Chekri Ganem and the Comité Central Syrien: Syrian Nationalism in Paris, 1905-1921

7/29/2019 Chekri Ganem and the Comit Central Syrien: Syrian Nationalism in Paris, 1905-1921.

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Chekri Ganem and the Comit Central Syrien: Syrian Nationalism in Paris, 1905-1921

Nathalie Marie Rosado

Senior ThesisHistory Honors Program

Professor Thomas Kselman4 April 2012


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Contents

Acknowledgements 3

Introduction 6

Chapter I: Chekri Ganems Entrance Into the French 11Public Sphere, 1905-1916

Chapter II: The Comit Central Syrien, 1916-1918 33

Chapter III: The Paris Peace Conference and Chekri Ganems Resignation 52From the Comit Central Syrien, 1918-1921

Conclusion 69

Bibliography 73


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Acknowledgements

First and foremost, words cannot express how indebted I am to my advisor,

Thomas Kselman, not only for the successful completion of this thesis, but for teaching

me all I know about French history and encouraging me as I improved my French

language skills, without which I would not have been able to conduct primary research.

Professor Kselman went above and beyond the duties of a thesis advisor by helping me

interpret primary sources, encouraging me to improve my writing style, and engaging in

casual French conversation with me. He has been by me as I developed an interest in

French colonialism and as I sought other endeavors, always encouraging me to pursuewhat I want most. I have appreciated his good humor and his reassurances even during

the times when we both knew that my work could get better. Throughout this process, I

have sought to write a thesis worthy of all that he has done for me.

Second, I would like to thank my Arabic professor, Ghada Bualuan, who has

served as the biggest inspiration behind my interest in French and Syro-Lebanese history.

Seeing Ghadas pride for her Lebanese culture, her passion to encourage a better

understanding of the Middle East, and her love of France is what sparked my curiosity

and led me to pursue historical studies in the subject. Ghada is a true role model for me,

and I hope to someday be a woman as kind, intelligent, worldly, and fashionable as she

is. Thank you for our great coffee dates and for encouraging me to stay true to my morals

while always remaining intellectually curious.

A big thank you to Professor Asher Kaufman for helping me as I sought to

decipher all the complexities of Middle-Eastern history and politics. His passion and

work for peace in the Syria-Lebanon-Israel tri-border region is truly inspiring.


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Thanks to Charlie Pineda for hosting me in Paris over Christmas break and

encouraging my studies. I can say that meeting his Lebanese friends, Youmna, Sara, and

Danielle, brought my thesis to life and showed me what it is really like to be Lebanese in

Paris today. I would also like to thank Antoine Honein from Lebanese Books in Atlanta

for hand-carrying Chekri Ganems political works all the way from Beirut so that I could

use them for my thesis.

I am very grateful to the history department at the University of Notre Dame. The

quality of the professors I have had here and their willingness to go out of their way to

help their students has been incredible. I would like to acknowledge the help and supportof Professor Julia Thomas and the incredibly talented honors history majors who wrote

theses this year. Our seminars and wonderful dinner gatherings provided a lot of

encouragement when I needed it.

This project would not have been possible without the funding that I received to

conduct research in Paris and buy the necessary books to write my thesis. I would like to

acknowledge the Nanovic Institute, the Center for Undergraduate Scholarly Engagement,

the McAvoy Fund for Undergraduate Excellence in the history department, and the

Undergraduate Research Opportunity Program at Notre Dame for giving me the financial

support necessary to carry out my research and providing me with an amazing

undergraduate experience.

I would like to thank my family in Puerto Rico, in particular my uncle, Carlos

Fraticelli, who always expresses interest in my academic endeavors and has an inspiring

passion for knowledge, and my grandfather, Luis Ortiz, for his frequent phone calls to tell

me how proud he is of me and how much he loves me.


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I could never sufficiently thank my parents, Edwin Rosado and Marisol Ortiz, for

the amazing support they have given me throughout this process and throughout my life

in general. I have been blessed with kind, humble, and loving parents who have

constantly done everything in their power to make me happy, even when I do not deserve

it. Both of them sacrificed the lives they knew in Puerto Rico to provide me with a better

future, and that is something I know I can never give back to them. Thank you to my little

sister, Roxann, for being my best friend and putting up with me for twenty-one years. I

simply cannot imagine life without all three of you in it, ever.

Finally, I would like to thank God for the life he has given me. Although I am notworthy of His grace, I somehow always find my way back to Him.


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Introduction

In this thesis, I analyze the political significance of a Syro-Lebanese organization

in Paris during the early twentieth century by drawing from its publications and the life of

its president, Chekri Ganem. A Christian Lebanese and a supporter of French

involvement in Syria, Chekri Ganem and the Comit Central Syrien represented an

alternative nationalism that challenged the anti-Western, pro-Arab, Islamic nationalisms

that developed during the period following World War I.

Because it was a pro-French organization on the payroll of the Quai dOrsay,

some historians, such as Christopher Andrew and A. S. Kanya-Forstner, dismiss theComit Central Syrien as an organization that merely expounded the views that the

French government wanted to hear. Other historians, such as Vincent Cloarec, dismiss

the Comit as an organization that did not have support from Syrians and Lebanese and

was therefore not effective in helping the French government to implement policy in

Syria. I argue that despite their loyalty to France, their views on policy in Syria were

grounded in authentic and reasonable concern to construct a national identity that would

embrace some of the principles at work in the French Republic, even while they affirmed

the value of political autonomy. In many instances, Ganem knew when the French

government needed to act in Syria, but officials at the Quai dOrsay would not always act

according to the Comits advice.

My goal is not to show how much support the Comit Central Syrien had in Syria

and Lebanon, but how they worked with the French government, how they were viewed

in France, and how they compared to and worked with opposing nationalist organizations

and other political views. My research in newspapers shows that the Comit Central


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Syrien was respected and enjoyed substantial support in French public opinion. This

support helped explain French sympathy for the French governments colonial interests

in Syria and Lebanon. Ganem built a reputation in France that made French society

sympathetic to French colonial interests in the Levant. The French mandate that governed

Syria and Lebanon in the interwar period was able to draw on this support, and the

Comit Central Syrien hoped that the mandate would establish religious tolerance by

creating a federal Syrian state with autonomous regions and a secular government.

In Chapter 1, I trace Chekri Ganems motivations as he developed his political

ideology while working for the Quai dOrsay. I analyze his literary works and his

political writings and argue that early on in his career, he was influenced by the political

events unfolding in Europe and the growing dissatisfaction of Syrians and Lebanese

under an oppressive Ottoman regime. When the Young Turk Revolution of 1908 brought

a new, more liberal constitutional era to the Ottoman Empire, Ganem began to work with

other nationalist organizations and use the opportunity to demand autonomy for Arabs

within the Empire. Once it became clear that the new regime was not as welcoming to the

Arab calls for autonomy as he had anticipated, Ganem and the Comit de lOrient, a

committee that preceded the Comit Central Syrien, called for the Arab people to

consider the aid of France in order to have their voices heard. The journal of the Comit

de lOrient, entitledLa Correspondance dOrient, surveyed Syrian and Lebanese citizens

and published excerpts and findings of newspapers in the Ottoman Empire in order to

show the dissatisfaction of the Syrian community within the new regime of the Young

Turks.


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In Chapter 2, I continue to describe Ganems involvement as his call for French

intervention in Syria became stronger. His work with the French government culminated

in an expedition to gather support for France among the Syro-Lebanese migr

communities of South America and resulted in the creation of the Comit Central Syrien,

of which Ganem was named the president. Ganem now openly advocated an insurrection

of the Arab people from the Empire, and I argue that although his creation of a Syrian

army to fight against the Ottoman Empire was militarily unsuccessful, his efforts show

the amount of trust that he had gained within officials at the Quai dOrsay and his role in

reorienting French policy in Syria. During World War I, Ganem and the Comit CentralSyrien engaged in two main activities. First, they concentrated their efforts in intelligence

gathering among Syrian communities abroad. Through the CCS, the Quai dOrsay built

strong relationships with the people of the nation in which it sought to establish French

authority. Second, they authored various propagandist works in France that showed their

nationalistic views and glorified France as the mother of the Syrian people. In this part, I

turn away from Ganem and introduceLa Syrie, an extensive book written by the

Comits secretary general, George Samn, which included a preface from Ganem. This

book was the manifesto of the Comit Central Syrien, a 500-page narrative that was

meant to counter the Arab nationalism of the Emir Faysal, a Hashemite prince whom the

British wished to use in order to establish their own presence in Syria under the pretext of

supporting Faysals call for Arab unity. I argue that the Comit Central Syrien provided

an alternative nationalism that allowed for pluralism and freedom of religion in Syria, a

country torn by religious, cultural, and ethnic sectarianism. Their plan to allow for

autonomous regions within a greater state of Syria showed that they were open to


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difference within the nation but were determined to ultimately unify it under the tutelage

of France. I also briefly allude to the Phoenician myth of identity that began to resurface

among many Lebanese, which held that Lebanon was not a part of the Arab race and that

the connection of Lebanon to France had existed for centuries.

