Che Guevara and Cuba Revolution

8/3/2019 Che Guevara and Cuba Revolution

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CHE GUEVARA AND CUBA REVOLUTION

Ernesto (Che) Guevara was born in Rosario in Argentine in 1928. After studyingmedicine at the University of Buenos Aires he worked as a doctor. While in Guatemalain 1954 he witnessed the socialist government of President Jacobo Arbenz overthrown

by an American backed military coup. Disgusted by what he saw, Guevara decided tojoin the Cuban revolutionary, Fidel Castro, in Mexico.

In 1956 Guevara, Castro and eighty other men and women arrived in Cuba in anattempt to overthrow the government of General Fulgencio Batista. This groupbecame known as the July 26 Movement. The plan was to set up their base in theSierra Maestra mountains. On the way to the mountains they were attacked bygovernment troops. By the time they reached the Sierra Maestra there were onlysixteen men left with twelve weapons between them. For the next few monthsCastro's guerrilla army raided isolated army garrisons and were gradually able tobuild-up their stock of weapons.

When the guerrillas took control of territory they redistributed the land amongst thepeasants. In return, the peasants helped the guerrillas against Batista's soldiers. Insome cases the peasants also joined Castro's army, as did students from the cities andoccasionally Catholic priests.

In an effort to find out information about the rebels people were pulled in forquestioning. Many innocent peoplewere tortured. Suspects, including children, were publicly executed and then lefthanging in the streets for several days as a warning to others who were consideringjoining the revolutionaries. The behaviour of Batista's forces increased support for theguerrillas. In 1958 forty-five organizations signed an open letter supporting the July

26 Movement. National bodies representing lawyers, architects, dentists, accountantsand social workers were amongst those who signed. Castro, who had originally reliedon the support of the poor, was now gaining the backing of the influential middleclasses.

General Fulgencio Batista responded to this by sending more troops to the SierraMaestra. He now had 10,000 men hunting for Castro and his 300-strong army.Although outnumbered, Castro's guerrillas were able to inflict defeat after defeat onthe government's troops. In the summer of 1958 over a thousand of Batista's soldierswere killed or wounded and many more were captured. Unlike Batista's soldiers,Castro's troops had developed a reputation for behaving well towards prisoners. This

encouraged Batista's troops to surrender to Castro when things went badly in battle.Complete military units began to join the guerrillas.

The United States supplied Batista with planes, ships and tanks, but the advantage ofusing the latest technology such as napalm failed to win them victory against theguerrillas. In March 1958, President Dwight Eisenhower, disillusioned with Batista'sperformance, suggested he held elections. This he did, but the people showed theirdissatisfaction with his government by refusing to vote. Over 75 per cent of the voters
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in the capital Havana boycotted the polls. In some areas, such as Santiago, it was ashigh as 98 per cent.

Fidel Castro was now confident he could beat Batista in a head-on battle. Leaving theSierra Maestra mountains, Castro's troops began to march on the main towns. Afterconsultations with the United States government, Batista decided to flee the country.Senior Generals left behind attempted to set up another military government. Castro'sreaction was to call for a general strike. The workers came out on strike and themilitary were forced to accept the people's desire for change. Castro marched intoHavana on January 9,1959, and became Cuba's new leader.

In its first hundred days in office Castro's government passed several new laws. Rentswere cut by up to 50 per cent for low wage earners; property owned by FulgencioBatista and his ministers was confiscated; the telephone company was nationalizedand the rates were reduced by 50 per cent; land was redistributed amongst thepeasants (including the land owned by the Castro family); separate facilities forblacks and whites (swimming pools, beaches, hotels, cemeteries etc.) were abolished.

In 1960 Guevara visited China and the Soviet Union. On his return he wrote two booksGuerrilla Warfare and Reminiscences of the Cuban Revolutionary War. In these bookshe argued that it was possible to export Cuba's revolution to other South Americancountries. Guevara served as Minister for Industries (1961-65) but in April 1965 heresigned and become a guerrilla leader in Bolivia.

In 1967 David Morales recruited Flix Rodrguez to train and head a team that wouldattempt to catch Che Guevara. Guevara was attempting to persuade the tin-minersliving in poverty to join his revolutionary army. When Guevara was captured, it wasRodriguez who interrogated him before he ordered his execution in October, 1967.

