Felgenhauer 1

Jarrad Felgenhauer

Che Guevara: Idol, Image, or Icon?

Everywhere we turn we are awash in images and imagery. They permeate us, structure

us, and infect us. It is as Guy Debord tells us in the very first of his 221 thesis The Society of the

Spectacle that, “In societies where modern conditions of production prevail, all life presents

itself as an immense accumulation of spectacles. Everything that was directly lived has moved

into representations.”1 Or as Marx surmised over 100 years prior, “all that is solid melts into

air.”2 To state such theses in our present point in history may seem like a cheap shot and at the

same time overly cynical. However our metaphors certainly betray us: “To be, is to be seen,”

“appearance is everything,” and “perception is reality,” just to name a few. The message is thus

clear, what is, fully and precisely, is what appears. And to be is to individualistically construct,

represent, or be represented. Ours is a society of character masks, whose wearers insist upon

them and in fact become them. And the notion appears to dig itself deep, as Debord writes again,

“The image detached from every aspect of life fuse in a common stream in which the unity of

this life can no longer be established…The spectacle presents itself simultaneously as all of

society…as [an] instrument of unification.”3

The sundering of image and reality, it turns out, appears to be true all the way down.

What was once there to be claimed as real, original, or even perhaps essential, has been lost to

the image. The image, the abstract representation, has become “the effective dictatorship of the

illusion in modern society,”4 which, “…suddenly presents itself as a self-moving substance

which passes through a process of its own…”5 for which anything we might grasp as real is a 1 Guy Debord, The Society of the Spectacle (Oakland: AK Press, 1983) Chapter 1, thesis 1 2 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The Communist Manifesto. From: The Marx Engels Reader: Second Edition. ed by Robert Tucker (London: WW Norton, 1978) p. 4763 Debord, The Society of the Spectacle, Chapter 1, theses 2-34 Debord, thesis 2135 Karl Marx. Capital: Vol I. trans. Ben Fowkes. (London: Penguin Books, 1976) p. 256

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“mere form” to its content. In short it is driven from the arena, smashed into the form of an

invisible. That which is completely there to be seen but ultimately cannot, because of the tyranny

of the constructed imaginary—the image.

In his diagnosis to the problem Jean-Luc Marion, like both Hegel and Marx, is a

physician of the highest order. And the problem at its core is at one and the same time the

problem of modern philosophy itself, namely, the problem of the subject-object dualism. How is

what’s “in here” in my head interact or latch onto or interact with what’s “out there” external to

me. Or even worse, how do I know what sensuously appears to me in lived experience is really

what is real, really what the thing is? As trivial as this may seem, these problems have real

consequences. Consequences which Marion is quite in tune with. “…The images make available

to the gaze events not only without common measure, without connections of meaning between

them…” He writes. “The image, closed off to its original, thus no longer has any reality other

than itself.”6 Marion in this way helps illuminate and give new understanding to Marx, who

writes in one of his many critiques of these alienating abstractions “They [images] are thought

entities…nothing but the production of the abstract…it is the opposition…between abstract

thinking and sensuous reality or real sensuousness.”7 In this vain, Marion cuts right to the heart

of the issue: On the one hand, the incessant dualism between image (abstract ‘thought entities’)

and reality, appearance and essence, and, in his language, visible and invisible. And on the other,

the driving down into the dust of the invisible by the visible, the crushing of reality by

representation in the current age.8 Why? Because reality itself has become invisible,

6 Jean-Luc Marion. The Crossing of the Visible (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004) p. 497 Karl Marx. The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844. From: The Marx-Engels Reader: Second Edition. ed Robert Tucker (New York: WW Norton, 1978) p.1108 I say current age, but what I’m of course referring to is capitalism, the logic of which has remained the same for hundreds of years. Also, I use the terms “invisible” and “reality” in this sentence as synonyms, but it must be said most strenuously here and now that I do not hold (as we will see) that reality or the true nature of things is inherently confined to a realm of invisibility. In fact my position will end up being quite the contrary, that the invisible (or reality, or essence) MUST be made visible, it must appear, and in fact always already is appearing—we