In Chapter 3, I conclude with the ultimate failure of Ganem and the Comit

Central Syrien to completely realize their political agenda in Syria. I argue that the

problem of Lebanon was partly a result of a change in the inclusive nature of the

narrative of the Comit Central Syrien. No longer welcoming of Muslims, the Comit

issued various statements during the Paris Peace Conference that spoke negatively ofIslam and sought to establish Syrians as a people different from Arab Muslims. This

inevitably made the narrative of the Comit more applicable to the Lebanese, and support

among Syrians became difficult to obtain. After struggles with British ambitions in the

Levant and the French failure to obtain Palestine as a result of those ambitions, the Quai

dOrsay ultimately established its rule over Syria, and in 1920, an autonomous Lebanon

was created. I argue that it was specifically the problem of Lebanon that led to the most

significant disagreements between Ganem and the Quai dOrsay, and that Ganems new

wish for an independent Lebanon, a cause of his Phoenician tendencies, were the reason

for his resignation from the Comit Central Syrien, which had resolved to continue to

advocate for a Greater Syria that encompassed Lebanon. Although Ganems original idea

of a Greater Syria had not been realized, his ultimate goal of establishing French

authority in the Levant was accomplished, rendering his presidency of the Comit Central

Syrien a success in the eyes of many Syrian nationalists and his memory one that was

cherished in French society until the time of his death.


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My research began with the literary and political works of Ganem and Samn,

where I was able to see the development of their political beliefs and the depth of their

connection to France. I was also able to visit the archives of the Ministre des Affaires

trangres in Paris, where I saw the actual relationship between Ganem and the French

Foreign Ministry. Through Ganems correspondence with various French officials at the

Quai dOrsay, I was able to understand his role in the development of French policy in

Syria and the factors leading up to the ultimate failure of Ganems Comit Central Syrien

to achieve what they believed should be a Greater Syria that encompassed Palestine and

Lebanon.Beyond the role of Chekri Ganem and the Comit Central Syrien, my thesis

conceptualizes how conflicting ideas about what constituted Arab nationalism emerged

and affected the post-World War I territorial settlements. The roots of problems in the

contemporary Middle East can be traced to the failure to define an inclusive nationalism

during this period, and the struggles of the Comit Central Syrien depict the conflicting

ideas that divided many Syrians and Lebanese as they sought independence following the

fall of the Ottoman Empire.


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Chapter I: Chekri Ganems Entrance Into the French PublicSphere, 1905-1916

Chekri Ganems Literary and Political Origins

When Chekri Ganem interviewed the Maronite Patriarch Hoyek during the

priests visit to Paris in 1905, he marked his entrance into politics. The Patriarch, in Paris

to visit the French president, mile Loubet, met with Ganem, who was serving as a

correspondent forLe Figaro, one of the leading daily newspapers in France. Through this

interview, Ganem presented his plan for the future of Syria and of Lebanon, and the

Patriarch argued that the time had come for France and the Maronites to march togethertowards the future under an enlightened government in Greater Syria.

The Maronites, and you know because you are a Maronite, place theirhopes in God, the Pope, and in France under the aegis of a tolerantOttoman government. Our loyalty [to France] is appreciated, and I remainloyal to these [French] traditions that have given Lebanon a long period oftranquility. But the truth is in the reality of actions, and not in dreams. Asthe spiritual leader of the Maronites, [sic] [I] will march together [withthem] towards the future, supported by France, our great and secularfriend, under the enlightened government of the Ottoman sultan.1

These remarks, although seemingly nave in that they assumed an easy pathway to

Lebanese autonomy in the Ottoman Empire with the support of France, showed that the

Patriarch, a leader in Lebanese affairs, was openly sending a message to the Ottoman

Empire and to France. Endorsed by Ganem, the Patriarch defined a reformed Ottoman

Empire and a Lebanon that would use French support to defend its interests. The meeting

between Ganem and Hoyek brought into account this ancient relationship and they both

suggested that the time had come for both nations to work together for the rights of the

1Le Patriarche dOrient,Le Figaro, October 12, 1905, accessed March 11, 2012.http://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k287130k.r=le%20figaro%20.langEN.


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Syrians and Lebanese who had lived under the rule of the Ottoman Empire since 1516. 2

The bond formed with Patriarch Hoyek during this visit would serve Ganem in pushing

for stronger French policies in Syria and Lebanon. The Patriarch talked about his loyalty

to France and his wishes for French support in Lebanon, which came from a longstanding

relationship between France and the Maronites. Syria and Lebanon were a part of the

Ottoman Empire, but France held a relationship with Lebanon that went back to the

1500s during the Turkish Capitulations, which allowed the French to pursue commercial

and political ventures in the Ottoman Empire. In 1860, France established itself as the

protector of the Maronites when the French government helped the Christian Lebanese ina bloody struggle against the Druze, a sect of Shia Islam with whom the Maronites had a

tense relationship.3 The Ottoman government had allowed France to establish educational

institutions in Lebanon, which the French saw as an opportunity to support the Christian

community of Lebanon.4 The Patriarch was thus alluding to a relationship that he

believed was at a turning point. Ganem wanted a stronger French policy in Lebanon and

explicit French influence as opposed to a relationship that had until then been primarily

religious, and he used his position as a correspondent for Le Figaro in order to publicize

those views. The Patriarchs visit to France marked an important moment in the

2 William L. Cleveland and Martin Bunton,A History of the Modern Middle East. 4th ed.(Philadelphia: Westview Press, 2009), 13-18.3 A. L. Tibawi,A Modern History of Syria, (London: Macmillan, 1969), 21-25.4See Samy F. Zaka, Education and Civilization in the Third Republic: The University ofSt. Joseph, (PhD diss., University of Notre Dame, 2006), 1-24, in which he analyzes thebroader impact of French educational missions in Syria and Lebanon through thedevelopments of the University of St. Joseph in Beirut. He argues that by the 1870s, theOttoman Sultan had expressed concern over the number of Catholic French schools inOttoman Syria and the threat they posed to the Ottoman Empire. The Patriarchs

reference to the relationship between France and Lebanon was largely founded on theeducational presence that France had established in the Levant through Catholicmissionaries.


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relationship between France and the Syro-Lebanese community, and Ganems role in the

meeting established his place in developing Frances commitment to the future of Syria.

Ganems loyalty to France began during his activism in Ottoman Lebanon. As a

young man during the 1870s, he helped a fifteen-year-old who was being brutalized by an

Ottoman officer. After escaping, I had to flee to the mountain and found refuge with a

French family from Lyon. For two months, I lived a French life. Who knows if that time

spent with [them] is what made me decide my future and what led me to France, he said,

recalling the event later in life.5 In 1882, he left Lebanon in order to pursue a post in the

French protectorate of Tunisia that his brother, Khalil, had arranged for him. In 1894, heestablished himself permanently in France. While serving as the president of the Ottoman

Chamber of Commerce in Paris, he began to write plays, novels, and poems, many of

them dealing with the Middle East, which won him initial praise and a broad audience in

France. As a writer, he would also engage in free-lance work with Le Figaro, which

allowed him to voice his opinions and reach a considerable French audience.

Three years after his meeting with Patriach Hoyek, Chekri Ganem and George

Samn founded lAssociation desAmis de lOrientin 1908 in order to more fully

advocate for French involvement in the future of Syria. Samn was a wealthy Greek-

Catholic physician from Damascus who also advocated for French authority in the

Levant, and he personally financed many of the initiatives undertaken by the Amis de

lOrient. By founding theAmis de lOrientshortly after the Young Turk Revolution of

1908, Ganem sought to take advantage of the new constitutional era in Turkey for the

5 Chekri Ganem, crits Politiques, ed. Georges T. Labaki (Beirut: ditions Dar An-Nahar, 1994), xv. See Labakis introduction to the political writings of Ganem, in which

he provides abrief biographical overview of Ganems life by using information obtainedfrom newspaper interviews.


