CHAPTER- II

UNDERSTANDING DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS

CHAPTER-II

UNDERSTANDING DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS

The mass conversiOn of politicians and political thinkers to the

cause of democracy has been the most dramatic and significant

events in political history. Democracy today is not just regarded as

the best form of political order for stability as well as development

but also an international cause. Everyone is a democrat these days

- liberals, conservatives, socialists, communists, anarchists and

even fascists are eager to proclaim the virtues of democracy and to

demonstrate their own democratic credentials. No doubt, with the

collapse of Soviet Union, democracy has emerged as perhaps the

only stable and enduring principle in the post-modern political

landscape. A host of democratic governments and parties, as well

as non-governmental organizations dedicated to human rights and

development are working to press autocratic regimes to change.

Various international agencies like the · World Bank, the

International Monetary Fund, the European Union and the North

Atlantic Treaty Organisation require a democratic system as a

condition for membership or aid. Similarly, Organisations like

Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International keep check on the

regimes on the violation of human rights.

The unanticipated collapse of Soviet Union which led to the

independence of Central Asian republics is, no doubt, the most

23

dramatic change in the landscape of the Asia in the post-Cold War

period. The Central Asian states, which are distinguished from most

of the former Soviet Union by comparatively traditional social

structure, declared themselves to be democratic republics as soon

as they became independent. The declaration was followed by

serious efforts to create democratic institutions and in some

instances the progress has been impressive. Uzbekistan, the

geographical center and a potential leader of the region, makes an

interesting case study where democracy is accepted as a future goal

and commitment to protect human rights of its citizen.

In order to understand democracy and human right in Uzbekistan

it is important to trace the evolution of these concepts, their

meaning and various theoretical frameworks and their suitability.

While doing so, this chapter will simultaneously trace the evolution

and different models of democracy.

Democracy

Democracy is a very old word but its meanings have always been

complex. The word democracy came into English in the sixteenth

cetttury from the Greek word demokratia, which means rule (kratosj

by the people (demos). However, the simple notion of rule by the

people does not get us very far. The meaning of democracy then

depends on what constitutes "people" and what one means by "to

rule" and people should rule and how far popular rule should

extend.

24

In ancient times democracy was understood in various ways such

as 'rule of many', 'rule of poor' and even 'mob rule'. In Politics,

Aristotle wrote: "a democracy is a state where the freemen and the

poor, being in the majority, are invested with the power of the

state."1 In Republic, Plato made Socrates say that "democracy comes

into being after the poor have conquered their opponents,

slaughtering some and banishing some, while to the remainder they

give an equal share of freedom and power."2

Ancient democratic theory is the study of democracy in Greek and

Roman history by thinkers like Thucydides, Socrates, Plato,

Aristotle, Xenophon and Cicero. Works of these thinkers are limited

to mere historical interest, as they do not teach us any thing about

modern democracy. After all what we understand by democracy was

unknown to the ancient societies. Moreover, the ancient thinkers

did not believe in democracy as a just and good political order. In

fact they were deeply critical of democracy. Aristotle went so far as

to classify democracy among the corrupted political order. Similarly,

Cicero thought undiluted democracy a disaster. The only common

thread running between the ancient and modern democracy is the

rule of people.

Medieval political theory gives a mixed treatment to democracy. The

early medieval age did not explicitly criticized democracy. The

Quoted in, Raymond Williams, KeYwords, cited in Philip Green, Democracy: Key Concepts in Critical Theory, Humanities Press, New Jersey, 1993,p 19.

ibid, pl9.

25

situation changed with the recovery of Aristotle's Politics. Thomas

Aquinas rejected democracy in favor of limited monarchy. He

defined democracy as popular power, where ordinary people, by

force of numbers, governed - oppressed - the rich; the whole people

acting like a tyrant.3 In On Kingship, he extols rule by one: just as

God rules the universe and the queen bee rules the hive, so the

monarch must rule the multitude. Democracy was against the

natural order. Dante drew on this analogy even more emphatically

in his On World Monarchy. Like the ancient age, democracy was

seen in very poor light or as bad political order in medieval times. 4

The beginning of modern political thought is a break point for

democracy. The first modern political thinker Nicolo Machiavelli,

despite his reputation for being an apologist for tyranny, wrote in

the Prince that there is some truth in the proverb "the voice of the

people is the voice of God". It was in the hands of Social Contract

theorists the contemporary meaning of democracy started taking

concrete shape. By arguing ·that the ultimate source of all

governmental authority lay in individuals possessed of both natural

liberty and natural rights, social contract theory established the

foundations for later democratic government and delegitimized once

and for all traditional dictatorship and divine right of kings. s

ibid., p20.

David Held, Models of Democracy, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1987, p 68.

Benjamin R. Barber, Democracy, in David Miller (ed), Tile Blackwell E11cyclopaedia of Political Tllougllt, Blackwell Pub, Oxford, 1994, p115.

