Chapter XX - Pena

8/10/2019 Chapter XX - Pena

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Chapter XX

FEES, OFFENSES, PENALTIES, ETC.

1. Registration fees.

The fees for services rendered in connection withoriginal and subsequent registration of lands, as are

payable to the Clerk of Court, the Sheriff, and the

Register of Deeds, are provided in Section 114 of Act

No. 496, as amended by Republic Act No. 177 and

later by Republic Act No. 928, and lastly by

Presidential Decrees Nos. 1418 and 1529.

Full payment of fees is a prerequisite to registration.

Thus, when an instrument is presented in the

authorized to accept same even for purposes of a

primary entry without payment in advance of at

- sos for each entry or

document, the rest of the fees due for registration

be

default thereof the entry made in the primary entry

book will ipso facto become null and void. The

government, however, is exempted from paying the

fees in advance in order to be entitled to entry of

registration.1

With respect to registration of a, mortgage involving

lands situated in different provinces, where it is

necessary to register the document in the Registries

of Deeds in separate places, the former practice wasto collect in each instance the full registration fee on

the basis of the total amount or consideration of the

mortgage. The apparent duplication of payments of

fees, though criticized in some quarters, was

sustained by the court on the principle that the

separate property situated in each province legally

secured the full amount of the mortgage obligation

due to the indivisible nature of such a contract.2

However, a deviation from the above principle has

1Rep. of the Phil. v. Hospital de San Juan de Dios, 84

Phil. 820.

2Hilado and Hilado v. Register of Deeds of

Occidental Negros, 49 Phil. 544.

554


been made possible with the enactment of Republic

Act No. 928, approved June 20, 1953, providing that

In a mortgage affecting properties situated in

different cities or provinces, the basis of the fees in

each registry of deeds where the document is to be

registered shall be such amount as obtained for the

properties lying within the jurisdiction of said

registry after apportioning the total amount of the

mortgage in accordance with the current assessed

value of such properties.

It may be stated, in this connection, that a

restraining order, injunction or mandamus issued by

the court may be entered in the Day Book of the

f title af-

fected, free of charge (P.D. 1529, Section 69).

Likewise, all documents or contracts executed by or

in favor of the National Housing Authority are

exempt from the payment of registration fees,

including fees for the issuance of titles, as well as of

documentary stamp tax (P.D. 1922, May 6, 1984).

under the Land Registration Act shall be subject of

larceny.3

3. Perjury.

Whoever knowingly swears falsely to any statement

required to be made under oath by the Land

Registration Act shall be guilty of perjury and liable

to the penalties provided by law for perjury.4

The legal requirement of lie claimants oath to the

answers in registration and cadastral proceedings5

statement under oath can neither be ignored nor

tolerated. A prosecution for perjury is the least that

could be expected.6

3Act 496, Sec. 115.4Act 496, Sec. 116.5Act 2259,

Sec. 9; Act 496, Sec. 34; Solis v. De Guzman, 33 Phil.

574. 6Act 496, Sec. 116, in connection with Act 2259,

Sec. 11.


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555

REGISTRATION OF LAND TITLES AND DEEDS

Whoever fraudulently procures, or assists infraudulently pro- curing or is privy to the fraudulent

s

of any Registry of Deeds, or of any erasure or

alteration in any entry in any set of books or in any

instrument authorized by the Land Registration Act,

or knowingly defrauds or is privy to defrauding any

person by means of a false or fraudulent instrument,

s duplicate cert

discretion of the court.7

5. Forgery.

(1) Whoever forges or procures to be forged or

assists in forging the seal of the clerk or of any

Registry of Deeds, or the name, signature, or

signature; or

(2) Fraudulently stamps or procures to be stamped

or assists in stamping any document with any forged

seal of the clerk or Reg- ister of Deeds; or

(3) Forges, or procures to be forged, or assists in

forging the name, signature, or handwriting of any

person whosoever to any instrument which is

expressly or impliedly authorized to be signed by

such person under the provisions of the Land

Registration Act; or

(4) Uses an, document upon which an impression, or

part of the impression, of any seal of the clerk or of a

Registry of Deeds has been forged, knowing the

same to have been forged, or any document the

signature to which has been forged, knowing the

same to have been forged, shall be imprisoned not

thousand pesos, or both, in the discretion of the

court.

7Act 496, Sec. 117; Vda. de Laig v. Court of Appeals,

G.R. No. L-26882, April 5, 8; 82 SCRA 294; 3 PLAJ 547.

556


Prosecution for offenses for violations of any of the

provisions of the Land Registration Act shall be

instituted and conducted in the proper Regional Trial

Court.8

6. Fraudulent sales.

Whoever, with intent to defraud, sells and conveys

registered land knowing that an undischarged

attachment or any other encumbrance exists

thereon which is not noted by memorandum on the

the grantee of such attachment or other

encumbrance before the consideration is paid, shall

be punished by imprisonment not exceeding three

years o

or by both, in the discretion of the court.9

It is to be observed that while under Section 119 of

Act 496 mere failure to inform the buyer of a

subsisting encumbrance on the property sold is

o commit the crime of fraudulent

sale, under the Revised Penal Code (Article 316,paragraph 2), however, mere non-disclosure is not

enough. Thus, it was held that there must be a

positive and direct statement or representation by

the seller that the realty he is disposing is not

burdened with any lien. The mere passive attitude

on his part in not disclosing the existence of the

constitute fraud within the meaning of the law.

Stated otherwise, there must be an express

misrepresentation that the property is free from

encumbrance. Silence as to encumbrance does not

involve a crime because the law does not penalize

the person who sells encumbered realty without

disclosing the encumbrance thereon, but one who

should sell it free from encumbrance.10

The law does not punish the mere selling of real

property mortgaged. In fact, it is permissible as may

be inferred from Article 2130 of the Civil Code which

provides that a stipulation forbidding the owner


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from alienating the immovable mortgaged shall be

void. What the law punishes is the sale of a

mortgaged property under the misrepresentation

that is not encumbered. The gravamen of the of-

8Act 496, Sec. 118.9Act 496, Sec. 119.10People v.

Guanio, 67 O.G. 202, May 11, 1971, CA, People v.

Gurango, 67 O.G.

16, April 19, 1971, CA.

557


fense is the deceitful disposition of the encumbered

property as free from encumbrance, although such

encumbrance be not recorded.11

7. Other remedy of aggrieved party.

No conviction for any act prohibited by the Land

Registration Act shall affect any remedy which any

person aggrieved or injured by such act may be

entitled to by law against the person who has

committed such act or against his estate.12

8. Discontinuance of pre-existing system of

registration.

As provided in Section 124 of Act No. 496, with

respect to lands unregistered in accordance with the

provisions thereof, the system of registration and

recording theretofore established by law would

the evidential weight given by existing law to titles

registered as existing law then provided would be

accorded to such titles in the hearings had under the

Land Registration Act before the court.

