CHAPTER VI

CHAPTER VI1

THE CONFLICT LINKAGES IN INDIA- PAKISTAN RELATIONS:

PAKISTAN'S REACTIONS TO PROBLEMS IN KASHMIR AND PUNJAB

KASHMIR

To come to grips with the character of the movement in Kashmir is no easy task.

Till the eighties the movements for plebiscite as well as liberation hinged on issues that

emphasized an exclusive ethnic identity of the people in the valley. The Islamic content

of such identity was either being glossed -over or used in a limited sense to enforce such

ethnic exclusivity. This is not to ignore incidents of riots on odd occasions i.e. rumours

of desecration· of places. of worship, theft of Prophet's hair from Hazratbal, riots in

reaction to riots in India. But the thread of Islam could never weave Kashmiris either

with their fellow believers in India or Pakistan. The remarkable restraint, the Kashmiris

displayed, during the years of communal holocaust (aftermath of partition) indicated that

Kashmir remained largely untouched by the arguments of two-nation theory and

communal rivalry that held sway in the rest of the sub-continent. The resistance of the

people to tribal invasions orchestrated by Pakistani politicians/ even confirmed their

In this Chapter,in the presentation of Kashmir problem I have heavily drawn on the draft report on the ICSSR sponsored project entitled 'Nationalism and Inter-State Relations in South Asia: Recent Trends'. I had worked as a Research Assistant in the project.

2 For firsthand account refer to G. K. Reddy,The Great Consoiracy(Bombay:BiitzPublications,n.d.)

230

unwillingness to act as pawns in the game of the divisive politics, advocated by the

leaders of the Pakistan movement. The valley as such was overwhelmed with sympathy

for India after the Indian army repulsed the invaders. The subsequent elections that

brought indisputable Shiekh Abdullah into power proved that the opinion of the people

in the valley had favourably switched in favour of a dignified, lasting relationship with

India.

Outlines of the History of Kashmir Problem

It is not within the scope of the present study to go into bizarre details of the

politics that made the people disenchanted with their union with India. But the efforts

from the Indian side was never too encouraging. Shiekh Abdullah's socialist policies that

ran counter to the interests of an entrenched Dogra Pandit class, were cited a proofs of

Abdullah's communal approach to politics. 3 This class could also convince the

administration at New Delhi of such a possible discriminatory rule and thus Abdullah fell

a victim to the social turbulence he authored. In order to preserve his constituency among

overwhelming Muslim population in the valley, he started mouthing propositions of

complete independence for Kashmir. The Indian commitments for plebiscite allowed

enough elbow-room to excite such an aspiration. Finally Abdullah's alleged collusion

with American President elect Adlai Stevenson, made the lobby opposed to him sound

legitimate and thus necessitated Indian State action and cost Abdullah his throne. From

3 M.J.Akbar makes a brilliant study of the politics in the period in his book,Kasbmir:Behind the Vale( Delhi: Viking, 1991)

231

that moment Abdullah, sold well in the valley as a counterpoise to the central

intervention. And the arguments in favour of independence gained wider currency in

Kashmir. But the movement in the valley that called for plebiscite has to be studied

separately from Pakistani call for plebiscite. The stress on communal identity always

came as a secondary component of an overall Kashmiri ethnic identity.

Then came the loyal rule of Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed who could never inspire

respect in the valley, as he was dismissed as a stooge, an agent of the centre. But the

Indian government chose to proceed with the government as such. With a loyal

government in Sri nagar, the Constituent assembly of Jammu and Kashmir took four years

to draft out and set into operation a constitution that for Kashmiris must have carried no

moral significance. During this time too the popular sympathy ran parallel to Pakistani

interest. M.A.Beg's founding of 'Plebiscite Front' with proclaimed pro-Pakistani temper

attests this proposition. However active Pakistani efforts failed to convince people for the

taste tribal invasion was still fresh in memory and they were in no mood to jump into fire

out of frying pan.

It needed a communal event to rock the popular sentiment in the valley. From day

(27 December 1963), of the theft of the Prophet's hair to (4th Jan.1964), the day of its

restoration the riots that set off in the state left the administration in Delhi gape in

wonder4• ) Shiekh Abdullah was released on 8th April 1964 and he embarked upon an

extensive tour in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir, in May. Shiekh associated himself with

4 (Though a lot haS been said of Pakistani involvement in the act no substantial proof was available to corroborate such an accusation

232

Plebiscite Front. Nehru's death complicated matters further. In November 1964 some

provisions of Indian constitution were extended to Kashmir which was detested by the

representative leadership. The government of India played it safe, showing that the

elected Kashmir assembly had solved the question of accession and now Kashmir formed

an integral part of India. But Shiekh's arrest and subsequent detainment had catapulted

the whole question of popular involvement back to the centre-stage. The representatives

that voted in favour of accession (ratifying the instrument of accession signed by Hari

Singh) had lost the faith of the people (otherwise plebiscite front founded by Mirza Afzal

Beg would not command such popular support as is reported in several newspapers).

Perhaps the leadership despite the political wisdom they had had, wanted to have a

solution that would look perfectly logical and legal without taking the popular sentiments

into considerations.

The extension of the provisions of Indian Constitution to Kashmir quite expectedly

provoked resentment from Pakistan. Pakistan raised it in United Nations without much

success however. In the meanwhile, in the valley, quite a cross-section of people detested

Shiekh 's association with Plebiscite Front and dissociated themselves from it to form

Awami Action Committee headed by Maulvi Farouqi, having distinct pro-Pakistani

sympathies. During the sametime too, National Conference was merged with Congress.

To restore his popular base Shiekh was seen making statements that were marked by

cautious but anti-India (if not pro-Pak) overtone. The question of plebiscite hung heavy

in the air. In March-April 1965 Shiekh's tour to Egypt, London, France, Algiers and

Saudi Arabia raised the suspicion of the Indian leaders further. Shiekh 's speeches in

233

Bradford. Nottingham, Birmingham were certainly designed to correct his image in the

eyes of the non-resident Kashmiri population who had almost dismissed him as a

persona-non-grata, an Indian stooge. But his violent assertion of Kashmiri identity (even

when it was not seccessionistic) must have irked the Central Government in Delhi. His

meeting with Chou-en-Lai and subsequent offer from Chou to visit China and Bhutto's

announcement of offering Pakistani passport to Shiekh to smoothen his visit to China in

case India denied the same to him, allayed Indian fears of Shiekh trying for a separate

state of Kashmir. Shiekh's proposal for an lndo-Pak confederation with a buffer

autonomous Kashmir belonging to both was earlier dismissed by India and Pakistan as

unrealistic.

To cap it all, fighting broke out between India-Pakistan over Rann of Kutch in

April 1%5 which continued uptilt June. Shiekh's freelance ambassadoring cruised to a

halt. He was arrested on 7th May, the moment his plane touched Paiam. In May the

fighting had already shifted to Kashmir along Line of Control. The ceasefire came about

in 1stJuly 1965.

On 9th July, a Pakistani Minister revealed that Azad Kashmir was prepared for

war with India. Compulsory military training in Azad Kashmir started recruiting people

heavily for an eventual showdown with India. All this turmoil in Aza6 Kashmir which

Pakistan brushed off as being 'Kashmiri' in origin was indeed funded and fuelled by

Pakistan to keep the issue alive, to use it as a diversion, in times of grave internal

disturbances. From 5th August 1965, armed infiltration( code-named Operation Gibralitor)

started from Pakistan side of Azad Kashmir, necessitating Indian counter attack on 3

234

different sections to repulse the infiltrators. On 23rd the U.N. sponsored cease fire comes

into operation.

There was a change in leadership in India after Shastri's death in Tashkent. But

from January 1966, tension mounted in the valley. Frequent clahes between police and

pro-Plebiscite front leaders were reported. There was an attempt on the life of the Chief

Minister, Mr.G.M.Sadiq. In April 1967 some prominent leaders appealed to the

government. to release Sheikh Abdullah. On 2nd January 1968, Shiekh was released.

Shiekh went to the valley and his presence calmed the valley for: a momenL But situation

remained tense all through. In October 1968, Shiekh called for an all party initiative on

Kashmir. Both wings of Congress and Jansangh boycotted the meet. The valley continued

to remain tense, thanks to Pakistani provocations. But other economic and political issues

(Bank Nationalisation Devaluation of Rupee etc etc.) raised too much political turmoil

in rest of India and the issue of Kashmir was pushed to the backyard. Throughout 1969

and 1970s the issue was not paid adequate attention. But Ayub's fall was imminent across

the border and Pakistan was busy handling the popular Bangladesh movement of Shiekh

Mujibur Rehman. In 1971 there were elections in both the countries. The election

preparations in India sought to ignore Kashmir issue. But in Pakistan the issue was raised

every now and then. Everybody was busy proclaiming his sympathy for Kashmir

movement. Even in one of his election speeches in 1970 Bhutto admitted that he had

engineered war against India in 1965.

Though Kashmir did not feature in the election agenda as it did in Pakistan, the

ruling party tried its best using all the power at its command to keep Shiekh Abdullah

235

out of the elections. This was the second attempt (since 1953) at throttling democracy in

the valley. The explanations that Shiekh's win would not augur well for India, that

Shiekh was all set for declaring freedom of Jammu and Kashmir upon his success in the

elections, seem too lame in retrospect. Just after Shiekh decided to move to the valley

to contest under Plebiscite Front's banner, his plane was delayed, and he was arrested

with his associates. Plebiscite Front was declared illegal and its members, ineligible for

contesting the elections. The Front boycotted the elections. The participation was too

low. (As some foreign newspapers reported; widespread rigging could not make the fake

participation too high). The Congress swept the elections. 5

~ However all this could not crystallize into any popular upsurge for obvious

reasons: Pakistan's inability to support them in the event of Awami League's demands

of a separate homeland in East Pakistan where the Bangladeshi Muslims had ·grown

weary of an oppressive government. Pakistan unleashed a complete reign of terror in

East Pakistan. But in the meanwhile it committed a mistake of attacking some Indian

posts on the border which dragged India to war with Pakistan on 5th December 1971.

On 16th December 1971, Pakistani troops surrendered. This had had its impact in

Kashmir, silencing all non-conforming opinion for sometime. Even Shiekh Abdullah in

custody, was seen departing from his familiar style of issuing uninhibited statements. He

was too cautious hereafter. The success succeeded like success, bringing the valley back

In retrospect it may be said lhat this was sure to generate in the minds of Kashmiris an inescapable hatred against India. Nothing hurts one more than the feeling of not being trusted with. This prepared the grounds for effective Pakistani propaganda, appealing to Ka5hmiri sentiments, pushing the anti-Indian feelings deep down further into their psyche.

236

to normalcy.

India lost another opportunity of solving the issue of Kashmir at this point. The

Simla Pact of July 1972 which prescribed for the 'bilateral settlement of all disputes

between the two countries' could have been stretched a bit to pressurise Pakistan to

withdraw the issue from UN and to agree not to raise Kashmir in International fora. We

would see how the UNIMOG stationed in Kashmir whose existence has been rendered

redundant almost, contributed to the militant movements in the valley recognising their

right to self determination whenever they were approached.

The calm in the valley was synchronised with protracted 3 year long negotiations

between Shiekh and the Central government., culminating in the signing of Delhi Accord

on 24 Feb. 1975,6 which recognised the state's special position in the federation. The

accord reversed certain steps that were taken up earlier. On 25 Feb.1975 Shiekh was

sworn in as the Chief Minister with Afzal Beg as his deputy. A Pakistani Government

spokesman reacted on 5 March 1973 when the talks were going on between Parthasarathi

6 The main provisions of the Accord were:

* *

* *

*

J & K recognized as a constituent of Union of India. Centre-State relations for J & K to be governed by

Art.370. Residuary powers to remain with the state. Parliament to have power to legislate on

a. Prevention of activities for disturbing territorial integrity. b. Seceessional activities. c. Dishonouring national flag, national anthem and constitution.

State govt. to be empowerd to review laws made by Parliament or extended to state after 1953 or any matter relating to concurrent list.

237

and Mirza Afzal Beg:

'It is evident from U.N. Security council resolutions, as indeed from the nature and history of the dispute that there are 3 parties to it -- India, Pakistan and above all the people of Kashmir. No settlement of this dispute which attempts to bypass one of the parties or is not acceptable to all three can be final and enduring'. 7

In Nov.1973 there were minor disturbances in Kashmir following Bhutto's visit

of Azad Kashmir where he praised the youth who had rioted in Srinagar the day before.

On 10 Nov.1973 Shiekh said that Bhutto's utterances would not change the status of

J&K, and they had reached the decision to accede to India after careful consideration 'I

am prepared to restart from the position we took in 1947'.

However, when in February 1975 Shiekh was sworn in,the Janasangh supporters

demonstrated ·in Jammu against the agreement. Bhutto called for a hartal throughout

Kashmir signifying the rejection of the Accord. But the hartal received little support in

the Kashmir Valley. Some minor clashes between pro-Pak Awamites of Maulvi Farooq

and supporters of Shiekh Abdullah was reported. On 5 March 1975, Bhutto went out of

his way to tell a reporter:

7

8

"The dispute is still there. It is between India and Pakistan .... We are committed to the ideal of a peaceful settlement but we have not signed a no-war pact. It is premature to say if hostilities were likely, but if all our peaceful efforts are exhausted, than we wil1 have to see". 8

Keesings Archives 1973 p.27385.