26

Thomas Hobbes, though a supporter of monarchy, defined

democracy as a regime in which sovereign power resides in an

assembly of all citizens. John Locke tried to reverse Hobbes by

rejecting monarchy and grounded government on the original and

continuous consent of the people. In other words, democracy came

to mean a system of government by consent operating through the

mechanism of a representative assembly. In both, Hobbes and

Locke, the focus was on the need to protect individual rights and

interests. The Utilitarian (Jeremy Bentham and James Mill) case for

democracy was also based on the need to protect or advance

individual interest. Bentham believed that universal franchise was

the only way of promoting the 'greatest happiness for the greatest

number'. This model of democracy, that is based on the principle

that 'citizens require protection from governors, as well as from

each other, to ensure that those who govern pursue policies that

are commensurate with citizen's interest as a whole', is termed as

protective democracy.6 Democracy is seen less as a mechanism

through which people can participate in political life and more as a

device through which people could protect themselves from the

encroachment of the government.

In short, protective democracy is but a limited and indirect form of

democracy. The consent of the governed is exercised through

regular and competitive elections. This ensures the accountability of

6 Op. Cit. no. 4, p70.

27

those who governs. Political equality thus means equal voting

rights. Liberty is guaranteed by separation of power and by

maintenance of basic rights and freedom. It is a constitutional

democracy. Ultimately, protective democracy aims to give the widest

possible scope to live their lives as they choose and thus tends to be

associated with minimum government intervention. 7 It is thus

compatible with laissez-faire capitalism. Protective democracy

therefore appealed to classical liberals and in modern politics to the

supporters of the New Right.

In the thoughts of Jean Jacques Rousseau there emerges an

alternative concern for development of human individual and the

community emerged. This gave rise to a new model, which is

referred as developmental democracy. For him, democracy was

ultimately a means through which human beings could achieve

freedom or autonomy, in the sense of obedience to a law one

prescribes to oneself.B In other words, citizens are free only 'free'

when they participate directly and continuously in shaping the life

of their community. Rousseau celebrated the notion of an active,

involved citizenry and was advocate of direct democracy. Although

not a supporter of common ownership, Rousseau stressed that

such a system of radical developmental democracy required

relatively a high level of economic equality. His theories have helped

Andrew Heywood, Politics, Macmillan, London, 1997, p72.

ibid., p72.

28

to shape the modern idea of participatory democracy taken up by

New Left in the 1960s and 1970s.

However, John Stuart Mill advanced a more modest form of

developmental democracy, which is compatible with the liberal

model of representative democracy. For him, the central virtue of

democracy was that it promotes the 'highest and harmonious'

development of individual capacities. He sought to defend a

conception of political life marked by enhanced individual liberty,

more accountable government and an efficient governmental

administration unhindered by corrupt practices and excessively

complex regulations. 9 Mill proposed the broadening of popular

participation that all educated including women should be

enfranchised. He was a supporter of parliamentary democracy or

deliberative democracy.

Though democratic ideas m the eighteenth and nineteenth

centuries were the product of liberalism, liberal's attitudes towards

it were distinctly ambivalent. This model of democracy had its own

problems, which Alexis de Tocqueville famously described as 'the

tyranny of majority'. This arises from the fact that 'the people' are

not a single but rather a collection of individuals and groups,

possessing different opm10ns and opposing interests. The

democratic procedure is recourse to the application of majority rule,

the principle that the will of the majority or greatest number should

9 op. cit., no. 4, p85.

29

prevail over the minority. Thus there is a danger of suppr-ession of

minority rights and individual liberty. James Madison articulated

similar concern at the US Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia

in 1787. Madison argued that the best defense against majoritarian

tyranny is a network of checks and balances that would make

government responsive to competing minorities and also safeguard

~he propertied few from property less masses.1o

However liberal theories about democracy in the twentieth century

tends to focus less on consent and participation and more on the

need for consensus in society. This can be seen in Schumpeter's

· 'realistic' model of democracy that defined democracy as "the

democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at

political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide

by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote" .11 For

Schumpeter democracy is the rule of the politicians. Its importance,

however, is in no way diminished: electoral competition creates a

political market that forces politicians to take account of the

various interests operating in society. 12 Pluralists like Robert Dahl

and Charles Lindblom have termed modern democratic system as

'polyarchy', which means rule by many as distinct from rule by all

people. A polyarchy is characterized by the extension of citizenship

10 Andrew Haywood, Political Ideologies: An Introduction, Macmillan Press Ltd., London, 1992,p43.

11 Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, Allen & Unwin, London, 1976, p269.

12 Andrew Haywood, op.cit, no.l 0, p45.

30

to a relatively high proportion of adults and the right of those

citizens to oppose government officials by voting them out of

office. 13 Elitist theorists like Gaetano Mosca, Vilfredo Pareto and

Robert Michels have differently argued that democracy often is only

a camouflage for the oligarchic tendencies of power and that

representation guarantees little more than a circulation of ruling

elites.

