CHAPTER III

ARMENIAN MILITANCY AGAINST TURKEY

The release of the perpetrators of genocide signaled a major shift in the

political winds. The former Allied Powers, having become bitter rivals over

the spoils of war, failed to act in unison in imposing peace or in dealing with

the stiff resistance of a Turkish nationalist movement. They concurred that the

Armenians should be freed and rehabilitated but took no effective measures to

achieve that objective. They hoped that the United States would extend a

protectorate over the devastated Armenian regions, but the United States was

recoiling from its involvement in the world war and turning its back on the

League of Nations. Unable to quell the Turkish nationalist movement, which

rejected the award of any territory for an Armenian state or even unrestricted

return of the Armenian refugees, the Allied Powers in 1923 made their peace

with the new Turkey. No provision was made for the rehabilitation, restitution,

or compensation of the Armenian survivors. Western abandonment of the

Armenians was so complete that the revised peace treaties included no

mention whatsoever of"Armenians" or "Armenia". It was as if the Armenians

had never existed in the Ottoman Empire. All Armenians who had returned to

their homes after the war were again uprooted and driven into exile. The

3,000-year presence of the Armenians in Asia Minor came to a violent end.

Armenian place-names were changed, and Armenian cultural monuments

were obliterated or allowed to fall into disrepair. Attempts to eliminate the

memory of Armenia included change of the geographical expression

"Armenian plateau" to "Eastern Anatolia". The Armenian survivors were

condemned to a life of exile and dispersion, being subjected to inevitable

acculturation and assimilation on five continents and facing an increasingly

indifferent world. With the consolidation of totalitarian regimes in Europe

during the 1920s and 1930s, memory of the Armenian cataclysm gradually

faded, and in the aftermath of the horrors and havoc of World War 11, it

virtually became the "forgotten genocide."'

1 David Marshall Lang, The Armenians: A People in Exile (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1981), p. 10.

95

The Armenians were scattered all over the world from the United

States, the Soviet Union, Europe, Australia, to the Middle East and even South

America. For the next fifty years, the survivors kept trying to grapple with the

enormity of what had happened to them, unable to fathom the reasons for the

inhuman treatment, the denials of the Turks, and the silence of the world. All

that they had been promised by the guardians of justice, the Western powers,

now belonged to Turkey. The ghosts of the past refused to be exorcised. In

their struggle for survival, trying to adapt to foreign lands and culture, their

personal hells remained buried deep within them. Their political parties and

cultural organizations were too preoccupied with resisting assimilation, paying

their dues to the victims of the genocide through mourning and prayers, and

expecting the world to understand and sympathize with the plight of the

Armenians to do anything more than write petitions and submit memoranda to

the international organizations, and governments which had anyway deserted

the Armenian cause to the demands of realpolitik .

Although there was some respite from the heavy burden of the past in

knowing that the Dashnaks had at least eliminated the chief perpetrators of the

genocide, there was no attempt on the part of the Armenians at understanding

their situation in a global context and redefining their identity and place in a

changed scenario. The political parties were too busy vying for the role of the

spokesperson of the Diaspora, of trying to position themselves vis-a-vis the

Soviet Union, of chasing power for power's sake. But all this changed in 1965.

24 April 1965 marked a turning point in the post-genocide history of the

Armenians. There was a spontaneous outburst of emotion as Armenians all

over the world came out of their homes in huge numbers to publicly

commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of the Genocide. The second generation

of survivors had grown up and was ready to demand their rightful place under

the sun. Agonized over the personal hells and repression of memory of their

parents and grandparents, refusing to silently suffer their fate unlike these

elderly loved ones, they demanded justice, they demanded from Turkey, not

only the recognition of the Genocide but also the return of their ancestral

lands, their homeland.

96

The changing world situation where the ThirdWorld was affirming its

place in the world made the Diaspora Armenians revaluate their position in

global affairs. They realized that in allying themselves with the Western world

on the basis of the common denominator of religion, they had been barking up

the wrong tree. They discovered that they belonged to the Third World and

had similar national aspirations as those of the newly independent nations.

They realized the importance of ending the inaction and their political

marginalization. In the words of Yves Ternon, "The 1968 c~sis led the new

generation to break off the passivity of the second generation, the 'generation

of the desert.' The search for their roots and the appropriation of their

patrimony included a reflection on their future. "2

While the political parties could not provide an alternative, the younger

generation was eager for a dynamic solution to their future. This could be

found in two contradictory and antagonistic means: education or violence.

They questioned the intellectuals on the concept of being an Armenian. The

fetishistic notion of an eternal Armenia was rejected by them and they opted

for a global, political, psychoanalytic, and cultural-consciousness raising,

active and enlightened integration as a realistic alternative to the assimilation­

terrorism alternative.3 However, there were those who could not see a political

solution through this cultural reasoning and demanded action, resistance, and

armed struggle. This alternative was found in Lebanon. The radical tendencies

of the Armenians were also nurtured by the deterioration of the economic

conditions of the Armenians in the Middle East, the political situation in

Lebanon, and to the growth ofthe economic crisis in the West.

In the face of Turkish intransigence and a lack of hope of political

settlement Armenian terrorism emerged as the only alternative to despair and

abandonment. According to Ternon, "Every act of terrorism against the Turks

involved a little bit of each Armenian for whom terrorism was thus a

2 Yves Temon, The Armenian Cause, (Translated from the French by Anahid Apelian Mangouni) (Delmar, New York: Caravan Books, 1985), p.165. 3 H. Kurkjian, "De !'integration," Haistan, no. 374 (1976), pp. 13-16. Reference in Temon, n.2, p. 167.

97

projection of himself. He was doing what he had always dreamed of doing.

Following the initial effect of surprise, the first terrorist actions were met with

relie£ Whenever the leaders of an organization or a party condemned the

actions officially, they nevertheless shaded their statements, and one could

read between the lines: 'It was not a good thing to do, but it had to be done. "'4

As a result of the treatment meted out to them in the Ottoman Empire

and the role of the Western Powers in increasing their vulnerability in a

regime that was already negatively predisposed towards them, it comes as no

surprise that many Armenians see themselves as a uniquely martyred Christian

nation ignored by the West and crucified by the Turks. 5 Outraged over the

situation, two small groups of Armenian terrorist began assassinating Turkish

diplomats in the 1970s: the anti Dashnak and Marxist ASALA and the

Dashnak Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide (JCAG), succeeded

in 1983 by the Armenian Revolutionary Army (ARA).6 When a few of the

terrorists were apprehended, some Armenians argued that the terrorists had

had a right to murder and should not be persecuted. While Armenian

extremists have carried out tasks under 19 operational names, the core terrorist

groups are the Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide (JCAG) and the

Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA)7• On the

surface these two groups appear to be united by a common cause, however, a

closer look at their techniques, and targeting, reveals that their methods and

objectives are very different.

4 Ternan, n. 2 , p. 193. 5 On this imagery see Khachig Tololyan, "Martyrdom as Legitimacy: Terrorism, Religion and Symbolic Appropriation in the Armenian Diaspora," in Paul Wilkinson and Alasdair M. Stewart (ed.), Contemporary Research on Terrorism, (Great Britain: The Aberdeen University Press, 1987), p. 93. 6 For a scholarly analysis see Michael M. Gunter, Pursuing the Just Cause of Their People: A study of Contemporary Armenian Terrorism (New York: Greenwood Press, 1986). 7 By operating under many different names, the terrorists hope to give the impression of the existence of numerous groups, implying a broader base of support within the woildwide Armenian community.

98

Early History

With the rise of nationalism throughout Europe, the decaying and

corrupt Ottoman regime, which resorted to brutal measures in order to

suppress the Armenian Question, was faced by a reaction from a section of the

Armenians. Following the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878, the Armenian

Patriarch in Constantinople, Megerdich Khrimian (Known by the affectionate

term, Hyrig or "Little Father") argued that the Armenians must hence use the

yergateh sherep (iron ladle) or armed force if they were ever to achieve their

demands. To illustrate his point, Hyrig told a parable. At the Berlin

Conference the European great powers had permitted him to meet with them

around a large kettle of herisa (Armenian festive food). But while the others

had iron ladles, Hyrig had only a paper one. Thus he could not partake of the

meal or achieve Armenian demands. 8

Seeking protection for the terribly oppressed Armenian peasant, a few

political organizations came up in the intellectual circles of the Armenian

Diaspora asking for greater autonomy for Armenia. One such organization

was the Dashnak Party (Hai Heghapokhakan Dashnaktsutiun or the Armenian

Revolutionary Federation) founded in 1890 in Tiflis, Georgia, as an umbrella

group of parties but failing that purpose, became a distinct party in 1892. It

was chiefly active in the Russian Empire at first, and then it established

branches in the Ottoman Empire. Three men are said to be its founding

fathers: Kristapor Mikaelian, Rostom Zorian, and Simon Zavarian.9 The

Hunchaks were founded in 1887 in Geneva, among the Russian radicals in

exile as the Hunchakian Revolutionary Party (Sotsial Demokrat Hnchakean

Kusaktsutiun ). Both of these parties were strongly influenced by Russian

8 All Armenians know this story ofHyrig and the iron ladle that represents the need to employ armed force. Interestingly, the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA), one of the later day Armenian terrorist groups, used this image as the logo for one of its support groups, the Armenian Popular Movement of Lebanon. The journal this group published was called Yergateh Sherep. Its symbol is a kettle of stew from which a Kalashnikov rifle twisted into the form of an iron ladle is extracting a piece of food shaped like the map of a greater Armenia. Tololyan, n. 6, p. 96. 9 Michael M Gunter, Transnational Armenian Activism (London: Research Institute for the Study of the Conflict and Terrorism 229,1990), p. 16.

99

radical populism and the Russian "to the people" movement of the 1870s. The

Armenian word "Hunchak" is, in fact, a translation of the Russian word

Kolkol, or Bell, the title ofHerzen's underground populist publication. The "to

the people" of these Armenian groups was not to the Russian peasants but

rather the downtrodden Armenians of the Ottoman Empire. These two parties

were later joined in 1903 by the Constitutional Democratic (Sahmanadrakan

Ramgavar) Party, which later became the Armenian Democratic Liberal Party

(Ramgavar Azatakan Miutiun), to be the major Armenian political parties at

the time of the Armenian Genocide. Io

In a multiethnic state, such as the Ottoman Empire, nationalism was

viewed by the Turks as a serious internal threat. I I The result was harsher

repression by Sultan Abdul Hamid's regime, manifested in a large-scale

massacre of Armenians in 1895. The militant Pan-Turanism of the Young

Turks who aided by the Dashnaks, seized power in 1908, made matters worse.