The above rule has now been abrogated inasmuch as

under the provision of Section 3 of Presidential

Decree No. 1529, approved June 11, 1978, thesystem of registration under the Spanish Mortgage

Law has been discontinued and all lands recorded

under said system which are not yet covered by

Torrens title shall be considered as unregistered

lands. All instruments affecting lands originally

registered under the Spanish Mortgage Law may

now be recorded under Section 113 of the Decree,

until the land shall have been brought under the

operation of the Torrens system.

The books of registration for unregistered lands

provided under Section 194 of the Revised

Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 3344,

will continue to remain in force; provided, that all

instruments dealing with unregistered lands shallhenceforth be registered under Section 113 of

Presidential Decree No. 1529.

oOo

11People v. Rubia Vda. de Torres, 62 O.G. 49, Dec. 5,

1966, CA. 12Act 496, Sec. 120.

558


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Chapter XXI

REGISTRATION OF PUBLIC LANDS 1. Public lands,

meaning and concept.

In its most general sense, public lands include all

lands owned by the government. In the more limited

only such lands as are subject to sale or other

disposable by the government under the general

laws. While the termpublic lands is

synonymous topublic domain, the latter

covers only such public lands as are unappropriated.

In Acts of Congress of the United States, the term

public lands is uniformly used to describe so

much of the national domain under the legislativepower of the Congress as has not been subjected to

private right or devoted to public use.1

Our Public Land Act (Commonwealth Act No. 141, as

amended) governs only such lands of the public

domain as are not timber nor mineral lands. In other

words, the termpublic lands as used in the

Public Land Act refers only to what used to be

known as public agricultural lands or what are

otherwise known as alienable or disposable; land of

the public domain.2

2. Grants of public lands brought under operation

of Torrens system.

Registration of grants and patents involving public

lands is governed by Section 122 of Act No. 496, as

amended by Section 103 of Presidential Decree No.

1529, which provides as follows:

SEC. 103.

When- ever public land is by the Government

alienated, granted or conveyed to any person, the

same shall be brought forthwith

1Montano v. Insular Government, 12 Phil. 572.

2Com. Act 141, Sec. 2.

559


under the operation of this Decree. It shall be the

issuing the instrument of

alienation, grant, patent or conveyance in behalf of

the Government to cause such instrument to be

city where the land lies, and to be there registered

like other deeds and conveyance, whereupon a

of registered land, and an owners duplicate

issued to the grantee. The deeds, grant, patent or

instrument of conveyance from the Government to

the grantee shall not take effect as a conveyance or

bind the land, but shall operate only as a contract

between the Government and the grantee and as

evidence of authority to the Register of Deeds to

make registration. It is the act of registration that

shall be the operative act to affect and convey theland, and in all cases under this Decree, registration

of the province or city where the land lies. The fees

for registration shall be paid by the grantee. After

due registration and iss

title, such land shall be deemed to be registered

land to all intents and purposes under this

Decree.

3. Nature of title issued for patented lands.

As expressly sanctioned by law, there can be notitle issued pursuant to

any grant or patent involving public lands is as

of title issued to private lands in the ordinary or

cadastral registration proceeding. The effect of

registration of a homestead or any other similar

title to the patentee is to vest in him an

incontestable title to the land, in the same manner

-

cree of the court, and the title so issued is absolutely

conclusive and indisputable. It is not subject to

collateral attack.3

In the absence of registration, title to the land

covered by a patent, sales or homestead, may not be

said to have been perfected and, therefore, not

indefeasible. A patent becomes indefeasible as a

3Lopez v. Padilla, G.R. No. L-27559, May 18, 1972; 45


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SCRA 44; Iglesia ni Cristo v. Judge of Br. I, C.F.I. of

Nueva Ecija, & DBP, G.R. No. L-35273, July 25, 1983;

123 SCRA 516.

560

REGISTRATION OF PUBLIC LANDS

Torrens Title only when said patent is registered

with the Register of Deeds pursuant to the

provisions of the Land Registration Act.4

However, the above rule does not hold true where

the land covered by a patent issued by the

Government had previously been determined in a

registration proceeding and adjudicated in favor of a

private individual other than the patentee, for the

same reason that the title issued pursuant to adecree of registration is as absolutely conclusive and

indisputable, and between two titles of apparently

prevail.

Thus, it was held that neither the patent issued by

the Direc- tor of Lands to applicants for homestead,

Deeds upon the patent is conclusive with respect to

the title of the patentee as against private

individuals claiming the land against the patentee

under title anterior to the issuance of the patent,

with it the presumption that the land to which it

relates was public land at the time of the issuance of

the patent to the original holder and casts upon the

opposing litigant the burden of overcom- ing the

presumption, as well as any unfavorable inferences

to which his contentions may be open should he

have been guilty of laches in the assertion of his

rights. The Director of Lands has no jurisdiction over

such property.5

In a case where the same parcel of land was covered

date, one of them having been acquired pursuant to

a patent to a decree issued in a judicial registration

proceeding, it was held that the former must give

way to the latter.6

pursuant to a decree of registration is on a higher

level than a

issued by the Director of Lands.7 However, the

foregoing rule applies only where two original

issued on different occasions to two different

persons. Thus, where said titles, were issued to only

one and the same person,

4Ortigas v. Hidalgo, G.R. No. 80140, June 28, 1991,

198 SCRA 635.

5De los Reyes v. Razon, 38 Phil.

480.6Nieto v. Quines, 110 Phil. 823.7Director of

Lands v. Ct. of App. and Cosme, 17 SCRA 71; Concha,

et al. v.

Magtira, G.R. No. L-19122, Oct. 19, 1966; 124 Phil.

961; Abelido v. Ardiente, 69 July 16, 1973, CA.

561


such as one pursuant to a homestead patent and the

other pursuant to judicial decree, and the owner of

said titles, taking advantage of the situation sold the

land to two different persons surrendering to each

purchasers having acted in good faith and having

registered their titles on the respective dates of the

registered is the valid one, considering that when

the subsequent sale was made by the former owner

he had nothing more to sell if the title hesurrendered to the subsequent purchaser is one

issued covering the same property. Where a person

sells the same land to two different persons who are

registers the transaction in his name in the Registry

of Property.8

prerogative of the Executive Department not of the

courts.9

Article XII, Section 3, of the 1987 Constitution of the

Philip- s of the public domain

into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and

national parks. Agricultural lands of the public

the uses to which they may be devoted. Of the


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above classes, only agricultural lands of the public

domain may be subject to alienation.

Under the Public Land Act, lands of the public

disposable lands, (2) timber lands, and (3) mineral

lands.