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“Admittedly, it could still be said that such an image refers to its original, but…I will never

know it.”9

The worry that was once implicit now makes itself explicit: that when trapped in a world

of autonomous, self-perpetuating, and self-moving images, “the heart of the unrealism in the real

society,”10 we grow to construct ourselves and live vicariously through continuous cycles and

webs of faint abstractions and character masks. I am no longer a faithful presentation or authentic

narration of myself (although ideology tells me that I am), because ultimately any authenticity

claim is itself just another representation or commodity which I latch myself on to. Who I am

then is nothing more than a hollowed out image, a blank canvas whose presentation is the cutting

and pasting of other images of my own choosing onto the empty space. “I am because I am seen,

and as I am seen,” Marion writes. “What constitutes me is first and foremost the image that I

become always available for transmission, broadcast, and consumption.”11 Marion’s mention of

consumption almost necessarily forces us to mention money, the image and character mask par

excellence. In the untethered construction of ourselves as images, what we essentially reveal

ourselves as is buyers and sellers—this is the ultimate revelation of what it means for us to be

free or to have freedom. Essentially I am nothing, nothing but a blank slate. But I am free to

have money and free to make and remake myself according to my own image, fit for public

consumption by others. Who I am is the image which is put forth, and the image I put forth is

what I can purchase. “That which is for me through the medium of money—that for which I can

pay—that am I…The extent of the power of money is the extent of my power.”12 Marx writes.

“…That which mediates my life for me, also mediates, the existence of other people for me. For

just fail to notice it. 9 Marion, p. 5010 Debord, Chapter 1, thesis 611 Marion, p. 5212 Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, p. 103

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me it is the other person.”13 This continuing saga of self-construction, representation,

deconstruction and re-representation falls in line with the perpetual quagmire which Hegel

referred to as unhappy consciousness, “a struggle against an enemy, victory over whom really

means being worsted, where to have attained one result is really to lose it in the opposite…” he

says. “…For therein consciousness finds only consciousness of its opposite as its essence — and

of its own nothingness…”14

It seems, then, that our problems are these: Can we at all regain an access to what is

original, what Marion refers to as the invisible? Or even better yet, can we find again the

invisible manifest squarely there before us in the visible itself? The good news is that Marion

thinks we can, and in this there is real progress. However our worry in this essay is that we can

do so only in retreat. That we must withdraw altogether from the sensuous world of the visible

and seek true reality elsewhere. For us this will ultimately unsatisfying, because instead of

overcoming, dialectically, this rupture of visible and invisible and doing so in the very realm of

the visible itself (which is the only place it can be truly be overcome—in the theater of action)

Marion only allows us to solve the issue one-sidedly, in ahistorical abstraction, while leaving the

matter in itself, the destruction of the cult of the image, untouched.

What Marion offers to us is not liberation from what he rightly calls “the tyranny of the

image”15 but instead an escape into the netherworld of the invisible through the icon. The icon,

he tells us, “removes the prestige of the visible from its face, in order to effectively render it an

imperceptible transparency…” it allows itself “to be disfigured…in order to do the will of God.”

The visibility of the sensuous world, and living humanity itself, is thus crushed and in this we

have the same dualisms of our modern philosophical fathers, back from the dead. For Marion the

13 Ibid p. 10314 GWF Hegel. Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit. trans A.V. Miller (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1977) p. 12715 Marion p. 58

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visible and invisible seem to be permanently cut off from each other. They are fixed, ahistorical,

and static entities, Thus the invisible is the complete other of the visible, there is no hope in

uniting them outside of complete abstraction. “The visible opens not onto another visible but

onto the other of the visible—The invisible Holy One…it [the visible icon] reaches the invisible

by never ceasing to transgress itself.”16 This is what Marx calls, “the duplication of the world

into a religious world and a secular one”17 and the appeal to the Holy One, the singular,

ahistorical, and immovable gives new credence to Horkheimer and Adorno’s worry that, “To the

enlightenment, that which does not reduce to numbers, and ultimately to the one, becomes

illusion.”18

Given Marion’s distrust of any hope left for sensuous reality and what he calls its

