Charkaoui v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration),stephanebeaulac.openum.ca/files/sites/84/2007/07/Charkaoui-v-Canada.pdf · UNTS 222; 312 ETS 5, entered into force 3 September 1953

From: Oxford Public International Law (http://opil.ouplaw.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved. Subscriber:Universite de Montreal; date: 08 May 2017

Date: 23February2007Contenttype: DomesticcourtdecisionsJurisdiction: Canada[ca]

Citation(s): (2007)1SCR350(OfficialCaseNo)2007SCC9(CanLII)(OtherReference)276DLR(4th)594(OtherReference)44CR(6th)1(OtherReference)152CRR(2d)17(OtherReference)54AdminLR(4th)1(OtherReference)ILDC640(CA2007)(OUPreference)Product: OxfordReportsonInternationalLaw[ORIL]Module: InternationalLawinDomesticCourts[ILDC]

CharkaouivCanada(CitizenshipandImmigration),Charkaouiandors,AttorneyGeneralofOntario(intervening)andors(intervening)vMinisterofCitizenshipandImmigrationandors,Appealjudgment,(2007)1SCR350,2007SCC9(CanLII),276DLR(4th)594,44CR(6th)1,152CRR(2d)17,54AdminLR(4th)1,ILDC640(CA2007),23rdFebruary2007,Canada[ca]

Parties: AdilCharkaoui,HassanAlmrei,MohamedHarkatCanada(MinisterofCitizenshipandImmigration),Canada(MinisterofPublicSafetyandEmergencyPreparedness),AttorneyGeneralofCanada

Additionalparties: (InterveningParty1)AttorneyGeneralofOntario(Canada[ca]),AmnestyInternational,BritishColumbiaCivilLibertiesAssociation(Canada[ca]),CanadianBarAssociation(Canada[ca]),CanadianCivilLibertiesAssociation(Canada[ca]),CanadianCouncilforRefugees(Canada[ca]),AfricanCanadianLegalClinic(Canada[ca]),InternationalCivilLibertiesMonitoringGroup(Canada[ca]),NationalAnti-RacismCouncilofCanada(Canada[ca]),CanadianArabFederation(Canada[ca]),CanadianCouncilonAmerican-IslamicRelations(Canada[ca]),CanadianMuslimCivilLibertiesAssociation(Canada[ca]),CriminalLawyers'Association(Ontario)(Canada[ca]),FederationofLawSocietiesofCanada(Canada[ca]),UniversityofToronto,FacultyofLaw—InternationalHumanRightsClinic(Canada[ca]),HumanRightsWatchJudges/Arbitrators: BMcLachlin(ChiefJustice);MBastarache;IBinnie;LLeBel;MDeschamps;MJFish;RSAbella;LCharron;MRothsteinProceduralStage: AppealjudgmentPreviousProceduralStage(s):FederalCourtdecision;Charkaoui(Re),(2004)4FCR32;2003FC1419(CanLII);253FTR22;38ImmLR(3d)56,5December2003FederalCourtofAppealdecision;Charkaoui(Re),(2005)2FCR299;2004FCA421(CanLII);247DLR(4th)405;328NR201;126CRR(2d)298;42ImmLR(3d)165,10December2004SubsequentDevelopment(s):SupremeCourtdecision;CharkaouivCanada(CitizenshipandImmigration),(2008)2SCR326;2008SCC38;294DLR(4th)478;58CR(6th)45,26June2008


RelatedDevelopment(s):Charkaoui(Re),FederalCourtdecision,2009CF1030,14October2009

Subject(s):Freedomfromtortureandcruel,inhuman,ordegradingtreatment—Judicialindependence/impartiality—Detention—Non-refoulement—Terrorism—Dueprocess—Consistentinterpretation—Judicialreview—Ruleoflaw

CoreIssue(s):Whethernationalsecuritylegislationauthorizingcertificatesofinadmissibilitytobeissuedagainstforeignnationalsandpermanentresidentswithouttheopportunityforthepersonsnamedinthecertificatestoknowthecaseputagainstthemviolateddueprocess.Whethernationalsecuritylegislationallowingdetentionwithoutwarrantandpreventingjudicialreviewofcontinuingdetention(habeascorpus)offoreignnationalsuntil120daysafterajudgedeterminedthecertificatetobereasonableinfringedthelegalguaranteeagainstarbitrarydetention.Whethernationalsecuritylegislationimposingdetentionpendingdeportationforlengthyandindeterminateperiods,orpermittingreleasesubjecttoonerousconditions,violateddueprocessandprotectionagainstcruelandunusualtreatment.

OxfordReportsonInternationalLawinDomesticCourtsiseditedby:

ProfessorAndréNollkaemper,UniversityofAmsterdamandAugustReinisch,UniversityofVienna.


FactsF1Theappellants,MessrsCharkaoui,Harkat,andAlmreiwerelivinginCanadawhentheywerearrestedanddetainedpursuanttoacertificateofinadmissibilityissuedbyCanada’sMinisterofCitizenshipandImmigrationundertheImmigrationandRefugeeProtectionAct,SC2001,c27(Canada)(‘IRPAct’).

F2TheprovisionsoftheIRPActallowedtheremovalofnon-citizens(permanentresidentsandforeignnationals)basedonvariousgroundsthatwereconsideredasthreatstonationalsecurity,includinginvolvementwithterroristactivities.

F3MrCharkaouiandMrHarkatwereconditionallyreleasedin2005and2006,respectively;MrAlmreiremainedindetentionatthetimeofthehearing.

F4ThecertificateschemeandthedetentionreviewprocessoftheIRPActwereconstitutionallychallenged,particularlywithregardtoSections1,7,9,10(c),12,and15oftheCanadianCharterofRightsandFreedoms,PartIoftheConstitutionAct,beingScheduleBoftheCanadaAct1982(UK),c11,1982(‘CanadianCharter’).

F5TheFederalCourtand,later,theFederalCourtofAppealupheldthevalidityoftheCanadianlegislation.

F6Thepartiespresentedahabeascorpusargumentabouta120-daydelayforjudicialreviewofcontinuingdetentiononthebasisofinternationallawandprecedents.

F7ThereliefsoughtwastohavetherelevantprovisionsoftheIRPActstruckout.

HeldH1Beforeastatecoulddetainpersonsforsignificantperiodsoftime,theywereentitledtoafairjudicialprocessthatcomprisedtherighttoahearingbeforeanindependentandimpartialmagistratedecidingonthefactsandthelaw,aswellastherighttoknowthecaseagainstthem,andtherighttoanswerthatcase.(paragraphs28–9)

H2Specifically,ontherighttoanswerthecaseagainsthimorher,prominentinimmigrationlaw,thebalancestruckintheIRPActwiththeneedtoprotectconfidentialintelligenceinformationinthecontextofnationalsecuritywasinadequate.(paragraphs53,63)

H3Theuseofevidenceundisclosedtothenamedpersons(bothpermanentresidentsandforeignnationals)inthecertificateofinadmissibility,withoutcompensatingmeasuresforsuchnon-disclosure,constitutedanunjustifiablebreachofdueprocess.(paragraphs65,87,139)

H4Inlightofalternativeapproachesadoptedforsimilarsecuritysituations(eganti-terrorism)inCanadaandinotherstates(cfUnitedKingdom)thereexistedlessintrusivesolutionstoprotectconfidentialsecurityinformation,suchasspecialtrialorspecialadvocatesystems.(paragraphs69,80,139)

H5Asthesigningofasecuritycertificateagainstaforeignnationalwasbasedonthedangerposedbysuchperson,therewasarationalfoundationforthedecisionandtheresultingdetentionwas,accordingly,notarbitrary.(paragraph89)

H6Whetherthroughhabeascorpusorothermechanisms,everyonehadarighttopromptreviewoftheirdetentiontodetermineitslegality;arightbasedontheCanadianCharterandwasfoundinotherstates(cfUnitedStates)andattheinternationallevel—egConventionfortheProtectionofHumanRightsandFundamentalFreedoms(4November1950)213UNTS222;312ETS5,enteredintoforce3September1953(‘EuropeanConventiononHumanRights’,‘ECHR’).(paragraph90)


H7Thedenialofaprompthearingtoforeignnationalsuntil120daysafterthecertificatehadbeenjudiciallydetermined,whilethedetentionreviewwaswithin48hoursforpermanentresidents,wasaviolationoftheirlegalguaranteeagainstarbitrarydetention.(paragraphs90,93,141)

H8ThedetentionreviewingprocessesprovidedforintheIRPActmeantthatapersonnamedonthecertificatewasnotinasituationinwhichtherewasnohopeofreleaseorrecoursetoalegalprocesstoprocurehisorherrelease,whichcouldcausepsychologicalstressandthusamounttocruelandunusualtreatment—cfSoeringvUnitedKingdom,(1996)11EHRR347,7July1989.Suchalegislativescheme,especiallyintheimmigrationcontext,wasadequate.(paragraphs98,107)

H9TheIRPAct,allowingdetentionorothermeasurespendingdeportation,hadtobereadinconformitywiththelegalguaranteesoftheCanadianCharter,andinlightoftheexperienceofforeigncourts—cfUnitedStates,UnitedKingdom—topermitongoingperiodicjudicialreviewofthecontinuedneedfordetentionandoffairnessofreleaseconditions.(paragraphs116,123–5)

H10Theappealwasallowed.TheprocedureforthejudicialapprovalofsecuritycertificatesprovidedforintheIRPActwasinconsistentwiththeCanadianCharterand,consequently,ofnoforceoreffect.(paragraph143)

DateofReport:29May2009

Reporter(s):StéphaneBeaulac

AnalysisA1Thereasonablenessofthebreachofdueprocessbecauseofundisclosedevidenceunderthecertificateofinadmissibilityschemeisevaluatedinviewofthelessintrusivealternativeofaspecialadvocatesystem.TheUnitedKingdom,inthecontextofanti-terrorismlegislation,isagoodexampleofsuchasystembeingimplementedtoprovideprotectionofthedetainee’sinterests,withtheSpecialImmigrationAppealsCommissionAct1997,c68,1997(UnitedKingdom).

A2Althoughnotcentraltothecourt’sreasoninginthiscase,itnotedthatapersoninadmissibleongroundsofsecuritylosttheprotectionofnon-refoulementunderthenationalsecuritylegislationandcould,intheory,bedeportedtotorture.ThiswouldconstituteabreachofCanada’sinternationalobligations.

A3Thecourtopinedthattheissueofdeportationtotorturehadnotbeenraisedandthat,accordingly,itdidnotneedtodecidethisaspectunderthelegislativeschemeinquestion.

A4Whenthecourtaddressedthelackofareviewmechanismforthelegalityofdetentionofforeignnationalsforupto120days,referencesweremadetointernationalexperience,butmerelyinpassing.Specifically,Article5oftheECHR,aswellasSlivenkovLatvia,No48321/99,9October2003,werecitedwithoutmore,insupportofthepropositionthateveryonehastherighttopromptreviewoftheircontinuingdetention.

A5Theinterpretationofhumanrightsprinciplesthatexistatboththenationalandinternationallevel,suchasthenotionofcruelandunusualtreatment,wasdonebythecourtwithaviewtoshowingtheconsistencyandtheharmonyintheapplicablelaw.

A6Indecidingto‘readin’periodicjudicialreviewofdetentionobligations,thecourtreferredtoprecedentsfromtheUnitedStatesandtheUnitedKingdom.Particularlywithrespecttothelatter,however,theparallelwassomewhattenuousbecausethelegislativeschemeisquitedifferent,asthecourtitselfacknowledged.

A7AsitoccursfrequentlyinCanada(asdoubtlessinotherjurisdictionsaswell),thecourtwaschoosing,withoutexplainingwhy,certainforeignandinternationallegalsourcesoverothers;it


mightbeconsiderednegativelyasaprocessof‘cherrypicking’,iedonepurelyforpurposesofjustificationorrhetoric.

DateofAnalysis:13October2009Analysisby:StéphaneBeaulac

Instrumentscitedinthefulltextofthisdecision:

International

ConventionfortheProtectionofHumanRightsandFundamentalFreedoms(4November1950)213UNTS222;312ETS5,enteredintoforce3September1953

Constitutions

CanadianCharterofRightsandFreedoms,PartIoftheConstitutionAct,beingScheduleBoftheCanadaAct1982(UK),c11,1982

Casescitedinthefulltextofthisdecision:

EuropeanCourtofHumanRights

SoeringvUnitedKingdom,(1996)11EHRR347,7July1989

ChahalvUnitedKingdom,(1996)23EHRR413,15November1996

SlivenkovLatvia,No48321/99,9October2003

Canadiandomesticcourts

SinghvMinisterofEmploymentandImmigration,(1985)1SCR177

ChiarellivCanada(MinisterofCitizenshipandImmigration),(1992)1SCR711

SureshvCanada(MinisterofCitizenshipandImmigration),(2002)1SCR3;ILDC186(CA2002)

MugeseravCanada(MinisterofCitizenshipandImmigration),(2005)2SCR100

MedovarskivCanada(MinisterofCitizenshipandImmigration),(2005)2SCR539

UnitedKingdomdomesticcourts

RvGovernorofDurhamPrison,expSingh,(1984)1AllER983

AvSecretaryofStatefortheHomeDepartment,(2005)3AllER169;(2004)UKHL56

UnitedStatesdomesticcourts

ZadvydasvDavis,533US678,2001

RasulvBush,DecisionofSupremeCourt,542US466,2004;ILDC115(US2004),28June2004

Toaccessfullcitationinformationforthisdocument,seetheOxfordLawCitatorrecord


Decision-fulltextThejudgmentoftheCourtwasdeliveredbyTheChiefJustice—

I.Introduction1Oneofthemostfundamentalresponsibilitiesofagovernmentistoensurethesecurityofitscitizens.Thismayrequireittoactoninformationthatitcannotdiscloseandtodetainpeoplewhothreatennationalsecurity.Yetinaconstitutionaldemocracy,governmentsmustactaccountablyandinconformitywiththeConstitutionandtherightsandlibertiesitguarantees.Thesetwopropositionsdescribeatensionthatliesattheheartofmoderndemocraticgovernance.Itisatensionthatmustberesolvedinawaythatrespectstheimperativesbothofsecurityandofaccountableconstitutionalgovernance.

2Inthiscase,weareconfrontedwithastatute,theImmigrationandRefugeeProtectionAct,S.C.2001,c.27(“IRPA”),thatattemptstoresolvethistensionintheimmigrationcontextbyallowingtheMinisterofCitizenshipandImmigration(the“Minister”),andtheMinisterofPublicSafetyandEmergencyPreparedness(collectively“theministers”)toissueacertificateofinadmissibilityleadingtothedetentionofapermanentresidentorforeignnationaldeemedtobeathreattonationalsecurity.Thecertificateandthedetentionarebothsubjecttoreviewbyajudge,inaprocessthatmaydeprivethepersonnamedinthecertificateofsomeoralloftheinformationonthebasisofwhichthecertificatewasissuedorthedetentionordered.ThequestioniswhetherthesolutionthatParliamenthasenactedconformstotheConstitution,andinparticulartheguaranteesintheCanadianCharterofRightsandFreedomsthatprotectagainstunjustifiableintrusionsonliberty,equalityandthefreedomfromarbitrarydetentionandfromcruelandunusualtreatment.

3IconcludethattheIRPAunjustifiablyviolatess.7oftheCharterbyallowingtheissuanceofacertificateofinadmissibilitybasedonsecretmaterialwithoutprovidingforanindependentagentatthestageofjudicialreviewtobetterprotectthenamedperson’sinterests.Ialsoconcludethatsomeofthetimelimitsintheprovisionsforcontinuingdetentionofaforeignnationalviolatess.9and10(c)becausetheyarearbitrary.Ifindthats.12hasnotbeenshowntobeviolatedsinceameaningfuldetentionreviewprocessoffersreliefagainstthepossibilityofindefinitedetention.Finally,Ifindthatthereisnobreachofthes.15equalityright.

II.Background4TheprovisionsoftheIRPAatissueinthiscase,reproducedintheAppendix,arepartofCanada’simmigrationlaw.Theirpurposeistopermittheremovalofnon-citizenslivinginCanada—permanentresidentsandforeignnationals—onvariousgrounds,includingconnectionwithterroristactivities.Theschemepermitsdeportationonthebasisofconfidentialinformationthatisnottobedisclosedtothepersonnamedinthecertificateoranyoneactingontheperson’sbehalforinhisorherinterest.Theschemewasmeantto“facilitat[e]theearlyremovalofpersonswhoareinadmissibleonseriousgrounds,includingpersonsposingathreattothesecurityofCanada”(ClausebyClauseAnalysis(2001),atp.72).Inreality,however,itmayalsoleadtolongperiodsofincarceration.