For purposes of administration and disposition, the

disposable or alienable are sub-

according to the use or purposes to which such lands

are destined, as follows:

(a) Agricultural;

(b) Residential, commercial, industrial, or for similar

productive purposes;

8DBP v. Mangawang, 120 Phil. 402.9Solis v.

Intermediate Appellate Court, 198 SCRA 267.

562


(c) Educational, charitable, or other similar purposes;

(d) Reservations for town sites and for public and

quasi- public uses.10

It may be stated, in this connection, that lands that

do not belong to anybody necessarily fall within the

category of property of public ownership, whether

under the Regalian Doctrine or under Art. XII,

Section 2, of the 1987 Constitution, for the simple

reason that they have no known or recognized

owner. Unless such lands be needed for public or

common use or service, they do not fall under Article

420 of the Civil Code, but under Article 421 of the

same Code, thus making them patrimonial, and

lands of the public domain.11

title has the burden of proof to overcome the

presumption that the land sought to be registered

forms part of the public domain.12

prerogative of the Executive Department and not of

the court.13

5. Timber and mineral lands not alienable.

Under Art. XII, Section 2, of the charter, all lands of

the public domain belong to the State and cannot bealienated, with the exception of agricultural lands.

Thus, where the area in question is a forest or

timber land and this fact is clearly established by the

Development to the effect that it is within the

portion of the area which was reverted to the

category of forest land, approved by the President,

such area can no longer be disposable or alienable.

Any patent or title issued by the Director of Lands to

private parties is void ab initio, for lack of

jurisdiction. The indefeasibility of the Torrens titlethat may be issued pursuant to such patent will not

lie against the State in an action for reversion of land

covered thereby when such land is a part of a public

forest reservation. Neither pre-

10Com. Act 141, Sec. 9.11Director of Lands v.

Araneta, 63 O.G. 39, Sept. 25, 1967, CA. 12Director

of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 195 SCRA

38. 13Solis v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 198

SCRA 267.

563


scription will lie against the State in such cases in

accordance with Article 1108, par. 4, of the Civil

Code. Accordingly, the right of reversion or

reconveyance to the State is not barred by

prescription. Even granting that Torrens title can no

longer be reopened under the Land Registration Act,

still the land covered thereby may be reconveyed to

the State in an action for reconveyance under

Section 101 of Com- monwealth Act No. 141.14

It is well-settled that a certi

forest or timber and mineral lands. Any title thus

issued on non-disposable lots, even in the hands of

an innocent purchaser for value, should be

cancelled.15


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Since the subject lot is mineral land, private

respondents possession thereof no matter how

long did not confer upon him possessory rights over

the same.16

For all physical purposes of ownership, the owner isnot required to secure a patent, as long as he

complies with the provisions of mining laws.17

Mineral lands, however, which at the time the

constitutional provisions took effect no longer

formed part of the public domain, do not come

within the prohibition. Thus, where the location of a

mining claim had been perfected prior to

November 15, 1935, when the Government of the

Commonwealth was inaugurated, and according to

the laws existing at that time, a valid location of

mining claim segregate the area from the public

domain, the legal effect of a valid location of a

mining claim is not only to segregate the area from

the public domain but also to grant to the locator

- ship of the claim and the right

to a patent therefore upon compliance with the

terms and conditions prescribed by law.18 In fact it

is to be observed in Section 3 of Act No. 137 of the

Commonwealth that it exempts from its provisions

vested rights and privileges existing on

14RP v. Samson Animas, G.R. No. L-37682, Mar. 29,

1974; 70 O.G. 32, p. 6634, Aug., 1974, 56 SCRA 499.

15Lepanto Consolidated Mining Co. v. Dumyung,

G.R. No. L-31666-68, Apr. 30, 1979; 89 SCRA 532.

16Atok Big Wedge Mining Co., Inc. v. Court of

Appeals, 193 SCRA 71. 17Ibid.18McDaniel v.

Apacible and Cuisia, 42 Phil. 749.

564


the date of the inauguration of the Government

established under the Constitution.19

Similarly, forest lands may also be privately owned, if

acquired prior to the existing legal prohibition. With

respect to such lands, however, Republic Act No.

152, amending Section 1829 of the Re- vised

Administrative Code, requires that every private

minor forest products shall register his title to the

same with the Director of Forestry. It is also required

that a list of such owners, with a statement of the

bounda- ries of their property, be furnished by the

Director of Forestry to the Commissioner of InternalRevenue, the same to be supplemented from time to

time as occasion may require. The titles to such

forest lands are subject to examination by the

of the province in which such land lies.

6. Modes of alienating public agricultural lands.

Lands of the public domain suitable for agriculture

are alienated by the Government, according to

Section 11 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, in the

following forms:

. (1) For homestead settlement;

.

(2) By sale;

. (3)

title

. (a) By judicial legalization; or

. (b) By administrative legalization (free

patent).

It will be noted that disposition of such public lands

by lease is not included for the reason that title does

not pass in the case of lease. However, in lieu of

lease we may add as another form of disposing or

alienating public lands the so-calledfree title

grant authorized by Commonwealth Act No.

691, approved October 15, 1945, as amended by

Republic Act No. 63, approved October 17, 1946,

providing for free distribution of public agricultural

lands under certain conditions.

19Gold Creek Mining Corporation v. Rodriguez and

Abadilla, 66 Phil. 259; Salacot Mining Co. v.

Rodriguez and Abadilla, 67 Phil. 97.

565



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This latter innovation is intended to encourage the

people to explore and cultivate more of our

agricultural lands, particularly those re- maining idle

for years. And, to provide the necessary incentive,

the Government furnishes the deserving applicants

with work animals, fertilizers, and the necessary

tools for the clearing and cultivation of the lot, pluscash monthly allowance for expenses. Once the legal

requirements are accomplished, the applicant

submits proof in the form prescribed by the

Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and

upon the approval thereof is granted a free title.20

7. Fishponds as agricultural lands.

the art and

science of the production of plants and animals

useful to man. The term agricultural products is not

limited to vegetable substance directly resultingfrom the tillage of the soil but includes domestic and

grown in ponds. Fishponds are included in the

term agricultural lands.

The mere conversion of

not change their character as agricultural into

mineral lands because insofar as the process of salt

production is concerned the kind of land used as

evaporating basin is not changed. The basin indeed

could just as well be a cement or metal receptacle,

let in and allowed to evaporate, leaving the salt

content. The fact that such receptable is used as an

indispensable accessory to the operation does not

change its basic character, any more than it would

convert agricultural land into mineral lands.21

Under the new Constitution, however, the term

agricultural land has now a restricted

- tinct category

ources. While

they cannot be alienated, they may be subject to

license, concession, or lease for a period limitation

Art. XII, Section 2).