A v1ew of democracy from the West usually means Linz and

Stepan's version of consolidated liberal democracy. 14 This definition

includes five factors: "a free and lively civil society ... a relatively

autonomous and valued political society ... a rule of law ... a state

bureaucracy ... [and] an institutionalized economic society."15

This definition is a far cry from other interpretations of democracy

such as illiberal democracy or past versions such as Schumpeter's

elite model. In Schumpeter's "elite theory of democracy,"16 the

central basis. for democracy is simply '"free competition among

would-be leaders for the vote of the electorate. "'17 This "minimalist

definition" has been expanded slightly today to include free and fair

elections, accountabilitv. the rule of law and a limited executive . -''

13 ibid., p45. 14 Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation, The

Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London, 1996, p. 7. 15 'b'd 7 • I I , p .. 16 John Nagle and Alison Mahr, Democracy and Democratization, Sage Publications, London,

1999, pp. 8-9. 17 • op.c1t., no I I, p9

31

branch. 18 However, Matveeva admits, "There is something lacking in

this definition, something related to the democratic process and the

values which accompany it." 19 Although many authors attempt to

pin down a tangible definition of democracy, the minimalist

definition points to an important feature: beyond these fundamental

items mentioned above, the "something lacking" is arguable, based

on cultural values and trends of the time.

Illiberal democracy is one example of how cultural values can

change certain definitions of democracy. Bell and Jayasuriya, Write

that "our claim is that democratisation in East and Southeast Asia

can be interpreted as a grafting of democratic practices and

institutions on to societies with an alternative cultural baggage."20

Therefore, Asian democracy exists today based on preferences for

"hierarchy and harmony as against liberal notions of equality and

pluralism," the bases of western liberal democracy. 21

Linz and Stepan bring up another important point, vital also to

Central Asian democratisation: that of presidential versus

parliamentarian forms of democratic government. Although whether

rl · ~' · 1 1 · · · r a_ state runs un'-er a presraent1a.1 or par.l1amentar1an vers1011 01

government does not preclude it from being a democracy, Linz and

Stepan argue that it can easily help or hurt the development of a

18 Anna Matveeva, "Democratization, Legitimacy and Political Change in Central Asia," in lntemational Affairs 75, I (I 999), p. 31.

19 ibid, p. 31 20 Daniel A. Bell and Kanishka Jayasuriya, "Understanding Illiberal Democracy: A Framework,"

in Towards Illiberal Democracy in Pacific Asia, St. Martin's Press: New York, 1995, p. 2 21 ibid, p. 9

32

democratic government in an emerging democratic state.22 In South

America, for example, strong presidential systems without the

checks and balances of a strong parliament, often lead to an

authoritarian ruler. As will be shown below, the five Central Asian

states have also fallen victim to this problem.

Any discussion on democracy will be incomplete without people's

democracy, which is a model of democracy generated in the Marxist

tradition. It was an attack on the liberal models of democracy as

well. Marxists have tended to be dismissive of liberal or '

parliamentary democracy, seeing it as a form of bourgeois or

capitalist democracy. It was taken to be no more than a mask for

protecting the property interests. People's democracy was used in

particular to designate the goal of social equality brought about

through the common ownership of wealth (social democracy in

original sense), in contrast to political democracy, which establishes

only a facade of equality. Marx believed that the overthrow of

capitalism would be a trigger that would allow genuine democracy

to flourish. The form of democracy that was developed in twentieth

century communist states, however, owed more to the ideas of V.I.

Lenin than it did to those of Marx. Later on thinkers like Jean Paul

Sartre, Maurice Marleau Ponty, Herbert Marcuse and Louis

Althusser contributed to Marxian model of democracy. But the

22 Op.cit, no.l4, p 141.

33

experience of the USSR has clearly weakened arguments favouring

people's democracy as being a superior model of democracy.

Although it is still a continuous debate about which is the most

desirable form of democracy, much of cotemporary debate revolves

around how democracy works in practice. However, there is a

broad, even worldwide, acceptance of a particular model of

democracy, generally termed as liberal democracy. Despite the

existence of competing tendencies within this broad category,

certain central features can be drawn. Liberal democracy is an

indirect and representative form of democracy in that political office

is gained through success in regular elections that are conducted

on the basis of universal adult franchise. It is based on competition

and electoral choice. These are achieved through political pluralism,

tolerance of a wide range of contending beliefs and the existence of

conflicting social philosophies and rival political movements and

parties. An important aspect of liberal democracy is that there is a

clear distinction between the state and civil society. This distinction

is maintained through the existence of autonomous groups and

interests and the market or capitalist Organisation of economic life.