5TheIRPArequirestheministerstosignacertificatedeclaringthataforeignnationalorpermanentresidentisinadmissibletoenterorremaininCanadaongroundsofsecurity,amongothers:s.77.AjudgeoftheFederalCourtthenreviewsthecertificatetodeterminewhetheritisreasonable:s.80.Ifthestatesorequests,thereviewisconductedincameraandexparte.Thepersonnamedinthecertificatehasnorighttoseethematerialonthebasisofwhichthecertificatewasissued.Non-sensitivematerialmaybedisclosed;sensitiveorconfidentialmaterialmustnotbedisclosedifthegovernmentobjects.Thenamedpersonandhisorherlawyercannotseeundisclosedmaterial,althoughtheministersandthereviewingjudgemayrelyonit.Attheendof


theday,thejudgemustprovidethepersonwithasummaryofthecaseagainsthimorher—asummarythatdoesnotdisclosematerialthatmightcompromisenationalsecurity.Ifthejudgedeterminesthatthecertificateisreasonable,thereisnoappealandnowaytohavethedecisionjudiciallyreviewed:s.80(3).

6Theconsequencesoftheissuanceandconfirmationofacertificateofinadmissibilityvary,dependingonwhetherthepersonisapermanentresidentofCanadaoraforeignnationalwhoserighttoremaininCanadahasnotyetbeenconfirmed.Permanentresidentswhotheministershavereasonablegroundstobelieveareadangertonationalsecuritymaybeheldindetention.Inordertodetainthem,theministersmustissueawarrantstatingthatthepersonisathreattonationalsecurityortoanotherperson,orisunlikelytoappearataproceedingorforremoval.Foreignnationals,meanwhile,mustbedetainedonceacertificateisissued:unders.82(2),thedetentionisautomatic.Whilethedetentionofapermanentresidentmustbereviewedwithin48hours,aforeignnational,ontheotherhand,mustapplyforreview,butmaynotdosountil120daysafterajudgeoftheFederalCourtdeterminesthecertificatetobereasonable.Inbothcases,ifthejudgefindsthecertificatetobereasonable,itbecomesaremovalorder.Suchanorderdeprivespermanentresidentsoftheirstatus;theirdetentionisthensubjecttoreviewonthesamebasisasthatofotherforeignnationals.

7Theremovalordercannotbeappealedandmaybeimmediatelyenforced,thuseliminatingtherequirementofholdingorcontinuinganexaminationoranadmissibilityhearing:s.81(b).Thedetainee,whetherapermanentresidentoraforeignnational,maynolongerapplyforprotection:s.81(c).Additionally,arefugeeoraprotectedpersondeterminedtobeinadmissibleonanyofthegroundsforacertificatelosestheprotectionoftheprincipleofnon-refoulementunders.115(1)if,intheopinionoftheMinister,thepersonshouldnotbeallowedtoremaininCanadaonthebasisofthenatureandseverityofactscommittedorofdangertothesecurityofCanada:s.115(2).Thismeansthatheorshemay,atleastintheory,bedeportedtotorture.

8Apermanentresidentdetainedunderacertificateisentitledtoareviewofhisorherdetentioneverysixmonths.Unders.83(3),ajudgemustorderthedetentionofapermanentresidenttobecontinuedifthejudgeissatisfiedthatthepersoncontinuestoposeadangertosecurityortothesafetyofanother,orisunlikelytoappearataproceedingorforremoval.

9Thedetentionofforeignnationals,ontheotherhand,ismandatory.Ifaforeignnationalhasnotbeenremovedwithin120daysofthecertificatebeingfoundreasonablebyajudge,however,thejudgemayorderthepersonreleasedonappropriateconditionsif“satisfiedthattheforeignnationalwillnotberemovedfromCanadawithinareasonabletimeandthatthereleasewillnotposeadangertonationalsecurityortothesafetyofanyperson”:s.84(2).Evenifreleased,theforeignnationalmaybedeported.

10Mr.Charkaouiisapermanentresident,whileMessrs.HarkatandAlmreiareforeignnationalswhohadbeenrecognizedasConventionrefugees.AllwerelivinginCanadawhentheywerearrestedanddetained.Atthetimeofthedecisionsonappeal,allhadbeendetainedforsometime—since2003,2002and2001respectively.In2001,ajudgeoftheFederalCourtdeterminedMr.Almrei’scertificatetobereasonable;anotherdeterminedMr.Harkat’scertificatetobereasonablein2005.ThereasonablenessofMr.Charkaoui’scertificatehasyettobedetermined.Messrs.CharkaouiandHarkatwerereleasedonconditionsin2005and2006respectively,butMr.HarkathasbeenadvisedthathewillbedeportedtoAlgeria,whichheiscontestinginotherproceedings.Mr.Almreiremainsindetention.Inallthesecases,thedetentionswerebasedonallegationsthattheindividualsconstitutedathreattothesecurityofCanadabyreasonofinvolvementinterroristactivities.Inthecourseoftheirdetentions,allthreeappellantschallenged,unsuccessfully,theconstitutionalityoftheIRPA’scertificateschemeanddetentionreviewprocess.

III.Issues


11TheappellantsarguethattheIRPA’scertificateschemeunderwhichtheirdetentionswereorderedisunconstitutional.TheyarguethatitviolatesfiveprovisionsoftheCharter:thes.7guaranteeoflife,libertyandsecurityoftheperson;thes.9guaranteeagainstarbitrarydetention;thes.10(c)guaranteeofapromptreviewofdetention;thes.12guaranteeagainstcruelandunusualtreatment;andthes.15guaranteeofequalprotectionandequalbenefitofthelaw.Theyalsoallegeviolationsofunwrittenconstitutionalprinciples.Idiscusstheseclaimsunderthefollowingheadings:

A.DoestheprocedureundertheIRPAfordeterminingthereasonablenessofthecertificateinfringes.7oftheCharter,andifso,istheinfringementjustifiedunders.1oftheCharter?

B.DoesthedetentionofpermanentresidentsorforeignnationalsundertheIRPAinfringess.7,9,10(c)or12oftheCharter,andifso,aretheinfringementsjustifiedunders.1oftheCharter?

C.Dothecertificateanddetentionreviewproceduresdiscriminatebetweencitizensandnon-citizens,contrarytos.15oftheCharter,andifso,isthediscriminationjustifiedunders.1oftheCharter?

D.AretheIRPAcertificateprovisionsinconsistentwiththeconstitutionalprincipleoftheruleoflaw?

A.DoestheProcedureUndertheIRPAforDeterminingtheReasonablenessoftheCertificateInfringeSection7oftheCharter,andifso,IstheInfringementJustifiedUnderSection1oftheCharter?

1.IsSection7oftheCharterEngaged?12Section7oftheCharterguaranteestherighttolife,libertyandsecurityoftheperson,andtherightnottobedeprivedthereofexceptinaccordancewiththeprinciplesoffundamentaljustice.Thisrequiresaclaimanttoprovetwomatters:first,thattherehasbeenorcouldbeadeprivationoftherighttolife,libertyandsecurityoftheperson,andsecond,thatthedeprivationwasnotorwouldnotbeinaccordancewiththeprinciplesoffundamentaljustice.Iftheclaimantsucceeds,thegovernmentbearstheburdenofjustifyingthedeprivationunders.1,whichprovidesthattherightsguaranteedbytheCharteraresubjectonlytosuchreasonablelimitsprescribedbylawascanbedemonstrablyjustifiedinafreeanddemocraticsociety.

13Theprovisionsatissue,foundatDivision9ofPart1oftheIRPA,clearlydeprivedetaineessuchastheappellantsoftheirliberty.Thepersonnamedinacertificatecanfacedetentionpendingtheoutcomeoftheproceedings.Inthecaseofaforeignnational,thisdetentionisautomaticandlastsatleastuntil120daysafterthecertificateisdeemedreasonable.Forbothforeignnationalsandpermanentresidents,theperiodofdetentioncanbe,andfrequentlyis,severalyears.Indeed,Mr.Almreiremainsindetentionanddoesnotknowwhen,ifever,hewillbereleased.

14Thedetainee’ssecuritymaybefurtheraffectedinvariousways.ThecertificateprocessmayleadtoremovalfromCanada,toaplacewherehisorherlifeorfreedomwouldbethreatened:seee.g.Singhv.MinisterofEmploymentandImmigration,1985CanLII65(S.C.C.),[1985]1S.C.R.177,atp.207,perWilsonJ.Acertificatemaybringwithittheaccusationthatoneisaterrorist,whichcouldcauseirreparableharmtotheindividual,particularlyifheorsheiseventuallydeportedtohisorherhomecountry.Finally,apersonwhoisdeterminedtobeinadmissibleongroundsofsecuritylosestheprotectionofs.115(1)oftheIRPA,whichmeansthatunders.115(2),heorshecanbedeportedtotortureiftheMinisterisoftheopinionthatthepersonisadangertothesecurityofCanada.

15InSureshv.Canada(MinisterofCitizenshipandImmigration),2002SCC1(CanLII),[2002]1


S.C.R.3,2002SCC1,thisCourtstated,atpara.76,that“barringextraordinarycircumstances,deportationtotorturewillgenerallyviolatetheprinciplesoffundamentaljusticeprotectedbys.7oftheCharter.”Morerecently,theFederalCourthasruledthatanothercertificatedetaineeisatriskoftortureifdeported,andthattherewerenoexceptionalcircumstancesjustifyingsuchadeportation:Jaballah(Re)2006FC1230(CanLII),(2006),148C.R.R.(2d)1,2006FC1230.Theappellantsclaimthattheywouldbeatriskoftortureifdeportedtotheircountriesoforigin.Butineachoftheircases,thisremainstobeprovenaspartofanapplicationforprotectionundertheprovisionsofPart2oftheIRPA.Theissueofdeportationtotortureisconsequentlynotbeforeushere.

16Theindividualinterestsatstakesuggestthats.7oftheCharter,thepurposeofwhichistoprotectthelife,libertyandsecurityoftheperson,isengaged,andthisleadsdirectlytothequestionwhethertheIRPA’simpingementontheseinterestsconformstotheprinciplesoffundamentaljustice.Thegovernmentargues,relyingonMedovarskiv.Canada(MinisterofCitizenshipandImmigration),2005SCC51(CanLII),[2005]2S.C.R.539,2005SCC51,thats.7doesnotapplybecausethisisanimmigrationmatter.Thecommentfromthatcaseonwhichthegovernmentrelieswasmadeinresponsetoaclaimthattodeportanon-citizenviolatess.7oftheCharter.Inconsideringthisclaim,theCourt,perMcLachlinC.J.,noted,atpara.46,citingChiarelliv.Canada(MinisterofEmploymentandImmigration),1992CanLII87(S.C.C.),[1992]1S.C.R.711,atp.733,that“[t]hemostfundamentalprincipleofimmigrationlawisthatnon-citizensdonothaveanunqualifiedrighttoenterorremaininCanada”.TheCourtadded:“Thusthedeportationofanon-citizeninitselfcannotimplicatethelibertyandsecurityinterestsprotectedbys.7”(Medovarski,atpara.46(emphasisadded)).

17Medovarskithusdoesnotstandforthepropositionthatproceedingsrelatedtodeportationintheimmigrationcontextareimmunefroms.7scrutiny.Whilethedeportationofanon-citizenintheimmigrationcontextmaynotinitselfengages.7oftheCharter,somefeaturesassociatedwithdeportation,suchasdetentioninthecourseofthecertificateprocessortheprospectofdeportationtotorture,maydoso.

18Indeterminingwhethers.7applies,wemustlookattheinterestsatstakeratherthanthelegallabelattachedtotheimpugnedlegislation.AsProfessorHamishStewartwrites:

Manyoftheprinciplesoffundamentaljusticeweredevelopedincriminalcases,buttheirapplicationisnotrestrictedtocriminalcases:theyapplywheneveroneofthethreeprotectedinterestsisengaged.Putanotherway,theprinciplesoffundamentaljusticeapplyincriminalproceedings,notbecausetheyarecriminalproceedings,butbecausethelibertyinterestisalwaysengagedincriminalproceedings.[Emphasisinoriginal.]

(“IsIndefiniteDetentionofTerroristSuspectsReallyConstitutional?”(2005),54U.N.B.L.J.235,atp.242 )

Iconcludethattheappellants’challengestothefairnessoftheprocessleadingtopossibledeportationandthelossoflibertyassociatedwithdetentionraiseimportantissuesoflibertyandsecurity,andthats.7oftheCharterisengaged.

2.HowDoSecurityConsiderationsAffecttheSection7Analysis?19Section7oftheCharterrequiresthatlawsthatinterferewithlife,libertyandsecurityofthepersonconformtotheprinciplesoffundamentaljustice—thebasicprinciplesthatunderlieournotionsofjusticeandfairprocess.Theseprinciplesincludeaguaranteeofproceduralfairness,havingregardtothecircumstancesandconsequencesoftheintrusiononlife,libertyorsecurity:Suresh,atpara.113.

20Section7oftheCharterrequiresnotaparticulartypeofprocess,butafairprocesshaving


regardtothenatureoftheproceedingsandtheinterestsatstake:UnitedStatesofAmericav.Ferras,2006SCC33(CanLII),[2006]2S.C.R.77,2006SCC33,atpara.14;R.v.Rodgers,2006SCC15(CanLII),[2006]1S.C.R.554,2006SCC15,atpara.47;Idziakv.Canada(MinisterofJustice),1992CanLII51(S.C.C.),[1992]3S.C.R.631,atpp.656–57.Theproceduresrequiredtomeetthedemandsoffundamentaljusticedependonthecontext(seeRodgers;R.v.Lyons,1987CanLII25(S.C.C.),[1987]2S.C.R.309,atp.361;Chiarelli,atpp.743–44;MountSinaiHospitalCenterv.Quebec(MinisterofHealthandSocialServices),2001SCC41(CanLII),[2001]2S.C.R.281,2001SCC41,atparas.20–21).Societalinterestsmaybetakenintoaccountinelucidatingtheapplicableprinciplesoffundamentaljustice:R.v.Malmo-Levine,2003SCC74(CanLII),[2003]3S.C.R.571,2003SCC74,atpara.98.

21Unlikes.1,s.7isnotconcernedwithwhetheralimitonlife,libertyorsecurityofthepersonisjustified,butwithwhetherthelimithasbeenimposedinawaythatrespectstheprinciplesoffundamentaljustice.Hence,ithasbeenheldthats.7doesnotpermit“afree-standinginquiry…intowhetheraparticularlegislativemeasure‘strikestherightbalance’betweenindividualandsocietalinterestsingeneral”(Malmo-Levine,atpara.96).Noris“achievingtherightbalance…itselfanoverarchingprincipleoffundamentaljustice”(ibid.).AsthemajorityinMalmo-Levinenoted,toholdotherwise“wouldentirelycollapsethes.1inquiryintos.7”(ibid.).Thisinturnwouldrelievethestatefromitsburdenofjustifyingintrusivemeasures,andrequiretheChartercomplainanttoshowthatthemeasuresarenotjustified.

22Thequestionatthes.7stageiswhethertheprinciplesoffundamentaljusticerelevanttothecasehavebeenobservedinsubstance,havingregardtothecontextandtheseriousnessoftheviolation.Theissueiswhethertheprocessisfundamentallyunfairtotheaffectedperson.Ifso,thedeprivationoflife,libertyorsecurityofthepersonsimplydoesnotconformtotherequirementsofs.7.Theinquirythenshiftstos.1oftheCharter,atwhichpointthegovernmenthasanopportunitytoestablishthattheflawedprocessisneverthelessjustifiedhavingregard,notably,tothepublicinterest.

23Itfollowsthatwhileadministrativeconstraintsassociatedwiththecontextofnationalsecuritymayinformtheanalysisonwhetheraparticularprocessisfundamentallyunfair,securityconcernscannotbeusedtoexcuseproceduresthatdonotconformtofundamentaljusticeatthes.7stageoftheanalysis.Ifthecontextmakesitimpossibletoadheretotheprinciplesoffundamentaljusticeintheirusualform,adequatesubstitutesmaybefound.Buttheprinciplesmustberespectedtopassthehurdleofs.7.Thatisthebottomline.

