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CHAPTER VI
THE 'IREATY OF FRI£NDSHIP
'lbe return of the Afghan delegation from rJiussoorie
to Kabul t-ms followed by a temporary eclipse of f-1ahmud Tarzi • s
influence and the predominance of General Nadir Khan in the
Afghan CotmcU, Tarzi was accused of having been \'JOn over by
the British just as Sardar Ali Ahmad had been at the Rawalpindi
Conference, This, ho,.,rever, was not the case, It l'lill be
recalled that Mabmud Tarzi neither signed any agreement \'lith
nor gave any concession to the British, Nadir Khan wanted to
1treaken Tarzi' s position as the latter \'TaS his major opponent
among the nobility of Amir Amanullab' s court. Tarz1, being
Arnir Amanullah' s father-in-law and supported by a major faction
in the court, was saved from disgrace, 1
Tb.e Treaty of Sevres \'las signed on 10 August 1920,
together \'lith tne Tripartite agreement between Great Britain,
France and Italy, regarding Anatolia. The struggle between
the Greeks and Turks continued w1 th .fluctuating fortunes until
16 September 1921, \"/hen the Greek '\>Tithdrawal began and even
tually resulted in the evacuation of Anatolia, 2
1 Dobbs Report on tb.e Kabul I~ission, Memorandum, A 194, L/P&S/18, IOLR,
2 R,R, Maconachie, A Precise on Afman A&!atrs ; 191~ 19~ (Simla, 1928), p. 45.
- 347 -
Relations bet\1een the Turkish and Soviet Governments
were cemented by the signature of the Treaty at rllosc0\'1 in
1921. The precise nature of the relations between the leaders
of the party of Union and Progress comprising Enver, Talat,
Jemal, Khalil, and Nuri Pashas, and the Soviet Government \'!ere
then not known clearly. In January 1921, Talat \..ras in
S\d tzerland and in touch w1 th Berlin; Knalil was at Tashkent;
Jemal Pasna at Kabul; and Enver .l?asha at Mosco,,. -- all
cooperating \d. tb the Bolsheviks in a campaign of anti-Britisn
propaganda. It appears from Enver Pasha' 5 subsequent
activities and death 1n Turk1stan that the Turkish leaders
were 1n effect pursuing some Pan-Turanian designs of Uleir
own, and only waiting for a favourable 'blrn of events to
discard Bolshevik friendship. Insofar as the Pan-I slaxnic
movement, promoted by the Committee of Union and Progress
leaders, threatened British interest in Asia, it suited tne
policy of the Soviet Government to support and finance it.
The Bolsheviks did not altogether trust either Enver or Jamal,
and suspected them of Pan-Turanian designs 'cbicb. threatened
Russian predominance in the Central Asian States and Trans
Caucasia. Angoran nationalist leaders and tbe Soviet Government
.... ere thus co-operating 1n an un-easy association based on
their common nostility to Britain and the \dllingness of the
Bolshevil(s to finance and promote any intrigue which \>Jould
damage British interests. 3
3 Ibid.
lhe Soviet Government continuously engaged 1n intrigue
and propaganda against the British Empire. Lenin, Trotsky and
Chicherin openly denounced Great Britain as their chief enemy,
and the main obstacle to tne spread of their doctrine. 4
In Trans-Caucasia and Turkistan, the Bolsheviks con
solidated their hold and the Muslim revolts in these regions
"'ere crushed. In Aul!'Jlst 1920, the Amir of Buknara was over
thro\m and fled along \d.Ul his follottrers to Af[jlanistan \\here
the story of their sufferings had a profound impression. It
\vas at this juncture and apparently in a revulsion o.f feeling
caused by tb.e Bukhara debacle that the Am1r 1nV1 ted a British
mission to Kabul.s
The Anglo-Soviet 'lrade Agreement, concluded 1n March
1921, was published with a British note addressed to the
BolsheVik Government, setting forth the evidence available
regarding their anti-British activities. The British. note
referred to the all.eged activities of the Russian Government
and its representatives and agents in Eastern countries
directed against British interests. To substantiate tb.e
charges, the note referred to the Congress of the 'rhird
International \oJhere Soviet leaders spoke against Britain. 6
4 Ibid.
5 Lud,dg 'vi. Adamec, Aj:ghan~tan. 1~t.1923 1 A Dieloma!i!,e Historx (Los Angeles, 19 ), p. 1 •
6 British Foreign Office note to Soviet Foreign Office., 27 September 1921, L/P&S/10/956, pt. 2, IOLR.
350
Chicherin, 1n his reply, undertook to avoid all action or
propaganda hostile to Great Britain tn the sense provided
against by the agreement. 'lbe formal reply from the Soviet
Commissarate for Foreign Affairs rejected the charges. It
categorically stated; "It is quite obvious that all the reports,
speeches and utterances quoted in the British Note have been
invented, forged and falsified for some purpose.?
'lbe internal si tuat1on of the Indian Empire also had
an impact on external events. During the later half of 1920,
the alliance between the Ali brothers and Gandhiji maintained
its strength and the non-cooperation movement gathered momentum.
During the first half of 1921 sporadic disorders and rioting
occurred tbrou@:lout India, \mile the speeches of the Indian
nationalists became e~avagantly inflammatory in tone,
IJiaulana Mohammad Ali, for instance, 1n a speech at Madras
declared that if the Amir of Afgnanistan invaded India to free
her .trom the infidel, 1 t would be the duty of Muslims to
assist him.8
'li'ibal unrest too continued. In October 1920 raids
by Zakka Khel increased, and two British soldiers were carried
a,-ray; they \'rere returned at the end of November. In the same
month a serious outrage was committed by Illirzali, a well ltno~m.
raider. Lt. Col. Foulkes, A.D.M. s. of Kohat was killed, and
his "'tife fatally wounded.
7 I"laxim Li tvinQ~ to Lord Cur zon, 27 September 1921, L/P&S/ 10/956, pt. 2, IOLR.
8 r•1aconacllie, n. 2, p. 48.
351
In September tbe Afridees \'rere inVited to attend a
ji£ga at Jalalabad by the Afghan Governor, Hashim Kh.ant who
had succeeded his brother Nadir Khan in August 1920. Shah
.r.tanmud, during his governorsb.ip o:f Khost, succeeded 1n causing
many attacks on the British linea of communication. All these
activities \'lere carried out by Haji Abdul Razaq of Kabul. '!be
Idona v:azlrs had been responsible for most of the raiding
carried out in Zhob. In September 1920, the \'laziris
\d th the approval of Haji Ab.dul Razaq surrounded Drazinda po.st,
and in October attacked Kaur Bridge Camp causing ninety
casual ties. 9
Two events, vrbich occurred during the interval between
the close of the Mussoorie Conference and the departure of the
British f'i1ss1on to Kabul, largel.y determin~ the Amir' s policy
to enter into free and direct diplomatic relations \d th other
countries. General r4ohammad \t[ali Khan, during his visit to
Tashkent, conducted preliminary negotiations for a Russo
Afghan Agreement. He was nominally appointed as envoy to
BUkhara and he had returned to Tashkent in June 1920. On 25
July 1920, he again left for MosCO\'/ where he eventually
concluded th.e treaties \'lith Moscow and Angora. The other
Afghan Mission, led by Abdul Karim Khan and accompanied by
Raja Mahendra Pratap, left for China. '!his mission conveyed
letters from the Amir, \me intended to negotiate a Treaty
9 Ibid.
352
of Friendship vti th the President of the Chinese Republic. 10
'rhe Government of India received information in
September that tbe excitement caused in Kabul by the revolution
in Bukl'lara might shortly lead tile Amir to press for the
conclusion of a formal a~eement w1 t.h tb.e British Government.
It l'ras anticipated that sucll overtures mi€Jlt be directed to
secure either a defensive alliance, or a free supply of arms
and amnnmi tion. The Government of India was inclined to
concede the latter as they considered the first alternative to
be impracticable. 11 The Viceroy in his letter of 24 September
1920 to I"lontague \tlrote that the Government of India would
insist 11of course~ onimmediate signature of :fr'ialdshlp 'treaty
on lines already laid do\·.n, on sincere co-operation on Indian
frontier between Afgllans and ourselves, and so long as
Bolshevik menace to Afghanistan may subsist, on continuous
friendly interchange of views on joint policy". 12
The secretary of State expressed a preference for a
gift of money to one of arms, and concluded: 11 \ie must take
care to prevent Afghans from manoeuvering into a position of
keeping in with both sides, and, ,.mile evading corresponding
10 Dobbs Report on the Kabul l11ssion, Memorandtml, A 194, L/P&S/18, IOLR.
11 Foreign Department, F. No. 2-F/1923 (Secret), Notes, P• 29, NAI.
12 Viceroy to secretary of State, 24 September 1920, Foreign Depar'bnent, F .No. 2-F/1923 (Secret), NAI.
353
obligations, deriving material assistance from both." 13
The British expectation that the Am1r would immediately
appeal for help on account of the collapse of Bukhara was
belied. It may have been that the Bolsheviks had promised
enormous amo1.mts of money and munition or that the Af~an
pride forbade an absolute confession of political miscalculation
and also a reversal of policy. It might be that even distrust
of the Bolsheviks, engendered by their successful conspiracy
against Bukhara, had been counter-balanced by the terror of
their success and by thougtl ts that the same fate might be in
store for Afghanistan. The situation in Bukhara drove the
Af ghana to take immediate steps tm'lards the renewal of nego-
ti at ions for .friendship td th the British.