The theory of liberal democracy has suffered from the limitation of

interpreting democracy primarily as a regime form of the state or a

principle of representative government, rather than as a way of

constituting collective life of society. As Bhikhu Parekh has argued,

'if liberalism has provided the theory of the liberal-democratic state,

34

democracy has supplied only its theory of government. Trapped

within the confines of liberalism, democratic impulse has been kept

in check by its dominant partner, liberalism.' 23

Democracy has clearly advanced in recent years. According to the

Freedom House's first Annual Survey of Freedom in 1972-73, nearly

28.27percent of states could be considered 'free', while 46.21

percent could be considered 'not free'; the 1999-2000 report, by

contrast, shows 44.27 percent of states 'free', with 25.00 percent

of states not free.24 In essence, the proportion of free states (what

Larry Diamond would call liberal democracies) to not free states

(which are generally consolidated autocracies) has inverted in the

last 27 years.2s However, the rise of democracy noted above does

not necessarily mean that autocracy is in the midst of an inexorable

decline. Indeed, as Huntington's analogy of waves would suggest,

there is the distinct possibility that once the current wave of

democratisation is through, we will see a resurgence of autocratic

states. Diamond points out that the 'third reverse wave' may

already be occurring, since democracy has made little progress

since the collapse of the Soviet Union.26 More often than not, the

relation between the state and democracy is believed to be a

derivative of the nature of the economic Organisation of the state. It

23 Bhikhu Parekh, The Cultural Particularity of Liberal Democracy, in David Held (ed.), Prospect for Democracy, Polity Press, Oxford, 1993,pl65.

24 data are at: http://www.freedomhouse.org/ratings/ratings.pdf; 1999-2000 data are at http://www .freedomhouse.org/news/table l.html.

25 Larry Diamond, Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore 1999,p 25.

26 ibid., pp 60-61

35

IS thus no accident that the transition from command to market

economy in post-Soviet states corresponds also to a transition to

democracy. But, many third world states do not follow this rule as

there are democracies with command economy and likewise many

market economies are not democracies. These democracies have

been defined as 'illiberal democracies'. We will discuss this aspect of

democracy at end of the work, but before that we will try to

understand another aspect of democracy, namely human right,

which is considered as integral to it.

Human Rights

The idea of human rights developed out of the natural rights

theories of the early modern period. Since December 1948, after the

proclamation of Universal Declaration of Human Rights, there is no

denying the fact tha:t there is almost universal recognition that

respect for human rights is absolutely essential for achieving the

agreed global priorities of peace, development and democracy.

Article 21 of the declaration clearly states that 'everyone· has the

right to take part in the government of his country, directly or

through freely chosen representatives' and 'the will of the people

shall be the basis of the authority of government'. Thus, it makes

democracy a human right. Along with this, there is another agreed

notion that among all forms of government it is only democracy that

ensures complete human rights. So to say, democracy and human

rights have become complementary to each other in today's world.

36

To simplify, human right means rights possessed by human beings

as human beings. The term has only come to the fore in this

century. Earlier it was commonly called as 'natural rights' or the

'rights of man'. Human rights are a modern and secular version of

'natural' rights, which were believed to be God-given.

Twentieth-century doctrine of human rights are direct descendent

of the liberal theory of natural rights. Many people use the terms

'natural right' and 'human right' interchangeably. The idea of

human right remains that of a right which is natural in that it is

conceived as a moral entitlement which human being possess in

their natural capacity as humans and not in virtue of any special

arrangement in to which they have entered or any particular system

of law under whose jurisdiction they fall. 27

Human rights are therefore universal, fundamental and absolute.

They are universal in a sense that they belong to all humans

everywhere, regardless of nationality, ethnic or racial origin, social.

background and so on. They are fundamental in that they are

inalienable as human rights can be denied or violated but a human

being's entitlement to them cannot be removed. They arc absolute - .

in that, as the basic grounds for living a genuinely human life, they

cannot be qualified. Human rights can be distinguished from civil

rights, in the sense that the former are moral principles that claim

universal jurisdiction, while the latter depend upon the freedoms

27 Peter Jones, 'Human Rights', in David Miller (ed), Tlte Blackwell Encyclopaedia of Political Tltougltt, Blackwell Pub, Oxford, 1994, p223.

37

and status accorded to citizens in a particular country. However,

the notion of civil liberties often rest upon an underlying belief in

human rights and are viewed as moral principles given legal

expression in the form of citizenship.

Human rights are regarded as the basic grounds for freedom,

equality and justice and embody the idea that all human lives are

worthy of respect. As such they have been accepted as one of the

cornerstone of international law, sometimes being used to justify

humanitarian and even military intervention. The most

authoritative definition of human right is found in the United

Nations Declaration of Human Right (1948), although other

documents, such as the European Convention on Human Rights

and Fundamental Freedoms ( 1953), have also been influential.

Judging from the formal declarations, human rights can be roughly

classified in to six categories. First and often foremost, is the right

to life. It consists of various rights as the right not to be murdered

or physically assaulted, right to have material essentials of life and

a minimum health care. Second, right to freedom of thought,

expression1 religion, association and movement. Third, right to

property. Fourth, there are rights concerning the individual's status

as citizen such as the right to nationality and democratic rights.

