Chapter 21 Population and Development - CyberArts Grade 8

80:20 development in an unequal world | 303

21 The right to choose– population and developmentRob Bowden

“The Millennium Development Goals, particularly theeradication of extreme poverty and hunger, cannot beachieved if questions of population and reproductivehealth care are not squarely addressed. And that meansstronger efforts to promote women’s rights and greaterinvestment in education and health, includingreproductive health and family planning.”

- UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, Bangkok

Another half a billion – did any one notice?

The latest report on world population released by the UnitedNations in 2006 (World Population Prospects: The 2004Revision), estimated the world population to have reached 6.5billion by mid-2005. This is an increase of half a billion peoplesince the landmark of the six billionth person was passed in1999 and is in line with predictions made at that time.Accordingly, the world population is increasing by some208,000 people every day. Even allowing for declines in thisgrowth rate, this still means that a child born at the dawnof the new millennium will witness a fifty per centincrease in the population of their planet, to around 9billion, by the time they celebrate their 50th birthday.Only after 2200 is world population expected to peakand stabilise at a little over 10 billion.

It is easy to be dismissive of such figures whenthey follow anticipated trends. Indeed,compared with the fanfare and mediaattention that greeted the world’s sixbillionth person there has been little- if any - attention given to thesix and a half billionth. Butbehind these numbers are realpeople, like you and me and mychildren, both of whom were bornwithin that period and make up partof that additional half billion.

1750 791 million

1804 1 billion

1900 1.7 billion

1927 2 billion

1950 2.5 billion

1960 3 billion

1974 4 billion

1987 5 billion

1999 6 billion

2005 6.5 billion

2013 7 billion

2028 8 billion

2050 9 billion

2150 9.7 billion

1750 1800 1850 1900 1950 2000 2050 2100 2150

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When considered at a regional level, it isbeyond debate that the vast majority ofrecent and future population growth hasbeen in the less developed regions of theworld. Between 2005 and 2050, the moredeveloped regions are expected toincrease their population by only around25 million. This compares with anexpected increase in less developedregions of some 2,587 million. In fact, ona ratio basis, 99 per cent of futurepopulation growth is expected to be inless developed regions.

The fastest population growth rates todayare in the fifty nations that comprise theleast developed group of countries. Inthese countries the average fertility level(number of children born per woman)over the period 2000-2005 was 5.02,compared to 2.58 in other less developedregions and 1.56 in the more developedregions. Africa, with the greatest numberof least developed nations, also registersthe highest average fertility levels of 4.97(2000-2005). In 12 African nationsincluding Niger, Uganda, Congo DR, Mali,Sierra Leone and Angola there has beenvirtually no change in fertility levels sincethe 1950s and all had fertility rates ofover 6.5 children per woman in 2000-2005.

High fertility in the least developedcountries

The implications of high fertility within the leastdeveloped group of countries is significant. Nationalgovernments and the international community arealready struggling to implement the MillenniumDevelopment Goals of 2015 (see MDG chapter 14)in these regions and rapid increases in population andsubsequent demands on basic services such as healthcare and education, threaten to undermine whatprogress there has been. With the proportion of theworld’s population living in the least developed regionsof the world expected to increase from 11.7 per centin 2005 to 19.1 per cent in 2050, there is considerableurgency to address the underlying factors ofpopulation growth in these countries. This becomes allthe more apparent when one realises that theestimated growth rates used in this chapter are allbased on assumptions that progress in areas such asfertility decline will be made. If fertility were to remainas it is today, then the population of the leastdeveloped regions would increase from 759 million in2005 to 2.7 billion by 2050, a full billion more thanunder the assumed scenario.

80:20 development in an unequal world304 |

A sixteen year old Ugandangirl with her recently bornfirst child. Uganda has oneof the highest fertility ratesin the world and is one ofnine countries in the worldexpected to jointly accountfor half of the world’spopulation increasebetween 2005-2050.

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Population(millions),

2005

Projected Population(millions),

2050

Projected Population(% of world total),

2050

Total fertility rate,

2000 - 2005

Projected totalfertility rate,

2045 - 2050

Population(% of world total),

2005

Africa

Asia

Europe

Latin America &Caribbean

North America

Oceania

More developedregions

Less developedregions

Least developedregions

World

906 1937 14.0 21.3 4.97 2.52

3905 5217 60.4 57.5 2.47 1.91

728 653 11.3 7.2 1.40 1.83

561 783 8.7 8.6 2.55 1.86

331 438 5.1 4.8 1.99 1.85

33 48 0.5 0.5 2.32 1.92

1211 1236 18.7 13.6 1.56 1.84

5253 7840 81.3 86.4 2.90 2.07

759 1735 11.7 19.1 5.02 2.57

6465 9076 100 100 2.65 2.05

Beware of numbers!