The Amir did not agree with some of th.e items contained
in the aide memoire given to the Af{#lan delegates after the
lllussoorie Conference. He explained his objectives in the
follo,.ring \'JOrds:
Notwithstanding that some of the 1 tems contained in the written statement and memoranda have been found in our Supreme Council not to be free b'om poss1b111 ty of complaint and objection, I can assure your Excellency that Ulis objection and complaint does not conflict with the basis of the question on 1tibich we \dsh to fo1.md the
13 secretary of State to Viceroy, 4 October 1920, Foreign Department, F .No. s-F/1923 (Secret), NAI.
14 Amir to Viceroy, 6 October 1920, Chelmsford Papers, M3S, EUR, E 264/55(0), IOLR.
354
conclusion of a treaty of friendship, but refers to certain things \·Jb.ich. are considered to be trivial. 14
The Amir requested tne Viceroy to send to Kabul a
delegation invested \'lith. full powers to negotiate and conclude
a Treaty of Friendship. He added: "Af€tJ,anistan considers itself
ready and prepared for the conclusion of a 'lreaty of Friendship
a."ld in the same 1:my as your Excellency has said that there \'1111
be no objection on th.e part of your Excellency' s Goverrunent to
negotiate a treaty, my Royal Government also have no objection
\d Ul regard to 1 t. "15 He expressed his desire that the Br1 t1sh
delegation should not exceed more than twenty persons. At the
same time, Mahmud Tarzi wrote a letter to Foreign Secretary to
the Government of India to the effect that the Amir would
prefer that an Englistunan, rather than an India, be vested
\'lith full po\rer s to si~ the proposed 'lreaty. 16 The Amir' s
decision to invite a British. delegation to Kabul had been
helped by a combination of events favourable to tb.e British.
both. inside and outside India and by internal troubles in
Afghanistan. In India the bi;)rat movement, \ffl.ich at the end
of July 1920 had swollen to enormous proportions, nad
collapsed about the middle of August. 'lhe non-cooperation
movement nad reached 1 ts peak of popular support but the British
14 Am1r to Viceroy, 6 October 1920, Chelmsford Papers, MSS, EUR. E 264/55 (0), IOLR.
15 Ibid.
16 Mabmud 'rarzi to Dobbs, 7 October 1920, C!lgl.m§ford Papers, MSS, EUR. E 264/55 (0), IOLR.
355
authorities were able to suppress it. In the Masud cotmtry,
the tribesmen seemed on tb.e point of accepting British
occupation, and had even submitted a petition setting forth
conditions on which the.y ~ggested that the administration of
their cotmtry should be carried out. In Af@lanistan there was
serious disaffection among the Af~an troops in distant
stations. In Afghan Turkistan, at Mazar-1-Sharif, there had
been a mutiny in August 1920, caused partly by an attempt to
pay the troops 1n kind instead of in cash. In September, the
troops in Farah and Chakhansur on the Western Afghan border
had also been mutinuous on account of the reduction of their
pay. On tb.e eastern side of Afgb.anistan, the Khostwals and
rllangals had been giving trouble throu€Jlout September, owing to
attempts to raise their revenue and to construct a telephone
line throu€)1 their country. 'lhese events undoubtedly influenced
the Afgtlan Government towards the decision to ask for the
despatch of a British fJiiss1on to Kabul. 17
'lbe Viceroy in a private letter to tbe secretary of
State informed tile latter of the Amir' s invitation and stated:
11You will be glad to hear that the Am1r has \\1ri tten me a letter
in \\bich he expresses the hope that a Treaty of Friendship will
soon be made. 1118 He, however, expressed the vievr that until
Afghanistan proved her .friendliness, it \'ras impossible to
conclude a Treaty of Friendship. 19 In his telegraphic message
17 Chelmsford to Montague, 7 October 192::>, Montague Paeers, Roll No. 1833, NAI.
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid.
356
of 15 October 1920 to the Secretary of state he weighed the
pros and cons of the acceptance of the Amir' s proposal. He
favoured a bilateral discussion of the problems as also the
conclusion of a Treaty of Friendship \'Jitb the Amir. He gave
the additional consideration 1n favour of sending a British
delegation to Kabul:
Owing to ineradicable tendency of delegates to intrigue td.th Indian Extremist party, presence of Afghan delegation at Mussoorie was found very troublesome. It \'TaS possible, O\lling to geograpnical position of Mussoorie, to isolate delegates to some extent, but 1 t \Y()uld be difficult to do so if renewed discussions took place in cold \lTeather in plains. In present circumstances, therefore, t>te should strongly deprecate arrival of another Afgban delegation 1n India and despatch of Britisn Mission to Kabul is only alternative. 20
The Government of India proposed tb.e follo,rJ.ng con
ditions as precedent to tne despatch of the British Mission
to Kabul:
(1) That the British Mission be authorised from the outset
to use the title of 'His Majesty• in addressing the Amir.
( 2) 'lbat as the i'tission would be sent only on the understanding
that the atipulations made in the Mussoorie aide memgil;e
v-rere accepted by the Amir, tne latter should be informed
accordingly.
(3) That no suspension of operations agatnst the Wana vLaztrs
20 Viceroy to secretary of state, 15 October 1920, Chelmgford Paeers• MSS. EUR. E/264/55 (0), IOLR.
357
could be entertained, and that the fact should be made
clear to the Amir.
(4) The British wireless installations and operators should
be taken to Kabul, and employed by the mission during the
negotiation. 21
There were some si@li:ficant shifts in tbe position
of the Government of India. It \'ras suggested that the contest
for 1nnuence in Afghanistan bet,.reen the Bolsheviks and the
British was inconvenient and migb.t eventually prove to be
embarrassing. Tbe British were in a position either to keep
absolutely aloof from Afgb.anistan, or to participate with tb.e
Bolsheviks in financing tile Af @tan Government. Even if the
Bolshevik agreement provided for the payment of an annual
subsidy to the Amir, this should not be held to preclude the
simultaneous grant of financial assistance to him by the
British Government. Tb.e Viceroy declared: "Tb.e exclusive
domination of Afghanistan, \'1bich vre should doubtless muon
prefer, has been rendered impossible by development of events,
unless 111e go to war. a22
The Government of India .felt that 1 t was necessary
to obtain accurate information as to tile contents of the
Russo-Afghan Agreement, before proceeding to negotiate a
Treaty of Friendship with Amir. Tb.e Viceroy stressed that
21 Ibid.
22 Viceroy to Secretary of State, 21 October 1920, Che1msford Papers, I'1SS. EUR. E 264/55 (0), IOLR.
358
1 t should be ascertained \'lhether the Amir had signed an
agreement with the Bolsheviks and that if so, did it include
provisions inconsistent w1 th Bri tisb interests. It \·ras
accordingly proposed to the home government to add another
condition to those mentioned above, requiring the Amir to
disclose the terms of the Russo-Af~an Agreement. 23 The
secretary of State concurred with the Viceroy tbat a clear
statement must be obtained from the Am1r as to his position
regarding his agreement with. the Bolsheviks. No subsidy should
be gi. ven in case it was revealed that the Amir was getting 1 t
from the Bolsheviks. It was not necessary to prevent
Afghanistan from haVing relations of a friendly cbaracter with
Soviet Russia. The Secretary of State added:
But tb.e pretence of accepting plea of Bolshevik assistance in developing Af@lanistan "rill not serve any purpose, when the fact that Bolshevik policy is inspired solely by tne desire to damage us is a matter of conunon knowledge. Therefore, if 1 t should turn out to be true tbat an a~eement on Ule lines indicated by evidence now at our disposal, bas actually been concluded betv1een Afgb.ans and Bolsheviks, and that the former are not prepared to repudiate it, it vzould be impossible for us to contemplate Treaty of Friendship w1 tn the Amir. 24
lhe Government of India, therefore, decided ttlat a
Treaty of Friendsbip was impossible if tbe Russo-Afgb.an
23 Viceroy to 3ecretary of state, 12 October 192.9.! Chel!nsford fapftts, MSS. EUR. E 264/55 (0), IOut.
24 secretary of state to Viceroy, 29 October 19:!>, Foreign Department, F. No. 2-F/1923 (Secret), NAI.
359
Agreement contained a provision for the establishment of SoViet
Consulates at Kandahar and Ghazni. 'I'l1e Viceroy accordingly
\-rote to the Amlrs
We have reason to believe that amongst other clauses the Bolshevists have stipulated for instance for tne location of their consulates at Gnazni and Kandahar in return for a subsidy. My friend, I find it difficult to believe tnat these Bolshevist claims can be found on faot, 1 t would render the conclusion of a friendship treaty between Great Britain and Afghanistan impossible. 25
·rne Viceroy fUrther pointed out that 1 t was decided at the
r•lussoorie Conference that if aJ13 agreement designed by the
Bolsheviks directly or indirectly against Great Britain \'lere
made between Afghanistan and the Bolsheviks, tbis would be
considered by the British Government as an unfriendly act.