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advancement of Syrian society. The Revolution ushered in the Second Constitutional Era

of the Ottoman Empire, dissolving Abdul Hamids oppressive regime, which Ganem

escaped shortly after his brother, Khalil, was condemned to death for political activism

against the government. Ganems society sought to promote progress in the Orient and a

positive relationship between the Ottoman Empire and Europe. TheAmis de lOrientwas

a society of Syrian and Lebanese emigrants, and with the liberal Young Turks on the

Ottoman throne, Ganem and Samn used the organization to express their vision of a new

civilization in the East.6 They believed that the Ottoman Empire was on the process of

regenerating itself, and they anticipated the renaissance of Eastern culture, which theybelieved would be much different from that of Europe. The establishment of the Amis de

lOrientmarked the beginning ofLa Correspondance dOrient, a journal first published

in 1908 that discussed a variety of issues concerning the Orient. It was published by the

Amis de lOrientand discussed economic, social, political, and literary issues concerning

the internal aspects of the Orient and its relationship with Europe. The publication of

Ganems journal solidified his role within the French colonial movement, and it served as

an instrument to reach out to the educated and politically aware classes in French society.

He was now a public figure and the most widely known representative of the Syro-

Lebanese community in Paris. As such, Ganem gave Parisians a sense of the Syrian

people as a Westernized, educated, and liberal community that supported the reformation

6Comit de lOrient, Notre Programme,La Correspondance dOrient, October 1,1908, accessed March 11, 2012.http://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k58102442.image.langEN.r=la%20correspondance%20d'orient. Most issues ofLa Correspondace dOrientstated the purpose of the writers,the affiliations of the journal, and the intent of their publication in a brief introduction. Ingeneral, they expounded similar beliefs about the need for a relationship between theOttoman Empire and its surrounding European countries.


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of the greater Ottoman Empire, and he instilled in the French a desire to support the

Syrian cause, believing that Syrians advocated similar values to those of French society.

The Young Turk Revolution of 1908 gave Ganem hope that the liberalism of the

reformers would allow for the different ethnicities of the Ottoman Empire to gain

autonomy and receive representation in the Ottoman parliament. Ganem, whose brother

was condemned to death for political activism under Abdul Hamids regime, was

personally attached to the cause of political freedom in the Levant. After working for the

French protectorate of Tunisia from 1882-1895, Ganem moved to Paris permanently and

began to use his position in French society to advocate for French involvement in thecause of the Syrian people. Despite his advocacy for French influence, Ganems writings

inLa Correspondance dOrientfrom 1908 until the outbreak of the Great War were not

characterized by separatism or any desire for Syrian or Lebanese independence from the

Ottoman Empire. Instead, he believed, as the Comit de lOrienthad expressed in the

first issue ofLa Correspondance dOrient, published in 1908, that the Young Turk

Revolution offered the opportunity for political autonomy of the different ethnicities of

the Ottoman Empire in the newly reformed government.7

In seeking to achieve political autonomy for the Arabs, Ganem grew dissatisfied

with the lack of action on behalf of the Syrian and Lebanese communities in the Ottoman

Empire. He argued that it was not because of European pressure that the Ottoman Empire

was crumbling, but rather because of the absence of patriotism among the people of Syria

within the Ottoman Empire. Ganem accused the Syrian Ottoman subjects of having a

careless attitude toward the developments in the area. Aprs moi le deluge, he said, or

7Comit de lOrient, Notre Programme,La Correspondance dOrient, October 1,1908.


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to be more local, after my donkey, the grass should grow no longer. That is our

patriotism.8 Ganem saw the Young Turk Revolution as a chance for Syrians to define

their political role in the Ottoman Empire, but he sensed that the people of Syria were not

taking advantage of that opportunity, preferring instead to continue with their present

situation as a community unable to control its own destiny and resigned to a powerless

status within the Empire. What had to happen is happening: stagnation [and] sterile

agitation, vain with impotent gestures and lifeless words.9 Ganem feared for their

political future, and he was often frustrated because he felt that the people of Syria did

not see the potential to be recognized as a distinct nation, self-governing and unifiedunder the same cause.

In addition to his political writings the idea of an independent Syria was also a

major theme in Ganems literary works, where he envisioned a Syria that would one day

rise up and be recognized as a nation. Ganem was actively involved with the Amis de

lOrient, but he had not left his primary profession as a poet and playwright. Antar, a play

about the son of a slave who rises to become a warrior, made Ganem a recognized figure

in Parisian society in 1910. The play exemplified the values of French liberalism at the

time, which denounced aristocratic privilege, calling instead for a meritocracy, in which

power was based on capacity and not on privilege by birth. Antardepicted the rise of a

common man to greatness, and within the story, Ganem visualized the rise of the Arab

people:

The future of a race and of a nation does not lieIn one man, were he to be the arbiter of combats,The king of the world. Nothing stops a people united.

8 Ganem, 10-11.9 Ibid.


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They rise! I see them rising step by step,From the Levant, until sunset, in such a blaze,As that of a golden star fading in the depths of the sky.10

In Antar, Ganem envisioned the rise of the Syrians and predicted the birth of a nation

from an initiative taken by its people. In his literary works as well as in his political

activism, he sought the cultural development of the Arab people, and he hoped that the

new regime in the Ottoman Empire would allow for the Arab culture to be recognized. At

this time, the term Arab was one that Ganem applied to himself in order to march in

solidarity with the Arabs of the Ottoman Empire. Because Ganem wanted the people of

Syria to unite against the injustices of the Ottoman Sultan, he adhered to a narrative inwhich one could be an Arab, a Syrian, and a Christian at the same time.11 Ganem never

advocated a complete separation of Syria and Lebanon from the Ottoman Empire, but he

envisioned the emergence of Arab nationalism with a newly reformed Ottoman Empire

and under the protection of France. The French values of liberalism present in his

narrative suggest that he believed an autonomous Syria should have been modeled on

French values and protected by the French government, even if Syria was to remain

under the rule of the Ottoman Empire. Both in his literary and political narratives, Ganem

refrained from speaking of a distinct Maronite or Lebanese civilization that alienated

10 Chekri Ganem, crits Litteraires: Posie, Roman, et Thtre, ed. Georges T. Labaki(Beirut: ditions Dar An-Nahar, 1994), 408.11 Asher Kaufman argues that Ganem and other Lebanese Christians might have believedthere to be cultural differences between Lebanese Maronites and Muslims in Syria andLebanon, but that before 1916, most Lebanese Maronites, such as Ganem, had notstrongly expressed their wishes for Lebanon to be separated from Syria nor for theLebanese to be considered a race different from the Arabs. Some indeed believed thatthere were intrinsic differences between Maronites and the rest of the population of Syria,but they were still conscious of the Arab identity to which they had been exposed whileliving in Syria throughout their whole lives. Asher Kaufman,Reviving Phoenicia: TheSearch for Identity in Lebanon, (London: I.B. Tauris, 2004), 82.


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Fig. 1: Chekri Ganem, dressed in the style ofAntar.

Muslims and Syrians. He spoke of Greater Syria as a whole, and he sought to gain

support from Arabs, Muslims, and Christians in order to advocate for a cohesive

movement to demand recognition of the Arab people of Syria.

Ganems references to a distinct Arab identity were accompanied by reassurance

that his remarks were not meant to be politically separatist or critical of Ottoman

authority. Ganems efforts to balance his political activism can be seen in a letter he sent

in April 1910 toLe Temps in Paris outlining the goals of the Arabs within the Ottoman

Empire. In order for it to reach an Ottoman audience, he had originally sought to publish


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this letter in the Tanin, a newspaper that supported the new Turkish regime. In the article,

Ganem had criticized the Ottoman parliament for its underrepresentation of Arab

representatives.12 He condemned as well the Turkish discrimination against Arabs in the

Ottoman civil service, in particular that of the foreign ministry.

