CHEMICAL STOCKPILE - HSDL

ANNISTON COMMUNITY EXERCISE 1994(ACE 94)

September 28, 1994

CHEMICAL STOCKPILELOCALS

EXERCISE REPORT

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ACEACPAEMAAMCAMCCOMANADANCANRAARARES

CAIRACDCCECLACPCSEPPCSM

DA PamDCXDERADESCOMDHR

E-mailEBSEMAEMDEMISEMSEMTENDEXEOCEODEOFEXPLAN

FAXFCPFEMAFMFSX

Anniston Community ExerciseAccess Control PointAlabama Emergency Management AgencyU.S. Army Materiel CommandU.S. Army Armament Munitions and Chemical CommandAnniston Army DepotArea Needing CorrectionArea Need Remedial ActionArmy RegulationAmateur Radio Emergency System

Chemical Accident or Incident Response and AssistanceCenters for Disease ControlChemical EventChemical Limited AreaCommand PostChemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness ProgramChemical Surety Material

Department of the Army PamphletDirection and Control ExerciseDefense Environmental Restoration AccountDepot Systems CommandDepartment of Human Resources

Electronic MailEmergency Broadcast SystemEmergency Management AgencyEmergency Management DirectorEmergency Management Information SystemEmergency Medical ServicesEmergency Medical TechnicianEnd of the ExerciseEmergency Operations CenterExplosive Ordnance DisposalEmergency Operations FacilityExercise Plan

FacsimileForward Command PostFederal Emergency Management AgencyField ManualFull Scale Exercise

ANNISTON COMMUNITY EXERCISE 1994(ACE 94)

September 28, 1994

EXERCISE REPORT

Report Date: November 14, 1994

INSTALLATION:

Anniston Army Depot, Anniston, Alabama

RESPONSE ORGANIZATIONS:

Alabama State Emergency Management AgencyCalhoun County Emergency Management Agency

Talladega County Emergency Management AgencyClay County Emergency Management Agency

Cleburne County Emergency Management AgencyEtowah County Emergency Management AgencySt. Clair County Emergency Management Agency

APPROVED BY:

Mary Lynne MillerFEMA Co-DirectorAnniston Community Exercise 1994

Daniel R. CivisArmy Co-DirectorAnniston Community Exercise 1994

This page not used.

Table of Contents

Section

INTRODUCTION

EXERCISE SCENARIO ...........................

EXERCISE OVERVIEW ..........................

LIST OF STRENGTHS, FINDINGS, AND OBSERVATIONS

AFTER-ACTION PROCESS .......................

COORDINATION INSTRUCTIONS ..................

TAB A: ON-POST ACTIVITIES ....................

TAB B: JOINT ACTIVITIES ......................

TAB C: OFF-POST EVALUATION .................STATE OF ALABAMA .....................CALHOUN COUNTY .......................TALLADEGA COUNTY .....................CLAY COUNTY ..........................CLEBURNE COUNTY ......................ETOWAH COUNTY ........................ST. CLAIR COUNTY .......................

.................... 2

.................... 2

.................... 3

..................... 8

.................... 8

................... A -1

................... B -1

................... C -1

................... C-3........................C-7

.................. C -11

.................. C -15

.................. C -19................... C -23

.................. C -27

APPENDIX I: ACTION PLANS

Page

........................ 1

I-1

i

list of Tables

Number Page

Table 1. Summary of ACE 94 Objectives .................................. 1

Table 2. Significant Events Time Line .................................... 2

Table 3 - Tab A Listing ................................ 4

Table 4. Tab B Listing ............................................... 6

Table 5. Tab C Listings ............................................... 6

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INTRODUCTION

The Anniston Community Exercise 1994 (ACE 94) provided the opportunity to demonstrateemergency response capabilities as specified in the extent of play agreements and to addressissues identified during ACE 93.

The requirement for conducting CSEPP exercises was established in the August 1988Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the Federal Emergency Management Agency(FEMA) and the Army (and reaffirmed in a Joint Memorandum for the Record (MFR) on January19, 1993). Objectives used for ACE 94 (see Table 1) are contained in the Chemical StockpileEmergency Preparedness Program Exercise Program, Part II, dated January 9, 1992. Exercisedesign, planning, and reporting guidance is contained in the revised Chemical StockpileEmergency Preparedness Program Exercises document, dated February 23, 1994.

The Anniston Exercise Planning Team was responsible for all aspects of the ACE 94 design. Allparticipating jurisdictions were represented on the team which was Co-Chaired by representativesfrom FEMA Region IV and the U.S. Army Defense Ammunition Center and School(USADACS). The Co-Chairs also served as the Exercise Co-Directors.

Table 1. Summary of ACE 94 Objectives

Jurisdiction Objectives

Anniston Army Depot 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16

State of Alabama 2, 4, 6, 7, 9

Calhoun County 6, 7, 9

Talladega County 2, 4, 6, 7, 9

Clay County 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 17

Cleburne County 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11

Etowah County 2, 4, 6, 7, 9

St. Clair County 2, 4, 6, 7, 9

One functional area, Command and Control, was added for coverage in this report, although itdoes not fit a specific objective as defined in the Chemical Stockpile Emergency PreparednessProgram Exercise Program, Part II, January 9, 1992. The Command and Control function is oneof the standards included in Planning Guidance for the Chemical Stockpile EmergencyPreparedness Program, November 25, 1992. The function is also included in FEMA PlanningGuidance for State and local governments in Civil Preparedness Guide 1-8.

The Co-Directors were supported in the conduct and evaluation of the exercise by controllers,evaluators, and other support personnel drawn from the nationwide CSEPP community.

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EXERCISE SCENARIO

During the required periodic inspection of an igloo storing 4.2 inch HD mortar rounds,significant water damage was discovered and it was determined that the structure would requirerepair before winter.

Coordination among ANAD, U.S. Army Materiel Command (AMC), U.S. Army ArmamentMunitions and Chemical Command (AMCCOM), and Depot Systems Command (DESCOM)concerning the repair of the igloo had occurred and it was agreed to move the munitions toanother igloo.

As the first load of the day was being transported, the driver experienced a seizure and lostcontrol of the vehicle, causing it to swerve off the road, tumble down a steep grade, and cometo rest near an igloo. A fire ensued which encompassed the 4.2 inch mortar rounds and spreadto the grass and trees. The fire lasted for about 30 minutes.

EXERCISE OVERVIEW

Anniston Community CSEPP planning is coordinated among the ANAD, the State of Alabama,the Alabama Counties of Calhoun, Talladega, Clay, Cleburne, Etowah, and St. Clair. Allparticipating emergency response organizations exercised their plans and procedures in responseto the scenario to the extent described in extent of play agreements (see ACE 94 EXPLAN). Abrief summary of response activities is provided at Table 2, Significant Events Time Line.

Table 2. Significant Events Time line

Time Activity

0901 Initiating Event/STARTEX

0902 ANAD EOC activated by the Surety Officer

0902 Off-post notifications begin

0902 Chemical Event (CE) is classified as a Community Emergency

0908 Protective Action Recommendation (PAR) made to off-post communities

0912 State EOC activated

0914 Tip of the plume reaches the 1% Lethality Line

0915 Clay County EOC activated

0915 Forward Command Post (FCP) operational

0915 Fire and Rescue Team members arrive at CE site

0916 Etowah County EOC activated

0917 St. Clair County EOC activated

2

0927 First Emergency Broadcast System (EBS) messages aired

0930 ANAD Commander requests Service Response Force (SRF) Commander

0930 Army Operations Center notified - SRF requested

0932 Initial press release

0933 DESCOM notified

0935 Fire at accident site extinguished

0935 Off-post EOCs make Protective Action Decisions (PADs)

0945 Cleburne county EOC activated

0945 i-20 closed

0950 EOD arrived at CE site

0955 Governor declared State of Emergency

0955 Calhoun County EOC activated

0955 Talladega County EOC activated

0958 SRF Commander designated

1017 Train derailment (Clay County)

1019 Forest fire north of Pelham Range (State of Alabama)

1024 Explosion and fire at Owens Plating Company plant (Etowah County)

1032 Tip of the chemical plume crosses the Depot boundary

1033 Interstate 20 fuel oil tanker accident (St. Clair County)

1040 Interstate 20 Monsanto truck accident (Cleburne County)

1045 Initial press conference

1056 National Respose Center notified

1100 Media Center established in the State EOC in Clanton

1500 ENDEX

LIST OF STRENGTHS, FINDINGS, AND OBSERVATIONS

Below are lists of strengths, findings, and observations identified during ACE 94. They aregrouped by the Tab in which they can be found. Findings have an assigned identifying (ID)number that may be used to identify the finding throughout the report and in exercising the actionplans. The number is structured as follows: XX94B8.1. The "XX" is a two-letter identification

3

of the response organization to which the finding applies (i.e., AN for Anniston Army Depot, ALfor the State of Alabama, CH for Calhoun County, TA for Talladega County, CL for ClayCounty, CB for Cleburne County, ET for Etowah County, ST for St. Clair County, and AI forfindings which apply to more than one organization, i.e., joint issues); "94" represents the currentyear; "B" is the Tab designation (A, B, or C) in which the finding is reported; "8" is the objectivenumber to which the finding relates; and ".1" is the sequence number of the finding under theobjective.

Issues from previous exercises that were not resolved during ACE 94 are listed by theirpreviously assigned ID number.

Table 3 - Tab A Listing

Type ID Number Description

Strength (Obj. 0) Command and control of EOC operations was excellent.

Strength (Obj. 0) The Forward Command Post (FCP) officer -took commandand control of the FCP early in the response effort.

Strength (Obj. 0) The use of mask numbers to identify casualties is anexcellent procedure.

Finding AN94A0. 1 A Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) decision was notformally developed.

Finding AN94A0.2 Stay times were exceeded.

Finding AN94A0.3 Monitoring of heat stress for response team personnel.

Finding A-0. 1 (93) Basis of SRF organization.

Finding A-0.2 (93) Heat stress management.

Finding A-0.3 (93) Timeliness of chemical event report.

Observation (Obj. 0) List of personnel by name entering the accident site, levelof PPE, and stay time was not maintained in the FCP.

Observation (Obj. 0) Personal comfort facilities and services availability in_________ vicinity of the FCP and hot line.

Observation (Obj. 0) Dressing out in full M-3 TAP gear prior to deployment.

Observation (Obj. 0) Recording of telephone data.

Finding A-2.1 (93) Timeliness of siren activation confirmation.

Observation (Obj. 4) EOC telephone operators did not use headset adapters.

Observation (Obj. 4) Imposition of "minimize" hindered legal office activity.

4

Table 3 - Tab A listing (Continued)

Strength (Obj. 5) The teamwork displayed by the hazard analysis sectionwas commendable.

Finding AN94A5.1 Survey Team EOC duties detailed in the CAIRA Plan.

Observation (Obj. 5) Insufficient use of low level monitoring

Strength (Obj. 8) Volunteers in the Media Center were very responsive.

Finding AN94A8.1 Use of the term "casualty" is confusing.

Finding AN94A8.2 AR 380-61 information provided to on-post community.

Observation (Obj. 8) Media analysis.

Observation (Obj. 8) Media Center volunteers.

Observation (Obj. 8) Use of the term "Media Center".

Observation (Obj. 8) Information provided to the media.

Finding A-9.1 (93) Timeliness and suitability of evacuation instructions.

Strength (Obj. 12) Real world/exercise emergency response by the ANADFire Department EMS and Dear Clinic was excellent.