24Intheinstantcase,thecontextisthedetention,incidentaltotheirremovaloranattempttoremovethemfromthecountry,ofpermanentresidentsandforeignnationalswhotheministersconcludeposeathreattonationalsecurity.Thiscontextmayimposecertainadministrativeconstraintsthatmaybeproperlyconsideredatthes.7stage.Fulldisclosureoftheinformationreliedonmaynotbepossible.Theexecutivebranchofgovernmentmayberequiredtoactquickly,withoutrecourse,atleastinthefirstinstance,tothejudicialproceduresnormallyrequiredforthedeprivationoflibertyorsecurityoftheperson.

25Atthesametime,itisacontextthatmayhaveimportant,indeedchilling,consequencesforthedetainee.Theseriousnessoftheindividualinterestsatstakeformspartofthecontextualanalysis.AsthisCourtstatedinSuresh,“[t]hegreatertheeffectonthelifeoftheindividualbythedecision,thegreatertheneedforproceduralprotectionstomeetthecommonlawdutyoffairnessandtherequirementsoffundamentaljusticeunders.7oftheCharter”(para.118).Thus,“factualsituationswhicharecloseroranalogoustocriminalproceedingswillmeritgreatervigilancebythecourts”:Dehghaniv.Canada(MinisterofEmploymentandImmigration),1993CanLII128(S.C.C.),[1993]1S.C.R.1053,atp.1077,perIacobucciJ.

26ThepotentialconsequencesofdeportationcombinedwithallegationsofterrorismhavebeenunderaharshspotlightduetotherecentreportoftheCommissionofInquiryintotheActionsof


CanadianOfficialsinRelationtoMaherArar.Mr.Arar,aCanadiancitizenborninSyria,wasdetainedbyAmericanofficialsanddeportedtoSyria.Thereportconcludesthatitis“verylikelythat,inmakingthedecisionstodetainandremoveMr.ArartoSyria,theU.S.authoritiesreliedoninformationaboutMr.ArarprovidedbytheRCMP”,includingunfoundedsuspicionslinkingMr.Arartoterroristgroups:ReportoftheEventsRelatingtoMaherArar:AnalysisandRecommendations(2006)(“ArarInquiry”),atp.30 .InSyria,Mr.Ararwastorturedanddetainedunderinhumaneconditionsforover11months.Inhisreport,CommissionerO’Connorrecommendsenhancedreviewandaccountabilitymechanismsforagenciesdealingwithnationalsecurity,includingnotonlytheRoyalCanadianMountedPolice,butalsoCitizenshipandImmigrationCanadaandtheCanadaBorderServicesAgency.Henotesthattheseimmigration-relatedinstitutionscanhaveanimportantimpactonindividualrightsbutthatthereisalackoftransparencysurroundingtheiractivitiesbecausetheiractivitiesofteninvolvesensitivenationalsecurityinformationthatcannotbedisclosedtothepublic:ANewReviewMechanismfortheRCMP’sNationalSecurityActivities(2006),atpp.562–65.Moreover,thesensitivenatureofsecurityinformationmeansthatinvestigationsleadtofewerprosecutions.This,inturn,restrictstheabilityofcourtstoguaranteeindividualrights:“Unlesschargesarelaid,…thechoiceofinvestigativetargets,methodsofinformationcollectionandexchange,andmeansofinvestigationgenerallywillnotbesubjecttojudicialscrutiny,mediacoverageorpublicdebate”(p.439).

27Theproceduresrequiredtoconformtotheprinciplesoffundamentaljusticemustreflecttheexigenciesofthesecuritycontext.Yettheycannotbepermittedtoerodetheessenceofs.7.Theprinciplesoffundamentaljusticecannotbereducedtothepointwheretheyceasetoprovidetheprotectionofdueprocessthatliesattheheartofs.7oftheCharter.Theprotectionmaynotbeascompleteasinacasewherenationalsecurityconstraintsdonotoperate.Buttosatisfys.7,meaningfulandsubstantialprotectiontheremustbe.

3.RelevantPrinciplesofFundamentalJustice28Theoverarchingprincipleoffundamentaljusticethatapplieshereisthis:beforethestatecandetainpeopleforsignificantperiodsoftime,itmustaccordthemafairjudicialprocess:NewBrunswick(MinisterofHealthandCommunityServices)v.G.(J.),1999CanLII653(S.C.C.),[1999]3S.C.R.46.“Itisanancientandvenerableprinciplethatnopersonshalllosehisorherlibertywithoutdueprocessaccordingtothelaw,whichmustinvolveameaningfuljudicialprocess”:Ferras,atpara.19.Thisprincipleemergedintheeraoffeudalmonarchy,intheformoftherighttobebroughtbeforeajudgeonamotionofhabeascorpus.ItremainsasfundamentaltoourmodernconceptionoflibertyasitwasinthedaysofKingJohn.

29Thisbasicprinciplehasanumberoffacets.Itcomprisestherighttoahearing.Itrequiresthatthehearingbebeforeanindependentandimpartialmagistrate.Itdemandsadecisionbythemagistrateonthefactsandthelaw.Anditentailstherighttoknowthecaseputagainstone,andtherighttoanswerthatcase.Preciselyhowtheserequirementsaremetwillvarywiththecontext.Butfors.7tobesatisfied,eachofthemmustbemetinsubstance.

30TheIRPAprocessincludesahearing.Theprocessconsistsoftwophases,oneexecutiveandonejudicial.Thereisnohearingattheexecutivephasethatresultsinissuanceofthecertificate.However,thisisfollowedbyareviewbeforeajudge,wherethenamedpersonisaffordedahearing.Thus,thefirstrequirement,thatofahearing,ismet.

31Questionsarise,however,ontheotherrequirements,namely:thatthejudgebeindependentandimpartial;thatthejudgemakeajudicialdecisionbasedonthefactsandthelaw;andfinally,thatthenamedpersonbeaffordedanopportunitytomeetthecaseputagainsthimorherbybeinginformedofthatcaseandbeingallowedtoquestionorcounterit.IconcludethattheIRPAschememeetsthefirstrequirementofindependenceandimpartiality,butfailstosatisfythesecondandthirdrequirements,whichareinterrelatedhere.


4.IstheJudgeIndependentandImpartial?32Althoughthescopeoftherequiredhearingcanvaryaccordingtocontext(Bakerv.Canada(MinisterofCitizenshipandImmigration),1999CanLII699(S.C.C.),[1999]2S.C.R.817),ahearingmustinclude“[a]nindependentjudicialphaseandanimpartialjudge”(Ferras,atpara.25).Thisrequirementisalsoconsistentwiththeunwrittenconstitutionalprincipleofjudicialindependence:ReferencereRemunerationofJudgesoftheProvincialCourtofPrinceEdwardIsland,1997CanLII317(S.C.C.),[1997]3S.C.R.3.Ithasalsobeencalled“thecornerstoneofthecommonlawdutyofproceduralfairness”(Applicationunders.83.28oftheCriminalCode(Re),2004SCC43(CanLII),[2004]2S.C.R.248,2004SCC42(“ReBagri”),atpara.81),andisnecessaryinordertoensurejudicialimpartiality:R.v.Lippé,1990CanLII18(S.C.C.),[1991]2S.C.R.114,atp.139.Itisnotenoughthatthejudgeinfactbeindependentandimpartial;fundamentaljusticerequiresthatthejudgealsoappeartobeindependentandimpartial.Thisflowsfromthefactthatjudicialindependencehastwofacets:actualindependenceandperceivedindependence(Valentev.TheQueen,1985CanLII25(S.C.C.),[1985]2S.C.R.673,atp.689).

33TheIRPAschemeprovidesforthecertificateissuedbytheministerstobereviewedbya“designatedjudge”,ajudgeoftheFederalCourtofCanada.Thequestionhereiswhether,fromaninstitutionalperspective,theroleassignedtodesignatedjudgesundertheIRPAleadstoaperceptionthatindependenceandimpartialityarecompromised.

34Thedesignatedjudgehasbeenaptlydescribedasthe“cornerstoneoftheprocedureestablishedbyParliament”intheIRPA(Charkaoui(Re),2003FC1419(CanLII),[2004]3F.C.R.32,2003FC1419,atpara.120,perNoëlJ.).Thejudgeisthesoleavenueofreviewforthenamedpersonandtheonlypersoncapableofprovidingtheessentialjudicialcomponentoftheprocess.

35Whenreviewingthecertificate,thejudgeseesallthematerialreliedonbythegovernment.Butifthegovernmentclaimsconfidentialityforcertainmaterial,thejudgecannotsharethismaterialwiththenamedperson.Thejudgemustmakehisorherdecisionwithouthearinganyobjectionsthenamedpersonmightbeabletomake,wereheorshegrantedaccesstothewholeoftherecord.Partofthehearingmaybeheldincamera,withonlythejudgeandthegovernmentlawyersintheroom.Thenamedpersonisnotthere.Hisorherlawyerisnotthere.Thereisnoonetospeakforthepersonortotesttheevidenceputagainsthimorher.

36ThesecircumstancesmaygiverisetoaperceptionthatthedesignatedjudgeundertheIRPAmaynotbeentirelyindependentandimpartialasbetweenthestateandthepersonnamedinthecertificate.SpeakingataconferenceinMarch2002,HugessenJ.oftheFederalCourtexpresseduneasewiththeroleassignedtodesignatedjudgesundertheIRPA:

Wedonotlikethisprocessofhavingtositalonehearingonlyoneparty,andlookingatthematerialsproducedbyonlyoneparty….

IfthereisonethingthatIlearnedinmypracticeattheBar,andIhavemanagedtoretainitthroughalltheseyears,itisthatgoodcross-examinationrequiresreallycarefulpreparationandagoodknowledgeofyourcase.Andbydefinition,judgesdonotdothat.…[W]edonothaveanyknowledgeexceptwhatisgiventousandwhenitisonlygiventousbyonepartywearenotwellsuitedtotestthematerialsthatareputbeforeus.[Emphasisadded.]

(J.K.Hugessen,“WatchingtheWatchers:DemocraticOversight”,inD.Daubneyetal.,eds.,Terrorism,LawandDemocracy:HowisCanadachangingfollowingSeptember11?(2002),381,atp.384 )

37Threerelatedconcernsarisewithrespecttoindependenceandimpartiality.FirstistheconcernthattheIRPAmaybeperceivedtodeprivethejudgeofhisorherindependentjudicialroleandco-optthejudgeasanagentoftheexecutivebranchofgovernment.Secondistheconcernthatthe


designatedjudgefunctionsasaninvestigativeofficerratherthanajudge.Thirdistheconcernthatthejudge,whoseroleincludescompensatingforthefactthatthenamedpersonmaynothaveaccesstomaterialandmaynotbepresentatthehearing,willbecomeassociatedwiththisperson’scase.

38Thefirstconcernislinkedtothedegreeofdeferencethatthejudgeaccordstotheministers’conclusionthatthefactssupportedtheissuanceofacertificateandthedetentionofthenamedperson.Judgesworkingundertheprocesshaveeschewedanoverlydeferentialapproach,insistinginsteadonasearchingexaminationofthereasonablenessofthecertificateonthematerialplacedbeforethem:Jaballah,Re2004FC299(CanLII),(2004),247F.T.R.68,2004FC299;Charkaoui(Re),2004FCA421(CanLII),[2005]2F.C.R.299,2004FCA421,atpara.74.Theyarecorrecttodoso,havingregardtothelanguageoftheprovision,thehistoryofitsadoption,andtheroleofthedesignatedjudge.

39First,anactiveroleforthedesignatedjudgeisjustifiedbythelanguageoftheIRPAandthestandardsofreviewitestablishes.Thestatuterequiresthedesignatedjudgetodeterminewhetherthecertificateis“reasonable”,andemphasizesfactualscrutinybyinstructingthejudgetodoso“onthebasisoftheinformationandevidenceavailable”(s.80(1)).Thislanguage,aswellastheaccompanyingfactual,legalandadministrativecontext,leadstotheconclusionthatthedesignatedjudgemustreviewthecertificateonastandardofreasonableness.Likewise,sincetheministers’decisiontodetainapermanentresidentisbasedon“reasonablegroundstobelieve”(s.82(1)),“[i]tislogicaltoassumethatinsubsequentreviewsbyadesignatedjudge,thesamestandardwillbeused”(Charkaoui(Re),2005FC248(CanLII),[2005]3F.C.R.389,2005FC248,atpara.30).The“reasonablegroundstobelieve”standardrequiresthejudgetoconsiderwhether“thereisanobjectivebasis…whichisbasedoncompellingandcredibleinformation”:Mugeserav.Canada(MinisterofCitizenshipandImmigration),2005SCC40(CanLII),[2005]2S.C.R.100,2005SCC40,atpara.114.“Reasonablegroundstobelieve”istheappropriatestandardforjudgestoapplywhenreviewingacontinuationofdetentionunderthecertificateprovisionsoftheIRPA.TheIRPAthereforedoesnotaskthedesignatedjudgetobedeferential,but,rather,askshimorhertoengageinasearchingreview.

40ThisinterpretationoftheIRPAisconfirmedbystatementsmadeinthecourseoftheadoptionofthescheme.WhileitwasconsideringtheIRPA,theStandingCommitteeonCitizenshipandImmigrationwasinformedthattheroleofthedesignatedjudgewouldbetoavoidtreatmentthatisunfair,arbitrary,orinviolationofdueprocess(TranscriptoftheStandingCommitteeonCitizenshipandImmigration,Thursday,April26,2001(online)).

41Finally,thefactthatthedesignatedjudgemayhaveaccesstomoreinformationthantheministersdidinmakingtheirinitialdecisiontoissueacertificateanddetainsuggeststhatthejudgepossessesrelativeexpertiseonthemattersatissueandisnomererubberstamp:Charkaoui(Re),2003FC1419(CanLII),2003FC1419,atpara.125.

42Iconcludethatanon-deferentialroleforthedesignatedjudgegoessomedistancetowardalleviatingthefirstconcern,thatthejudgewillbeperceivedtobeinthecampofthegovernment.

43Thesecondconcernisthatthejudgemaybeseentofunctionmoreasaninvestigatorthanasanindependentandimpartialadjudicator.Thelawisclearthattheprinciplesoffundamentaljusticearebreachedifajudgeisreducedtoanexecutive,investigativefunction.Atthesametime,themerefactthatajudgeisrequiredtoassistinaninvestigativeactivitydoesnotdeprivethejudgeoftherequisiteindependence.InReBagri,theCourtconsideredwhetheraprovisionoftheCriminalCode,R.S.C.1985,c.C‒46,thatprovidesforajudgetoassistthestateingatheringevidenceintheinvestigationofaterroristoffenceviolateds.7ors.11(d)oftheCharter.Unders.83.28,ajudgecanorderapersontoattendbeforethejudge(orbeforeanotherjudge)togiveinformationonasuspectedpastorfutureterrorismoffence,andsupervisethetakingoftheperson’sstatement.Thehearingcantakeplaceincamera,anditsveryexistencecanbekeptsecret.Criticsofs.83.28


arguedthatitco-optsthepresidingjudgeintoperforminganinvestigativeratherthananadjudicativerole.Themajorityheldthattheprovisionviolatesneithers.7oftheCharternortheunwrittenprincipleofjudicialindependence.Itstressedthats.83.28givesjudgesbroaddiscretiontovarythetermsoftheordermadeunderitandtoensurethatconstitutionalandcommonlawvaluesarerespected.Italsonotedthatjudgesroutinelyparticipateininvestigationsinthecriminalcontextandthattheirroleinthesesituationsisto“actasacheckagainststateexcess”(para.86),andemphasizedthatinthecontextofinvestigativehearingsthejudgewasnotaskedtoquestiontheindividualorchallengetheevidence,butmerelytomediateandensurethefairnessoftheproceeding.However,itwarnedthat“oncelegislationinvokestheaidofthejudiciary,wemustremainvigilanttoensurethattheintegrityofitsroleisnotcompromisedordiluted”(para.87).