Fifth are the rights concerning the conduct of government, in

particular rights concerning the 'rule of law' and the administration

of justice such as the right not to be subjected to arbitrary arrest

38

and right to fair trial. Finally, human rights are claimed to certain

social, economic and cultural goods. The UN Declaration, for

example, asserts human rights to education, work, social security,

rest and leisure and a standard of living adequate for one's health

and well-being.28

The past few decades have witnessed the continued rise of the

application of international human rights law as well as the

extension of a wider public discourse on human rights, to a point

where human rights could be seen as one of the most globalised

political value of our times. The language of liberal human rights

has moved in to fill the vacuum created by the demise of grand

political narratives m the aftermath of the Cold War.

Notwithstanding disputes over their conceptuaiization and

application, human rights are common among the few utopian

ideas left, there is still a remarkable degree of consensus by the

governments on the principle at least that these rights be protected.

Nevertheless, the concept of human right has been challenged from

various corners. At present, the most important controversy is the

discussions of cross-cultural applicabilir; of human rights revolving

around the universalism / relativism debate and the importance of

culture. It involves two main issues: first, what concept of human

ontology is to be used and what rights naturally extend from that

view of human nature; and second, what significance should be

28 ibid., p223.

39

g1ven to the notion of 'culture' in the construction of a normative

moral order and to what degree does global diversity in system of

justice undermine any basis for the universality of human rights.29

Despite the demonstration of ethnocentrism in the field of human

rights, certain aspects of Universalist's case need to be considered,

at least as future possibilities. Due to communications and media,

tourism, finance capital, consumer images, transport technologies,

migration and so on, the world's societies are increasingly

integrated into global networks. Human rights Organisations form

one such network, which in turn makes it a universal ideology.

Clearly, the constitution of Uzbekistan also adheres to this notion of

human right.

In recent times, analyses of legal and normative orders have become

too involved in discussions of whether or not human rights exist in

the legal codes of 'traditional societies'. Attempts are being made to

search for conceptual similarities in different moral traditions and

particularly in Islamic sharia. There may exist certain conceptual

similarities, but one can never know how they will articulate until

the concepts are brought into a concrete relationship in a particular

socio-historical context. Jack Donnelly argues that 'what is being

compared with human rights are notions of human dignity, or

limitations on the arbitrary exercise of power. These are not rights

in strict sense since they are obligations constituted between rulers

29 Richard A. Wilson, Human Rights, Culture and Context: Antltropological Perspective, Pluto Press, London, 1999, p3.

40

and the divine authority, not between rulers and ruled. They are

therefore not human rights in the sense of being special

entitlements to protection, which derive from the mere fact of being

human.'30

Now, commg back to the democracy and its relationship with

human rights, there seems to be a near consensus that they share

a relationship of complimentarity. Human rights can be best

safeguarded in a democracy and a state, which ensures human

rights, is a democracy of some form or the other.

Transition to Democracy

The wave of democratisation since the '70s makes it possible to look

at the democracy-building. This has led to a shift away from the

broad modernisation and historical approaches. Now the focus is

not on. the underlying conditions of democracy but on the

immediate tactics of transition. The intellectual problem here is to

understand how the choices made by the politician in the move

from authoritarianism affect the pace, form and outcome of the

regime change.

Dankwart Rustow established the field of 'transitology', the study of

democratic transitions. Rustow's question was not, what factors

encourage democratic stability? Rather he asked: how do politicians

bring a democracy into being in the first place? And his answer,

broadly, was that democracy is a bargain reached by conflicting

30 ibid., p 14.

41

groups which come to recognize the inevitability of power-sharing.

Groups which recognize the impossibility of monopolizing power

make do with a settlement which at least offers the chance to win

office through elections. 31 Although Rustow's approach was ve:ry

different from Lipset's, he reached a similar conclusion: democracy

is compromise. South Africa's transition from white rule is textbook

example. As Johnson and Schlemmer comment, 'the three main

parties hammered out an essentially liberal democratic constitution

although none of them much believed in it'.32 Democracy's success,

in South Africa and elsewhere, rested on being eve:ryone's second

choice: optimal for no one, acceptable to eve:ryone.33

A major finding of 'transitology' is the central role played by political

elites. Even if democracy is made for the people, it is rarely made by

them. Democracy is 'imposed' from above. On Latin America, Little

suggests that 'pressure from below was only rarely a· factor in the

democratisation process. Where this took radical form (as in

Guatemala and El Salvador) it led to a tightening of authoritarian

control and only in Nicaragua in 1979 did popular protest

succeeded in overthrowing authoritarianism. '34

31 Rod Hague, Martin Harrop and Shaun Breslin, Comparative Government and Politics: An Introduction, (41

h ed), Macmillan Press, 1998, p30. 32 Johnson,R. and Schlemmer, L. (eds), Launching Democracy in south Africa: The First Open

E/ection,April/994, Yale University Press, New Haven, Conn. And London, 1996. p 9 33 ibid., p9 34 W. Little, 'Democratisation in Latin America 1980-95' in D. Potter (eds), Democratization,

Polity Press, Cambridge, 1997, p181.