Do you want to ignore everything that was said and published in the Arabpress and in the whole world since the proclamation of the Constitution[established by the Young Turks after they came into power]? First, afterthe constitution was established, the Ottoman government proceeded torevoke the posts of all Arab officersof the twelve that were in theOttoman foreign ministry, all but one were told to step down, and the oneArab left was sent to Tiflis and replaced by a young doctor with noexperience in the [political] profession. The Arab world is, at this very

moment, deeply affected.

13

Ganem was troubled by the fact that he, so far away from the Ottoman Empire, was the

first to make note of such discrimination in the new government. Although the new

regime instituted a parliamentary government in order to represent the different voices of

the Empire, Ganem believed they had failed to carry out their promises. When Ganems

article was turned down by the Tanin, the editors ofLa Correspondance dOrientclaimed

that the Young Turk revolution was violating the principle of freedom of the press. The

Young Turk Revolution, supposedly a Western-oriented movement spearheaded by

intellectuals, secularists, and ethnic minorities, had become a nationalist movement that

only catered to Turkish citizens and failed to address the demands of the ethnic minorities

in the empire. As Chekri Ganem became aware of the exclusive nature of the Young Turk

12Bulletin de lEtranger,Le Temps, April 11, 1910, accessed February 22, 2012.http://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k240081g.r=le%20temps%20paris%201861.langEN.13Turcs et Arabes,La Correspondance dOrient. June 15, 1910, accessed February 22,2012.http://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k5805941h.image.langEN.r=correspondance%20d'orient.


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regime, he became increasingly assertive in support of Arab nationalism and made

himself present amongst the various Arab intellectuals who frequently gathered in Paris.

Ganems nationalism rested on the possibility of a distinct Syrian nation. In his

early writings, Ganem worried about the future of Syria if the Syrian people did not rise

up and take advantage of what he believed was a new era that would regenerate the

Ottoman Empire. Ganems writings about Macedonia, a country also under Ottoman rule,

showed his study of the political future of another nation fighting for autonomy and gives

insight into the development of his political ideology for Syria. The partition of

Macedonia taught him that autonomy for Syria without the support of a powerful nationcould end negatively. Macedonia was a country whose fight for autonomy was crushed

by the competing powers that sought to benefit territorially from its partition. But even

while he bemoaned the fate of Macedonia, Ganem insisted on the value of a continued

connection with the Ottoman Empire. He had hoped that autonomy would also be in the

near future for the Slavs of Macedonia, and he advised against decentralization from the

Ottoman Empire:

Decentralization! The word itself [sic] seems frightening. [Such a concept]would turn the Empire into a salon where the number of people involveddoes not allow for a general dialog. That way they will form into smallgroups and act each according to their own desires and interests in theirsmall milieu.14

Ottoman control in Macedonia ended during the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913, but rather

than achieving independence, Macedonia was divided among Greece, Bulgaria, and

Serbia. Ganem feared that the same would happen to Syria if Syrians did not seek to

make demands concerning their political future. As Ganem became more personally

14 Ganem, crits Politiques, 34.


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invested in the fate of the Macedonians, his political thought concerning Syria developed,

and he began to explicitly demand Arab recognition within the Syrian Empire. He knew

that in order for Syria avoid falling under the control of other nations, Syrians would need

to ally themselves with a great power. He did not wish for Syria to be completely

independent, and Syrias relationship with France became very important as he began to

develop the idea of Syrian autonomy. The end of the Balkan Wars in May 1913 that

resulted in the partition of Macedonia served as a turning point in Ganems political

thought and led to his call to action when organizing a gathering of Arab intellectuals in

Paris in 1913.The First Arab Congress, 1913

In 1912, Ganem headed a movement to unite Arabs in support of autonomy for Syria and

became recognized as an important figure among those in French society who supported

French colonialism. During the summer of 1912, Ganem founded the Comit Libanais de

Paris, and that same year, theAssociation des Amis de lOrientchanged its name to the

Comit de lOrient.15 The Comit de lOrientwas closely tied to the French foreign

ministry and officials from Quai dOrsay were involved with the organization. These

changes within already existing organizations and the creation of new colonialist

committees in 1912 suggest that the French colonialist movement was being strongly

supported by Syrians in Paris and was thus gaining serious attention from the French

government. By 1913, the French public considered Ganem to be more than an

accomplished poet. As he cultivates the French muse, he does not forget the brothers of

his race, wroteLe Figaro, lauding his efforts to advocate for the recognition of Arabs in

15 Christopher M. Andrew and A.S. Kanya-Forstner, The Climax of French ImperialExpansion, 1914-1924 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1981), 47.


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the Ottoman Empire.16 The French began to distinguish his love of Lebanon and his

unique commitment to France, and they perceived him as a potentially important figure in

the pursuit of French policy in the Levant. His play,Antar, remained very popular during

the Parisian season, and it depicted his political position as sympathetic to the right of

France in the Levant, as well as being critical of the authority of the Ottoman Empire. He

became the voice for the oppressed Ottoman subjects, defending the values of liberty and

equality for the Arab minorities in the Ottoman Empire. As his love of France was

noticed by French society, the French in turn became sympathetic to French colonial

interests in the Levant.Ganems wishes forthe Turkish government to recognize Arab nationalism and

his position as a political figure working with the French government allowed him to

begin to work with other Arab nationalist organizations that were less sympathetic to the

idea of French involvement in Syria and Lebanon. One of the challenges that Ganem

faced as part of the Comit de lOrientshortly after its formation was working with the

members ofal-Fatat, a secret Arab society founded in 1909 by two Arab students. After

the Young Turk Revolution, Ahmad Quadri of Damascus and Awni Abd al-Hadi of

Nablus were convinced that the Young Turks were solely concerned with Turkish

nationalism and sought to subjugate all other nationalities of the Ottoman Empire once

they came to power.17 They then decided to organize a secret society based on the model

of the Young Turks that advocated for an Arab nation to be placed within the ranks of

other nations. Quadri and al-Hadi moved to Paris to finish their studies, and it was there

16Jean Louis, Quelques Croix,Le Figaro. February 21, 1913, accessed March 08,2012. http://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k289866m.r=le%20figaro.langEN.17 Eliezer Tauber, The Emergence of Arab Movements (London: Frank Cass, 1993), 91-92.


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that they established the first administrative committee of the society in 1911. The

organization was one that rejected the influence of the French in the Levant, a position

Ganem challenged when he reached out to them in order to discuss the future of Arabs

within the Ottoman Empire.

The First Arab Congress established Ganem as a key figure within the Arab

migr communities both in Paris and abroad that were concerned about the future of

Arabs in the Ottoman Empire. Ganems ability to negotiate with Muslims and Arab

nationalists, such as those ofal-Fatat, made him a valuable asset to the Quai dOrsay. al-

Fatatwas an Arab nationalist and predominantly Muslim society, but in 1913, Ganemcollaborated with its members in order to take part in their biggest initiative, an Arab

congress that was to be held in Paris that year. When the Muslim reformers of the

Ottoman Empire suggested that the Congress be held in Paris, the Quai dOrsay was

taken aback, unsure of how to collaborate with organizations whose demands were not

likely to coincide with French ambitions in Syria. Ganem, however, saw an opportunity

for the Quai dOrsay to become a majorplayer in the initiative taken to demand Arab

recognition. He knew that denying them the opportunity to hold the Congress in Paris

would hurt French ambitions in Syria, and he advised the Quai dOrsay to use the

occasion to control the reformist movement.18 Ganem had a vision of Syria and Lebanon

that involved France, and but it was during the First Arab Congress that he began to use

his position within the Comit de lOrientto realize it.

The involvement of Ganem and the Comit de lOrientin the First Arab Congress

made them a credible voice for the demands of the Syrian people, despite the fact that

18 Andrew and Kanya-Forstner, 51.


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Ganem was working for the Quai dOrsay and the Comit de lOrientwas headquartered

in France.19 During the period following the Young Turk Revolution of 1908, the Arab

nationalism that some of the members of the First Arab Congress advocated still adhered

to the Ottoman Empire. For the Syrians who advocated Arab nationalism during the

Congress in 1913, political autonomy was limited to Greater Syria, a region in the Middle

East that encompassed Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, and part of Jordan. Rather than being

connected to the Arabs of Arabia, Arab nationalism during the First Arab Congress

demanded the recognition of Arab culture from the Ottoman government. Because most

Syrians and Lebanese supported this earlier version of Arab nationalism and were unitedin an effort to demand autonomy from the Ottoman Empire, they frequently gathered in

Paris from 1908-1919 to discuss political issues and organize political gatherings, with

Chekri Ganem playing a significant role.20 Ganem was therefore closely associated and

aware of the political thought that began to develop among the Arab communities as the

Ottoman Empire began to decay. Although no one at the time could have predicted its

complete decline, Ganem took the opportunity to engage in the general political

discussions among Arabs following the Young Turk Revolution and keep French

officials informed of the information that he gathered.21 The dialog he maintained with

other Arab nationalist organizations in and outside of Paris connected him to the reality

19 In my primary source research, I did not come upon evidence that explicitly showedthe terms of Ganems contract with the French government. When reviewing secondaryliterature, I found that Asher Kaufman as well as Christopher Andrew and A.S. Kanya-Forstner claim that Ganem was on the payroll of the Quai dOrsay, with Kaufman

referring to Ganem as a type of mercenary.20 Kaufman, 80.21 Andrew and Kanya Forstner, 51.