Keesing's Archives, 1975, p.27398.

238

In Kashmir, Shiekh was busy reviving the National Conference. It was relaunched

on 13 April 1975. On 4 July 1975, Shiekh Abdullah and Mirza Afzal Beg got elected to

Kashmir Assembly securing 90% of votes polled and both of them defeated the pro-Pak

Jamiat-e-Islami candidates. On 5 July 1975 Shiekh dissolved Plebiscite Front and merged

it _with National Conference. On 15 August some Congress leaders defected. into National

Conference. Shiekh laid emphasis on the federal structure of the party. Provincial

committees were set up for each of the regions.

On 9 July 1979 Shiekh formed the ministry. On 13 July he suffered a severe heart

attack. His deputy Mirza Afzal Beg shouldered all responsibility as his deputy. After

coming to power on 13 September he said in the assembly:

"It is my government's declared policy to continue to ·make its contribution to building a strong India without allowing anyone to usurp its internal autonomy" .9

Begining of The present trouble in Kashmir.

On 29 October 1977 Jammu & Kashmir public safety ordinance was promulgated

and it was published on 6 November 1977, empowering the government to detain persons

upto two years without mentioning any reason whatsoever. In response to widespread

criticism to the ordinance Shiekh said at a press conference on 8 November 1977 that as

long as there was no international agreement between India nd Pakistan on Kashmir, the

explosive situation on the border line would continue and laws were needed to deal with

9 Keesing's Archives, 1977, p.28512 A.

239

anti-national elements. This showed Shiekh 's genuine concern over the troubles created

in the state by the infiltrators from across the border.

This has to be read along with the reactions of the Pakistani press during this

time. In its editorial of 28 December 1975 Khyber mail wrote: 'Shiekh Abdullah has

been making the best out of a bad job by salvaging what little there remained of

Kashmir's identity in its limited sphere'. Some other newspapers came down heavily on

Simla Pact which had crippled Pakistan in the international sphere. The newspapers were

busy whipping up passion even through mild admonishments:

They(the Kashmiris) should forget that the world will get them juistice ... why should Motamar A lam Islami (which in its session atMecca in Dec.l975 refused to take up Kashmir issue) take up the issue when the Kashmiris themselves are in a docile mood? If they desire to attract the world

·attention then they should become crusaders, and vow that either they will achieve their goal or perish ... they should take up gun on one hand and Koran on the other . . . . the world beats the weak and even does not allow them to cry but bows before the strong." . 10

Against this setting when incitement from Pakistan came in handy for the

people in the valley. Shiekh's steps were justified with elections round the corner

Pakistani politicians had also brought Kashmir back into their electoral agenda. On 1

May 1976, Bhutto declared in Muzaffarabad: "Kashmiri struggle for the right of

self-determination is inseparately linked up with the ideal of Pakistan ..... The ideal of

Pakistan envisaged inclusion of all Muslim majority areas of the sub-continent in the

10 Abduzzar Ghaffani in Nawai Wgt, 29 Jan.1976.

240

Islamic State; the struggle is not yet complete". 11 The subsequent rise of Zia to power

and Bhutto's trial for murder pushed the issue of Kashmir to background for quite

sometime. Zia would take time to consolidate his position before speaking up for the

Kashmir is.

Rise of Zia-ui-Haq and the Kashmir Issue.

The year 1979 saw Zia-ul-Haq raising the issue of Kashmir in private discussions.

In an interview with Kuldip Nayar, Zia said: 'The basic thing is that Kashmir is like a

Sahrag {artery). Zia's remarks on Vajpayee's visit to Pakistan and his refusal to discuss

Kashmir, were quite straight forward and uninhibitive: 'If he (Vajpayee) is not going to

talk on Kashmir; not even tolerate a sentence or remark, then how could his visit have

borne fruit? 12' Zia by then had already entered the centre stage of Pakistan politics and

consolidate his position. He had learnt the art of demagogy too quickly. 13 In the issue

of Kashmir he found an instant tranquilizer. However people in Azad Kashmir would

take some more years to reconcile to his stand on Kashmir. On 6 April 1979, upon

Bhutto's execution, there were violent demonstrations in Azad Kashmir against Zia. The

slogan shouting mob attacked Ahmadiyas and Jamiat-i-Islami offices and workers. Their

II Reported Pakistan Times(Lahore)2 May 1976.

12 Reported, Tribune (Chandigarh) 8 February 1979.

13 Zia ul Haq reportedly told ari Americanjoumalist;'lfwe' can decide on Kashmir issue today .lam sure that we will be shaking our hands all along the border. 'Reported Dawn (Karachi)20 March 1979.

241

slogan was 'Pakistan ko tor do, Azad Kashmir wapas do'. There was similar spurt of

violence in the valley. The irate mobs attempted . to set fire to the houses of Jamiati

Leaders. There were hartals in Baramulla, Sopore, Doda, and Uri. Burqa-clad women

staged dharna at Badsah Chowk, wailed, wept and beat their breast in anger.

In April 1979, 200 persons from POK demonstrated near India house in London

for the release of Maqbool Butt (a Kashmir Liberation Front terrorist taken into custody

by Indian authorities) and self-determination for the Kashmiris. In May an international

conference was ~lied to discuss 'liberation of Muslim lands from non-IslamiC

domination'. It called for support of UN, NAM and OAU the conference which was held

in London continued for four days and 100 delegates from 27 countries participated in

it. The conference adopted a resolution warning India not to tamper with the

demographic character of the disputed territory. In September 1979 in the NAM summit

in Havanna Zia sought to raise Kashmir issue. But the conventions of NAM prevented

Zia from raising the issue in the. course of formal deliberations. A frustrated Zia was

seen dumping everything on Bhutto: 'Bhutto sold out Kashmir to India during Simla

talks'. Shiekh Abdullah's response is worth noting here:

14

If there was any such problem, it was for India and Pakistan and not for the people of the state ... We have linked ourselves with our brethren in the rest of the country and therefore the people of the state are not confronted with the Kashmir problem'. 14

Reported in Times of India, 21 September 1979.

242

In October the issue was raised in United Nations by Pakistan. India's response

was firm as ever: 'J&K was an integral part of India and India will never compromise

its territorial integrity. With Shiekh taking up sides with India, the pro-Pak elements in

the valley were left in the lurch. There was not much popular support which these

elements could rely upon. But heretofore cautious statesmanship was the need of the hour

to keep these elements permanently suppressed.

The Eighties: Islamization of the Kashmir Issue

From the eighties, keeping rhythm with Zia's Islamization programme in

Pakistan, political set up in Azad Kashmir was also given a corresponding face-lift.

Popular opinion in Pakistan as well as Kashmir supported the move for Islamization, for

the people in Pakistan believed (especially the orthodox section tike

Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Pakistan, Jamiat-i-Islami) that it was only through vigorous

Islamization that Kashmiri sympathy can be drawn towards Pakistan, which would

facilitate Kashmiri disillusionment with India.

In May 1980, the Imam of Kabaa Sharif came to the valley and attended the

Sheerat Conference. Jamiat-i-Islami wanted to reap advantages out of it. An accident of

a truck belonging to security personnel with a private scooter came in handy for the

Jamiat to set up a communal stir. The party attempted disturbances in vulnerable areas

of Jammu as well. But it was largely unsuccessful. In August however the communal

temperature reached the dangermark for some time. The Moradabad killings (where the

P.A.C. went in rampage in a Muslim locality) upset the communal harmony in the valley

243

for two days. The situations was brought quickly under control. The students were seen

shouting slogans: 'La Sharquia, La gharbia Islamia Islamia (Neither East, nor West, we

are for Islam and Islam alone). The students sought to advocate an Iran type revolution

in the state.

It was clear that the pro-Pak elements had started appealing to the educated

youth, whose frustrations on the employment front could be exploited to create such

disturbances. On 22nd August 1980, the student wing of Jamiati Islami, the Jamiat-i-tulba

held the World Islamic Conference under its- auspices. The Jamiati lslami had started

inciting the youth into its struggle against India. Shiekh unwittingly shared the blame for

having allowed such conferences to take place in Kashmir during his tenure. In March

1981, Viswa Hindu Parishad held a conference in. Jammu, perhaps as an answer to the

Islamic conferences that preceded it. Shiekh was finnly of the opinion that if any

religious gathering was organized without political overtones, there was absolutely no

harm in it. Sheikh was perhaps a bit too innocent in the art of negative politics for such

religious gatherings could easily be converted into political platforms.

Towards the end of 1980, pro-Pak elements were nabbed in quite a number of

places in the valley. On 3 November1980 16 members ofpro-Pak People's League were

arrested in charges of forming a pro-Pak subversive group. Trained Pakistani agents were

arrested in the Poonch, Uri, Rajouri sectors.

In March 1981, replying to questions of a BJP member Sheikh told that 16 spies;

427 infiltrators were held during 1980. Pakistan made arms and ammunitions were seized

from them. In the Assembly a Congress member demanded citizenship for refugees from

244

West Pakistan, Shiekh agreed to consider the whole thing, through the Resettlement Bill.

But the bill would not accommodate the 40,000 Harijans who fled from Pakistan in 1947

and settled down in the border areas of Jammu. Shiekh refused to consider their cases.

In April further proofs of Pakistan sponsoring terrorism in the valley came to the fore.

In May Shiekh in an interview to Tribune reaffirmed his faith in democracy in India.

'We on our part have linked our lot with India. We donot subscribe to the two-nations theory; ours is a multi-religious society'. 1s

Upon being asked why no serious action was being taken on people who are

questio~ing the accession; he remarked

sharp:

IS

16

17

'These elements represented only a small section of the ·state's population. Besides I don't believe in suppressing free expression'. 16

In October 1981 Pakistan raised the issue at the UN again. India's answer was

'Even if one were inclined to dismiss the reference as ritual, it has to be pointed out that it is unfortunate, objectionable and in the overall context counter productive .... There is a contradiction in declaring one's commitment to Simla Pact and raising the issue of J&K in UNO ... Propaganda and polemics have no place if the objective is mutual trust and good neighbourliness'. 17

Reported in Tribune(Chandigarh)l4 May 1981.

Ibid.

Reported in Times of lndia(Delhi)28 October 1981.

245

In early February 1981, Pakistan's delegate Agha Hilaly raised the issue of

Kashmir again in U.N. Human Rights Convention in Geneva, equating the state of

Jammu & Kashmir with Palestine and Namibia. Indian displeasure was conveyed through

cancellation of the visit of foreign-secretary to Pakistan.

Death of Sheikh Abdullah: Changing Dimensions of the Kashmir Problem.

On 8 September 1982 Shiekh Abdullah passed away. The entire valley roared with

slogans like; 'Sher-e-Kashmir ka kya Irshad, Hindu Muslim Sikh lttehad' and

'La-e-la-ha-il-allah, Zinda thawan Abdullah', 'Baba-i-Quom Zindabad', 'Shero, Kutuh

Gokh'. London Times described him as one of the last surviving major figures in India's ·

struggle for Independence ... "but he was above all a Kashmiri nationalist. For the most,

he remained the lion of Kashmir, admired for his roar as well as for his commitment to

Kashmir and his people".

Farooq stepped into his shoes. The question of succes~ion was decided by Shiekh

in advance. Earlier in May the government of J&K had issued a white paper accusing

Zia's steps of annexing the northern areas of POK, Gilgit Hunza, Nagar, Yasin, Ponial

and Chitral. The political parties in Azad Kashmir had also detested the move. Farooq

had reacted strongly against. such moves. After assuming Chief Ministership in July 1983

he declared that the people of his state could never have peace as long as a portion of it

remained under Pakistani occupation. 'We are determined to do all that is possible to

take back that part of our territory', he said. In November he toured the border areas of

Uri, Titwal, Guruz and said that he found the people resolute enough to fight back any

246

possible Pakistani attack. In December 1983, the people of Azad Kashmir planned a long

march from Azad Kashmir to Islamabad covering a distance of 145 Km to protest against

the military regime of Zia-ul-Haq. Heavy military crackdown and arrests that followed

forced the rally to fizzle out. But such a decision bore fruit. In January 1984, Zia was

seen raising the issue of Kashmir once again perhaps to keep the people of Azad Kashmir

assured. In London in an interview with 'Impact' an English fortnightly, Zia said.

"Pakistan cannot forsake or forget Kashmir but will continue to argue peacefully on it knowing India will not hand it over to us on a platter... Kashmir is Pakistan's national issue". 18

From January 1984 the terrorist activities were stepped up in the valley. Mass

arrests of pro-Pak elements began. The leaders of Jamiat were rounded up. "Indian

newspapers blamed Farooq for having passed the Resettlement Bill which permitted

people from the POK to cross over the border and resettle in Indian Kashmir. 'The

measure had immense potential, for mischief with Pakistan's continuing predilection to

fish in troubled waters and suspected desire of some other powers to destabilise that part

of Kashmir'. The cancellation of the cricket match between India and West Indies in

Srinagar earlier on 13 October 1983 due to disturbances from the spectators who waved

Pakistani flags and shouted pro-Pak slogans were quoted by newspapers as instances of

mischief the pro-Pak elements had wrought in the valley.