44TheIRPAprovisionsbeforetheCourt,likes.83.28oftheCriminalCode,preservetheessentialelementsofthejudicialrole.ItisevenclearerinthiscasethaninReBagrithattheprocessestablishedbythelegislationatissueisnotpurelyinvestigative;thejudge’staskofdeterminingwhetherthecertificateis“reasonable”seemsonitsfaceclosertoadjudicativereviewofanexecutiveactthantoinvestigation.Ontheotherhand,theprovisionsseemtorequirethejudgetoactivelyvettheevidence,anactivitythattheCourtviewedassuspectinReBagri.NoëlJ.,thedesignatedjudgeforMr.Charkaoui’scase,stated:

DesignatedjudgespresideoverhearingsandheartheMinister’switnesses.Theyexaminewitnessesthemselvesastheneedarises.Theyexaminethedocumentscarefullytodeterminewhichinformationisrelatedtosecurityandwhichinformationisnot.Inordertodoso,theyexamine,amongotherthings,thesourcesoftheinformation,thewayinwhichitwasobtained,thereliabilityofthesourcesandthemethodused,andwhetheritispossibletocorroboratetheinformationbyothermeans.

2003FC1419(CanLII),(2003FC1419,atpara.101)

Thesecommentssuggestthatwhilethedesignatedjudgemaybemoreinvolvedinvettingandskepticallyscrutinizingtheevidencethanwouldbethecaseinanormaljudicialhearing,thejudgeisneverthelessperformingtheadjudicativefunctionofevaluation,ratherthantheexecutivefunctionofinvestigation.However,caremustbetakentoavoidallowingtheinvestigativeaspectoftheprocesstooverwhelmitsadjudicativeaspect.

45Thethirdconcernisthatthejudge’sroleassoleprotectorofthenamedperson’sinterestmayassociatethejudge,infactorperception,withthatinterest.Ajudgewhoisobligedtotakeona“defence”roleintheabsenceofcounselmayunconsciouslybecomeassociatedwiththatcamp:R.v.Taublerreflex,(1987),20O.A.C.64,atp.71;R.v.Turlonreflex,(1989),49C.C.C.(3d)186(Ont.C.A.),atp.191.Thisconcernmustbebalancedagainsttheoppositeconcernthatthejudgemayappeartobepartofthegovernmentschemeandhenceinthegovernment’scamp.Thecriticalconsideration,however,isthattheIRPApermits—indeedrequires—thejudgetoconductthereviewinanindependentandjudicialfashion.Providedthejudgedoesso,theschemecannotbecondemnedonthegroundthatheorsheis,infactorperception,inthenamedperson’scamp.

46Iconcludethat,onitsface,theIRPAprocessisdesignedtopreservetheindependenceandimpartialityofthedesignatedjudge,asrequiredbys.7.Properlyfollowedbyjudgescommittedtoasearchingreview,itcannotbesaidtocompromisetheperceivedindependenceandimpartialityofthedesignatedjudge.

47InotethatthisconclusionconclusivelyrebutstheappellantCharkaoui’scontentionthattheIRPAbreachestheunwrittenconstitutionalprincipleofjudicialindependenceaffirmedinProvincialCourtJudges’Assn.ofNewBrunswickv.NewBrunswick(MinisterofJustice),2005SCC44(CanLII),[2005]2S.C.R.286,2005SCC44.

5.IstheDecisionBasedontheFactsandtheLaw?


48Tocomplywiths.7oftheCharter,themagistratemustmakeadecisionbasedonthefactsandthelaw.Intheextraditioncontext,theprinciplesoffundamentaljusticehavebeenheldtorequire,“ataminimum,ameaningfuljudicialassessmentofthecaseonthebasisoftheevidenceandthelaw.Ajudgeconsiderstherespectiverightsofthelitigantsorpartiesandmakesfindingsoffactonthebasisofevidenceandappliesthelawtothosefindings.Bothfactsandlawmustbeconsideredforatrueadjudication.SinceBonham’sCase[(1610),8Co.Rep.113b,77E.R.646],theessenceofajudicialhearinghasbeenthetreatmentoffactsrevealedbytheevidenceinconsiderationofthesubstantiverightsofthepartiesassetdownbylaw”(Ferras,atpara.25).Theindividualandsocietalinterestsatstakeinthecertificateofinadmissibilitycontextsuggestsimilarrequirements.

49TheIRPAprocessatissueseekstomeetthisrequirementbyplacingmaterialbeforethejudgeforevaluation.Asapracticalmatter,mostifnotallofthematerialthatthejudgeconsidersisproducedbythegovernmentandcanbevettedforreliabilityandsufficiencyonlybythejudge.Thenormalstandardsusedtoensurethereliabilityofevidenceincourtdonotapply:s.78(j).Thenamedpersonmaybeshownlittleornoneofthematerialreliedonbytheministersandthejudge,andmaythusnotbeinapositiontoknoworchallengethecaseagainsthimorher.Itfollowsthatthejudge’sdecision,whilebasedontheevidencebeforehimorher,maynotbebasedonalloftheevidenceavailable.

50Therearetwotypesofjudicialsystems,andtheyensurethatthefullcaseisplacedbeforethejudgeintwodifferentways.Ininquisitorialsystems,asinContinentalEurope,thejudgetakeschargeofthegatheringofevidenceinanindependentandimpartialway.Bycontrast,anadversarialsystem,whichisthenorminCanada,reliesontheparties—whoareentitledtodisclosureofthecasetomeet,andtofullparticipationinopenproceedings—toproducetherelevantevidence.ThedesignatedjudgeundertheIRPAdoesnotpossessthefullandindependentpowerstogatherevidencethatexistintheinquisitorialprocess.Atthesametime,thenamedpersonisnotgiventhedisclosureandtherighttoparticipateintheproceedingsthatcharacterizetheadversarialprocess.Theresultisaconcernthatthedesignatedjudge,despitehisorherbesteffortstogetalltherelevantevidence,maybeobliged—perhapsunknowingly—tomaketherequireddecisionbasedononlypartoftherelevantevidence.AsHugessenJ.hasnoted,theadversarialsystemprovides“therealwarrantythattheoutcomeofwhatwedoisgoingtobefairandjust”(p.385);withoutit,thejudgemayfeel“alittlebitlikeafigleaf”(ProceedingsoftheMarch2002Conference,atp.386).

51JudgesoftheFederalCourthaveworkedassiduouslytoovercomethedifficultiesinherentintheroletheIRPAhasassignedtothem.Totheircredit,theyhaveadoptedapseudo-inquisitorialroleandsoughttoseriouslytesttheprotecteddocumentationandinformation.Buttheroleremainspseudo-inquisitorial.Thejudgeisnotaffordedthepowertoindependentlyinvestigateallrelevantfactsthattrueinquisitorialjudgesenjoy.Atthesametime,sincethenamedpersonisnotgivenafullpictureofthecasetomeet,thejudgecannotrelyonthepartiestopresentmissingevidence.Theresultisthat,attheendoftheday,onecannotbesurethatthejudgehasbeenexposedtothewholefactualpicture.

52Similarconcernsarisewithrespecttotherequirementthatthedecisionbebasedonthelaw.Withoutknowledgeoftheinformationputagainsthimorher,thenamedpersonmaynotbeinapositiontoraiselegalobjectionsrelatingtotheevidence,ortodeveloplegalargumentsbasedontheevidence.Thenamedpersonis,tobesure,permittedtomakelegalrepresentations.Butwithoutdisclosureandfullparticipationthroughouttheprocess,heorshemaynotbeinapositiontoputforwardafulllegalargument.

6.Isthe“CasetoMeet”PrincipleSatisfied?53Lastbutnotleast,afairhearingrequiresthattheaffectedpersonbeinformedofthecaseagainsthimorher,andbepermittedtorespondtothatcase.Thisrightiswellestablishedinimmigrationlaw.Thequestioniswhethertheprocedures“provideanadequateopportunityfor[an


affectedperson]tostatehiscaseandknowthecasehehastomeet”(Singh,atp.213).Similarly,inSuresh,theCourtheldthatapersonfacingdeportationtotortureunders.53(1)(b)oftheformerImmigrationAct,R.S.C.1985,c.I-2,must“[n]otonly…beinformedofthecasetobemet…[but]alsobegivenanopportunitytochallengetheinformationoftheMinisterwhereissuesastoitsvalidityarise”(para.123).

54UndertheIRPA’scertificatescheme,thenamedpersonmaybedeprivedofaccesstosomeoralloftheinformationputagainsthimorher,whichwoulddenythepersontheabilitytoknowthecasetomeet.Withoutthisinformation,thenamedpersonmaynotbeinapositiontocontradicterrors,identifyomissions,challengethecredibilityofinformantsorrefutefalseallegations.Thisproblemisseriousinitself.Italsounderliestheconcerns,discussedabove,abouttheindependenceandimpartialityofthedesignatedjudge,andtheabilityofthejudgetomakeadecisionbasedonthefactsandlaw.

55Confidentialityisaconstantpreoccupationofthecertificatescheme.Thejudge“shallensure”theconfidentialityoftheinformationonwhichthecertificateisbasedandofanyotherevidenceif,intheopinionofthejudge,disclosurewouldbeinjurioustonationalsecurityortothesafetyofanyperson:s.78(b).Attherequestofeitherminister“atanytimeduringtheproceedings”,thejudge“shallhear”informationorevidenceintheabsenceofthenamedpersonandhisorhercounselif,intheopinionofthejudge,itsdisclosurewouldbeinjurioustonationalsecurityortothesafetyofanyperson:s.78(e).Thejudge“shallprovide”thenamedpersonwithasummaryofinformationthatenableshimorhertobereasonablyinformedofthecircumstancesgivingrisetothecertificate,butthesummarycannotincludeanythingthatwould,intheopinionofthejudge,beinjurioustonationalsecurityortothesafetyofanyperson:s.78(h).Ultimately,thejudgemayhavetoconsiderinformationthatisnotincludedinthesummary:s.78(g).Intheresult,thejudgemayberequiredtodecidethecase,whollyorinpart,onthebasisofinformationthatthenamedpersonandhisorhercounselneversee.Thenamedpersonmayknownothingofthecasetomeet,andalthoughtechnicallyaffordedanopportunitytobeheard,maybeleftinapositionofhavingnoideaastowhatneedstobesaid.

56Thesameconcernsarisewithrespecttothedetentionreviewprocessunderss.83and84oftheIRPA.Section78appliestodetentionreviewsunders.83,andithasbeenfoundtoapplytodetentionreviewsunders.84(2):Almreiv.Canada(MinisterofCitizenshipandImmigration),2005FCA54(CanLII),[2005]3F.C.R.142,2005FCA54,atparas.71–72.

57Therighttoknowthecasetobemetisnotabsolute.Canadianstatutessometimesprovideforexparteorincamerahearings,inwhichjudgesmustdecideimportantissuesafterhearingfromonlyoneside.InRodgers,themajorityofthisCourtdeclinedtorecognizenoticeandparticipationasinvariableconstitutionalnorms,emphasizingacontext-sensitiveapproachtoproceduralfairness.AndinGoodisv.Ontario(MinistryofCorrectionalServices),2006SCC31(CanLII),[2006]2S.C.R.32,2006SCC31,theCourt,perRothsteinJ.,heldthatwhile“[h]earingfrombothsidesofanissueisaprincipletobedepartedfromonlyinexceptionalcircumstances”,intheordinarycase,ajudgewouldbe“wellequipped…todeterminewhetherarecordissubjectto[solicitor-client]privilege”withouttheassistanceofcounselonbothsides(para.21).

58Moreparticularly,theCourthasrepeatedlyrecognizedthatnationalsecurityconsiderationscanlimittheextentofdisclosureofinformationtotheaffectedindividual.InChiarelli,thisCourtfoundthattheSecurityIntelligenceReviewCommitteecould,ininvestigatingcertificatesundertheformerImmigrationAct,1976,S.C.1976–77,c.52(laterR.S.C.1985,c.I-2),refusetodisclosedetailsofinvestigationtechniquesandpolicesources.Thecontextforelucidatingtheprinciplesoffundamentaljusticeinthatcaseincludedthestate’s“interestineffectivelyconductingnationalsecurityandcriminalintelligenceinvestigationsandinprotectingpolicesources”(p.744).InSuresh,thisCourtheldthatarefugeefacingthepossibilityofdeportationtotorturewasentitledtodisclosureofalltheinformationonwhichtheMinisterwasbasinghisorherdecision,“[s]ubjectto


privilegeorsimilarvalidreasonsforreduceddisclosure,suchassafeguardingconfidentialpublicsecuritydocuments”(para.122).And,inRubyv.Canada(SolicitorGeneral),2002SCC75(CanLII),[2002]4S.C.R.3,2002SCC75,theCourtupheldthesectionofthePrivacyAct,R.S.C.1985,c.P-21,thatmandatesincameraandexparteproceedingswherethegovernmentclaimsanexemptionfromdisclosureongroundsofnationalsecurityormaintenanceofforeignconfidences.TheCourtmadeclearthatthesesocietalconcernsformedpartoftherelevantcontextfordeterminingthescopeoftheapplicableprinciplesoffundamentaljustice(paras.38–44).

59Insomecontexts,substitutesforfulldisclosuremaypermitcompliancewiths.7oftheCharter.Forexample,inRodgers,themajorityoftheCourtupheldtheconstitutionalityofexpartehearingsforapplicationsunders.487.055oftheCriminalCodetotakeDNAsamplesfromlistedmultipleoffenders,onthegroundthattheprotectionsParliamenthadputinplacewereadequate(paras.51–52).Similarly,inChiarelli,theCourtupheldthelackofdisclosureonthebasisthattheinformationdisclosedbywayofsummaryandtheopportunitytocallwitnessesandcross-examineRCMPwitnesseswhotestifiedincamerasatisfiedtherequirementsoffundamentaljustice.AndinRuby,theCourtheldthatthesubstitutemeasuresprovidedbyParliamentsatisfiedtheconstitutionalrequirementsofproceduralfairness(para.42).ArbourJ.stated:“Insuchcircumstances,fairnessismetthroughotherproceduralsafeguardssuchassubsequentdisclosure,judicialreviewandrightsofappeal”(para.40).

60Wherelimiteddisclosureorexpartehearingshavebeenfoundtosatisfytheprinciplesoffundamentaljustice,theintrusiononlibertyandsecurityhastypicallybeenlessseriousthanthateffectedbytheIRPA:Rodgers,atpara.53.Itisonethingtodepriveapersonoffullinformationwherefingerprintingisatstake,andquiteanothertodenyhimorherinformationwheretheconsequencesareremovalfromthecountryorindefinitedetention.Moreover,eveninthelessintrusivesituations,courtshaveinsistedthatdisclosurebeasspecificandcompleteaspossible.

61Inthecontextofnationalsecurity,non-disclosure,whichmaybeextensive,coupledwiththegraveintrusionsonlibertyimposedonadetainee,makesitdifficult,ifnotimpossible,tofindsubstituteproceduresthatwillsatisfys.7.Fundamentaljusticerequiressubstantialcompliancewiththeveneratedprinciplethatapersonwhoselibertyisinjeopardymustbegivenanopportunitytoknowthecasetomeet,andanopportunitytomeetthecase.Yettheimperativeoftheprotectionofsocietymayprecludethis.Informationmaybeobtainedfromothercountriesorfrominformersonconditionthatitnotbedisclosed.Oritmaysimplybesocriticalthatitcannotbedisclosedwithoutriskingpublicsecurity.Thisisarealityofourmodernworld.Ifs.7istobesatisfied,eitherthepersonmustbegiventhenecessaryinformation,orasubstantialsubstituteforthatinformationmustbefound.Neitheristhecasehere.

62TheonlyprotectiontheIRPAaccordsthenamedpersonisareviewbyadesignatedjudgetodeterminewhetherthecertificateisreasonable.Theministersarguethatthisisadequateinthatitmaintainsa“delicatebalance”betweentherighttoafairhearingandtheneedtoprotectconfidentialsecurityintelligenceinformation.Theappellants,ontheotherhand,arguethatthejudge’sefforts,howeverconscientious,cannotprovideaneffectivesubstituteforinformedparticipation.