Finding AN94A12.1 Army policy on first response capability at a CAI site.

Observation (Obj. 12) Exposure of guards to mustard vapor.

Strength (Obj. 13) Excellent PDS and hot line operation.

Finding A-13.1 (93) Monitoring and complying with stay times.

Finding A-13.2 (93) Verification of gross level monitoring.

Observation (Obj. 13) Use of rubber thongs at PDS.

Observation (Obj. 13) The role of the forward staging area and the hot line.

Finding AN94A14.1 Packaging of fuzed mortar rounds.

Finding A-14.1 (93) Command guidance on protective clothing.

Strength (Obj. 15) Evaluators permitted to use their own protective masks.

Finding A-15.1 (93) Push package.

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Table 4. Tab B Listing


Finding AI94B0.1 EMIS permitted overwrite of previously entered data.

Observation (Obj. 4) Number of FAX machines in the ANAD EOC.

Observation (Obj. 4) Communications protocols used by "hotline" phone users.

Finding AI94B7.1 The initial ANAD Form 18.

Observation (Obj. 7) All information on the ANAD Form 18, Off-Site__________ Notification, was repeated on every notification.

Finding AI94B8.1 Coordination between State PIOs and Depot PAOs.

Finding B-8.1 (93) Coordination and communication in the JIC.

Finding B-8.2 (93) Responsiveness of media briefings.

Finding B-8.3 (93) Equipment in the JIC briefing area.

Finding B-8.4 (93) Content of EBS messages.

Table 5. Tab C Listing


Observation AL (Obj. 2) CSEPP training.

Strength AL (Obj. 4) Volunteer RACES/ARES personnel exercise_____________ participation.

Observation AL (Obj. 4) E-mail usage.

Finding AL94C7.1 EBS message and reception center location procedures.

Finding CH94C7.1 EBS message content (previous issue C-CA-7.3)

Observation CH (Obj. 7) EBS message process.

Finding C-CA-2.1 (93) Timely notification of municipalities and unincorporated__________________ jurisdictions.

Finding C-CA-2.2 (93) Alert and mobilization.

Finding C-CA-2.3 (93) EOC activation notification.

Finding C-CA-2.4 (93) Provision of situation reports.

Finding C-CA-4.1 (93) Communications capabilities.

Finding C-CA-4.2 (93) Communications procedures.

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Table 5. Tab C Listing (Continued)

Strength TA (Obj. 2) Situation update briefings and use of EOC checklists.

Observation TA (Obj. 2) Law enforcement representation.

Observation TA (Obj. 2) Lengths of time required for EOC member notification.

Strength TA (Obj. 4) The communications team is composed of highly skilledvolunteers.

Observation TA (Obj. 4) Telephone lines in EOC.

Observation TA (Obj. 4) No written procedures for communications operators.

Observation TA (Obj. 4) Number of FAX machines.

Finding TA94C6.1 The initial PAD did not include Zone C-6.

Strength TA (Obj. 7) County Public Information Officer performance.

Finding TA94C7.1 EBS message delays.

Finding TA94C7.2 EBS message content.

Finding C-TA-11.1 (93) Congregate care capability.

Observation CB (Obj. 2) Incomplete installation of maps, clock and otherdisplays in the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF).

Observation CB (Obj. 4) Limited telephone lines serving the EOF.

Observation CB (Obj. 7) EBS procedures need clarification when the county is"unaffected".

Strength ET (Obj. 2) Notification and activation of EOC staff.

Observation ET (Obj. 4) The State hotline did not work properly.

Strength ET (Obj. 6) Ability to assess chemical risk.

Strength ET (Obj. 9) Good coordination between EOC reception careorganizations.

Strength ET (Obj. 9) Fire officials properly corrected erroneous informationprovided during a simulated phone conversation.

Strength ET (Obj. 9) Coordination on location of TCPs and reception carecenters.

Observation ET (Obj. 9) Coordination of TCP and reception center locations.

Strength ST (Obj. 2) The activation of the operations facility was done in aconcise and timely manner.

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Table 5. Tab C Listing (Continued)

Observation ST (Obj. 2) Event logs were not conspicuously displayed for___________ . ___________ _ .viewing at essential times.

Observation ST (Obj. 2) Efficient and timely message logging procedures werenot evident during the period of operation.

Strength ST (Obj. 4) Understanding of communications and automation______________ equipment displayed by the operations staff.

Strength ST (Obj. 4) RACES communications greatly contributed to thecommunications effectiveness of the operations facility.

Strength ST (Obj. 4) Efficient and timely handling of incoming calls to theoperations facility was displayed by the staff.

Strength ST (Obj. 6) Timely and accurate protective action decision making.

Observation ST (Obj. 7) EBS message release.

Strength ST (Obj. 9) Initiation of preplanned traffic and access control plans.

AFTER-ACTION PROCESS

Anniston Community response organizations had 15 days to respond to this report with actionplans to address all findings identified during the exercise and unresolved issues from previousexercises. Appendix I summarizes these findings in table format. The appropriate jurisdictionscompleted the action plans by adding the responsible agency for accomplishing the correction andprovide an estimated completion date. If a player organization did not agree with a finding, orthe recommendation for correction of the finding, comments were added to the action plan.Action plans will be reviewed quarterly by a joint review panel and monitored by FEMAheadquarters and the Army chain of command. A joint headquarters FEMA-Army review willalso be conducted concurrent with the annual budget process.

COORDINATION INSTRUCTIONS

Questions regarding this report should be addressed to the Exercise Co-Directors at the following:

Mary Lynne MillerFEMA Region IV1371 Peachtree Street, NESuite 700Atlanta, GA 30309-3108Telephone: (404) 853-4454FAX: (404) 853-4484

Director,USADACSAttn: SMCAC-ASE (Dan Civis)Savanna, IL 61074-9639Telephone: (815) 273-8595FAX: (815) 273-8935

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TAB A: ON-POST ACTIVITIES

Tab A documents the specific strengths, findings, and observations noted by the evaluation teamconcerning emergency response plans and procedures demonstrated by the Anniston Army Depot(ANAD) during the Anniston Community Exercise 1994 (ACE 94). The evaluation team'srecommendations are also provided, where appropriate.

A listing of issues from previous exercises is provided at the end of this Tab.

Objective 0: Command and Control.

Strength

Description: Command and control of EOC operations was excellent.

Discussion: Installation personnel functioned well; the EOC was well organized andefficiently laid out, and management provided excellent leadership. Operating personnelwere kept up to date via frequent and comprehensive status briefings.

Strength

Description: The Forward Command Post (FCP) officer took command and control ofthe FCP early in the response effort.

Discussion: The FCP officer exercised forceful and decisive leadership of the FCP whenevents started to get chaotic.

Strength

Description: The use of mask numbers to identify casualties is an excellent procedure.

Discussion: Instead of using the individual names when discussing casualties over theradio, depot personnel used the number of the individual's protective mask. Thisprocedure is effective and reduces the possibility of release of information concerninginjuries or deaths, if applicable, and thus reduces the possibility of anxiety or stress onspouses or relatives with access to radio traffic.

Finding AN94A0.1

Description: A Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) decision was not formallydeveloped.

Discussion: A Survey Team arrived at the accident site in Level A, followed shortly byEOD wearing Modified Level A (which was appropriate considering that hazard levelswere unknown). A decision should have been made by the installation commanderconcerning the level of dress, and a summary of the decision should have been entered

A-1

into the EOC log. The same process needs to be used when considering the appropriatelevel of dress for the M12 operators.

Reference: DA Pam 50-6, paragraph 2-10 b(l)(b)

Recommendation: ANAD should develop plans to ensure that exceptions to emergencyPPE requirements are defined, and based on the nature of the emergency. Procedures forformal entry of these decisions into the official log of the event should be established.

Finding AN94A0.2

Description: Stay times were exceeded.

Discussion: Depot team 2, depot team 3, and the EOD team in Modified Level Aexceeded maximum stay times. The EOD Commander in the FCP attempted to track staytimes for EOD personnel, but was unsuccessful. The depot procedure is to track staytimes by teams, but this was not effective.

Reference: DA Pam 385-61, table 4-1

Recommendation: ANAD should establish a procedure to maintain a list of personnel byname, level of PPE, and stay time in the FCP.

Finding AN94A0.3

Description: There was inadequate monitoring for heat stress for response teampersonnel.

Discussion: The published guidelines for stay times in chemical protective gear aremaximums; they should be interpreted to allow for the age and level of physicalconditioning of response team personnel. Permissible time limits for young, conditionedsoldiers should not be applied to older, less fit individuals. This practice, plus inadequatesupervisor/response team monitoring of performance and heat load, resulted in heatcasualties during this exercise. Rotation of fatigued personnel back into the accident sitecontributed to the situation. Vital signs of responders were being taken when requested,but not as a routine procedure; this information could be used to help identify heat relatedor other medical conditions.

Reference: DA Pam 385-61, page 134, paragraph D-5c.

Recommendations: ANAD should implement:

(1) More judicious interpretation of published guidance on safe time limits inprotective gear.

(2) Better supervisor/team member interaction to ensure more accurate heat stressmanagement on-site.

A-2

(3) Vital sign monitoring of individuals after wearing of chemical protective gear andbefore reentering a site as a minimum. Vital signs could also be monitored beforefirst entry to the site. These procedures would help preclude high risk individualsfrom wearing protective clothing and document responders' status on removal ofprotective clothing.

Observation

Description: A list of personnel by name entering the accident site, level of personalprotective equipment (PPE), and stay time was not being maintained in the FCP.

Discussion: A list of personnel entering the site was maintained at the hot line but notthe level of PPE being worn by each individual or stay time. The number of personnelentering the site was maintained by security. The FCP monitored stay times by teams.It is extremely important to maintain a list of personnel, PPE, and stay times at a centrallocation to know who is in the area and how long they can stay in PPE.

Recommendation: ANAD should establish procedures to maintain a list of personnel, byname, level of PPE, and stay time at the FCP.

Observation

Description: Lack of personal comfort facilities and services availability in vicinity of theFCP and hot line.

Discussions:

(1) Porta-potties were requested, but not received in the vicinity of the FCP. Thispresented a problem for personal relief.

(2) Personnel left the field to return to the main post for lunch. If Morale, Welfareand Recreation (MWR) activity or another organization provided, on areimbursable basis, "Brown Bags" or other meal services, considerable time couldbe saved due to travel reduction, and more assets could be available for responseto the accident site.

Recommendations:

(1) ANAD should place sanitary facilities at hot line/FCP locations or makearrangements to transport same to these locations as part of the initial response.

(2) ANAD should institute agreements with MWR or another service organization toprovide meal services during extended operations.

A-3

Observation

Description: Dressing out in full M-3 TAP gear (less protective mask) prior todeployment.

Discussion: Depot personnel were observed dressing out completely in the M3 TAP suit(except mask) prior to being deployed to the accident site. Several persons, completelyencapsulated in their suits, waited for a considerable period of time prior to beingdeployed to the accident site. This increased the body temperature and possibly limitedthe ability of the person to give full response.

Recommendation: Depot personnel should keep suits below the upper torso until requiredto deploy to the accident site.

Observation

Description: Inconsistent recording of telephone data.

Discussion: Telephone acknowledgement of messages sent from the EOC wasinconsistent. Some persons recorded telephone numbers while others recorded locations.

Recommendation: Institute procedures detailing a consistent method of recordinginformation on messages sent and acknowledgements received.