“mimetic logic” in which, “the image doubles in the visible what the original keeps in the

invisible”19 where the sensible world acts as “so many distorting filters,”20 where are we to find

the invisible? Yes, we have already stated in the religious icon. But the visibility of the icon must

deny itself in order to present the invisible, Marion tells us of a single (The One as stated above)

specific place. The black, invisible, pupils of the eyes. Why the eyes? Because, as Marion makes

explicitly clear to tell us that that this invisible (the two eyes of the icon), “signals not a new

visible, nor a counter visible, but rather the invisible origin of the gaze of the other upon me.”21

Thus, this power of the other’s (in this case Jesus himself, which is of course eventually The One

—God himself) gaze, “exempts itself from the power of the image…to cross there another

gaze.”22 Therefore Marion is wishing to tell us that any and all sensuous nature is at one and the

16 Ibid p. 78 emphasis added. 17 Marx, “Theses on Feuerbach” p. 14518 Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer. The Dialectic of Enlightenment. Trans by John Cumming. (New York: Herder and Herder, 1972) p. 719 Marion p. 8320 Ibid p. 7921 Ibid p. 5622 Ibid p. 57

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same time both sullied with the discriminatory and prejudicial nature of the “image” and that we

ourselves, as living sensuous being are the embodiment of this colonial attitude. “The image

wants to take over love,” he writes, sinking it to “pornography, meaninglessness, or a

combination of the two.”

The invisible thus is not only other to ourselves but wholly and completely other. It meets

in the icon only as a communion of the two (visible and invisible), but this communion is only

achieved by the icon’s complete and utter break with all things visible whatsoever, hence the

fixation on the pure blackness of the eyes. Furthermore, knowledge of this is something foreign

in nature, because the invisible can never appear in the richness of sensuous visibility but only by

way of sensuous nature’s full-fledged self-denial of itself, analogous to Christ’s self-denial of

himself23 during his passion, as he tells Pilate, “My kingdom is not of this world.”24 Marx both

highlights with precision and at the same time cuts right to the soul of when he argues that in this

line of thinking “it is [sensuous] objectivity which is to be annulled…the objective character that

is offensive and constitutes estrangement.”25 The problem of course being that if we seek to

retreat from sensuous nature, not only are we cutting ourselves off from any appearing of the

essence, the invisible, but in a reversal of fortune we “confirm the pseudo-essence…the self-

estranged essence in its denial.”26

What is clear from Marion is that he finds the icon wholly unique because it denies

and/or resists the colonialism of sensuous nature and visibility by both denying is own

sensuousness in favor of the invisible lurking beyond it on the one hand, and at the same time

resisting our own colonial volitions on the other through the crossing of the gazes on the other.

23 By “Self-denial of himself” I mean that Christ denies his sensuous humanity to reveal his divinity. He denies his “visible” so as to make the “invisible” in some way transparent. 24 John 18:3625 Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, p. 11726 Ibid p. 119

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The icon points to another gaze, and thus “solicits a veneration”27 from us because it comes from

the aforementioned pointed to gaze which in the icon gives, “an intentional transitivity of the

visible and the invisible…only in so far as it shows the other-than-itself.”28 But this veneration,

this declaration of respect for autonomous otherness, is all that we are allowed to give because

the essence, the invisible, this gaze never truly appears in the realm of the sensuous nature,

which is also by definition the realm of the living. “Only the one who prays,” Marion writes,

“can thus climb from the visible to the invisible.”29

We therefore are left floundered in a world of images in, out, and all the way down in our

sensuous lives, and because we ourselves are sensuous and earthly beings, the only out way is by

means of abstraction to either a Noumenal realm and/or through the veneration of the true

invisibility and autonomy of the other, in this case The One. The essence, the invisible is never

intimately or imminently presents in the visible realm30, which is to say the essence never

becomes appearance or actuality, or that invisible never becomes visible. There is only a “bond

of a communion”31 of opposed visible and invisible in the eyes of the icon, which Marion tells us

must be a ruptured otherness, because once it becomes truly or imminently visible to us, the the

imposing image is sure to follow.

The principle reason why this will not do for us is that Marion leaves us with a diagnosis

but not a prescription. Because by not grappling, not struggling with the other (the invisible) we

have no hope of achieving a new unity with it,32 and in fact by denying the struggle in his

insistence on the perpetual otherness of the invisible and by seeking it not in the visibility of

27 Marion, p. 8728 Marion p. 84, 8629 Ibid p. 75 30 The way for instance, Jesus is really and imminently present in the Eucharist. Or the way value is likewise really and imminently present in money. 31 Ibid p. 8732 Not as a colonial unity of domination, but a true overcoming—which is to say a unity in difference.