Rodriguez still possesses Guevaras Rolex watch that he took as a trophy.In their book, Ultimate Sacrifice, published in 2006, Larmar Waldron and ThomHartmann argued that in 1963 Guevara was involved in a plot with Juan AlmeidaBosch to overthrow Fidel Castro.

(1) Che Guevara, speech (21st August, 1960)

Almost everyone knows that I began my career as a doctor a few years ago. When Ibegan to study medicine, most of the concepts that I now have as a revolutionary

were absent from my store of ideals. I wanted to succeed just as everyone wants tosucceed. I dreamed of becoming a famous researcher; I dreamed of working tirelesslyto aid humanity, but this was conceived as personal achievement. I was - as we all are- a product of my environment.

After graduating, due to special circumstances and perhaps also to my personality, Ibegan to travel throughout America. Except for Haiti and the Dominican Republic, Ihave visited all the countries of Latin America. Because of the circumstances in which
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I made my trips, first as a student and later as a doctor, I perceived closely misery,hunger, disease - a father's inability to have his child treated because he lacks themoney, the brutalization that hunger andpermanent punishment provoke in man until a father sees the death of his child assomething without importance, as happens very often to the mistreated classes of our

American fatherland. I began to realize then that there were things as important asbeing a famous researcher or as important as making a substantial contribution tomedicine: to aid those people.

But I continued to be, as we always remain, a product of my environment and Iwanted to aid those people with my personal effort. Already I had traveled much - atthe time I was in Guatemala, Arbenz's Guatemala - and I began to make some noteson the norms that a revolutionary doctor should follow. I began to study the means ofbecoming a revolutionary doctor.

Then aggression came to Guatemala. It was the aggression of the United FruitCompany, the State Department, and John Foster Dulles - in reality the same thing -

and their puppet, called Castillo Armas. The aggression succeeded, for the Guatemalapeople had not achieved the degree of maturity that the Cuban people have today.One day I chose the road of exile, that is, the road of flight, for Guatemala was notmy country.

I became aware, then, of a fundamental fact: To be a revolutionary doctor or to be arevolutionary at all, there must first be a revolution. The isolated effort of one man,regardless of its purity of ideals, is worthless. If one works alone in some isolatedcorner of Latin America because of a desire to sacrifice one's entire life to nobleideals, it makes no difference because one fights against adverse governments andsocial conditions that prevent progress. To be useful it is essential to make a

revolution as we have done in Cuba, where the whole population mobilizes and learnsto use arms and fight together. Cubans have learned how much value there is in aweapon and in the unity of the people. So today one has the right and the duty ofbeing, above everything else, a revolutionary doctor, that is, a man who uses hisprofessional knowledge to serve the Revolution and the people.

Now old questions reappear: How does one actually carry out a work of socialwelfare? How does one correlate individual effort with the needs of society? Toanswer, we have to review each of our lives, and this should be done with critical zealin order to reach the conclusion that almost everything that we thought and feltbefore the Revolution should be filed and a new type of human being should be

created.

(2) Che Guevara, speech (17th October, 1959)

Our universities produced lawyers and doctors for the old social system, but did notcreate enough agricultural extension teachers, agronomists, chemists, or physicists. Infact, we do not even have mathematicians. Consequently we have had to innovate.


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In many cases our universities do not even offer the required resources. On a fewoccasions a very small number of students go into such fields. We have found atechnological vacuum because there was no planning, no direction on the part of thestate that considered the needs of our society.

We believe that the state is capable of understanding the needs of the nation; assuch, then, the state must participate in the administration and direction of theuniversity. Many people oppose this vehemently. Many consider it a destruction ofuniversity autonomy.

This is a mistaken attitude. The university cannot be an ivory tower, far away fromthe society, removed from the practical accomplishments of the Revolution. If suchan attitude is maintained, the university will continue giving our society lawyers thatwe do not need.

There are two possible paths that the university can take. A number of studentsdenounce state intervention and the loss of university autonomy. This student sector

reflects its class background while forgetting its revolutionary obligation. This sectorhas not realized that it has an obligation to workers and peasants. Our workers andpeasants died beside the students in order to attain power.

It is dangerous to maintain this attitude. The fact is that larger questions are involvedhere. Great strategic links are being developed abroad to destroy our Revolution.Those forces are trying to attract all those who have been hurt by the Revolution. Wedo not refer to the embezzlers, criminals, or the members of the old government; weare thinking of those who have remained on the margin of this revolutionary process,those who have lost economically but support the Revolution in a limited way.