18 Reponed in Tribune (Cbandigarh), 29 Jan. 1984.

247

The elections to the State Legislative Assembly on 5 June 1983 saw a sharp

polarisation of votes along communal lines. The National Conference won all the Muslim

dominated constituencies. Farooq declared the election to be a plebiscite for the people

to choose between National Conference and Congress (I) Farooq won and was sworn in

as the chief minister. Senior oppositions leaders like H.N.Bahuguna and Biju Pattanaik

had campaigned for him. In Jammu even Farooq's position improved upon his father's.

He polled thirty eight percent of the votes in Jammu. But the Congress would not accept

defeat and declared the elections fraud. Farooq's siding with opposition leaders in the

event of unconstitutional ouster of N.T.Ramarao from power in Andhra Pradesh in 1982

had sufficiently irked Mrs. Gandhi t~ label Farooq in the course of her election campaign

in Jammu as 'my enemy'.

Much to the bad luck of Farooq the· condition in the vaney fast worsened. In

August, the terrorists plans to sabotage celebration of independence day of India started,

wi~h bomb blasts around Sri nagar. In connection with one such incident at the time of

Independence Day function four suspects were arrested -- Iqbal Quereshi, Altaf

Quereshi, and Majid Lala. Situations came to a head with the cricket match between

India and West Indies.

Farooq could not play his political options with caution during this time, when

the central government. was making excuses ready to unseat him. Farooq chose to

provoke Mrs. Gandhi further by deciding; against the wishes of Congress, to host a

meeting of the opposition leaders in Srinagar. In the first week of October the leaders of

India opposed to Mrs. Gandhi duly gathered in Srinagar, as much in a gesture of

248

solidarity as an effort to demand a shift in the balance of power between the centre and

the state. G.M.Shah was persuaded to effect a break in the party by the Congress. When

Farooq learnt about it he expelled G.M.Shah from the party. To ensure better

administration of the whole plan B.K.Nehru, the idealist who would refuse to be party

to such sinister political moves, was transferred to Gujarat and Jagmohan was installed

as Governor in Sri nagar. The Governor had a critical role to play in the whole act

because it fell upon the Governor to decide the question of defection under the

Representatives of the peoples Act passed by Shiekh Abdullah to prevent defections in

future.

Mhatre Murder hanging of Maqbool Butt and Repercussions in Kashmir

The kidnapping of Ravindra Mhatre demanding release of Quereshi's relatives

and Maqbool Butt and his killing in the first week of February 1984 by the Kashmir

Liberation Army in England kept the nation bewildered for sometime.

The hanging of Maqbool Butt on 11th February 1984 came as a quick retaliatory

measure. It was received with violent reaction from people in Kashmir as well as POK.

offices and educational institutions closed down in Azad Kashmir as a mark of protest.

The newspapers in Kashmir were flooded with praises of Butt in Pakistan : Shama e

Azadi e Kashmir Ka Parwana qurban ho gaya. A columnists in Business Recorder

wrote. He may rise in Kashmir's soul just as Saint Joan does in the French passion for

liberty. The 'Muslim' wrote; this is an act on the same lines in which the Pope was

249

subjected to the murderous attach by the Turkish fanatic Alga. 19 Zia called Butt a great

freedom fighter. the valley was relatively less violent but still hartals were organized in

Kashmir valley and minor acts of violence marked the protest marches. Hashim

Quereshi and some others leaders went on television to declare, Butt's murder shall be

avenged. One of them said: 'One Butt is dead but a thousand more will be born. Every

Kashmir will die for an independent Kashmir'. All his showed then stubbornness. The

valley witnessed serious violence in the subsequent months. 20

The JKLF was rejuvenated after Butt's murder seeking to exploit the feelings

excited after that Amanullah was the most quoted leader around, busy proclaiming

0

independence of Kashmir in the model of Switzerland away from the tutelage of India

and Pakistan. In May 1984, Pakistan planned to build a 100 km long road to Karakoram

from Skardu, which was of strategic importance for the defense of India.

G.M. Shah's coming into-power hardly changed the atmosphere prevailing in the

State. On 15 August, 1984, people owing allegiance to People's league, Awami Action .

Committee, Jamiat-i-Islami and other pro-Pak groups hoisted Pakistani flags in several

colleges and other place in Srinagar, Badgan, Sopare, Pulwama districts to celebrate

Pakistan's independence dry. Handwritten posters were found pasted in the walls :

19

20

'-We are not slaves of India, let us celebrate the independence day of Pakistan. We do not want to associate ourselves with the independence day of the Kafirs on

M.A. Akhyar in Business Records (Karachi) 16 Feb. 1984.

Pakistan Times(Lahore) 20 Feb 1984. and Tribune 23 Feb 1984.

250

August 15. ' 21

While the Congress accused Farooq's National Conference of inciting such

troubles, reality pointed otherwise. The tampering with the democratic process in the

state could have snowballed into such distractions. Once their faith in a just democratic

process was gone it- took little time from them to take up arms and take law into their

own hands. The violence in the valley as such continued in an unending spiral. The

Pakistani support sustained their spirit of defiance. The appeal of their religion (with the

oft repeated call for Jehad) provided the necessary moral thrust to their actions and the

frustration of the youth, partly out of shortage of avenue for employment, partly out of

an administrative (political as well) set up which failed to identify itself with the masses,

became the necessary driving force. The constant presence of the security forces must

have infused in the people a sense of insecurity as well as a sense of disloyalty, which

they would seek to rip open. As Salman Rushdie wrote in 'The Independent' on 7 May

1990:

"For long Indian secularism has seemed very much like military occupation to Kashmiris. When people are asked to choose between tasks and mosque, they do not usually choose tanks".

In August the some leaders in POK called upon the people to resist Pak

government's moves for merger of POK into Pakistan. But Pakistan virtually kept the

21 Indian Express (New Delhi) 16 August 1984.

251

Azad Kashmir government. on Seize for the subversive activities in India were monitored

in POK under Pakistan sponsorship. In September 1984, training camps were set up in

Chirat (Muree district) and Adiabad (near Haji Pir Pass). Guerilla command

organisations were formed to supervise subversive activities in J&K. Reports revealed

that Pakistan had divided the guerilla forces (secret subversive groups, SSG) into 3

formations known as Mujahids, Rajakars and Para-Commandoes. Mujaheeds were

formed out of trained group in guerilla warfare that conducted the operations

unsuccessfully in J&K ·in 1965. It was reorganised and equipped with sophisticated

armaments, and was scattered round Poonch, Rajouri & Uri Sectors. In late September

the Pak espionage act in the border district of Poonch started in full Swing. 13 spies

were nabbed who reveled their connections with Punjab militants. The Pakistani scholars

went on weaving dreams in the meanwhile :

Kashmir is going to fall in the lap of Pakistan like a ripe fruit ....... Time has come to take the Kashmir issue out of cold storage and revive it ...... I can see that Pakistan will get Kashmir after a few years if it prepares its pol~cies with · wisdom; boldness and perservance. 22

On 28 October 1984, the N.awa Kadal Bridge was burnr- down in the downtown

area of Srinagar after prior warning by the Militants. On 31 Jan 1985 a Pak trained Sikh

extremist Puran Singh was arrested while crossing the border and upon interrogation

revealed information about Pak training camps at Adiabad and Kalamullah. Throughout

22 Lt. Gen. Sarfaraj Khan quoted in Tribune 8 Oct. 1984

252

1985, everyday terrorists were shot down frequently by security personnel while

attempting to cross the border, and in each case Pakistani made weapons were recovered

from them. In March the press revealed that the pro-Pak Kashmiris and the Sikh

extremists abroad had started working in close cooperation.

From March the terrorist groups started adopting non-political planks including

agitation againsL sale or serving of liquor in the state. Other targets were college

libraries and Universities where the authorities were forced to stop circulating books

which leaders branded as un-lslamic. In May 1985 in Nowhatta area of Srinagar the

Indian tri-colour was burnt down and anti-India slogans were shouted. Photographs of

Farooq Abdullah and Maulvi Farooq were set ablaze in two localities in Srinagar.

Farooq and Maulvi were refused to be accepted as leaders by extremist political groups

like Jamiat-i-Islami, Jamiat-i-Tulba, People's league, KLF, Mahzi Azadi who are fanning

anti-India sentiments in Kashmir. Farooq denounced Jamiat actions addressing people

from ~ama Masjid in Srinagar: 'Those who want to weaken pro-Indian forces in Kashmir

are enemies of 18 crore muslims in India. 23 Abdul Ghani Lone and Mirwaiz Farooq also

addressed the gathering.

However the violence in the valley continued unabated. In July pro-Pak

demonstrations clashed with Police in Srinagar and 100 persons including 60 policemen

were injured. (This time demonstrators demanded the people responsible for assault on

the life of Farooq Abdullah be brought to book). Earlier in June 1985 in the elections to

23 Indian Exoress (Delhi) 20 May 1985.

253

POK legislature All Jammu Kashmir Muslim Conference won majority seats and formed

the government. After Zia's public meeting in POK where he raised the issue of

plebiscite, in August, the P.M. of POK, Sikander Hayat accused Pakistani Govt. stand

on Kashmir of being apologetic and compromising. His government. for the first time

allocated funds as token money to be spent on liberating the Indian held Kashmir. He

said:

"Kashmiris are not bound by Simla agreement as they were not a party to • " 24 It.... .

Throughout October 1985, armed encounter between the subversives and Indian

security personnel continued. Acts of bombing and killing continued in the valley.

Jamat-i-Islami, a pro-Pak organization gave calls for hartal on Fridays. The Indian

newspaper reported that bulk of teachers working in schools colleges or universities were

in some way or other related to one or other secessionist organisation. 25

It is interesting to note here that the dismissal of Farooq Abdullah government

was seriously resented in Pakistan and POK. Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Faiz Ali Chisti, the

chairman of Kashmir Liberation Organisation led a peaceful procession in Mirpur against

Abdullah's ouster. Irshad Ahmed Haqqani wrote:

"This time Mrs.Gandhi has used third rate political

24 Statesman (Delhi) 13 Aug. 1985.

25 Indian Express(Delhi)23July 1984.

254

conspiratorial and evasive tactics instead of direct action ... the imposition of emergency in 1975 had exposed her dictatorial face; her recent action would further bare it to the world". 26

"The Kashmir people will be soon masters of their fate, and India will have to render an account of its atrocities:"

Jo chup rahegi zabaane khanjar . Lahu pukarega asteen ka. 27

The assassination of Mrs.Gandhi in October 1984 stunned the subcontinent for

some time. It showed the success of terrorism in ripping open the security at the top

level. Rajiv who succeeded approach his mother looked very cautious and sincere in

solving the _problems he inherited from his mother. His approach was admired in the

press in India and abroad. In the elections held in 1984 November the Congress party

was voted back to power with almost three f-Ourth majurity. Such brute majority behind

him would-help him in solving the problems-that plagued the country, the press observed.

Issue of Ayodhya and Polarisation in the Valley

Reopening of the controversial Ayodhya temple in February 1986 precipitated in

riots all over the country. It generated communal waves too strong to penetrate the

. otherwise indifferent, Kashmir valley. Riots were reported near Anantnag. Thousands of

people led by militant Muslim youths assembled around 11 a.m. on 20 February 1986

26 Jang (Karachi)4 July 1984.

Jang (Karachi) in its editorial on July 1984.

255

near Anantnag and the procession moved towards Khannabal and raided the villages in

route, looted shops, houses set a temple a blaze and demolished a samadhi. In the

village Lokabhavan, three temples were set ablaze and an ashram was attacked. The

government offered accommodation to the displaced who refused to stay back and

pleaded: 'What we need are a few buses to cross Banihal pass. We do not want to live

or die here'. In Jammu earlier on 17 February Hindus, attacked a police station" in

response to an earlier demonstration by Muslims chanting pro-Pak slogans. By 26

February curfew was clamped in major areas all over the state and army was alerted to

meet any challenge from anti-:national elements. A temporary relaxation of curfew in

certain areas on 5 March 1986 led to unprovoked violence which led to further

imposition of curfew. From the beginning of February the state Congress I was totally

dismayed at the performance ofthe G.M. Shah ministry. On 6 March 1986 Congress (I)

withdrew support and on 7 March G~M~Shah resigned. Under Section 92 of J&K

constitution the President's rule was imposed in the state on the same day.

However the situation did not improve. In September, against alleged partiality

of Jagmohan in the recruitment of candidates to RECs and polytechnics, demonstration

near Basantbagh area in Srinagar which included a large number of girls became unruly

and indulged in violence. In the afternoon other pro-Pak elements joined the

demonstrators and held Srinagar to ransom. At Mirkadal area, photographs of Shiekh and

Farooq Abdullah were pulled down. In the morning the slogans were 'Islam Zindabad,

Down with Jagmohan' but after a scuffle with police slogans changed to 'We want

Pakistan, Down with traitors (Farooq and Shiekh Abdullah).

256

On 16 September 1986, violence started in Kashmir town in Doda district in

Srinagar in reaction to one girl student slapping another for shouting pro-Pak slogans.