Objective 4: Communications.

Observation

Description: EOC telephone operators did not use headset adapters.

Discussion: Operators at both the Telephone Operations position and the Off-DepotCoordinator position used their telephone extensively throughout the day while trying towrite at the same time. Headsets would facilitate the process.

Recommendation: ANAD should use telephone headsets that are switchable forheadset/handset for persons within the EOC who may be on the telephone for an extendedperiod of time. This option provides hands free operation so that operators can continueto write without trying to balance a telephone.

Observation

Description: Imposition of "minimize" hindered legal office activity.

Discussion: The ANAD legal office was unable to initiate off-post telephonecommunications with Fort McClellan due to "minimize" being imposed. Minimizeprevented calls from the legal office to higher headquarters (SIMCELL) as well. Thiscould have an impact on the claims office which would be established in Building 220.

A-4

Recommendation: ANAD should ensure that two telephone lines are available to thelegal office in Building 220 during emergencies.

Objective 5: Hazard Assessment and Recommendations.

Strength

Description: The teamwork displayed by the hazard analysis section was commendable.

Discussion: The teamwork displayed by the hazard analysis section was commendable.They arrived at their duty location in the EOC promptly; the first plume model wasgenerated at 0907; and they operated in a professional manner, assisting each other as theneed arose. Although there were some problems identified in the hazard analysis area,none could be attributed to a lack of effort or dedication on the part of the hazard analysisteam members.

Recommendation: Hazard analysis team members should be commended for theirdedication and professionalism during ACE 94.

Finding AN94A5.1

Description: No Survey Team EOC duty is detailed in the CAIRA Plan.

Discussion: Page 154 of the CAIRA Plan indicates that the Hazard Analysis Officer willserve as Survey Team Monitor when a Survey Team member is not present in the EOC.The implication is that the Survey Team should send someone to the EOC to serve asSurvey Team Monitor, but in the discussion of Survey Team duties (pages. 188-191,CAIRA Plan), no mention is made of sending someone to the EOC.

Reference: ANAD CAIRA Plan, page 154, paragraph 2i, and pages 188-191.

Recommendations: ANAD should consider changing the CAIRA Plan in one of twoways, either:

(1) The Hazard Analysis Officer should become the Survey Team Monitor under allconditions; or

(2) The assigned duties of the Survey Team should state that a team member willreport to the EOC to serve as Survey Team Monitor. This method may bepreferable to avoid overburdening the Hazard Analysis Officer.

Observation

Description: There was insufficient use of low level monitoring.

A-5

Discussion: ANAD uses the D2PC generated information on 1% lethality, no deaths, andno effects to dispatch monitoring teams. With the safe siding effect of the D2PC model,this information is invaluable to emergency responders insofar as short term effects formustard agent. Mustard agent, though, has been identified as a carcinogen. As acarcinogen, the time weighted average, becomes an important concentration of interest forexposure effects. Since there was no attempt to gather empirical data on low-levelconcentrations, it is unlikely if the Army would ever be able to determine if, in fact, theagent plume had gone over any populated areas, thereby potentially exposing individuals.Teams dispatched on the installation to various places would have been protected againstlow level concentrations by the respiratory protection worn.

Also of note is the fact that the Depot used the M256A1 kit for agent detection, but itonly detects to a concentration of 2.5 mg/m3 while the no effects dosage for mustard is2 mg-min/m3. The M256A1 kit was used at various locations including the hot linelocation prior to setup even though the hot line was upwind, outside the fragment zone,and outside the projected hazard wedge. Use of the M256A1 for initial setup of the hotline was of basically no value.

Reference: 40 CFR Part 300 (NCP), para. 300.430 (e)(2)(i)(A)(2) and DA Pam 50-6,para. 11 a (3)(a).

Recommendation: CBDCOM should develop a national level policy on the applicationof off-post monitoring. Once developed, ANAD should incorporate those procedures touse its low level monitoring capabilities to gather physical data while a plume is stillprojected.

Objective 8: Public Information.

Strength

Description: Depot volunteers in the Media Center were very responsive.

Discussion: In ACE93, media representatives were not handled in a professional manner.This year, the depot volunteers assigned to the Media Center were very responsive to themedia's requests. Given their general lack of experience and training and the absence ofa depot PAO in the Media Center, they performed well.

Recommendation: Volunteers in the Media Center should be thanked for theirparticipation and asked to assist again.

Finding AN94A8.1

Description: Use of the term "casualty" is confusing.

A-6

Discussion: EOC personnel, including public affairs representatives, used the term"casualty" to mean dead and injured. An individual assigned to the public affairs officeassumed that "three casualties" meant "three dead" and reported the same to the media.Use of the term "casualty" is forbidden in the public affairs area for precisely that reason.

Reference: FM 46-1.

Recommendation: There should be additional training of assigned personnel.

Finding AN94A8.2

Description: Information provided to the on-post community was inadequate.

Discussion: There was no system to keep on-post personnel informed about the status ofthe accident and the general information that was available about the plume would haveled some workers to believe they were in danger. Since EBS messages cannot be heardin most work places, the installation must assume the responsibility to provide the workforce with information. Keeping the internal audience informed is a commandresponsibility.

Reference: AR 360-81, Command Information and FM 50-6, paragraph 8-4a(4).

Recommendation: ANAD should provide command information to its work force.Consideration should be given to use of the LAN and E-mail as mechanisms to keep thework force informed.

Observation

Description: Media analysis was inadequate.

Discussion: Two radio reports were provided to the depot PAO. Although there weretwo errors in the noon report, no action was taken to correct the record.

(1) The first error was "civilian casualties are expected in the areas of Talladega,Eastaboga, and Lincoln", a remark which was attributed to the installationcommander. In fact, he said that those would be areas affected by a worst caseevent. This was probably too subtle a difference for a radio reporter to catch.

(2) The second error was "if you believe you have been exposed to the deadlymustard cloud, decontaminate your skin with liquid bleach and see your doctor."That statement was taken from a fact sheet provided by the PAO, but did notinclude the instruction to wash the bleach off.

Recommendation: The JIC/Media Center plan should include an analysis cell (see ACE-93, B-8.6)

A-7

Observation

Description: Media Center was run by untrained volunteers.

Discussion: The depot Media Center was left in the hands of depot volunteers when thethree senior members of the public affairs office went to the EOC. A public affairsspecialist from Huntsville Corps of Engineers was also at the Media Center, but did nottake charge. Errors that could have been corrected by having a seasoned public affairsspecialist in charge were left uncorrected. Information flow from the PAOs at the EOCwas slow; if all the experienced people are in the EOC, they must push information tothe Media Center, not wait to be asked.

Recommendation: At least one public affairs specialist should remain at the MediaCenter.

Observation

Description: Use of the term "Media Center" was confusing.

Discussion: The ANAD PAO used the term "Media Center" to refer to the working areafor public affairs (normally the ANAD public affairs office) in Building 7, third floor.The media thought Media Center referred to the space provided for them to work fromon the first floor of Building 7.

Recommendation: Clearer terminology should be used to differentiate between the twoareas.

Observation

Description: Information provided the media was inadequate.

Discussion: The media were told to call the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) forinformation about long-term effects of mustard exposure. Long-term effects are alegitimate community and media concern. Information on effects on women, children,and elderly was not provided at either press conference although it was requested. Mediawere not provided a plume diagram. Media were notified at 1027 of a 1045 pressconference. Several fact sheets available to the PAO were not provided to the media.

Recommendation: PAOs should take the question, find answers, and provide appropriateresponses.

Objective 12: Medical Response.

Strength

Description: Real world/exercise emergency response by the ANAD Fire DepartmentEMS and Dear Clinic was excellent.

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Discussion: The professionalism of the ANAD Fire Department EMS was highly evidentin the short response time and very proficient management and transport of real worldpatients resulting from exercise play. Likewise, the Dear Clinic was extremely wellorganized to receive casualties. It provided exceptionally timely and capable treatmentof all patients (both exercise and real world) and effectively transferred patients needinghigher levels of care to civilian treatment facilities.

Finding AN94A12.1

Description: Inadequate Army policy on first response capability at a chemical accidentsite.

Discussion: The training and equipment provided to patient transfer vehicle (PTV) crewsshould be maintained at a level commensurate with the role assigned to them in the localCAIRA Plan. The responding crew performed admirably considering the level of trainingand equipment provided to them. Most observed weaknesses in patient assessment,management, and transport were directly attributable to the current Army policy whichplaces insufficiently trained and equipped personnel in a first responder role. Asignificant potential for serious traumatic injury or death and chemical agent exposureexists in a CLA environment. EMT or an equivalent level of capability (which waslacking) is essential on these teams. DA Pam 50-6 requires that "...the rescue andtreatment of casualties should receive high priority." (paragraph 3-5c(6), and that"immediate ...administration of appropriate antidotes and lifesaving measures must occurwithin minutes to prevent serious injury or death." (paragraph 6-b). To meet theseobjectives, first responders would need EMT or equivalent training and capability.

References: ANAD CAIRA Plan, Annex E, Appendix 5, Tab H and DA Pam 50-6,CAIRA Operations, 17 May 91.

Recommendations:

(1) Army policy should require an EMT or equivalent level of capability on all firstresponse teams operating in a CLA environment. DA Pam 50-6, paragraph 6-3a(3) should be changed to require this level of capability. This issue wasidentified in ACE 93 as item A-12.4 with action assigned to AMC and DA.ANAD should initiate correspondence to effect the necessary changes.

(2) The training and equipment provided to PTV crews must realistically reflect themission assigned to them by the local CAIRA Plan.

Observation

Description: Exposure of guards to mustard vapor.

Discussion: Actions taken by security force personnel to provide first responder treatmentto injured personnel was commendable. Security personnel are trained in the hazardsassociated with fires and explosives. If they wish to ignore these hazards they are

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knowledgeable of the potential consequences. However, the potential for agent exposureto, responding guards was especially great for mustard agent, and the guards need to beaware of its latent effects. Personal decontamination procedures used by each guard afterfirst responder treatment may not be adequate to prevent effects from agent exposure.Agent vapor exposure encountered for as little as two minutes would likely cause injuryto exposed skin.

Recommendation: If security force personnel are to be used for first responder treatment,they should be equipped with proper protective equipment. Additionally, close medicalmonitoring of potentially exposed personnel for latent effects is essential. For mustardagent vapor exposure, security personnel should be trained to understand the risk toexposed skin, the short amount of time for mustard injury (with delayed visual effects),and the irreversible nature of mustard agent exposure.

Objective 13: Contamination Control.

Strength

Description: Excellent PDS and hot line operation.

Discussion: The installation's new personnel decontamination station/hot line is anexcellent, well designed, mobile facility. The personnel operating the hot line did anoutstanding job in setting up quickly and processing persons through the facility. Theyshowed the ability to provide resupply of towels and clothing for redress. The hot linewas a commendable operation.

Observation

Description: Use of rubber thongs at PDS.

Discussion: The installation's procedure of using rubber shower thongs at the PDS iscostly.

Recommendation: Consideration should be given to using paper slippers during redressof personnel processing through the PDS. This could significantly reduce the costassociated with exercises. Another possibility would be to collect the rubber thongs afteran exercise, wash and disinfect them in the protective clothing laundry,. and reuse them.

Observation

Description: Confusion between the role of the forward staging area and the hot line.