All these people are dispersed throughout different social classes. Today they canexpress their discontent with freedom. National and international reactionaries wantto strengthen their forces by attracting these people and making a front to bringeconomic depression, an invasion, or who knows what.

The issue of autonomy which is being fought so furiously is creating the veryconditions that we should avoid. Those are the conditions that reactionaries can useeffectively against the Revolution. The university, vanguard of our struggling people,cannot become a backward element, but it would become so if the university did notincorporate itself into the great plans of the Revolution.

(3) Che Guevara, Tactics and Strategy of the Latin American Revolution (October,1962)

There are no unalterable tactical and strategic objectives. Some- times tacticalobjectives attain strategic importance, and other times strategic objectives becomemerely tactical elements. The thorough study of the relative importance of eachelement permits the full utilization, by the revolutionary forces, of all of the factsand circumstances leading up to the great and final strategic objective: the taking of


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power.

Power is the sine qua non strategic objective of the revolutionary forces, andeverything must be subordinated to this basic endeavor.

But the taking of power, in this world polarized by two forces of extreme disparity

and absolutely incompatible in interests, cannot be limited to the boundaries of asingle geographic or social unit. The seizure of power is a worldwide objective of therevolutionary forces. To conquer the future is the strategic element of revolution;freezing the present is the counterstrategy motivating the forces of world reactiontoday, for they are on the defensive.

In this worldwide struggle, position is very important. At times it is decisive. Cuba, forexample, is a vanguard outpost, an outpost which overlooks the extremely broadstretches of the economically distorted world of Latin America. Cuba's example is abeacon, a guiding light for all the peoples of America. The Cuban outpost is of greatstrategic value to the major contenders who at this moment dispute their hegemony

of the world: imperialism and socialism.

Its value would be different if it had been located in another geographic or socialsetting. Its value was different when prior to the Revolution it merely constituted atactical element of the imperialist world. Its value has increased, not only because itis an open door to America but because, added to the strength of its strategic,military and tactical position, is the power of its moral influence. "Moral missiles" aresuch a devastatingly effective weapon that they have become the most importantelement in determining Cuba's value. That is why, to analyze each element in thepolitical struggle, one cannot extract it from its particular set of circumstances. Allthe antecedents serve to reaffirm a line or position consistent with its great strategic

objectives.Relating this discussion to America, one must ask the necessary question: What arethe tactical elements that must be used to achieve the major objective of takingpower in this part of the world? Is it possible or not, given the present conditions inour continent, to achieve it (socialist power, that is) by peaceful means? Weemphatically answer that, in the great majority of cases, this is not possible. Themost that could be achieved would be the formal takeover of the bourgeoissuperstructure of power and the transition to socialism of that government which,under the established bourgeois legal system, having achieved formal power will stillhave to wage a very violent struggle against all who attempt, in one way or another,to check its progress toward new social structures.

(4) Che Guevara, Guerrilla Warfare: A Method, Cuba Socialista (September, 1963)

Guerrilla warfare has been employed on innumerable occasions throughout history indifferent circumstances to obtain different objectives. Lately it has been employed invarious popular wars of liberation when the vanguard of the people chose the road of


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irregular armed struggle against enemies of superior military power. Asia, Africa, andLatin America have been the scene of such actions in attempts to obtain power in thestruggle against feudal, neo-colonial, or colonial exploitation. In Europe, guerrillaunits were used as a supplement to native or allied regular armies.

In America, guerrilla warfare has been employed on several occasions. As a case inpoint, we have the experience of Cesar Augusto Sandino fighting against the Yankeeexpeditionary force on the Segovia of Nicaragua. Recently we had Cuba'srevolutionary war. Since then in America the problem of guerrilla war has been raisedin discussions of theory by the progressive parties of the continent with the questionof whether its utilization is possible or convenient. This has become the topic of verycontroversial polemics.

Almost immediately the question arises: Is guerrilla warfare the only formula forseizing power in all of Latin America? Or, at any rate, will it be the predominantform? Or simply, will it be one formula among many used during the struggle? Andultimately we may ask: Will Cuba's example be applicable to the present situation on

the continent? In the course of polemics, those who want to undertake guerrillawarfare are criticized for forgetting mass struggle, implying that guerrilla warfare andmass struggle are opposed to each other. We reject this implication, for guerrillawarfare is a people's war; to attempt to carry out this type of war without thepopulation's support is the prelude to inevitable disaster. The guerrilla is the combatvanguard of the people, situated in a specified place in a certain region, armed andwilling to carry out a series of warlike actions for the one possible strategic end - theseizure of power. The guerrilla is supported by the peasant and worker masses of theregion and of the whole territory in which it acts. Without these prerequisites,guerrilla warfare is not possible.