In 1909, over 30,000 Armenians were massacred in Adana and other villages

along the Cilician plains in order to stifle the Armenian voices asking for

reforms to alleviate their miserable conditions. From its inception in 1890, the

ARF resorted to violent means because of what it perceived as the necessity of

self-defense in the absence of any legal means of protection. However, this

only seemed to intensify the oppression of the Ottoman regime. (This factor

must also be seen in light of the fact that the Armenians were not permitted to

p·ossess any arms, thus making them even more vulnerable to greater

depredations by the zapityes, the frequent attacks of bandits and the nomadic

Kurds. It also exposed them to the willful excesses of the Ottoman regime.)

According to M. V arandian, an early ARF party historian, "Perhaps there has

never been a revolutionary party - not even the Russian Narodovoletz, or the

Italian Carbo naris - with such rich experiences in the road of terrorist acts, as

the AR Federation, which in its difficult environment, has developed the most

1° For an excellent analysis see Louise Nalbandian, The Armenian Revolutionary Movement: The Development of Armenian Political Parties through the Nineteenth Century (Berkeley and Los Angeles: The University of California Press, 1963). 11 Gunter, n. 9, p. 2.

100

frenzied types of terrorists, and given hundreds of masters of the pistol, the

bomb and the dagger, for acts ofrevenge."12

The ARF's Manifesto issued in 1891 "sounded like a declaration of

war against the Turkish authorities," declared a modern Dashnak writer. 13 "To

attain its aims by means of revolution, the Armenian Revolutionary Federation

shall organize revolutionary bands which shall wage an incessant fight against

the Government," wrote Simon Vratzian, the Dashnak leader who briefly

became the Premier of the independent Republic of Armenia after the First

World War14 The resulting fedayeen movement, claims another Armenian

writer, "was a forerunner of the freedom fighters from Iran to Algeria in the

20th century Muslim world."15 This terrorism, which was well developed by

the dawn of the 20th Century, was used not only against Turkish officials, but

also other Armenians who had run foul ofthe Party's interests.16 However, as

many historians point out, the Dashnaks did not find favor with the Church

because of their reliance on violence to achieve their ends, and also did not

have popular support. 17

After the massacres of 1915, the Armenians were left homeless,

stateless and relegated to the status of the "starving Armenians". The Turkish

Military Tribunal established to punish the perpetrators of these massacres of

the Armenians declared the Young Turk leaders accused of perpetrating this

crime guilty, and handed out death sentences to a few of them. But as the

12 M. Varandian, as cited inK. S. Papazian, Patriotism Perverted: Armenian Revolutionary Federation (Boston: 1918), p. 18. 13 Manuel S. Hassassian, ARF as a Revolutionary Party, 1890-21 (Jerusalem: Hai Tad Publications, 1983). p.4. 14 Simon Vratzian, "The Armenian Revolution and the Armenian Revolutionary Federation," TheArmenian Review, (Boston) 3, Autumn 1950, p. 19. 15 Anaide Ter Minassian, Nationalism and Socialism in the Armenian Revolutionary moment (1887-1912) (Cambridge, Mass.: The Zoryan Institute, 1984), p. 19. Also see James G Mandalian, Armenian Freedom Fighters: The Memoirs of Rouben Der Minasian (Boston: Hairenik Association, 1963). The term "fedayee" refers to freedom fighters in the Middle East organized as irregulars or guerrillas and comes from an Arab word meaning "those who sacrifice themselves." Thus the term has almost mystical ring to it redolent of the original meaning of the term "martyr." 16 See Papazian, n. 14, pp. 17-18 and 68-70. 17 Stanford J. Shaw and Eze1 K Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), pp. 201-2.

101

world situation changed, the forces of Mustafa Kemal freed themselves of the

obligation of respecting the provisions of the Treaty of Sevres by renegotiating

a new Treaty of Lausanne. The Armenian Question and the Armenians were

soon a forgotten entity. Although the Armenians were scattered around the

world with only their tragedy to tie them together, the Dashnaks, by virtue of

having an organizational structure in place and their tradition of revolutionary

activity decided to execute the decision of the Turkish Military Tribunal that

lay buried in the annals of history.

After 1921, the leaders of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation

sought refuge in Persia, and then moved to the major centers of the Armenian

Diaspora. Seeking justice for the genocide, the ARF decided at its Ninth

World Congress to carry out the death sentences of the Turkish Military

Tribunals. The American delegate to the Congress, Shahan Natali, (whose real

name was Hagop Der Hagopian) was designated to supervise the project,

codenamed Operation Nemesis. 18 An initial unit of five men was assigned the

mission of executing Talaat. Finally on 15 March 1921, Soghomon

Tehelerian, the executioner designate, shot dead the former Ottoman Minister

of Interior Talaat Bey-who was living in Berlin under the pseudonym Ali Sayi

Bey. Tehelerian was subsequently declared not guilty by a Berlin court, a

judgment which was considered tantamount to acknowledging Talaat's role in

the Armenian Genocide of 1915.19 Illustrating the continuing depth of the

Armenian hatred, years later the author of a National Geographic article on

Armenians met an Armenian in Belgrade, Yugoslavia, who claimed that his

father had killed Talaat. When the author asked what the Armenian thought

about his father's actions, the simple reply was: "I am proud."20

Cemal Pasha was shot to death in front of the Cheka headquarters in

Tiflis, Georgia, on 25 July 1922, by two Armenians, Bedros Der Boghossian

18 Christopher J Walker, Armenia: The Survival of a Nation, (London: Croom Helm, 1980), p. 344. Shahan Natali is the pseudonym ofHagop Der Hagopian, an Armenian from Turkey, for many years the editor of Hairenik in Boston. 19 Temon, n. 2, p. 100. 20 Gunter, n. 9,p. 7. Even the orders for Operation Nemesis cannot be found in the minutes of the ARF's Ninth World Congress.20 See Temon, n. 2, p. 194.

102

and Ardashes Kevorkian. Said Halim, the former Ottoman grand vizier, was

assassinated in Rome on 6 December 1921, by Arshavir Shiragian, an

Armenian who also claimed to have murdered, along with an accomplice

Aram Erganian, two other Ottoman officials in Berlin, Behaeddin Shakir and

Cerna! Azmi on 17118 April 1922. Enver Pasha was killed while leading the

Turkic rebels against the Red Army near Bukhara in Central Asia on August 4,

1992. There is an unverified account that the Soviet soldier who fired the gun

was an Armenian.21 The last one Dr. Nazim was implicated in a plot against

Mustafa Kemal and hanged following the Smyrna trial in 1926.22 By the mid-

1920s, however, unable to make a foothold in Soviet Armenia, the Dashnaks

decided that the Soviet Union was the main enemy (although they certainly

bore no love for Turkey), and Natali was expelled from the Party. Nemesis

disappeared following these incidents in the early 1920s, and after this there

was a lull in the violent activities of the Dashnaks against Turkey. The goals

of the Dashnaks -to reclaim their lost homeland, as specified in the Treaty of

Sevres and to seek reparation and recognition of the crimes committed upon

their people by Turkey; a solution similar to Germany's admission of guilt and

reparations to Israel after World War II- was sought to be achieved through

petitions and memoranda to international organizations and governments of

various countries.

But in the period following Operation Nemesis till after the fiftieth

anniversary of the Armenian Genocide, the Dashnaks concentrated their

energies mostly on working within the Armenian Diaspora communities,

keeping the Armenian identity and issue alive, denouncing Soviet Armenia,

vying with the other political parties (the Hunchaks and Ramgavars) to have a

greater influence in the Diaspora, and in challenging the authority of the

Catholicosate of Echmiadzin. Their hatred of the Soviet Union was so strong

that their violence was even turned against fellow Armenians. While leading a

Christmas Eve procession down the aisle ofthe Armenian Church of the Holy

Cross in New York in 1933, Archbishop's Ghevond Tourian was murdered by

21 Michael M Gunter, "The Armenian Terrorist Campaign Against Turkey," Orient, 24:4, 1983, p. 457. 22 For a detailed description see Temon, n. 2, pp. 96-101.

103

Dashnak 'hit men' in the full presence of his congregation.23 The apparent

reason was the Archbishop's support of Soviet Armenia, a concept the

nationalist Dashnaks did not accept.

The year 1965 marked a watershed in the history of the Armenian

Genocide issue. The commemorations of the fiftieth anniversary opened the

floodgates of years of repressed Armenian memories and demands and also

marked the maturation of a politically aware and confident second generation

of survivors. While this event and the changing world situation influenced the

Armenian Diaspora, surprisingly it was an individual act of outrage of a first

generation survivor that was to mark the beginning of the Armenians'

organized armed struggle against Turkish obduracy and denial. Despite its

hoary antecedents, the Armenian terrorist campaign against Turkey began only

in the 1970s. In 1972, Jean-Marie Cazoni, son of an Armenian-French painter,

gave a speech in Marseilles calling for coordinated acts against Turkey. Then,

in an individual act of revenge not connected to any organized effort, an eighty

four-year-old Californian of Armenian descent, Kourken Y anikian,

assassinated Mehmet Baydar and Bahadir Demir, the Turkish consul general

and vice consul, respectively, in Los Angeles on January 27, 1973. Yanikian, a

survivor of the Armenian Genocide, frustrated by the indifference to the plight

of the Armenians had 'brooded quietly until he could bear it no longer. '24

Although the ARF and the majority of the Armenians repudiated his act, and

some even tried to make him appear as a madman, 25 he was not insane. His

was an act of desperation, a release for the years of despair, from the future

that too showed no signs of responding. It was cathartic.

Justice Commandos Of The Armenian Genocide (JCAG)

During the massacres of 1915, many Armenians fled to Lebanon,

which had long been regarded as a refuge for dispossessed minorities. It was

here that the terrorist alternative would find its beginnings. As the Western

23 Gunter, n. 9,op. cit., p.7. 24 Temon, n. 2, p. 171. 25 Sentenced to life imprisonment, Yanikian was paroled in 198l.ibid.

104

Diaspora became increasingly threatened with assimilation, the Armenian

community in Lebanon, boasting of the presence of the major organs of the

three political parties, the Catholicosate of Cilicia, cultural and benevolent

organizations, schools, churches, newspapers, sports centers - came to

symbolize the preservation of ethnic identity. In its retention of the old feudal

structures, had inadvertently immunized itself to the effects of integration,

urbanization, and industrialization.

But this situation too changed in 1967 with the arrival of the

Palestinian fedayeens. So far content to stand by the government so long as it

represented the real power and kept the fifteen religious communities in peace

with one another, the Armenians were forced to take sides as the Lebanese

Muslim parties became more radicalized and divided. Although the political

parties and the church collectively opted for neutrality, there were many

Armenians who chose to migrate to the West. When the Phalangists (Catholic

Christian Rightists) decided to use the Armenian section of east Beirut, known

as Bourj Hammoud, to launch their attacks against the adjacent Muslim

section called Naba'a, a split resulted within the Armenian community. The

right-wing Dashnaks felt that they had a duty to take up arms on behalf of

their Christian brothers, while others, mainly left-wing Armenian youth drew

closer to their Palestinian counterparts (with whom they had close contacts via

the universities and due to the proximity of their neighborhoods). These left­

wing Armenians believed that Palestinians were in a similar situation as the

Armenians and began to perceive them as their role models. "Like them, they

were refugees; like them they had been pushed around from one country to the

another; like them, they wanted a land that was denied them; like them, they

had met with the indifference of nations. But the Palestinians organized

themselves, took up arms, and fought back."26 Disillusioned with their leaders

whose sole reliance on words had brought them nothing these youth were

enticed by the armed struggle and began to form their own groups (e.g.