When thinking about population and developmentit is important to treat numbers with caution. Thisis especially so when they are predictive forecastsbased on hypothetical scenarios. Most are littlemore than good (and sometimes not so good)estimates. In 2006 for example the UN releasedpredictions for a 2150population of some 9.7billion, a figuresignificantly lower thanthe 11.6 billion theypredicted for the samedate in 1992. If the UN’smain population monitoringagency can revise its figures byalmost 2 billion people, or 16per cent, in little more than adecade then how much faith canbe placed in such estimates mustbe seriously questioned.

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Besides their often dubious accuracy, a pre-occupation with population statistics andpredictive scenarios has a tendency to dehumaniseand reduce the complex population anddevelopment nexus into meaningless mathematicalpolemics. As a result, the realities of people on theground, the core of the population anddevelopment debate, are often strangely absent.

Why does it matter…

“The unprecedented surge in population,combined with rising individualconsumption, is pushing our claims on theplanet beyond its natural limits…. Despitethe many encouraging demographic trends,the need to stabilize global population is asurgent as ever.”

- Beyond Malthus by Lester R Brown et al, 2000

…or does it?

“There are no limits to carrying capacity ofthe earth that are likely to bind at any timein the foreseeable future. There isn’t a risk ofan apocalypse due to global warming oranything else. The idea that the world isheaded over an abyss is profoundly wrong.The idea that we should put limits ongrowth because of some natural limit is aprofound error.”

- Lawrence Summers, former chief economistWorld Bank and former Secretary

to the US Treasury, 1990s

These two opposing quotes epitomise thepolarisation that exists in debates aroundpopulation and development. Put simply thedebate is based around the idea of theEarth having a finite ability to support thehuman population and its activities. Foralmost 200 years scientists of variouspersuasions (the pessimists) have beenpredicting the imminent collapse of theEarth’s life support systems and, with it, thehuman population as we know it. Dramaticstuff, but many argue that to date thesecalamities have not (yet) materialised. Thereis thus an equally strong school of thought(the optimists) that believes in the ingenuityof humanity to overcome any limits throughinnovation, adaptation, technology anddevelopment. Despite decades of debate,this bipolar interpretation remainsremarkably intact and still leans heavily onthe theories of its earliest proponents –Malthus for the pessimists and Boserup forthe optimists.


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Put simply the population debate is based aroundthe idea of the Earth having a finite ability tosupport the human population and its activities.

Pessimists v. Optimists

Achieving a better life for child six billionand all who follow him/her is a matter ofgreat contention. Theories as to the causallinks between population and developmentand the concomitant solutions abound, butthey can be broadly classed into two age-old camps – the pessimists and theoptimists.


The OptimistsFar from viewing population as a problem, agroup of scholars known as the optimists,believe that population is in fact an incentiveto development and prosperity. Thisapproach to population and development hasbeen popularised by the writings of EsterBoserup and, more recently, by the economistJulian Simon who refers to people as ‘theultimate resource’.

Optimists often point to the fact that globalfood supply per person has kept ahead ofpopulation growth since the 1970s throughinnovations such as high-yielding varieties(HYVs) of crops and the improved harvesting,processing and storage of food stuffs. Thesechanges, they would contest, were allbrought about by human reaction topopulation pressure and resource scarcity.

The optimistic approach to population ispopular among economists as it endorses thecontinued use of resources for human gain inthe knowledge that, when necessary, humaningenuity will provide a solution to theirscarcity, such as an alternative, or technologyto reach previously inaccessible supplies.

The Pessimists Based on the ideas of British economist Thomas Malthus,writing in 1798, the pessimists argue that populationgrowth is exerting too much pressure on the naturalresource base and is unsustainable. Supporters of suchideas (known as neo-Malthusians) believe that the planetcannot support greater human numbers and is alreadyoverpopulated. Chief among the neo-Malthusians arePaul and Anne Ehrlich. Their publication, ‘The PopulationBomb’ (1968) applied Malthus’ principles at a broaderlevel of resource availability.

According to the Ehrlichs, there were simply too manypeople on our planet and its ability to support suchnumbers was close to breaking point, hence the analogyof a bomb waiting to explode. By 1990 when theEhrlichs reformulated their arguments in ‘The PopulationExplosion’, the bomb had, according to them, alreadyexploded. Global warming, groundwater depletion anddeclining world grain stocks, were cited as proof of thisreality. The time had come to limit the damage throughimmediate, even drastic actions to control populationgrowth. As they state very clearly in the introduction to‘The Population Explosion’, ‘…anyone opposing birthcontrol is unknowingly voting to have human populationsize controlled by a massive increase in early deaths’.