20Molina v. Rafferty, 38 Phil. 174; Molina v. Director

of Fisheries, 54 O.G. 16, July 28, 1958, CA.

21Camus v. Ct. of Agrarian Relations, et al., 120 Phil.

372. 566


8. Director of Lands as quasi-

The Director of Lands has been made by law a quasi-

fact, even passes upon questions of mixed fact and

law, and considers and decides the quali-

applicants for the purchase of public lands. The

decisions of the Director of Lands on the

construction of the Public Land Law are entitled to

great respect by the courts. Upon a question of fact,

a decision rendered by the Director of Lands and

approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural

Resources is conclusive and not subject to be

reviewed by the courts, in the absence of a showing

that such decision was rendered in consequence of

fraud, imposition, or mistake, other than error of

judgment in estimating the value or effect of

evidence, regardless of whether or not it is

consistent with the preponderance of the evidence,

so long as there is some evidence upon which the

the Director of Lands in case of administrative

investigation under Section 91 of the Public Land

Law is to determine whether or not fraud had been

committed in securing such title in order that the ap-

Government.22

Upon a question of law, however, the decision of the

Director of Lands, although approved by the

Secretary, is in no sense conclusive upon the

courts; it is subject to review. Thus, any action of the

Director of Lands which is based upon a

misconstruction of the law can be corrected by the

courts.23 Moreover, the power and authority given

to the Director of lands to alienate and dispose of

public lands does not divest the regular courts of

their jurisdiction over possessory action.24

judicial legalization.

apply for con- ete

title by judicial legalization, as well as by

administrative legalization (free patent), used to be


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time, the last extension

22Ybaez v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 194 SCRA

743. 230rtua v. Singson Encarnacion, 59 Phil.

440.24Solis v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 198

SCRA 367.

567


designated by Presidential Decree No. 1073 being up

to December 31, 1987. This right is made available to

e alienable and

disposable lands of the public domain who has been

in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious

possession and occupation by himself and through

his predecessors-in-interest, under a claim

of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945. For

the purpose of such judicial legalization, however,

the maximum area that can be applied for is 144

hectares.

Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by

Republic Act No. 1942, as follows:

(a) Those who prior to the transfer of sovereignty

from Spain to the United States, have applied for the

purchase, composition or other form of grant oflands of the public domain under the laws and royal

decrees then in force and have instituted and

prosecuted the proceedings in connection therewith,

but have, with or without default upon their part, or

for any other cause, not received title therefor if

such applicants or grantees and their heirs have

occupied and cultivated said lands continuously

of their applications. (Repealed by PD

1073)

(b) Those who by themselves or through their

predecessors in interest have been in open,continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and

occupation of agricultural lands; of the public

domain, under a bo claim of acquisition of

ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier,

war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively

presumed to have performed all the conditions

essential to a Government grant and shall be

of this chapter. (Amended by PD 1073).

The above-quoted provision of law was further

amended by Republic Act No. 3872, approved June

18, 1964, by adding a new subsection reading as

follows:

(c) Members of the national cultural minorities

who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-

interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive

and notorious possession and occupation of lands

of the public domain suitable to agriculture, whether

disposable or not, under claim of

ownership

568


for at least thirty years shall be entitled to the rights

granted in subsection (b) hereof (Amended by

PD 1073)

Under the law in force and controlling decided cases,

an occupant who, having acquired no title from the

government, seeks to obtain registration of public

land, against or even without the opposition of the

government, must show that his occupation has

begun since the year 1894 (now reduced to a periodsince June 12, 1945); and that the same has been

open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious, under a

claim of ownership.25

However, it does not seem enough for an applicant,

who hap- pened to be an alien, to prove that he or

his predecessors in interest had been in open,

continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of

the land applied for since 1894, or even from 1880

registration. It is still necessary to show that the

applicant has some title to the land that may be

the government by purchase or by grant, under the

laws, orders, and decrees promulgated by the

Spanish government in the Philippines, or by

possessory information under the Spanish Mortgage

Law. And the only exception to this rule is where the

land has been in possession of the occupant or his

predecessors in interest since time immemorial and


10/19

such possession would justify the presumption that

the land had never been part of the public domain or

that it had been a private property even before the

Spanish conquest. In effect, the general principle is

that all lands that were not acquired from the

government, either by purchase or by grant, belong

to the State.26

However, a person who was a foreigner at the time

he succeeds to the possession of the land, is not

his imperfect title to the land, so long as he was

his application.27

On the other hand, a private corporation even if

more than 60% of its capital belongs to Filipinos, is

-

25Director of Lands v. Agustin, et al., 42 Phil. 227;

Padilla v. Reyes, 60 Phil. 697.

26Oh Cho v. Director of Lands, 75 Phil.

890.

27Makmud v. Director of Lands, 62 O.G. 4, Jan.

24, 1966, CA.

569


Public Land Act, since that would be violative of

Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitu- tion,

which provides that no private corporation or

association may hold alienable lands of the public

domain except by lease. Although the land applied

for might have been acquired by the corporation by

purchase, it did not cease to be public land until a

f title had been issued to any Filipino

citizen claiming it under Section 48(b) of the Public

Land Act.28

therefore, under the Land Registration Act, is to be

where the land is located.

10. Person competent to question land grant.

In a case where the State had granted free

composition title to a parcel of land in favor of

certain individuals, and there were other persons

who tried to show that such land was cultivated by

them for many years prior to the registration thereof

in the name of the grantees, the Supreme Court held

that such persons who have not obtained any title tolands from the State or thru persons who obtained

title from the State cannot question the titles legally

issued by the State.29

11. Government grant when deemed acquired.

Where all the necessary requirements for a grant by

the Gov- ernment have been complied with through

actual physical possession, openly, continuously

said land under the provisions of Chapter VIII of Act

No. 2874, amending Act No. 926 (carried over asChapter VIII of Com- monwealth Act No. 141), the

possessor is deemed to have already acquired by

operation of law not only a right to a grant, but a

grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that

said grant may be sanctioned by the

28Manila Electric Co. v. Castro-Bartolome and Rep.

of the Phil., G.R. No. L-49623, June 29, 1982; 114

SCRA 799; RP v. Villanueva and Iglesia ni Cristo, G.R.

No. 55289, June 29, 1982; 114 SCRA 875.