The letter concluded t11th an intimation Utat if the Wana
\'lazirs did not accept tne terms offered them, punitive measures
would be taken against then. 26
The Amir in his reply pointed out that as the head
of an independent State he had the ri~t to enter into relations
wi tn other countries. Soviet Kussia was Af ~anistan' s nei~bour,
and he wanted to have neitllbourly and friendly relations 1.1itn
her. Moreover, h.e \-ranted to settlle the old boundary dispute
m th her. The Amir accused the British of conspiring and
25 Viceroy to Amir1 7 November 1920, Foreign Department, F .No. 2-F/1923 \Secret), NAI.
26 Viceroy to Amir, 7 November 19al, 9\§l.m§ford. Papers, MSS. EUR. E 264/55 (0), IOta.
360
designing to keep his country isolated from others and added:
Today the said Government bas reached such a stage that 1 t has entered into commercial and even political relations and discussions \dtn Your Excellency's Government, and Afghanistan considers it vitally important to settle and rectify the violations of terri tory \'1hich had taken place on its borders during tbe time of the Tsarist Government. ZT
He assured the Viceroy that the agreement bet,reen Russia and
Af8lanistan ,.,ould not in any 'VBY harm British interests.
Regarding the establistunent of Soviet consulates at Ghami
and Kandahar, he assured the Viceroy that the issue had not
been decided and \'JOuld never be used for political purposes.
The Amir further proposed that action against the Wazirs
should be deferred and requested that no punisbment should
be meted out to them. 28
Having received the Amir' s reply, the Viceroy
expressed his vim>ts to the Secretary of State. The Amir bad
"faUed to comply with our stipulation that the terms of b.is
agreement \'Tith. the Bolsheviks should be furnished to us"•
But on the -
contemplated establishment at Gbami and Kandahar of Bolsb.evik consulates, his assurance that final. decision has not yet been reacbed, seems to us to be genuine, and to indicate that he is open to enter into discussion and negotiations on that
27 Amir to Viceroy:, 16 November 1920P Chelmsford Paper;s, l.\1SS. EUR. E26li/55 (0) , IOLR.
28 lunir to Viceroy, 16 November 1920, FO. 371/6745, Public Record Office, London.
361
point •••• As to \1/azirs expedition, it would of course have been impossible to accept suggestion of Amir, but difficulty seems n0\1 to have been removed by Wazir' s submission. 29
Persistence in the demand .for disclosure of the Russo-Afghan
Treaty t'lOUld have dangerous consequences. 1 t was feared that
the Amir mirjlt refuse the disclosure of the treaty. The
Viceroy recommended Ulat His r-tajesty' s Government agree 'tx>
send a mission to Kabul. 30
The Secretary of State in b1s private and personal
tele~am to Lord Chelmsford stated that the matter pertaining
to Afgbanistan vzas of vital importance and be could not take
an independent decision to send a mission to Kabul. 'lhe matter
would be decided by the Cabinet. He further remarked: ny our
mission will arrive in Kabul to find 1\lrkisn and Bolshevik.
missions and tnat Ute Amir tdll have an opportunity for
typical. Af@tlan tactics 1n playing one against the other. n31
'lbe secretary of State invited tlle Cabinet to
express their considered opinion as to the expediency of
sending a mission to Afghanistan. He reViewed and furnished
brief information regarding Anglo-Afghan relations since the
Ra\'ralpindi Peace Conference. The Cabinet did not take any
29 Foreign Department, F.No. 2-F/19Zj (Secret)p Pro. 679, NAI.
30 Ibide
31 Secretary o.f State to Viceroy, 2 December 1920, L/P&S/10/1061, IOLR.
362
decision as its members felt that they could not overrule the
considered opinion of the man on the spot. 32 After 'this
Cabinet decision, tne matter had to be settled betlmen the
India Office 1n London and tb.e Government of India. AA. India
Office minute, dated 28 November 1920, concurred with the
Viceroy• s suggestion that the presence of Bolshevik Consulates
1n Ghazni and Kandahar "rould render tba conclusion of treaty
of friendship w1 th Afghanistan impossible. The British had
suggested at tne Mussoorie Conference that the British and the
Bolsheviks should establish their consulates on their oto.tn
sides - J alalabad and Kandabar for the British and Her at and
Mazer Sharif .for the BolsheViks. It was also decided that the
Amir should communicate tbe terms of the Russo-Aftjlan
'l'reaty. 3'
The Secretary of state accordingly informed the
Viceroy that no treaty of fr1endsb1p cOUld be signed w1 th
Afghanistan in case there were anti-British provisions, such
as the establishment of consulates 1n Eastern Af~anistan, 1n
the Russo-Af{jlan 1reaty. ije feared that the dispatch of a
mission to Kabul would be a matter of humiliation for the
Bri tisb. He feared that the 'lUrks and the Bolsheviks \'rould
create trouble for tb.e British t<lission. He "rent on to say:
32 Cabinet meeting, 6 December 1920, L/P&S/10/1061, IOIR.
33 f'linutes by Roos-Keppel. 2B November 1920, L/P&S/10/1061, IOlR.
His Majesty's Government still entertain serious misgivings regarding the proposal wtlich you make •••• In any case Amir is guilty of deliberate evasion in not replying to our definite requests and, once our ~i1ss1on is at Kabul, the risk remains that our hands will be forced again and again by consideration that almost any concession on our part is to be preferred to not securing any agreement at all. 34
The Viceroy referred certain points to the Secretary
of State for urgent consideration. These were:
(1) v~ether the Mission could be authorised to use the title
of 'His r-tajesty' w1 th reference to the Amir.
( 2) \'Jhether the Am1r should be informed that any treaty
concluded would have to be published under Article 18
of tb.e Covenant of tbe League of Nations.
(3) vlh.ether the Amir could be allot-red diplomatic represen
tation 1n London.
(4) 'tJhetner a minor rectification of the frontier at Torkham
could be granted. 35
The Secretary of State agreed that the last three
points may, if absolutely necessary, be conceded and then only
in return for an adequate ®1d .P.£.9. .9l!2 in eacb case. Regarding
the ftrst point tne Secretary of State deferred the concession
tm.til the conclusion of a satisfactory 'treaty. 36
34 Secretary of State to Viceroy, 8 December 19~, L/P&S/10/1061, IOLR.
35 Viceroy to Secretary of State, 12 December 1920, L/P&S/10/1061, IOLR.
36 secretary of state to Viceroy, 19 December 1920, Foreign Department, F.No. 2-F/1923 (secret), NAI.
364
'lhe Viceroy, however, thought that the title of the
Amir was of vi tal importance. He pointed out: "Our r·ii ssion
\'1111 be helplessly handicapped if they are not authorised to
address Amir by the title which he has asswned, and it is
more than likely that the \r1h.ole negotiations may break down
upon this petty matter. n31 'l'he Secretary submitted the
question to tl:le King ~Jbo did not .favour the grant of the
title of 'His Majesty• to the Amir tmtil he had signed a
treaty of .friendsb.ip with Britain. Further, he \·ras against tb.e
employment of the title as something to bargain with in 'b:'eaty
negotiations, for in his opinion: "It ouEjlt to be reserved as
re,.,ard· for practical proof of bona &1qes and friendsnip of
Am1r as evinced 1n a treaty acceptable to British Govern-
ment. n38
After some correspondence the British Mission arrived
in Kabul on 7 January 1921. 39 Th.e reception at Kabul, thougtl
extremely friendly from the official point of vie\'lt was far
from that accorded to the Dane l41ssion in 1904. No higll
officials came out of Kabul 1x> greet the lllission; there was
no Salute (Dane had been accorded a twenty-one gun salute;
37 Viceroy to secretary of State, 12 December 193>, Foreign Department, F. No. 2-F I 1923 (Secret) , NA.I.
38 secretary of State to Viceroy, 29 December 1920, Foreign Department, F.No. 2-F/1923 (Secret), NAI.
39 lhe British Mission ~1as led by Sir H. Dobbs and had among its members P.J. P1pon, Lt. Col s.F. Muspratt, Nawab Sir Shams Shah and J. G. Ai tcheson.
365
and no regiments \'lSre drawn up on the parade grolmd 1x> give a
general salute as the British Mission passed). There was,
however, a magnificent guard of honour to receive the Mission
at the gate of their residence. 'lhe meharnandg, the officer
in-charge of guests, explained that the officials could not
travel 1n uniform all the way tbrougb. the cold \'leather out of
Kabul for reception. \llhile this may be one explanation it may
have been that the Amir did not wish to receive tb.e Mission
\d th a public demonstration any greater than \'ras accorded to
the Bolshevik Mission. Furttler 0 the Amir may have had the
intention of according to the British Mission a reception at
par with the reception accorded by the British to the Afghan
Mission. It \'JOuld be recalled that the Afghan Mission led by
'l'arzi had not been given a salute. 40
The first ph.ase of negotiations began on 13 January
1921, with a private meeting bet\'leen the Amir and f~Jahmud Tarzl
on one side and S1r H. Dobbs and Sir Shams Shan on the other.
Dobbs communicated the information at his disposal regarding
the Russo-Afghan negotiations, and tbe objects of J emal.
