage in 2009 is 51.95 pesos per day (9 hours), atabout 5.77 pesos per hour. (approximately $0.43 U.S. per hour).

Below are the market prices o some staple oods, theamount o time spent at a minimum wage job to a ord them(time cost), and their perceived price in the U.S. at a minimumwage job.

1 kilo o black beans =12.5 pesos (/5.77) time cost = 2.16 hours(xUS min wage 6.25)= $13.50 equivalent

1 chicken =38 pesos (/5.77) time cost = 6.58 hours(xUS min wage 6.25)= $41 equivalent

Package o corn tortillas =17 pesos (/5.77) time cost = 2.95 hours(xUS min wage 6.25)= $18.44


23/31

44

trade between countries to be more advantageous or transnationalcorporations, securing access to natural resources (particularly oil)in Canada and Mexico, and creating an international plan which

urthers the U.S.s security agenda. 145 In essence, this plan merges therelationship between international trade and security under the pretexto greater integration. 146

In de ense against criticisms, the United States explained in

a press con erence that this economic integration and regulationstandardization was necessary because multinational corporationshave a di cult time meeting di erent standards o the three countries.147 Tis may be so, but the government has been reluctant to discussthe underlying initiative to uni y security measures which is muchmore signi cant.

By uni ying security measures, it is expected that Mexico andCanada will be orced to adapt to U.S. policy on issues such as bordercontrol, privatized security measures, and the reduction o civilliberties. 148 o do so, Mexico must modernize and increase its military to be up to par with standards set by the U.S. Te o cial explanation isthat it will be used to curb the drug trade, but it is eared that with thegrowing discontent and poverty within Mexico, this militarization willbe used against civil society instead.

Te SPP is problematic in many ways, but perhaps the mostthreatening is its goal o deep integration at a time when integrationcreated by NAF A has lead to a growing disparity between the richand poor within Mexico. Te growing rate o immigration to the U.S.is a per ect indication o NAF As ailure to provide real economicgrowth in the country. Instead, it has created record pro ts to a ew major corporations who are now guiding the e orts to urther integrateeconomic policy between North American countries.

In addition, tightening security measures will mean capping thesa ety valve o migration. Without the income rom migrant workersin the U.S., Mexico will all urther into poverty. Tis raises theprospect that as social uprising is sparked by these economic ailures,the Mexican military will be gaining the capacity to suppress legitimatepublic protest.

Roo ops o San Cristobal de las Casas A misty morning in Chavajeval


24/31

46 47

CHAPTER 15 : militarization and the merida initiativeTe Mexican military has a long, documented history o human rights abuses. 149 It also has a recordo political corruption underneath the appearance o democracy. 150 Although Mexico has claimed inrecent years that it is decreasing its military presence within Chiapas, it has in act grown in strength.

During 1996, at the same time the San Andrs Accords were signed, the government movedone-third o the entire Mexican army into Chiapas. 151 From 1997 to 2000, the military decreased thenumber o ormal military installations rom 120 to 73 by merging bases together, in turn creatinga stronger orce. 152 Tis presence is a threat to the surrounding communities, as cases o military-

caused violence, provocations, destruction o property and deaths have continued to occur. 153Tere are currently two orms o oppression taking place in Mexico; low-intensity war are and

government-supported vigilante paramilitary war are. 154 Low-intensity war are is a tactic usedby the government to instil l ear upon citizens and divide communities. Government-sponsored

programs o er ree assistance to coerce individuals to leave resistances,as mentioned in discussion o the Zapatistas. 155 In some cases, thegovernment has demanded citizens to give money in order to ght theZapatistas. I one is to re use, t hey are charged to be in allegiance w iththem, something they would never admit in ear o persecution. 156 TeMexican military has also employed paramilitaries to commit atrocitiesagainst citizens, and still claim no responsibility or those acts.

Tis year, the SPP has led a new military agreement called theMerida Initiative, also known as Plan Mexico. Tis re ers to PlanColumbia, a ailed military support program or Columbias armed

orces which has wasted billions o dollars combating the trade o drugsand suppressing an armed civil movement. 157

Tis initiative was planned by the SPP and inserted into a largermilitary bill which passed in October o 2007. President Bush describedit as a new security cooperation initiative to combat drug tra ckingand organized crime. 158 However, it appears to be a n expensive military response to treat the symptoms o larger underlying issues.