Discussion: A forward staging area for donning protective equipment was establishedbetween the accident site and the hot line. Confusion occurred when the area wasimproperly named a "mini-hot line". Personnel exiting the contaminated area passedthrough this area, were washed off, declared decontaminated, and removed their protective

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masks. There was no indication that all of the decontamination steps had beenaccomplished. The effort to establish a staging area in order to conserve stay times wascommendable, but more work is needed to fully develop the concept.

Recommendation: Personnel should be trained to remain masked and suited up untilproperly processed through the designated installation hot line.

Objective 14: Chemical Event Hazard Mitigation.

Finding AN94A14.1

Description: Canning crew personnel improperly packed fuzed mortar rounds.

Discussion: Fuzed munitions should never be placed fuze first into prop charge cans.If for some reason the fuze had experienced the required forces, it could have armed andfunctioned. Fuzed munitions, regardless of condition, should be stored and transportedin either a horizontal or vertical (fuzed end on top) orientation.

Reference: SOP No. AN-0000-M-264, Handling of Leakers, pages. 73 - 74, AppendicesH and I.

Recommendation: Follow the diagrams in the SOP.

Objective 15: Emergency Supplies and Equipment.

Strength

Description: Evaluators were permitted to use their own protective masks.

Discussion: During ACE 93 (A-15.2) responding units from off-post were not permittedto use their own organic personnel protective equipment. AMC Safety has not yetdeveloped nor published guidelines that all CSM installations accept the respondingorganization's protective clothing certification. Allowing this saves time, equipment, andmoney, and seems a reasonable approach in this period of scarce resources.

Recommendation: ANAD should continue accepting other installation/respondingorganization's protective clothing certification.

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Status of Areas Needing Correction (ANCs) from previous exercises:


Previous Issue: A-0.1

Description: Basis of SRF Organization.

Status: This item remains open and is carried forward as Finding A-0. 1 (93).


Description: Heat Stress Management.

Status: This item remains open and is carried forward as Finding A-0.2 (93).


Description: Timeliness of Chemical Event Report.

Status: This item remains open for AMC and is carried forward as Finding A-0.3 (93).


Description: Clarity of Chemical Accident Investigation Responsibility.

Status: This item is closed as a draft Army Regulation is complete and out for comment.

Objective 2: Alert and Activation


Description: Timeliness of Siren Activation Confirmation.

Status: This item was not evaluated, remains open, and is carried forward as Finding A-2.1 (93).

Objective 9: Protective Action Implementation


Description: Timeliness and Suitability of Evacuation Instructions.

Status: This item was not evaluated, remains open, and is carried forward as Finding A-9.1. (93).

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Objective 13: Contamination Control (Emergency Workers and Equipment)


Description: Monitoring and Complying with Stay Times

Status: This item remains open, and is carried forward as Finding A-13.1 (93).


Description: Lack of Verification of Gross Level Monitoring.


Objective 14: Chemical Event Hazard Mitigation


Description: Inadequate Command Guidance on Protective Clothing.

Status: This item remains open, and is carried forward as Finding A-14.1 (93).

Objective 15: Emergency Supplies and Equipment


Description: Push Package Shortages.



Description: Responder Deployment Without Organic Protective Clothing.

Status: This item is closed.

Objective 16: Security and Accountability.


Description: Improper Response to Civil Disturbance.


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Description: Absence of Marking/Mapping System for Chemical Rounds.



Description: Breaches of Two-Man Rule.


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TAB B: JOINT ACTIVITIES

INTRODUCTION

This Tab documents the specific strengths, findings, and observations noted by the evaluationteam during ACE 94 for emergency response plans and procedures that require joint (on-post andoff-post) coordination for execution. The evaluation team's recommendations are also provided,where appropriate.

A listing of issues from previous exercises is provided at the end of this Tab.


Finding A194B0.1

Description: EMIS permitted overwrite of previously entered data.

Discussion: Second entries made to the legal operations section of the EMIS will writeover original material and may replace other previously entered material. As more andmore information is maintained in electronic form, safeguards are needed to preventdeleting logs that are required for operational reasons and possibly for legal reasons (e.g.,administrative log requirement of the NCP).

Reference: CSEPP Planning Guidance, paragraph A-l0h.

Recommendation: ANAD should coordinate with IEM to ensure correction for the LegalStatus Board and other boards where documentation must be maintained.

Action: ANAD


Observation

Description: Insufficient number of FAX machines in the ANAD EOC delayedtransmission of critical data to off-post jurisdictions.

Discussion: The ANAD EOC had two FAX machines that were being used totransmit/receive messages to/from counties and the State EOC. The machines were notdesignated as send or receive and anyone could use the machines to send out information.These machines became overloaded early in the operation. Approximately 30 minutesinto the exercise, an additional telephone line, FAX machine were installed in the EOC.

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Recommendation: ANAD should have four dedicated FAX machines immediatelyavailable for use within the ANAD EOC. The machines should be designated as send orreceive and specific operators should be trained to operate the machines. All recordersshould document the location where messages were sent and the location from which atelephone acknowledgement was received. An alternative recommendation, prior to theinstallation of the FEMIS system, would be to selectively install FAX/modem cards incomputers to reduce the requirement for additional FAX machines. The telephone lineswould still be required in order to keep existing lines free for incoming calls.

Action: ANAD.

Observation

Description: Poor communications protocols were used by "Hotline" phone users

Discussion: Poor communications protocols used by "Hotline" participants (i.e., numerousinterruptions for repeat of data) at off-post sites on the hotline phone during the initialForm 18 notification (Message #001) delayed receipt of critical assessment informationand created the potential for confusion.

Recommendation: The Anniston CSEPP Community should reevaluate Form 18 protocolsused on the hotline phone during emergency notifications.

Action: ANAD lead for Anniston Community.

Objective 7: Public Alerting and Recommendations.

Finding AI94B7.1

Description: The initial ANAD Form 18 transmitted to the civilian community had thewrong wind direction.

Discussion: Prior to commencing operations, ANAD transmitted a work plan, withaccompanying plume plot, to the civilian community. This plume projection was basedon the weather conditions at the time which included the wind coming from 010 degrees.At approximately 0840, the ANAD EOC was given updated weather data with the windcoming from 063 degrees. Upon receipt of the updated weather, the ANAD EOCimmediately recalculated and replotted. This information was posted.in the EOC anddisplayed on a projection screen in the EOC. When the EOC was informed, at 0901, ofthe chemical accident, the hazard analysts immediately initiated the ANAD Form 18 fortransmission to the off-post community. All the data on the Form 18 was correct withthe exception of the wind direction which was listed as being from 010 degrees. Thiscaused confusion in the civilian community because they could not reconcile the reportedwind direction with the PAR case number that they were given. The error was caughtand the correction was telephonically relayed to the off-post communities. The nextscheduled transmission of the ANAD Form 18 contained current, correct, and accurateinformation.

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Reference: CSEPP Planning Guidance, paragraph 6.1.

Recommendation: ANAD should ensure the accuracy of all information transmitted offthe installation.

Action: ANAD.

Observation

Description: All information on the ANAD Form 18, Off-Site Notification, was repeatedon every notification.

Discussion: IAW the ANAD CAIRA Plan the ANAD Off-Post Coordinator is requiredto make a hotline phone call to the Alabama EMA, and all IRZ and PAZ Counties usingForm 18 Off-Site Notification Form, "as soon as sufficient information is available." Theinitial notification to the off-post agencies began at 0902 and was completed at 0908;subsequent messages took from 9 to 12 minutes to transmit. The time required totransmit every block of information at each notification is significant. Many of the blocksof information did not change from one notification to the next.

Recommendations: The Anniston Community should consider that subsequentnotifications identify only new or changed conditions on the hotline call. The FAXfollow-up would still have the complete Form 18 information. Further recommend thatthe form be automated for ease of preparation and that a FAX board be added to the PCused by the Off-Post Coordinator (in the ANAD EOC) so that the form can be transmittedautomatically without tying up a FAX machine in the EOC.

An alternate solution to the FAX/modem board would be to install electronic mail on eachoff-depot computer. This would allow simultaneous transmission of information therebysaving 15 to 20 minutes per transmission time.

Action: ANAD lead for the Anniston Community.


Finding AI94B8.1

Description: Coordination between State PIOs and Depot PAOs was inadequate.

Discussion: There is no written JIS plan for State, County and Army PAOs to follow.There are no public affairs Memoranda of Understanding/Agreement with augmentingpublic affairs offices. Neither ANAD, nor the CSEPP Counties, were notified of the StateMedia Center activation. Agreed upon procedures called for the State to forward countyEBS messages to the depot PAO. Depot press releases and press conferences were notcoordinated with State or counties in advance.

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Reference: DA Pam 50-6, paragraph H-be(5) and CSEPP Planning Guidance, paragraph8.14 and Appendix J.

Recommendation: Immediate action should be taken by AEMA, ANAD, and counties tocomplete a written JIS plan. ANAD should complete a written MOU with the MICOMPAO and the Huntsville Corps of Engineers PAO detailing support requirements.

Action: ANAD for support agreements and ANAD and AEMA for JIC Plan.



Previous Issue: B-5.1

Description: Accuracy of Event Notification.



Description: No Effects Dosage Required by AR 385-61 Not Used.


Objective 7: Public Alerting and Protective Action Recommendation Dissemination.


Description: Event Updates.



Description: Inadequacy of Form 18




Description: Lack of Coordination and Communication in the JIC.

Status: This item remains open and is carried forward as Finding B-8.1 (93).

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Description: Responsiveness of Media Briefings.



Description: Inadequate Equipment in the JIC Briefing Area.



Description: Inadequacy of Content of EBS Messages.


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TAB C: OFF-POST EVALUATION

INTRODUTION

This Tab documents the specific strengths, findings, and/or observations noted by the evaluationteam concerning the emergency response plans and procedures demonstrated by the State ofAlabama, Counties of Calhoun, Talladega, Clay, Cleburne, Etowah, and St. Clair during ACE 94.The evaluation team's recommendations are also provided, where appropriate.

The status of previous exercise issues is provided at the end of the appropriate objective write-upin this report. Areas Needing Correction (ANCs) from previous exercises, not demonstratedbecause of ACE 94 extent of play agreements, are listed as Findings.

OBJECTIVES

The objectives selected by the ACE 94 Planning Team for demonstration and evaluation by thecivil jurisdictions were objectives 2 through 13 and 17, as they appear in the Chemical StockpileEmergency Preparedness Program Exercises, Part II, January 9, 1992. Exceptions to fulldemonstration of an objective are listed in the ACE 94 Exercise Plan, Annex A, Extent of Play.

EVALUATIONS

Individual evaluations may found on the following pages:

STATE OF ALABAMACALHOUN COUNTY..TALLADEGA COUNTYCLAY COUNTY .....CLEBURNE COUNTY .ETOWAH COUNTY ...ST. CLAIR COUNTY . .

... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C -3

... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C -7

... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C -11

... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C -15

... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C -19

... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C -23... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C -2 7

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STATE OF ALABAMA

INTRODUCTION

The State of Alabama demonstrated, to the extent applicable to its current mission and plans,Objectives 2, 4, 6, 7 and 9. Strengths, findings, and/or observations appropriate for theseobjectives are detailed below.

Objective 2: Alert and Activation.

The State of Alabama successfully demonstrated the ability to alert, mobilize, and activateappropriate personnel and facilities fully for emergency response.

Observation

Description: Lack of CSEPP training.

Discussion: Several PAZ county staff members noted that they had a limitedunderstanding of CSEPP and needed additional training in EOC operations.