AS ALA) with the aid of the Palestinians. 27

26 Temon, n. 2, p. 169. 27 For a detailed analysis see ibid, pp. 167-70, 203-5.

105

With the death of the former ARF leaders of the Armenian Republic by

the early 1970s, the priority given the anti-Soviet line began to alter. While

still maintaining that Soviet Armenia had the right to become independent, the

Dashnaks moved closer to identifying their organization with that of the third

world national liberation movements, and 'fascist' Turkey became the main

enemy.28 The 'political platform' ratified by the 23rd World Congress of the

ARF in 1985 made the ultimate goal of the Party explicit: "The principal

political aim of the ARF remains the realization of a free, independent and

integral Armenia encompassing the Wilsonian boundaries, N akhichevan,

Gharabagh and Akhalkalak. "29 The Platform also declared: "On the road to the

resolution of the Armenian Cause, our enemy is Turkey."

Most sources claim that the Dashnaks decided to create a new terrorist

arm, the Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide (JCAG) -called the

Armenian Revolutionary Army (ARA) since July 1983- because they were

losing their young activist members to what was perceived as the new, more

dynamic terrorist organization, AS ALA. 30 The radical shift in ARF strategy

took place at the Twentieth Congress of the Party held at Vienna in 1972 with

the decision to launch the JCAG.31 However, there are no documented sources

to prove that the JCAG was the fighting arm of the ARF; this decision was

probably 'suggested by coded words or dotted lines. ' 32 The Dashnak militants

were aware that they received their orders from the party Bureau but refused

to be trapped by written documents. If the decision was made by the

executive, it was never officially communicated to the membership of ARF.

Although the communiques of the central committees the world over exhibited

support for the JCAG, the central committee of the Eastern USA strongly

2s G unter, n. 21, p. 457. 29 This and the following citations were taken from "Political Platform of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation ratified by the 23'd World Congress," The Armenian Weekly, 16 August 1986, pp. 1, 7; and 30 August 1986, p.1. 30 On this point see The Armenian Reporter, 18 August 1983, p. 10; 29 September 1983, p.1; and 2 February 1984, p. 2. 31 P. Terzian, "La Question armenienne aujourd'hui," Critique socialiste 44 (Fall1982), p. 62. Reference in Temon, n. 2, p. 194, fn. 4. 32 Temon, n. 2, p. 194.

106

rejected any suggestions of the ARF having any links with the 'current wave

of Armenian terrorism. '33

The goals of the JCAG were- to reestablish an independent Armenia as

specified in the Treaty of Sevres and to seek compensation from Turkey for its

evils of 1915 that had destroyed an entire community of Armenians, their

homes and their cultural symbols. JCAG in its communiques appears to strive

for these goals. Following the assassination of the Turkish ambassador to

Vienna and Paris in October and December, JCAG in a follow-up

communique entitled "To all the Peoples Governments" wrote: "May the

world realize that we will lay down our arms only when the Turkish

government publicly denounces the genocide perpetrated by Turkey in 1915

against the Armenian people and agrees top negotiate with Armenian

representatives in order to reinstate justice." 34After a series of bombings in

Paris in July 1979, it further proclaimed, "We demand that the Turkish

government -which is occupying our country and is an extension of the

Ottoman Empire- stand by its responsibilities and return the Armenian lands to

their true owners."35

The JCAG was not seeking revenge against the Turks for the atrocities

committed by them against the Armenians during the Ottoman regime, but

was motivated by the desire for recognition of the Genocide, and reparations.

Following the bombings in New York City and Los Angeles on October 12,

1980, JCAG stated: "We make clear that our struggle today against the

Turkish government is not to be regarded as revenge for the 1915 genocide in

which 1.5 million Armenian men, women and children were massacred. Our

struggle today is directed to have the Turkish government to admit to its

responsibility for that murderous act, as well as to return to the Armenian

people the lands taken forcibly and today occupied by the imperialistic

33 Nishan Saroyan, "Radical Armenian Movements in the 1980's," Paper presented in 1981 at Berkeley Symposium, California, pp.2-3. ibid, fn 3. 34 Andrew Corsun, "Armenian Terrorism: A Profile," Department of State Bulletin, August 1982, p.34. 35 Cited in Edward Mickolus, Transnational Terrorism: A Chronology of Events, 1968-79 (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood, 1980), p. 856.

107

Turkish government since the genocide. We demand once again that the

Turkish government admit its responsibility for the genocide of 1915 and

make appropriate territorial and financial reparations to the long suffering

Armenian people."36 This theme remains constant in all their communiques till

February 1982 with the assassination of the honorary Turkish consul to

Boston, Orhan Gunduz. In Paris JCAG stated that: "The shooting was to

reaffirm the permanence of our demand. The Turkish government must

recognize the responsibility of its predecessors in 1915 in the execution and

genocide perpetrated against the Armenian people, and it must clearly

condemn it. Secondly, the Turkish government must recognize the right of the

Armenian people to constitute a free and independent state of Armenian land

which Turkey illegally occupies."37

Through these acts, the JCAG was, like any other tet:rorist group,

seeking publicity for their cause and also to rekindle a sense of Armenian

identity or nationalism. The indifference of the world for over half a century

was a cause of great frustration to them and their eye on publicity is expressed

through these words, "With these explosions we are keeping the world aware

of the existence of the Armenian people."38 The resort to violence was a

means to shake the international community, which refused to consider the

peaceful appeal of the Armenians, out of this indifference, " Armenian

frustration and indignation- especially in the face of Turkish distortions and

denials- have led to renewed determination to struggle to regain Armenian

territorial and national rights .... Some Armenians have apparently lost faith in

the willingness or capacity of the world's governments to listen to, or act on,

peaceful appeals. "39

The failure of the recourse to legal means, all the memoranda and

petitions to gain recognition of the Armenian Genocide, especially due to the

vigilance of the Turkish diplomats, delimited the target of the JCAG. It was to

36 Corsun, n. 34, p. 34. 371bid. 38 Mickolus, n. 35, p. 856. 39 Cited in The New York Times, May 30, 1977.

108

be these guardians of denial; the Turkish diplomats. Unlike ASALA, the

JCAG shunned other international terrorist connections and struck only at

Turkish targets. After it murdered the Turkish Consul General in Los Angeles

in 1982, for example, JCAG announced: "Our sole targets are Turkish

diplomats and Turkish institutions.'740 In pointed contrast to ASALA, ARA

also made clear its intention to campaign against only the Turkish enemy,

while leaving others alone: "Our target is the Turkish reactionary government

through all its official representatives.''41 In another "Communique" ARA

noted that its activities "will conclude when, taking note of the legality of the

Armenian Cause, the Turkish government begins negotiations with the

representatives of the Armenian people,"42 a demand similar to that of its

predecessor the JCAG.

As avowed, and in keeping with their intention to address the western

world through their acts, the "Justice Seekers" appeared to be specialists in the

murder of Turkish diplomats assigned to embassies and consulates in the

western world. The first operation of JCAG was carried out when three

unknown persons assassinated the Turkish Ambassador to Austria, Danis

Tunaligil, in Vienna on 22 October 1975. A mysterious "Boldikian Group"

attached to the "Justice Commandoes of the Armenian Genocide" claimed

responsibility for it. Two days later the same commando group assassinated

the Turkish ambassador to France, Ismail Erez, and his chauffeur. The

organization was shrouded in mystery until27 May 1976, when an accidental

explosion destroyed the Armenian Cultural Center, an ARF headquarters, on

Rue Bleue in Paris. The police found the body of a Lebanese Armenian who

had been manipulating explosives and arrested another Armenian, Kevork

Papazian and found various brochures signed by the "Justice Commandoes of

the Armenian Genocide" claiming responsibility for the murder of the Turkish

ambassadors in Vienna and Paris and announcing a third operation which was

4° Cited in Robert Lindsey, "Turkish Diplomat is Slain on Coast: Armenian Terror Group takes Responsibility in Shooting," The New York Times, 29 January 1982, p A12. 41 "Communique," dated 12 October 1984, and published in The Armenian Weekly, 3 November 1984, p.2. 42 "Communique," dated 19 November 1984, published in The Armenian Weekly, 29 December 1984, p.2.

109

to take place in Turkey.43 Sure enough one year later, on 29 May 1972, bomb

explosions at the airport at Y esilkoy and the Sirkeci train station in Istanbul

left five dead and 64 injured. A branch of the JCAG, the "Group of 28 May" -

based on the day of independence of the Armenian Republic- claimed

responsibility.44

However, contrary to its avowed a1ms of carrymg out the

assassinations of Turkish diplomats only, the JCAG attacked civilian targets

too. Turkey was rocked by explosions and there was an anti-terrorist backlash

against the Armenians of Istanbul. The JCAG killed the son of a Turkish

diplomat in Netherlands, Ahmet Benler, the director of the Turkish Tourist

Office in Paris, Yilmaz Kolpan, and placed bombs in the Turkish Airlines

office and the Turkish Tourist Office in France. On these civilian killings,

Temon opines, "That the bombers and the killers of diplomats never had the

intention to spread terror is a credit they can be granted. On several occasions,

however, actions exceeded intentions.'.45

JCAG concentrated its operation solely on Turkish interests. The one

possible exception was the January 1980 triple bombing of the offices of

Swiss Air, TWA, and British Airlines in Madrid. At first JCAG claimed credit

for the bombing, but in a later phone call to the local press, the caller said that

JCAG was not responsible for the bombing, and in fact, condemned it. As the

group name implies, of the 22 operations carried out by JCAG, ten of the

operations were assassinations (resulting in 12 deaths), six were attempted

assassinations, and six were bombings. The activities of JCAG, which began

from 1975 continued upto 1985, in the later phase as ARA, after which there

was no more terrorist activity from this group.

43 Ternan, n. 2, p. 196. 44 For a detailed list of operations of the JCAG, see Ternon, n. 2, pp. 196-200 and Esat Uras, The Armenians in History and the Armenian Question, (Istanbul: Documentary Publications,1988), p. 183-216. 45 Ternan, n. 2, p. 200.