(5) Che Guevara, Guerrilla Warfare (1961)

We consider that the Cuban Revolution made three fundamental contributions to thelaws of the revolutionary movement in the current situation in America. First,people's forces can win a war against the army. Second, one need not always wait forall conditions favorable to revolution to be present; the insurrection itself can createthem. Third, in the underdeveloped parts of America, the battleground for armedstruggle should in the main be the countryside.

(6) Che Guevara, The Cuban Economy, International Affairs (October, 1964)

Sugar cane has been part of the Cuban picture since the sixteenth century. It wasbrought to the island only a few years after the discovery of America; however, theslave system of exploitation kept cultivation on a subsistence level. Only with thetechnological innovations which converted the sugar mill into a factory, with theintroduction of the railway and the abolition of slavery, did the production of sugar


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begin to show a considerable growth, and one which assumed extraordinaryproportions under Yankee auspices.

The natural advantages of the cultivation of sugar in Cuba are obvious, but thepredominant fact is that Cuba was developed as a sugar factory of the United States.

North American banks and capitalists soon controlled the commercial exploitation ofsugar and, furthermore, a good share of the industrial output of the land. In this way,a monopolistic control was established by U.S. interests in all aspects of a sugarproduction, which soon became the predominant factor in our foreign trade due tothe rapidly developing monoproductive characteristics of the country.

Cuba became the sugar-producing and -exporting country par excellence; and if shedid not develop even further in this respect, the reason is to be found in the capitalistcontradictions which put a limit to a continuous expansion of the Cuban sugarindustry, which depended almost entirely on North American capital.

The North American government used the quota system on imports of Cuban sugar notonly to protect her own sugar industry, as demanded by her own producers, but alsoto make possible the unrestricted introduction into our country of North Americanmanufactured goods. The preferential treaties of the beginning of the century gaveNorth American products imported into Cuba a tariff advantage of 20 percent over themost favored of the nations with whom Cuba might sign trade agreements. Underthese conditions of competition, and in view of the proximity of the United States, itbecame almost impossible for any foreign country to compete with North Americanmanufactured goods.

The US quota system meant stagnation for our sugar production. During the last yearsthe Cuban productive capacity was rarely utilized to the full, but the preferentialtreatment given to Cuban sugar by the quota also meant that no other export cropscould compete with it on an economic basis.

Consequently, the only two activities of our agriculture were cultivation of sugar caneand the breeding of low-quality cattle on pastures which at the same time served asreserve areas for the sugar plantation owners.

Unemployment became a constant feature of life in rural areas, resulting in themigration of agricultural workers to the cities. But industry did not develop either,only some public service undertakings under Yankee auspices (transportation,communications, electrical energy).

(7) Che Guevara, People's War, People's Army(1964)

Mass struggle was utilized throughout the war by the Vietnamese communist party. Itwas used, first of all, because guerrilla warfare is one expression of the mass struggle.One cannot conceive of guerrilla war when it is isolated from the people. Theguerrilla group is the numerically inferior vanguard of the great majority of the


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people, who have no weapons but express themselves through the vanguard. Also,mass struggle was used in the cities as an indispensable weapon for the developmentof the struggle. It is important to point out that never during the period of thestruggle for liberation did the masses give away any of their rights in order to getsome concession from the regime. The people did not talk about reciprocal

concessions but demanded liberties and guarantees, which brought inevitably in manysectors a crueler war than the French would have waged otherwise. This massstruggle without compromises - which gives it its dynamic character - gives usfundamental elements with which to understand the problem of the liberationstruggle in Latin America.

Marxism was applied according to the concrete historical situation of Vietnam andbecause of the guiding role of the vanguard party, faithful to its people andconsequently to its doctrine, a resounding victory was achieved over the imperialists.The characteristics of the struggle, in which territory had to be given to the enemyand many years had to pass in order to achieve final victory, with fluctuations, ebband flow, was that of a protracted war. During the entire struggle one could say thatthe front lines were where the enemy was. At a given moment, the enemy occupiedalmost the entire territory and the front was spread to wherever the enemy was.Later the lines of combat were delimited and a main front was established. But theenemy's rear guard constituted another front; it was a total war and the colonialistswere never able to mobilize their forces with ease against the liberated zones. Theslogan "dynamism, initiative, mobility, and quick decision in new situations" is insynthesis the guerrilla tactic. These few words expressed the tremendously difficultart of popular war.