Muslims constituted nearly 48 percent of town's population. Resentment had surfaced

earlier after a lecturer ordered students to cover their heads with dupattas. In a raid on

18 September intelligence officers gathered evidence ofo letters passed between POK

leaders and leaders of Jamiat instigating them to incite anti India and anti-Hindu violence.

Two outgoing packet revealed requests from Jamiat leaders to JKLF leaders to raise the

issue of atrocities and excesses perpetrated by the security personnel with Amnesty

International. On 27 September there was an agitation by the newly formed Muslim

United Front in Baramulla over the death of a youth in police firing. Patriot wrote in its

editorial on 13 October 1986:

28

29

"Excessive reliance, over too long a period, only on administration counter-measures turns out to be detrimental to larger national interest. ln9eed fundamentalists are deriving some political mileage out of it by gaining public sympathy. The vital element of political neutralization is missing". 28

Mirwaiz Farooq demanded elections and said:

"Such activities (communal clashes) were part of a · conspiracy of vested interests who wanted to give the situation in the state a communal tinge". 29

Patriot(Delhi) 13 October 1986.

Patriot, 13 October 1986.

257

Rajiv-Farooq Accord: Impact on the Kashmir issue.

The Rajiv-Farooq accord of November 1986 was just overlooked in the valley as

a pretentious affair. Just after the accord people who were dissatisfied with both the

terrorists and the central government. were not left with any alternative political

institution to join which could channelize their grievances. This lack of a buffer made the

problem worse. The elections that followed the accord in March 1987 were boycotted by

majority of the people. The attendance was poor and Congress-National Conference

combine swept the polls and Farooq was sworn in as the Chief minister. All this would

not affect the terrorist situation in the valley. In June 1987 the activity climbed to its

peak.As such the accord was not hailed with as much enthusiasm as expected. In

December a Urdu daily 'Wadi Ki Awaz' carried the story earlier published by Deccan

Herald which allegedly contained some derogatory remarks on the Prophet. It was

published in screeching headlines. It sparked off violent demonstrations. Anti India

pro-Pak slogans were shouted and an army jeep was burnt down. Shiekh Abdullah had

described the pro-Pak sympathise as a minuscule minority in 1979. But by 1986 they had

multiplied too many times to become a substantial section of the Kashmiri population.

The return to power of Farooq after forging an alliance with the Congress had

sufficiently degraded Farooq in the eyes of a majority section of Kashmiris. Throughout

the years of President's rule they had developed an overriding antipathy towards the

Congress Party. As such the possibility of a political alternative in Kashmir which would

have sprung back and absorbed, in every likelihood, a significant section of the people

258

who had chosen to join the ranks of the subversives in the absence of such alternative

was wasted away. Farooq would reminisce the whole thing as a major mistake in a

seminar in Jawaharlal Nehru University in 1991.

On 22 March 1987 Farooq was sworn in as Chief Minister. But the wining of an

election on the sheer criterion of majority did not prove his general acceptability. The

infiltrations had wrought impartable damage in the minds of people. The false glory of

fighting a liberation movement had created an army of young subversives whose

commitment to the cause of independence (at least unyoking from India) of Kashmir was

too strong to be shaken. An act of subversion does not need an entire populace to take

up arms. A small band of committed youth surcharged with the idea of liberty and

freedom can usher in a state of anarchy. That was precisely happening in Kashmir.

Electoral victory or defeat hardly mattered for the terrorists. Rather defeat shut them off

from the public eye to operate stealthily without being subjected to public scrutiny.

In 1987, the terrorist activity went on in a low key. In February the governments

of India and Pakistan signed agreements for phased withdrawal of troops from the border

to reduce tension. In an unofficial visit to India in February Zia assured that all support

to separatists shall be withdrawn. The victory of National Conference in Kashmir too had

had its effect and the year passed off relatively peacefully. In January 1988, Rajiv went

to Pakistan (in an un-official visit) to attend the funeral of Badshah Khan. Around same

time Pakistan put up offensive and started indiscriminate firing on civilian targets. Firing

was reported at Sokur, Bagyal dara, Degwar, Langoor Hills, Nakkharkot, border

villages, making it difficult for people even to reap their harvest.

259

With the Pak offensive the terrorist activity in the valley started too. Towards

June there was serious unrest in the valley resulting out of popular opposition to the

ruling alliance. The JKLF announced its four year long offensive against India around this

time too. Small issues like increases in electricity charges, were sufficient to precipitate

an agitation. In August usual Independence Day troubles were marked in Srinagar. In

two or three localities pro-Pak elements went on a rampage indulging in violence arson

and loot. This made Farooq remark; 'I would not hesitate to march these elements to the

border and throw them over to Pakistan'. Farooq government. asked the state recruitment

boards to keep pro-Pak elements out of recruitment. The death of Zia ul Haq in a plane

crash caused riots in the valley in August. The feeling expressed was so intense that it

seemed certain forces felt being orphaned by his death.

After Benazir came to power through-a democratic elections , Indo-Pak bilateral

relations were activated to normalise relations. But they failed to carry effect on the

disturbances in Kashmir. On the Republic day on 26 January 1989 demonstrations took

place in the valley. In April Kashmir Liberation Front mounted a 3 day protest against

police actions. The three main militant groups. the Pakistan based KLF, the People's

League, the Islamic Student's League formed a united front to step up their activities in

Kashmir. The People's League leader Shabir Shah confessed in 'India Today' that they

had been drawing every kind of support from Pakistan earlier but Benazir had suspended

all helps, after coming to power. In April 1989, Farooq reshuffled his cabinet as security

situation worsened in the valley. After the Ramazan fast, the situation even worsened

further. Farooq admitted in the State Legislature in August that 170 bomb explosions had

260

occurred during last 12 months.

In November came the general elections in India in which Congress suffered

great reverses. A spurious alliance was hammered out of political deliberation among

Janata Dal, BJP and the Left Front. V.P.Singh assumed Prime Ministership, V.P.Singh

was hailed in the Pakistan Press as a politician with a different outlook. But soon his

honest efforts at normalising relations with Pakistan were viewed with suspicion. The

Pakistan Press wrote in a reaction to the failure of talks between Abdus Sattar (special

envoy of Benazir) and V.P.Singh in January:

The belligerent mood in New Delhi is indicative of its growing irritation with failure to control the mass uprising in Kashmir Valley .. .. the outstanding feature of the current upsurge in the valley is it indigenous character both in terms of 'identity' and 'content'. It would be real

.politick if Mrs. Bhutto in line with her father's legacy, decides to keep up a pipe line to ... (this) resistance in the valley p-layed it at a low key and at the same time sought dialogue with New Delhi. 30

The increase in terrorist activity in the valley in the meanwhile coincided with

V.P.Singh's coming to power. On 8 December 1989 Mufti's daughter of the home

minister, Mufti Mohammad Syed Dr:Rubiya Syed was kidnapped by KLF militants. The

militants demanded release of five JKLF leaders. On 13 December after State

Government capitulated to such demands Rubiya was released. This event booster the

morale of the militants further. The fact that the State Government was brought to its

30 Khalid Mehmood in Nation (Karachi) 18 Jan.l990.

261

knees was taken as a victory for the militants. Towards late December a campaign of

violent protest was organized by the principal secessionist outfit, the KLF which rendered

the capital, Srinagar ungovernable. Whole of the valley remained paralysed either by

JKLF sponsored hartals or government imposed curfews.

Such a backdrop was too tempting for the leaders in Pakistan to go unexploited,

in terms of advocating the Kashmiri cause. 'The press in Pakistan was flooded with news

items on Kashmir. Top Pakistani intelligentsia issued appeals to the government to back

up the movement in Kashmir:

31

'The scattered dissent in J&K has consolidated into a freedom movement and it has acquired a new force ... Shiekh Abdullah who at one time was worshipped in the valley is now denounced as a traitor . . . India has held on to this Muslim majority state in defiance of the principle on

·which the sub-continent was divided. Kashmir is not viewed by the world as an integral part of India in the sense in which Punjab is . . . it is a disputed territory .. Kashmir is no longer a simmering dispute between India and Pakistan, it is a rebellion by indigenous population, much in the manner of Palestinian 'Intefeda' in Arab and West Bank'. 31

Nawai Wagt wrote in its editorial on 10 January 90.

Pakis~n should not give up the cause of Kashmir liberation out of fear of Indian accusation. Pakistan has supported Afghan Muslims to the hilt without caring for the displeasure of a superpower like Soviet Union ... India is not a superpower, why should it be afraid of India .... If Soviet Union failed in its dreams of supremacy and overlordship, why should it be afraid of India?"

Ghani Eirabie in Dawn (Karachi) 8 Jan.l990.

262

All this must have persuaded Benazir to come out of forced silence on the issue

of Kashmir. On 22 January she said "Self determination is an inherent right of the

Kashmirs·.

The Nineties

By then political instability in the valley had set in again. On 19 January 1990,

K.V.K.Rao, the Governor was replaced by Jagmohan. During his earlier tenure

Jagmohan had taken some progressive measures in the valley and was a bit popular for

which in the face of the sudden upsurge in Kashmir the central government sent him

again to take care of the situation. But Farooq had serious personal differences with

Jagmohan. Moreover his contention that his harsh measures on terrorists had Jagmohan

unpopular in the eyes of the average population and his installation would provoke

serious reactions, was not quite unconvincing. Farooq resigned in protest on 18 Jan.1990,

and under section 92(A) of J&K constitution Governor's rule was imposed in the State.

On 20 Jan. 1990 there were violent reactions over the resignation of Farooq and

installation of Jagmohan as Governor. Large number of Indian troops arrived in the

valley to control situation. They arrested a large no. of extremists and opened fire on a

mob in which at least 35 people were suspected to be killed. On 26 Jan. 1990, on the eve

of Republic Day, government imposed news blackout in Srinagar.

Indian government. reacted strongly to Pakistani concern over the deteriorating

situation in Kashmir. 'The Pakistani statement was wanton, unwarranted and

unacceptable interference in India's internal affairs'. The visit of Shahibzed Yakub Khan,

263

the Pakistani Foreign Minister did not bear any fruit as his terms, were unacceptable for

India. He held Kashmir to be a disputed territory whose future had to be decided by a

U.N. supervised plebiscite which could be made operative only after bilateral

negotiations, between India and Pakistan in the spirit of Simla Agreement. Yakub denied

Pakistani involvement in the disturbances: India held his speech would provide 'direct

incitement to subversive violence and terrorist activities'.

In February the terrorist activities mounted. On 12 February an intelligence

officer was shot dead by terrorists. On 13 February the head of the State Television,

Lasa Koul was assassinated. On 23 February, as many as 4,00,000 people participated

in a peaceful demonstration in Srinagar to the UNMOG office to deliver a memorandum

calling for monitoring of ceasefire line (1949) and the UN supervised plebiscite. Towards

the end of January the leader of the Azad Kashmir, Sardar Abdul Quayum Khan had

threatened to send 10,000 people over the line of control in support of the fight for

Kashmiri self determination. On 10 February the PM of Pakistan addressed a joint sitting

on the events in Kashmir and stressed that her government would continue to be

'steadfast in its support for the right of self-determination'. 32 The February upsurge

could be attributed to these two things: the open involvement of Azad Kashmir Govt. in

the unrest, and the shift of governments policy on Kashmir by according it top-priority.

The terrorists in the valley might have drawn sufficient inspiration from this.

32 Dawn(Karachi) II February 1990.

264 .

In April the sordid drama of kidnapping was acted out again. The student wing

of JKLF seized 3 hostages on 6 April 1990, H.L.Khera (General Manager State H.M.T),

Mushirul Haque (Vice Chancellor Kashmir University) and Abdul Gani (Haque's Secy).

The kidnappers demanded release of three militants which was not acceded to. On 10

April 1990, H.L.Khera was killed and on 11 April Haque and his secretary were killed.

Indian authorities suspected Pakistani hand behind such a dare-devil act.

On 11 April the Indian Prime Minister warned in a speech in Loksabha; 'Our

message to Pakistan is clean that you cannot get away with Kashmir without a war'. On

15 April Mufti the Home Minister declared that a war with Pakistan would be justified

if it would break 'the strong hold of the secessionists'.

The harsh measures adapted in the valley forced the terrorists to extend their

campaign beyond the ·state. On 10 April an organization calling itself Mujahideen

Kashmir claimed responsibility for explosion of bombs at two police stations in Delhi.

The bomb attacks in a train on the outskirts of Bombay on 13 April, the bomb blast in

a bus in New Delhi were attributed to Kashmiri militants. Amid such tension I.K.Gujaral

and Yakub Khan met in New York while attending UN special economic session and

issued a joint communique calling for continuing contacts between military Chief for

exercising restraint and maintaining channels of communications.