63Iagreewiththeappellants.Theissueatthes.7stage,asdiscussedabove,isnotwhetherthegovernmenthasstrucktherightbalancebetweentheneedforsecurityandindividualliberties;thatistheissueatthestageofs.1justificationofanestablishedlimitationonaCharterright.Thequestionatthes.7stageiswhetherthebasicrequirementsofproceduraljusticehavebeenmet,eitherintheusualwayorinanalternativefashionappropriatetothecontext,havingregardtothegovernment’sobjectiveandtheinterestsofthepersonaffected.ThefairnessoftheIRPAprocedurerestsentirelyontheshouldersofthedesignatedjudge.Thoseshoulderscannotbythemselvesbeartheheavyburdenofassuring,infactandappearance,thatthedecisiononthereasonablenessofthecertificateisimpartial,isbasedonafullviewofthefactsandlaw,and


reflectsthenamedperson’sknowledgeofthecasetomeet.Thejudge,workingundertheconstraintsimposedbytheIRPA,simplycannotfillthevacuumleftbytheremovalofthetraditionalguaranteesofafairhearing.Thejudgeseesonlywhattheministersputbeforehimorher.Thejudge,knowingnothingelseaboutthecase,isnotinapositiontoidentifyerrors,findomissionsorassessthecredibilityandtruthfulnessoftheinformationinthewaythenamedpersonwouldbe.Althoughthejudgemayaskquestionsofthenamedpersonwhenthehearingisreopened,thejudgeispreventedfromaskingquestionsthatmightdisclosetheprotectedinformation.Likewise,sincethenamedpersondoesnotknowwhathasbeenputagainsthimorher,heorshedoesnotknowwhatthedesignatedjudgeneedstohear.Ifthejudgecannotprovidethenamedpersonwithasummaryoftheinformationthatissufficienttoenablethepersontoknowthecasetomeet,thenthejudgecannotbesatisfiedthattheinformationbeforehimorherissufficientorreliable.Despitethejudge’sbesteffortstoquestionthegovernment’switnessesandscrutinizethedocumentaryevidence,heorsheisplacedinthesituationofaskingquestionsandultimatelydecidingtheissuesonthebasisofincompleteandpotentiallyunreliableinformation.

64Thejudgeisnothelpless;heorshecannotecontradictionsbetweendocuments,insistthattherebeatleastsomeevidenceonthecriticalpoints,andmakelimitedinferencesonthevalueandcredibilityoftheinformationfromitssource.Nevertheless,thejudge’sactivityonbehalfofthenamedpersonisconfinedtowhatispresentedbytheministers.Thejudgeisthereforenotinapositiontocompensateforthelackofinformedscrutiny,challengeandcounter-evidencethatapersonfamiliarwiththecasecouldbring.Suchscrutinyisthewholepointoftheprinciplethatapersonwhoselibertyisinjeopardymustknowthecasetomeet.Herethatprinciplehasnotmerelybeenlimited;ithasbeeneffectivelygutted.Howcanonemeetacaseonedoesnotknow?

7.ConclusiononSection765IntheIRPA,anattempthasbeenmadetomeettherequirementsoffundamentaljusticeessentiallythroughonemechanism—thedesignatedjudgechargedwithreviewingthecertificateofinadmissibilityandthedetention.ToParliament’scredit,asincereattempthasbeenmadetogivethedesignatedjudgethepowersnecessarytodischargetheroleinanindependentmanner,basedonthefactsandthelaw.Yet,thesecrecyrequiredbytheschemedeniesthenamedpersontheopportunitytoknowthecaseputagainsthimorher,andhencetochallengethegovernment’scase.This,inturn,underminesthejudge’sabilitytocometoadecisionbasedonalltherelevantfactsandlaw.DespitethebesteffortsofjudgesoftheFederalCourttobreathejudiciallifeintotheIRPAprocedure,itfailstoassurethefairhearingthats.7oftheCharterrequiresbeforethestatedeprivesapersonoflife,libertyorsecurityoftheperson.IthereforeconcludethattheIRPA’sprocedurefordeterminingwhetheracertificateisreasonabledoesnotconformtotheprinciplesoffundamentaljusticeasembodiedins.7oftheCharter.Thesameconclusionnecessarilyappliestothedetentionreviewproceduresunderss.83and84oftheIRPA.

8.IstheLimitJustifiedUnderSection1oftheCharter?66TheCharterdoesnotguaranteerightsabsolutely.Thestateispermittedtolimitrights—includingthes.7guaranteeoflife,libertyandsecurity—ifitcanestablishthatthelimitsaredemonstrablyjustifiableinafreeanddemocraticsociety.Thissaid,violationsofs.7arenoteasilysavedbys.1.InReB.C.MotorVehicleAct,1985CanLII81(S.C.C.),[1985]2S.C.R.486,LamerJ.(ashethenwas)stated,forthemajority:

Section1may,forreasonsofadministrativeexpediency,successfullycometotherescueofanotherwiseviolationofs.7,butonlyincasesarisingoutofexceptionalconditions,suchasnaturaldisasters,theoutbreakofwar,epidemics,andthelike.[p.518]

Therightsprotectedbys.7—life,liberty,andsecurityoftheperson—arebasictoourconceptionofafreeanddemocraticsociety,andhencearenoteasilyoverriddenbycompetingsocialinterests.Itfollowsthatviolationsoftheprinciplesoffundamentaljustice,specificallythe


righttoafairhearing,aredifficulttojustifyunders.1:G.(J.).Nevertheless,thetaskmaynotbeimpossible,particularlyinextraordinarycircumstanceswhereconcernsaregraveandthechallengescomplex.

67Thetesttobeappliedindeterminingwhetheraviolationcanbejustifiedunders.1,knownastheOakestest(R.v.Oakes,1986CanLII46(S.C.C.),[1986]1S.C.R.103),requiresapressingandsubstantialobjectiveandproportionalmeans.Afindingofproportionalityrequires:(a)meansrationallyconnectedtotheobjective;(b)minimalimpairmentofrights;and(c)proportionalitybetweentheeffectsoftheinfringementandtheimportanceoftheobjective.

68TheprotectionofCanada’snationalsecurityandrelatedintelligencesourcesundoubtedlyconstitutesapressingandsubstantialobjective.Moreover,theIRPA’sprovisionsregardingthenon-disclosureofevidenceatcertificatehearingsarerationallyconnectedtothisobjective.Thefactsonthispointareundisputed.Canadaisanetimporterofsecurityinformation.ThisinformationisessentialtothesecurityanddefenceofCanada,anddisclosurewouldadverselyaffectitsflowandquality:seeRuby.ThisleavesthequestionwhetherthemeansParliamenthaschosen,i.e.acertificateprocedureleadingtodetentionanddeportationofnon-citizensonthegroundthattheyposeathreattoCanada’ssecurity,minimallyimpairstherightsofnon-citizens.

69Therealitiesthatconfrontmoderngovernmentsfacedwiththechallengeofterrorismarestark.Intheinterestofsecurity,itmaybenecessarytodetainpersonsdeemedtoposeathreat.Atthesametime,securityconcernsmayprecludedisclosureoftheevidenceonwhichthedetentionisbased.Butthesetensionsarenotnew.Asweshallsee,Canadahasalreadydevisedprocessesthatgofurtherinpreservings.7rightswhileprotectingsensitiveinformation;untilrecently,oneofthesesolutionswasapplicableinthesecuritycertificatecontext.NorarethesetensionsuniquetoCanada:inthespecificcontextofanti-terrorismlegislation,theUnitedKingdomusesspecialcounseltoprovideameasureofprotectiontothedetainedperson’sinterests,whilepreservingtheconfidentialityofinformationthatmustbekeptsecret.ThesealternativessuggestthattheIRPAregime,whichplacesonthejudgetheentireburdenofprotectingtheperson’sinterest,doesnotminimallyimpairtherightsofnon-citizens,andhencecannotbesavedunders.1oftheCharter.

(a)LessIntrusiveAlternatives70ThisisnotthefirsttimeCanadahashadtoreconcilethedemandsofnationalsecuritywiththeproceduralrightsguaranteedbytheCharter.Inanumberoflegalcontexts,Canadiangovernmentinstitutionshavefoundwaystoprotectsensitiveinformationwhiletreatingindividualsfairly.Insomesituations,thesolutionhasinvolvedtheuseofspecialcounsel,inamannercloselyapproximatinganadversarialprocess.

71TheSecurityIntelligenceReviewCommittee(“SIRC”)isanindependentreviewbodythatmonitorstheactivitiesoftheCanadianSecurityIntelligenceService(“CSIS”).Establishedin1984undertheCanadianSecurityIntelligenceServiceAct,S.C.1984,c.21(nowR.S.C.1985,c.C-23),SIRCiscomposedofthreetofivemembersofthePrivyCouncilwhoarenotcurrentlyservinginParliament.UndertheformerImmigrationAct,SIRChadthepowertovetfindingsofinadmissibilitybasedonallegedthreatstonationalsecurity;aministerialcertificatecouldnotbeissuedwithoutaSIRCinvestigation.IftheMinisterofEmploymentandImmigrationandtheSolicitorGeneralwereoftheopinionthatanon-citizenwasinadmissibleduetoinvolvementinorganizedcrime,espionage,subversion,actsofviolence,etc.,theywerefirstobligedtomakeareporttoSIRC:ImmigrationAct,s.39(2).SIRCwouldtheninvestigatethegroundsforthereport,providingtheaffectedpersonwith“astatementsummarizingsuchinformationavailabletoitaswillenablethepersontobeasfullyinformedaspossibleofthecircumstancesgivingrisetothereport”:s.39(6).Aftercompletingitsinvestigation,SIRCwouldsendareporttotheGovernorinCouncilcontainingitsrecommendationastowhetherasecuritycertificateshouldbeissued:s.39(9).Acopyofthesamereportwouldbeprovidedtothenon-citizen:s.39(10).IftheGovernorinCouncilwassatisfiedthatthenon-citizenwasinadmissibleonappropriategrounds,heorshecouldthendirecttheMinisterof


EmploymentandImmigrationtoissueasecuritycertificate:s.40(1).

72Empoweredtodevelopitsowninvestigativeprocedures,SIRCestablishedaformaladversarialprocess,with“acourt-likehearingroom”and“proceduresthatmirroredjudicialproceedingsasmuchaspossible”.TheprocessalsoincludedanindependentpaneloflawyerswithsecurityclearancestoactascounseltoSIRC(M.Rankin,“TheSecurityIntelligenceReviewCommittee:ReconcilingNationalSecuritywithProceduralFairness”(1990),3C.J.A.L.P.173,atp.179) .

73ASIRCmemberpresidingatahearinghadthediscretiontobalancenationalsecurityagainstproceduralfairnessindetermininghowmuchinformationcouldbedisclosedtotheaffectedperson.Thenon-citizenandhisorhercounselwouldnormallybepresentinthehearingroom,exceptwhensensitivenationalsecurityevidencewastendered.(ThepresidingSIRCmemberwoulddecidewhethertoexcludethenon-citizenduringcertaintestimony.)Atsuchajuncture,independent,security-clearedSIRCcounselwouldactonbehalfofthenon-citizen.TheSIRCcounselwereinstructedtocross-examinewitnessesforCSIS“withasmuchvigourasonewouldexpectfromthecomplainant’scounsel”(Rankin,atp.184;SIRCAnnualReport1988–1989(1989)(“SIRCAnnualReport”),atp.64).Attheendofthisexparteportionofthehearing,theexcludedpersonwouldbebroughtbackintotheroomandprovidedwithasummary,whichwouldinclude“thegistoftheevidence,withoutdisclosingthenationalsecurityinformation”(SIRCAnnualReport,atp.64).TheSIRCcounselwouldnegotiatethecontentsofthesummarywithCSIS,underthesupervisionofthepresidingSIRCmember(ibid.).Theaffectedpersonandhisorhercounselwouldthenbeallowedtoasktheirownquestions,andtocross-examineonthebasisofthesummary(Rankin,atp.184).

74InthewordsofProfessorRankin,SIRC’sproceduresrepresented“anattempttopreservethebestfeaturesoftheadversarialprocesswithitsinsistenceonvigorouscross-examination,butnottorunafouloftherequirementsofnationalsecurity”(p.185).Theseproceduresillustratehowspecialcounselcanprovidenotonlyaneffectivesubstituteforinformedparticipation,butcanalsohelpbolsteractualinformedparticipationbytheaffectedperson.Sincethespecialcounselhadaroleindetermininghowmuchinformationwouldbeincludedinthesummary,disclosurewaspresumablymorecompletethanwouldotherwisehavebeenthecase.Sensitivenationalsecurityinformationwasstillprotected,buttheexecutivewasrequiredtojustifythebreadthofthisprotection.

75In1988Parliamentaddeds.40.1totheImmigrationActtoempowertheMinisterandtheSolicitorGeneraltoissuesecuritycertificatesinrespectofforeignnationals.Section40.1effectivelybypassedtheSIRCinvestigationprocesswhereforeignnationalswereconcerned,insteadreferringthecertificatetoadesignatedjudgeoftheFederalCourtforsubsequentreview.SecuritycertificatesinrespectofpermanentresidentsremainedsubjecttoSIRCscrutinyuntil2002,whenParliamentrepealedtheImmigrationActandreplaceditwiththeIRPA.

76CertainelementsofSIRCprocessmaybeinappropriatetothecontextofterrorism.Wherethereisariskofcatastrophicactsofviolence,itwouldbefoolhardytorequirealengthyreviewprocessbeforeacertificatecouldbeissued.ButitwasnotsuggestedbeforethisCourtthatSIRC’sspecialcounselsystemhadnotfunctionedwellinconnectionwiththereviewofcertificatesundertheImmigrationAct,norwasanyexplanationgivenforwhy,underthenewsystemforvettingcertificatesandreviewingdetentions,aspecialcounselprocesshadnotbeenretained.

77TheSIRCprocessisnottheonlyexampleoftheCanadianlegalsystemstrikingabetterbalancebetweentheprotectionofsensitiveinformationandtheproceduralrightsofindividuals.AcurrentexampleisfoundintheCanadaEvidenceAct,R.S.C.1985,c.C-5(“CEA”),whichpermitsthegovernmenttoobjecttothedisclosureofinformationongroundsofpublicinterest,inproceedingstowhichtheActapplies:ss.37to39.UndertherecentamendmentstotheCEAsetoutintheAnti-terrorismAct,S.C.2001,c.41,aparticipantinaproceedingwhoisrequiredtodiscloseorexpectstodisclosepotentiallyinjuriousorsensitiveinformation,orwhobelievesthat


suchinformationmightbedisclosed,mustnotifytheAttorneyGeneralaboutthepotentialdisclosure,andtheAttorneyGeneralmaythenapplytotheFederalCourtforanorderprohibitingthedisclosureoftheinformation:ss.38.01,38.02,38.04.Thejudgeenjoysconsiderablediscretionindecidingwhethertheinformationshouldbedisclosed.Ifthejudgeconcludesthatdisclosureoftheinformationwouldbeinjurioustointernationalrelations,nationaldefenceornationalsecurity,butthatthepublicinterestindisclosureoutweighsinimportancethepublicinterestinnon-disclosure,thejudgemayorderthedisclosureofallorpartoftheinformation,onsuchconditionsasheorsheseesfit.NosimilarresidualdiscretionexistsundertheIRPA,whichrequiresjudgesnottodiscloseinformationthedisclosureofwhichwouldbeinjurioustonationalsecurityortothesafetyofanyperson.Moreover,theCEAmakesnoprovisionfortheuseofinformationthathasnotbeendisclosed.WhiletheCEAdoesnotaddressthesameproblemsastheIRPA,andhenceisoflimitedassistancehere,itillustratesParliament’sconcernunderotherlegislationforstrikingasensitivebalancebetweentheneedforprotectionofconfidentialinformationandtherightsoftheindividual.

78CrownanddefencecounselintherecentAirIndiatrial(R.v.Malik,2005BCSC350(CanLII),[2005]B.C.J.No.521(QL),2005BCSC350)werefacedwiththetaskofmanagingsecurityandintelligenceinformationandattemptingtoprotectproceduralfairness.TheCrownwasinpossessionofthefruitsofa17-year-longinvestigationintotheterroristbombingofapassengeraircraftandarelatedexplosioninNarita,Japan.Itwithheldmaterialonthebasisofrelevance,nationalsecurityprivilegeandlitigationprivilege.Crownanddefencecounselcametoanagreementunderwhichdefencecounselobtainedconsentsfromtheirclientstoconductapreliminaryreviewofthewithheldmaterial,onwrittenundertakingsnottodisclosethematerialtoanyone,includingtheclient.Disclosureinaspecifictrial,toaselectgroupofcounselonundertakings,maynotprovideaworkingmodelforgeneraldeportationlegislationthatmustdealwithawidevarietyofcounselinahostofcases.Nevertheless,theproceduresadoptedintheAirIndiatrialsuggestthatasearchshouldbemadeforalessintrusivesolutionthantheonefoundintheIRPA.