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of the politics of Syria. He was aware of the demands of Arab nationalists and held views

that were similar to those of other Arab nationalists.

Through his association with the Syrian and Lebanese political circles in Paris,

Ganem developed a widely held view regarding the fate of Syria in the First Arab

Congress. Historians Christopher Andrew and A.S. Kanya-Forstner argue that Chekri

Ganem and the Comit de lOrientdid not represent the wishes of the Syrian and

Lebanese people regarding the fate of Syria because most Lebanese at the time wished

for an independent Lebanon rather than a Greater Syria. 22 The First Arab Congress

shows, however, that the ambitions of Arab leaders were not unified, and that theproblem of Lebanon had not quite yet emerged during the First Arab Congress. The

delegates at the Congress tried to address various issues that affected the Arab subjects of

the Ottoman Empire, but they failed to come up with a solid consensus on what course of

action was best to take at the time. Part of the reason for the lack of consensus was the

diversity of the delegations: there was a mix of eleven Christians, eleven Muslims, and

one Jew.23 With no single outstanding political sentiment within the Arab communities,

they were torn between alliances with the European powers, their loyalty to the Ottoman

Empire, and the political autonomy that they believed should be granted to the Arabs

within the Empire. Ganem was another voice in the political discussion, in which no one

could claim to represent the true ambitions of the Arabs. The Arab Congress of 1913

concluded with statements that showed a mix of political agendas that did not make up a

compromise among the members of the delegations. Among the delegates, there were

22 Ibid., 48.23 For information about the different viewpoints displayed in the First Arab Congress, Irefer to Asher Kaufman, who provides a detailed summary of the different nationalistgroups involved in the proceedings of the event. Kaufman, 80-82.


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two positions that closely mirrored Ganems wishes for Syria. One was represented by

Ahmad Bayhum and Khalil Zni, a Muslim and a Christian from Beirut who, like

Ganem, advocated for French authority in Syria. Another was the delegation of Nadra

Moutran, a Greek Melchite from Baalbeck who advocated for a Greater Syria and who

began talks with the Comit de lOrientin support of a future French presence in Syria.

Although he was Lebanese, Moutran believed that Lebanon belonged within Syria, but he

differed from Ganem in that he believed that Syria was a Muslim nation, rather than a

Christian one. The desire among the delegates to include Lebanon as a part of Syria show

that Ganems political ideology concerning Lebanon was shared by other leaders,establishing a position that evoked the longstanding demand for an imperial affiliation

that would also accept a powerful French influence. Ganem did have slightly different

approaches to the problem of Syria than those of Bayhum, Zni, and Moutran, but their

advocacy for a Greater Syria and their ties to the French government were similar. The

leaders of the First Arab Congress nevertheless failed to achieve a consensus on what

they thought to be the best solution to the goal of Arab autonomy from the Ottoman

Empire. The officials at the Quai dOrsay were relieved that they were able to adjourn the

First Arab Congress without provoking hostilities from the Ottoman Empire. The

inconclusive nature of the Congress also meant that many issues were left unresolved,

and many of the nationalist delegations were unsatisfied. The Ottoman government

published a program for reforms that would potentially improve Arab representation in

the Ottoman Empire, and the Arab leaders worked with Ganem to urge French officials to

put pressure on the Ottoman government so that they would follow through with their

promises of improvement.


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In 1914, one year after the Arab Congress, the lack of changes implemented by

the Ottoman government left many Arabs dissatisfied, and the Comit de lOrientused

La Correspondance dOrientto demand change and galvanize the reformist Arabs.

Albert Hourani argues that Syrians found themselves asking an important question during

the time following the First Arab Congress.

The nationalists found themselves faced with a question of great moment:what would be the fate of the Arab provinces when the Empire collapsed?Would it be possible for them to constitute an independent state, or wouldthey fall into the hands of new masters?24

The people of Syria and Lebanon were not satisfied with the reforms of the First Arab

Congress, and they slowly began to explore the possibility of independence or allegiance

to a new nation. In an article named Les Reformes Arabes,La Correspondance

dOrientilluminated the inadequacy of the reforms, calling into question the future of

Syria and Lebanon within the control of the Ottoman Empire. In the article,La

Correspondance dOrientreported on the advances that had been made since the

Ottomans had agreed to allow for more Arab autonomy in the Empire, and by surveying

the dissatisfaction of the Arab people in Egypt and in Syria, the Comit de lOrient

sought to address the possibility of independence or allegiance to another great power.

The article reported that a considerable number of Arabs had been named senators in the

Ottoman parliament, but that the Arab leaders all refused. It went on to argue that naming

known Arab leaders to the Ottoman parliament was not going to be enough to hide the

lack of progress concerning the Arab reforms promised at the First Arab Congress.

Taking advantage of the disappointment of the Arab leaders, Ganem and the editors ofLa

24 Albert Hourani, Syria and Lebanon: A Political Essay (London: Oxford UniversityPress: 1946), 40.


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Correspondance dOrientbegan to suggest that other measures had to be taken. The

interviews conducted byLa Correspondance dOrientshowed that Arabs in the Ottoman

Empire had realized that the reforms set forth by the First Arab Congress were not going

to be granted by the Ottoman government. In the same article that portrayed the

dissatisfaction of the Arabs in the Ottoman Empire, the writer forLa Correspondance

dOrientresorted once more to using the example of Eastern Europe, as Ganem had done

in the past, as a way to advocate for change in Syria. In his view, the example of

Armenia, with Russian support, suggested the value of European influence, such as that

of France, when seeking to achieve reform.The [Ottoman Empire] should prevent Arabs from getting the impressionthat the reforms cannot be obtained without the pressure of Europeanpowers. [It is doubtful] that they have not realized that if the Armenianssaw satisfaction in almost all of their demands, it was thanks to the supportof Russia.25

Just as Armenia was being defended from the oppression of the Ottoman Empire with

Russian support, some Arabs began to wonder if European intervention was the only way

for them to institute change within the Ottoman Empire. The article then told the story of

one Arab who asked whether they had to place themselves under the rule of a great power

in order for their demands to be heard.26 By reporting on the Arab reforms, Ganems

journal began to suggest the threat of European intervention as necessary for Arab

nationalism to achieve its goals.

25Comit de lOrient, Les Reformes Arabes,La Correspondance dOrient, February16, 1914, accessed March 07, 2012.http://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k58057924.image.langEN.r=correspondance%20d'orient.26 Ibid.


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The Beginning of an Official French Policy in Syria

In 1914, Ganems duties as part of the Comit de lOrientbecame more closely

tied to the Quai dOrsay, and he began to workmore with French officials than with other

Arab nationalists. Ganem recognized Arab dissent in the Ottoman Empire, and he sought

to garner the support of the French government in order to advocate for an official French

policy in Syria. While Ganem and the Comit de lOrientencouraged a direct French role

in Syria, various French government officials and committees were hesitant as to how

France should establish a presence in the region. The divisions among the delegations in

the Arab Congress of 1913 showed that separatist ideas were present among Arabsubjects of the Ottoman Empire, and although the Quai dOrsay felt a duty to remain

neutral in order to avoid hostilities with the Turkish government, various French

diplomats and organizations, such as Ganem and the Comit de lOrient, began talks with

nationalists who sought insurrection.27Ganems move toward a more separatist position

developed in his relationships with Lieutenant Husson, a chef-adjoint to the Minister of

War, and Nadra Moutran, a separatist Greek Melchite from Baalbeck. Both met with

Ganem in order to devise a plan for a future government in Syria with the backing of the

Comit Libanais de Paris, which Ganem also headed.28 After the Arab Congress,

Moutran had begun talks with the parliamentary authorities that wished for French

intervention in Syria. They sought to convince Ganem to support their mission on behalf

of the Quai dOrsay and the Comit Libanais de Paris. Ganem was not convinced, and

the Quai dOrsay still refused to take part in any measures that would render the Ottoman

27 Andrew and Kanya-Forstner, 52.28 Vincent Cloarec,La France et la question de Syrie, 1914-1918, (Paris: CNRS ditions,1998), 68.