On 21 May Maulvi Farooq., the leaders of Awami Action Committee was shot

dead by unidentified gun-men at his Srinagar home. Maulvi had changed his stand from

accession to Pakistan, to total independent Kashmir, which could have irked pro-Pak

terrorist. The spate of violence that followed in its wake must have sent enough signals

265

to the assassins not to divulge their identity. (Rather Kashmiri guerilla groups denied

involvement in the act and put responsibility on the security forces). The funeral

procession was attended by thousands of people from the valley in clear violation of the

curfew. As the cortege reached the Is lamia college precincts, a section of the

processionist started an altercation with the security forces which culminated in the

opening of fire killing so people on the spot. The death toll reached 100 according to

private estimates. The incident shattered the peace of the valley which had prevailed for

a month. It necessitated the resignation of Jagmohan on 25 May. His removal was a

direct response to the action of the security forces in the aftermath of Farooq's

assassination. 33 Girish Saxena, security advisor to the P.M. was appointed Governor of

Kashmir.

In June the terrorists in Kashmir were seen using rockets to attack two water-front

hotels which were used as barracks for security forces. In the attack 4 policeman were

killed and 4 wounded. The killings were intended to avenge the death of Mohammed

Abdullah Bangroo, the field commander of Hizbul Mujaheedin on 18 June by policeman,

the terrorist would affirm. JKLF leader Amanullah Khan announced on 18 June

formation of 24 member provisional government from Muzaffarabad, 'to represent

Kashmiris living under India occupied Kashmir'. The government so formed included

members from Jamiat too. On the same day, president's rule was imposed following the

expiry of six months of governors rule. Though at the political level the talks went on

33 Jagn10han was nominated to the upper house on 28 May '90

266

throughout July and August neither the border skirmishes nor the unrest in the valley

subsided. Indo-Pak relations as a variable in the unrest in the valley was fast receding

to background. The terrorists had independent roles to perform in the valley. Though

different terrorist organisation subscribed to different ideologies i.e. some would advocate

complete independence, some accession to Pakistan, their subversive acts when clubbed

together had the potential to throw the valley into the abyss of anarchy. Though they

were divided over a substantial number of issues, their common hatred of Indian rule

which had manifested itself through long curfews, frequent firings at demonstratQrs at

slightest provocation; infused in these organisations a sense of psychological unity which

enabled them to transcend their differences caused by occasional in fightings. The sense

of terror it created in the valley was more tolerable for the people of Kashmir, who with

their typical insecurity complex and anti-authority lYiases saw in the curfews and the

security personnels a sinister Indian campaign for their final enslavement. The prevailing

atmosphere of exhaustion and dismay made them shrink back into the comfortable

confines of (the assurances of) their faith. This made the task of the propaga?dist even

easier with a ready stock of faithfuls around. This stress on Islam proved a strong uniting

factor and softened the attitude of the people towards Pakistan. Th-e raider had suddenly

become the liberator. The blames were to be shared by the authorities in power, for their

lackadaisical treatment of the problem. Right since 1947 the centre had the ill-reputation

of pulling down every elected governments never allowing them settle down which must

have induced-in the people a chronic sense of insecurity. The puppet government inspite

of their progressive steps and better performance could never gather popular sanction

267_

behind them. They were dismissed as illegitimate stooges, as traitors. In their blinding

enthusiasm to hold the territorial integrity, the people in power perhaps forgot to cater

to the grievances of the people at the psychological level. They never tried to drive out

the sense of alienation the people in the valley so gravely suffered from. Even genuine

protests were misconstrued as being sponsored by Pakistan and were firmly dealt with.

They refused to feel the pulse of the people. Any act of disapproval from the people was

interpreted as disloyalty. However it is almost impossible to wrench out loyalty from a

whole populace by sheer force. In human behaviour persuasion has effects unattainable

by force. The people in power refused to learn from their mistakes and repeat

performance of the same mistakes alienated them from the people of Kashmir further.

The present state of impasse is the result of such miscalculation which needs be corrected

in future once the valley settles down to normalcy.

In April 1990, Iran was seen protesting to Indian government. over its use of

violence against Kashmiri Muslims. In March 1990, representatives of Lebanon's

pro-IEanian Hezbollah participated in a seminar on "Jihad in Kashmir" organised by Azad

Kashmir government in Rawalpindi. It is pertinent to reveal here that Rawalpindi is the

only place outside POK where military training to Kashmiris are imparted. The 'Lal

Haveli' in the congested Bohra Bazar of Rawalpindi, serves as the nerve centre to

co-ordinate several camps for Kashmir youth on the outskirts of the city. The Muslim

conference set up a Kashmir Liberation Cell at Chandnichowk in Rawalpindi which

served as the hub of a major propaganda effort to help Kashmiri militants. Qazi Hussain

Ahmed, the Jamaat Chief appointed at the initiative of lSI told Shekhar Gupta, an Indian

268

journalist (which captured the mood well) in July 1990.

The Tashkent accord put Kashmir question in a coffin, the Simla accord hammered nails to it. Today, the Kashmir's have broken out of it and they deserve support.

Against this backdrop the Pakistani government sought to launch a massive

international media and diplomatic campaign. The report of Kanwar Sandhu in 16-31

March 1990 issue of 'India Today' bore his experiences in 'Azad Kashmir'. He came

across slogans written on the walls:

"Dukhtre Kasmir ke pairon ki zanziren katne ki garhi aa pahunchi hei" and "Allah ho Akbar Marde Mujahid, Mard-e-Khuda Talwar Utha, Maidaan mein aa".

He gathered news that the Federal government of Pakistan had sanctioned 50

lakhs for the expenditure of Kashmir Liberation Cell. He also saw youth collecting funds

openly for 'Jehad' on the streets. His impression of the whole administrative set up in

Kashmir was that the top ranking officials were deputed from the Centre. As such the

steps taken by POK government cannot just be brushed away as Kashmiri, when Pakistan

monitors the whole execution of the plans. Sandhu records his whole impression like this:

"After 10 days of travel through POK, the overriding impression is that AK has suddenly awaken from the obscurity of last 40 yrs. Today they are all soldiers in the holy war that has been launched to liberate Kashmir, some

269

armed with the fanaticism of Islam, others, more dangerously, with Kalasnikovs. The ultimate irony is that the provocation for that has not come from Islamabad, but from Sri nagar and New Delhi". 34

From 15 to 23 May 1990, Benazir undertook a 9 day tour of West Asian Capitals

to gatller- support in favour of Kashmir. In his banquet speech hosted in honour of

Benazir the lranian President Rafsanjani urged the Muslim countries 'to actively work

for tile elimination of the suppression suffered by the Muslim in Kashmir. Other Head

of States were cautious in their remarks. The OIC secretariat in Jeddah had already

issued a strongly worded statement accusing Indian activity in Kashmir. The Secretariat

held Hindu-Fundamentalists responsible for the killing of Maulana Mirwaiz Farooq.

Ill 1991 the preparation for elections, the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi and

subsequeJlt victory of Congress seemed to have little impact in the valley. The

disturbances continued. The government formed by P. V .Narasimha Rao proved quite

astute to deal with domestic problems. The cases of kidnappings in June 1991 were

severely dealt with. The terrorism in Punjab suffered a big set back with the state police

geari11g ap for elections in early 1992. It had its impact on Kashmir as well.

AJI through these months the India-Pakistan official level talks were carried on,

with \lsual bureaucratic zeal. In April the agreements were signed on the issue of advance

notice in the case of military exercises and the issue of mutual air-space-protection.

Towards the end of January P. V.Narasimha Rao went to New York to attend the

34 Kanwar Sandhu in India Today 16-31 March 1990.

270

security council meet. On 2 Feb. 1992, P. V. Narsimha Rao met in World Economic Meet

in Davos where Sharif called 1992 the year of reconciliation. There he met Nawaz

Sharif. But just after the meeting Nawaz Sharif, as if in a bid to demonstrate that his

meeting with P. V. Narasimha Rao has not spoilt him, gave a call for a Pakistan-wide

strike for putting pressure on international community on the issue of Kashmir. This has,

perhaps, to be understood in the context of growing anti-Punjabi resentment all over

Pakistan. Soon afterwards on 5 Feb. the JKLF Chief Mr.Amanullah announced the

organization of a march across I ine of actual control on 11 February 1992. The Pakistani

authorities, correctly assessed that the whole issue may lead to a confrontation and

banned this protest march on 6 Feb. But 7,000 JKLF man defied the ban, set on foot,

were blockaded and came under fire resulting in 7 casualties. In Jammu and Kashmir

almost 4,000 people defied curfew to demonstrate their solidarity with the marchers

across the border. The month of March was characterized by Sharifs call for an

independent Kashmir. Like every leader preceding him, he was resorting to India-baiting

to compensate for loss of popularity his government was facing. Sharif's government

urged UN to take action against India on the question of Kashmir and to send a fact.

Finding team to Kashmir for Pakistan 'cannot be expected to continue to indefinitely

prevent such marches by use of force'.

Here the Pakistan use of force can also be interpreted in terms of the Pakistan

government's apathy towards JKLF. In Nov.1991, there were reported clashes between

the JKLF and pro-Pak Hizbullah groups. The JKLF's stand of Independent Kashmir

always incurred the wrath of Pakistan Government. From 1993, the Pakistan

271

Government's efforts at international ising the issue of Human Rights in Kashmir has kept . the movement alive in the valley. Pakistan has always tried to cancel the effect of Indian

success at every possible level; be it at the diplomatic level by wining over Iran in

Geneva in UNHRC or at the military-strategic level by flushing out terrorists from

Hazaratbal Mosque; by ensuring that situation in the valley sinks deeper in the

militancy. Recent newspaper reports sugest that Pakistan intelligence is employing

Afgahan Mujahideens to float ultra-fundamentalist militant outfits like Harkat-ul-Ansar,

Al-faran, to keep the problem on the boil all the-time. Pakistan's direct involvement in

Kashmir has become-the most important stumbling block in India-Pakistan relation during

the recent years.

Punjab -Problem - A General Discussion

lt is the context that very often determines the direction of a movement.

Otherwise five centuries after Guru Nanak preached his realisation about the 'Sat Kartar',

one would be at a loss to explain, how a simple message of love could invoke violence

and bloodshed for the sake of preserving the values of a community built around the

central message of love. Often bracketed into the Bhakti cult, the offshoot of Hinduism

that Nanak raised, came to be known as Sikhism, named after his disciples known ac;

'Sikhs' (in Prakrit, from Sanskrit Sikshya}. The spiritual domain it outlined could not

inhibit the Sikhs to enter into the quest for temporal power, and soon they found

themselves at loggerheads with the Moghuls. The post-Akbar Moghul rule ~ourished

Sikhism with 'faith's richest fertilizer --persecution'. The execution of the fifth Guru of

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the Sikhs, Arjun Dev and the ninth Guru Tegh Bahadur provoked a sense of ·vengeance

and infused the spirit of militancy into the Sikhs.

The tenth Guru Gobind Singh gave the community a concrete shape, militarized

it, and called it the Khalsa (the pure). It was during this time that the codification of the

scriptures took final shape. The decline of Mughals dissipated the zeal of the Sikhs who

divided into bands or mists,· till Ranjit Singh consolidated their combined energy to forge

a powerful Sikh Kingdom in Punjab. It was around this time that the gurudwaras were

built up, for earlier, the worship used to be. conducted in bt.til.dings caUed dhar.amsalas.

After Ranjit Singh, the Sikhs had no other leader of such standing, who could save the

kingdom from the attack of the British. The British annexation gave a new context to

Sikhism, for majority of the Sikhs were recruited into the British army, and thus came

a sense of economic security which enabled them to pause and look around for their

cultural roots. It was then that the Sikhs started looking at them as being separate from

the Hindus and a new identity, self-conscious and assertive, emerged. When faced with

the threat of missionary activity by British evangelists, the Sikhs I ike Arya Samaj ist 's

Shuddhi movement opened up a parallel proselytizing movement called the Singh Sabha.

This signalled a departure from Hinduism and Khalsa members who considered

themselves as essentially Hindu, and Sikhism as a branch of Hinduism were soon

discredited as Sanatanis and then 'Tat Khalsa' (the True Khalsa) was established to take

care of Sikhism. Then came the widely circulated pamphlets (in 1899) claiming a

separate identity for the Sikhs from the Hindus. Of them, Kahan Singh's pamphlet 'Hum

Hindu Nahin', forcefully put forth his arguments that Sikhism was a separate religion.

273

The Anti-colonial freedom-struggle gave the Sikh movement yet another context.

The 1970s saw the Akalis (the immortal ones) set up Shiromani Gurudwar Prabandhak

Committee (SGPC) to gain control over the Gurudwaras, earlier in the hands of

hereditary mahants called Udasis (they were infact Sahajdhari Sikhs, indistinguishable

from Hindus in appearance) who in close cooperation with British, amassed large

fortunes by virtue of managing the gurudwaras as trustees and allegedly paying no

attention to the religion they were required to save. After five-years of incessant activity;

that alternated between non-violent non-cooperation and violent encounters with the

recalcitrant mahants; the SGPC gained absolute control of the gurudwaras, and soon it

was at the centre of the Sikh community, assuming great temporal power onto itself

through its control of the income that came from the management of the gurudwaras. The

SGPC, soon started defining Sikhism in exclusive terms. By 1943, there was a section

of leadership among the Sikhs, who had even started contemplating an 'Azad S~khistan'. ·'5

A Sikh delegation had also staked their claim for an independent Sikh state before the

Cabinet mission, which was brushed aside by the British. 36

Demand for the Pimjabi Suba : Beginning of Sikh Ethnic Assertion

The post"'partition days drew the Sikhs and Hindus together, for they were united

in their collateral hatred against the Muslims in the wake of the communal riots that

35 Master Tara Singh 'Azad Punjab Scheme' in The Tribun~Lahore) 23 July 1943. Quor~ll in A.C. Kapur, The Punjab Crisis (New Delhi: S.Chand & Co.) 1985, p.l71.