110

The deep divisions in the Diaspora due to ideological differences were

to manifest themselves in the armed struggle too. In December 1982, Apo

Ashjian, the head of JCAG and a member of the ARF's Central Committee in

Lebanon was apparently killed by his Dashnak associates because he

advocated Dashnak co-operation with ASALA and sought to disregard a

reputed deal with the United States. With Ashjian's death, the Dashnaks

created ARA which was active until shortly before its head, Sarkis

Azanavourian, also a member of the ARF Central Committee in Lebanon, was

gunned down in Beirut, apparently by AS ALA. 46 Throughout 1984, when the

diplomatic assassinations stopped, JCAG-ARA killed 20 Turkish diplomats or

members of their immediate families, while ASALA, in spite of its much

greater claims, was responsible for only eight diplomatic murders.47 ARA

made one last attack. In March 1985 it killed a Canadian security guard during

an attack on the Turkish Embassy in Ottawa and then disappeared. Later it

became apparent that the leaders of the two Dashnak terrorist groups had

themselves been assassinated during internecine violence of Armenians in

Lebanon.

In a further theoretical justification of terrorism, the Dashnak press

declared that "the acts of the Armenian Revolutionary Army and the Justice

Commandos against Turkish officials are supported by a mass of the

Armenian people since the Oppressor [Turkey] is being defied."48 Armenians

"could only be excited by these acts of violence, as 'acts of creation' since the

destruction of any representative of the Oppressor, Turkey, means the

assertion of Armenian dignity." In yet another apology the Dashnaks argued

that "our Cause-no matter how militant at times - is not and never was part of

46 For an analysis of this Dashnak-ASALA fratricide in Lebanon during the early and especially the mid-1980s, see Michael M. Gunter, "The Armenian Dashnak Party in Crisis," Crossroads (Washington, D.C.), no. 26, 1987, pp 75-88. 47 For a list of the assassinations and who was responsible also see Gunter, n.6, pp. 68-69. ASALA was responsible, however, for a number of civilian deaths, particularly during bloody airport attacks in Ankara (1982) and Paris (1983). · 48 Aram Khaligian, "The Necessities of Violence and National Culture in the Liberation Struggle," The Armenian Weekly, 31 December 1986, p.l, it was reported that on "27 July 1986 ... Requiem services for the five heroes of the Armenian revolutionary Army ... [were] held at the St. Hagop Church of Montreal by request of the Montreal Lev on Shant Chapter of the ARF Youth Organization of Canada."

111

'International terrorism.".49 To assert otherwise was a "heavy-handed attempt

to intimidate the Armenian nation and force our people to deny its support

of ... the ARF." Despite this defence of violence, there have been no more

terrorist activities by the Dashnaks since 1985. The reason for this is

apparently that these actions had served their purpose of preventing ASALA

from winning over the Armenian youth, helped to bring the Armenian cause to

the attention of the world, but were later on creating negative publicity.50

Indeed the Political Platform of the Party's 23rd world congress even offered a

hope for eventual conciliation: "Because of geographical and historical

circumstances ... the Armenian nation and the Turkish nation are bound to live

side by side, to coexist and to cultivate neighborly relations based on

reciprocal understanding and sincere cooperation."51

Armenian Secret Army For The Liberation Of Armenia

(AS ALA)

ASALA (Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia) was a

product of the post-1965 political thinking of young Lebanese Armenians who

came from the left of traditional parties such as the ARF's Zavarian Group. It

emerged in contact with the Palestinian terrorism and acquired its military and

political lessons from it. The civil war in Lebanon in 1975 saw savage fighting

between the Christian Phalangists and the Muslims. The Armenians, caught in

the crossfire, vehemently maintained neutrality. But the ARF delegates met

Yasir Arafat and agreed to recognize the Palestinian's rights but stuck to its

stand on neutrality and even refused offers of financial and military aid.

However, it sent a small group of young men to the Palestinian camps for

training. This was to mark the beginning of the contest between ASALA and

ARF for influence among the young militant youth of the Armenian Diaspora

in Lebanon. Despite great provocations, the Armenians refused to be drawn

into the battle between the conservative Phalangists and the progressive

49 This and the following citations were taken from Tatul Sonentz-Papazian, "The ARF Legacy- Are We Ready?" The Armenian Weekly, 31 December 1986, p.3. 50 Gunter, n. 9, p.l9. 51 ibid.

112

Palestinian militia. But the deteriorating situation saw large-scale migrations

of Armenians to Western Europe, Canada, and the United States. Finally in

1979, the break between ASALA and the Dashnaks was accomplished. The

forty thousand Armenian migrants from Lebanon from 1975 to 1980, carried

with them 'a memory of violence which transformed the host Armenian

societies and injected a real element of terrorism into the European

communities. '52

ASALA, which already existed when the civil war began in Lebanon

in1975, emerged as an alternative to the traditional Armenian political parties,

especially the Dashnaks. ASALA explains its genesis in its journal Armenia:

"International imperialism had almost completely spread its dominance on our

people in the Diaspora through the rightist Dashnag Party which is a tool in

the hands of imperialism and Zionism."53 So the main aim of the ''New

National Liberation Struggle launched in 1975 by ASALA is the liberation of

the Turkish occupied Armenian lands ... another main aim of the .... Struggle is

the political and national awakening of the Armenian people which has led to

a dangerous 'deep sleep' by the treacherous policy of the Dashnag party."54

. They declared that "even the name given to their armed group 'Justice

Commandoes of the Armenian Genocide' reveals the deliberate indifference

of the Dashnag leadership vis-a-vis the Armenian Territorial Question."55

ASALA was strengthened by the ideological crisis in ARF wherein a

huge chasm had developed between the conservative and radical elements. It

had certain advantages over ARF that added to its appeal to the Armenian

youth. It was more flexible and adaptable than the ARF because it did not

have to operate within the narrow confines of a political program. It was more

radical than ARF because unlike the latter, it believed that armed struggle was

the only means to achieve its goals. Its terrorism was more diversified and

intensive and through its 'more extensive use of violence, it helped the

52 Temon, n. 2, p. 205. 53 Armenia, no. 131/13, 1986, p.lO. 54Moush (Organ of the Armenian Popular Movement or political arm of ASALA in Greece) No. 13, Autumn 1987, p.3. 55 Armenia, no. 127-128/11-12, 1986, p. 18.

113

Armenians vent their hatreds and disappointments more completely and

showed an impatient youth the allure of extremism. '56 The dream of the

establishment of an Armenian State offered by ASALA was lapped up by the

Armenians living all over the world who suffered from "unemployment,

exploitation by their compatriots and others, and were deprived of their

fundamental social, economic, political and national rights."57

At the end of 1981, ASALA published an eight-point political program

that was described as "the political line that the Popular Movement of ASALA

will support."111 The program was apparently the result of long discussions

with the leaders of various 'popular movements' with a view to forming

eventually a united organization covering a broad spectrum from left to right.

However, there was little deviation in this from its first public declaration on

10 July 1978. In the program ASALA identified its enemies as 'Turkish

imperialism' supported by 'Local reaction' and 'International imperialism.'

Revolutionary violence was said to be 'the principal means' to achieve the

liberation of Armenian territories. Its only enemy was the Turkish

government, which occupied nine-tenths of the Armenian territory. It was the

main goal of ASALA to recover these territories. The allies of the Turkish

State were its enemies: this included American imperialism and the members

ofNATO, the Western powers which abandoned the Armenian Cause for their

own selfish interests, such as France and Switzerland. ASALA was a Marxist

revolutionary organization which wanted to liberate Armenia from the

clutches of their main enemy; the "reactionary and chauvinistic Turkish

state ... For no people whatsoever can abandon and give up its land and

country, no matter how long its occupation lasts and in spite of the strong

means at the disposal of the oppressive enemy."58 It justified its use of

violence as a means to achieve its objectives by stating that, "The errors and

bankruptcy of the conventional Armenian political parties which shouldered

the responsibility of defending the national rights of pour people, which

56 Temon, n. 2, p. 212. 57 Saroyan, n. 33, p.13. 58 First Press Interview, 10 July 1978, ASALA Interview (Britain: Popular Movement for the ASALA, April1982), p.2.

114

naturally did not succeed in securing any gains" and "the intransigence of our

enemy ... was enough proof to convince us that our enemies, especially those

who adhere to policies of chauvinism and terror and are strongly connected

with the ·centers of world oppression and tyranny will never give up what they

have usurped, except by force of arms. So we can regain our rights only by

force of arms. And this cannot be done except by continuous and escalating

attacks against the enemy until he is forced to acknowledge our national

rights. "59

It considered the revolutionary movements opposing Turkey and the

USA, such as the PKK, its friends. ASALA proclaimed its solidarity with the

Cypriot people, the Palestinians, other Arab peoples and Iranians (who

complete the geographical encirclement of Turkey}, but not their leaders. As

part of the international revolutionary movement, ASALA would support

those who 'reject the authority of the oppressing classes' and would endeavor

to 'strengthen and expand' coalitions within the 'International revolutionary

movement.' Those countries which recognized the Armenian Genocide were

considered the friends of the Armenians, those who continued to deny it, the

enemies. They believed that the leaders of Armenian political parties had

failed the people. The ARF was considered obsolete and criticized on grounds

of its past failures; by allying with American imperialism, and thus with the

Turks, it had condemned the Armenians to assimilation. By 1980, Hagop

Hagopian boasted, "In five years we managed to win for ourselves the support

of the Armenian masses and the democratic and revolutionary forces

throughout the world. "60 He even claimed that "some of the leaders of

Tashnag and Henshang (Hunchaks) have secretly joined ELA ( ASALA)."

ASALA was convinced that it fulfilled the needs of all Armenians and

was thus admired. It headed the struggle for national liberation and aimed to

bring all Armenians, irrespective of their class, or political leanings, under one

59 ibid, p. 6. 60 Hagop Hagopian was the main interpreter of the political line of ASALA- who denied being its leader. According to Temon, Hagopian 'appeared as an armed prophet, a man who mustered the nationalistic faith. He was both a war chief who insured his gains and practiced strategic withdrawal, and a player who did not show his hand.' See Temon, n. 2, p. 206.

115

banner. ASALA first and foremost was created in its own words, to become

"today the representing power of the Armenian people."61 In its attempt to

appropriate the leadership of Armenian Diaspora, ASALA tried to co-opt

historical Armenian heroes and deeds. Gourgen Yanikian, whose murder of

two Turkish consuls in California in 1973 anticipated the terrorism that began

in 1975, was adopted as 'the spiritual leader' of the organization and

operations named for him and such other historical Armenian heroes and

places as Andranik, Shahan Natali, Erzurum and, Van among other.

Andranik's portrait appeared with a fictional one representing ASALA's

leader, Hagop Hagopian, alongside the masthead of the organization's organ,

Armenia. Even Vatche Daghlian, the leader of Dashnak's "Lisbon Five," was

usurped as an ASALA martyr ''who had been killed during a mission in

Lisbon, following a Dashnag- international conspiracy."62 Further tapping the

Armenian historical ~oots, the words of the (Soviet Armenian) poet Y eghishe

Charentz, "0 Armenian people I Your sole salvation is I in your collective

force,"63 were cited as a call for unity under ASALA.