42

Indeed, Diamandouros even advocate 'a strategic demobilisation of

the masses during elite negotiations' so the elites can agree the

transition in a calm atmosphere.35

We can divide democratisation into three phases: liberalisation,

transition and consolidation. In the liberalization phase, the

authoritarian regime relaxes its controls, eases repression and

permits more open political competition. Political prisoners may be

released and media censorship reduced. For instance, in South

Africa the White regime legalised the African National Congress and

released Nelson Mandela from prison in 1990. Liberalisation most

often triggered by a sense of failure within the authoritarian

coalition itself as existing rulers recognize that the regime is

declining in both effectiveness and legitimacy.

Liberalisation creates its own momentum. As political space opens,

so the opposition gains strength; finally, the existing rulers realize

their time is over. In South Africa, president de Klerk soon found

his power leaking away to Nelson Mandela and the ANC. Mikhail

Gorbachev may have set out to reform communism in the Soviet

Union but he ended as its undertaker, overwhelmed by the

reforming force he himself had unleashed.Thus the scene is set for

the transition proper to begin.

35 P.Diamandouros, 'Conclusion'; in R. Gunther, P.Diamandouros and H. Puhle(eds), The Politics of Democratic consolidation: Southem Europe in ComparativePerception, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London, 1995, p 403.

43

In the transition phase, the old regime is dismantled and

democratic institutions are established. A democratic transition is

complete when a freely elected government is installed with

sovereign authority. Transitions occur in two main ways. The most

common is reform, which means the exsiting elite takes the lead in

initiating peaceful change. Examples include Spain after Franco

( 197 5), Brazil after the army decided to step down ( 1985) and

Hungary and others in East Europe (1989). The other mode of

transition is called rupture. Here, the opposing takes the initiative

and the old regime rather than collapsing form within, is destroyed

form without, if necessary by violence. Rupture IS an uncommon

and uncertain road to democracy. In Romania, for instance, the

Ceaucescu dictatorship was overthrown by violence in 1989. But

ex-communists captured the revolution and their leader Ion Iliescu

remained in power as President until defeated in an election in

1996-a lengthy transition indeed. 36

Consolidation is the final phase of democratisation. A democracy

has consolidated when it provides an accepted framework for

political competition. As Przeworski put it, democracy is

consolidated when under given political and economic conditions a

particular system of institutions becomes the only game in town

36 Op. cit . no. 31, p 30

44

and when no one can 1magme acting outside the democratic

institutions. 37

To consolidate, a democracy must offer the real prospect of an

election victory for the opposition. This gives the opponents of the

current ruler an incentive to accept the political system as a whole.

And the acid test comes on the first occasion when an election does

lead to defeat for the government. If the losers accept the voters'

verdict, removing their hands from the power, then the democracy

is well on its way to consolidation.

Thus the extent of democratic consolidation in South Korea was

confirmed by the presidential election of 1997 ,which saw the first

peaceful transfer of power to the center-left in the country's history.

The virtue of a peaceful transfer, once it has been achieved, it that

it establishes the distinction between the system of government and

the present incumbents. The outcome of consolidation is a system,

which is permanent precisely because rulers come and go by

regular means. The requirement is that all powerful actors must

abide by the rules of the game even though they may not believe in

them. Thus the object of consolidators is not so much to win the

hearts and minds of the antidemocrats. Rather the idea is to

confine these dangerous tendencies to their as far as possible.38 In

these circumstances, opposition fades because it is unable to

37 A.Przeworski, Democracy a11d tile Market: Political a11d Eco11opmic Reform ill Eastem Europe alld Latill America, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge and New York, 1991. p.26

38 op.cit., no. 31, p32.

45

express itself. So consolidation is, in Rustow's apt term, a matter of

'habituation': 'democratic ruler must be not so much believed in as

applied'.39

Historical experience of transitions to democracy varies. The first

wave of democracies, such as Britain, Scandinavia and the United

States, enjoyed a leisurely transformation, with the gap between

liberalization and consolidation stretching over centuries. The

extension of the suffrage occurred gradually, often without any

clear notion that the outcome would be a representative democracy

based on universal suffrage. Democracy was a result rather than an

intention. But later waves of democratisation expected quicker

results; and they had a democratic objective in mind from the start.

After their defeat in the Second World War, for instance, Japan and

West Germany moved rapidly from dictatorship to democracy.

Modern transitions are compressed: managed revolution more than

unplanned evolution. In view of this, it is remarkable that the new

democracies so rapidly established smce the 1970s have

consolidated so successfully. 40

A major explanation of this accomplishment was a favorable global

and regional context. The end of the Cold War meant dictators

could not longer hide under the skirts of a superpower. The collapse

of communism destroyed the credibility of the major alternative to

39 ibid., p 32. 40 ibid., p 32.