36 Dr. Gopal Singh, History of the Sikh People (Delhi: World Book Centre) 1979 p. 70l

274

rocked the subcontinent. But the rationale of Partition, on the basis of communal identity

could not but keep the exclusivist argument alive within the fold of the Sikhs. People

like Master Tara Singh would go on howling for a Sikh majority State. By May 1948 the

Indian government had set up a Sikh majority unit within the heart of East Punjab,

Patiala and East Punjab States Union (PEPSU) composed of Patiala, Nabha, Jind and

Faridkot. But this could not assuage the feelings of the Sikhs, more so, because the

Hindus in Punjab started disown-ing the Punjabi language in favour of Hindi which gave

apparent recognition to a coterminal Punjabi-Sikh37 identity which had a territorial

component to it. Sikhs soon started reorganization of Punjabi on the basis of language.

Even though the verbiage was secular, it concealed an antipathy towards the Hindus who

opposed their call for a Punjabi suba. The two prominent Akali leaders master Tara

Singh and Fateh Singh kept the movement alive through intermittent fasts-unto death and

in the year 1966, just on the eve orFateh Singh's self-immolation the Centre, conceded

reorganization of the Punjab state on the basis of language.

But the reorganization scheme was never carried through to its logical

conclusions. The dispute over the status of Chandigarh, that would accrue to Punjab, and

distribution of river water (Ravi-Beas) made the matters worse. It took another fast by

Fateh Singh in January 1970 to extract an important concession from Mrs Indira Gandhi

37 T.R. Sharma interpreted tllis Punjabi-Sikh identity which fonned the backbone of the Akali demand for Punjabi Suba as the 'urge to preserve the Punjabi identity as a distinct socio-cullmal group in a definite territory and the urge for Sikh identity as a distinct religious group' going together. In 'Post-election Punjab: Some trends' in Gopal Singh (ed) The Punjab Today (New Delhi: Intenle~:tual Publishing House) 1987 p.317.

275

who announced a package which recognized Punjab's claim over Chandigarh which was

to be given to Punjab in return for Hindi-speaking areas of Abohar and Fazilka together

with a furlong-wide strip of territory which would ensure contiguity with Haryana. But

the Centre did not take convincing effort to implement this package. This caused

dissatisfaction among the Akali leaders. By keeping the debate alive (over the package)

the Congress government allowed the whole thing to be politicised in religious terms. the

Anandpur Sahib resolution, adopted in April 1973, showed the direction of the Akali

movement.

The Centre's vacciliation can be understood in terms of Congress-Akali political

rivalry which continued from the days of the independence, with Akali Dal falling behind

the Congress in electoral number game which might be one of the reasons why Akalis

were desperate about their claims for a Sikh-majority state where they can make then

dicktat run by garnering support in communal term, if need be. The Congress

vacciliation suddenly gave them an unique opportunity to strike back and convince an

electorate which was gradually showing an inclination, which was overtly religious38 and

glorified the Khalsa, the Panth and the Sikhism. But still it was not so much

secessionistic, as it reflected the urge for greater autonomy. 39 As a Punjabi-Sikh identity.

that sought to assert itself through demands for political autonomy, the movement could

38 The resolution said duu the aim of the Panth was to seek the 'exaltation of the Sikh Panth · and fundamental policy of the Akali Dal was to 'seek the realisation of this birthright of teh Khalsa'. (From the text of Anandpur Sahib Resolution).

39 The political goal envisaged in d1e resolution was to 'endeavour to have the Indian constitution recast fon real; federa! .principles, wid1 equal representation for all states at the Centre'. Quoh:J from Anandpur Sahib Resolution.

276

claim an ethnic status.

This ethno-political assertion soon degenerated into communal violence, once it

assertion against the state was misinterpreted in anti-Hindu and communal terms.Jana

Sanghists made the whole situation worse by jumping into the fray. In a procession

headed by Harbanslal Khanna of Janasangh against the demand of the Sikhs for the Holy

city status for Amritsar, provocative slogan were sho.uted (i.e. Kachha, kara, Kripan.

Bhejo inko Pakistan). 40 This created great resentment among the Sikhs who came out ·

with aggressive counter-protests. The whole political atmosphere in Punjab was soon

communalised.

Rise of Bhindranwale:- The issue of Sikhism gains momentum

It was at this juncture that Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwa1e entered the scene.

Trained in Sikh religious discourse from Dam Dami Taksal,41 Bhindranwale42 became

its head in 1977 at the age of thirty. A person of humble origin, he hailed from an area

(Chowk Mehta) which was largely left untouched by the green-revolution which the

conservatives believed had brought along with opulence, an attitude~ banal and cynical;

that ate away the core virtues of the Sikh faith. Bhindranwale particularly believed too

40 Quoted in Afsir Karim, Cowuer Terrorism The Pakistan Factor (Delhi: Lancer International) 1991, p 30.

41 Dam Dami Taksal is the Sikh Religious School, established in 18th Century by the legendary Deep Singh who confronted the troops of Ahmad Shah Abdali with his cut-off held on one hand and sword on the other. head-quartered in Chowk Mehta, near Amritsar.

42 He wa>caJled Bhindranwala after the name of the village, Bhindran.

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much in this. A person of religious persuasion and a revivalist preacher, he aimed at

proselytizing the non-Sikh Punjabis like Sahajdharis 43 and Nirankaris44 and the

untouchables, by spreading fundamental popular messages of the Sikh faith, as

transmitted by the Gurus.

After he assumed the headship of Dam Dami Taksal Bhindranwale's mission

along with that of Akhand Kirtani Jatha45 was seen lodged in a violent confrontation with

the Nirankaris at Amritsar on 13 April 1978, in which his group suffered major reverses ...

In counter attack, forty leading Nirankaris were killed including their head Gurubachan

Singh (on 26 April 1978). From 13 April onward, Punjab seethed with violence that

revolved around the theme of purifying the Sikh faith and restoring it to its pristine

purity. This conflict was then limited to the Sikhs and sought to consolidate a

community which was perceived to be falling apart

After the clash April 1978, Bhindranwale was apprehended by the police, only

to be released soon, upon intervention by the Congress leaders, state administration and

the Judiciary. The Congress Party, then out of power, wanted to reap Bhindranwalc's

popularity to create a major divide in the Akali Dal; the party's major electoral opponent

43 Shadajdharis were Sikhs who as distinguished from Keshdhari were allowed not to grow their hair and (shun other distinguishing marks) to pass untraced .as Hindus to escape Mughal oppression and thus retain maintenance of Sikh dharmashala which were later known as gurudwaras.

44 Dayal Das established the Nirankari Sikh in the middle of the 19th century. By 1980 it has moved towards a Hindu 'God man cult' under the leadership of Gurubachan Singh. It had a firm tlcnt in the lower caste section particularly among the Ramdasias and Muzhabis which the revivalist sought to reincorporate into Sikhism.

45 Akhand Kinani Jatha, a hymn group founded by Bibi Am.arjit Kaur contributed to tht: growth of militant ideology. Its members sought to spread the tenets of an orthodox, austere Sikhism. tht:y were also opposed to the Nirankaris for their heretical 'Godman cult'.

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in the state. Even the Congress Party supported the Bhindranwale faction in the 1979

election to the SGPC in which Bhindranwale's supporters could win only four out of 106

seats. Bhindranwale supported the Congress in three seats. After 1980, the Congress

realized that the Bhindranwale-proposition was not electorally profitable and thus it

distanced itself from the Bhindranwale faction. But the brief honeymoon with Congress

was enough to incline Bhindranwale towards politics, eventhough he would stay put to

his missionary revivalist track. But it affected Akali politics and partly to parade its

commitment to the Sikh community as well as the Sikh faith and partly to steal the winds

out of Bhindranwale, the Akali Dal refurbished its agenda to include demands on the

basis of religion and thus politicization of religion started in a big way.

From early 1970s, the demands for a separate Sikh state also started raising its

head, especially among expatriate Sikhs. In 1971, Dr. Jagjit Singh Chauhan took out an

advertisement in the New York Times in favour of Khalistan. In July 1977, he came

back to India and helped the formation of the Dal Khalsa. In March 1980, he hoisted

a Khalistan flag at a Gurudwara at Anandpur and formed a twelve man Khalistan council,

which started issuing Khalistan stamps and passports. 46 But there were few takers.

Bhindranwale was indifferent to such an idea of a separate Sikh nation which he 'neither

favoured nor opposed,47' although Ire supported the Sikh concept of miri-piri (that the

46 For detailed study refer lO Report of Indian Home Ministry 'Sikh Agitation for Khalistan' , reprinted in Kuldip Nayar and Khuswant Singh (eds.) Tragedy of Punjab: Operation Blue Star and Afh:r (New Delhi: Vision Btxlks) 1984 pp. 142-155.

47 Quoted in Mark Juergensmeyer, The new Cold War: Religious Natinalism Confronts the: Secular State (Berldey: University of California Press ) 1993 p. 95.

279

temporal and spiritual realms are connected). By early 1981, however, a section of Aka! i

Dal took up the issue and in March 1981, a World Sikh Convention, supported by a

splinter group of Akali Dal backed a Khalistan resolution.

By mid 1989, the religious messages of Bhindranwale and the political aspiration

of the expatriate Sikhs coalesced together to form an explosive combine, in the minds of

the Sikh youth. The students showed particular susceptibility to the call for puritanism

and Khalistan. In May 1981, the student wing of the Akali Dal, AISSA demanded

closure of all cigarette shops within the walled city of Amritsar. Even some leading Akali

leaders like Jagdev Singh Talwandi and Gurubachan Singh Tohra were eager to join the

militants.

In the meanwhile, in March 1981, Ganga Singh Dhillon, an expatriate Sikh,

mooted the idea of a separate Sikh nation hood while addressing All India Sikh Education

Conference, held at Chandigarh. On 15 April 1981, the SGPC followed suit, passing a

resolution under the presidentship of Sant Harchand Singh Longowal which declared that

'Sikhs are a nation'. On 26 July 1981 the Sikh convention headed by Longowal, held at

Gurudwara Manji Sahib, just outside the Golden Temple; issued a charter of demands

containing demands which ranged from political to religious ones.It was imaged upon the

Anand Sahib resolution, though, the ideological underpinnings (latent in Anand Sahib

Resolution) were made explicit through religious demands. 48

48 The main religious demadns were: the granting of holy City status to Amritsar, banning the sale of liquor, tobaco and meat in the city, relaying of devotional music (Kirtan) by AIR from 1hc Golden Temple, renaming Frontier Mail as Golden Temple Express, right to carry Kirpan (ritual sworu) on the airlines, an All India Gurudwara Act.

280

In September 1981, soon after the demands were made, Lata Jagat Narain; a

leading newspaper publisher, an outspoken critic of Khalistan and a prominent Hindu;

was assassinated. Bhindranwale was implicated in the act and arrested in front of a

50,000 strong crowd at his Chowk Mehta Gurudwara and was released immediately

afterwards for lack of evidence. Bhindranwale was said to have remarked that 'the

government has done more for me in one week than I could have achieved in years'. And

thus, the legend of Bhindranwale was born.

The roaring success of Bhindranwale put even more pressure on the Akal i

moderates to stick to their revised agenda of demands on the centre. And now the Aka I is

backed their demands by widespread civil disobedience campaigns: Nehar Roko (stop the

work of Sutlej-Yamuna canat that would steal water from Punjab farmers),Rasta Roko

(stop the road traffic) Rail Roko (stop the trains) and Kam Roko (stop work). By August

1982, the Morcha dictator Sant Longowal gave the call for a holy war (Dharam Yudh)

asking Sikhs to court arrest in thousands, everyday. Bhindranwale was not sitting idle

and was launching his independent agitation over the !J.rrest of Bhai Amrik Singh, 1he

president of All India Sikh Student's Federation (AISSF).

The success of Longowal's civil disobedience campaign soon motivated

Bhindranwale to join the agitation. This did not happen without affecting the civility of

the 'civil disobedience campaign' and by early 1983 the movement had turned violent, and

the killing of Hindus and officials opposed to the demands became routine affairs. The

climax came with the murder of a Sikh D.G. of police Mr A.S.Atal on 25 April 1983.

The centre took this all as an indication of the shrinking law and order situation 111

281

Punjab and imposed governor's rule and dismissed its own party government in Punjab,

on 6 October 1983. By then, however, a host of militant outfits had come up, ready to

take up arms for whatever causes, decided by the leaders of the movement as.

worth-dying-for. To name the leading ones; Babbar khalsa, Babbar Khalsa international.

Dal Khalsa, Bhindranwale Tiger Forces, Dashmesh Regiments, Khalistan Commando

Force, National Council of Khalistan.