Despite initially attacking the Armenian Church, ASALA later on

came to believe that the pride of place of the Church must be restored because

it was the beacon of hope and guidance to the Armenian people. The AS ALA

fighter was a pure revolutionary, unsiezable and invulnerable, who placed the

Armenian Cause before his family and his life, and was not a terrorist. Further

ASALA was independent and proud, and claimed that it owed nothing to

either any government or any other Revolutionary party. It also claimed that

there was no force in the world which could tarnish the name of their

'organization,' confine their 'struggle', and exhaust their 'will.' ASALA

projected Soviet Armenia as the unique and irreplaceable basis of the

Armenian people as they believed that it was a free country, and the Soviet

Union was considered a friendly country, but not an ally, since it refused to

61 Armenia, (Boston) no. 105-106/7-8, 1985, p.29. For further analyses of ASALA see Gunter, Pursuing the Just Cause, especially pp. 40-54; Anat Kurz and Ariel Memari, ASALA: Irrational Terror or Political Tool (Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, 1986); and Ternon, n. 2, pp. 203-225. 62 Armenia, no. 127-128/ 11-12, 1986, p.7. 63 Armenia, no. 131/13, 1986, p. 7.

116

serve as a revolutionary base. The final goal of ASALA was a united Armenia

with a 'democratic socialist and revolutionary government.' The Soviet Union

and other socialist governments were to be called upon for help and Soviet

Annenia itself turned in to a base for 'the long people's war.'

ASALA was thus a Marxist revolutionary and Armenian nationalist

group claiming to be the spokesperson of all Armenians. It was also a secret

army, and in the absence of any territorial base it was driven to underground

activity. However, in order to recruit members, it relied on propaganda which

it conducted through press conferences, interviews and its own periodical,

Armenia. Armenia was edited in several languages: Armenian, English,

French, Arabic, and Russian. There was a remarkable amount of secrecy about

the organization. Even in Beirut, they were invisible, had no headquarters, and

could not be contacted by mail or telephone. During public appearances and at

the press conferences and interviews that they held, the ASALA members

were always masked and used pseudonyms which 'following frequent practice

in Armenia were alliterative doubles ( eg., Hagop Hagopian, Mihran

Mihranian, V ahram Vahramian). '64 These measures which were undertaken

more to avoid recognition of the members in their neighborhoods than police

identification ensured that there was a sufficient recruitment of determined

militants.65

The craftiness of the ASALA militants can be gauged by the fact that

until 3 October 1980, almost three years during which they carried out more

than a hundred claimed attentats, none of the security agencies of the world

knew anything more about them than what the ASALA wanted them to know

through its communiques and three press conferences. To the extent that none

of its members had ever been spotted, it seemed like a phantom organization.66

In the words of Yves Temon these militants with an "extraordinary amount of

conviction... confounded the investigators by engaging in cymctsm,

provocation, bluff and lies with a rare talent. .. Their remarks were not

MTernon,n.2,p.216. 65 ibid. . 66 ibid., p. 215.

117

improvised ... Their reasoning had the coherence of granite. Immoderation and

reason, presumption and caution, impetuosity and modernism, vivid hatred

and cool anger were artfully proportioned in their official declarations. Where

one could see frenzy, there was actually guile."67 It had a collegial leadership,

yet neither its membership nor its mode of election was known. It was divided

into two branches, a political one, which handled recruitment and

indoctrination, and a military one, which carried out its operations.68

The targets of ASALA were not limited to Turkey or its allies, or those

who had denied the Armenian Genocide, but even some Armenian

organizations. ANCHA (the Armenian National Committee for Homeless

Armenians),69 along with the World Council of Churches which had been

organizing the migration of Armenians from the Soviet Union or the Middle

East mainly to the United States, Canada and, Australia was a major target of

ASALA. All political parties condemned ANCHA for pursuing an agenda

which hurt the Armenian presence in the Middle East and facilitated

assimilation and the ASALA accused it of 'playing a prime role in the

liquidation of the Armenian Question' a policy encouraged by the Western

countries to 'ease the pressure on Turkey.' 70 Italy, with its 16 ANCHA centers

was identified as a major accomplice. ASALA threatened to strike any country

which gave asylum to ANCHA, including the Vatican and the Pope. 71

It is noteworthy, therefore, that ASALA's birth was announced by a

bombing attack against the headquarters of the World Council of Churches

situated in Beirut on 3 January 1975. Hagop Hagopian, the founder and leader

of AS ALA, later wrote about the selection of this as the first target, "I chose it

because the above mentioned organization was conspiring with the United

States, with the Tashnag's co-operation to send the Armenian youth away from

67 ibid., p. 206. 68 ibid., p. 209. 69 ANCHA was founded by San Francisco restaurateur George Mardikian at the end of World War II to aid the emigration to the United States of "Displaced Persons," Armenian refugees who were then in Germany. 70 Interview with Hagop Hagopian (in Swiss and Italian Newspapers), ASALA Interview, p. 32-33. 71Armenia, no. 0, interview ofHagop Hagopian, pp. 34-35.

118

the Middle East and socialist countries."72 ASALA was going to challenge the

existing Armenian elites led by the Dashnaks who were allowing the

emigration and thus assimilation to occur.

In 1980, in a communique published by it, ASALA revealed the

number of operations it had carried out every year without further details and

subsuming those of other organizations. For 1975 it claimed six operations

against Turkish interests in Beirut and two against American representatives in

the Middle East, and an explosion on 5 January in front of the headquarters of

the United Nations delegation in Ankara. In 1976, the strikes were largely

limited to Lebanon. On 16 February, the Antranik Group claimed

responsibility for the assassination of the first secretary of the Turkish

Embassy in Beirut. Keeping under wraps most of its operations, ASALA

revealed the attacks it had made on a military base and a Turkish army vehicle

in Ankara and Istanbul. Initially the press simply reported these attentats

without interpreting them. In fact it assigned the blame to Cypriots and

disdainfully ignored the Armenian claims to these operations. In 1978 and the

first half of 1979, AS ALA's major activities were carried out on Turkish soil.

But even foreign governments, such as France, Switzerland, Italy, and

Canada, were threatened by ASALA because they attempted to apprehend

Armenian terrorists within their jurisdiction. After Kani Gungor, the Turkish

commercial attache in Ottawa, Canada, was seriously wounded, a message

from ASALA menacingly declared: "We warn the Canadian authorities

against all initiatives against our compatriots as well as the utilization of any

kind of force or violence against them."73 ASALA also threatened to attack

"all Swiss diplomats throughout the world" unless that government released

two Armenians held because a bomb they were prepanng exploded

prematurely in their hotel room in Geneva. 74 AS ALA carried out more

72 Armenia, no. 89-9015-6, 1984, p. 5. 73 Cited in The New York Times, April10, 1982. 74 John Kifner, "Armenians Assert Suicide Squads are Ready," New York Times, January 5, 198l.Some forty bombings were carried out against Swiss interests. See corsun, n. 34, p.34. Following its deadly raid on the Ankara (Esenboga) airport on August 7, 1982, ASALA threatened a number of Western countries with new terrorist acts unless these countries released within seven days some Armenian terrorists they were currently holding in prison. See "ASALA threatens U.S.A., France, Canada, United Kingdom, Switzerland and Sweden," NewSpot: Turkish Digest (Directorate General of Press and information Ankara, Turkey}, August 13, 1982, p.l

119

international attacks during 1981 than any other terrorist organization. Its

primary targets in the initial phase were Turkish, but later, under cover names,

ASALA attacked Swiss interests in retaliation for the arrest of ASALA

members and, using the name Orly Organization, it attacked French interests

in retaliation for arrest of an ASALA member, Monte Melkonian (accused of

an attentat against a Turkish diplomat in Rome on 25 October 1981) carrying a

false passport at Orly Airport on 11 November 1981. ASALA carried out 40

attacks in 11 countries during the year. Switzerland and France were not the

only countries which were targeted by ASALA. In 1979, it claimed

responsibility for two explosions in Paris against the offices of KLM Royal

Dutch Airlines and Lufthansa in order to condemn the preferential ties uniting

the Netherlands and Germany to Turkey. This was the first time that the

French press commented in some detail about the operations of ASALA.75

Italy and Canada too were victims of ASALA's wrath. On 31 May 1982, three

alleged group members were arrested for attempting to bomb the Air Canada

Cargo bay at Los Angeles International Airport. It is suspected that this

bombing was in retaliation to the May 18 and 20 arrests of the alleged ASALA

members/sympathizers by the Toronto police for the same. Furthermore, non­

Turkish airlines of their offices, such as Air-France, Alitalia, British Airways,

El AI, KLM, Lufthansa, Pan Am, Sabena, Swissair, and TWA were hit

because of their commercial relations with Turkey.76

ASALA's operations were extensively spread throughout the world.

The maximum number of actions took place in Western Europe, and a

substantial number in the Middle East and a few in the USA. Turkey,

Lebanon, Iran, Iraq, France, Italy, the United Kingdom, Spain, Germany,

Denmark, and the USA were all witness to ASALA's operations on their soil.

Although most of the attacks were bombings against French and Swiss

property, the most serious were attacks against Turkish targets. These included

75 Temon, n. 2, p. 215. 76 The above lists of Armenian terrorist targets were largely gleaned from Russel Howe, "Death in Westwood: One More Battle in a 67-Year-Old Armenian War," Los Angeles Herald Examiner, January 31, 1982. See also, the lengthy communique issued by ASALA in the The New York Times, March 1, 1980. See ibid, September 25 and September 27, 1981, for further claims concerning some 200 bombings, takeovers, assassinations, and other such acts perpetrated by Armenian terrorists.

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the seizure of the Turkish consulate in Paris. On 24 September 1981, four

ASALA militants on a suicide mission, in the first 'overt' operation of the

organization, seized the Turkish Consulate in Paris. In this operation, the

Turkish vice-Consul was seriously wounded, his bodyguard killed, and fifteen

people held hostage. It was broadcast live on television and for a brief period,

the Armenian Cause topped the television viewer ratings in France.77

According to Monte Melkonian, a member of AS ALA, this so called "Van

Operation" by the "Y eghia Keshishian Suicidal Commando" marked

"ASALA's historic peak. It became the greatest single military/propagandist

success ever achieved in the history of the Diaspora. Summed up this was a

tremendous achievement which created a previously unequalled atmosphere of

patriotic enthusiasm which made ASALA the hope in the eyes of a vast

number of Armenians for the realization of our national aspirations."78 In an

overt threat to French authorities, ASALA warned that unless political asylum

were granted to the four terrorists who had occupied the consulate and finally

surrendered (upon the assurance that their demands would be complied with),

"there is no doubt there will be a confrontation between them and us"79.