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sensuous nature but in the invisible gaze of the invisible other we in fact end up reinforcing what

we had wished to cure—the detached world of the image. What we seek, however, is an

overcoming in dialectic of this dichotomy, “being thus at home with itself in it’s other—being as

such.”33 In other words, a unity in difference. “The conversion of the subject into the predicate,

and of the predicate into the subject,” Marx argues, “the exchange of that which determines for

that which is determined, is always the most immediate revolution.”34 To achieve such a unity

the invisible must be visibly present to us, certainly as an other, but not as perpetually distant,

accessible only as an escape through the gaze of another invisible (the eyes of the icon), but

instead imminent in sensuous nature. In short, the essence [invisible] must appear. “Separation,”

Debord tells us, “is the alpha and omega of the spectacle.”35 This separation, despite Marion’s

sound diagnosis is never fully resolved in him, but only given room to move by a choice: remain

in the forever tyrannical visible, or escape to the realm of the separated invisible through the

power of the icon and conteplative faith.

How do we propose to bear this imminence out? Through our own dialectical unity of

revolutionary theory and practice. We therefore need not take our eyes off the visible, but rather

embrace it as something, “…To be understood in its contradiction and revolutionized in practice.

Thus, for instance, after the earthly family is discovered to be the secret of the holy family, the

former must then itself be destroyed in theory and in practice.”36 Or as Chretien rightly reminds

us, that in the struggle, “new, unlooked for strengths spring forth suddenly from the wounds

33 Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, p. 11734 Karl Marx. Kreuznach Notebooks 1 From: Peter Hudis. “Death of the Death of the Subject” (2005) http://libcom.org/library/death-of-subject-marxist-humanism accessed: 10 December 201535 Debord, thesis 2536 Marx, “Theses on Feuerbach” p. 144

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received.”37 The secret invisible which we therefore seek is not up in the clouds or across an

invisible gaze, but right here.

The invisible lies in the contradictory and obscuring nature of the visible—in order to see

it, our eyes must not leave it. Which is to say ultimately that this visible is not set in stone or

written in blood, bequeathed to eternal posterity for once and for all time. If such were the case

then Marion would be 100 percent correct, that there is no exit in seeking the invisible from

within the visible, that it is tyrannical all the way down. But for us this tyranny of the visible has

movement, no less in the way that history itself has movement in the sense that it springs forth or

hurls back, it overcomes and is overcome, it unifies and contradicts, it revolutionizes and

succumbs to counter-revolution. But in this movement of force, counterforce, and contradiction

what is revealed are cleavages of openings and pockets of space from whence the invisible,

which was truly there to be seen along is grasped. “It is in the movement to the transcendence of

the opposition between Notion and Reality,” Raya Dunayevskaya says, “That the transcendence

will be achieved…not only as a history in the consciousness of freedom, but, as we shall see, as

achievement in actuality…”38

In order to achieve this task, however, we will need a new icon. One which can expose

phenomenologically in lived experience the struggle both in theory and in action—in short, the

dialectical movement in its own becoming. In this task there is no better choice than Alberto

Korda’s 1960 photograph of the Argentine revolutionary Ernesto “Che” Guevara entitled

Guerrillero Heroico.39

37 Jean-Louis Chretien. Hand to Hand: Listening to the Work of Art. Trans by Stephen E Lewis. (New York: Fordham University Press, 2003) p. 138 Raya Dunayevskaya. “Hegel’s Absolute as New Beginning” From: The Power of Negativity: Selected Writings on the Dialectic in Hegel and Marx. Ed by Peter Hudis and Kevin Anderson. (New York: Lexington Books, 2002) p. 18039 In English, “Heroic Guerrilla Fighter”

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On March 4th, 1960, just over 14 months to the day that Fidel Castro, his lieutenants Raul

Castro and Che Guevara, and their revolutionary 26th of July Movement ousted U.S. backed

dictator Fulgencio Bautista to establish a revolutionary socialist state just 93 miles off the