Pasha's Mission to Kabul and pressed for a statement of
Afgtan policy. He explained 12lat the start of negotiations
would be difficult tmt11 the Afghans disclosed the terms of
their treaty w1 th Russia. 1be Amir prevaricated, but offered
an assurance that th.e Bolsheviks '-rould not be· aJ..lowed to
40 Dobbs to Chelmsford, 9 January 1921, f4ontague Papers, Roll No. 1831, NAI.
366
Wldertake any action deemed to be hostile to the British
Government. In conolus1on the Amir said lle would discuss the
matter over w1 th his adVisers and then take a decision as to
whether he could render a definite reply to Dobb' s enquiries. 41
On 18 January at a five-hour long conference where
the Af(jlans were represented by Mahmud Tarzi and Nadir Khan
and the Br1 tish by Dobbs and Colonel ttluspratt, the Afgtlan
representatives gave deftnite assurances to the Britisn
delegates that:
( 1) ratification of the Russo-Af gtlan 'lreaty had not yet
taken place~ and that even if i.t \'lere ratified by
Moscot'l, the Amir could decline to rats.fy it;
(2) if the Amir were satisfied of British fX-iendship, he
would decline to ratifY clauses hostUe to the British
Government, and
(3) Jamal Pastla' s mission was to re@gan1se the Afghan army,
and b.e would not be perm! tted to intrigue w1 th the
frontier tribes. Nadir Khan pressed for some concession
to Af3lan pretensions in connection wi tb the Bri tisb
frontier tribes.42
Regarding Dobbs' request that 1he terms of the Russo
Afgban agreement may be commWlicated to him, Tarzi pointed out
41 Dobbs to Denys Bray~ 15 January 1921, L/P&s/10/955, IOIR.
42 Viceroy to Secretary of State, 20 January 1921, L/P&S/10/955, IOLR.
367
that at the preliminary stage of negotiations those terms could
not be disclosed. 43 Nadir Khan insisted that the tribes should
be granted the ri~t to self-determination. He said: "'\tle have
made promises to the tribes. They are our co-religionists, and
our own flesh and blood. We cannot abandon them. I don't want
you to give them to us entirely. Let them be free and let us
agree to punish them jointly if they raid eith.er British or
Afghan territory. n44
In the first and second official meetings held on
21 and 24 January, an Afghan Draft 1%-eaty \'ras discussed.
The principles of the 11ussoor1e ~ memoire were generally
agreed to by the Afghan representative, Malunud Tarzi, but \'lith
various amendments. The provisions of the draft included,
inter ~~ Afghan independence, tbe establishment of an
Afghan legation 1n London and consulates in India; the ri~t
to import arms and ammunition via India to Afghanistan; the
payment of rupees four crores 'thirty-six lakhs to the Am1r as
compensation for expenses incurred by Amir Habibullab during
the First '"'orld vlar; a plebiscite among Bri tisll frontier tribes
\'11th a vie\<r to • seJ.f-determination• as to the form of their
future government; and, a British undertaking that the 'l'urkisb.
Treaty 1rrould be amended. 45
43 Foreign Department, F.No. s-F/1923 (Secret), Pro. 746, NAI.
44 Maconachie, n. 20 p. 56.
45 Viceroy to Secretary of State, 24 January 1921, L/P&S/10/955, IOLR.
368
Dobbs pointed out that the Af@lan draft differed
.fundamentally from the stipulations of the t-Iussoorie aide
memoire. So great \'tas the difference that Dobbs feared an
immediate breakdown of the negotiations. 46 He made it clear
that in such an event relations be~reen the two Government
\•rould not be tb.ose which bad supervened on the Treaty of
Ra\1lalpind1 and \'l!arned: "From the day tb.e Rawalpindi Treaty
ttfas si@Jled \lfe have exercised tbe greatest forbearance regar
ding numerous incidents. In futllre any measure vb.ich '"e may
consider to be necessary for our securit¥ or our honour will
be taken without hesitation. n47 Secretary of State Montague,
on learning of the Afghan Draft Treaty, exclaimed: "Y e Gods~
But TJrhat is tile use of Dobbs listening to all this. As I
said yesterday or tile day before, he surely ougbt not to
discuss treaty at all unless we are satisfied as to BolsheVik
relationsh1p.n48
ihe Chief Cormnissioner of the North-West Frontier
Province, however, was of the opinion tbat only t\tfo courses
'-rare open, either to insist on absolute non-interference w1 th
the tribes by the Afghan Government or to offer a concrete
concession. He himself favoured the second alternative and
46 For-eign Department, F .No. 2.F I 1923 (Secret), Pro. 767, HAl.
47 Maconacnie, n. 2, p. 56.
48 Note, 31 January 1921, L/P&S/ 10/955, IOLR.
even sUggested an undertaking to be gi. ven for British with
dra"Jal from Wana. 49
On 7 February 1921 Dobbs \'Jrote to the Viceroy and
informed him about the subst1tut1on of the clause drafted as
a face-saving device, proViding for reciprocal information by
the t'tlO Governments regarding any measures \'tlieh mif#lt appear
necessary for maintenance of order among the tri 'bes on their
common border and for periodical exchange of visits between
the British and the Af~an frontier officers.so The Viceroy
\'ras \d.se enougtl to agree to a face-saVing clause for the
Afghans rather than break off tne negotiations altogether.5 1
'!be Secretary of State however, took exception to the
provision; "'lbe tribes of Afghan origin \\!hose \'relfare has
always been of close interest to the sentiment of the Af@lan
natlon" incorporated in the draft. He \'!rote to the Viceroy
that to recognise formally the ri~t of tlle AfS1ans to interest
themselves in frontier Pathans, on grounds of common nationality,
\'fas of vi tal importance. It \'ras in effect a vi tal departure
.from British attitude on tribal questions. He, however, set
aside his reservations and accepted the Government of Indiat s
advice. 52
49 .l"orei~ Department, F.No. 2-F/1923 (secret), Pro. 818, NAI.
50 Viceroy to Secretary of State, 9 February 1921, L/P&S/ 10/955, IOLR.
51 Chelmsford to t'lontague, 14 Febru3l"y 1921, Montcamas Papet.s, Roll No. 1831, NAI.
52 Ibid.
370
I'rlahmud Tarzi, in a private meeting, assured Dobbs
that a settlement on the lines of his draft 'face-saver' \'10ul.d
be accepted by Afghanistan, if she \'Tere satisfied as to other
clauses of the Ai. gh.an draft Treaty. 53
On 18 February Dobbs communicated his first draft
of ',W eller' Treaty aimed to control anti-British elements
in Af~anistan, rather than at their exclusion from 'the
country on the lines of the Mussoorie ~memoirs; to th.e
Government of India vJhen 1 t was communicated to tne secretary
of State. This draft reco~ized Afghanistan's independence.
Diplomatic relations WOUld be established between London and
Kabul; but the Afghan minister in London could deal w1 th the
British Government only tb.roufP, Secretary of State for India.
The Consulates of third Po~.rers v!OUl.d be excluded from the
Indian border. Afghanistan could import arms via India witbout
paying transit duties. ibe Afgb.ans \tlOuld not be allowed to
intrigue td. th the Frontier Tribes. Recirpoeal declarations
were to be made that ne1ttler party had concluded with a 1h1rd
Povrer any agreement ·.·.hich affected the mutual interests of
the parties. The British. would grant an annual. subsidy of
25 lakhs of rupees and tel.egraph material from Landi Kotal to
Kandahar via Kabul. 54
53 Dobbs to Denys Bray, 15 February 1921, Foreign Department, F.No. 2-F/1923 (Secret), NAI.
54 Maconachie, n. 2, p. 54.
371
The Secretary of State expressed bis alarm at the
course of the Kabul negotiations. 1he Afghan tactics of aiming
at piecemeal concessions \-rould, he feared, resul. t 1n spirming
out negotiations until receipt of ratification of the Russo
Afghan 'treaty. He went on to say that the abandonment of the
Afghan request for technical facilities "apparently synchro
nises with Bolshevik decision, for \·.rhich it may perhaps be
inferred that Afghans on their side intend to ratify. I,
therefore, think they sb.ould be reminded that His I-iajesty' s
Government have no intention of concl.uding treaty \d th them
tmless completely satisfied as to terms of treaty l<.rith the
BolsheViks.n55
Dobbs disagtteed with the Secretary of State's vie\'r
that the negotiations be stopped if the Af~an did not disclose
the terms of the Russo-Af ljlan treaty. He thought it unnecessary
to denand for a disclosure of the Russo-Afghan Treaty to the
point of rupture, 1£ the Afghans accepted his proposals with
minor changes and gave guarantees which adequately proVided
against BolsheVik designs. He added: "If Af~ans deliberately
intended to deceive, they could al\'laYs produce bogus or in
complete Russian Treaty, and we should, therefore, be better
off from their having pretended to disclose 1 t. n56
55 Secretary of State to Viceroy, 19 February 1921, L/P&S/10/955, IOLR.
56 Vicerqy to Secretary of State, 2B February 1921, L/P&S/10/955, IOLR.
372
The Secretary of State 1fJaS • however, dissatisfied w1 th
the 'gis a1ler' Treaty as a \\bole. He held tb.at the British
had already given more concessions to the Af{#lans and that
notb.ing had been secured 1n return. He suggested incorporation
of a provision for British • advice in a friendly way in regard
to foreign relations of Afghanistan•. He reiterated that no
treaty could be signed unless and until there was an assurance
that the Treaty wi tb the Bolsheviks contained nothing against
British interest. He went on to say:
In particular it should be understood that any treaty which provides for payment of a subsidy to tbe Af(jLans by tile BolsheViks must ipso facto, be held objectionabl.e. It is a question for consideration ~ether a strong stand mignt not also be made against supply of aeroplanes and arms to Afghans by BolsheViks outside their treaty. 57