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Empire vulnerable to partition. In their view, France was not at war against the Ottoman

Empire, but rather opposed to a German presence and expansion within the Ottoman

Empire that threatened French influence.29 Parliamentary advocacy for immediate action

in Syria was nonetheless strong in December 1914, leading Senator Etienne Flandin to

advocate for French intervention in Syria and sought support from colonialists in

parliament and received enough to create a comit parliamentaire pour action

ltrangerin order to mobilize an operation in the region. Flandins parliamentary

committee built a relationship with Moutrans Syrian-Arab committee in Paris, as well as

with Husson. Ganem, however, had to tread carefully, because the Quai dOrsay did not

yet support the official stance on Syria that Flandin was advocating in the Senate.

Although the Comit de lOrienthad been conducting talks with Moutran since the First

Arab Congress, Ganem had to decline any pressure by Flandin to become involved in the

Senate campaign for action in Syria. The Quai dOrsay was adamant about pursuing a

policy that would bring reconciliation between Turks and Arabs, thus avoiding the Arab

question.30 Although Ganem wanted to act quickly in Syria, he could not do so, nor

devise plans of action with other colonial organizations because of his affiliation with the

Quai dOrsay.

Pressure from diplomats abroad to act in Syria was also very strong, but the Quai

dOrsay would not budge. Ganem also could not support the position of diplomats like

Albert DeFrance, the French Minister in Cairo, and Georges Picot, the consul general of

Beirut, both of whom wanted to pursue the sending of a French expeditionary force to

Syria in order to establish a presence there before the British could invade. The

29 Ibid., 71.30 Andrew and Kanya-Forstner, 52.


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diplomatic pressure from Picot and DeFrance on the Quai dOrsay was just as powerful

as the parliamentary initiatives led by Husson. Both diplomats were close to Syria, and

they were overly fearful of a growing British influence in the area. Picot was especially

passionate about the Lebanese cause and made frequent appeals to the French

government for action in the Levant. He was concerned with the threat of Zionism, the

movement to establish a Jewish homeland in Palestine, and advocated for a stronger

French presence in Lebanon because he feared that the English were trying to make an

alliance with the Zionist movement. Although the French government had been

approached by Jewish leaders about the possibility of a Jewish state, French officialsconsidered the possibility to be almost laughable.31 Picot, on the other hand, took the

initiative of the Jews seriously, and he tried to convince the Quai dOrsay to make plans

with the Jewish leaders in order to come up with a post-war settlement for Palestine that

would be favorable to France, an effort that did not gain the support of French officials.

Similar to Picot, the Comit de lOrienthad been aware of the possible

implications of Zionism. Shortly after the First Arab Congress, George Samn addressed

the issue inLa Correspondance dOrient. Samn noted the influx of Jewish immigrants

to Palestine and worried about the stance that the Ottoman government was going to take

on the immigration policies that were allowing the European Jews to migrate so easily

across the Turkish Empire. He first addressed the issue of Zionism in 1914 and wrote of

its effect on the Ottoman Empire, particularly in the parts of Palestine dominated by

Germany. He believed that Zionist migrations were causing German-speaking schools to



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demand that Hebrew become an official language in schools as well.32 Samn believed

that if the migrations continued, Hebrew could indeed become one of the official

languages of Palestine, and that the Ottoman Empire had to act quickly in order to

address the lax migration policies that the Young Turks had implemented as a way to

diversify the Empire. His thoughts on the issue showed that the Comit de lOrienthad a

clear and realistic view of the events unfolding in Syria. While the French government

did not see the growing influence of Zionism, Samn feared the possibility that education

system, and eventually other parts of Palestine would be overtaken by Jewish influence.

Like George Picot, who was stationed in Beirut, the Comit de lOrientwas very awareof the growing power of Zionism and its possible effect on French authority in the

Levant.

By 1915, Chekri Ganem and the Comit de lOrient had established themselves at

the forefront of French policy in the Levant. Due to all of the parliamentary and

diplomatic advocacy for a French presence in Syria, the French government resolved to

use Ganem to find other Syrian nationalists who held similar views and who supported

French influence in the restructuring of Syria as it became evident that the Ottoman

Empire was doomed to fall.

32George Samn, Le Sionisme,La Correspondance dOrient, February 16, 1914,accessed February 2, 2012.http://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k58057924.image.langEN.r=correspondance%20d'orient.


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Chapter II: The Comit Central Syrien, 1916-1918.

Organizing a Revolution: La Legion dOrient

By the fall of 1916, the French government had become more determined to claim their

authority in Syria, and in order to counter the British supported Zionist movement in

Palestine, the Quai dOrsay assigned Chekri Ganem a secret mission in South America in

order to survey the political makeup of populations from which France would be seeking

support. Named The Chekri Ganem Project, the organization of a Lgion dOrient to

combat Ottoman forces in World War Ibecame Ganems primary responsibility. The

Quai dOrsay put Ganem in contact with two of its most experienced foreign officials , J.

Got and G. Wiet, both officials of the Foreign Ministry, so that they could work together

in planning an insurrection against the Ottoman Empire. Their efforts culminated in an

organization called the Comit Central Syrien, which would be led by Ganem, who was

named president, and which was to recruit supporters favorable to the French cause in

Syria. The official goals of the organization were to advocate for the liberation of the

Syrian people under the protection of France and to serve as a mediator between Syrians

and the French republic.33

In order to counter British efforts to establish authority in Palestine, the French

government sought to recruit volunteers to form an army that would revolt against the

Ottoman Empire, and they used the Comit Central Syrien to lead the mission. For the

Comit Central Syrien, the assignment signaled a change in the purpose of both Ganem

and Samns role within the French colonial movement. Rather than serving diplomatic

roles, they now had military duties that thrust them into a different facet of French



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colonial efforts. Although the mission was a military one, however, it was the

relationships built with the migr communities abroad that exemplified the significance

of the Comit Central Syriens efforts. The mission of the Comit Central Syrien

involved budding relationships with lite communities favorable to French interests

among the people of Brazil and Argentina in addition to gathering volunteers for what

they believed would be an army of thousands.

Ganem knew that in order to gather support among Syrian and Lebanese migrs,

he needed to send reputable members of the Comit Central Syrien as representatives of

the mission to recruit volunteers. He assembled a delegation to travel to Brazil andArgentina that would serve as the face of their mission, and he managed to construct a

group that represented the diversity of the CCS. The group was led by Jamil Mardam

Bey, a Syrian Muslim, Joseph El Khazen, a Maronite intellectual, and Csar Jean Lacah,

a distinguished physician. The composition of the delegation conveyed a sense of unity

among people of different religions and different professions, all united under a common

cause: the liberation of the Syrian people from the Ottoman Empire. The aim of the

expedition was twofold; they sought to garner support for the French cause and begin

recruitment for the Lgion dOrient. The Comit Central Syrien was to be held

responsible for all of the recruitment of Syrians and for the fees associated with bringing

the volunteers to France, so they were given control of all the financial aspects of the

operation. The mission was confidential, and extreme care was to be taken when

transporting the volunteers to the main ports of Bordeaux, Marseille, and Le Havre.

Although they were to publicize their trip to South America in order to generate


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enthusiasm among the Syrian migrs, the operation of recruitment was to be carried out

carefully.