Te Merida Initiative allocates a total o $1.4 billion o taxpayers money as a military aid packageto Mexico over the span o two or three years. 159 During the rst year o unding in 2008, Mexicoreceived $400 million, and another $65 million went to var ious Central American countries. 160

Tis money is used to purchase military equipment, helicopters and aircra , unding or privatede ense contractors, and judicial re orm. 161 However, this plan ails to address the demand or drugsin the U.S. or poverty in Mexico; the root causes o drug tra ck ing.

Te Merida Initiative is also a concern because o the reputation the Mexican military has orhuman rights abuses, which requently occur under the pretext o anti-narcotic operations. 162 Many ear that this is merely an extension o the United States security agenda which will be usedby the Mexican military or civil en orcement rather than law en orcement. It could mean thecriminalization o law ul civil protest and suppression o civil movements, which is already a reality in Mexico.

It appears to be ironic that the United States, the market which eeds Mexicos drug tra cking,is urthering its ailing war on drugs by spending billions o dollars on another countrys military.Tis neither addresses the act that the U.S. already supplies the capital to make drug tra ckingpro table, or the act that its success ul trade policies such as NAF A has created the widespreadpoverty which drive Mexicans to migrate and engage in illegal trades such as drugs.

Gra ti calling or the liberation o political prisoners

The United States Army School o the Americas, (SOA)is a military training base in Fort Benning, Georgia. Thisinstitute is unded by the Department o De ense andtrains Latin American security personnel in combat,counter-insurgency, and counter-narcotics. 163 164 It isresponsible or instructing a number o dictators andmilitary agents who have committed some o the worsthuman rights abuses in Latin America. 165

In 1996 the SOA was orced to release trainingmanuals it used which advocated the use o torture,extortion and execution. 166 In response to mountingcriticism o its support o unjust and inhumane practices,the SOA was renamed the Western Hemisphere Institute

or Security Cooperation in 2001. 167 This center o military education is yet another case o how the UnitedStates security agenda has been extended beyond itsnational jurisdiction and used against civilians.

To learn more about the School o Americas,visit http://www.soaw.org.

school of the americas

Gra ti protesting or the dissolution o law en orcement


25/31

49

Acteal, Chiapas is home to an indigenous Tsotsilcommunity committed to passivism and nonviolence,originally populated by re ugees displaced rom

their land. The story o the massacre which occurredhere is a sobering example o the counterinsurgencytactics being used by the Mexican military againstits own people in Chiapas. 168 The people o Acteal,known as Las Abejas, (the bees in English) are a civilassociation o neutral territory, neither siding withthe government or Zapatistas. 169

Although the Abejas support the same demandsor indigenous rights as the Zapatistas, they disagree

with the use o armed orce. 170 This distinctionbetween the two groups did not prevent the Mexicangovernment rom pressuring them not to supportthe Zapatistas. 171 During 1995 and 1996, the Mexicangovernment signed an agreement or indigenousrights and claimed it would be a year o peace andreconciliation. At this time the Zapatistas continuedto receive hostility and death threats rom themilitary. 172

On December 22, 1997, a paramilitary groupunded and armed by the Mexican military

surrounded the small community and brutallymurdered 49 people. 173 O those killed, 19 werewomen, 4 o whom were pregnant, 8 were men, 14were girls, 4 were boys, and rom 17 to 26 otherssurvived with injuries. 174 175 Many o the victimswere praying when the group o over 300 attackersopened ire on their small church.

The legal prosecution o the paramilitaries andthe intellectual directors o the massacre has beena long and relatively unsuccess ul process. Only 87o the attackers involved have been charged, andseveral o these charges have been absolved. 176 Fi teen public servants were charged, but were low

level or ex-o icers who received only short sentencesor light charges such as possession o weapons,

instead o connection to organized crime as they

should have received. 177To this day, 27 people believed to be the

intellectual leaders o the massacre have warrantsout or their arrest and have yet to be charged, andthe Abejas have received no reparations or damages

rom the attack. 178 In 2005 the case was taken tointernational human rights organizations but theyare still waiting or the case to be processed be oreinvestigations will begin. 179

The Mexican government insists that the con lictoccurred over religious or communal di erences anddenies arming the paramilitary group. 180 However,the military has used such armed orce to keepZapatista in luence rom expanding. Accordingto FrayBart, a human rights watch organization,

rom 1995 to 2000, 138 non-Zapatistas have beenexecuted, tortured, illegally detained or havedisappeared due to paramilitary troops in northernChiapas. 181 The government has also used low-intensity tactics to pit societies against each other,which has caused divisions among the Abejas. 182