After his release from a French prison in the summer of 1986, Kevork

Guzelian, one of the four participants in the Van operation discussed it at

length. 80 According to him, "The essential aim ... was to gain on political

ground and to tum the attention of international public opinion on Turkey" In

addition ASALA wanted to "shake the Armenian community in France, which

until 1981 was in a slumber." During the hostage drama, said Guzelian, "we

immediately made an appeal to the Armenians through a phone call.... to

organize a demonstration around the Consulate and back us up." Since about

77 Temon, n. 2, p. 221. 78 "Booklet Giving History of ASALA 's Existence Gives New Insight into the Revolutionary Movement," The Armenian Reporter, 10 January 1985, pp. 3, 5; and subsequent issues until 7 March 1985. hereafter cited as "ASALA-RM History." This booklet was originally published in France by the dissident ASALA-Revolutionary Movement (the anti-Hagopian faction of ASALA) under the title "The Reality," in response to charges and allegations made against it by Hagopian's ASALA group in the Middle East. Most knowledgeable observers believe that the American-born, anti-Hagopian leader Monte Melkonian wrote it. 79 Cited in John Kifner, "Armenians Assert Suicide Squads are Ready", The New York Times, September 27, 1981. 8° Cited in Armenia, no. 131113, 1986, pp.18-19.

121

3,000 Turks had surrounded the Consulate in a demonstration ... clashes took

place between the Turks and Armenians in the streets. The leader of the

"Yeghia Keshishian" group was V azken Sislian; the other members were

Kevork Guzelian, Aram Basmadjian, and Hagop Tjoulfayan. One was a

former Dashllak, the other two were former Hunchaks, proving that Armenian

youth were abandoning traditional parties.81 Guzelian claimed, "In one word,

after our operation we noticed an awakening of national awareness in the

Armenians in France." French Armenians who did not speak Armenian started

to learn the language. Before 1981, the 24 April demonstrations in France

brought out no more than 150 Armenians, but after the Van operation the

figure rose to 10000. He was convinced that, "This was not due to the

activities of the organizations ... found in France but came as a result of

ASALA's national and revolutionary sacrifices."

ASALA and the JCAG targeted the Embassies of Turkey in Athens,

Beirut, Bern, Brussels, Madrid, Paris, The Hague, and Vienna, as well as the

Turkish delegations to OECD and the Turkish Center at the United Nations.

The Turkish consulate in Geneva was bombed on two separate occasions; the

ones in Los Angeles and Lyons, once; and the Paris consulate, seized and

occupied. The Turkish Airlines (THY) offices in Amsterdam, Copenhagen,

Frankfurt, Geneva, London, Milan, Paris and Rome were bombed too. Foreign

governments were cautioned to "lift the protection thus far accorded" to Turks

and Turkish property or else be "held responsible for the innocent victims

within their own personnel (sic)," while travelers were advised against using

any form of Turkish transportation "because they might become the innocent

victims of our rage. "82

As for international connections with other groups, ASALA itself

confirmed such links. As a spokesman for it said in an interview, "We

sympathize and exchange assistance and services with the Baader-Meinhof

81 Temon, n. 2, p. 221. 82 Communique issued by the "General Revolutionary Command, Armenia, of the Armenian Secret Am1y for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA)," one of the two main Armenian terrorist groups, as cited in Sulzberger, "Deadline for More terror" The New York Times, Apri19, 1977.

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group. We have relations with all the European revolutionary movements

except the Basques of Spain (ETA), and do not ask me why."83 ASALA

received training and logistical support from the Popular Front for the

Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and the Democratic front for the Liberation of

Palestine (DFLP). When asked if Palestinians used to train Turkish terrorists

in their camps, Mr. Abu Firas, the chief PLO representative in Turkey replied,

"In our camps, we train them to be terrorists in their countries but to fight

against Israel. For this reason we cannot be held responsible for training them.

Since Armenians are citizens of Lebanon, we also train them to fight for the

liberation of Palestine."84In 1980, PFLP held a conference for ASALA and a

"Kurdistan Workers' Party" at a hideout in the ancient Casbah of Sidon,

Lebanon. The members of ASALA at this conference were protected by

Palestinian gunmen, and the former "emphasized their links with Marxist

Palestinian formations. "85

Some authors believe that the triple bombings of the offices of KLM,

Lufthansa, and Turkish Airlines on 13 November 1979 in Paris were

influenced by ASALA's close cooperation with the Palestinians. In a follow­

up communique to this attack, ASALA set its theme for future operation. After

these attacks, it released a statement: "Let imperialism and its collaborators of

the world know that their institutions are targets for our heroes and will be

destroyed. We will kill and destroy because that is the only language

understood by imperialists."86 Although there have been reports of links

between Armenian terrorists and Greek Cypriots, Greeks, and even the

Soviets, there is no evidence to prove this. The Soviet Union was more

concerned with maintaining cordial relations with Turkey. Soviet Armenian

foreign affairs officials in fact, declared that, "(Soviet) foreign policy must be

made in Moscow, not in Armenia. Steps against Turkey, a NATO member,

83 ASALA spokesman cited in "Nadim Nasir Report: Al-Maja/lah visits an Armenian Secret Army Base in Lebanon," in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), Daily Report (Middle East and Africa), September I, 1982, p. G8. Henceforth referred to as the "Nadim Nasir Report." 84 Andrew Corsun, n. 34, p. 35. 85 Claire Sterling, The Terror Network: The Secret War of International Terrorism (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1981) p. 243. 86 Andrew Corsun, n. 34, p. 34.

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would involve our overall relations with NATO." In the words of an ASALA

representative, "It (Soviet Armenia) should be a springboard for liberation, but

this is not happening, apparently because they (the Soviets) believe only in

what they call 'democratic struggle' as far as Turkey is concerned."87

ASALA's hope to become the leader of a broad, united front ofall

Armenian groups, however, foundered upon the general Armenian tendency

toward divisive factionalism. After ASALA began to indulge in extensive

attacks on civilian targets of foreign nations that arrested ASALA members, it

created a dilemma for the Armenian Diaspora too. So far proud of ASALA's

acts, they found it difficult to justify these innocent deaths and condemned

them. Hagop Hagopian's willingness to employ indiscriminate terrorism

against innocent civilians and non-Turkish targets as in the Ankara and Paris

Orly airports in 1982 and 1983 respectively and the Istanbul Covered Bazaar

in 1983, was to prove an important factor in creating a rift within the ranks of

ASALA too. "In the name of the Armenian revolution, inhuman operations

(i.e., atrocities) were being committed due to which dozens of innocent people

were dying and hundreds of others had been wounded," declared Monte

Melkonian. 88 He further stated, "Orly claimed innocent lives. It debases our

struggle."89 Another reason for the splintering of ASALA can be traced to the

Israeli invasion of Lebanon in June 1982 which resulted in the organization's

being forced to flee west Beirut to the Bekaa Valley. The internecine quarrels

led to the assassination of Khachig Havarian and Vicken Ayvazian, two of

Hagopian's leading allies by Monte Melkonian and David Davidian on 15-16

July 1983 in the Bekaa Valley. Following even more bitter mutual

recriminations, Hagopian's ASALA quickly lost its previous effectiveness and

influence. ASALA lost its allies and contacts outside Lebanon and retained its

influence only in The Armenian Popular Movement in Greece, but it fell

increasingly under Syrian contro1.90 With the exception of a vicious spate of

87 "Nadim Nasir Report," n. 83. 88 "ASALA-RM History." n. 78. 89 "Monte Melkonian Explains His Break with ASALA: Interview," The Armenian Reporter, 12 January 1984, p. 4. 90 By the end of the decade, a partial rapprochement between Syria and Turkey was to prove disastrous for ASALA. Gunter, n. 21, p. 466.

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bloodletting in Lebanon between it and the Dashnaks in 1985 and early 1986,

ASALA ceased to carry out any more operations and became increasingly

moribund.

After the arrest and imprisonment of Monte Melkonian in Paris at the

end of 1985, there were a series of deadly bombings in Paris in September

1986. Although these were initially thought to have been the handiwork of

ASALA to secure the release of Varoujan Garabedian, the perpetrator of the

deadly Orly bombing in 1983, these apprehensions were laid to rest with the

arrest ofthe actual perpetrators in March 1987. Then on 28 April1988, Hagop

Hagopian himself was apparently assassinated in Athens, Greece. It was said

that he had been expelled from AS ALA at the end of 1987. It was later

disclosed that the Syrians had been behind both events partly because of

Hagopian's refusal to toe their line, which involved driving booby- trapped

trucks into Christian east Beirut for later explosion,91 and partly because of

improved relations between Syria and Turkey. The Syrians also resented

Hagopian's close relations with such Palestinians as Abu Cherif, Abu Ayyad,

and Fouad Bitar who operated independently of Syrian influence. Khatchadour

Khoshudian, an ASALA militant who was killed in Beirut on 24 February

1987 was said to have been the first victim of the Syrians. Indeed Armenia

itself cryptically admitted that Khorshudian "did not fall where he had dreamt

to fall ... and his martyrdom did not answer but brought forth torturing

questions."92 The Syrian-controlled remnant of ASALA was reduced to

merely issuing proclamations and threats.

Modus-operandi of JCAG and ASALA

Most reports about Armenian terrorist groups mention numerous

different groups. Edward F. Mickolus, mentions some eleven Armenian

organizations. The number cited by different sources varies from four to

nineteen.93 Many sources avoid the figures altogether by labeling them under

91 Gunter, n. 9, p. 25. 92Armenia, No. 135/15, 1987, p.l. 93 Corsun states that Armenian extremists have carried out attacks under 19 operational names. See Andrew Corsun, n. 34, p. 33.

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the term 'several'. However the fact of the matter is that despite all these

organizational titles, there appeared to be only two main Armenian militant

groups: ASALA and JCAG. All these other organizations were merely a cover

used by these two organizations (especially AS ALA, since the JCAG groups

clearly referred to being associated with the organization) to carry out their

activities without leaving a trail and to probably 'give a bandwagon

impression of a wide range of involvement within the international Armenian

community to impress both the general international public and also their

Armenian compatriots. ' 94 While the JCAG carried out its operations under the

names of the "Boldikian Group," "Group of 28 May," "Ohannes Kazandjian

Group," "Kevork Tchavouche Group" etc., ASALA used names such as the "3

October Group," "Swiss 15 Group," "Yeghia Keshishian," "September­

France," "Orly Group," "Khrimian Hairik Group" etc. It would be interesting

to mention here the origins of adoption of this tactic of using various names by

ASALA, and a few references to its notorious groups.