79TheArarInquiryprovidesanotherexampleoftheuseofspecialcounselinCanada.TheCommissionhadtoexamineconfidentialinformationrelatedtotheinvestigationofterrorismplotswhilepreservingMr.Arar’sandthepublic’sinterestindisclosure.TheCommissionwasgovernedbytheCEA.Tohelpassessclaimsforconfidentiality,theCommissionerwasassistedbyindependentsecurity-clearedlegalcounselwithabackgroundinsecurityandintelligence,whoserolewastoactasamicuscuriaeonconfidentialityapplications.Thescheme’saimwastoensurethatonlyinformationthatwasrightlysubjecttonationalsecurityconfidentialitywaskeptfrompublicview.Thereisnoindicationthattheseproceduresincreasedtheriskofdisclosureofprotectedinformation.

80Finally,InotethespecialadvocatesystememployedbytheSpecialImmigrationAppealsCommission(“SIAC”)intheUnitedKingdom.SIACandthespecialadvocatesystemwerecreatedinresponsetoChahalv.UnitedKingdom,15November1996,ReportsofJudgmentsandDecisions1996-V,p.1831,inwhichtheEuropeanCourtofHumanRightshadheldthattheproceduretheninplacewasinadequate.ThecourtinChahalcommentedfavourablyontheideaofsecurity-clearedcounselinstructedbythecourt,identifyingitasbeingCanadianinorigin(perhapsreferringtotheproceduredevelopedbySIRC).

81TheU.K.’sspecialadvocatesystemresemblestheCanadianSIRCmodel.Section6(1)oftheSpecialImmigrationAppealsCommissionAct1997(U.K.),1997,c.68,statesthatthespecialadvocateisappointedto“representtheinterestsofanappellant”inanyproceedingsbeforeSIACfromwhichtheappellantandhisorherlegalrepresentativesareexcluded.Section6(4),however,specifiesthatthespecialadvocate“shallnotberesponsibletothepersonwhoseinterestsheisappointedtorepresent”.Rule35oftheSpecialImmigrationAppealsCommission(Procedure)Rules2003,S.I.2003/1034,setsoutthespecialadvocate’sthreemainfunctions:(1)tomake


submissionstotheCommissionatanyhearingsfromwhichtheappellantandtheappellant’srepresentativesareexcluded;(2)tocross-examinewitnessesatanysuchhearings;and(3)tomakewrittensubmissionstotheCommission.Afterseeingtheprotectedinformation,thespecialadvocatemaynotcommunicatewiththeappellantortheappellant’srepresentativewithoutauthorizationfromtheCommission:rule36.Ifthespecialadvocaterequestssuchauthorization,theCommissiongivestheSecretaryofStateanopportunitytoobjecttotheproposedcommunicationbeforedecidingwhethertoauthorizeit:rule38.

82TheuseofspecialadvocateshasreceivedwidespreadsupportinCanadianacademiccommentary.ProfessorRoach,forexample,criticizestheCourtofAppeal’sconclusioninCharkaoui(Re),2004FCA421(CanLII),2004FCA421,thatsuchameasureisnotconstitutionallyrequired:

Inmyview,thisapproachwasinerrorbecauseincameraandexpartehearingsoffendbasicnotionsofafairhearingandspecialadvocatesconstituteoneexampleofanapproachthatisamoreproportionateresponsetoreconcilingtheneedtokeepsomeinformationsecretandtheneedtoensureasmuchfairnessandadversarialchallengeaspossible.[Emphasisadded.]

(K.Roach,“TenWaystoImproveCanadianAnti-TerrorismLaw”(2006),51Crim.L.Q.102,atp.120 )

83Thissaid,theU.K.’sspecialadvocatesystemhasalsobeencriticizedfornotgoingfarenough.InApril2005,theHouseofCommonsConstitutionalAffairsCommitteepublishedareportontheoperationofSIACandtheuseofspecialadvocates(TheoperationoftheSpecialImmigrationAppealsCommission(SIAC)andtheuseofSpecialAdvocates).TheCommitteelistedthreeimportantdisadvantagesfacedbyspecialadvocates:(1)oncetheyhaveseentheconfidentialmaterial,theycannot,subjecttonarrowexceptions,takeinstructionsfromtheappellantortheappellant’scounsel;(2)theylacktheresourcesofanordinarylegalteam,forthepurposeofconductinginsecretafulldefence;and(3)theyhavenopowertocallwitnesses(para.52).

84Despitethesedifficulties,SIACitselfhascommentedfavourablyontheassistanceprovidedbyspecialadvocates,statingthatasaresultofthe“rigorouscross-examination”ofthegovernment’sevidencebythespecialadvocate,itwassatisfiedthatthegovernment’sassertionswereunsupportedbytheevidence(M.v.SecretaryofStatefortheHomeDepartment,[2004]UKSIAC17/2002(BAILII),March8,2004,atpara.10).TheEnglandandWalesCourtofAppealupheldSIAC’sdecision:[2004]2AllE.R.863,[2004]EWCACiv324.

(b)TheIRPASchemeDoesNotMinimallyImpairtheNamedPerson’sRights85Parliamentisnotrequiredtousetheperfect,orleastrestrictive,alternativetoachieveitsobjective:R.v.Chaulk,1990CanLII34(S.C.C.),[1990]3S.C.R.1303.However,bearinginmindthedeferencethatisowedtoParliamentinitslegislativechoices,thealternativesdiscusseddemonstratethattheIRPAdoesnotminimallyimpairthenamedperson’srights.

86UndertheIRPA,thegovernmenteffectivelydecideswhatcanbedisclosedtothenamedperson.Notonlyisthenamedpersonnotshowntheinformationandnotpermittedtoparticipateinproceedingsinvolvingit,butnoonebutthejudgemaylookattheinformationwithaviewtoprotectingthenamedperson’sinterests.Whythedraftersofthelegislationdidnotprovideforspecialcounseltoobjectivelyreviewthematerialwithaviewtoprotectingthenamedperson’sinterest,aswasformerlydoneforthereviewofsecuritycertificatesbySIRCandispresentlydoneintheUnitedKingdom,hasnotbeenexplained.Thespecialcounselsystemmaynotbeperfectfromthenamedperson’sperspective,giventhatspecialcounselcannotrevealconfidentialmaterial.But,withoutcompromisingsecurity,itbetterprotectsthenamedperson’ss.7interests.

87IconcludethattheIRPA’sproceduresfordeterminingwhetheracertificateisreasonableand


fordetentionreviewcannotbejustifiedasminimalimpairmentsoftheindividual’srighttoajudicialdeterminationonthefactsandthelawandrighttoknowandmeetthecase.MechanismsdevelopedinCanadaandabroadillustratethatthegovernmentcandomoretoprotecttheindividualwhilekeepingcriticalinformationconfidentialthanithasdoneintheIRPA.PreciselywhatmoreshouldbedoneisamatterforParliamenttodecide.Butitisclearthatmoremustbedonetomeettherequirementsofafreeanddemocraticsociety.

B.DoestheDetentionofPermanentResidentsorForeignNationalsUndertheIRPAInfringeSections7,9,10(c)or12oftheCharter,andifso,AretheInfringementsJustifiedUnderSection1oftheCharter?

1.TimeConstraintsonReviewforForeignNationals:BreachofSection9orSection10(c)?88Section9oftheCharterguaranteesfreedomfromarbitrarydetention.Thisguaranteeexpressesoneofthemostfundamentalnormsoftheruleoflaw.Thestatemaynotdetainarbitrarily,butonlyinaccordancewiththelaw.TheappellantMr.AlmreiarguesthatdetentionundertheIRPAisarbitrarywithrespecttoforeignnationals,firstbecauseitpermitstheirdetentionwithoutwarrantandwithoutregardtotheirpersonalcircumstances,andsecondbecauseitpreventsreviewuntil120daysafterthecertificateisconfirmed.Inbothrespects,foreignnationalsaretreateddifferentlythanpermanentresidents.

89IwouldrejectMr.Almrei’sargumentthatautomaticdetentionofforeignnationalsisarbitrarybecauseitiseffectedwithoutregardtothepersonalcircumstancesofthedetainee.Detentionisnotarbitrarywherethereare“standardsthatarerationallyrelatedtothepurposeofthepowerofdetention”:P.W.Hogg,ConstitutionalLawofCanada(loose-leafed.),vol.2,atp.46–5 .Thetriggeringeventforthedetentionofaforeignnationalisthesigningofacertificatestatingthattheforeignnationalisinadmissibleongroundsofsecurity,violatinghumanorinternationalrights,seriouscriminalityororganizedcriminality.Thesecuritygroundisbasedonthedangerposedbythenamedperson,andthereforeprovidesarationalfoundationforthedetention.R.v.Swain,1991CanLII104(S.C.C.),[1991]1S.C.R.933,inwhichthisCourtstruckdownaprovisionoftheCriminalCoderequiringthatanaccusedacquittedofanoffenceonthebasisofaninsanitydefencebedetainedautomaticallywithoutahearing,isdistinguishable.TheCourtheldthatitwasarbitrarytorequirethedetentionofpersonsacquittedbyreasonofmentaldisorderwithouttheapplicationofanystandardwhatsoever,because“[n]otalloftheseindividualswillbedangerous”:atp.1013,perLamerC.J.Butinthenationalsecuritycontext,thesignatureofacertificateunders.77oftheIRPAonthegroundofsecurityisnecessarilyrelatedtothedangerousnessoftheindividual.Whilenotalltheothergroundsfortheissuanceofacertificateunders.77(1)areconclusiveofthedangerposedbythenamedperson,dangerisnottheonlyconstitutionalbasisuponwhichanindividualcanbedetained,andarbitrarinessofdetentionundertheothergroundswasnotargued.

90ThisleavesMr.Almrei’sargumentthattheIRPAimposesarbitrarydetentionbecauseitpreventsreviewofthedetentionofforeignnationalsuntil120daysafterthecertificateisconfirmed.Whetherthroughhabeascorpusorstatutorymechanisms,foreignnationals,likeothers,havearighttopromptreviewtoensurethattheirdetentioncomplieswiththelaw.Thisprincipleisaffirmedins.10(c)oftheCharter.Itisalsorecognizedinternationally:seeRasulv.Bush,542U.S.466(2004);Zadvydasv.Davis,533U.S.678(2001);art.5oftheConventionfortheProtectionofHumanRightsandFundamentalFreedoms,213U.N.T.S.221(“EuropeanConventiononHumanRights”);Slivenkov.Latvia[GC],No.48321/99,ECHR2003-X,p.229.Whilethegovernmentacceptsthisprinciple,itarguesthatthe120-dayperiodins.84(2)issufficientlyprompt,relying,asdidthecourtsbelow,onthefactthatforeignnationalscanapplyforreleaseanddepartfromCanadaatanytime.

91Thelackofreviewforforeignnationalsuntil120daysafterthereasonablenessofthecertificatehasbeenjudiciallydeterminedviolatestheguaranteeagainstarbitrarydetentionins.9


oftheCharter,aguaranteewhichencompassestherighttopromptreviewofdetentionunders.10(c)oftheCharter.Permanentresidentsnamedincertificatesareentitledtoanautomaticreviewwithin48hours.Thesametimeframeforreviewofdetentionappliestobothpermanentresidentsandforeignnationalsunders.57oftheIRPA.AndundertheCriminalCode,apersonwhoisarrestedwithorwithoutawarrantistobebroughtbeforeajudgewithin24hours,orassoonaspossible:s.503(1).Theseprovisionsindicatetheseriousnesswithwhichthedeprivationoflibertyisviewed,andofferguidanceastoacceptabledelaysbeforethisdeprivationisreviewed.

92Thegovernmentsubmitsthatthedetentionprovisions,andmorespecificallytheabsenceofreviewforforeignnationalsuntil120daysafterthecertificatehasbeendeterminedtobereasonable,reflectitsobjectiveofcreatingatimelyremovalprocessforindividualsthoughttoconstituteadangertonationalsecurity,andassertsthatwhentheprovisionsweredrafted,itwasthoughtthattheremovalprocesswouldbesofastthattherewouldbenoneedforreview.Thisismoreanadmissionoftheexcessivenessofthe120-dayperiodthanajustification.

93Itisclearthattheremaybeaneedforsomeflexibilityregardingtheperiodforwhichasuspectedterroristmaybedetained.Confrontedwithaterroristthreat,stateofficialsmayneedtoactimmediately,intheabsenceofafullydocumentedcase.Itmaytakesometimetoverifyanddocumentthethreat.Wherestateofficialsactexpeditiously,thefailuretomeetanarbitrarytargetofafixednumberofhoursshouldnotmeantheautomaticreleaseoftheperson,whomaywellbedangerous.However,thiscannotjustifythecompletedenialofatimelydetentionreview.Permanentresidentswhoposeadangertonationalsecurityarealsomeanttoberemovedexpeditiously.Ifthisobjectivecanbepursuedwhileprovidingpermanentresidentswithamandatorydetentionreviewwithin48hours,thenhowcanadenialofreviewforforeignnationalsfor120daysafterthecertificateisconfirmedbeconsideredaminimalimpairment?

94Iconcludethatthelackoftimelyreviewofthedetentionofforeignnationalsviolatess.9ands.10(c)andcannotbesavedbys.1.

2.DoExtendedPeriodsofDetentionUndertheSchemeViolateSection7ortheSection12GuaranteeAgainstCruelandUnusualTreatment?95ThequestionatthispointiswhethertheextendeddetentionthatmayoccurundertheIRPAviolatestheguaranteeagainstcruelandunusualtreatmentunders.12oftheCharter.Thethresholdforbreachofs.12ishigh.AsstatedbyLamerJ.inSmith,treatmentorpunishmentiscruelandunusualifitis“soexcessiveastooutrage[our]standardsofdecency”:R.v.Smith,1987CanLII64(S.C.C.),[1987]1S.C.R.1045,atp.1067;alsoR.v.Wiles,2005SCC84(CanLII),[2005]3S.C.R.895,2005SCC84,atpara.4.

96Thes.12issueofcruelandunusualtreatmentisintertwinedwiths.7considerations,sincetheindefinitenessofdetention,aswellasthepsychologicalstressitmaycause,isrelatedtothemechanismsavailabletothedetaineetoregainliberty.Itisnotthedetentionitself,orevenitslength,thatisobjectionable.Detentionitselfisneverpleasant,butitisonlycruelandunusualinthelegalsenseifitviolatesacceptednormsoftreatment.Denyingthemeansrequiredbytheprinciplesoffundamentaljusticetochallengeadetentionmayrenderthedetentionarbitrarilyindefiniteandsupporttheargumentthatitiscruelorunusual.(Thesamemaybetrueofonerousconditionsofreleasethatseriouslyrestrictaperson’slibertywithoutaffordinganopportunitytochallengetherestrictions.)Conversely,asystemthatpermitsthedetaineetochallengethedetentionandobtainareleaseifoneisjustifiedmayleadtotheconclusionthatthedetentionisnotcruelandunusual:seeSahinv.Canada(MinisterofCitizenshipandImmigration),1994CanLII3521(F.C.),[1995]1F.C.214(T.D.),perRothsteinJ.(ashethenwas).

97Mr.Almrei’sfirstsubmissionisthat“thecombinationofthelegislativeschemeandtheconditionsofdetention…[transforms]theAppellant’sdetentionintoonethatiscruelandunusual”.Iwouldrejectthissubmission.ThisCourthasnot,initspastdecisions,recognizeds.12asa


mechanismtochallengetheoverallfairnessofaparticularlegislativeregime.

98Morenarrowly,however,ithasbeenrecognizedthatindefinitedetentionincircumstanceswherethedetaineehasnohopeofreleaseorrecoursetoalegalprocesstoprocurehisorherreleasemaycausepsychologicalstressandthereforeconstitutecruelandunusualtreatment:Eur.CourtH.R.,Soeringcase,judgmentof7July1989,SeriesA,No.161,atpara.111;compareLyons,atpp.339–41.However,forthereasonsthatfollow,IconcludethattheIRPAdoesnotimposecruelandunusualtreatmentwithinthemeaningofs.12oftheCharterbecause,althoughdetentionsmaybelengthy,theIRPA,properlyinterpreted,providesaprocessforreviewingdetentionandobtainingreleaseandforreviewingandamendingconditionsofrelease,whereappropriate.