Dobbs assured his Government from Kabul 'that h.e would
not make concessions about Torkham or other points unless pre
vention of Russian propaganda, Afghan neutrality and cessation
of intrigues \"11th tribes were assured. After discussing the
situation in Kabul~ ne remarked: "'tis not possible to
entertain the hope of making Afghans, at any rate by res
pectable means, discard Russian subsidy or admit any measure
of control of their foreign relations by the British. n58
57 Secretary of State to Viceroy • 23 February 193), L/P&S/10/955, IOLR.
58 Viceroy to Foreign and Political Department, 28 February 1921, L/P&S/10/955, IOLR.
313
'lhe Government of India requested the Secretary of
State to modify his att1 tude and to empower Dobbs to proceed
\dth tne negotiations. They proposed that the Bolshevik
consulates should be excluded from the frontiers of India,
the terms of the Bolshevik agreement should be secured if
possible, and that tbe grant of Russian subsidy to Afghanistan
should not be held necessarily to preclude the grant of a
British subs1dy. 59
1he Secretary of State replied to the effect that,
( 1) if the Afghan Government rejected the proposals prohibiting
Bolshevik consulates on tbe Indian frontier and [email protected],
negotiations should be broken off. (2) If they accepted these
proposals, they \t~ere further required to disclose the terms of
the Russo-Afghan Treaty; (3) If the terms were disclosed and
considered by Dobbs to be such. as to justify continuance of
negotiations, the instructions of His rllajesty Government should
be taken. (4) 1he idea of a subsidy being paid both by the
British Government and Russia were not liked by the British
Government. 60
It is apparent tb.at the Secretary of State was
forced by circumstances to modify his Viel>rs. He \tras no longer
quite as def1ni te as b.e b. ad been in his telegram of 29 October
59 Viceroy to Sec~tary of State, 1 March 1921, L/P&S/ 10/955, IOLR.
60 secretary of State to Viceroy, 5 March 1921, L/P&s/ 10/955, IOLR.
374
1920, 1n \'Thien he had said that simultaneous subsidies from
the British. and the Russian Governments ttrere an impossib111 ty
l'ihile in a telegram of 29 July he had characterised such an
idea as absurd and indefensible. 61
On 28 February 1921, the Russo-Af~an Treaty \'Tas
signed by the Afghan Envoy at Mosco"r and the Russian Foreign
Minister. Dobbs anticipated rupture as a result of the ins
tructions given by tne Secretary of State. He, therefore,
decided to give first place 1n renewed discussions to
official request for disclosure of the terms of Bolshevik
1reaty.62
The Secretary of State in his telegram of 11 March
changed his tone; he insisted on the disclosure of tbe terms
of the Russo-Afgtlan Treaty. 63 'lbe Government of India now
formally requested the Home Government to reconsider their
demands; and that disclosure of the Russo-Afgban a~eement and
Bolshevik subsidy or gift of arms to Afghanistan be eliminated.
The Viceroy requested tile Secretary of State for a free hand
in concluding a treaty of friendship w1 th Afghanistan. 64
The Secretary of State instructed the Government
61 Secretary of State to Viceroy, 29 JUly 1920, L/P&S/10/955, IOLR.
62 Minute, India Office, 2 March. 1921, L/P&S/10/955, IOLR.
63 Secretary of State to Viceroy, 11 {'!larch 1921, L/P&S/ 10/955, IOLR.
64 Viceroy to secretary of State, 15 March 1921, L/P&S/ 10/1955, IOLR.
375
of India not to sign th.e treaty until the Afl#\ans disclosed the
Russo-AfB)lan 'lreaty and they were convinced that this treaty
contained nothing harmful. The Viceroy as well as Dobbs, on
the other hand, held that there \'laS no need for disclosure of
Russo-Af{#lan 'lreaty. 1bey thou~ t that their draft treaty
provided ample safeguards. 65
'Lhe Secretary of State, therefore, deci~ed to refer
the controversy to the Cabinet. 'lhe Cabinet decided that
there should be no dual subsidy and th.at certain passages
should be redrafted to bring out this point. On the oUler
b.and, 1t t'las urged that in v1e"1 of British mUitary obliga
tions el.Se\..tlere, 1 t mignt be pre.ferable to tolerate a Russian
subsidy for the time being rattler than incur the risk of the
heavy expense of a fresh .frontier "tlar. The Cabinet finally
decided that Dobbs sb.ould not sign the treaty, until the
Cabinet had had an opportunity of considering the terms of
the Soviet Treaty, particularly tb.e question of subsidies. 66
The Viceroy telegraphically requested the Home
Government to set aside their objection to Bolshevik subsiey
and arms. It was more important from the British point of
Vie\'1 to resist the establishment of Bolshevik consulates 1n
65 Proceedings of the Cabinet Meeting, 3 March 1921, D,fP&S/10/955, IOlR.
66 Ibid.
376
Gham1, Kandahar and Jalalabad. He argued that money and arms,
even if they were excluded from the Treaty oould be given 1n
trade transactions between Afghanistan and soviet Russia. 67
\'lhile these exchanges t~ere taking place the Home
Government sprang a surprise at the Government of India. The
Secretary of State informed the Viceroy on 16 March that a
Trade Agreement had been s1~ed bet\>reen SoViet Russia and
Great Bri ta1n. The Government of India had not been kept
informed of the progress of the negotiations preliminary to tilis
agreement. They were surprised to find that use had been made,
in Sir Robert Horne's note accompanying the agreement, of
information regarding l'.bich Dobbs had given the Am1r an implied
undertaking against publication. 68
, 'lhe Kabul negotiations were seriously affected by AV\.t.to- R \A.SSlcU'\
the ~ lrade Agz'eement and Sir Robert Horn's note to
Krass1n, as Br1 tain was now 1n direct contact w1 th SoViet Russia.
Dobbs thou~t that th.e British Mission 1n Kabul could not
reasonably ask the Afghans to disclose the terms of the
Russo-AffJ:lan ':treaty. The matter could n0\'1 be discussed bet\1een
th.e British and SoViet Governments directly. Dobbs t1ent on
to saya
67 Vicer~ to Secretary of State, 15 March 1921, L/P&S/10/955, IOLR.
68 Sir Robert Horne \'laS Chief British Representative who signed the Anglo-Russian trade agt"eement tori th Krasin who led the Soviet delegation.
377
Crux of the problem is \"lhether Moscow, in response to Bri tisll pressure, \dll decline to ratifY draft Afgpan Treaty and eliminate clauses 1n 'l.bicb. provision is made for subsidy, arms, and Eastern consulates. If trade agreement continues in operation in spite of tb.eir refusal to adopt this course. 1 t will gl'eatly weaken our position vis-a-vis Afghanistan, since it \'Jill be argued by [email protected] that question has n0\'1 become one of direct negotiation between British Government and Russia. 69
After the conclusion of the Russo-Afg,.an agreement,
Dobbs folmd himself in a difficult situation and Visited Delhi
for consultations. His suggestion \'laS ttlat the Home Government
should demand from the Russian Government disclosure of the
Russo-Afghan Treaty. In the meantime, on 31 March the
MancBester Guardi!Jl publisb.ed the text of the Russo-Afghan
Treaty.70
The Af(jlans, 1n the mean\\b.Ue, prepared an amended
draft treaty and submitted it to Dobbs on 5 April. It was
accompanied by an official letter indicated that 1 t was an
absolutely final draft. Tb.e terms included stipulations tilat
the tribes which took part in the Afgb.an war should be excused
from the payment of fines and surrender of rifles; and 'that the
Af gb.ans claim to Arnawai should be recognised. 'lbere was no
provision excluding foreign consulates in Eastern Afghanistan.
This draft treaty \oJaS not acceptable to Dobbs \'bo, therefore,
69 Dobbs to Government of India, 22 March 1921, L/P&S/10/955, IOIR.
70 Maconacnie, n. 2p p. 59.
378
prepared for rupture tn the negotiat1ons.71
Aware of the impending rupture, Tarzi had fixed
9 April for the final official meeting, and 11 April for a
fare\'Tell audience \din tb.e Amir. In the meantime, the Amir' s
uncle died, and official business tms suspended for three
days. Tb.e Amir intervened to resolve the deadlock and discussed
the problems directly with Dobbs. It appeared from 1he
discussion that the main difficul. ties were the proposed Russian
consulates in Eastern Af t1lanistan, and the condi tiona about the
imports of arms. Regarding consulates, the Amir conceded tbat
the British objections were just, but pointed out that Dobb' s
insistence upon the exclusion of Russian consulates from
Eastern Affjlanistan forced him to choose between Soviet
Russia and Britain. 72 Tarz1 admitted Ulat tne main considera
tion g1 ven to the Russians in the treaty was Eastern consulates,
the sole object of wb.ich, he conceded, was to stir up trouble
in India. 'lhe Am1r and Tarzi, however, dwelt on tb.e risk of
rupture w1 th Russia, ''lhic:h they \'JOuld rtm by exclusion of the
consulates from Easter.n Afghanistan.73
Dobbs realised the Amir' s difficulties and suggested
th.at the Home Government "be no\'r moved to press Russians very
71 Viceroy to Seaetary of state, 6 AprU 1921, L/P&S/10/ 955, IOLR.
72 Dobbs Report on the Kabul Mission, Memorandum, A 1/94, L/P&S/18, IOLR.
73 Vicer~ to the Secretary of State, 12 April 1920, L/P&S/10 /955, IOIR.
379
strongly regarding consulates and to demand an early reply.