29Reyes v. Rodriguez, 62 Phil. 771. 570


courts

under the provisions of Section 50 of

possessor is deemed to have acquired the land by a

grant of the State, it follows that the same has

ceased to be part of the public domain and has

become private property and, therefore, is beyondthe control of the Director of Lands. Hence, any

further grant by the Government involving the same

land to other persons may be said to be null and

void.30

Incidentally, it may be asked: May a person validly

contract to sellall his rights, interests, and


11/19

participation over a building together with the

public land upon which it is erected? It was held

that, while there seems to be no question with

respect to the sale of the building, the seller as

public land claimant may waive, transfer or alienate

his rights over the public land. As to whether or not

land of the public domain will depend upon the

Director of Lands who has executive control over the

concession and disposition of the same, and the

could be raised in due time during the administrative

proceedings for the disposition of such land.31 As to

vested rights over the land such cannot be validly

claimed by private respondents since the approval

by the Director of Lands of their proof for a

homestead patent is now a condition sine qua non

for the existence of such vested right.32

12. Title issued upon patent annullable on ground

of fraud.

Section 38 of Act No. 496 (now Sec. 32 of P.D. No.

1529) permit- ting the review or reopening of decree

of registration within one year after the entry

thereof by the Administrator of Land Registration

Authority does not seem

homestead or free patent obtained through actual

fraud for the reason that in the latter instance there

is no judicial decree that may be reopened orreviewed by the court. However, it cannot be denied

that a patent as issued by the Director

30Mesina v. Pineda Vda. de Sonza, 108 Phil. 251;

Herico v. Dar, Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-23265,

Jan. 28, 1980; 95 SCRA 437.

31Penaco v. Ruaya, et al., G.R. No. L-28102, Dec. 14,

1981; 80 O.G. 4, Jan. 23, 1984; 110 SCRA 46.

32Quinsay v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 195

SCRA 268. 571


grants, awards, and conveys the land

applied for though in an administrative proceeding

to the applicant, with practically the same effect as

when the decree of registration is issued to a party

to whom the land was adjudicated by the court in a

land registration proceeding. It is quite apparent that

the purpose and effect of both patent and decree is

in principle the same. Upon this assumption it was

held that such remedy of review on the ground of

actual fraud may properly be invoked in connectionwith public land grants or patents within the same

period of one year legally allowed for the reopening

or review of a judicial decree of registration. For that

purpose the period of one year is to be reckoned

from the date of the order for the issuance of the

patent, so that, beyond that period the action for

the land grant can no longer be entertained.33

on the strength of a homestead patent partakes of

- cate issued in a judicialproceeding and becomes indefeasible and

incontrovertible upon the expiration of one year

from the date of the issuance of the patent.34

On the other hand, while under ordinary

circumstances the statute of limitations may bar an

action to cancel a Torrens title issued upon a free

patent, yet where the registered owner, be the

patentee or his successor-in-interest, knew that the

parcel of land described in the patent and in the

Torrens title actually belonged to another person,

such statute barring action will not apply. It may be

the better procedure, however, that the true owner

bring an action to have the ownership or title to the

land judicially settled, and the court in the exercise

of its equity jurisdiction, without ordering the

cancellation of the Torrens title issued upon the

patent, may direct the registered owner to reconvey

the land to the rightful owner.35

The trend of the rule regarding the one-year

limitation as enunciated in the foregoing discussion

should not be confused with

33Sumail v. Judge of Court of First Instance of

Cotabato, et al., 96 Phil. 947; Lucas v. Durian, 102

Phil. 1157; Director of Lands v. De Luna, 110 Phil. 28;

Nelayan v. Nelayan, 109 Phil. 183; Lopez v. Padilla,

G.R. No. L-27559, May 18, 1972; 45 SCRA 44.

34Ingaran v. Ramelo, 107 Phil. 498. 35Vital v. Anore,

et al., 90 Phil. 855.


12/19

572


the doctrine in a previous decision36 of the Court of

Appeals holding that the title issued to the patenteeprocured through fraud shall ipso facto become

cancelled and rendered void, in which event an

action seeking cancellation or reconveyance

probably may not be necessary anymore. Thus, in

that particular case, where a person who obtained a

free patent had knowingly made a false statement of

material and essential facts in his application for the

same, by stat- ing therein that the lot in question

was part of the public domain not occupied or

claimed by any other person when in fact according

to his own previous statement the said land formerly

belonged to another person as his private property,from whom he allegedly acquired the same, it was

held that, in accordance with the provisions of

Section 91 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, his title

thereto became ipso facto cancelled and,

consequently, rendered null and void. For a free pat-

ent which purports to convey land to which the

government did not have any title at the time of its

issuance could not have vested any title in the

patentee.

Consistent with the same trend, where more than

one year had elapsedand in a particular case

even six yearsfrom the date of the issuance of

title, and the patentee was found to have acted in

bad faith with having full knowledge of another

person who earlier had public, continuous, and

adverse possession of the subject land at the time he

secured the issuance of the patent over the same, it

cancelled and declared null and void premised on

the ground that such title cannot be used as a shield

to perpetuate fraud.37 With all due respect to this

ruling, however, we would like to express an opinionthat, in order to preserve the stability of the Torrens

system and maintain the indefeasibility of a Torrens

title in effect after more than one year from the date

of the issuance of the decree of registration or the

public land patent, as the case may be, such titled

land should have been ordered reconveyed to the

rightful owner in an appropriate action provided

this has not prescribed, instead of outright declaring

a Torrens title null and void.

36Suva v. Ventura, 40 O.G. 8, 4th Suppl., Aug. 23,

1941, CA.

37Director of Lands v. Abanilla, et al., G.R. No. L-

26324, Aug. 31, 1983; 124 SCRA 358.

573


13. Registration of patents mandatory.

It is expressly required by law that all patents or

be granted be registered in accordance with Section

122 of the Land Registration Act (now Sec. 103 ofP.D. No. 1529). Actual conveyance of such lands is to

be effec- tive only upon such registration which shall

be the operative act to convey and affect the land.38

Public land patents when registered in the

correspond

veritable Torrens titles subject to no encumbrances

Neither does a registered contract of lease

constitutetitle or deed of conveyance within

the meaning of Section 122 of the Land RegistrationAct. The documents mentioned in said section are

those documents transferring owner- shipnot

document of lease, transferring mere possession.39

14. When homestead patent becomes indefeasible.

A homestead patent, once registered under the land

Registration Act, becomes as indefeasible as a

Torrens title, and cannot thereafter be the subject of

an investigation for determination or judgment in a

cadastral case. Any new title which the cadastral

court may order to be issued is null and void and

should be cancelled. All that the cadastral court may

do is to make correction of technical errors in the

description of the property contained in its title, or

proceed to the partition thereof if it is owned by two

or more co-owners.40 Thus, it was held that

the homestead patent has been duly registered


13/19

pursuant to Section 122 of Act No. 496 automatically

comes under the operation of Section 38 of the

same Act and subject to all the safeguards therein

provided, particularly the indefeasibility of such

date of issuance thereof.41

38Com. Act 141, Sec. 107, Ortegas v. Hidalgo, 198

SCRA 635.39Dagdag v. Nepomuceno, 105 Phil.