The mission was a meticulously crafted ordeal that became difficult and

inefficient as it sought to keep a low profile and at the same recruit thousands of Syrians

to fight under the name of France. The Comit Central Syrien was charged with

transporting volunteers who would become soldiers in the French initiative against the

Ottoman Empire, but they were to take all the precautions necessary while executing the

mission. All volunteers were to be sent in separate boats, and the regional Syrian

committees were to abstain from sending important groups that were likely to be noticed.The Comit Central Syrien and the Quai dOrsay were to be addressed before each

departure and after each arrival by telegram, and the whole mission was to be carried out

carefully so as to not attract any unwanted attention.34 The precautions were meant to

avoid suspicion from the Ottoman government and any of its allies. There were major

risks involved, and rather than facing embarrassment were the mission to fail, the French

government preferred to keep it confidential. The Quai dOrsay had not yet established an

aggressive policy in the Levant, choosing instead to focus on the more imminent threats

to the French mainland during the war, and the Lgion was a way for them to ease

themselves into the Syrian community before fully pursuing an aggressive policy in the

Levant. The Comit Central Syrien also had the responsibility of choosing the contact

persons who were to aid them once they reached the shores of France.

The composition of the Lgion also contributed to the complication of its military

efforts. The Lgion was not only made up of Syrians, but also of Armenians, who were

34 Archives du Ministre des Affaires trangeres (MAE), Paris. A. Ribot to A. Foch. May18, 1917. Turquie: Levant, Syrie-Liban.


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also fighting for independence from the Ottoman Empire. The Lgion is often deemed a

failure because by November 1917, exactly one year after its formation, only 300 Syrian

volunteers had been recruited. The number of Armenians in the Lgion was eight times

larger. Eliezer Tauber argues that discipline was a major factor that contributed to the

failure of the Legion.35 The Syrian soldiers were not very engaged in their duties, and

they were often at odds with the Armenian soldiers. The failure however, should not be

attributed to the recruitment efforts of the Comit Central Syrien, but to the flawed

ideology of such a mission. The Armenian volunteers were recruited directly from

Armenia and from refugee camps in Port Sad. They were truly invested in the fight fortheir homeland because they were still a part of it. The Syrian soldiers, on the other hand,

lived abroad and had built new lives for themselves away from the horrors of war that

threatened to tear Syria apart. The problem in discipline did not lie with the recruitment

efforts of the Comit nor with the training provided by the French military, but rather

with the lack of interest of Syrian migrs who would not be directly affected by the

outcome of the war once they went back to the Americas. It appeared that being far from

home, the enthusiasm displayed upon the arrival of the mission completely dissipated.

Communication with the different branches and committees of the Quai dOrsay

also made the operation difficult, especially when it came to recruitment efforts. Many

requests had been received from various soldiers who wished to devote their efforts to the

Armenian and Syrian cause, but the hierarchical and bureaucratic procedures that were

necessary for them to transfer those soldiers to the Lgion dOrient proved to be

35 Eliezer Tauber, La Legion d'Orient et la Legion Arabe,Revue Franaise d'Histoired'Outre-Mer, 81 (1994), 174-9.


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difficult.36 There seemed to be a divide between the French army that had the support of a

few foreign volunteers and the Lgion dOrient that Romieu, the general of the Lgion,

was constructing. Eliezer Tauber argues that the Lgion dOrient was an effort by the

French to make up for their lack of forces in Syria, but seeing as they were unwilling to

provide the appropriate support to the Lgion, the mission was not a military success. 37

While the British were working with Zionist organizations in order to make their claims

in Palestine seem legitimate, the French failed to use the Lgion dOrient in order to gain

Syrian support and establish their authority in Syria.

French Intelligence Gathering in the LevantDespite the failure of the military aspects of the Lgion, it is important to note that

the mission had a symbolic significance that went beyond military successes. The efforts

of Chekri Ganem and George Samn during the formation of the Lgion dOrient

culminated in the creation of the Comit Central Syrien, which was specifically assigned

to handle recruitment efforts and take on a new initiative to gather information on the

public opinion of Syrians and Lebanese abroad. The creation of the CCS showed the

interest of the Quai dOrsay in gathering support among migr populations in the

Americas. While the relationship with these populations did not aid their recruitment

efforts it did serve to establish a political base in South America that allowed them to

survey the political makeup and sources of dissent against the French Empire present

within those communities abroad. Although the Lgion dOrient was not a military

success, its creation suggests the development of a new French colonial strategy. Instead

of conquest, French officials wanted to use a strategy that involved building relationships

36 MAE, G. Wiet to J. Got. April 7, 1917. Turquie: Levant Syrie-Liban.37 Eliezer Tauber, La Legion d'Orient et la Legion Arabe


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with the people of the lands they sought to conquer, and the Comit Central Syrien

became a vital part of French efforts in the campaign to redirect policy in Syria.

The importance of gathering intelligence and building relationships with the lite

followed a precedent set by General Louis-Hubert Lyautey during his command of the

French protectorate of Morocco. Before an official protectorate was established Morocco,

French forces were met with opposition, and many tribes were in revolt.38Lyauteys

colonial ideology was based on a policy of indirect rule; he believed that the colonized

country should retain its institutions, govern itself with its own agencies, and work under

the simple control of a foreign power.Instead of abolishing the traditional systems, make use of them: Rule withthe mandarin and not against him. Offend no tradition, change no custom,[we must] remind ourselves that in all human society there is a rulingclass, born to rule, without which nothing can be done, and a class to beruled: [we should] enlist the ruling class in our service. Once themandarins are our friends, certain of us and needing us, they have only tosay the word and the country will be pacified.39

Lyautey believed in working with the colonized rather than exercising power over them

and going against their traditions. Instead of exercising direct rule, Lyautey emphasized

that the colonizing powers government should only aid in foreign representation and

manage the finances of the colonized government in order to aid with economic

development. In order to establish such a system, Lyautey understood that it was

necessary to build relationships with the lite and use their influence in order to control

the rest of the classes in Moroccan society.

38 Herbert Ingram Priestley, France Overseas: A Study of Modern Imperialism, (NewYork: D. Appleton-Century Company, 1938), 349.39 Hubert Luaytey to his sister, November 16, 1894, quoted in Edward Berenson, Heroesof Empire: Five Charismatic Men and the Conquest of Africa (Berkeley: University ofCalifornia Press, 2011), 230.


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When seeking to establish their power over Syria, French officials planned to

develop similar relationships with the lite of Syria and Lebanon, and through the Comit

Central Syrien, they sought to obtain information about their emigrant communities

abroad. In addition to recruitment, the Comit Central Syrien was expected to organize

the propaganda that followed.40During Ganems South American mission, the

recruitment of volunteers for the Lgion dOrient was not the only purpose of their

travels. Ganem also sought to have his representatives establish new branches of Syrian

committees and liaise with the Syrian nationalist organizations that were already in

existence abroad. Ganems organization of Syrian committees amounts to animplementation of Lyauteys strategy. By putting other Syrians abroad in charge of these

committees, the Quai dOrsay gave Syrians the impression that they had an important

role in deciding the political future of their nation. Besides communicating with Syrians

and Lebanese migrs around the world, the Comit Central Syrien was not involved in

any intelligence gathering efforts in Syria and Lebanon, which marked its primary

difference from Lyauteys strategy. Lyauteys strategy was to work with the lite

communities in Morocco and allow them to govern the rest of the classes, whereas the

Comit Central Syrien reached out to Syrians and Lebanese abroad who were

intellectuals, businesspeople, government officials, or generally successful in their

professional endeavors. Rather than seeking to work with the Syrian and Lebanese lite

that would govern Syria and Lebanon in the future, the Quai dOrsay sought to formalize

40 MAE. Memorandum. May 19, 1917. Guerre 1914-1918.


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its relationship with lite migrs in order to build a foundation for French claims to the

Levant and make up for its weak military presence in Syria and Lebanon.41

The beginning of the Comit Central Syriens mission in Brazil seemed

promising, and the delegates began to establish a method to reach out to the community.