(8) Felix I. Rodriguez, Shadow Warrior(1989)

Escape was impossible. The room had but one barred window in the rear. There weretroops all around the schoolhouse. No, the soldier was only complying with his orders.The Bolivians didn't want any prisoners. They wanted the guerrillas dead. I turnedwithout saying anything and went back into the room where Che lay, his arms and legstrussed together.

The place was small-about eight feet long and ten feet wide with mud walls andearthen floor. The tiny window was the sole source of light. There was a single,

narrow door also facing the front. Che lay next to an old wooden bench. In the rear ofthe room, just across from him were the bodies of Antonio and Arturo.

I examined him more closely than I had before. He was a wreck. His clothes werefilthy, ripped in several places and missing most of their buttons. He didn't even haveproper shoes, only pieces of leather wrapped around his feet and tied with cord.

I stood above Che, my boots near his head, just as Che had once stood over my dear
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friend and fellow 2506 Brigade member, Nestor Pino. Captured at the Bay of Pigs,Pino was beaten by Castro's soldiers when he told them that he was not a cook orradio operator but the company commander of a paratroop battalion. His bodybattered, he lay on the earthen floor of a seaside hut taking the kicks and blows.Suddenly, they stopped.

Pino opened his eyes and saw a pair of polished boots next to his face. He looked up.It was Che Guevara, staring coolly down at him. Che spoke as matter-of-factly as if hewas telling a child tomorrow is a school day. "We're going to kill you all," he said toPino.

Pino had survived his ordeal. Now, the situation was reversed. Che Guevara lay at myfeet. He looked like a piece of trash.

I said, "Che Guevara, I want to talk to you."

Even now he played the role of comandante. His eyes flashed. "Nobody interrogates

me," he replied sarcastically."Comandante, " I said, somewhat amazed that he had chosen to answer me at all, "Ididn't come to interrogate you. Our ideals are different. But I admire you. You used tobe a minister of state in Cuba. Now look at you - you are like this because you believein your ideals. I have come to talk to you."

He looked at me for about a minute in silence, then agreed to speak and asked if hecould sit up. I ordered a soldier to untie him and got him propped onto the ricketywooden bench. I got him tobacco for his pipe.

He would not discuss tactical matters or technical things. When I asked him about

some of his specific operations, he responded by saying only, "You know I cannotanswer that."

But to more general questions, like "Comandante, of all the possible countries in theregion, why did you pick Bolivia to export your revolution?" he answered at length.

He told me he had considered other places - Venezuela, Central America, and theDominican Republic were three he named. But, he added, experience had shown thatwhen Cuba tried to foment unrest so close to the U.S., the Yanquis reacted stronglyand the revolutionary activities failed.

So, Che continued, since countries like Venezuela and Nicaragua were "too important

to Yankee imperialism, and the Americans hadn't allowed us any success there, wefigured that, by picking a country so far from the U.S. it wouldn't appear to presentan immediate threat, the Yanquis wouldn't concern themselves with what we did.Bolivia fulfills that requirement.

"Second," he added, "we were looking for a poor country-and Bolivia is poor. Andthird, Bolivia shares boundaries with five countries. If we are successful in Bolivia,then we can move into other places-Argentina, Chile, Brazil, Peru, Paraguay."


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He told me he believed that he'd lost support in Bolivia because the people were tooprovincial. "They cannot see their revolution in broad terms-as an internationalguerrilla movement working for the proletariat-but only as a regional issue," he said."They want a Boliviano comandante, not a Cuban, even though I am an expert in thesematters."

We talked about Cuba. He admitted to me that the economy was in a shambles,largely because of the economic boycott by the U.S. "But you helped cause that," Itold Che. "You-a doctor-were made president of the Cuban National Bank. What doesa doctor know about economics?"

"Do you know how I became president of the Cuban National Bank?" he asked me. "No."