216.40Pamintuan v. San Agustin, 43 Phil. 558; 561;

El Hogar Filipino v. Olviga, 60

Phil. 17, 18; Duran v. Oliva, 113 Phil. 144; Fiesta v.

Court of Appeals & Reano, G.R. No. L-50345, May 14,

1985; 136 SCRA 421.

41Republic of the Phil. v. Heirs of Carle, 105 Phil.

1227. 574


however, by the Supreme Court, the one-year period

within which an aggrieved party may seek review of

a homestead award runs from the promulgation of

the order of the Director of Lands for the issuance of

the patent, and not from its actual issuance.42

As in the case of homestead patent, the same rule

holds true in the case of registered sales patent.Thus, it was held that whenever public lands are

alienated, granted or conveyed to applicants thereof

and the deed, grant or instrument of conveyance

(sales patent) registered with the Register of Deeds

s

duplicate of title issued, such lands are deemed

registered lands under the Torrens system and the

- sued is as conclusive and

private lands in ordinary or cadastral registration

proceedings. Stated otherwise, such lands can no

longer be registered again in the name of anotherparty as a result of subsequent cadastral

proceeding.43

However, the above rule regarding indefeasibility of

title is only true and correct if the agricultural land

patented or granted as homestead by the

Government, after the legal requirements had been

complied with by the homesteader, was part of the

public domain. If it was no longer part thereof at the

time of the grant, but a private land segregated from

the mass of the public domain, then the patent and

the Torrens title issued upon said patent or

homestead grant are a nullity.44

indefeasibility one (1) year after the issuance of

patent and no longer open to review on the ground

of actual fraud. The law serves those who are

vigilant and diligent and not those who sleep when

the law requires them to act. Persons whose

property has been wrongly or erroneously registered

in anothers name is not to set aside the decree,

but, re- specting the decree as incontrovertible and

no longer open to review, should bring an ordinary

action in the ordinary court of justice for

42Lopez, et al. v. Padilla, et al., G.R. No. L-27559,

May 18, 1972; 45 SCRA 44. 43Ramos, Heirs of v.

Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. L-48575, Oct. 15,

1985. 44Vital v. Anore, et al., 90 Phil. 855; Parco,

Heirs of v. Haw Pia, G.R. No. L-22478,

May 30, 1972; 68 O.G. 38, p. 7468, Sept. 18, 1972;

45 SCRA 164. 575


reconveyance or, if the property has passed into

hands of an innocent purchaser for value, for

damages. The date of issuance of the patent

corresponds to the date of the issuance of the

decree in ordinary registration cases because the

registration to the party entitled to it, and the patent

grants, awards, and conveys the land applied for to

the applicant. This is in consonance with the intent

and spirit of the homestead laws, i.e., conservation

of a family home, and to encourage settlement,

residence and cultivation and improvement of landsfor public domain. To entertain such inquiry, contest

and decision after it has been given by the

Government thru the process of proceeding in

accordance with the Public Land Law, there would

arise confusion, uncertainty and suspicion on the

gov- ernments system of distributing public

agricultural lands pursuant to theLand for the


14/19

Landless policy of the State.45

15. Restrictions in disposition of homestead, free

patent and individual purchase.

From the date of the approval of the application and

issuance of the patent or grant, lands acquired under

free patent or homestead cannot be subject to

encumbrances or alienation, nor shall they become

liable to the satisfaction of any debt contracted prior

to the expiration of said period, except in favor of

the Government or any of its branches, units or

institutions. But the improvements or crops on the

land may

persons, associations, or corporations.46 Thus, as to

the land it was held that where a debt was

contracted within the said period, even if it was

years, the homestead cannot be made liable to the

satisfaction of such debt.47 Neither may it be validly

agreed that in case of nonpayment of the loan so

-

year period a deed selling or assigning the land to

the creditor for the same amount in payment of

45Ybaez v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No.

68291, March 16, 1991, 194 SCRA 743.

46

Com. Act 141, Sec. 118, as amended by Com. Act.456. 47Villanueva v. Paras, 69 Phil. 684.

576


the debt. For this may be considered practically a

sale of the homestead to satisfy a debt contracted

-year period, which is the very event

which the law seeks to prevent. And it is immaterial

whether the satisfaction of the debt be made either

by a voluntary sale or through judicial proceeding as

when the property is levied upon and sold at public

auction because the spirit of the law may be

defeated either way.48

It is peculiar to note, in this connection, that under

the provision of Section 5 of Republic Act 720,

otherwise known as the Rural Bank Act, as amended

by Republic Act 5939, in the granting of loans by

such rural banks primarily for the purpose of

meeting normal credit needs of any small farmer or

farm family owning or cultivating, in the aggregate,

agricultural production, as well as the normal credit

needs of cooperatives and small merchants, thelatter whose capital investment does not exceed

P25,000.00, homestead or free patent lands, even

pending issuance of titles but already approved,

may be offered and accepted, as security, provided

that when the corresponding titles are issued the

same shall be delivered to the Register of Deeds of

the province where such lands are situated for the

annotation of encumbrance.

Where a homestead is sold to a private individual

approval thereof by the Secretary of Natural

valid curative effect. The approval is merely a

formality which the law requires for the purpose of

testing the validity of the sale on legal or

constitutional ground. The absence of such formality

in proper cases will not render the transaction null

and void. What is important is the period within

which the sale is executed. The provision of the law

which prohibits the sale or encumbrance of the

patent is mandatory,49 and it is immaterial whether

such prohibited transaction is registered or not.50

In a case a contract of sale of a homestead was

perfected within the prohibitory period, the same

being illegal and void, the execution of the formal

deed even after the expiration of said period does

not

48Cadiz, et al. v. Nicolas, 102 Phil. 1032.

49De los

Santos, etc. v. Roman Catholic Church of Midsayap,

94 Phil. 405. 50Rep. of the Phil. v. Garcia, 105 Phil.

826.

577


and cannot legalize it, since the law prohibiting such

transfer does not distinguish between executory and

consummated sales.51


15/19

It is to be borne in mind, however, that Act No. 926,

Philippine Commission on October 7, 1903, to

implement the Philippine Bill of 1902, contained

absolutely no prohibition against the disposition of a

patent. Hence, it was held that where vested rightsin a homestead were acquired under said Act No.

issuance of the homestead patent is valid and

binding.52

old doctrine that where rights, title and interests of a

person have become vested under the provisions of

Act No. 926, the same cannot be affected by any law

passed subsequent thereto. In other words, the

provisions of subsequent law such as Act No. 2874

cannot be invoked for the purpose of defeating the

vested rights acquired before its adoption.53

Neither will the prohibition within the same period

of a homestead inasmuch as a partition is not a

conveyance or an alienation in the legal contem-

plation and does not run counter to the pertinent

provision of the Public Land Law.54

within twenty-

no alienation, transfer or conveyance of any

homestead may be made without the approval of

the Secretary of Natural Resources, which approvalcannot be denied except on constitutional and legal

grounds. However, the sale of a homestead before

the expiration of said period of twenty-

not rendered null and void by the failure to obtain

the required approval from the Secretary.55 The

required approval may be regarded as directory;56

hence, in a case of necessity it may be applied for

even after the sale had been consummated.57

51Manzano v. Ocampo, 1 SCRA 691: Menil v. Court

of Appeals, G.R. No. L-43668-69, July 11, 1978; 84

SCRA 413.