Recommendation: The State should take the lead in making EOC operations training andCSEPP-unique training available to the PAZ emergency operations paid and volunteerstaff.

Previous Issue: C-AE-2.l.

Description: Inadequate Use of Displays and Maps.

Status: Resolved; the State of Alabama successfully demonstrated the ability toadequately use existing facilities to provide the necessary and critical information to allexercise players.


Strength

Description: Volunteer RACES/ARES personnel exercise participation.

Discussion: RACES/ARES volunteer personnel provided backup radio communicationssupport to the State of Alabama during ACE 94. RACES/ARES volunteers arerepresentatives of the surrounding community. As such, they are willing to donate theirtime and make their invaluable expertise available during exercises. Their unselfishactions support the CSEPP in providing maximum protection to the public and theenvironment. RACES/ARES volunteers deserve recognition for their dedication to theircommunity.

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Recommendation: Volunteers should be actively recruited at all CSEPP sites. Volunteerscan provide support in all functional areas of the program during exercises and in actualemergencies.

Observation

Description: Lack of E-mail usage.

Discussion: The State published an E-mail directory for communications between the IRZcounties and the State EOC. While automation was not evaluated in the exercise,numerous E-mail messages were transmitted to the State from Talladega County and noreply was received.

Recommendation: The State should examine E-mail procedures and equipment status toensure efficient use of E-mail during exercises.

Objective 6: Protective Action Decisions.

The State EOC functioned properly in assisting the affected counties by monitoring the status ofevacuations, road blocks, and the determination of appropriate reception center locations in hostjurisdictions. The State Department of Human Resources and the American Red Cross, inconjunction with AEMA, utilized the resource materials available in the case studies to determinethe appropriate jurisdictions and reception centers. This function was delayed at the beginningof the exercise due to the conflicting wind direction information that was received from ANAD;however, this was corrected and the State resumed reception center operations.

Previous Issue: C-AE-6.1

Description: Lack of coordination in determination of evacuation destinations.

Status: Resolved; coordination for this exercise was adequate.

Objective 7: Public Alerting and PAR Dissemination.

Finding AL94C7.1

Description: EBS message and reception center location procedures.

Discussion: AEMA and the Calhoun County EMA agreed to a process by which CalhounCounty would develop an EBS message that would describe the zone affected in theprotective action decision and the prescribed evacuation route to be used. However,Calhoun County would not address the destination of the evacuees. The State of Alabamawould then issue a subsequent EBS message stating the name of the jurisdiction and thelocation of the reception center. This process was followed during ACE 94. However,the State took an excessive amount of time between the time that Calhoun County issued

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its first EBS message and the time that the State issued the follow-on message. ACalhoun County EBS message was issued at 9:27 a.m. instructing the public to evacuatefrom Zone C-1 and to utilize i-20 west towards Birmingham. The State subsequentlyissued a follow-on message at 10:50 stating the reception centers that evacuees shoulduse. This was one hour and twenty-three minutes after the public was initially alerted toevacuate. Assuming that most people will leave when told to do so, many evacueeswould have already reached Birmingham, some 50 miles from the Anniston area.

Reference: A verbal pre-exercise agreement between AEMA and Calhoun County.

Recommendation: AEMA must determine the reception centers by case number andprovide that information to the County. To facilitate a more timely EBS activation,Calhoun County must prepare prescripted EBS messages including all pertinentinformation that the evacuees will need prior to evacuation. The message should includeall relevant data reflecting CSEPP Planning Guidance, Appendix J, paragraph J-19.

Action: AEMA and Calhoun County.

Objective 9: Protective Action Implementation.

The State EOC staff worked well as a unit in focusing on the protective action implementationthat occurred at the local government level. The State EOC staff verified and tracked countyevacuations, traffic control points, access control points, EBS messages, evacuations, receptioncenters, and congregate care centers. The Department of Human Resources and the AmericanRed Cross worked closely together in tracking the status of the reception centers and thecongregate care centers.

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CALHOUN COUNTY

INTRODUCTION

In accordance with its revised extent of play agreement, Calhoun County demonstrated, to thedegree necessary to satisfy the requirement to demonstrate corrections to previous exercise AreasNeeding Remedial Action (ANRAs), selected Points of Review for Objectives 6, 7, and 9.


Calhoun County demonstrated a competent and quick decision making process in determining theappropriate protective action as a result of the incident at the depot. The PAD was decided ina timely manner (within one minute) once confirmation of weather data (i.e., correct winddirection) was received from the depot. No subsequent PADs were necessary. Promptcoordination of the selected PAD was effected with the State and PAZ counties.

Previous Issue: C-CA-6.1

Description: Failure to Provide PAD Coordination.

Status: Resolved; coordination for this exercise was adequate.


Calhoun County adequately demonstrated its ability to alert the public and issue appropriateemergency instructions with the following exception:

Finding CH94C7.1

Description: EBS Message Content Previous Issue C-CA-7.3

Discussion: Calhoun County activated the siren system (simulated) in Zone C-1 at 0927.This was immediately followed by the activation of the EBS by the county PIO with acall to radio station WHMA. For purposes of evacuation, Zone C-1 was evacuatedutilizing both primary and alternate routes: people north of Brumer Valley Road wereinstructed to use the alternate evacuation route (Highway 62 towards Ragland); and thosesouth of Brumer Valley Road advised to use the primary evacuation route (I-20 towardsBirmingham). However, all required message items were not included.

Reference: Appendix J, page J-15, paragraph J-19.

Recommendation: Prescripted messages should be revised to include the time that themessage was authorized for release (authorized release time to the EBS station fordissemination to the public) and a reference to relevant public information materials.

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Previous Issue: C-CA-7.1 (ANRA).

Description: Inadequate public alerting processing time.

Status: Resolved.

Previous Issue: C-CA-7.2 (ANRA).

Description: Absence of providing EBS coordination.

Status: Resolved; coordination was accomplished in accordance with exercise agreements.

Observation

Description: The process by which the State of Alabama and Calhoun County issue EBSmessages and describe reception center locations.

Discussion: The State of Alabama Emergency Management Agency and the CalhounCounty Emergency Management Agency agreed to a process by which Calhoun Countywould develop an EBS message that would describe the zone affected in the protectiveaction decision and the prescribed evacuation route to be used. However, it would makeno mention of the destination of the evacuees.

Reference: A pre-exercise agreement between AEMA and Calhoun County.

Recommendation: To facilitate a more timely and complete EBS activation, it isrecommended that Calhoun County construct an EBS message with all pertinentinformation that the evacuees will need prior to evacuation.


Calhoun County EMA successfully demonstrated its ability and resources to effectivelyimplement the appropriate protective actions in response to the incident at the depot. Actionstaken were consistent with the county's PAD and planning strategy. No special populations ortransportation-dependent persons played a factor in the protective action implementation process.

Previous Issue: C-CA-9.1.

Description: Lack of a protective action concept.

Status: Resolved; see Objectives 6 and 7.

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Description: Lack of timely notification of municipalities and unincorporatedjurisdictions.

Status: Not demonstrated. Carried forward as Finding C-CA-2.1 (93).


Description: Excessive delay between alert and mobilization and associated problems.



Description: Lack of EOC activation notification.



Description: Lack of provision of situation reports.




Description: Inadequacies of communications capabilities.



Description: Inadequate communications procedures.


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TALLADEGA COUNTY

INTRODUCTION

In accordance with its extent of play agreement, Talladega County demonstrated, to the degreeapplicable to its current mission and plans, Objectives 2, 4, 6, 7, and 9.

The following are the strengths, findings, and observations that constitute this evaluation:


Strength

Description: Situation update briefings and use of EOC checklists.

Discussion: Detailed briefings were held when crucial events occurred. All EOC staffwere included in these briefings and the information was accurate and timely. The EOCstatus chart and checklist were adequate and easy to understand. Up-to-date informationwas readily available to all EOC staff.

Observation

Description: Lack of law enforcement representation.

Discussion: The lack of law enforcement representation hindered the availability ofofficers for staffing TCPs. There should be at least one law enforcement person in theEOC to coordinate efforts.

Observation

Description: Lengths of time required for EOC member notification.

Discussion: This time could be minimized if an automated paging system was in placefor major players. It is understood that the EOC has only four phone lines and that morelines are to be installed. However, the amount of time to call staff could be lessened.Since this event occurred during normal duty hours, there was no major problem, excepttime. If an event occurred after normal working hours, there could be a problem.

Also, the administrative assistant could have used additional help in placing phone calls.


Strength

Description: The communications team members are all highly skilled volunteers.

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Discussion: The communications team members arrived on time and went straight to thetask of establishing their communications on HF and UHF nets. Within fifteen minutes,all volunteer and permanent fire companies were on the net, and communications betweenthe State and counties was established. Information passed and received was impressivelydone, especially the quality of play from the operators.

Observation

Description: Insufficient telephone lines in the EOC.

Discussion: The four telephone lines coming into the EOC are inadequate. The Directorexplained that four more are due in by March, 1995. From the observation of landlineutilization, that will also be inadequate.

Recommendation: An estimated twelve lines would be required; eight lines will beneeded for telephones, two for FAX, and two for contingency.

Observation

Description: No written procedures for communications operators.

Discussion: There are no written procedures for the communications operators to follow.Although all are skilled operators, it would be helpful to have written procedures for themto review to ensure they are aware of all aspects of the communications operations. Iffor some reason the experienced volunteers are not available, a new volunteer could havea frame of reference for what is expected of him/her.

Recommendation: Written procedures should be formulated for the communicationssection of the EOC.

Observation

Description: Insufficient number of FAX machines.

Discussion: The FAX machine went down early in the day causing a 15 minute delayin transmitting information to the participating counties and Media Center. Although thedelay was not long, it could have caused major problems in a real event.

Recommendation: Add two FAX machines - one for incoming, and one for outgoingtraffic.


Finding TA94C6.1

Description: The initial protective action decision (PAD) did not include Zone C-6.

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Discussion: The EOC received initial notification from ANAD at 0916 with a a PAR thatincluded the evacuation of zones C11, C6, C5, and C4 in Talladega County. It wasdecided by the EOC Operations Chief and the Emergency Management Director (EMD)based upon PAR's from ANAD to evacuate C4, C5 and C11 at 0917, but omitted ZoneC6.

Initially, zone C6 was overlooked. At 1115, when it became apparent that zone C6 hadbeen overlooked, the director decided to evacuate.

Given the wind direction and velocity, there was still ample time to direct and completethe evacuation of zone C6 before the plume would reach the area. However, theoperational procedure that allowed the area to be overlooked should be reviewed by thecounty and enhanced where needed.

Recommendation: Procedures or a checklist should be implemented to help ensure allareas are considered for evacuation.


Strength

Description: County PIO performance.

Discussion: The County PIO was very responsive to the media, pro-active in gatheringinformation in the EOC and worked very hard to get information out to the public in atimely manner. Also, she was very innovative and flexible when equipment failure orpre-planned actions did not work.

Finding TA94C7.1

Description: EBS message delays.

Discussion: The EBS message dissemination process was started at 0916, but themessage was not broadcast to the public until 0950. Pre-scripted messages wereavailable, but were not used because they did not contain information about zone C11which is a PAZ zone. The PIO typed an EBS message which addressed zone C11describing the area and where citizens should evacuate.

References: CSEPP Planning Guidance, Appendix F, page F-9, paragraph F-1.