"I'll tell you a joke." He laughed. "We were sitting in a meeting one day, and Fidelcame in and he asked for a dedicated economista. I misheard him - I thought he wasasking for a dedicated comunista, so I raised my hand." He shrugged. "And that's why

Fidel selected me as head of the Cuban economy. "

He refused to talk about what he had done in Africa although, when I said we'd beentold he had a ten thousand-man guerrilla force, but that his African soldiers were adisaster, he laughed sadly and said, "If I'd really had ten thousand guerrillas it wouldhave been different. But you are right, you know - the Africans were very, very badsoldiers."

He refused to speak badly about Fidel, although he damned him with faint praise.Actually, Che was evasive when Fidel's name came up. It became apparent to me thathe was bitter over the Cuban dictator's lack of support for the Bolivian incursion.Indeed, that Che admitted how bad the Cuban economy was represented anindictment of Fidel's leadership, even though he did not specifically criticize him.

Che and I talked for about an hour and a half until, shortly before noon, I heard thechopper arrive. I went outside and discovered that Nino de Guzman had brought acamera from Major Saucedo, who wanted a picture of the prisoner. That was when Ipurposely screwed up the Bolivian's camera, but had Nino de Guzman snap a pictureof

Che and me using my own Pentax. It is the only photograph of Che alive on the day hedied.

Back inside, we resumed our conversation. Che expressed surprise that I knew somuch about him, and about Cuba. "You are not a Bolivian," he said.

"No, I am not. Where do you think I am from?"

"You could be a Puerto Rican or a Cuban. Whoever you are, by the sorts of questionsyou've been asking I believe that you work for the intelligence service of the UnitedStates."


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"You are right, Comandante," I said. "I am a Cuban. I was a member of the 2506Brigade. In fact, I was a member of the infiltration teams that operated inside Cubabefore the invasion at the Bay of Pigs."

"What's your name?"

"Felix. Just Felix, Comandante." I wanted to say more, but I didn't dare. There wasstill a slim possibility that he might get out of this alive, and I didn't want my identityto escape with him.

"Ha," Che answered. Nothing more. I don't know what he was thinking at the momentand I never asked.

We started to talk about the Cuban economy once again when we were interrupted byshots, followed by the sounds of a body falling to the floor. Aniceto had beenexecuted in the adjoining room. Che stopped talking. He did not say anything aboutthe shooting, but his face reflected sadness and he shook his head slowly from left to

right several times.Perhaps it was in that instant that he realized that he, too, was doomed, even thoughI did not tell him so until just before 1 P.M.

I had been putting off the inevitable, shuttling between Che's room and the tablewhere I was photographing his documents. I was taking pictures of his diary when thevillage schoolteacher arrived.

"Mi Capitan?"

I looked up from my work. "Yes?"

"When are you going to shoot him?"

That caught my attention. "Why are you asking me that?" I asked.

"Because the radio is already reporting that he is dead from combat wounds."

The Bolivians were taking no chances. That radio report sealed Che's fate. I wentdown the hill, into the schoolhouse and looked Che in the face. "Comandante, " I said,"I have done everything in my power, but orders have come from the SupremeBolivian Command..."

His face turned as white as writing paper. "It is better like this, Felix. I should never

have been captured alive."

When I asked him if he had any message for his family, he said, "Tell Fidel that he willsoon see a triumphant revolution in America." He said it in a way that, to me, seemedto mock the Cuban dictator for abandoning him here in the Bolivian jungle. Then Cheadded, "And tell my wife to get remarried and try to be happy."

Then we embraced, and it was a tremendously emotional moment for me. I no longer


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hated him. His moment of truth had come, and he was conducting himself like a man.He was facing his death with courage and grace.

I looked at my watch. It was one in the afternoon. I walked outside to where MarioTeran and Lieutenant Perez stood. I looked at Teran, whose face shone as if he hadbeen drinking. I told him not to shoot Che in the face, but from the neck down. Then Iwalked up the hill and began making notes. When I heard the shots I checked mywatch. It was 1: 10 P.M.

Che was dead.

(9) Warren Hinckle& William Turner, Deadly Secrets: The CIA-Mafia War Against

Castro and the Assassination of JFK(1992)

On April 20, 1976, the CIA agent who had orchestrated the hunt for Che Guevara inBolivia, retired. The brief ceremony, during which he was awarded the IntelligenceStar for Valor, was held in his Miami home. He had refused to accept it from DirectorGeorge Bush at Langley because he considered Bush a political appointee who waswet behind the ears when it came to covert actions.