American coast, a mysterious and tragic explosion occurred in Havana Harbor. The blast came

from the French freighter La Coubre, which had arrived earlier that morning. When Guevara

heard of the incident he immediately rushed to the scene, pushing back those who attempted to

stop him out of concern for his safety, as a secondary blast had struck the area.40 In the end about

100 people died in the explosion. Fidel Castro immediately blamed the CIA for the attack and

although there is some evidence to suggest the accuracy of the charge, it is ultimately

inconclusive who or what exactly initiated the blast.41

The follow day, March 5th, Castro called for a mass funeral and demonstration at the

Colon Cemetery in Havana to honor the victims. At the end, he (Castro) delivered one of his

most famous and fiery speeches, Patria o Muerte (“Homeland or Death”). At or near the end of

the eulogy, Guevara emerged from the background of the horizon into the foreground on the

stage for a matter of seconds before disappearing again. Alberto Korda, Castro’s official

photographer, was in the crowd with his camera and snapped several pictures of Che as he

emerged, seemingly from the depths. Korda, who immediately realized what had just taken place

later reflected on the encounter, stating that after he saw the image he had captured that the first

thing that draws one in is Che’s facial expression, which he said reveals “absolute implacability,”

anger and pain.42 A man who at one and the same time is equal parts stoic and emotional,

resolute and reckless, violent and loving.

40 John Lee Anderson. Che Guevara: A Revolutionary Life (New York: Grove Press, 1997) p. 44241 Ibid 42 Anderson p. 465

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What is the most striking feature of the Korda’s photograph of Che, is that it is as close to

the perfect snapshot of the dialectic in motion ever captured (if such a thing is even possible to

begin with). How is this so? First and foremost, it is the shear spontaneity and pure fluidity of

picture. Of course, the picture itself (ie its physical substance) captures only a moment in time,

and is thus forever fixed. But before these substantial properties of the photograph ever see the

light of day, the picture is first and foremost a presentation of an event, a dynamic encounter. The

photograph itself was completely un-staged and unplanned. Its setting was not predetermined

and there was no prior awareness, either by Korda or Che himself, of what was taking place. He

(Che) was not asked to dress a certain way, stand in a certain place, or strike a certain pose and

Korda, for his part, was simply just another face in the crowd. Thus the dialectic enters the stage.

Because in capturing not a static photograph but an event, Korda is able with a single snapshot in

time to present to us something moving, i.e. which has movement. Something which emerges

from the fog in motion, in process, in dialectic, with a past, a present and a future. The picture

therefore, is not doomed forever to a singular/individual, out of context, and/or transcendent slice

of time, but at once and in its very singularity and fluidity captures and presents to us the entire

movement of the dialectic: immediacy, mediation, negation, and sublation

As with Marion’s icon, the eyes of Che give something away to the viewer. But what do

his eyes tell us that Marion’s icon do not? As is noticed immediately Che is not looking at us, he

is looking beyond us as a being both intimately and inescapably visible, with clear

acknowledgment of the cold and calculative nature of the present (remember, the picture was

taken at a national day of mourning), while at the same time peering off into a distant future,

which is, in the final analysis, no less visible than the immediate present. Che’s eyes comfortably

draw us in, in a kind of unifying embrace but then immediately shove us away in difference and

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otherness as if to say, “Not here, but out there. In the distance, beyond this visible moment, yet at

the same time intimately connected to it,” giving new found credence to his statement that, “I am

not a liberator. Liberators do not exist. They exist when people liberate themselves.”43

This dialectically connected duality, of drawing us in then pushing us out forces us, the

viewer, to remain firmly with our feet on the ground, echoing Che’s cautionary advice that to

view “aesthetic ideas as a unique being whose aspiration is to remain immaculate…is nothing

more than an attempt to escape.”44 Heading Che’s advice, the photograph implores us to remain

in the visible realm (because we cannot escape) in order to ascertain visible-to-visible

contradictions from whence a new visible (i.e. an imminent invisible) can appear. We find this as

the eyes of the picture give way to the distinctive and contradictory facial features.