On 3 October 1980, the secret phase of ASALA was over with the

arrest of Alec Yenikomshian and Suzy Masseredjian. The two were injured by

explosives in a hotel room in Geneva. Their arrest marked the beginning of a

fighting process for ASALA against the Western Powers. While the militants

were to be judged by the laws of the country they were arrested in, ASALA

had only one way to protect its members -by resorting to terrorism. A

terrorism which was self-supporting could not be tolerated for long and risked

robbing the organization of all its influence. In order to avoid this trap, it

decided to ascribe its activities to those of independent groups which had

appeared spontaneously. The group, operating under various commando

names, took it upon itself to carry out "military operations against any country

which attempts to jail or try any of its commandos". ASALA, using the name

"3 October Group," in a four month period carried out 18 bombings against

Swiss interests worldwide in an effort to exert pressure on the Swiss to release

their comrades. The two extremists received 18-month suspended sentences

and were exiled from Switz~rland for 15 years.

94 Gunter, n. 21, p. 463

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On 9 June 1981, Mardiros Jamgotchian was caught for assassinating a

Turkish diplomat Mehmet-Savas Yorguz- outside the Turkish consulate in

Geneva. From the time of his arrest on June 9 to December 19 (he was

sentenced to imprisonment), ASALA under the name "June 9 Organization,"

perpetrated 15 bombings against Swiss targets worldwide. After

Jamgotchian's release, ASALA, again using the name "Armenian Group 15",

carried out bombings against the targets. However, it was the "Orly Group"

founded to pressurize the French government to release an ASALA member,

Monte Melkonian, arrested at the Orly airport in France on 11 November

1981, for traveling with a forged passport under the name ofDimitriu Giorgiu,

that acquired notoriety for its targeting of French establishments. Incidentally

it was this group through which the police found a direct link to ASALA. The

accidental death of an ASALA militant, Pierre Gulumian, on 30 July 1982, in

a pavilion in Gagny put the French police on the track of the "Orly Group"

and finally led them to conclusive links between this group and ASALA.95

Besides this form of subterfuge it would be interesting to understand

the technical or strategic aspects of the Armenian militant operations. Between

1975 and 1983 Armenian terrorists claimed responsibility of over 200

incidents, including the assassination of twenty-six Turkish diplomats and/or

their family members. Although the tactic of assassination had been used

repeatedly, the majority of their operations were bombings, which were simple

in conception and design. Unlike the Irish Republican Army (IRA), which

favors remote control devices, Armenian terrorists were partial to a

Czechoslovakian manufactured plastic called Semtex-H.96In the

overwhelming majority of attacks, this device is set at such an hour as to cause

property damage and not take lives. Operationally Armenian terrorists must be

viewed as unsophisticated in comparison to other groups and never displayed

the ability or inclination to hit a hard target.97 The exceptions were the seizure

of the Consulate in Paris on September 1981, and the attempted assassination

of the Turkish consul General in Rotterdam on 21 July 1982, both of which

95 Temon, n. 2, p. 224. 96 Gunter, n. 21, p. 467. 97 Ibid, pp. 467-468.

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failed. Compared to other groups, their bombings and assassinations required

the minimum of logistical planning. Of the 21 Turkish diplomats/ family

members slain between 1975-1982, 14 were killed while in their car which

was stopped at a light, slowing before entering a busy intersection, or parked.

Out of the ten attempted assassinations of Turkish diplomats, eight took place

while the diplomat was in his vehicle, which was parked or slowing down for

a traffic light or at an intersection. These attacks were carried out by

assassination teams armed primarily with automatic 8mm weapons. The group

varied in size from a lone gunman in eight attacks to two assailants with a

third member in a waiting car. With the exception of the July 21 attack in

Rotterdam, the diplomatic vehicles that were involved in these attacks were

not armored and the only protective cover (if any) was a driver/bodyguard.98

An important factor in the operations of ASALA was also their use of

media to further their cause. As mentioned earlier ASALA had its own

periodical 'Armenia,' that was used for propaganda purposes, that published

interviews and articles along the lines of its political ideology. Interestingly, in

1976, a group of about ten leftist Armenian youth had found a sub-group

"Armenian Struggle" and began publishing Hay Baykar. This publication

which was against the AGBU 'aristocracy', the Church and political parties

and had displayed its solidarity to the Turkish and Kurdish people,

aggressively propagated the cause of 'everyday' being 'April 24; the struggle

must be held on two fields, in the Diaspora against Turkey and American

imperialism, and in Soviet Armenia by supporting the contestation. '99

Increasingly it found itself displaying its affinity to ASALA. In 1980, it

published interviews with Abu Ayyad, the PLO number two man and a major

mediator between Palestinians and ASALA. After 1980, it openly adopted

ASALAS's political line and "Armenian Struggle" organized a "Committee of

support to Armenian political prisoners," which held meetings and press

conferences for the release of prisoners. In March 1982, "Armenian Struggle"

had become the French section of a "National Armenian Movement for

98 Corsun, n. 34, p. 32. 99 Hay Baykar 2 (April1977). For details see Ternon, n. 2, p. 230.

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ASALA," which has seven other organizations m the Diaspora: Canada,

United States, Iran, Great Britain, India, Greece, and Cyprus. However, it

limited itself to peaceful publicity-seeking actions such as the peaceful

occupations of the offices of Turkish Airlines on 11 June 1981 and, Swissair

on 15 December 1981. 100 Besides the print media, ASALA also used the very

powerful medium of the radio to gain publicity. ASALA's first radio

broadcasts began in 1981 in Beirut with a daily one-hour program "The Voice

ofthe Armenians in Lebanon".

Responses to Armenian Militancy

Outraged over their tragedy, when the two small groups of Armenian

terrorists began assassinating Turkish diplomats in the 1970s: the anti Dashnak

and Marxist ASALA and the Dashnak Justice Commandos of the Armenian

Genocide (JCAG), succeeded in 1983 by the Armenian Revolutionary Army

(ARA), 101 a few of the terrorists were apprehended. At this time some

Armenians argued that the terrorists had had a right to murder and should not

be persecuted. After Hampartzoum 'Harry' Sassounian, a nineteen year old

Lebanese Armenian (who had migrated to the USA in 19'77), a member of the

.Armenian Youth Federation (AYF)102, was found guilty of assassinating

Kemal Arikan, the Turkish Consul General in Los Angeles in 1982, for

example, some Armenians in Boston announced: "What occurred throughout

Hampig's trial was a mockery of justice, an attempt to stop the Armenian

people from actively pursuing their cause ... We are outraged by the .... guilty

verdict."103 ARF groups throughout the world came out strongly in support of

Sassounian. Similar sentiments were expressed concerning other terrorist acts.

The support continued in the form of writing letters to Sassounian in prison104

and frequent appeals to release him and others similarly convicted. 105 A very

100 For a detailed exposition see ibid, p. 231. 101 For a scholarly analysis see Gunter, n. 6 .. 102 A YF is the youth wing of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation and is very active in the Diaspora, trying to instill 'Armenianness' in the Armenian youth. 103 Cited in The Armenian Weekly, (Washington) 14 January 1984, pp.7, 6. 104 See, for example, ibid, 11 July 1987, p. 9, where almost an entire page is devoted to such an appeal. 105 See, for example, ibid, 17 October 1987, p. 16.

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successful 'Solidarity Day' dinner for Sassounian was held on 6 February

1987, at the Pasadena Armenian Center in Califomia. 106 Via an audio

recording, Sassounian told the 650 guests that he received many letters from

Armenians throughout the world. Hasmig Derderian, a member of the

Sassounian Defense Committee, reminded the audience that Sassounian's

imprisonment 'was aimed at the entire Armenian people and its cause, in a

vicious attempt to silence the collective struggle to restore the national rights

of Armenians in a free homeland.' An 'evening-long songfest of national and

revolutionary songs' followed. One of the singers remarked 'on the great

popular support Sassounian' s case elicits.'

The trial of Max Kilndjian in France elicited a spectacular support

from the Armenian communities. Accused of conducting an assassination

attempt on the Turkish ambassador to Switzerland, Dogan Turkmen, on 6

February 1980, there was an unconditional support for Klindjian in the

committee formed for his defense, the "Committee for Defense of the

Armenian Cause." The tracts of this committee pledged: "Guilty or not, we

shall defend Max Klindjian." The trial was held on 22 and 23 January 1982, in

the courthouse of Aix-en-Provence, 107 which was swarming with Armenian

supporters from Marseille, Lyon, Valence, Grenoble, and Paris. Like

Soghomon Tehlirian's trial had become a trial of Talaat Pasha, that of

Klindjian became the trial of the Turkish government which pushed the

accused to take to militancy due to its denialist policy. While Henri Nogueres,

president of the League of Human Rights, and French policemen testified in

favor of Klindjian, the members of the socialist government defended the

Armenian Cause. 108 Klindjian was set free to the cries of Armenians, "We

have won, we have won!" the case of Klindjian was significant because for

106 The following information and citations are taken from Serge Samoniantz, "Banquet Raises $30,000 for Hampig Sassounian," The California Courier, 19 February 1987, p.S. 107 Stenographic transcript of the trial in Les Armeniens en cour d'Assises (Roqm!vaire: Parentheses, 1983). Reference in Temon, n. 2, p. 199. 108

' Shortly before the trial, Hurriyet, the Istanbul daily newspaper published on its front page under the caption "Here are the French Quintuplets, Enemies of Turkey," the photographs of Louis Mermaz, Charles Hemu, Gaston Defferre, Joseph Franceschi-currently assigned to combat terrorism-and Jean Poperen.' Temon, n. 2, fn 19.

130

once it united the Armenians of France "behind one member in whom it

projected itself and through whom it achieved catharsis."109

The Armenians looked upon these terrorist activities with some

measure of relief and pride. Armand Arabian, a superior court judge in

California, declared: "It is the right of Armenians to seek redress ... Some seek

it in street corners."110 George Mason, the former, moderate publisher of The

[Armenian] California Courier, concluded: "There are many Armenian

Americans in California who feel great sympathy and support for the

Armenian terrorists. I have talked to numerous peaceful, fair and thoughtful

men who have expressed support for the terrorists."111 Levon Marashlian, a

Glendale College professor of history, said Armenian terrorists are "patriots

who have been waiting for 70 years."112 Dennis Papazian, the professor of

history at the University of Michigan in Dearborn, was quoted as saying: "In a

way I'm kind of proud of the terrorists."113

In the United States, the Turkish State Folk Dance Ensemble

performances in California were canceled because of threats and a bombing,

the Ataturk Centennial night organized by the American-Turkish Association

of Houston was disruptedl1 4 and at the University of California, Los Angeles,

the classes of Professor Stanford J. Shaw115 were disrupted on many

occasions by Armenian students. Professor Shaw, who had also received

anonymous threats, opted for sabbatical leave in January 1982. Replying to an

109 ibid, p. 200. 11° Cited in Michael Leahy, "LA Armenian Community Grows Fastest in State," The California Courier, 25 August 1983, p. 7. 111 Cited in George Mason, "This & That," The California Courier, 7 February 1985, p. 8. 112 Cited in Dave Smith, "Terrorism Mars Armenian Image," The California Courier, 4 August 1983, p. 2. 113 Cited in Pete Stine, "A Silent Plea for Lost Memory," The Armenian Reporter, 8 September 1983, p. 8. 114 'Introduction,' Setting the Record Straight on Armenian Propaganda Against Turkey (booklet published by the Assembly of the Turkish American Associations, 1982). 115 Professor Stanford J Shaw had along with his Turkish wife Ezel Kurel Shaw authored the two volume- History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, and had keenly defended their version of the facts of the 1915 massacres, had attempted to block, whenever possible, the publication of works dealing with the Armenian Question, by turning in negative evaluations to publishers soliciting their advice as manuscript readers. See Ternon, n. 2, p. 226.