Operation Blue Star: Inc-entives for Khalistan

The events of the subsequent period, armed these nascent or_ganizations with the

required moral courage to take up arms with full conviction. As events would unfold.

immediately after the imposition of the governor's rule, Bhindranwale, in order to escape

rearrest, entered the promises of the Golden temple upon being permitted entry by the

president of the Temple management committee, Mr. Gurubachan Singh Tohra. There

ensued a fight between Bhindranwale's for as and Longowal's supporters, but

Bhindranwale with his supporters was soon comfortably lodged in Akal Takht (the part

of the·shrine representing the temporal power of the Lord) and with the help of a former

Major General of the Indian army Mr. Sahbeg Singh started fortifying the temple

complex and training terrorists in it.

By then Bindranwale had become a cult figure, an alternative source of authority

in Punjab, with whom no ambitious moderate Akali leader, worth the name, could

publlcly differ without risking his popularity. His taped sermons urging Sikh youths to

take up arms to fight for the Khalsa (pure Sikh brotherhood) sold far and wide. His

282

sympathizers in police and civil administration had grown so much that inspite of the

posting of 150 companies of constabulary forces around Punjab, including ninety around

the Golden Temple itself, the administration 'failed to check the massive induction of

arms into the Golden Temple. 49

In May 1984, Mrs. Gandhi held a hurried round of negotiations with the Sikh

leaders which proved · inconclusive,since Bhindrawale refused to join the discussions.

despite persuasions by G.S. Tohra who had allowed him asylum inside the Temple.No

Akali leader could bypass him to arrive at any conclusion. But the talks hardened the

sentiments on the side of the administration and in a quick decision, army was brought

around to flush the Golden temple free of militants. The three day long army operation

(code named Operation Blue Star from 4 June 1984 to 6 June 1984) managed to gain . control of the Temple. Bhindrawale was killed _along with 554 terrorists. The casually

from the army side was 92. But the grievous injury that the army action caused in the

minds of the Sikhs was immeasurable. it provoked heavy censure from even liberal Sikh

quarters. Khushwant Singh (known to be of an agnostic variety) would call the action

a tragic error of judgment,a grieveous mistake and a gross miscalculation, which

'humiliate the pride' and wounded' the religious susceptibilities of every single Sikh·.~~~

Immediately afterwards,almost 3000 Sikhs deserted the army. And the coufltry lost its

Prime Minister on 31 October 1984, at the hands of two of her body guards. The riots

49 For a detailed study see Mark Tully and Satish Jacob, Amritsar: Mrs Gandhi's Last B<tllk (Lo~don: Jonathan Cape) 1985.

50 Khuswant Singh's responce tp the Government White Paper on Punjab in Rajya Sahh<t on 25 July 1984 , Quoted in The Times of India (Delhi) 26th July 1984.

283

that followed the assassination alienated the Sikhs even further. The anti-Sikh riot<; of

November 1984 claimed almost 3,000 innocent Sikh lives (official estimate was 2723).

And as K.R. Bombwall, a senior political analyst would observe,it would even tie the

Sikh even in stronger bond:

'The sledge hammer blows struck at the Sikh · psycheappeartohave dissolved the numerous sectarian

clergies rural Sikhs and urban Shikhs,Jats and Mazhabis, Ramgarhias and higher caste Khatris and Aroras etc. which divide the Sikh community and to have merged a plurality of Socio-economic identity into a single overarching ethnic identity. ' 51

Thus the year 1984 was a major turning point in Punjab politics which made rhe

movement, which started on the plancks of a strained centre-state relations, assume a

communal colour; as if a Hindi state was hell bent on wiping out every possible

non-Hindi identity. This attitudinal divide made it possible on the part of Pakistan ro

interfere in the Punjab affairs, for major expatriate Sikhs who advocated the cause of

Khalistan were given free entry into Pakistan and even had established good rapport with

the President Zia-ui-Haq. As such the terrorists, in order to avoid army apprhension (for

Operation Woodrose that followed Blue Star sought to weed out terrorists from every

possible hideout,) went across the border into Pakistan, from where the would launch

their attacks.

From 1984 onwards, Pakistan also started visualizing the problem as a God-sent

51 K. R. BombwaJI, • Sikh Identity and Federal Polity: A Critique of AkaJi Postion in Gopal Singh(ed), Punjab Today op.cit p.l58.

284

opportunity to avenge the division of Pakistan. If Bangladesh punctured the theory of

Two-nations, here was one case which could put it back in the currency, if carried

through to its logical conclusion (of yet another secession). The reactions in the Pakistan

press to the army action in the Golden Temple was openly inciting. The press wrote that

during the partition the Sikhs could not foresee the danger of being swept over by the

Hindus, otherwise they would have struck a deal with the Muslim league and not let the

Quaid's offer slip off their hand52•

Rajiv-Longowal Accord: No Effect on Militancy

In the meanwhile Rajiv-Longowal accord singed on 24 July 1985 encouraged

people to believe that things would be set aright soon. But militancy had travelled too far

and at the popular Sikh level the accord did not cut much ice. Longowal was killed on

20 August 1985 and the Akali Government led by Surjit Singh Barnala that was elected

to power subsequently, could not bargain it out effectively with the centre to implement

the accord without delay. The Central government did not show as much sincerity to

keep its promises as envisaged in the accord either. And the terrorist activities continued

unabated, as Barnala government increasingly lost its legitimacy in the absence of any

visible change in the status quo, that nearly proved that the Central government's

52 Z.A. Suleri wrote in 'Pakistan Times' (Lahore) 23 June 1984: Sikhs are a classic exampk of a lost people. llte might protest and agitate, but the tentacles of Hindu majority will never relax their grip on them ..... Brahminism is a jealous creed .... It either seeks to absorb non-Hindu cults into Hindudt 1111

or to reduce them to serfdom or non-entity. Look at the fate of Buddhism and Jainism. They hardly t"xi~t in India except in relics which they have left behind

285

commitments were designed to dupe the Akali Dal Longowal group. When Barnala

ordered a search in the Golden temple complex to fish out terrorists in April 1986, who

had declared the eatablishment of Khalistan from the Temple. It led to divisions in the

Akali Dal, further weakening its power base and thus contributing to the militants

movement thereby. Finally on 11 May 1987,the Barnala government was pulled down

and President's rule was imposed in the state, on the grounds that the Barnala

government did not have political will to combat violence and the fresh spurt of violence

from the early April showed that a parallel authority was working in the state by the

fundamentalists and the extremists, in the temples and gurudwaras, as opposed to the

Punjab government secretariat at Chandigarh. 53

The Ray- Ribeiro combine54 could not prove effective either. lnspite of tough

search operations by the police on 25 June 1987 and 18 July 1987,the Golden Temple

continued to be under the control of the terrorists who took orders from the powerfu I

Panthic committees (among whom Sohan Singh faction was most influential) rather than

the assorted SGPC. This continued for a while till, 9 May 1988 When S.S. Virk DSP.

CRPF was fired upon from the temple premises. This led to the launching of operation

Black Thunder (May 12-18, 1988) to as against 640 deaths in 1986, in 1987 there were

1383 deaths which claimed upto 2423 in 1988 and 2019 in 1989 flush out the terrorists.

53 The Times of India (DeU1i) 13 May 1987, carried d1e text of d1e Govenm1ents letter lo

dle President.

54 Sidhard1a Ray d1e Governor of Naxalite supression fame Julio Ribeiro the police ~hid acclaimed as dle inveterate super cop.

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The strategy paid of well as many militants surrendered. But this could do nothing better

than shifting the venue to other places, i.e. neighbouring states of Himachal Pradesh.

Haryana and even Delhi.

In late 1988, the fencing of lndo-Pak border along Punjab sector started and this

army operation along the border compelled the terrorists to retaliate and disperse into

places hitherto untouched by terrorist violence. The execution of the assassins of Mrs.

Gandhi on 6 January 1989, gave a spurt to militant activity in the state. The terrorists

sought to reinforce potential measures, fashioned after strict religious and moral codes,

like banning liquor, meat, beauty parlour etc. The death toll for the year was slightly

lower than 1988, but still the grip of the terrorists was undeniably heavy. The general

elections of November 1989, indicated the direction of the movement. Persons owing

allegiance to 'Khalistan' won substantially. The elected members from Punjab included.

Srimaranjit Singh Mann who headed United Akali Dal and advocated independerll

Khalistan, Attinder Pal Singh of Khalistan Liberation Organization (KLO) and implicated

in the Indira Gandhi assassination case and Bimal Khalsa the widow of Beant Singh, one

of the assassins of Mrs. Gandhi.

As such the conciliatory posture adopted by the non-Congress National Front

Government could not yield much dividend. In terms of violence 1990 proved to be the

bloodiest year followed by the year 1991. From 1981 to 1989 the terrorists gunned down

55 people including policemen, whereas in first two years 1990-1991 more than 6000

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were killed55• The terrorist violence sought to criminalise the movement by confronting

police and paramilitary forces and even in some cases targeting their families and

relatives as well. The ideologues of the movement on the other hand were busy

proclaiming 'hukumnamas' or 'dictates' demanding conformity to a new set of social

code of behavior, which even sought to coerce the media. 56

For most of the part of 1990- 1991, these dictates very nearly determined the code

of behaviour in Punjab. The government, the judiciary, the print-media were at a virtual

stand still. From December 1991, the government launched 'Operation Rakshak which

started its activities in three border districts of Ferozepur, Gurudaspur and Amritsar. It

compelled terrorists to move out of Punjab and hide among the prosperous Sikhs

dispersed all out India, which showed that the militants could act far afeild from Punjab

and that they had built up a national network of harbourers, sympathizers and

55 From 1981 to 1982,451 policemen were killed whereas in 1991 and 1992, some 973 policemen were killed.

Index of terroist activity (from confidential source used by Manoj Joshi in 'Combating Terrorism in Punjab' in Conflict Studies (UK)May 1993

56

Year 1986 1987 !988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993(March) Persons Killed 562 1005 2050 1320 2849 3161 1520 231 (Police) 42 95 110 152 500 495 251 14 Terrorist killed 78 328 373 699 720 1494 2109 258

*

* *

*

*

The dikat commanded tbat the school uniforms should be of a particular colour and banned skirts for girls (a school head-mistress was shot for not enforcing this change) the media should take particular care of Punjab and Punjabi languages. the consumption of alcohol, cigrettes and meat as well as ostentation in weddings should be banned. the banks should favour Punj~in disbursing loans and credit (31 branches of various banks were set afire on 21 October 1991 for having ignored the diktat. the newsmen should call the terrorists militants and add honorific titles of 'Bhai' before their names.

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supporters. 57 The Operation Rakshak, however, was withdrawn in a premature fashion

in June 1991, when the scheduled election in Punjab were cancelled and the

governor,Gen. O.P. Malhotra resigned. Withdrawal of Operation Rakshak gave a fresh

lease to violence in the state.

The Nineties: Stemming the tide of Terrorism in Punjab.

The victory of the Congress, after the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi on 20th June

1991 during his election campaign in Madras gave a new turn to politics in India. The

Congress government was habitually disinclined to any understanding with the militants

and as such, Operation Rak:shak:-11 was started again from 15 November 1991. The

move was sophisticated, low key and well planned. The redeployment created the

necessary moral space for holding of elections in February 1992 which was boycotted by

all major political parties of the Sikhs, mostly under pressure from the militants. The

Central government did not seem willing to accommodate them as the boycott was not

taken seriously at all. Rather it paced the way for a Congress win which strengthened the

minority Na!:asimha Rao Government with additional 12 M.P.~ at the Central level and

simultaneously lodged a Congress government in Punjab under Beant Singh.

The election put the moderate Akali faction into defensive and finally pushed them

into the militants camp by making them captive to the logic of violence. The Akalis came

together (almost all of them: Prakash Singh Badal, Baba Joginder Singh, Kartar Singh

57 Manoj Joshi's paper, cited earlier, makes a brilliant attempt to present the case in an elaborate manner, from which much of the information has been borrowed hence forward in this chapter.

289

Narang who authored the move, Manjit Singh of AISSF) to form a new Unified

Shiromani Panthic Action Committee and thus the groundwork was prepared for a major

counter offensive to the army actions, which also sought to discredit the new stale

government.

From March to June 1992, the terrorists were in full rampage. During March the

terrorist killed 15 non Punjab Engineers of the Indian Acrylics Fibre Plant in Sangrur and

mowed down 30 innocent people in a crowed locality of Fieldganj in Ludhiana. In April

two teachers were killed in Punjab University Camp-us to convey the message that .all

works should be done in Punjab. Apart from that individual assassinations were carefully . planned. In May a former M.P., Hussain Singh was assassinated, the state Excise

Commissioner A.K. Mishra was gunned down in Patiala, the Union Agricultural Prices

(UAP) Chief, Devendra Singh Tyagi was killed in Delhi and engineer the state-owned

AIR M.L. Manchanda was kidnapped and milled. The killings were not arbitrary hut

carried symbolic messages of Socio-political reforms demanded by the militants. TilE

UAP chief was killed to show that the Punjab famous were not getting a good deal from

UAP which fixes support prices for food grains. The kilJing of the excise official

denoted the anti- alcohol, anti-tobacco message, and the beh~ading of the junior AIR

official emphasized the observation of the code of conduct issued to media officials.