If they cannot do this, it is necessary for us to realise
that AfW1ans are precluded from complying with our demands,
except at the utmost risk of rupture wi1h Russia, and, unless
the support and compensation indicated forthcoming, they \'rill
not run the risk. a74
The Secretary of State thereupon consul ted Lord
Curzon, the Foreign secretary t-lho considered 1 t un\d.se to put
pressure on the Russians regarding consulates 1n Eastern
Af€tlan1stan; tbe Russians migbt retort by asking the British
\#that right had they to object to Russian consulates in an
independent AfS1an1stan. 'lbe Viceroy \'laS told that "Dobbs has
at the moment established position \\bicll is advantageous from
detaching A.fgbans from BolsheViks by our making a comprehensive
offer of assistance, and I shall be glad to have your further
views.n7S
For some time the correspondence between the Secretary
of State and the Viceroy \mB mainly concerned with th.e possibi-
11 ty of securing an 'Exolusi ve• 'Ireaty to eliminate Bolshevik
influence &an Afghanistan. 'lhe Aftjlans were to be compensated
adequately for. the loss of the benefits accruing fran the
Russo-Afgtlan Treaty, and supplied w1 th the means of repelling
Russian aggression, \'bich might be expectea to result from
74 Dobbs to Government of India, 10 AprU 1921, L/P&S/10/ 955, IOLR.
75 Secretary of State to Viceroy, 15 AprU 1921, L/P&S/ 10/955, IOLR.
380
their acceptance of an 'Exclusive' Treaty w1 tb. the Bri t1sh
Government. Dobbs also expressed his opinion th.at if suffi
cient inducement \'lere offered to the Afi?Jlans, the British
could tdn them over. Regarding Afghanistan• s financial crisis
he ~ote:
Her need of money now is so B'eat, and the discontent of army is so serious, that it was possible that far immediate adequate sum and promise of arms in the event of Russian aggression, she would sacrifice to some extent her power of independent action, \iOuld forego her tribal pretensions, and break with the Turkish Nationalists and Russia sufficiently for our purposes. 76
In a subsequent letter to the Government of India,
Dobbs was less hopeful of the prospect of success in dealing
1.·ti th tbe Afghans. Rosenburg, \\ho had a treaty w1 til him for
ratification, ~ras announced by Kabul press to arrive in Kabul
on 26 AprU. Afghanistan• s relations w1 th Soviet Russia had
reduced Brittan freedom of action. As Dobbs put it:
It is impossible for us nottr to suggest even informal control of foreign. affairs, but a mutual promise not to make wi Ulout consultation agt"eement affecting mutual interests 1111 tb. a tnird power ••• could be made acceptable to Afghanistan. Dismissal of Bolshevik Minister from Kabul could not be demanded by us but we could ask tb.at official or unofficial representatives be strictly limited, and \'te eoul.d possibly secure informally tnat Jamal's uervices be politely terminated. 77
76 Dobbs to Government of India, 21 AprU 1921, L/P&S/10/ 955, rom..
77 Ibid.
381
'.t.be complexity of the problem was summarized as
follows:
( 1) Russia tfanted a treaty w1 th. Afghanistan to secure her
position w1 th Muslims in her Central Asian republic
on the Af ~an border and to threaten the British 1n
India.
(2) Afghanistan \!ranted a treaty with both Russia and Britain
and wanted to escape domination by either power,
{3) Britain t'lanted a treaty tdth Afghanistan to prevent
Russia' s domination and bring Aftjl.anistan under her
own sphere of influence.
{ 4) 'lhe North-vi est Frontier of India \'las unsettled, partly
because of lack of settlement bet\reen Afghanistan and
Britain and partly because Afgnanistan was exercising
her influence against the Bri tisn 1n order to force
concessions from them,7B
The Secretary of State preferred an exclusive policy.
He feared that the course of action favoured by Ule Government
of India would leave the Amir free to receive money and arms
from the Bolsneviks and military assistance from the Turks,
He assured the Viceroy that Britain abandonment of consulates
in Eastern Af ghan1 stan, 79
78 Viceroy to Secretary of State, Zl April 1921, L/P&S/ 10/955, IOLR,
79 Secretary of State to Viceroy, 29 April 1921, L/P&S/ 10/955t IOLR.
382
Dobbs could not see any advantages in concluding an
exclusive tt'eaty 1!tiUl Af~anistan. He thought that if the
Russians were excluded on paper, the Amir would receive Russian
money and arms under the guise of commercial transactions. 'lbe
Viceroy agreed w1 th. Dobbs and suggested that a settlement
should be made wi tll At. gtlanistan. He cautioned that rupture
would create problems both on the frontier and in India and
added&
But I want a settlement at present td th Af8lanistan, even though we cannot get 1 t on terms we should like. It is 1n rrt'J opinion undesirable that we should come away wi 1hout a treaty, w.L th probabUi ty of serious external and internal consequences and prospect of Af~anistan securing treaty relations of sorts t-ritb all important powers but our-selves. 80
Dobbs in his private letter to Lord Reading cautioned him by
saying: "VIe could afford to be dilatory in the old days \ben
we had no Vigilant opponents at Kabul. '\'le can no longer afford
1 t now at critical stages of negotiation such as present. n81
The Government of India reviewed the situation and
presented three possible courses of action viz. { 1) pursuance
of the exclusive policy; ( 2) presentation of tb.e • ,W al.ler'
treaty as a final offer plus a public and formal assurance
against aggression by a third po\'Ter and a demand for the
disclosure of all treaties made by the Afgban Government; and
80 Viceroy to Secretary of State, 5 May 1921, L/P&S/10/955, IOLR.
81 Dobbs to Lord Reading, 26 May 1921, vol. 23, Reading Paoet-it MSS. E.'UR. E 238, IOLR.
383
(3) Modification of 'J?J& a1U£' is unessentia1 9 but insistence
on the disclosure of Ule Russian Treaty, exclusion of the
Eastern Consulates, and an assurance against Russian
aggression. 62
Tb.e Viceroy, after reviewing the three alternative
courses. of action, preferred modification of 'pis aller'
treaty. He explained his preference clue to th.e changed
circumstances as follows:
\Ve should be prepared to go to considerable length, in money and arms to secure a clear S\'leep of the SoViet 'l'reaty and SoViet influence from Af~anistan \-Jere this possible. But \'Ie believe that 1 t is not. Our offer, in \\hatever form 1 t \'las couched, t'fould be in effect a reversion towards our old control of Afghanistan• s foreign relations and \-<TOuld be regarded as such •••• But the Am1r came to the throne as the champion of Afgjlanistan' s independence and has proclaimed it in all his public utterances, and \'Te believe it would be impossible for bim to accept this or ant similar clause. 83
It was feared that an Exclusive Treaty and \Atithdrat.,al
of Russian legation \ITould be an act of provocation and would
lead to a 'lrlal' bet\-reen Afghanistan and Russia. It \'Tas British
policy not to encourage Afghanistan to provoke Russia. rJiore
over, a formal promise that the Russian legation should be
excluded from Af€Jlanistan l'Tas irreconcUable w1 tb. Afghan
independence. 'lhe British wanted to exclude Russia from
82 For exclusive, • pis aller' and gentlemanly treaties, see Appendix XI.
83 Viceroy to Secretary of State, 27M~ 1921, L/P&S/10/955, IOLR.
384
Afghanistan and keep it under their sphere of influence. without
bearing expenditure and any risk.
The Secretary of State, emphasising his preference
for th.e Exclusive Treaty, agreed, if this t'lere fotmd to be
impraetible, in the last resort to sanction the '.W, a11E' • 84
Dobbs decided to inform the Afghans tb.at if they '\'TOuld ter
minate tbeir 'lreaty \d th Russia and undertake not to receive
any subsidy or munition directly or ind1rectly from Russia,
the British vrould g1 ve 40 lakhs of rupees. The Afghans could
have a Russian legation in Kabul and could make a purely
commercial agreement ~Ti ttl Russia. 85 'Ihus the benefits to
be anticipated from the • Exclusive• 'lreaty t>Tere very unsubs
tantial. It seemed that the Af{jlan Government could only be
asked to g1 ve undertakings against acceptance of Russian money
and arms. The Bolshevik intrigue in Af~anistan \>JOuld remain
~li tn the unavoidable retention of the Russian legation and
consulates outside the prohibited zone. It ".ras evident that
an exclusive treaty with tbese reservations t'IOUld not be
exclusive at all.