Recommendation: Pre-scripted messages should be rewritten to leave blank spaces forthe inclusion of affected zones, evacuation routes, shelters, time, and date of message.In addition, EBS messages must be initiated in time to meet the criteria specified in theCSEPP Guidance (8 minutes total).

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Finding TA94C7.2

Description: Inadequate EBS message content.

Discussion: Times and dates were not on the EBS messages to provide a reference to theEBS stations and EOC staff as to when the public had been informed and the last updateto the public. In addition, references to relevant public information materials were notincluded.

References: CSEPP Planning Guidance, Appendix J, page J-18, paragraph J-19.

Recommendation: EBS message content should be changed to ensure that all relevantdata reflected in current CSEPP Guidance is included.

Previous Issue: C-TA-11.2.

Description: Incomplete EBS message content (i.e., name, locations, and directions toshelters).

Status: Resolved.


The ability to implement protective actions was demonstrated by the EOC personnel. Simulatedtraffic control points and a staging area were set up. Coordination was effected with Calhounand St. Clair Counties to direct and receive Talladega evacuees. Special needs populations wereconsidered and handled during the alert/notification and evacuation process. During a simulatedHAZMAT spill the Operation Chief, Fire and Rescue, and the National Guard acted quickly toassess the damage, adjust alternate routes and place traffic control points while simultaneouslynotifying the State and adjacent Counties.

Status of Areas Need Correction (ANCs) from previous exercises:

Objective 11: Congregate Care.

Previous Issue: C-TA-11.1.

Description: Lack of demonstration of congregate care capability.

Status: Not demonstrated. Carried forward as Finding C-TA-11.1 (93).

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CLAY COUNTY

INTRODUCTION

In accordance with its extent of play agreement, Clay County demonstrated, to the degreeapplicable to its current mission and plans, Objectives 1 through 11 and 17.

Objective 1: Chemical Event Assessment and Classification.

Current guidelines do not lend themselves to off-post jurisdictions demonstrating this objective,since only the on-post EOC has the information and responsibility for this objective.Additionally, the event classification is made by the on-post element and passed via hotline tooff-post jurisdictions.

However, Clay County is heavily involved and serious about tracking this aspect of EOCoperations. Clay County made every attempt to verify and validate the hazard assessmentclassification broadcast by the post. The completion of this objective was consistent with theirextent of play agreement.


The County implemented its alert and notification procedures immediately upon receipt of thehotline call and finished within 10 minutes. Their EOC was fully staffed within 1 hour with nopositions unsupported.

Many key Clay County positions are filled by unpaid volunteers. They are highly motivated,well trained, and professional. They all understood their assignments and the County operatingprocedures. Each volunteer reported in a timely manner and began work immediately. Severalvolunteers were present the day before the exercise and attended the evaluator orientation andbriefing with key staff. During the exercise, a volunteer conducted several of the key briefingsand functioned more like a full-time and key member of the staff than as a volunteer.

Additionally, the Clay County management team and staff demonstrates unusual leadership andteam-building qualities in their ability to recruit, train, and retain a group of such positive,professional, and dedicated volunteers. Overall, this reflects uncommon and adept leadership bythe County EMA director.

Clay County's security was especially good. They promptly badged all participants, and accessto their facility was handled by a senior member of the Sheriffs Department. Although themedia, and other appropriate personnel, had ready access to the County EOC, visitors werecontrolled and professionally handled, but appropriately restricted according to County EOCaccess plans and procedures.

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Objective 3: 24-Hour Staffing.

Clay County demonstrated its ability to maintain staffing on a continuous 24-hour basis with asimulation conducted during their 10:30 a.m. EOC briefing. They demonstrated a shift changefor every position and a briefing was provided to the second shift. The briefing was adequateto enable the shift to continue the responsibilities of their positions.


Clay County fully demonstrated its ability to communicate effectively with all appropriateemergency response locations, organizations, and field personnel. All communications systemsoperated properly and without problems and all personnel demonstrated the capability to operatethe systems properly. All personnel followed organizational protocols and procedures regardingcommunications and play of the objective was consistent with extent of play agreements. ClayCounty operated their UHF, VHF, RACES, and FAX systems with volunteers.


Clay County demonstrated the ability to conduct hazard assessment. Based on the informationreceived during initial notification, the EOC quickly determined and plotted the direction andprobable size of the hazard plume.


Clay County demonstrated the ability to make appropriate protective action decisions for achemical event. They quickly determined and understood that because of the size and directionof the plume that a protective action decision for the county was unnecessary.


Clay County demonstrated the ability to alert the public to the chemical event and to disseminateProtective Action Recommendation (PAR) messages in a timely manner. They accomplished thisobjective, although dissemination of PARs was unnecessary because of the size and direction ofthe plume.


Clay County demonstrated the ability to coordinate and disseminate accurate and timelyinformation to the public about a chemical event. They issued EBS messages at appropriatetimes and in a timely manner. The messages were both pre-scripted and ad hoc according to thecircumstances. In all cases, appropriate messages were selected or ad hoc messages developedfor appropriate circumstances, such as to provide information to and about spontaneous evacuees.

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Clay County accomplished this objective using a volunteer Public Information Officer. Sheperformed the function in an efficient, professional manner and was knowledgeable andenthusiastic about her duties. A member of the real local media visited the EOC and interviewedher about the exercise and she solicited his future participation as a volunteer in the EOC. ThePIO demonstrated good knowledge of her duties, coordinated well with appropriate personnelprior to release of EBS messages, and was unusually enthusiastic and professional in completionof assigned duties.


Clay County successfully demonstrated the ability and resources necessary to implementappropriate protective actions for a chemical event, although the direction and size of the plumedid not require that they take direct protective actions in their County.

Clay County demonstrated this objective indirectly as a result of the simulated sheltering andhandling of evacuees traveling to the county. It was clear that they understood, had theresources, and were prepared to implement appropriate protective actions according to their plansand procedures. They demonstrated the objective according to their extent of play agreement.

Objective 10: Contamination Control (Public).

Clay County discussed its anticipated actions for monitoring and controlling contamination of thepublic through an appropriate registration, contamination screening, and decontamination process.

Clay County demonstrated this objective indirectly as a result of the sheltering and mass caresimulations for evacuees traveling to the county.


Clay County successfully demonstrated this objective indirectly as a result of the sheltering andmass care simulations for evacuees traveling to the county.

Objective 17: Legal.

Clay County did not demonstrate this objective as exercise play was terminated before theirinvolvement with this objective. In addition, this objective is designed primarily for Armydemonstration.

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CLEBURNE COUNTY

INTRODUCTION

In accordance with its extent of play agreement, Cleburne County demonstrated, to the degreeapplicable to its current mission and plans, Objectives 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 11.


Observation

Description: Incomplete installation of maps, clock and other displays in the EmergencyOperations Facility (EOF).

Discussion: The EOF is new and this was the first time it was used. Not all displays andmonitors have been installed or set up. The clock for the Operations Room was difficultto see from some positions, resulting in some staff using their own watches, which werenot all coordinated with the displayed clock. Law Enforcement, Fire & Rescue, and EMSpositions could have benefitted from their own map for displaying deployments of fieldresources. The eventual EOF operating concept calls for the folding partition between theOperations Section and Decision Makers (Leadership) area to be closed. Each room willneed its own map indicating the projected plume and protective action zones.

Recommendation: As the installation of monitors and displays is completed in the EOF,mount a clock on the wall for better visibility and include additional map displays.

Previous Issues: C-CL-2. 1 and C-CL-2.2.

Description: Insufficient Facilities and Lack of Sufficient Support Staff.

Status: Resolved; the new EOF is a very good and well utilized facility providingsufficient space for staff. Communications are improved and should be even better afterthe County 911 dispatch occupies the other half of the building, placing the bestcommunications in the county adjacent to the EOF operations area. Sufficient supportstaff were present. See related discussion below and under the Objective #4.


Observation

Description: Limited number of telephone lines serving the EOF.

Discussion: The Cleburne County EOF has only 3 commercial telephone lines. Whilethe demands of this exercise were handled by the phone system, in a real event, theselines could easily be overtaxed, resulting in lack of outgoing dial tone when needed byEOF staff and busy signals for incoming calls.

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Recommendation: When the County 911 dispatch moves into the other half of theCCEMA building, examine the feasibility of sharing non-emergency business lines in theEOF, or add additional service to the EOF.


Based on the wind direction and zones affected identified in the Work Plan and initial Form 18Notification, the preliminary assessment was that Cleburne County residents were not at directrisk. The principal impact expected on Cleburne County was the influx of evacuees passingthrough or needing to be sheltered.

When the Monsanto truck HAZMAT incident occurred and was reported to be blocking Interstate20, the impact on evacuees was assessed. It was determined that eastbound traffic backing updue to closure of the highway would be in a subzone not affected by the plume.


The initial Protective Action Decision (PAD) was made by the EMA Director at 0920 based oninformation in the initial Form 18 (Message 001) "CSEPP hotline" telephone notification andassessments of the previous daily workplan and weather forecasts. The decision was made thatno protective action was required because the projected plume was not moving toward CleburneCounty.

A precautionary decision was made that citizens should be requested to stay off the roads, exceptfor emergency travel, because of the potential influx of evacuees passing through the county.

Objective 7: Public Alerting and PAR Dissemination.

Observation

Description: EBS procedures for unaffected counties need clarification.

Discussion: The Cleburne County request to their Media Center Liaison, sent via theState EOC, apparently went unanswered. No call back was received indicating that therequested message would or would not be developed by the State Liaison at the MediaCenter. Procedures are unclear for the instance where the County is unaffected, and hasno PIO.

The County implemented its interpretation of current plans and the JIC/JIS concept inexpecting their message to be handled by the State. Plans appear to be unclear as to theprocedure and protocol under these circumstances.

Recommendation: The State and counties should work together to clarify and reviseprocedures for EBS broadcasts by "unaffected" counties.

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No news releases were prepared by Cleburne County. Information for one EBS message waspassed to the State EOC for coordination and incorporation into a broadcast by their State PIOLiaison through the Media Center. See objective #7 for discussion and Observation related tothis process.

Several rumor control calls were received and handled appropriately. The decision was made toinform concerned citizens that the County was unaffected, but that (for precautionary reasons)they should stay off the roads unless they had an emergency situation.


Protective actions (e.g., evacuation or shelter-in-place) were not directed or implemented forCleburne County.

Access and traffic control points (ACPs/TCPs) were implemented (simulated) in support ofevacuation from Calhoun and Talladega Counties. The ACPs/TCPs were correctly selected fromthe planning guidance for case #328.

Objective 10: Contamination Control (Public).

Based on the extent of play agreement, Cleburne County was not expected to demonstrate actionsunder this objective. However, the following activity was noted.

The State was requested to open the National Guard Armory at Heflin as a reception andcontamination screening point for evacuees from the ANAD event. In accordance with a processdeveloped during exercise play by the local Health Department representative and the Directorof Human Resources present in the Cleburne County EOF, screening would be provided by localnurses and EMS personnel trained in ACTFAST.


Under CSEPP response case #328 and the designation by the State of shelters to be opened,Cleburne County was not required to take actions under this Objective.

However, the opening of mass care centers was simulated at the direction of the HealthDepartment representative and Department of Human Resources (DHR) Director to handle anyevacuees from Calhoun or Talladega Counties that might stop in Cleburne County. The Healthand DHR representatives were also tasked to develop a contamination screening process forevacuees that might stop in the county.