The delegation was warmly received by the Syrian population of Sa Paulo, and Paul

Claudel, the Minister of France to Brazil, believed that there was much patriotism, good

will, and love for France among the migrs.42 From the moment they arrived, Claudel

had un plan de matriculation, or a plan for integration, for the Syrian subjects so that they

would be more closely tied to France. He knew that there was a class of Syrians in Brazilthat was made up of successful merchants, businessmen, and intellectuals who felt

isolated and vulnerable because they were so far away from their country. His plan was to

work with Mardam Bey and Lacah in order to establish a committee in Sa Paulo that

would focus on reaching out to these individuals through propaganda and methodical

recruitment. He was especially adamant about using the committees as a way to obtain

patentes de nationalitfor Syrian migrs so that by becoming official Syrian citizens,

rather than Ottoman subjects, they could enjoy the privileges of French protection. By

distributing thesepatentes, he hoped that he could disseminate individual propaganda and

encourage sentiments that would promote a French presence among the Syrian

communities.43 Mardam Bey and Lacah agreed to proceed with his plans, and with the

consent of the French Foreign Minister, Claudel collaborated with the Comit Central

Syrien in order to implement a strategy that combined propaganda and Syrian

41 Narbona, 154-156.42 MAE. P. Claudel to A. Ribot, June 29, 1917. Guerre 1914-1918.43 Ibid.


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naturalization in order to construct a bond between the Syrian lite of Brazil and the

French government. The initiative of the CCS and Paul Claudels plans for the integration

of Syrian migrs into a French culture exemplified the French colonial strategy of

working with the lite and their wishes to integrate the communities they sought to

colonize into the French culture and instill in them a loyalty to France. Claudel knew that

the Syrian community in Brazil felt alienated and vulnerable after leaving Syria, and he

wanted the Syrians of Brazil to fall into a haven of French influence that would make

them sympathetic to French interests. By establishing committees in Sa Paulo, the

Comit Central Syrien sought to give the Syrian community a sense of security and madethe Syrian migrs feel that, as fellow Syrians, Ganem and the Comit Central Syrien

were acting on their best interests.

The Threats of Zionism and Arab Nationalism

The efforts of the Comit Central Syrien to gather intelligence abroad give insight

to the colonial strategies ofthe Quai dOrsay, but the relationships they established with

the Syrian diaspora in South America did little to counter British interests in Palestine.

The Quai dOrsay knew that British diplomats continued to form alliances with Zionist

organizations and suspected that they now had interests in Syria as well. The Sykes-Picot

Agreement of 1916, devised by diplomats George Picot of France and Mark Sykes of

Britain gave France control of parts of southern Turkey, northern Iraq, Syria and Lebanon

were the Ottoman Empire to fall, and it granted Britain Jordan, Iraq, and the ports of

Haifa and Acre.44 The agreement held that Palestine was to remain under an international

regime because of its holy places, but as Turkey entered the war in 1916, the agreement

44 Margaret MacMillan, Paris 1919: Six Months That Changed the World(New York:Random House, 2002), 381-426.


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between France and Britain was disregarded. By allying themselves to the Zionist cause,

British diplomats sought to gain control over Palestine, whose future had not been

decided by the Sykes-Picot Agreement. By December 1917, Ganem was aware of the

British threat to Palestine, which bordered Syria, and he wrote to the Quai dOrsay in

desperation to demand French action in Palestine. Chekri Ganem knew that because of

the imminent loss of Palestine, Syria was also at stake:

The English are in Palestine. The necessities of war and of maintainingorder in [Syria] have allowed the British to name a colonial officer thegovernor of Jerusalem. His authority has been called to extend along withthe position of the army in the neighboring regions [of Jerusalem]. Where

is [their authority] going to stop? What boundary separates Syria fromPalestine? The Comit Central Syrien cannot ignore the difficulties thathave arisen for France.45

Despite Ganems call for the French government to act, the reality was that France

simply did not have the military presence that Britain held in Palestine, and the French

did not have Zionists organizations in France with whom they could work in order to

establish a presence in Palestine. Neville Mandel argues that in France, the Zionist

movement had little strength, since an assimilated Jewish population was not willing to

leave their comfortable lifestyle in France in order to settle in a Jewish homeland.46

Although the possibility of French authority in Palestine seemed unlikely, Ganem was

nevertheless aware of the danger of a British-Zionist alliance and worried that British

interests would not stop in Palestine.

The British had similar goals of encouraging nationalist sentiments that would

facilitate their interests in the Middle East, so they began to collaborate with Arabs who

45 MAE. Ganem to Ministre des Affaires trangeres. December 18, 1917. Guerre 1914-1918.46 Neville Mandel, "Attempts at an Arab-Zionist Entente: 1913-1914."


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supported Arab nationalism. Arab nationalism, however, had changed from the one that

Ganem had supported during the First Arab Congress of 1913. It had become a

movement that promoted solidarity among all Arabic-speaking peoples and demanded

immediate independence from the Ottoman Empire. It held that all Arabic-speaking

nations should bond together in a unified nation, and it was suspicious of Western

influence in Arab affairs, therefore hostile to any French interests in Syria. Ganem did not

support this kind of nationalism, and he used the Comit Central Syrien during the time

after the conclusion of his assignment with the Lgion dOrient to create a Syrian

nationalism to combat the new Arab nationalism that threatened to take over Syria. AsBritish interests turned to the Middle East, the Quai dOrsay used the Comit Central

Syrien to combat the threat of an Arab nationalism. When the Lgion dOrient was not as

successful as the Quai dOrsay had hoped, the duties of the Comit Central Syrien were

reoriented to focus on combating the British-led Arab nationalism that compromised their

vision of a Greater Syria. Arab nationalism, which called for the establishment of a

unified Arab nation that extended from the Atlantic Ocean to the Arabian Sea and

rejected the involvement of the Western world in the Arab world, rejected the historical

bond between France and Syria. The British, unlike the French, encouraged Arab

nationalism and did not reveal a preference for Christians over Muslims. Because the

French government did not want to support any Arab nationalist movements, pro-British

sentiments among Syrian Muslims and Syrian Arab nationalists began to spread.

In order to combat British interests in the region, the Comit Central Syrien

expounded another view of nationalism to legitimize French authority in Syria. They

knew that Arab nationalism was bound to thrive in Syria if they did not try to stop it, and


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they believed that they could expound a different kind of nationalism that could be

nurtured under a benevolent mandate regime. By containing such a nationalism under a

French regime, the Quai dOrsay believed that they could control Arab nationalism and

make it sympathetic to France. In a letter to the French Foreign Ministry, High

Commissioner Maxime Weygand proposed that they create a distinct Syrian nationalism

that would center on Damascus, because a Syrian nationalism, he believed, would

weaken Arab nationalism and would aid in the formation of a national identity for the

Syrian people.47 The Comit Central Syrien thrived on these efforts and sought to revive

the aspirations of a Greater Syria by developing propaganda centralized on the theme of anationalism that was specific to the people of Syria.

The Syrian Alternative to Arab Nationalism in George SamnsLa Syrie

Arab nationalism, backed by British colonial interests, presented the biggest

challenge to French ambitions in Syria and to the work of the Comit Central Syrien.

Christopher Andrew and A.S. Kanya-Forstner argue that it was during the challenge

presented by Prince Faysal that the Quai dOrsay realized that it was not through the

work of the Comit Central Syrien that they could react to Arab forces in Syria, but

through the French military and the work of French diplomats in Damascus. The Comit

Central Syrien, however, was not meant to serve diplomatic nor military purposes outside

of their role during the organization of the Lgion dOrient. Their work, even as they

sought to gather an army in South America, maintained a bigger purpose of establishing

ties with the Syrian lite and serving as a liaison between the officials at the Quai dOrsay

47 Maxime Weygand to Ministre des Affaires trangres, November 10, 1924, quoted inPhilip S. Khoury, Syria and the French Mandate: The Politics of Arab Nationalism,1920-1945 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), 54.


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and these communities. During Faysals attempt to establish an Arab nationalist

stronghold in Syria, the Comit Central Syrien appealed to Syrians by seeking to

construct an Arab nationalism that was unique to Syrian aspirations. A distinctly Syrian

nationalism, they believed, was the best way to dispel the anti-French characteristics of

Arab nationalism while still maintaining the importance of the Syrian culture.

La Syrie by George Samn provides a way to look into the construction and

development of a distinct Syrian nationalism under the aegis of France.48 During the time

of the Arab revolt, in which the British supported an insurrection of Arab nationalists

against the Ottoman Empire, the Arab nationalism that was developing under theencouragement of the British became predominantly Islamic and suspicious of the

Western allies, particularly France. The Comit Central Syrien appealed to the historical

roots of the relationship between Greater Syria and France in order to combat the Anglo-

Arab alliance, which proved to be just as threatening as their alliance with the Zionists. In

reality, both movements were very similarthe Arab nationalists led by lEmir Faysal

were backed by British interests and the Comit Central Syrien was supported by French

interests in Syria. The Comit Central Syrien sought to legitimize their call for French

Documents

Chekri Ganem and the Comité Central Syrien: Syrian Nationalism in Paris, 1905-1921