At a meeting of the tt-To delegations held on 30 J1.me,
Dobbs ~ormed Tarzi of tne secretary of State• s sanction of
• pis aller' 1reaty. 'lhe Afghan delegates pointed out that
84 Dobbs Report on the Kabul f>iission, Memorandum, A 194P L/P&s/18, IOLR •
85 Dobbs to Government of India, 3 Jtme 1921, L/P&S/10/955, IOill.
385
Afgtanistan would, by rupture with Russia, lose not only
Panjdeh and Russian subsidy, but also other benefits, such as
telegraphic lines, a smokeless po\'lder factory, 5,500 rifles,
field guns, anti-aircraft ~s, and twelve aeroplanes. The
British should supply all these immediately and not only in
the event of an attack by a third power. Tarzi and the other
Af~an representatives professed to be prepared to consider a
complete break 't'ri ttl Russia involving the exclusion of the
Russian legation.86
proposals:
Dobbs at a meeting held on 4 June made the foUO\dng
If treaty with. Russia is entirely scrapped and Russian Minister withdra"m, British Government will give assurances alreac:\V' mentioned, subsid;y of 40 lakhs of rupees, in1 tial grant of 10 lakhs • telegraph. material b-om Kabul Via Kandahar to Herat only 160 miles being provided immediately and six aeroplanes after six months, ''lith the contingent gift of muni tiona already mentioned in the event tmprovoked Russian attack. 87
Dobbs went on to say that 1f the Afghans received only a Russian
legation and Russian Commercial agents outside the probib1 ted
zone, tile British Government would give the Afghans 35 lakhs
of rupees and telegraph material. In the event of war
bet\>reen Russia and Af@Jlanistan, the Bri tisn would not give
86 Dobbs to Government of India, 3 June 1921, L/P&S/10/955, IOLR.
87 Dobbs to Government of India, 4 J\Dle 1921, L/P&s/10/955, IOI.R.
386
any assurance of military or any other type of b.elp to
Af ~ani stan. 88
Though the Aftjlans at first seemed. somewb.at inclined.
to consider these proposals, they eventually pressed for an
offensive and defensive alliance with the Br1tish.8 9
On 11 June, Dobbs reported to the Government of India
that the Aff#\an Government bad decided on a complete break
\'11th Russia.· At this point th.e Secretary of State telegt-a
phically reminded the Government of India of their earlier
contention that the Bolsheviks" after being expelled fran
Afghanistan, would stUl be able, under the Turko-Af3lan
Treaty, to return in a Turkish guise. 90 In anotner telegram
he insisted for a simllar reason on the exclusion of Bukbaran
consulates from the prohibited zane.91
At a meeting on 14 July, Mahmud Tarzi intimated that
a definite decision had been reached by the Aftjlan Council
that no understanding could be given, as prov1ded for by clause
15 of the proposed Exclusive Treaty~ for exchange of viet-rs
regarding future agreement. 92
The Secretary of State \'laS not ready to accept a
88 Dobbs to Government of India, 4 June 1921, L/P&S/10/ 955, IOLR.
89 Ibid.
90 secretary of State to Viceroy o 11 June 1921, L/P&S/ 10/ 955, IOLR. .j
91 Secretary of State to Viceroy, 16 Jme 1921, L/P&s/ 10/ 955, IOLR.
92 Dobbs to Government of India, 18 July 1921, L/P&S/10/ 955, IOLR.
387
' pis aller' treaty and w1 thdre\'1 any authority g1 ven to Dobbs
to negotiate it. He proposed a treaty as between two c1V111-
zed nations, by \tJhich provision t>rould be made for the reci
procal riS1t to send Envoys and Consuls arid for offer of
ordinary ne1ghbourly relations. The subs~dy could not be
paid to Afghanistan. Ttle Treaty thus described came to be
known 1n the correspondence as the 'gentlemanly' treaty. 93
Durtng these negotiations tne British continued
these efforts to retain as much Exclusive control over
Af~anistan as was possible. On 17 July, the British Foreign
0 ffice objected to a commercial agreement signed between
Af ~anistan and Italy; 1 t informed the I tal ian Government
that the Amir, by an agreement \'lhich b.e was on the verge of
concluding \d.th the British, was about to admit the superior
and predominant pol1 tical influence of Great Britain in his
country. Tb.e British stUl considered Af(jlanistan to lie
~ tb.1n tbe spllere of Bri t1 sh political influence. 94 News o.f
this British representation regarding [email protected] ireaty
reache\'! tne Afghan Government on 25 July. Dobbs immediately
felt a ef4, Be in the Aftjl.an attitude. He reported that the
British obje, t1on-
woUl.Cl ~P~Y ... ~ccotmt for the Afghans extraordinary~ face and their sudden bitter
·,
93 secretary of state to Viceroy, 5 August 1921, L/P&S/ 10/ 955, IOlR.
94 Dobbs Report on the Kabul f1ission, Memorandum, A 194, L/P&S/ 18, IOIR.
anti-Bri t1sh attitude. We may be sure that Frenob and Italians have made most of the statement that tb.e intention of our contemp.. lated treaty was to reaffirm our predominant political interest in Af~anistan, and that thou~ ostensibly Afgnanistan now enjoys independence, she is still regarded by us as within the sphere of our political influence. 95
In a private meeting held on 6 August, Mahmud i'arz1
put forl1ard an absolutely final draft treaty.96 It \'ras
accompanied by a note setting forth the disadvantages and
dangers wnich complete rupture \\11th Russia \vould entail for
Aftjlanistan. 97 The proposed treaty abandoned the exclusive
proposals, did not proVide for the exclusion of the Eastern
Consulates, and demanded an amnesty, not only for the Masuds
and Wazirs, but for all the frontier tribes '.from Cll1 tral to
Soutb. Baluchistan• •
Dobbs 1n his telegram of 6 August remarked that
' argue further would be useless and humiliating". \'lhile
th~~ relatS.ons between Dobbs and the Afghan Government '\'Iere
str \:ned, the meil bag of the British. l4iss1on was lost on its
Kabul to India. Dobbs suspected the Af~an Govern
ment' s n. . 1nth1s and, tilere.fore, suspended the negotiations.
95 Dobbs to aov~ nment of India, Z1 July 1921, L/P&S/ 10/ 955, IOLR. ,_
'-,
96 This draft treaty ~~ pX"epared by the Amir' s CotmoU. 'lb.ey had decided that- 1 t either nad to be accepted or the Bri tisb. Mission sil~ul.d leave.
97 Dobbs to Government of India, 8 August 1921, L/P&S/ 10/ 955, IOIB.
389
He planned to wait for a fortnigb.t for the recovery of the
mail bag and appropriate explanations from the AffP.an
Government. He wanted to use the incident to exert pressure
on the AfS1ans: "In view of this robbery of diplomatic post,
we shall now be 1n a position to take up strong position
w1 th the Af ghana and threaten them. n9B On 20 August two
members of the Afghan Foreign Office brought tb.e maU bag
along \'lith a letter of apology from 1·7ahmud Tarzi. 1be
interval between the rupture of negotiations and the return
of the bag 'l.'las occupied by discussions regarding the future
talks, bet\'reen the Government of India and the Home Government.
Dobbs proposed to place the 'exclusive' and 'gentlemanly'
draft treatm simultaneously before the Afl'Jlans and allO\'T
them to choose. He thought that the Af ghana would prefer
an ordinary treaty to rupture. They t-rere not ready for war,
d ~~uld like to avoid confrontation with Russia. To
m.., tnta1n balance between the two powers, the Afghans could not
w predominance of Russian ~linister in Kabul. 99
·On 23 August Mahmud Tarzi informed Dobbs that the
Russo-Af an ~eaty had been ratified. On 1 September, fal'zl
officially ;, tlmated a copy of the Treaty to the Bri t1sb
r-tission in Kabu, ·.; 100 'lbe Government of India considered that
98 Dobbs to Reading, 9 August 1921, vol. 23, Reatiing Pagmos, MSS. EUR. E 238, IOLR.
99 Dobbs to Government of India, 21 August 1921, L/P&S/10/ 955, IOLR.
100 Dobbs to Reading, 24 August 1921, vol. 23 • Reading Paoers, r-tss. EUR. E. 238, IOUl.
390
no further insistence on disclosure of secret clauses \ms
needed, and that the ''13'3 \'las no,., clear for negotiations of
the ' pis aller' treaty, proVided a note was given by Dobbs to
the effect that the establishment of consulates in the prohi
bited zone by a third power \>Tould constitute a breach. of the
treaty • 101
Dobbs was directed by the Government of India to
request the disclosure of the Russian Treaty as ratified in
Kabul. The SoViet Government bad already furnished the
British Government officially w1 th a copy of the treaty
ratified by them, \'1hich contained a provision for the estab
lishment of Russian Consulates at Kandahar and Gb.azni and
had granted a large subsidy and other help to Af@lanistan.
In reply to Dobbs' request, the A.f Sian Government furnished a
copy of a portion of the treaty and agreements, omitting the
~ost vi tal portions relating to the grant of help to
A'(gnanistan by the Soviet Government. 102
·,·,hUe the negotiations bet\'reen Af@lanistan and
Brita~ \'lere at a critical juncture, an Afghan mission to
the United States led by Mohammad Wali Khan had
arrived 1n ondon and had an intervie\'1 on 17 August with Lord
Curzon. Wh.e}M~hammad Wall Kban re£erred to the Kabul '-,
101 Vicerey to Secretary of State, 9 August 1921, L/P&S/10, 1956, IO~.
102 The Treaty as disclosed by the Af{#lan Government "'as an ordinary treaty guaranteeing neigb.bourly relations bet\-reen Af g-,.anistan and Soviet Russia. See Appendix XII.