Upon retiring Ramos resumed using his true name, Felix I. Rodriguez, which had beenmothballed during his years of agency service. Rodriguez, who resembles Desi Arnaz,had belonged to the landed gentry in pre-revolutionary Cuba, and he carried a

personal grudge against Castro. In 1961 while training with Brigade 2506 before theBay of Pigs invasion, he volunteered to assassinate Fidel. He said that the CIApresented him with "a beautiful German bolt action rifle with a powerful telescopicsight, all neatly packaged in a custom-made carrying case." The weapon had beenpresighted for a location where Castro made frequent appearances. But after severalabortive attempts to infiltrate Cuba, the mission was abandoned."

Rodriguez went on to a number of assignments under his JM/WAVE case officer,Thomas Clines. During the October 1962 Missile Crisis he was poised to parachute intoCuba to plant a beacon pointing to a Russian missile site, but the crisis passed. Hebecame communications officer in Nicaragua for Manuel Artime's Second NavalGuerrilla, which was conducting hit-and-run raids to soften up Cuba for a secondinvasion. He went on to lead helicopter assault teams in Vietnam.

But by his own account Rodriguez's most magnificent moment came when he lifted offin a helicopter from La Higuera, Bolivia, on October 9, 1967, with Che Guevara's bodylashed to the right skid. "On my wrist was his steel Rolex GMT Master with its red-and-blue bezel," he recounted. "In my breast pocket, wrapped in paper from my loose-leafnotebook, was the partially smoked tobacco from his last pipe."
http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/JFKhinckle.htmhttp://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/JFKturnerW.htmhttp://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/JFKhinckle.htmhttp://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/JFKturnerW.htm


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2006)

Eighteen years ago, Thom Hartmann and I began writing a book about the battles ofPresident Kennedy and his brother, Attorney General Robert F Kennedy, against theMafia and Fidel Castro. In 2005, using new information from almost two dozen peoplewho worked with John and Robert Kennedy-backed up by thousands of files at theNational Archives-we exposed for the first time JFK's top-secret plan to overthrowCastro and invade Cuba on December 1, 1963. "The Plan for a Coup in Cuba" (as it wastitled in a memo for the joint Chiefs of Staff) would include a "palace coup" toeliminate Castro, allowing a new Cuban "Provisional Government" to step into thepower vacuum. The coup would be supported by a "full-scale invasion" of Cuba by theUS military, if necessary.

However, even as JFK's secret plan was nearing its final stage, he had two emissariesmaking last-ditch attempts to avoid a potentially bloody coup and invasion by tryingto jump-start secret negotiations with Fidel Castro. One long-secret November 1963memo about those negotiations states that "there was a rift between Castro and the

(Che) Guevara ... Almeida group on the question of Cuba's future course." CheGuevara is still widely known today, perhaps even more than in 1963. But most peoplein the United States have never heard of Che's ally against Castro, Juan Almeida, eventhough in 1963 he wielded more power inside Cuba than Che himself. In some ways,Almeida was the third most powerful official in Cuba in 1963, after Fidel and hisbrother Raul - and even today, in 2006, the CIA lists Juan Almeida as the third-highestofficial in the current Cuban government.

In this new edition, we can now reveal for the first time that Almeida wasn't justallied with Che against Castro in November of 1963: Almeida was also allied withPresident Kennedy. In 1963, Juan Almeida was the powerful Commander of the Cuban

Army, one of the most famous heroes of the Revolution - and he was going to leadJFK's "palace coup" against Fidel. Commander Almeida had been in direct contact withJohn and Robert Kennedy's top Cuban exile aide since May of 1963, and both menwould be part of Cuba's new, post-coup Provisional Government. By the morning ofNovember 22, 1963, Almeida had even received a large cash payment authorized bythe Kennedys, and the CIA had placed his family under US protection in a foreigncountry.

The "Plan for a Coup in Cuba" was fully authorized by JFK and personally run byRobert Kennedy. Only about a dozen people in the US government knew the full scopeof the plan, all of whom worked for the military or the CIA, or reported directly to

Robert. The Kennedys' plan was prepared primarily by the US military, with the CIAplaying a major supporting role. Input was also obtained from key officials in a fewother agencies, but most of those who worked on the plan knew only about carefullycompartmentalized aspects, believing it to be a theoretical exercise in case a Cubanofficial volunteered to depose Fidel.

Documents

Che Guevara and Cuba Revolution