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ETOWAH COUNTY

INTRODUCTION

In accordance with its extent of play agreement, Etowah County demonstrated, to the degreeapplicable to its current mission and plans, Objectives 2, 4, 6, 7, and 9.


Strength

Description: Notification and activation of EOC staff

Discussion: The emergency management staff efficiently and effectively made the properactions to activate all EOC staff within a 10 minute period following notification of acommunity emergency declared at Anniston Army Depot. The EOC staff effectively usedthe emergency dispatchers to make all calls necessary for this duty. This quicknotification of the EOC staff should especially be noted since the Emergency ManagementCoordinator was not present at the EOC.

Previous Issue: C-ET-2.1

Description: Lack of Event Classification Protocol

Status: Resolved.


Observation

Description: The State hotline did not work properly

Discussion: After receiving the first telephone call on the CSEPP hotline at 0855, theemergency management staff member was cut off from the call. Later, anotheremergency management staff member picked up the phone to make a call to the State andthe roll call was already in progress though Etowah County's equipment did not ring.

Recommendation: The Etowah County CSEPP hotline equipment should be tested forcorrect ringing capability and potential of disconnection during use.

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Strength

Description: Ability to assess chemical risk.

Discussion: The EOC staff, through careful discussion and computer modeling,determined that the mustard agent release would not directly affect the citizens of EtowahCounty. This determination was made after the information that the no effects line wasjust under 13 kilometers while the county line is 20 kilometers away from the incidentsite.


Due to wind direction, the Etowah County EOC made the decision not to evacuate or shelter-in-place. Since no protective actions were required by the County due to exercise situation, theEOC did not perform public alerting during its play.


Strength

Description: Good coordination between EOC reception care organizations.

Discussion: The DHR, Red Cross; and Salvation Army coordinated well with each otherto implement the opening of the emergency reception center. This should be noted sincethe DHR representative with the most EOC experience had been called away to the StateEOC for the day.

Strength

Description: Fire officials properly corrected erroneous information provided during asimulated phone conversation.

Discussion: During the exercise, a simulated call (from the SIMCELL) from an insurancecompany inquiring whether the fire department would respond to a fire within anevacuated, potentially contaminated area was injected. The fire official in the EOC statedthey would enter a contaminated area, however, minutes later, the fire official returneda call clarifying the fact that the fire department would respond to a fire in an evacuatedarea but not one in a contaminated area.

Observation

Description: Lack of coordination on location of TCPs and reception care centers.

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Discussion: It was unclear whether all EOC members knew the location of the receptioncare centers and the TCPs. This was especially evident based on the fact that the lawenforcement officials at TCPs may not have known where to direct incoming evacueesfrom Calhoun County.

Recommendation: Formal announcements of the location of the TCPs and reception carecenters should be verbalized to the entire EOC staff. The Log Board and the ShelterBoard mounted on the walls should be used to supplement the verbal communication ofthis information. The location and address of these activities will assist EOC staff inknowing emergency actions that have been made by other EOC agencies.

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ST. CLAIR COUNTY

INTRODUCTION

In accordance with its extent of play agreement, St. Clair County demonstrated, to the degreeapplicable to its current mission and plans, Objectives 2, 4, 6, 7 and 9.


Strength

Description: The activation of the operations facility was done in a concise and timelymanner.

Discussion: The decision to activate was made at 0920, notification calls began at 0930and were completed at 0945 by two callers. All phone numbers were correct, sharing ofcall-out responsibilities and the staffs professional manner was impressive. It is to benoted that during the call-out procedure, staff members also were interrupted to answerdoor phone, release security door lock, give instruction on sign-in procedures and directEOC incoming personnel to assigned work locations.

Observation

Description: Event logs were not conspicuously displayed for viewing at essential times.

Discussion: The operations facility utilized the automation system to display plume dataand various planning information such as traffic/access control points and sheltermanagement plans. A manual status board on the far wall of the facility was updated asevents happened. However, the position of the status board made it difficult for all staffto easily view.

Recommendation: The county should assign and have additional personnel trained in useof IBS computer system so that the events log could be displayed on the overheadprojector when the plume display is not required.

Observation

Description: Efficient and timely message logging procedures were not evident duringthe period of operation.

Discussion: Message logs were maintained by one person with copying assistance froman additional administrative person. As message traffic was received it was recorded intothe message log without any time stamp or destination information. The recorder at timeswas unsure of the proper routing of the traffic.

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Recommendation: Procedures should developed to ensure that all facility personnel areaware of the message logging requirements and the date, time, and destination informationis included on each message.


Strength

Description: An excellent understanding of communications and automation equipmentwas displayed by the operations staff.

Discussion: CSEPP Planner's expertise on all communications equipment was veryevident. Use of computer and IBS system was imperative considering the manyassignments and responsibilities assigned the Planner. Although the power unexpectedlywent out, he knew exactly how to check that the back-up generator power was on andfunctioning properly. Communications with Army Depot, IRZ, PAZ, and Host Countieswere accomplished through the various means available; i.e., RACES Operators, E-mail,EBS, and 911 Dispatch besides the regular and hotline phone systems were utilized.

Strength

Description: RACES communications greatly contributed to the communicationseffectiveness of the operations facility.

Discussion: The contribution of the two RACES Operators was essential to ACE 94 inSt. Clair County. As volunteer operators who performed normal communicationrequirements, they also handled reception center traffic and supported the SheriffsDepartment in conjunction with the HAZMAT incident.

Strength

Description: Efficient and timely handling of incoming calls to the operations facility wasdisplayed by the staff.

Discussion: Handling of incoming "concerned citizen, etc.", calls from the SIMCELLwere handled by the County Director and PIO/CSEPP Planner in a polite andknowledgeable manner. With their busy and varied assignments, this was anaccomplishment.

Previous Issue: C-ST-4. 1

Description: Requirement to expand phone system to provide more lines.

Status: Resolved; a detailed four page diagram of the automation and communicationscapabilities of the EOC was furnished.

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Objective 6: Protective Action Decisions

Strength

Description: Timely and accurate protective action decision making was performed bythe County Director and CSEPP Planner.

Discussion: The St. Clair County Director and CSEPP planner quickly identified that St.Clair County residents were not in danger and did not need to evacuate. St. Clairimmediately activated its traffic and access control plans along with reception centerplans to receive Talladega County evacuees and pass through Calhoun County evacuees.Department of Human Resources and Red Cross representatives went into action toactivate the shelter locations.

Objective 7: Public Alerting and PAR Dissemination

Observation

Description: Even though St. Clair County did not evacuate any zones, the Public AffairsOfficer initiated an EBS message to the CPCS-l station (WHMA-FM) in Anniston andthe local radio station (WFHK-AM) in St. Clair County to advise the residents that thechemical accident at the Anniston Army Depot posed no threat to county residents.

Discussion: The St. Clair County Public Affairs Officer initiated the EBS message to itsCPCS-1 station and the local radio station at 1040 hours. Copies were FAXed to theSIMCELL and the other CSEPP counties at the same time. In addition, the messagecontained information regarding the reception center (Moody High School) for evacueesfrom Talladega County. The local radio stations were instructed to repeat the messageon thirty minute intervals. The message was sent over one hour after the initial CalhounCounty EBS message instructing zone C-1 to evacuate. Talladega County initiated itsfirst EBS message at 0950 hours. County residents will surely question if they are at riskprior to the time that St. Clair released its initial EBS message.

Recommendation: The County should initiate EBS messages in a more timely mannereven though the Talladega County EBS message and the State EBS message identifiedthe Moody High School reception center.

Previous Issue: C-ST-8. 1.

Description: Lack of EBS coordination.

Status: Resolved; St. Clair County has been included in the operational area for WHMA-FM (CPCS-1) in Anniston.

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Objective 9: Protective Action Implementation

Strength

Description: St. Clair County initiated its preplanned traffic and access control plans ina timely manner to support the evacuation from Calhoun and Talladega Counties.

Discussion: The CSEPP planner quickly verified the threat notification and protectiveaction decisions and initiated the county traffic and access control plan at 0922 in supportof the evacuation of Calhoun and Talladega Counties. It was evident that considerableplanning had been done in advance to support the plan. Action plans were loaded in theIBS system and accessed for immediate implementation. Coordination was effected withthe State Department of Public Safety to close access to Interstate 20 to provide for timelyflow of traffic towards Birmingham. In addition the shelter management team providedpersonnel to open and operate a shelter at the Moody High School.

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APPENDIX I: ACTION PLANS

This Appendix contains the action plans of the Anniston Community elements. Each lists anyfinding identified in ACE 94 for the following:

Anniston Army Depot ............... I-3Joint Findings ............... I-9State of Alabama ............... I-13Calhoun County ................. I-15Talladega County . ............... I -19

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ACTION PLAN FOR ANNISTON ARMY DEPOTAnniston Community Exercise 1994

(September 28, 1994)

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FINDING RESPONSIBLE FOR COMPLETIONNUMBER SHORT TITLE CORRECTION DATE

AN94AO. 1 PPE decision not ANAD Safety Completedformally developed. Sue Turton

CORRECTIVE ACTION: The hazard analysis supporting protective clothing andequipment was developed and sent for staffing 8 Sep 94. Comments wereincorporated and the hazard analysis was finalized the week prior to the exercise.This did not leave sufficient time for practice. In the future, decisions on level ofdress should be based on the content of the hazard analysis and advice from the safetyrepresentative in the EOC. The safety representative will log the decision into theEMIS to include the basis for decision.


AN94A0.2 Stay Times ANAD DCO-CMO CompletedExceeded Dale Yarbrough

CORRECTIVE ACTION: An additional responder has been assigned to the FieldCommand Post (FCP). This individual's primary responsibility will be to maintain alist of downrange personnel by name, level of dress, and monitor their stay times.


AN94A0.3 Heat Stress ANAD DCO-CMO CompletedManagement Dale Yarbrough

CORRECTIVE ACTION: Monitoring for heat stress for response team personnel willbe as stated in the answer to finding AN94A0.2. The only guidelines for stay timesare contained in DA Pamphlet 385-61. There are no allowances for age or physicalconditions of responders. If a responder has a medical/physical problem, he/sheshould notify the FCP prior to being dispatched downrange. ANAD will initiate aprocedure for monitoring responder vital signs upon their processing through thehotline after being downrange. This will be accomplished by fire departmentpersonnel assigned to the FCP.


A-0. 1 (93) Basis of SRF AMC SFAOrganization

CORRECTIVE ACTION: Detailed information/disposition for this finding was notavailable at the time of publication.


A-0.3 (93) Timeliness of AMCChemical EventReport



A-2.1 (93) Timeliness of Siren ANAD DLES-SO CompletedActivation Bill StewartConfirmation

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I

CORRECTIVE ACTION: Security patrols will notify the Desk Control Officer thatthe siren has been activated by using an alternate frequency or calling by telephone toverify siren activation.


AN94A5.1 No Survey Team ANAD DCO-RM 30 Dec 94EOC Duty in Genell YoungCAIRA Plan

CORRECTIVE ACTION: The position and duties of Survey Team Monitor will beadded to the CAIRA Plan.


AN94A8.1 Use of the Term ANAD PAO 14 Dec 94Casualty Joan Gustafson

CORRECTION ACTION: Training for JIC support personnel will be accomplishedon 14 Dec 94, subject to delay pending outcome of upcoming PAO training inChicago as well as the identification of additional JIC support personnel.