391
negotiations, Lord Curzon broke off the conversation, saying
that the negotiations 1n Kabul \~re tile affair of Afghanistan
and India and not his concern. The AfSlan mission wanted to
be introduced to the King by Lord Cura:>n but he declined to
do so and re£erred Ute matter to Ute India Office. Mohammed
vlali Khan informed the Affjlan [email protected] of Lord
Curzon• s attitude. Mahmud Tarzi in his letter of 28 August
to Dobbs complained about the treatment of the Afgtlan Mission
in London. 103
Lord Curzon addressed a note to the Soviet Govern
ment on 7 September 1921, calling attention to breaches of
undertakings entered into under the preamble of the Anglo
Soviet i'rade Agreement. The Russian Treaty with Af€P,anistan
t'las referred to as the most serious charge against the SoViet
Government. Reference was made to Stalin's mention of the
· Russo-Af(#lan Treaty as an instrument to guarantee friendl.y
}, ... elations with a state \'bose territory was an important
el by 't'JIU.ch tttne Communist International maintained
dire\! t contact with India". '!he note further referred to
4 and 5 of the Russo-Afgtlan Treaty which prOVided
for the ek'!tablishment of Russian consulates in Gbazni and
Kandahar. 10~ 1h1s ttlas also interpreted as an un&iendly
act.
103 Adamec, n. 5, P• 164.
104 British. Foreign Office to Cheoher1n, Soviet Fore13'). Commissary, 7 Septanber,1921, L/P&s/10/956, pt. 2, IOLR.
392
1be Russians People' s Commissariate on '0 September
handed over a note to the British re[lresentative in Moscow to
be submitted to the British ForeiPJl Office. Tb.e note denied
the charges against the Soviet Government and went on to say:
It is quite obvious that all the reports, speeches and utterances quoted in tbe Br1 tish note bave been invented, forged and falsified for some purpose. They have appeared some time ago 1n papers, t-:hieb. have also reproduced a number of o1:her documents, circulars and letters, purporting to come from tbe 'lbird International, various Soviet institutions or from Mr Lenin, Trotsky, Tchi tcherin, Litvinoff •••• 105
It t-ras added in the note that strict instructions had been
issued after the conclusion of tile Anglo-Russian Agreement
by the Russian Government to 1 ts representatives in the East
ordering them to abstain from any anti-Bri tisb. propaganda. 106
Th.e Secretary of State adVised the Viceroy that fUll
1solosure of any secret clause in the Russo-Af@lan ~eaty
tore.: s a condition precedent to the conclusion of a 'l'reaty on
aller' lines.
On 13 September Mahmud Tarzi, wiUlout replying to
the requ~t for full disclosure made by Dobbs 0 wrote 'that
the ·Afghan ~vernment could negQ_tiate only wi 1h His Majesty' s
105 r.iaxim Li tvinof, Deputy People's Commissary for Foreif¥1 Affairs t.o Lord Curzon, Z1 September 1921, L/P&S/10/956, pt. 2, IOLR.
106 Ibid.
Government and not \•11th the Government of India. 107 This was
an obvious counter-action to the attitude adopted by Lord
Curzon towards the Af[#lan Mission 1n London.
Dobbs repeatedly demanded full disclosure of tbe
Russo-Aff#lan Treaty, failing \'bich he would soon leave KabUl.
On 18 September, I'lahmud Tar z1 intimated that he could only
give a private verbal assurance in regard to tne supplementary
undertakings "11 1h Russia. Dobbs privately asked Mahmud Tarzi
whether he would be prepared to accept a 'gentlemanly treaty'.
The draft treaty was presented by Dobbs at an official
meeting held on 19 September. 100
On 25 September, the Amir intervened and 1nvi ted
Dobbs to see b.im privately. He insisted on an Exclusive
Treaty and indicated that he was prepared to cancel the treaty
w1 th Russia \IJb.ich had been recently ratified. Dobbs suspected
he Afgbans and thou~t that the Amir wanted to get the maximum
be; efi ts from botn the British and the Russians. In a
tb.e deeper implications of the Amir' s
r~y own feeling 1s that 1 t is 1m possible for "Great Britain to involve herself in a transa~:tlon of such a discreditable nature. If,
107 Vicerqy to Secretary of State, 15 September 1921, L/P&S/10/955, IOLR.
108 Dobbs to Government of India, 19 September 1921, L/P&S/10/955, IOLR.
394
\'Ji thin six weeks after ratification, and after receiVing subsidy 0 Amir tears 1n pieces Treaty wiUl Russia he could equally well tear up ours. We should never be safe wi 1h him. 109
The Government of India ags:-eed w1 th tilis view and considered
the Amir' s proposal obviously dangerous.
'lbe Government of India feared that a breach with
Afghanistan \"'Iuld have a most serious upsetting effect on tb.e
tribes on the frontier, especially if 'the cry of jeh,aci l'ras
raised. Af~anistan had become stronger and had probably
received arms from SoViet Russia. It could rely on further
Soviet help in a conflict witb the British. It was, therefore,
proposed by the Government of India that the Friendship
1reaty was tbe best alternative.
After a lengthy correspondence between the Govern
ment of India and the home government, tne Secretary of State )
~ave his decision as follows: \
Dobbs should accordingly reply to Amir that exclusive treat,y has been made impossible by Am1r' s own action in ratifying the treaty witb. Bolsheviks, even if his proposals t!J'ere acceptable in themselves; and that since be has not only rejected condition upon ~bida Hts Majesty' s Government were thernsel ves
· Fepared to offer b.1m a treaty of friendship b'Ut h.as no"r committed nimself formally to an alliance witn Bolsheviks, it has become necessary to adjourn negotiations until he is in different frame of mind. 110
109 Dobbs to Denys Bray~ 25 September 1921, L/P&S/10/955, IOlR.
110 Secretary of State to Viceroy, 2B October 1921, L/P&S/ 10/9(:/J, IOLR.
395
After a lengthy bargaining by the Amir on tribal
question and financial assistance, on 11 November, the news
reached Kabul 'that the Bri tisn motor transport for the return
of the Mission to India b.ad erot\§led the frontier. On the
same evening Ule Amir granted Dobbs a farewell audience, 1n
\llhich he accepted the ' gentlemanly t..'reaty' • Stressing his
O\IJn role in finally agreeing to a treaty, the Amir assured
Dobbs tb.at Foreign Minister Mahmud Tarz1 was not aware of this
decision. 'lbe Treaty \'laS signed on 22 November 1921, 1n the
Delkusha Palace between Amir Amanullab. and Sir H. Dobbs. 111
After Ute signing of tne 'l'rea-ey Dobbs announced that as a
mark of its satisfaction at the establishment of good
neighbourly relations, the British Government would make an
immediate large gift of telegaph material to 1tle Amir. 112
On 1 December, after a most cordial fare't'rell to
t~e British Mission, tne Amir delivered a speech asserting
th.a.t tlle Treaty 'lri til the Br1 tish was one of neiS!.bourly
rela:t1ons only and not of friendship. He declared that he -,_
•.-~ould 'only be prepared to enter into close friendly relations
with tbe British if they showed generosity towards Turkey
and the fr<m.tier tribes and treated the inhabitants of India
td th kindness. 113 Most probably the aim of this speech was
111 For the text of tb.e Treaty see Appendix XIII.
112 Dobbs Report on the Kabul Mission, A 194, L/P&s/18, IOLR.
113 Ibid.
396
to tell the Indian IVIuslims that he \ltas the champion of tb.e1r
cause and ttle KhUafat movement and to as sure the frontier
tribes that he had not deserted tb.em and would struggle for
procuring their rif#lta.
The terms of the Anglo-Afghan Treaty were favoura
ble to the Afghans. 1b.e Afl91ans could manage to extract
benefit from botb. of her pot~Ter.tul neigb.bours. They could
manage to stay out of th.eir spheres of infiuence. 1he
Af@tlans were congt-atulated by the Indian paper Zamindar in
these words:
'lbe terms of the Anglo-Afghan Treaty, indicate the cleverness of Ule Afghans in securing Vf!t"/ favourable cond1 t1ons for their country. 'lhe English appear to fear the Bolsheviks and llave managed to obtain a modification of the AfS1an 'lreaty td th Russ1at the Amir haVing agr-eed not to all0\'1 any SoViet agent near 'the frontier of India. 114
, lhe Dande Mataram of the 2B November 1921 congra-
tu.\ated the Am1r on his success in securing his terms from \
th.e'-~1tisb. 'lhe paper maintained that AffP.anistan succeeded .
in se~ing many advantageous terms from Great Britain, t.Jb.ile '
the latt~~ country gained nothing solid except tne Friendship
Treaty with the ruler of Afghanistan. 115
The Xftki~ in its 27 December issue \llrote that
signing the treaty was a great success for British diplomaoy.1
114
115
Tl}e 6amindar (Lahore), 19 December 1921; PUQjab Press Abs;tract, vol. 34, no. 51, p. 582.
B§,Pde !ateramp 28 November 1921, Pmjab .PJ:ess Abstract, vol. 3 , no. 49, p. 525.
It \'II'Ote:
\
'
No subsidy \dll be paid to it (Afghanistan) 1n future from tb.e Indian exchequer, tJbich should satisfy those tmo used to regard 1 t as an injustifiable burden upon this country. 'lbe provision regarding the establishment of Bri tlsh Consulates at Kandahar and J alalabad constitutes the great victory for British diplomacy, inasmuch. as the arrangement would practically annul tbe Afghan treaty with SoViet Government. 116
116 ±he Va!sl• (Amritsar), 2.1 November 1921, Punjab P£ea§ Abstract, vol. 34, no. 49, PP• 525-26, N M L.