When we look at Che’s face what do we see? Korda gives us a hint, telling us the face

reveals the mark of the true revolutionary: firmness, anger, stoicism, and pain45 But it also

reveals a visibly contradictory otherness, that of revolutionary love. “Let me say that the true

revolutionary is guided by great feelings of love. It is impossible to think of a genuine

revolutionary lacking this quality,” Che says, “We must strive every day so that this love of

living humanity is transformed into actual deeds, into acts that serve as examples, as a moving

force.”46 Thus, the contradictory emergence of Che’s face, the conflict of anger and love as a

moving force, gives us the dialectical clue to which his eyes give the rubberstamp in their

piercing beyond us into a new visible which has yet to come but which at the same time must

only be called forth from the present situation. The new possibility of a yet to come visibility,

beyond the circumstances of the current condition, therefore must emerge from the old as an 43 Che Guevara. “Statement in Mexico.” From: Kaplan AP World History 2005. ed by the Kaplan staff. (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2005) p. 240 44 Che Guevara, “Socialism and Man in Cuba” (1965) https://www.marxists.org/archive/guevara/1965/03/man-socialism.htm Accessed: 9 December 2015 45Quoted in: Trisha Ziff. "Che Guevara: Revolutionary & Icon" (New York: Abrams Image, 2006) p 3346 Guevara, “Socialism and Man in Cuba,” emphasis added

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imminently present invisible47 yet, “…still stamped with the birth marks of the old society from

whose womb it emerges.”48

What appears before us in the experience of the photograph is the visible snapshot in time

of what we as viewers are after: a unity in difference, a unity in otherness. “In the relation of

inner and outer, the essential moment of this emerges,” Hegel says, “namely, that its

determinations are posited as being in negative unity in such a manner that each immediately is

not only its other but also the totality of the whole.”49 As a purely internal relation, we view the

dialectic of Che himself as the subject of the photograph—a man who reveals a living and

breathing embodiment of a personal subjective dialectic of the pain and healing, the anger and

love, and the stoicism and emotion so strikingly apparent on his face and in his eyes. While at the

very same time we experience Che, as a fully formed object of the photograph emerging as an

external relation against the visible horizon of present history, i.e. he appears from what

“is,”—“here” and “now,”—to present us with a counter or contradictory “new” visible, not only

of what appears in the immediacy of today but what might appear in the imminence that is

tomorrow. It is in this internal-external unity in otherness50 from whence we become conscious

of what was there all along—the invisible as new visibility. The metaphorical reference to

pregnancy mentioned above (see footnote 50) now gains further traction because today, what is

visible, is always pregnant with tomorrow, that which will be made visible. “The Essence must

appear or shine forth,” Hegel writes. But, “Essence accordingly is not something beyond or

47 As we have said before, invisible only in the sense that it is failed to be recognized. As we have argued all along, the invisible is essentially visible. 48 Karl Marx, “Critique of the Gotha Program” From: The Marx-Engels Reader: Second Edition. Ed by Robert Tucker (London: WW Norton, 1978) p. 52949 GWF Hegel, Science of Logic. “Vol. I, Book II, § 1152” https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/hl/hlessenc.htm#HL2_526 accessed: 13 December 2015 50 As both a unity of theoretical (internal) and practical (external) matters as well as subject-object.

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behind appearance, but – just because it is the essence which exists – the existence is

Appearance.”51

Che’s emergence, his springing forth in the photograph is thus at once and always

completely visible to us, something John Dewey references as an “unanalyzed totality.”52

But at the same time his visibility is foreign to us, it is a contradictory otherness that is not

supposed to be there when compared to the mundane habits of the visible horizon of being from

which he emerges. The icon of Che is not, nor is Che himself for that matter, the invisible. Nor

does he allow the invisible to pass through him through visible self-denial as Marion’s icon does,

collapsing the visible into the invisible. Instead, Che shows us a contradictory sensuous visible

encounter within and against the very horizon of the tyrannical visible itself. It is in this very

dialectical and contradictory struggle in which cleavages of space are carved out, from whence

the invisible, which was intimately visible all along, makes itself conscious to us. We therefore

come to see the invisible as the interrogation the movement, and the method of the visible itself

as an historical concept and artefact.

51 GWF Hegel. Shorter Logic: Part One of the Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences: The Logic, §131 https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/sl/slappear.htm#SL131n accessed: 13 December 2015. Emphasis added52 John Dewey. “Experience and Philosophic Method.” From: Pragmatism and Classical American Philosophy: Second Edition. ed by John J Stuhr (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) p. 463