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AN94A8.2 Inadequate Infor- ANAD DCO-RM 30 Dec 94mation Provided to Genell YoungOn-Post Community

CORRECTIVE ACTION: ANAD will implement procedures to notify the on-postwork force by E-mail or red phone of significant events during chemical events. Thisresponsibility will be added to the EOC Operations Officer's duties.


A-9.1 (93) Timeliness and Suit- ANAD DCO-RM 30 Dec 94ability of Evacuation Genell YoungInstructions

CORRECTIVE ACTION: Procedure implemented in Finding AN94A8.2 will resolvethis Finding.


A-13.1 (93) Monitoring and ANAD DCO-CMO CompletedComplying with Stay Dale YarbroughTimes

CORRECTIVE ACTION: Procedures implemented in Findings AN94A0.2 andAN94A0.3 have resolved this Finding.


A-13.2 (93) Lack of Verification ANAD DAO-SD Completedof Gross Level Rufus SearsMonitoring

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RESPONSIBLE FOR COMPLETIONSHORT TITLE CORRECTION DATE

Inadequate Army DA/ANAD DCO-RM 30 Dec 94policy on first Frank Raineyresponse capabilityat a CAI site

CORRECTIVE ACTION: ANAD will initiate correspondence to DA requesting thatArmy policy require an EMT or equivalent level of capability on all first responseteams operating in a CLA environment. Additionally, the ANAD CAIRA Plan, TabH, will be changed to reflect only the current capabilities of the PTV teams which isbasic emergency first aid. If and when DA requires a higher level of capability forfirst responders, they need to support that decision with training and equipmentauthorizations.

CORRECTIVE ACTION: In addition to M8 paper testing, verification will be furtherenhanced by employing mini-cam hookup in the PDS doffing chamber andprepositioning of M8A1 alarms.


A-14.1 (93) Inadequate ANAD Safety CompletedCommand Guidance Sue Turtonon ProtectiveClothing

CORRECTIVE ACTION: Procedures implemented in Findings AN94A0.1 haveresolved this Finding.


A-15.1 (93) Push Package AMCShortages


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AN94A14.1 Canning Crew Per- ANAD DCO-CMO Completedsonnel Improperly Dale YarbroughPacked FuzedRounds

CORRECTIVE ACTION: The rounds were inadvertently overpacked incorrectly bypersonnel due to the stress of the emergency situation. A training point for futureexercises at ANAD will be to stress proper containerization of munitions IAWregulatory requirements. This training emphasis should alleviate this problem in thefuture.

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ACTION PLAN FOR JOINT FINDINGSAnniston Community Exercise 1994



AI94B0.1 EMIS permitted over- ANAD DCO-RM 30 Nov 94write of previously Don Brodersenentered data

CORRECTIVE ACTION: As second entries are made, original information is transferredto a data file in the data server. These data "archives" can be accessed for data retrievalas required. The logs are set up in this manner to allow them to be updated as morecurrent information becomes available. ANADs EOC System Administrator is contactingACS to see if safeguards can be implemented to ensure pertinent historical data is notinadvertently lost. If this is a problem at this location, then all sites with EMIS will havethe same problem.

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AI94B7.1 Initial ANAD Form ANAD DCO-RM Completed18 had incorrect wind Don Brodersendirection

CORRECTIVE ACTION: Initial Form 18 data will be verified with the Chief HazardAnalyst and reviewed and initialed by either the Chemical Surety Officer or the Directorof Operations prior to being sent to the off-post community. A Form 18 checklist hasbeen developed to assist off-post coordinators in filling out the form.

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AI94B8.1 Coordination between ANAD and AEMA 16 Dec 94State PIOs and Depot ANAD-PAO Joan GustafsonPAOs was inadequate AEMA Clayton Peters

CORRECTIVE ACTION: Because State, County, and Depot public affairs/informationactivities were all located in separate areas for this exercise, and JIC equipment was notunpacked and installed, communication between players was almost impossible toachieve. Once the JIC is completed and equipment permanently installed, Depot, State,and County personnel will be together (or at least within talking distance) andcoordination and communication difficulties alleviated.

An attempt to get an agreed upon JIC Plan between all participants will be undertakenwith the intent of having it in final draft format prior to the March 95 exercise. At thattime, any problem areas can be identified and corrections or recommended changes madeprior to finalization of the document. Having a completed JIC facility is a main factor inbeing able to accomplish this.

MOUs with MICOM and Corps of Engineers for PAO support will be finalized (they arecurrently in draft form) and staffed appropriately.


B-8.1 (93) Lack of Coordination ANAD PAO 16 Dec 94and Communication in AEMA PIOthe JIC

CORRECTIVE ACTION: Procedures implemented in Finding AN94B8.1 will attempt toresolve this Finding.


B-8.2 (93) Responsiveness of AMCMedia Briefings



B-8.3 (93) Inadequate Equipment ANAD PAO Mar 95in the JIC Briefing AEMA PIO

CORRECTIVE ACTION: Procedures implemented in Finding AN94B8.1 will resolvethis Finding.


B-8.4 (93) Inadequacy of Content Anniston CSEPP Communityof EBS Messages


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ACTION PLAN FOR THE STATE OF ALABAMAAnniston Community Exercise 1994


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AL94C7.1 EBS message and Bill Klein A. 28 Feb. 95reception center B. 31 Aug. 95location procedures C. 31 Aug. 96

Correction of this finding will occur in three successive stages:

A. Prior to providing reception center locations in EBS messages, three issues must beresolved. They are:1. CSEPP funding must be made available to the host counties (Jefferson, Lee, and

Madison).2. A Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between Calhoun County (IRZ) and the

host counties stating that the host counties will accept evacuees must be signed.3. An agreement with the State of Georgia to allow evacuees bound for Lee

County (AL) to use Interstate 20 and U.S. Route 27 to I-85 must be reached.

B. Once funded, the host counties will begin the selection of specific reception centersand mass care shelters for each IRZ zone.

C. Host counties will begin the detailed planning necessary to establish specificreception centers and mass care shelters for each IRZ zone including staffing,resource allocation, and training.

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ACTION PLAN FOR CALHOUN COUNTYAnniston Community Exercise 1994



CH94C7.1 EBS Message Content

JURISDICTION COMMENTS: Calhoun County has challenged this Finding andrequested arbitration. Calhoun County's comments, forwarded to Ms. Mary Lynne Miller,the FEMA Region IV Exercise Co-Director in a letter dated October 5, 1994, are asfollow:

Dissemination. It seems inconsistent to state "Calhoun County competently demonstratedits ability to properly alert the public and issue appropriate emergency instructions"; thenhighlight a Finding.

Recommendation: Our daily ops prescripted EBS message included the time the messagewas authorized for release. FEMA Reg IV, FEMA HQ, and Army representatives havebeen briefed on numerous occasions regarding our daily operations; part of which is thedevelopment of a prescripted EBS message based on the day's worst case scenario. Afterreview and approval by the Director, daily operations EBS messages are posted in theEOC. The time the message is approved during daily operations is the authorized time forrelease. Should an accident/incident occur and conditions have not changed, that dailyoperations prescripted EBS message is released. Daily operations, as described above,allow us to meet the 8 minute window to alert and notify the public in the event of achemical accident/incident. The time period for implementing the protective action, asstated in the EBS message is immediately. The EBS message regarding relevant publicinformation materials states "listen to local radio and/or television for further information".When an EBS message tells a Zone to evacuate immediately, it seems ridiculous to tellthem to take valuable time to find and then look up information in a phone book orbrochure.

Finding. We challenge this finding and request an arbitration hearing with CBDCOMimmediately.

CO-DIRECTORS' COMMENTS: In accordance with Section 3.5.5 of "ChemicalStockpile Emergency Preparedness Program Exercises", dated February 23, 1994, thisFinding is being forwarded to the CSEPP Executive Council (formerly the Joint SteeringCommittee) for arbitration.

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C-CA-2.1 (93) Lack of Timely D. Champ March 95Notification

PIO will contact affected municipalities and brief them as necessary. Corrective actionswill be demonstrated during ACE95.


C-CA-2.2 (93) Excessive Delay in D. Long March 95Alert andMobilization

Daily operations have greatly improved the time required to make PADs and implementthem. Corrective actions will be demonstrated during ACE95.


C-CA-2.3 (93) Lack of EOC D. Champ / M. Burney March 95ActivationNotification

Procedures have been established for the PIO to inform the media of EOC activation,concurrent with EBS activation. EOC Communications will notify AEMA. Correctiveactions will be demonstrated during ACE95.


C-CA-2.4 (93) Lack of Situation J. Nolin March 95Reports

This was corrected with the installation of EMIS, and will be demonstrated duringACE95.

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This item was corrected through the provision of training by the Communications Officer,and will be demonstrated during ACE 95.


C-CA-4.1 (93) Inadequate M. Burney late 1996CommunicationsCapabilities

This issue will be corrected with the installation of the 800MHz radio system.


C-CA-4.2 (93) Inadequate M. Burney March 95CommunicationsProcedures

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ACTION PLAN FOR TALLADEGA COUNTYAnniston Community Exercise 1994


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TA94C6.1 Initial PAD Omitted Holcomb CompletedZone C-6

CORRECTIVE ACTION: Zone C-6 was initially omitted due to emphasis on IRZevacuation. Procedures on PAZ evacuation have been reexamined and this should notoccur again. However, we wish to point out that due to the distance of this zone fromthe incident site, there was ample time to accomplish the evacuation before the arrival ofthe plume.


TA94C7.1 EBS Message Delays Holcomb - Bass 1 Feb 95

CORRECTIVE ACTION: Because she was hired only two weeks before the exercise,our new PIO had not had the opportunity for adequate training. Since the exercise, shehas received a Public Presentation Course, the CSEPP JIC Training Course and isscheduled for FEMA Introduction to Public Affairs in February.


TA94C7.2 Inadequate EBS Holcomb - Bass 15 Feb 95Message Content

CORRECTIVE ACTION: While we had prescripted messages for the IRZ, we had notprepared a set for the PAZ. We are in process of writing messages for this area andthese will be completed a month in advance of the March 1995 FSX.

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C-TA-11.1 (93) Lack of Holcomb - Red Cross 15 Mar 95Demonstration ofCongregate CareCapability

CORRECTIVE ACTION: Based on the scenario, congregate care was not necessary inTalladega County, as evacuees were routed to other countries. However, we had RedCross and DHR in our EOC. We intend to demonstrate this objective in the March 1995FSX.

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS (Continued)

Mustard AgentHigh Frequency

Identification (Number)

Local Area Network

Memorandum for the RecordMissile CommandMemorandum of UnderstandingMorale, Welfare and Recreation

Protective Action DecisionPublic Affairs OfficerProtective Action RecommendationPersonnel Decontamination StationPublic Information OfficerPoint(s) of ReviewPersonal Protective EquipmentPatient Transfer Vehicle

Radio Amateur Civil Emergency ServiceReal Time Analytical Platform

Standard Operating Procedures; Standing Operating ProceduresService Response ForceSRF CommanderStart of the Exercise

Traffic Control Point

USADACS

AIALANCBCHCLETSTTA

U.S. Army Defense Ammunition Center and School

Joint IssuesState of AlabamaAnniston Army DepotCleburne CountyCalhoun CountyClay CountyEtowah CountySt. Clair CountyTalladega County

HDHF

ID

LAN

MFRMICOMMOUMWR

PADPAOPARPDSPIOPORPPEPTV

RACESRTAP

SOPSRFSRFCSTARTEX

TCP

IDENTIFIER CODES

Documents

CHEMICAL STOCKPILE - HSDL