99Onitsface,theIRPApermitsdetentionpendingdeportationonsecuritygrounds.Inreality,however,areleasefromdetentionmaybedifficulttoobtain.TheFederalCourtsuggestedthatMr.Almrei“holdsthekeytohisrelease”:Almreiv.Canada(MinisterofCitizenshipandImmigration),2004FC420(CanLII),[2004]4F.C.R.327,2004FC420,atpara.138.Butvoluntarydeparturemaybeimpossible.Apersonnamedinacertificateofinadmissibilitymayhavenowheretogo.Othercountriesmayassumesuchapersontobeaterroristandarelikelytorefuseentry,orthepersonmayfeartortureonhisorherreturn.Deportationmayfailforthesamereasons,despitetheobservationthat“[i]nourjurisdiction,atthismoment,deportationtotortureremainsapossibility”inexceptionalcircumstances:Almrei,2005FCA54(CanLII),2005FCA54,atpara.127.Theonlyrealisticoptionmaybejudicialrelease.

100Inthecaseofapermanentresident,detentioniscontinuedifthejudgeissatisfiedthattheperson“continuestobeadangertonationalsecurityortothesafetyofanyperson,orisunlikelytoappearataproceedingorforremoval”:s.83(3).Theministersbeartheinitialburdenofestablishingthatthesecriteriaaremet:Charkaoui(Re),2003FC882(CanLII),[2004]1F.C.R.528,2003FC882,atpara.36.Inthecaseofaforeignnational,releasemaybegrantedifthejudgeis“satisfiedthattheforeignnationalwillnotberemovedfromCanadawithinareasonabletimeandthatthereleasewillnotposeadangertonationalsecurityortothesafetyofanyperson”:s.84(2).Unlikes.83(3),s.84(2)placestheonusonthedetainee:seeAhaniv.Canada(MinisterofCitizenshipandImmigration)2000CanLII15800(F.C.A.),(2000),24Admin.L.R.(3d)171(F.C.A.).

101Courtsthusfarhaveunderstoodtheseprovisionstosetahighstandardforrelease.Ininterpretingthepredecessortos.84(2)undertheImmigrationAct,theFederalCourtofAppealheldthatjudicialrelease“cannotbeanautomaticoreasythingtoachieve”,andthatit“isnottoberoutinelyobtained”:Ahani,atpara.13.Atthesametime,courtshavereadtheprovisionasallowingthejudgetoinquirewhethertermsandconditionscouldmakethereleasesafe.ThisisaninvitationthatFederalCourtjudgeshaverightlyaccepted:Harkatv.Canada(MinisterofCitizenshipandImmigration)2006FC628(CanLII),[2007]1F.C.R.321,2006FC628,atpara.82;Almreiv.Canada(MinisterofCitizenshipandImmigration)2005FC1645(CanLII),(2005),270F.T.R.1,2005FC1645,atparas.419–26.Likewise,whenreviewingthedetentionofapermanentresidentunders.83(3),judgeshaveexaminedthecontextthatwouldsurroundreleaseinordertodeterminewhetherthepersonwouldposeasecurityrisk:Charkaoui(Re),2005FC248(CanLII),2005FC248,atparas.71–73.

102ThecasesatbarillustratethedifficultythatmaybeencounteredinseekingreleasefromadetentionimposedundertheIRPA.Atthetimeofwriting,Mr.Almrei,aforeignnational,hasbeendetainedforoverfiveyears.HecannotbedeporteduntiltheMinisterissuesanopinionthatheconstitutesadangertothepublic.Buttwo“dangeropinions”havealreadybeenquashedbytheFederalCourt,thelastoneinMarch2005.TheMinisterhasyettoissueanewone.IndismissingMr.Almrei’sapplicationforjudicialrelease,Layden-StevensonJ.heldthatMr.Almreihadestablishedthathisremovalwasnotimminent,wasnota“donedeal”andwouldnotoccurwithinareasonabletime(para.272).However,sheheldthatshewascompelledtokeephimindetentionbecauseshefoundthathisreleasewouldposeadangertonationalsecurityunders.84(2):Almrei,2005FC


1645(CanLII),2005FC1645.Mr.Almreiarguesthatasfarasheisconcerned,hisdetentionisindefinite.

103Mr.Harkathasbeenreleasedfromdetention,butremainsunderhousearrestandcontinuoussurveillancebytheCanadaBorderServicesAgency(“CBSA”)andtheRCMPbyvirtueofanorderbyDawsonJ.HemustatalltimeswearanelectronicmonitoringdeviceandobtaintheCBSA’spermissionbeforeleavinghishouse.Hemustatalltimesbeunderthesupervisionofeitherhiswifeorhismother-in-law.AccesstohisresidenceisrestrictedtoindividualswhohavepostedsuretiesandtoMr.Harkat’slegalcounsel,aswellastoemergency,fire,policeandhealthcareprofessionals.TheCBSAispermittedtointerceptalltelephoneandoralcommunicationsbetweenMr.Harkatandanythirdparty.Mr.HarkatisforbiddentouseanycellularphoneoranycomputerwithInternetconnectivity.BreachofanyofthenumerousconditionsinDawsonJ.’sorderwouldleadtoautomaticrearrest;however,theseconditionsaresubjecttoongoingreviewandamendment.ThegovernmentisattemptingtodeporthimtoAlgeria;whetherthisispossiblemaydependontheoutcomeoflegalprocessesthatarestillpending.

104Mr.Charkaouihasbeenreleasedfromdetentionunderconditionsthataresomewhatlessonerous:Charkaoui(Re),2005FC248(CanLII),2005FC248,atpara.86.Theseconditionshaveaseriousimpactonhisliberty,andheremainsinjeopardyofbeingrearrestedforabreachofhisconditions.Buttheconditionsaresubjecttoongoingreviewandhavebeenamendedseveraltimessubsequenttohisrelease.Morelegalavenuesremaintobeexplored.WhetherthegovernmentwillseektodeportMr.Charkaouiordetainhimanewmaydependontheoutcomeofhisapplicationforprotectionandthedeterminationofthereasonablenessofhiscertificate.

105ItisthusclearthatwhiletheIRPAinprincipleimposesdetentiononlypendingdeportation,itmayinfactpermitlengthyandindeterminatedetentionorlengthyperiodssubjecttoonerousreleaseconditions.Thenextquestioniswhetherthisviolatess.7ors.12basedontheapplicablelegalprinciples.

106ThisCourthaspreviouslyconsideredthepossibilityofindefinitedetentioninthecriminalcontext.InLyons,amajorityoftheCourtheldthat“dangerousoffender”legislationallowingforindefinitedetentiondidnotconstitutecruelandunusualtreatmentorpunishmentwithinthemeaningofs.12oftheCharterbecausethestatutoryschemeincludesaparoleprocessthat“ensuresthatincarcerationisimposedforonlyaslongasthecircumstancesoftheindividualcaserequire”(p.341,perLaForestJ.).Itistruethatajudgecanimposethedangerousoffenderdesignationonlyonapersonwhohasbeenconvictedofaseriouspersonalinjuryoffence;thisCourtindicatedthatasentenceofindeterminatedetention,appliedwithrespecttoafuturecrimeoracrimethathadalreadybeenpunished,wouldviolates.7oftheCharter(pp.327–28,perLaForestJ.).Buttheuseincriminallawofindeterminatedetentionasatoolofsentencing—servingbothapunitiveandapreventivefunction—doesnotestablishtheconstitutionalityofpreventivedetentionmeasuresintheimmigrationcontext.

107TheprinciplesunderlyingLyonsmustbeadaptedinthecaseatbartotheimmigrationcontext,whichrequiresaperiodoftimeforreviewofthenamedperson’srighttoremaininCanada.Drawingonthem,Iconcludethatthes.7principlesoffundamentaljusticeandthes.12guaranteeoffreedomfromcruelandunusualtreatmentrequirethat,whereapersonisdetainedorissubjecttoonerousconditionsofreleaseforanextendedperiodunderimmigrationlaw,thedetentionortheconditionsmustbeaccompaniedbyameaningfulprocessofongoingreviewthattakesintoaccountthecontextandcircumstancesoftheindividualcase.Suchpersonsmusthavemeaningfulopportunitiestochallengetheircontinueddetentionortheconditionsoftheirrelease.

108Thetypeofprocessrequiredhasbeenexploredincasesinvolvinganalogoussituations.InSahin,RothsteinJ.hadoccasiontoexamineasituationofongoingdetention(forreasonsunrelatedtonationalsecurity)undertheImmigrationAct.Heconcludedthat“whatamountstoanindefinitedetentionforalengthyperiodoftimemay,inanappropriatecase,constituteadeprivationof


libertythatisnotinaccordancewiththeprinciplesoffundamentaljustice”(p.229)andheldthatongoingdetentionundertheImmigrationActcouldbeconstitutionalifitresultedfromtheweighingofanumberoffactors(atpp.231–32):

Thefollowinglist,which,ofcourse,isnotexhaustiveofallconsiderations,seemstometoatleastaddressthemoreobvious[considerations].Needlesstosay,theconsiderationsrelevanttoaspecificcase,andtheweighttobeplaceduponthem,willdependuponthecircumstancesofthecase.

(1)Reasonsforthedetention,i.e.istheapplicantconsideredadangertothepublicoristhereaconcernthathewouldnotappearforremoval.Iwouldthinkthatthereisastrongercaseforcontinuingalongdetentionwhenanindividualisconsideredadangertothepublic.

(2)Lengthoftimeindetentionandlengthoftimedetentionwilllikelycontinue.Ifanindividualhasbeenheldindetentionforsometimeasinthecaseatbar,andafurtherlengthydetentionisanticipated,oriffuturedetentiontimecannotbeascertained,Iwouldthinkthatthesefactswouldtendtofavourrelease.

(3)Hastheapplicantortherespondentcausedanydelayorhaseithernotbeenasdiligentasreasonablypossible.Unexplaineddelayandevenunexplainedlackofdiligenceshouldcountagainsttheoffendingparty.

(4)Theavailability,effectivenessandappropriatenessofalternativestodetentionsuchasoutrightrelease,bailbond,periodicreporting,confinementtoaparticularlocationorgeographicarea,therequirementtoreportchangesofaddressortelephonenumbers,detentioninaformthatcouldbelessrestrictivetotheindividual,etc.

AconsiderationthatIthinkdeservessignificantweightistheamountoftimethatisanticipateduntilafinaldecision,determining,onewayortheother,whethertheapplicantmayremaininCanadaormustleave.

109FactorsregardingreleaseareconsideredinanotherpartoftheIRPAandtheaccompanyingImmigrationandRefugeeProtectionRegulations,SOR/2002-227(“IRPRegulations”).Whenanon-citizennotnamedinacertificateisdetainedbecauseheorsheisinadmissibleandalsoisadangertothepublicorisunlikelytoappearforexamination,thenon-citizenisentitledtodetentionreviewsbeforetheImmigrationandRefugeeBoard:IRPA,ss.55to57.Indeterminingwhetherthenon-citizenshouldbeheldorreleased,theBoardmusttakeintoaccount“prescribedfactors”:(a)thereasonfordetention;(b)thelengthoftimeindetention;(c)whetherthereareanyelementsthatcanassistindeterminingthelengthoftimethatdetentionislikelytocontinueand,ifso,thatlengthoftime;(d)anyunexplaineddelaysorunexplainedlackofdiligencecausedbytheDepartmentorthepersonconcerned;and(e)theexistenceofalternativestodetention(s.58IRPAandr.248IRPRegulations).

110IconcludethatextendedperiodsofdetentionunderthecertificateprovisionsoftheIRPAdonotviolatess.7and12oftheCharterifaccompaniedbyaprocessthatprovidesregularopportunitiesforreviewofdetention,takingintoaccountallrelevantfactors,includingthefollowing:

(a)ReasonsforDetention111Thecriteriaforsigningacertificateare“security,violatinghumanorinternationalrights,seriouscriminalityororganizedcriminality”(s.77).Detentionpursuanttoacertificateisjustifiedonthebasisofacontinuingthreattonationalsecurityortothesafetyofanyperson.Whilethecriteriaforreleaseunders.83oftheIRPAalsoincludethelikelihoodthatapersonwillappearata


proceedingorforremoval,athreattonationalsecurityortothesafetyofapersonisamoreimportantfactorforthepurposeofjustifyingcontinueddetention.Themoreseriousthethreat,thegreaterwillbethejustificationfordetention.

(b)LengthofDetention112Thelengthofthedetentiontodateisanimportantfactor,bothfromtheperspectiveoftheindividualandfromtheperspectiveofnationalsecurity.Thelongertheperiod,thelesslikelythatanindividualwillremainathreattosecurity:“Theimminenceofdangermaydeclinewiththepassageoftime”:Charkaoui(Re),2005FC248(CanLII),2005FC248,atpara.74.NoëlJ.concludedthatMr.Charkaouicouldbereleasedsafelyfromdetentionbecausehislongperiodofdetentionhadcuthimofffromwhateverassociationswithextremistgroupshemayhavehad.Likewise,inMr.Harkat’scase,DawsonJ.basedherdecisiontoreleaseMr.Harkatinpartonthefactthatthelongperiodofdetentionmeantthat“hisabilitytocommunicatewithpersonsintheIslamicextremistnetworkhasbeendisrupted”:Harkat,2006FC628(CanLII),2006FC628,atpara.86.

113Alongerperiodofdetentionwouldalsosignifythatthegovernmentwouldhavehadmoretimetogatherevidenceestablishingthenatureofthethreatposedbythedetainedperson.Whilethegovernment’sevidentiaryonusmaynotbeheavyattheinitialdetentionreview(seeabove,atpara.93),itmustbeheavierwhenthegovernmenthashadmoretimetoinvestigateanddocumentthethreat.

(c)ReasonsfortheDelayinDeportation114Whenreviewingdetentionspendingdeportation,judgeshaveassessedwhetherthedelayshavebeencausedbythedetaineesorthegovernment:Sahin,atp.231.InreviewingMr.Almrei’sapplicationforrelease,theFederalCourtofAppealstatedthatareviewingjudgecould“discount,inwholeorinpart,thedelayresultingfromproceedingsresortedtobyanapplicantthathavethepreciseeffectofpreventingcompliancebytheCrownwiththelawwithinareasonabletime”:Almrei,2005FCA54(CanLII),2005FCA54,atpara.58;seealsoHarkat,2006FC628(CanLII),2006FC628,atpara.30.RecoursebythegovernmentortheindividualtoapplicableprovisionsoftheIRPAthatarereasonableinthecircumstancesandrecoursebytheindividualtoreasonableCharterchallengesshouldnotcountagainsteitherparty.Ontheotherhand,anunexplaineddelayorlackofdiligenceshouldcountagainsttheoffendingparty.

(d)AnticipatedFutureLengthofDetention115Iftherewillbealengthydetentionbeforedeportationorifthefuturedetentiontimecannotbeascertained,thisisafactorthatweighsinfavourofrelease.

(e)AvailabilityofAlternativestoDetention116Stringentreleaseconditions,suchasthoseimposedonMr.CharkaouiandMr.Harkat,seriouslylimitindividualliberty.However,theyarelessseverethanincarceration.Alternativestolengthydetentionpursuanttoacertificate,suchasstringentreleaseconditions,mustnotbeadisproportionateresponsetothenatureofthethreat.

117Inotherwords,theremustbedetentionreviewsonaregularbasis,atwhichtimesthereviewingjudgeshouldbeabletolookatallfactorsrelevanttothejusticeofcontinueddetention,includingthepossibilityoftheIRPA’sdetentionprovisionsbeingmisusedorabused.Analogousprinciplesapplytoextendedperiodsofreleasesubjecttoonerousorrestrictiveconditions:theseconditionsmustbesubjecttoongoing,regularreviewunderareviewprocessthattakesintoaccountalltheabovefactors,includingtheexistenceofalternativestotheconditions.

118DotheprovisionsforreviewofdetentionundertheIRPA’scertificateschemesatisfytheserequirements?Toanswerthisquestion,wemustexaminess.83(3)and84(2)ingreaterdetail.


119Section84(2)governsthereleaseofforeignnationals.Itrequiresthejudgetoconsiderwhetherthe“release”ofthedetaineewouldposeadangertosecurity.Thisimpliesthatthejudgecanconsidertermsandconditionsthatwouldneutralizethedanger.Thejudge,ifsatisfiedthatthedangernolongerexistsorthatitcanbeneutralizedbyconditions,mayordertherelease.