52Corpus, et al. v. Beltran, et al., 97 Phil. 772.

53Balboa v. Farrales, 51 Phil. 498.

54Jacinto v.

Jacinto, 105 Phil. 1218.55Flores v. Plasina, et al., 94

Phil. 327. 56Evangelista v. Montano, 93 Phil.

275.

57Sigue v. Escaro, 53 O.G. 4, Feb. 28, 1957, CA.

578


Every conveyance of land acquired under the free

patent or homestead provisions of the law, whenproper, is subject to repurchase by the applicant,

his widow, or legal heirs, within a p

from the date of the execution of the deed of sale or

conveyance, and not from the registration thereof

58 On the form

and manner in which the right to repurchase a

homestead or land acquired under a free patent may

be exercised, the Public Land Law is silent. For lack of

such legal precept, it was held that any act which

should amount to a demand for reconveyance

59

Another restriction imposed by law60 with respect

to lands granted under the free patent, homestead,

or individual sale provisions of the Public Land Act,

is that no corporation, association, or partnership

may acquire or have any right, title, interest, or

property right whatsoever to any such lands or to

any permanent improvement thereon, unless solely

for commercial, industrial, educational, religious or

charitable purposes or for a right-of-way, and

subject to the consent of the grantee and the

approval of the Secretary of Natural Resources.

16. Approval and re

validate.

It has been held that an instrument, constituting a

mortgage on a parcel of land for which an

application for the issuance of a homestead or free

expiration of the period

and after the issuance of the homestead or free

patent, is null and void ab initio, and the notation

issued to the applicant does not give validity to said

mortgage, on the ground that it would subject said

land to the satisfaction of an obligation contracted

prior to the expiration of the above-stated period of

61

However, alienations or encumbrances made in

favor of the government or of any of its branches or

legally constituted banking


16/19

58Com. Act No. 141, Sec. 119; Galasinao, et al. v.

Austria and Cardehas, 97 Phil. 82; Abogado v.

Aquino, et al., 100 Phil. 224; Baysua v. Suguitan, et

al., 99 Phil. 389.

59Peralta, et al. v. Alipio, 97 Phil. 719.60Com. Act

141, Sec. 121, as amended by Com. Act 615; and P.D.

763. 61Sabas v. Garma, et al., 66 Phil. 471.

579


corporations are exempted from the prohibition that

the land granted under a homestead title cannot be

enc

years from the date of the issuance of the patent.

The Philippine National Bank being a government-

controlled banking corporation, the execution of a

judgment in its favor against a homestead is,

therefore, valid and legal.62

17. Erring homesteader not barred by pari delicto.

Where a homestead was illegally sold in violation of

the homestead law, the principle of in pari delicto is

not applicable. Reason for the rule is that the policy

of the law is to give land to a family for home and

cultivation and the law allows the homesteader to

reac- quire the land even if it has been sold; hence,the right may not be waived. In the case at bar, the

sale of the homestead by the deceased homesteader

om the issuance of the patent was

null and void and his heirs have the right to recover

the homestead illegally disposed of. The sale being

void, the action to recover the homestead does not

prescribe because mere lapse of time cannot give

acts that are null and void and

inexistent.63 In fact, the vendor never lost his title or

ownership over the homestead, and for that reason

there is no need for him to repurchase the same

from the vendee, nor for the latter to execute adeed of reconveyance in his favor. The case stands

actually for mutual restitution, incident to the nullity

of the conveyance.64 Let not the fact be overlooked,

however, that the alienation of a homestead,

whether in whole or in part, within the prohibitive

ient cause for reversion to the State

of the whole grant.65

Furthermore, the rule of inpari delicto, where two

persons are equally at fault, does not apply to an

inexistent contract, such as, a sale void ab initio.

Neither party may thus be entitled to a relief under

the law.66

Suppose the vendee, upon learning of the

vendors attempt to recover the land, constructed

improvements thereon, can he recover

62Philippine National Bank v. Espinosa, 66 Phil. 716.

63Angeles, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al., 102 Phil.

1006. 64Felices v. Iriola, 103 Phil. 125.65Rep. of the

Phil. v. Garcia, 105 Phil. 826.

66Castro v. Escutin, G.R. No. L-27406, May 31, 1979;

90 SCRA 349. 580


the value of such improvements? While both vendor

and vendee acted in bad faith because they are

presumed to know that the sale was illegal and void,

and consequently, under Article 453 of the New Civil

Code, their rights should be the same as though both

had acted in good faith, however, the vendee cannot

recover the value of the improvements introduced

by him because they were made on the premises

only after the vendor has tried to recover the land.By so doing, he acted in bad faith and as a penalty

therefor, he must forfeit his improvements without

any right to reimbursement. For, as provided by

Article 449 of the New Civil Code,He who builds,

plants or sows in bad faith on the land of another,

loses what is built, planted or sown without right to

indemnity.67

18. Succession to homestead rights.

In case of death of the homesteader before he has

been able to perfect his right to the issuance of the

take over to succeed him? Under the provisions of

Section 3 of Act No. 926, enacted October 7, 1903,

where the applicant to a homestead should die, he

shall be succeeded in his rights, subject to the

corresponding obligations, by his widow,who

shall be entitled to have issued to her the patent if


17/19

the shows that she had complied with the

requirements thereof. However, under Section

105 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, which is the

later legislation, this taking effect in 1936, the

homestead applicant, upon his death, shall be

succeeded in his rights and obligations with respect

to the land applied for or granted by his heirs in

law.68

19. Primordial aim to preserve land grants to

family.

It is well known that the laws on public land grants,

particularly the homestead laws, were designed to

distribute disposable agricultural lots of the State

to land destitute citizens for their home and

cultivation. Pursuant to such benevolent intention,

the State prohibits the sale or encumbrance of the

homestead (Section 118)-year period the

law impliedly permits alienation of the homestead;

but in line

67Felices v. Iriola, supra.68Capinpin, et al. v.

Valdez, et al., 53 O.G. 17, Sept. 15, 1957, CA.