Mexico, as a nation, is guilty or a number o atrocities including the massacre o Acteal. It is nosecret that the military employs counterinsurgencygroups to suppress civil movements, even thoseas peace ul as the Abejas. The United States is alsoguilty or inancially supporting the Mexican militaryand extending its security agenda at the cost o human lives. Throughout their struggle to overcometragedy and seek justice, the Abejas remain irm intheir belie ; We opt or peace, no matter the cost, nomatter the consequences. 183

the massacre of acteal

A boy rom Acteal fies a home-made kite on the road near the community


26/31

50 51

CHAPTER 16 : mexico today and tomorrowMexicos struggle to overcome the mass o debt it has accumulated is not over today, like mostcountries who borrowed decades ago. Many o these nations are today more poor and lesseconomically developed than they were be ore the crisis struck. 184 Te total external debt o LatinAmerica has grown rom $60 billion in t he mid-1970s to $204 billion in 1980, $433 billion in 1990,and $706 billion by the end o 1999. At this point they were paying $123 billion per year in debtservice, mainly to the United States. 185 Even through the help o initiatives which have loweredpayments, Latin America remains $180 billion in debt. 186

With the prospect o NAF A and now NAF A+ as models o economic integration, Mexicomay slip urther into poverty as a ew multinational corporations rake in record pro ts. We are

beginning to see the emergence o ailed cities, and possibly ailed statesas the current policies simply cannot support a population unable towork or sustain themselves. 187

However, there is a great deal o work being done to help supportnew methods o trade and economic independence or the people o Mexico. A number o organizations work within the rural areas o Chiapas to support autonomous movements, local economies, andprotect civil liberties.

CIEPAC, the Center or Economic and Political Research andCommunity Action, is a center o research which provides in ormationand education or grassroot organizations, cooperatives, armers andtrade unions on how economic and political issues a ect the people inChiapas. 188 Tis helps to ll the gap in in ormation which occurs inrural areas and provides access to greater education.

DESMI, an organization or Economic and Social Developmento Indigenous Mexicans, works to strengthen and support indigenouspeople through collective projects. Tey ocus on community development which is guided by the peoples needs and accompaniedby their organization. Tey strive to create a solidarious economywhich is locally-based and helps to secure the independence andautonomy o communities. 189 Some initiatives they have supported inChiapas include maintaining local and native oods in diets, producingmaximum yields o ood in small yards at home, and providing healthierand more e cient stoves or rural households. 190

FrayBart, the Human Rights Center Fray Bartlome de las Casas, isa human rights center which investigates human rights abuses and helpsguides victims through the legal process. It also provides assistanceto communities threatened by violence and works with internationalhuman rights organizations to le unsettled cases.

Characteristic landscape o northern Chiapas enveloped in low clouds A bell tower o an old church in San Cristobal de las Casas


27/31

53

refection and conclusion : CHAPTER 17I believe it is evident in t he current state o Mexico, and Chiapas in particular, that our internationaleconomic policies are dangerously short-sighted. Tese mechanisms which sel -perpetually consolidate power and capital are o en g uided by political and ideological motivations, and spare noexpense to meet their objectives, even i it costs human lives.

In examining the current theoretic models and systems in place today, we must acknowledge thatthe world is not a machine and there ore economics, politics, and social sciences cannot predict theoutcome o its in uence. Te human element driving and determining the direction o these models

needs to be taken into consideration as well as the humans subject to its consequences.Most Americans are experiencing a alse sense o afuence. I every thing cost its true price, we

could probably not a ord to live as com ortably as we do. Our economic system has discounted theprice o commodities by placing the burden o its real cost on other humans and t he environment.

Neoliberal capitalism is a generator o great wealth and extreme poverty. Tis economic modelhas dominated a global ree market which has rapidly swallowed a great deal o developing countriesand le them impoverished and in debt. However, this approach to economic growth is generating aseries o consequential issues which similarly-oriented policies cannot resolve.

Te people o Chavajeval and the indigenous people o Chiapas are revolutionaries in theiropposition to economic and political marginalization and subjugation. While some rose inarmed protest, others secretly organized in the mountains to create a more just and avorableway to trade. Teir struggle is not just about land re orm but about autonomy and economicindependence. Neoliberal-guided U.S. policy has stripped many rural communities o their oodsovereignty and ability to compete in a global market.

Even within an alternative market such as air trade, some armers are barely scraping by. Localinitiatives are help ul to combat their disadvantage in the global economy, but they will not prevent

the growing disparity between the rich and the poor. Economic inequality is a structurally-createdcondition. Tis means anything less than reevaluating the ideology behind the cur rent internationaleconomic system is treating the symptoms o its policies.

I do not wish to simply paint a grim picture o reality, but rather in orm and challenge the audienceto envision a better uture. It may be di cult to conceive o a world where every individual can make aliving without in turn exploiting or pro ting o o anothers disadvantage. We must try regardless.