46

liberal democracy. Leading players such as the United State and the

European Union and sympathetic institutions such as the World

Bank, began to promote democracy. Often, a favorable regional

context also eased transition. Greece, Portugal and "Spain - and

more recently Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic -

undoubtedly benefited from their position close to the heartland of

European democracy. Indeed Diamond suggests that 'the greatest

regional force for democratic consolidation in the Americas may well

be the move towards regional free trade'.41

The ease of a transition to democracy is influenced by the nature of

the previous regime. The shift from communist rule is particularly

fraught because it involves a triple move: from communism to

democracy, from a planned to a market economy and from arbitrary

power to the rule of law. More than military regimes, communist

rulers controlled all aspects of society. As a result, their post

communist successors must encourage social institutions as well

as consolidating a new political and economic order. They must aim

to develop social capital at a time of political change, economic

dislocation and nationalist assertion, a challenging project indeed.42

While we are focusing on transitions to democracy, we must not

forget that history also provides some instances of transitions from

democracy. The classic democratic breakdowns were Germany, Italy

41 L. Diamond, " Democracy in Americas", Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, vo1.550, p39

42 op. cit. no. 31, p33.

47

and Spain in interwar Europe. Military coups in Latin American

during the 1970s are other instances. However, it is rare for

consolidated democracies to disintegrate, the democracies most

likely to fall apart are ones that were never fully legitimate in the

first place. For example, military coups in postcolonial Africa

replaced liberal democratic forms which departing colonialists had

constructed in haste, with little concern for long-term effectiveness.

Similarly, in interwar Germany, the Weimar Republic overthrown by

Hitler was never fully legitimate nor particularly effective.43

When democracies do collapse, the underlying cause is often the

same as for authoritarian regimes. The crucial factor is the inability

of the government to resolve pressing problems, economic or

military. This suggests that the prognosis for democracy over the

next few decades is favourable but not guaranteed.

The future health of democracy depends on the continuing capacity

of rulers to prevent or resolve social, economic and military

problems. In the twenty-first century, there may be no coherent

alternative to liberal democracy and the market economy. But this

will not be enough to prevent demagogu.es from seeking to exploit

the opportunities provided by disillusioned citizens, particularly in

ethnically-divided societies where national boundaries remain

contested. Democracy may be partly 'self-legitimizing' in that people

who help to shape decisions then feel obliged to abide by them. But

43 Op. cit., no. 31, p33

48

democracy, like any other form of rule, will also continue to be

judged by results.

Central Asia

Unlike many independent states that fought and won their freedom

from various forms of colonial or invading powers, the five states of

Central Asia-Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan

'llo and Uzbekistan -were all handed their independence in 1991 by

the crumbling Soviet Union and only hesitantly accepted it. "Few

peoples of the world have ever been forced to become independent

nations. Yet that is precisely what happened to the five Central

Asian republics .... "44 So far all the five Central Asian states have

managed to wade through the transition and form independent

nations in the post-Soviet era.

Among the numerous issues facing the newly independent states

were: governmental institutions, constitutions and overall

government structures; declining economies and the challenges of

economic transitions; cultural and minority groups, including the

large "minorities" of Russians, especially in Kazakhstan; developing

disrupted and often destroyed environments; using but not wasting

the large deposits of natural resources such as natural gas and oil;

and building foreign relations that would take advantage of the

44 Martha Brill Olcott, "Central Asia's Catapult to Independence," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 71, No. 3 (Summer) 1992. Also see Martha Brill Olcott, Central Asia's New States: Independence, Foreign Policy and Regional Security, United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington D.C., 1996, pp 3-20.

49

region's natural resources and central geographical location without

allowing outside actors to e:xploit them.

Most experts agree that the current state of democracy in Central

Asia, eight years after independence,· is bleak. "The emergent

regimes appear at their best as a hybrid between authoritarianism

and democracy, at their worst as offering a choice between state

disintegration and totalitarianism."45

In May 1992, Tajikistan government forces turned violent against a

peaceful public demonstrations in favor of democratic reforms and

civil war quickly followed. In December 1992, the hard-liners

regained power and any fledgling democratic institutions or ideas

were quickly stifled.46 The victorious parties, however, soon split

among themselves.47 Today, a "fragile coalition with the Islamic

opposition"48 and the secular ruling hard-line party and economic

dependence on Russia and Uzbekistan49 hinder further democratic

development. so

The large minority of Russian - speakers in Kazakhstan has raised

the issue that many other former - Soviet states are presently

45 Anna Matveeva, "Democratization, Legitimacy and Political Change in Central Asia," in International Affairs 75, I, 1999, p31

46 Muriel Atkin, "Thwarted Democratization in Tajikistan," in Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott (eds), Conflict, Cleavage and Change in Central Asia and the Caucasus, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997, p 290.

47 ibid., p 30 48 The Economist, "Likely Lads," February 7, 1998. 49 Najam Abbas, "Tajik Fingers Pointing North: Rakhmanov's Rare Display Of Resentment Over

'Uzbek Interference,'" http://eurasianews.com/1117taj.htm. 50 Op.cit., no.45, p 44.