581


with the primordial purpose to favor the

homesteader and his family the statute provides

that such alienation or conveyance (Section 119)

shall be subject to the right of repurchase by the

This Section 119 is undoubtedly a complement of

Section 118. It aims to preserve and keep in the

family of the homesteader that portion of public

land which the State had gratuitously given to him. It

would, therefore, be in keeping with this

fundamental idea to hold that the right to

repurchase exists not only when the original

homesteader makes the conveyance, but also when

it is made by his widow or heirs. This construction is

clearly deductible from the terms of the statute.69

Incidentally, it may be asked whether the right to

repurchase is still preserved where the land acquired

by virtue of homestead or free patent was conveyed

more than 25 years after the issuance of the title to

the patentee. To resolve this question, it was held in

a case that the right to repurchase may be exercised

where the sale took place after more than 27 years,

and in another case where the patented land was

sold more than 41 years after it was acquired, and,

in fact, even if the land was acquired under the old

Public Land Law (Act 926) which contained noprovision on the right or redemption, as a matter of

public policy.70

As applied topacto de retro sale, it was held that the

-year period of legal redemption under Section

119 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 does not begin

to run until after the expiration of the conventional

period of redemption.71 With all due respect to such

view, however, it is submitted that inasmuch as in

such sale underpacto de retro the title to property

passes to and vests in the purchaser upon the

registration, if not upon the execution, of the deed,for the purposes of the legal redemption it would

not seem necessary to wait for the expiration of the

conventional period before the legal period may

begin to run.

On the other hand, in the case of extrajudicial

foreclosure of mortgage where Act No. 3135 grants

the mortgagor and other persons named in the law a

period of one year within which to redeem, it was

69Pascua v. Talens, 89 Phil. 792.

70Santana v. Marias, GR. No. L-35537, Dec. 27,

1979, 94 SCRA 853; Isaac v. Tan Chuan Leong, 89

Phil. 24; Francisco v. Certeza, Sr., 113 Phil. 543.

71Galanza v. Nuesa, 95 Phil. 713.

582


held that

under the Public Land Act is to be counted not from

the date of the auction sale but from the date of theconsolidation of ownership on the part of the

purchaser.72 This may be explained by the peculiar

circumstance that in such a foreclosure sale title

does not immediately vest absolutely in the

purchaser and this can be inferred from the fact that

the mortgagor is meanwhile entitled to the

possession of the property or to the income

therefrom for the duration of the redemption


18/19

period, which income may be used or credited to

him as part of the redemption price.

The more recent view, however, is to the effect that

where a homestead was sold subject to redemption

- year period for redemption

as prescribed in Section 119 of the Public Land Actshould be counted from the date of the sale and not

from the date the ownership of the land had

become consolidated in the buyer for the reason

that both under Section 60 of the Land Regis- tration

Act and under Section 119 of Commonwealth Act

No. 141, the owner of a piece of land is neither

prohibited nor precluded from binding himself to an

agreement whereby his right of repurchase is for a

certain period starting from the date of the deed of

sale.73

20. When right to repurchase disallowed.

Considering that Section 119 of the Public Land Act

aims to preserve in the family of the patentee that

portion of the public domain which the State has

gratuitously given to him, it is apparent that the right

of redemption provided in case of conveyance

thereof refers to an alienation made to a third

person outside the family circle. Conveyance made

to an immediate member of the family of the

homesteader and his direct descendant and heir

does not seem to be legally contemplated. Thus, in a

certain case where the homesteader died leaving ason and a daughter as his heirs, and meanwhile the

daughter sold her share to her brother, in an action

subsequently instituted by the daughter to redeem

that which she had sold, it was held that the right of

redemption does not fall within the purpose, spirit

and meaning of Section 119 of the Public Land Act

authorizing

72Baradi v. Ignacio, et al, 52 O.G. 11, p. 5172, Sept.

15, 1956; 98 Phil. 190.

73Monge, et al. v. Angeles, 101 Phil. 563; Manuel v.Phil. National Bank, 101 Phil. 968.

583


such redemption in order to keep the patented land

within the family of the original homesteader.74

So also, where the intention in exercising the right to

repurchase is not for the purpose of preserving the

land within the family circle but to dispose of it again

policy and spirit of the law. Thus, the law

discourages patentees from taking advantage of the

salutary policy behind the Public Land Law to enable

them to repurchase the land only to dispose of it

75

It may also be taken into account, in this connection,

that under the new Constitution agricultural land has

assumed a limited sense as to refer only to farmland,

unlike under the old Constitution where any land

other than forest or mineral was considered

agricultural land. Thus, where land is no longer used

for agricultural purpose, the enforcement of theright reserved by law for the homesteader or

conveyance may be relaxed. Accordingly, in an

actual case decided where the patentee was already

71 years old, not residing in the property at the time

of the sale, and the property was no longer

agricultural land but residential and commercial,

aggravated by the further fact that the motivation

that the repurchase should be disallowed.76

21. Legal restriction in disposition by non-Christians.

Conveyance and encumbrance made by persons

belonging to the so-callednon-Christian

Filipinos or national cultural minorities, when

proper, may only be valid if the person making the

conveyance or encumbrance is able to read and can

understand the language in which the instrument of

conveyance or encumbrance is written. However,

conveyances and encumbrances made by illiterate

non-Christians, or literate non-Christians where the

instrument of conveyance or encumbrance is in alanguage not understood by the

74Lasud v. Lasud, G.R. No. L-19242, Feb. 29, 1964;

63 O.G., 1, p. 43, Jan. 2, 1967; 10 SCRA 425.

75Simeon v. Pea, G.R. No. L-29049, Dec. 29, 1970,

36 SCRA 610; Santander, et al. v. Villanueva, 103


19/19

Phil. 1.

76Santana v. Marias, G.R. No. L-35537, Dec. 27,

1979, 94 SCRA 853. 584


said literate non-Christians, shall not be valid unless

duly approved by the Chairman of the Commission

on National Integration.77

Where an owner of certain land is a non-Christian

Filipino and illiterate, may he execute a valid

mortgage through an attorney-in- fact who is

literate? Here it was held in the negative, explaining

that an attorney-in-fact can have no greater power

than his principal. By an extension of the personality

of his principal, the act of an agent within hisauthority is, in effect, also the act of his principal. As

a corollary to that principle, what the principal can

do by himself, his agent can likewise perform; but

what the principal cannot do, his agent cannot also

execute or perform. Thus, it is of no consequence

that the attorney-in-fact is a literate Christian for so

long as the property owner pertains to the non-

Christian group of Filipinos and is illiterate, he enjoys

the safeguards provided in the law. These safe-

guards are there to protect the owner not only as

against the fraud and deceit of third persons, but

also against the fraud and deceit of his own

attorney-in-fact. Hence, under the circumstance the

written and express approval of the proper

authorities duly indorsed upon the contract or

agreement cannot be dispensed with for the validity

thereof.78

oOo

Documents

Chapter XX - Pena