Capitalism in its present orm is not inherent in essence. It is not a n inevitable stage in theevolution o humanity, and neither is the process o globalization and economic integration. Weare not perpetually bound to these systems, especially i we acknowledge that they are ailing overtime. Te policies directed by neoliberal economics and expansionist politics have incited a host o problems as a result o their lack o concern or their long-term e ects. Now we must decide whetherit is enough to change these policies within their current structures or i the only way to preventstructural oppression is to create new ones.

Leaving Chavajeval with a swarm o theories and emotions weighing down upon me, Ikept returning to the question o what I could possibly do to change the state o this seemingly uncontrollable situation. Reversing decades o subordination and injustice is not an easy task to assume. But I knew t heir story needed to be told, and hope ully it may lead others to ace thechallange collectively and in solidarity with all people o the world.

h i l d


28/31

54

how you can get involved :As neighbors and world citizens, we cannot dismiss these un ortunate realities and stand by idly. Tecycles o poverty and marginalization will continue until we can match orces which gain power andpro t through oppression with resistance.

Here are some ways you can make a di erence:

Educate yourself, stay informed of current events and investigate what is really taking place inthe world today.

Educate others by sharing your knowledge, and speak up even when your opinions are not wellreceived. Sending letters to the editor o your local paper is a great way to spread awareness andpossibly change minds.

Write to your political leaders. A great deal of important legislation came from the mountede orts o grassroots organization and public action.

Donate to organizations which are doing crucial work to make change. Many are under-fundedand their employees o en volunteer their services.

Be a conscientious consumer and learn about the companies you purchase from. You have thepower to vote with your dollars by choosing who to support.

Help to create networks of empowered citizens. Tere are many organized e orts to bring changealready in progress, and there is always greater power in numbers.

Below is a list o resources or additional in ormation on Mexico, trade-related issues in NorthAmerica and air trade:

www.witness orpeace.org

www.sipaz.orgwww.publiccitizen.org/tradewww.americaspolicy.orgwww.equalexchange.coopwww.jubileejustice.comwww.narconews.comwww.soaw.orgwww.globalexchange.orgamericas.irc-online.org

bibliography :


29/31

56 57

1 Campasinos o Chavajeval. Chiapas Delegation:

Globalization, Justice and Co ee. Chiapas, Mexico,

Chavajeval. 31 Jan. 2009.

2 Campasinos o Chavajeval.




6 Te Endless Struggle: An Overview o Indigenous

Peoples History in Mexico. Witness or PeaceMexico Factsheet (Jan. 2009).

7 Reyes Ball, Alexis, and Ann Teisen. Mexican

History. Chiapas Delegation: Globalization, Justice

and Co ee. San Cristobal de las Casas. 25 Jan. 2009.

8 Reyes Ball, Teisen, Mexican History.

9 Pickard, Miguel. Impacts o the Neoliberal Model

on Development and Migration in Chiapas.

Chiapas Delegation: Globalization, Justice and

Co ee. Center or Economic and Political Research

and Community Action (CIEPAC), San Cristobal

de las Casas, Chiapas, Mexico. 26 Jan. 2009.

10 Solnit, Rebecca. Hope in the Dark Untold Histories,

Wild Possibilities. New York: Nation Books, 2004.

33.

11 Pickard.

12 Duncan, Stan G. From Jubilee to the World Bank,

Economic Globalization or Faith-Based Activists.Jubilee Justice, 2008. 42.

13 Duncan, Jubilee 25.



16 Duncan, Stan G. Globalization and U.S.-Mexico

Economic Relations: Te E ects o Debt and

Structural Adjustment in Mexico. Chiapas

Delegation: Globalization, Justice and Co ee.

Chiapas, Mexico, San Cristobal de las Casas. 26 Jan.

2009.

17 Duncan, Globalization.






23 Duncan, Jubilee 39.24 Duncan, Globalization.









33 Duncan, Jubilee 39.34 Duncan, Jubilee 40.


36 Solnit, 35.

37 Ortega, Julio Cesar. Te Zapatista Movement and

Current Issues around Militarization in Chiapas.

Chiapas Delegation: Globalization, Justice and

Co ee. Chiapas, Mexico, San Cristobal de las Casas.

28 Jan. 2008.

38 Reyes Ball, Teisen, Mexican History.

39 Solnit, 34.

40 Solnit, 34.

41 Ortega.

42 Or

Documents

Chiapas: A Glimpse Into the Consequences of Short-Sighted Economic Policy