120Section83(3),whichappliestopermanentresidents,hasaslightlydifferentwording.Itrequiresthejudgetoconsidernotwhetherthereleasewouldposeadangerasunders.84(2),butwhetherthepermanentresidentcontinuestobeadanger.Anissuemayariseastowhetherthisdifferenceinwordingaffectstheabilityofthejudgetofashionconditionsandhencetoorderconditionalrelease.Inmyview,thereisnopracticaldifferencebetweensayingaperson’sreleasewouldbeadangerandsayingthatthepersonisadanger.Ithereforereads.83(3),likes.84(2),asenablingthejudgetoconsiderwhetheranydangerattendantonreleasecanbemitigatedbyconditions.

121Onthisbasis,Iconcludethatforbothforeignnationalsandpermanentresidents,theIRPA’scertificateschemeprovidesamechanismforreviewofdetention,whichpermitsthereviewingjudgetofashionconditionsthatwouldneutralizetheriskofdangeruponrelease,andhencetoorderthereleaseofthedetainee.

122Reviewingjudgeshavealsodevelopedapracticeofperiodicreviewinconnectionwithreleaseprocedures:Charkaoui(Re),2005FC248(CanLII),2005FC248,atpara.86.Intheimmigrationcontext,suchperiodicreviewsmustbeunderstoodtoberequiredbyss.7and12oftheCharter.TheFederalCourtofAppealhassuggestedthatonceaforeignnationalhasbroughtanapplicationforreleaseunders.84(2),heorshecannotbringanewapplicationexceptonthebasisof(i)newevidenceor(ii)amaterialchangeincircumstancessincethepreviousapplication:Almrei,2005FCA54(CanLII),2005FCA54;seealso,Ahani,atparas.14–15.Suchaninterpretationwouldleadtoaholdingthats.84(2)isinconsistentwithss.7and12;however,sinces.84(2)hasalreadybeenfoundtoinfringes.9andcannotbesavedunders.1,itisnotnecessarytodecidethisissue.

123Insummary,theIRPA,interpretedinconformitywiththeCharter,permitsrobustongoingjudicialreviewofthecontinuedneedforandjusticeofthedetainee’sdetentionpendingdeportation.Onthisbasis,IconcludethatextendedperiodsofdetentionpendingdeportationunderthecertificateprovisionsoftheIRPAdonotviolates.7ors.12oftheCharter,providedthatreviewingcourtsadheretotheguidelinessetoutabove.Thus,theIRPAprocedureitselfisnotunconstitutionalonthisground.However,thisdoesnotprecludethepossibilityofajudgeconcludingatacertainpointthataparticulardetentionconstitutescruelandunusualtreatmentorisinconsistentwiththeprinciplesoffundamentaljustice,andthereforeinfringestheCharterinamannerthatisremediableunders.24(1)oftheCharter.

124TheseconclusionsareconsistentwithEnglishandAmericanauthority.Canada,itgoeswithoutsaying,isnotaloneinfacingtheproblemofdetentionintheimmigrationcontextinsituationswheredeportationisdifficultorimpossible.CourtsintheUnitedKingdomandtheUnitedStateshavesuggestedthatdetentioninthiscontextcanbeusedonlyduringtheperiodwhereitisreasonablynecessaryfordeportationpurposes:R.v.GovernorofDurhamPrison,exparteSingh,[1984]1AllE.R.983(Q.B.);Zadvydas.

125AcaseraisingsimilarissuesisthedecisionoftheHouseofLordsinA.v.SecretaryofStatefortheHomeDepartment,[2005]3AllE.R.169,[2004]UKHL56(“ReA”).Thiswasanappealbroughtbynineforeignnationalswhoweresuspectedofinvolvementinterrorism,butwerenotchargedwithanycrime.TheUnitedKingdomgovernmentsoughttodeportthem,butinmostcasesthiswasimpossibleduetoariskoftorture.SomostoftheindividualsweredetainedatBelmarshPrisonunders.23oftheAnti-terrorism,CrimeandSecurityAct2001(U.K.),2001,c.24.Thisprovisionempoweredthegovernmenttodetainsuspectedinternationalterroristsundertheprovisionsgoverningdetentionpendingdeportation,despitethefactthatremovalfromtheUnited


Kingdomwastemporarilyorindefinitelyprevented,inderogationfromart.5oftheEuropeanConventiononHumanRights:seeChahal.

126ThegovernmentclaimedthatthisderogationwasnecessarytocombatthenationalsecuritythreatposedbyAl-Qaedaterrorists.TheHouseofLords,byamajorityof8to1,acceptedthatAl-Qaedaterrorismrepresentedaseriousthreattothelifeofthenation,butsevenoftheeightLordswhoacceptedthispremiseneverthelessconcludedthats.23wasnotstrictlyrequiredbytheexigenciesofthesituation.ThesesamesevenLordsalsoconcludedthats.23wasincompatiblewithart.14oftheEuropeanConventiononHumanRights,becauseofthewayitdiscriminatedbetweennationalsandnon-nationals.Thederogationpermittingpermanentdetentionofnon-nationalstreatedthemmoreharshlythannationals.Absentthepossibilityofdeportation,itlostitscharacterasanimmigrationprovision,andhenceconstitutedunlawfuldiscrimination.

127ThefindinginReAofbreachofthedetentionnormsundertheEuropeanConventiononHumanRightswaspredicatedontheU.K.Act’sauthorizationofpermanentdetention.TheIRPA,unliketheU.K.legislationunderconsiderationinReA,doesnotauthorizeindefinitedetentionand,interpretedassuggestedabove,providesaneffectivereviewprocessthatmeetstherequirementsofCanadianlaw.

128Thefairnessofthedetentionreviewprocedurearisesasanindependentissue.Iconcludedabovethatthisprocedure,likethecertificatedeterminationprocedure,deniestherighttoafairhearinganddoessoinawaythatdoesnotminimallyimpairthedetainee’srights.Forthereasonsgivenearlier,Parliamentmustthereforerevisittheprovisionsfordetentionreviewinordertomeaningfullyprotecttheproceduralrightsofdetainees.

C.DotheCertificateandDetentionReviewProceduresDiscriminateBetweenCitizensandNon-Citizens,ContrarytoSection15oftheCharter,andifso,IstheDiscriminationJustifiedUnderSection1oftheCharter?129TheappellantMr.CharkaouiarguesthattheIRPAcertificateschemediscriminatesagainstnon-citizens,contrarytos.15(1)oftheCharter.However,s.6oftheCharterspecificallyallowsfordifferentialtreatmentofcitizensandnon-citizensindeportationmatters:onlycitizensareaccordedtherighttoenter,remaininandleaveCanada(s.6(1)).Adeportationschemethatappliestonon-citizens,butnottocitizens,doesnot,forthatreasonalone,violates.15oftheCharter:Chiarelli.

130Itisarguedthatwhilethisisso,therearetwowaysinwhichtheIRPAcould,insomecircumstances,resultindiscrimination.First,detentionmaybecomeindefiniteasdeportationisputofforbecomesimpossible,forexamplebecausethereisnocountrytowhichthepersoncanbedeported.Second,thegovernmentcouldconceivablyusetheIRPAnotforthepurposeofdeportation,buttodetainthepersononsecuritygrounds.Inbothsituations,thesourceoftheproblemisthatthedetentionisnolongerrelated,ineffectorpurpose,tothegoalofdeportation.InReA,thelegislationconsideredbytheHouseofLordsexpresslyprovidedforindefinitedetention;thiswasanimportantfactorleadingtothemajority’sholdingthatthelegislationwentbeyondtheconcernsofimmigrationlegislationandthuswrongfullydiscriminatedbetweennationalsandnon-nationals:paras.54,81,134,157–58,180and229.

131Eventhoughthedetentionofsomeoftheappellantshasbeenlong—indeed,Mr.Almrei’scontinues—therecordonwhichwemustrelydoesnotestablishthatthedetentionsatissuehavebecomeunhingedfromthestate’spurposeofdeportation.Moregenerally,theanswertotheseconcernsliesinaneffectivereviewprocessthatpermitsthejudgetoconsiderallmattersrelevanttothedetention,asdiscussedearlierinthesereasons.

132Iconcludethatabreachofs.15oftheCharterhasnotbeenestablished.

D.AretheIRPACertificateProvisionsInconsistentWiththeConstitutional


PrincipleoftheRuleofLaw?133TheappellantMr.CharkaouiclaimsthattheunwrittenconstitutionalprincipleoftheruleoflawisinfringedbytwoaspectsoftheIRPAscheme:theunavailabilityofanappealofthedesignatedjudge’sdeterminationthatthecertificateisreasonable;andtheprovisionins.82fortheissuanceofanarrestwarrantbytheexecutive(inthecaseofapermanentresident)orformandatoryarrestwithoutawarrantfollowinganexecutivedecision(inthecaseofaforeignnational).

134Theruleoflawincorporatesanumberofthemes.Mostfundamentally,itrequiresgovernmentofficialstoexercisetheirauthorityaccordingtolaw,andnotarbitrarily:Roncarelliv.Duplessis,1959CanLII50(S.C.C.),[1959]S.C.R.121;ReferencereManitobaLanguageRights,1985CanLII33(S.C.C.),[1985]1S.C.R.721,atp.748–49.Itrequiresthecreationandmaintenanceofanactualorderofpositivelaws:ReferencereManitobaLanguageRights.Anditislinkedtotheprincipleofjudicialindependence:ReferencereRemunerationofJudgesoftheProvincialCourtofPrinceEdwardIsland.

135Mr.Charkaoui’sclaimisbasednotonanyofthesethemes,butonthecontentoftheIRPA.ButasthisCourtheldinBritishColumbiav.ImperialTobaccoCanadaLtd.,2005SCC49(CanLII),[2005]2S.C.R.473,2005SCC49,“itisdifficulttoconceiveofhowtheruleoflawcouldbeusedasabasisforinvalidatinglegislation…basedonitscontent”(para.59).Evenifthisdictumleavesroomforexceptions,Mr.CharkaouihasnotestablishedthattheIRPAshouldbeoneofthem.

136First,Mr.Charkaouiarguesthattheruleoflawisviolatedbytheunavailabilityofanappealofthejudge’sdeterminationofthereasonablenessofthecertificate.Butthereisnoconstitutionalrighttoanappeal(Kourtessisv.M.N.R.,1993CanLII137(S.C.C.),[1993]2S.C.R.53);norcansucharightbesaidtoflowfromtheruleoflawinthiscontext.TheFederalCourtisasuperiorcourt,notanadministrativetribunal:FederalCourtsAct,R.S.C.1985,c.F-7,s.4.FederalCourtjudges,whenreviewingcertificatesundertheIRPA,haveallthepowersofFederalCourtjudgesandexercisetheirpowersjudicially.Moreover,theFederalCourtofAppealhasreinforcedthelegalityoftheprocessbyholdingthatitisappropriatetocircumventthes.80(3)privativeclausewheretheconstitutionalityoflegislationischallenged(Charkaoui(Re),2004FCA421(CanLII),2004FCA421,atparas.47–50)orwherethenamedpersonallegesbiasonthepartofthedesignatedjudge(Zündel,Re2004FCA394(CanLII),(2004),331N.R.180,2004FCA394).

137Second,Mr.Charkaouiarguesthattheruleoflawisviolatedbytheprovisionforarrestunderawarrantissuedbytheexecutive(inthecaseofapermanentresident)orforautomaticdetentionwithoutawarrant(inthecaseofaforeignnational).Buttheruleoflawdoesnotcategoricallyprohibitautomaticdetentionordetentiononthebasisofanexecutivedecision.TheconstitutionalprotectionssurroundingarrestanddetentionaresetoutintheCharter,anditishardtoseewhattheruleoflawcouldaddtotheseprovisions.

IV.Conclusion138TheschemesetupunderDivision9ofPart1oftheIRPAsuffersfromtwodefectsthatareinconsistentwiththeCharter.

139Thefirstisthats.78(g)allowsfortheuseofevidencethatisneverdisclosedtothenamedpersonwithoutprovidingadequatemeasurestocompensateforthisnon-disclosureandtheconstitutionalproblemsitcauses.Itisclearfromapproachesadoptedinotherdemocracies,andinCanadaitselfinothersecuritysituations,thatsolutionscanbedevisedthatprotectconfidentialsecurityinformationandatthesametimearelessintrusiveontheperson’srights.ItfollowsthattheIRPA’sprocedureforthejudicialconfirmationofcertificatesandreviewofdetentionviolatess.7oftheCharterandhasnotbeenshowntobejustifiedunders.1oftheCharter.IwoulddeclaretheproceduretobeinconsistentwiththeCharter,andhenceofnoforceoreffect.


140However,inordertogiveParliamenttimetoamendthelaw,Iwouldsuspendthisdeclarationforoneyearfromthedateofthisjudgment.IfthegovernmentchoosestogoforwardwiththeproceedingstohavethereasonablenessofMr.Charkaoui’scertificatedeterminedduringtheone-yearsuspensionperiod,theexistingprocessundertheIRPAwillapply.Afteroneyear,thecertificatesofMr.HarkatandMr.Almrei(andofanyotherindividualswhosecertificateshavebeendeemedreasonable)willlosethe“reasonable”statusthathasbeenconferredonthem,anditwillbeopentothemtoapplytohavethecertificatesquashed.Ifthegovernmentintendstoemployacertificateaftertheone-yeardelay,itwillneedtoseekafreshdeterminationofreasonablenessunderthenewprocessdevisedbyParliament.Likewise,anydetentionreviewoccurringafterthedelaywillbesubjecttothenewprocess.

141Theseconddefectisfoundins.84(2)oftheIRPA,whichdeniesaprompthearingtoforeignnationalsbyimposinga120-dayembargo,afterconfirmationofthecertificate,onapplicationsforrelease.CounselfortheministerssubmittedinoralargumentthatifthisCourtweretofindthats.84(2)violatestheCharter,theappropriateremedywouldbetostrikes.84(2)andreadforeignnationalsintos.83.Thisisagoodfirststep,butitdoesnotprovideacompletesolution,sinces.83dealswithdetentionreviewonlyuntilthecertificatehasbeendeterminedtobereasonable,whereass.84(2)dealswithdetentionreviewafterithasbeendeterminedtobereasonable.Strikings.84(2)wouldthereforeleavenoprovisionforreviewofdetentionofforeignnationalsoncethecertificatehasbeendeemedreasonable.

142Accordingly,Iconcludethattheappropriateremedyistostrikes.84(2)aswellastoreadforeignnationalsintos.83andtostrikethewords“untiladeterminationismadeundersubsection80(1)”froms.83(2).

143Iwouldallowtheappealswithcoststotheappellants,andanswertheconstitutionalquestionsasfollows:

1.Doss.33and77to85oftheImmigrationandRefugeeProtectionAct,S.C.2001,c.27,inwholeorinpartorthroughtheircombinedeffect,offendtheprincipleofjudicialindependenceprotectedby:

(a)s.96oftheConstitutionAct,1867,or

(b)thePreambletotheConstitutionAct,1867?

Answer:No.

2.Doss.33and77to85oftheImmigrationandRefugeeProtectionAct,S.C.2001,c.27,inwholeorinpartorthroughtheircombinedeffect,offendtheconstitutionalprincipleoftheruleoflaw?

Answer:No.

3.Doss.33and77to85oftheImmigrationandRefugeeProtectionAct,S.C.2001,c.27,inwholeorinpartorthroughtheircombinedeffect,infringes.7oftheCanadianCharterofRightsandFreedoms?

Answer:Yes.

4.Ifso,istheinfringementareasonablelimitprescribedbylawascanbedemonstrablyjustifiedinafreeanddemocraticsocietyunders.1oftheCanadianCharterofRightsandFreedoms?

Answer:No.

5.Doss.33and77to85oftheImmigrationandRefugeeProtectionAct,S.C.2001,c.27,


inwholeorinpartorthroughtheircombinedeffect,infringes.9oftheCanadianCharterofRightsandFreedoms?

Answer:Yes.


Answer:No.


Answer:Yes.


Answer:No.


Answer:No.


Answer:Itisunnecessarytoanswerthisquestion.


Answer:No.


Answer:Itisunnecessarytoanswerthisquestion.


Documents

Charkaoui v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration),stephanebeaulac.openum.ca/files/sites/84/2007/07/Charkaoui-v-Canada.pdf · UNTS 222; 312 ETS 5, entered into force 3 September 1953