50

dealing with-the nature of a "nation-state." Language laws, single-

citizenship laws {having to choose between Russian or Kazakh

citizenship) and the "transfer of power and wealth" from the

Russians to the Kazakhs since independence have all threatened

the traditional superior positions of the Russians in Kazakhstan

and strengthened possibilities for ethnic conflict.s1 Kazakh

President Nursultan Nazarbaev, who led the country during Soviet

times as well, has managed to keep ethnic strife to a minimum

since independence. However, this issue is a constant threat to

stability in the region.

By 1994, Kyrgyzstan began showing anti-democratic signs.

Newspapers were banned, elections rigged, corruption uncovered

and presidentialism carried out through constitutional changes. 52

Although it is still considered by the West to be the most

"outwardly" democratic nation of Central Asia, Kyrgyzstan seems to

be falling into the same anti-democratic traps as its neighbors, with

little to offer the world in return for vital foreign investment.

Many experts believe that Uzbekistan's President Islam Karimov is

the quintessentiaJ example of "presidentialism."53 The fact that

Uzbekistan houses the largest Islamic population of any of the

51 Martha Brill Olcott, "Democratization and the Growth of Political Participation in Kazakstan," in op.cit. no.46, p 216.

52 Martha Brill Olcott, Ce11tral Asia's New States: llldepelldellce, Foreign Policy a11d Regio11al Security, United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington D.C., 1996, pp 92-94.

53 Gregory Gleason, "Uzbekistan: The Politics of National Independence," in Ian Bremmer and Ray Taras (eds), New States New Politics: Buildi11g tile Post-Soviet Nations, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997, p 581

51

Central Asian states remains a constant threat to Karimov.54 He

walked relatively softly around this issue in the short time after

independence but soon enough began to talk about what he termed

"extremist" threats.

Turkmenistan resembles its Central Asian neighbors 1n its

Presidential-authoritarian government structure, tampered

elections, economic crisis and, like Kazakhstan an.d Uzbekistan, its

abundant reserves of natural gas and oil. Although ethnic strife

does not control the actions of the state, there has been an explicit

movement towards "Turkmenisation" of public and cultural

society.ss

In general, there has been no substantial structural reforms to

foster democracy in Central Asia. Ochs, referring to such

"stagnation" as "consciously arrested development," states simply

that Turkmenistan "is probably the least transformed former Soviet

republic."56 While other Central Asian states have made at least

nominal progress towards privatization and other market reforms in

the economic arena, for example, Turkmenistan has advocated slow

progress and implemented practically nothing.s7

As mentioned above, presidentialism and authoritarianism rule

Central Asian governments. The Economist goes as far as simply

54 op.cit., no.52, p 117 55 David Nissman, "Turkmenistan: Just Like Old Times," in ibid., p 644. 56 Michael Ochs, "Turkmenistan: The Quest for Stability and Control," in op.cit., no.8, p 348. 57 ibid., p 312

52

stating, "Broadly, the Caucasus has strong presidents, whereas

Central Asia has dictators." ss Zakaria even refers to Kazakhstan as

being a "near-tyranny."59 The main reasons for such observations

are due to · following reasons. Political parties are generally only

allowed to register selectively and their power is often rendered null

due to corrupt elections, government-controlled press and physical

threats and oppression. Four of the five states' constitutions

(Turkmenistan is the exception) proclaim democratic, multi-party

politics, but few live up to this. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan come

the closest to upholding the promises their Constitutions make.

According to the 1998 Freedom House report, 60 twelve legalized

political parties existed in Kazakhstan by 1996 and eighteen

currently exist in Kyrgyzstan6 1• These two states have been awarded

the label of "transitional" in their polity and economy, as opposed to

Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan that were labeled

"consolidated autocracy" in their polity and "consolidated statist" in

their economy.62

Thus, even in such uncertain atmospheres as in Central Asia, some

positive sign for democracy cannot be ruled out. Slow but certain

growth of civil society is taking place, which is good for democracy.

New NGOs, both domestic and foreign, are coming up. But, many

58 Tile Economist, "Likely Lads," February 7, 1998. 59 Fareed Zakaria, "The Rise of Illiberal Democracy," Foreign Affairs, (November/December)

1997,p.24. 6° Freedom House, Nations in Transit 1998, http://freedomhouse.org/nit98. 61 Op.cit., no.51, pp 210-212. 62 ibid., p 212.

53

foreign observers reduced the question of the five republics' future

development to the simple question of whether they would move

toward the Turkish model of secular democracy or toward Iranian­

style theocracy. But the past three years have shown that,

especially in Tashkent and the other capitals of the region, there is

a strong inclination to neither copy any model nor to throw

themselves into the arms of a new "big. brother," but rather to strive

for development on the foundation of Central Asia's own cultural

heritage.63

63 Swiss Review of World Affairs, "New Contours for an Old Region," May 2, 1995.

54