The Operation Rakshak II soon launched its offensive in defined ways. It started

off with preventing trans-border traffic of terrorists and arms, then coordinated with the

local police and civil authorities in their anti terrorists operations through a neatly

evolved Quick Reaction Teams (QRTs) which were hooked on to police wireless net and

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came to the aid of the police within 15 minutes of receiving the signals. Last but not I he

least, to boost the morale of the local populace, schools, health centers were run by 1he

army. Apart from this, the army kept the 900 villages along the border under s1ric1

surveillance.

Simultaneous reorganization of the police under K.P.S. Gill and his successor

D.S. Mangat also infused confidence in the Punjab Police force. The synchronisation of

army police operation geared their activity in a big way. In April 1992, Tarn Taran. a '

major terrorist infested area was brought under army-pol ice control. The opera! ion

improved qualitatively in targeting important terrorists and eliminating them. The

elimination of BTFK's Ludhiana chief Rachpal Singh Chandran, was soon followed by

the elimination of the KLF chief Gurjat Singh Budhasinghwala, (on 26 July 1992) and

his successor Navroop Singh Dhotian was kiHed in an encounter shortly afterwards. The

legendary chief of the Babbar Khalsa, Sukhdev Singh Dasuwal was killed when he came

down to attend one funeral.

The terrorists soon avenged themselves with killing security men and their

relatives. But the security force was resolute enough to be browbeaten and in one of 1he

major surprise operations following banging of Sukhdev Singh <\lias Sukha and Harjinder

Singh alias linda on 9 October 1992 (accused of murdering A.S. Vaidya the ex- Indian

Army Chief), the security forces killed Talvinder Singh Parmar of Babbar Khalsa

International on 15 October 1992 near Kang Rain village close to Phillaur. Parmar. a

Candian citizen, was a major fund raiser for the movement and acted as a conduil

between the organization and the lSI of Pakistan. By the end of the year Dharam Singh

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Kashtiwal of Babbar Khalsa and Nishan Singh Makher who ran his own KLF faction

were eliminated. The prize event however was the death in an encounter of Gurubachhan

Singh Manochal, the chief of BTFK the erstwhile self-declared Jathedar of Akal Takht

and instrumental in whipping up violence what defamed the Barnala government in l9X6.

Eventhough quite a few dreaded terrorists are still at large (like Wassan Singh

Zaffar"Wal of the Panthic Committee, Pramjit Singh Parmar of Khalistan Commando

Force, Wadhawa Singh of the Babbar Khalsa and Sohan Singh of the Panthic Committee.

the army seemed to have stemmed the tide against terrorism in the state of Punjab. The

criminalisation of the movement during the early nineties has made the terrorists lose the

moral basis of their struggle and hence their all important popular support. It is still

premature to decide whether the movement has collapsed but one hopes it will fare for

the better in the days to come.

Pakistan's Hand in Punjab Trouble

The Sikh demand for a separate state, which started on the eve of Indian

independence stayed confined to a minority elite among them, which was soon swallowed

up in the communal carnage which struck a firm bond between the Hindus and the Sikhs.

It is interesting to Jearn that the Muslim league spokesman Mohammed Zafarullah

Khan58• argued out passionately before the Punjab Boundary Commission, which was set

up to assist Cyril Radcliffe in drawing the boundary line, that Sikhs have been victims

58 It was an irony that has own Muslim identify was soon put to question because of his Ahmadiya background

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of historical misunderstanding regarding their views on the Muslims for during rhe

Mogul rule the people who got the gurus executed were the Hindus59 and thus it would

be better if they decided to stay on with Pakistan. It was even rumored that some of rhe

prominent Sikh leaders had even broached the idea of Sikhistan within Pakistan wilh

Jinnah.But these ideas never appealed to the Sikh masses in general for they had chosen

to stay with India in a federation.

The immensity of the problem that the independent India was confronted wirh.

blurred the appeal for a Sikh nation while the green revolution kept the Jat peasantry

happy and contented. The mid fifties witnessed a struggle for following between he

Congress and the Akali Dal and very soon the Akali Dal by virtue of its religious

standing mustered up a following which made claims of reorganization of the Punjab

state on linguistic basis. This in actual operation would favour the Sikhs, even though

the Demand was couched in Secular terms. The Hindu assertion closely followed. Bur

Nehru was openly hostile to any such proposition. Lalbahadur and Mrs. Gandhi, who

followed Nehru were rather conciliatory and the movement for Punjabi Suba become a

success after Punjab was reorganized in 1966. But the reorganization was allowed ro

continue in an incomplete form, 60 allowing Akali agitation to remain within manageable

limits until Congress could tap a religions fanatic Bhindranwale to counter the Aka I is

59 TI1e discussion on the them has been done in chapter-3 of this study.

60 As has been mentioned earlier, the status of Chandigarh, the issue of distrihution of rivt:r waters remained unresolved and in discussions over the issue the Central initiative was half hearted aud often partial towards Haryana. Even when same political party was in lower in Haryana and the ceiun.:. the centre would vacciliate.

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politically and unwittingly shift popular support from the moderates to the

fundamentalists and complicate matters in Punjab. When the demands conceded as

genuine, would be forged into a struggle for socio-religious revival, its appeal becomes

irresistible. And thus by the eighties the Sikh problem had taken off now it remains to

be seen how Pakistan got involved in the whole episode.

Many analysts believe that Pakistan entered the Punjab tangle after the ·Blue Star

Operations of 1984. But, it was not all that sudden and abrupt a move. Pakistan had

to do a lot of fence-sitting before it would involve itself in the act. Thus from the

beginning of the eighties we mark that expatriate Sikhs like G.S. Dhillon who found, in

the mounting disaffection in Punjab, an opportunity to float their idea of an Independent

Sikh State, were granted audiences with the President of Pakistan during his U.S. tour

of 1982. 61 Even Long before that in September 1981 the sikh hijackers who flow the Air

India plane to Lahore were not returned to India even after repeated reminders. Zia was

openly claiming that the non resident sikhs were begging for help which he would not

offer. The sikh Pilgrims from India on visits to Nankana Sahib (Lahore) were also

aiiegedhy being instigated by sikhs based abroad to wage a militant struggle against the

Indian government. Inspite of allegations from Indian side Pakistan government remained

absolutely silent over the issue. Perhaps Pakistan government was biding time to gauge

the strength and direction of the movement.

The Year 1984, after the Blue star Operation, must have convinced Pakistan about

61 Mentioned in Pakistan Times (Lahore) 5 June 1983.

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the uncompromising character of the movement. The Pakistani intelligence, perhaps, was

the first so pick up the hint and started providing asylum to people who fled from Indian

side of Punjab.

The open involvement of the Sikh diaspora abroad (in UK, USA, Canda,

Germany and elsewhere) in the Punjab trouble provided Pakistan with the intervening

buffer space to shrug off Indian accusations. On the other hand the expatriate Sikh

community used Pakistan as a base from which they would launch their movement. Thus

they mutually reinforced each other's interest; while Pakistan sought to create internal

division62 in India the Sikhs wanted to secure their independent Sikh state, call it

Khalistan or whatever. The Blue Star operation had provided these expatriates with a

huge constiuency among the Punjab's youth ready to take up the cause of Khalistan. Most

of the militant outfits operating in the state after 1984 had their branches abroad. Thr

most prominent among them, the International Sikh Youth Federation, Babbar Khalsa and

Dal Khalsa had branched in UK, USA, Canada and Germany. The expatriate community

also had some uncomprosing advocates like G.S. Dhillon, G.S. Chauhan, Paramjit Singh

Parmar, Manjit Singh, Gurudip Singh Sibir and a host of others. They were the people

who gave the terrorists moral and material support to carry forward their activity in

India.

But all this would certainly fizzle out in the absence of a ready platform from

which the terrorist operation would be launched. If it were not for Pakistan, the

62 It was soon coupled up with a spirit of vengeance. Lt. Gen. (Retd) A.l. Akram would urge the Government to seize the opportunity to avenge the dismembennent of Pakistan. The Pakistan Prl·ss would echo this idea

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movement would not gather the strength it did. By allowing the much needed physical

space to the terrorists and making the communication between them and their mentors

abroad possible the Pakistan Intelligence wing (the lSI) acted as a promoter of terrorism

in India.

From 1984 on wards the quality of weaponry and the style of operation went on

improving in a marked degree, adding to Indian suspicion of Pakistan hand behind the

operations. During the early periods massacres were carried out wish 455 pistols, with

rifles and stenguns of Indian make, but from 1986 on wards the terrorists started using

AK-475. From 1988, there was yet another qualitative jump- RPG-7 rockets and remote

control bomb blasts, General Purpose Machine Gun (GPMGs), Dragunov sniper rifles.

Kenpro transceiver sets, night vision equipments etc. The source of supply for all this

was in Pakistan. The flow of sophisticated weapons and ammunition was assured through

open purchase in Pakistan. The main weapons and automatics used by the terrorists such

as AK-47, AK-54, AK-74 or AK-94 which are easy to carry and operate are generally

purchased from Darha, an open arms market near Peshawar on subsidised rates through

good offices of lSI. 63

The first allegations of Pakistani involvement were hinted in the White Paper on

the Operation Blue Star. But from 1985 the way the press and semi officiai ex-militiamen

like A. I. Akram, Akram Khan mentioned earlier) close to corridors of power,wanLcd

to cook up the issue and parade it as a God-sent opportunity to meddle in and disturb

63 Afsir Karim, Counter Terrorism: Pakistan Factor op.cit. p 51.

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domestic peace in India, lent credence to such suspicions. The Pakistan hand got evident

from 1986 on-wards. Just after the Operation Black Thunder, the Indian Government

presented Pakistan with a 21 page dossier outlining the details of Pakistani involvement

in the act. The pamphlet released by the Home Minstry of India, 'Involvement of

Pakistan in terrorism in Jammu & Kashmir and Punjab'64 (From May 1988 to April

1990) gave further proofs. of Pakistani involvement. This document outlined the cases of

trans-borader incidents which confirmed Indian allegations of Sikh terrorists being trained

and equipped in Pakistan. It is difficult to imagine whether an operation of such a grand

scale with so much of sophisticated weaponry could be prepared in Pakistan, if the

government of Pakistan would not encourge it, through undercover support. But Pakistan

chose to deny any involvement and rather proposed joint patrolling of borders.

The Indian Government pamphlet of 1993, 'Facets of a Proxy War' 65 even makes

a convincing dig at the Pakistani denials of any involvement by documenting, statements

of leaders in Pakistan (presented in Pakistan Press), tapped telephone calls, interrogation

reporst, detailed reports of trans-border encounters and even it carries a list of telephone

numbers in Lahore, from where the terrorists get directions. The documents contained

confessions of foreign Sikh militants like Gurudip Singh Sibia who admitted that he had

crossed over from the Gujarat border and had been living in Pakistan for past 18 months.

The Indian Government further urged Pakistan to handover four dreaded terrorists hiding

64 Involvement of Palistan in Terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir and Punjah (From May 1988 to April 1990). Ministry of Home Affairs. Govenm1ent of India (undated).

65 Facets of a Proxy War (Ministry of Home Affairs (New Delhi: Governmenc ot India) 1993.

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in Pakistan to India (Wassan Singh Zaffarwal, Sukhdev Singh Dasuwal, Gurubachan

Singh Manochal etc.) as an expression of goodwill. The Pakistan refused to

cooperate,arguing that the terrorists were not in Pakistan.

From 1984 till 1993, the issue of Punjab terrorism certainly affected India

Pakistan relations in a major way. The repeated Pakistani denial of Indian charges as well

as unremitting endeavour from the Indian side to implicate Pakistan in the issue through

evidence which Indian side held conclusive, hardened sentiments on both sides. Even the

situation came to a head 1987-1988 with Indian Army action in the border which

provoked counter- army build up from Pakistan side and almost dragged the two

countries to a war. The situation worsened in 1990 too. Punjab thus featured as a major

irritant in Indo-Pak relations during the eighties.

In recent years it has been noticed that terrorists in Pujab are seeking diversionary

corridors for shipment of arms from Pakistan to keep terrorism alive. And one such

conrridors is through Nepal with which India shares a very porus border. Other possible

routes are the swamp of the Rann of Kutch and the deserts of Rajasthan. Apart from this

intelligence reports hint at a close nexus operating among all the major terrorist groups

in the subcontinent ranging from insurgents in the North-East, the ULFA in Assam, the

LTIE in Tamilnadu to terrorists in Punjab and Kashmir. The most alarming signal is the

possibility that Pakistan is co-ordinating the activities through its intellegence wing. This

apprehension was aired by the Indian Home Minister,S.B. Chavan in June 1992.66

66 Subhash Kirpekar, 'Chauvan amicipates more troubles from Pakistan' in The Times of India (Delhi) 7 June 1992.

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What the militants in India have needed and what Pakistan has provided them

with, is a safe sanctuary from where the terrorist can launch their operations. It has been

in the interest of Pakistan to keep such low intensity conflict alive through doctoring such

proxy-wars. Until and unless Pakistan realises the effects they have on bilateral relations,

Indo-Pak relations will continue to be as crisis-ridden as ever.

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