131

inquiry concerning this matter, William D. Scheafer, executive vice chancellor

at UCLA, wrote: "Because an international terrorist organization is involved,

the university's power to remedy the situation is limited."116

While it would only be natural to expect support for this militancy

within the Armenian community, it even had supporters who were non­

Armenian, often governments. The Greek Sympathy for Armenian activism,

for example, largely results from the traditional Hellenic hatred of the Turks.

The special requiem service held in Athens in December 1986 for Kamig

V ahardian, an AS ALA agent who was accidentally killed during an attempt to

bomb the Kuwait Airlines office in Athens from a motorcycle in 1982 further

illustrates the situation. At the requiem, Reverend Spiros Tsakalos of the

Greek Orthodox Church delivered a eulogy in which he declared: "The

Turkish fascist regime understands only the language of armed struggle

carried out by the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia."

When the Yugoslavian authorities released Harutiun Levonian, the assassin of

the Turkish ambassador to Yugoslavia, from prison in 1987, the Greeks

quickly allowed him to enter their country and receive badly needed medical

attention. Syrian support for Armenian activism stemmed from traditional

animosities and political ambitions. The Turkish annexation of Ratay

(Alexandretta) province in 1939, problems dealing with the waters of the

Euphrates River and its long-term aspirations all encouraged the Syrians to

support anti-Turkish ends.

The situation regarding France was similar, although to a lesser extent,

since the Turks did not conquer and rule that country for 400 years as they did

Greece. In the early 1980s the Armenian National Movement in France,

known by the French abbreviation "MNA", and headed by Ara Toranian

emerged as a dynamic political force in part because of the obvious French

sympathy for the Armenians. A number of French politicians also supported

the Armenians because of their electoral power in certain areas where they

116 Letter to Professor William J. Griswold, Colorado State University, October 21, 1982.

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were concentrated. On 24 April 1982. For example, Gaston Defferre, the

Minister of Interior and the Mayor of Marseille- which has a relatively large

Armenian population- told them, "France will assist you to triumph in the

pursuit of your just cause." Minister of Defense Hernu told a large Armenian

rally in his home city of Villeurbane on 10 October 1982, "Whenever there are

aggressions, we must raise the question as to who the real aggressor is. Are the

aggressors the people that survived a genocide committed by the Turks or the

Turks themselves?" 117

Although the rise of Armenian militancy was a desperate measure that

stemmed from the failure of the Armenians to develop sufficient political

strength to present their case in a more conventional manner, it had its

detractors within the Armenian community too. Most Armenians, claimed

Martin H. Halabian of the ARF, found the publicity gained through these

violent acts as 'repulsive.' 118 The famous Armenian-American author, Michael

J. Arlen was quoted in the New York Times as stating, "Even by current

standards of political terror, the Armenian 'hits' were reprehensible. " 119

An important point distinguishing the later day Armenian terrorists

from their predecessors of the 1920s is that their victims were not even born

when the alleged crimes for which they were being attacked were supposedly

committed. The difference between the perceptions of this generation of

militants and that of the one that was involved in operation Nemesis is obvious

in the following passages. After having assassinated several leading Ottoman

officials in Western Europe, for instance, the Dashnak agent Arshavir

Shiragian wrote, "I never thought once of using my gun against innocent

people ... not even Turkish ones ... " his answer to all those who would ask him

as to why he did not kill Azmi (the bodyguard of one ofhis victims) or others

was, "I thought the answer obvious: Azmi had no responsibility for the

planning or the execution ofthe massacres of the Armenian people ... we were

meting out punishment to persons who had been tried in absentia and who had

117 Ternon, n. 2, p. 226. 118 Christian Science Monitor, (Boston) May 6, 1982. 119 Cited in The New York Times, March 11, 1980.

133

been found guilty of mass murder."120 On the other hand during the attack on

(Esenboga) International Airport in Ankara on August 7, 1982,121 in which

nine passengers were killed and seventy-two others were wounded, 122 as he

fired at his victims, one of the gunmen, referring to the Turkish massacre of

Armenians in 1915, yelled, "More than a million of us died! What's the

difference if 25 of you die?"123 Also when police told Levon Ekmekjian, one

of the terrorists captured during the Ankara raid, how many had been killed

and wounded, his response was, "It wasn't enough."

No terrorist group is monotheistic, and neither were the Armenians.

Both groups despite their common goals took pains to dissociate themselves

from the acts of each other. JCAG did not want to be associated with the

operations of ASALA against the non-Turkish targets. On 4 April 1981,

Beirut's Rightist Christian Cell received a phone call from an alleged JCAG

member claiming that the group was not connected with ASALA and that

JCAG's attacks were logical measures for the injustice committed against

Armenians; its targets were the Turks and Turkish institutions. ASALA was

eager to avoid being mistaken for the JCAG. Hagop Hagopian in an interview

said, "The Dashnag party is trying to imitate us in order to regain lost ground.

The 1980 operation in Rome against the Turkish ambassador to the Vatican

was claimed by the Dashnags who used the name of a revolutionary group, the

Avenger Commandos of the Armenian Genocide."124

120 Arshavir Shiragian, The Legacy: Memoirs of an Armenian Patriot (Boston: Hairenik Press, 1976), pp. 135-36. 121 Shortly before the attack on the Ankara airport, the military commander of an ASALA base in Lebanon boasted: "I want to say that, over the years, we have carried out scores of military operations inside Turkey, including the assassination of some U.S. personnel," ''Nadim Nasir Report." ASALA claimed it killed twenty-five and wounded thirty-two others in an attack on Istanbul's famous covered bazaar in June 1983. See The Armenian Reporter, (Boston) June 30, 1983,p.l. 122 For further details of this attack, see "Terrorism Claims New Victims: 9 killed, 72 wounded in Airport Attack," Turkey Today, August 1982, p.l; and the press accounts in the NeW York Times, August 8, 1982; and Washington Post, August 8, 1982 and August 9, 1982. For additional details see NewSpot: Turkish Digest (Ankara) August 13, 1982, p.1, and September 10, 1982, p.3. 123 Time, (New York) August 23, 1982, p. 38. 124 Corsun, n. 34, p. 35.

134

Conclusion

As a U.S. State Department study put it, " By resorting to terrorism,

Armenian extremists were able to accomplish in seven years what legitimate

Armenian organizations have been trying to do for almost 70 years­

internationalize the Armenian cause."125 However, in terms of concrete results,

the militancy has not achieved much. Certainly, Turkey, whom these militant

groups had hoped to destabilize and induce it to negotiate the Genocide issue,

embittered by the terror already committed, only became more inflexible.

While the Turkish press did begin crediting these acts of violence against its

country's establishments and nationals to the Armenian militant groups, and

gave ample coverage to these events, the general attitude of the Press and the

Turkish government has been to step up the efforts at denial. It has attempted

to support its thesis 'by clothing it with measured rebuttals, using pseudo­

scientific methods.' The Turkish government has established a professorship

for the study of the Armenian Question in Istanbul which seeks to show that

during the First World War, the Armenians were the victims of their own

seditious ambitions. In May 1981, the senate of the Istanbul University issued

a circular to the students which highlighted the "crimes committed by the

Armenian terrorists" sought to be justified on the basis of a mythical story of

Genocide, and also reiterated that the Armenian Question no longer existed

since all the minorities in Turkey enjoyed total civil rights. Turkish-American

associations were formed in American universities to counter the Armenian

allegations and activities. 126

Following "Operation Van," the Turkish government launched a major

publicity drive by inviting the French television channel TFI to interview

elderly people who, pointing to the ruins of Van recounted stories of the

annihilation of one million Turks and the city at the hands of the Russians and

the Armenians. The more 'Armenian terrorism expanded, the more the

125 ibid, p. 31. 126 Levan Marashlian, "Changing Dimensions in Armenian-Kurdish Relations and Political Modernizations in the Diaspora," Paper presented in September 1981 at Berkeley, California, p. 79. Reference in Ternan, n. 2.

135

Turkish population- in Turkey as well as in the Turkish expatriate community­

was mobilized by the press against the Armenians.' 127 In fact, the only

consequence of the Armenian militancy was that Turkey could no longer

ignore the existence of the Armenians, but beyond that the Turkish

government actually exploits the violence to try to tum it to its own advantage.

Armenian terrorism evoked greater interest in and awareness of the

Armenian question throughout the world, and did convince the Western

democracies of the historical fact of the Armenian Genocide, 'even if their

diplomats are cautious in their official declarations.' 128 However, by their

targeting the establishments of non-Turkish governments and its civilian

population, the Armenian terrorists managed to lose any sympathy they had

gained. The initial attacks against the Turkish targets saw the press in

Switzerland . speaking in favor of the Armenians and indignant at the

indifference of the West to the plight of the Armenians. The sympathy of the

Swiss population, which reflected in the verdict of clemency in the case of

Alec and Suzy was absent by the time of Jamgotchian's trial largely due to the

offensives of the "9 June Group" following Jamgotchian's arrest.

The instinctive, visceral reaction to the initial operations of these

terrorist groups against Turkish targets provided a catharsis to almost all

Diaspora Armenians and mobilized and transformed it. It gave back identity

and hope to a crisis-laden Diaspora, broke the seclusion of minorities and

strengthened the Armenian national feeling. However, the excesses of these

groups finally alienated the more moderate members of the Diaspora

community. In the absence of the possibility of this armed struggle ever

leading to a territorial occupation of their historic lands, and the highly

spectacular and deadly actions threatening the public perception of the

substantially integrated Armenian population in their host countries, it was

only a matter of time before the Diaspora was divided in its support for these

groups. On the other and, these acts only provided the Turkish government to

127 Ternan, n. 2, p. 227. 128 ibid.

136

fuel the nationalistic instinct of its citizens and popular passions. But in the

final analysis it cannot be denied that the Armenian militancy against Turkey

did inform the Western public opinion and its implicit recognition, and

brought the Armenian Question back on the world stage. As Ternan says,

Armenian terrorism had the possibility to 'actualize' the Armenian Cause for

'political debates' to 'be initiated on new bases.'

137