Such views were not new and had prevailed since the1960s, dominating much of development thinking andassistance. This is seen in an address by the then USPresident, Lyndon Johnson, to the United Nations in1965, ‘Let us act on the fact that less than five dollarsinvested in population control is worth a hundred dollarsinvested in economic growth’

For pessimists then, population itself is the problem andits control, the answer to the world’s development andenvironment problems. In their minds it is overpopulationthat causes environmental degradation, keeps millions inpoverty and ultimately destabilises economies andsocieties.

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Boserup (the optimist)Boserup argued in the mid-1960s, thatpopulation was not a problem, but rather astimulus for innovation and development.Survival would stimulate human ingenuity andimprove people’s standard of living. Shebelieved in agricultural intensification and ininnovations such as irrigation, terracing,mechanisation and the use of fertilisers.

Malthus (the pessimist)The basis of his theory is very simple. Populationgrows in a geometric pattern (2, 4, 8, 16, 32….etc),but food supplies can only increase arithmetically (2,3, 4, 5, 6….etc). Therefore at some point, unlesscontrolled, population will exceed the ability of theenvironment to support it.

Rev. Thomas Robert Malthus – 1766 to1834 – was an English demographer andpolitical economist and is best known forhis pessimistic but highly influentialviews about population.

Ester Boserup – 1910 to 1999 – was aDanish economist who specialised ineconomic development and agricultureand worked at the UN.

Betting the Planet: The Sequel

Last August, New York Times columnist JohnTierney placed a bet with Houston energyprognosticator Matthew Simmons (a leadingproponent of the “peak oil” theory) about thefuture price movements of crude oil, with eachside putting up US$5,000. The episode wasregarded by many as a kind of sequel to thefamous bet in the 1980s between libertarianeconomist Julian Simon and ecologist PaulEhrlich, which Simon won.

Simmons had argued that “oil prices will soarinto the triple digits” in the coming years. Morespecifically, prices would more than triple thecontemporary figure of $65 a barrel by 2010,reaching “at least $200 a barrel” (in 2005dollars). His thesis was based on the argumentthat the world’s oil resources – most notably inthe Middle East – will become increasinglyscarce. But what has actually been happeningwith oil prices lately?

Data from the International Monetary Fundoffer an interesting read. Using the average ofthree spot prices, the monthly figures for oilprices from September to February (2005-2006)were (per barrel, in current US dollars) $61.65,$58.18, $54.98, $56.47, $62.36, and $59.71.In other words, there has in fact been a 3.5%fall in oil prices if we were to compare the latestprices to last August.

Bear in mind that during 2006, there has beenincreased violence in Iraq that has rendered itsoil assets vulnerable. We have seen energysupplies in Europe being threatened by Russia’soil diplomacy in Ukraine. We have seenVenezuelan President Hugo Chavez threateningto disrupt oil exports to North America. TheIranian president has delivered frequent threatsto cut exports to the oil markets to drive pricesup. All this is not to mention the fact thatHurricanes Katrina and Rita caused considerabledamage to oil supplies and refinery facilities inthe United States and adjacent countries. Itcould be argued that the reserves wereadequate to avoid any supply crunch thatwould have raised prices, and that there waslittle tangible damage to oil supplies to theglobal market. However, knowing how

speculative markets can be, it is indeed curiousto see oil prices not rising to levels suggested bySimmons. How can we explain the failure of thedoomsayers’ predictions to pan out?

Perhaps we can take a cue from the argumentsof the late Julian Simon, who suggested thatconstant human endeavours have ensuredthroughout the centuries that commoditieshave gradually become easier to acquire, andnew techniques have continually beendeveloped to make use of them moreefficiently. In his book The Ultimate Resource,Simon even argued that a larger population is anet benefit, not a cost, because the additionalpeople increase the pace of innovation thatallows the more effective exploitation andefficient use of resources.

With respect to oil prices, there are significantfactors tending to depress prices, such as thedrive in many countries toward alternativesources of energy and an emphasis on greenercars and energy efficiency. Thus, though thedemand for oil in China and India is indeedsteeply increasing, this alone is unlikely to pushthe price through the ceiling.

Ehrlich, the author of The Population Bomb,The End of Affluence and other books, rejectsthis optimistic line of thought, and predicts adoomsday for mankind if it continues itsdynamic lifestyle (as he has been doing sincethe 1970s). The problem with the arguments ofEhrlich and other like-minded prophets of doomis that they are asking too much of 21st-centurycapitalist men and women, and simultaneouslyignoring their capabilities. Is it fair to ask anIndian taxi driver who earns perhaps less than$5 a day to spend more than his monthlywages to install a more energy-efficient engineor take his car for servicing more frequently?

Surely this is the larger question thegovernments of poorer countries must throw atthe Organisation of Economic Cooperation andDevelopment nations – why should they be leftbehind on the pretext of damaging theenvironment, when Europe and the Westvirtually industrialised on the corpse of theirown (and the world’s) environment and bystretching their empires’ resources? The only


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long-lasting response must come from thosewho can afford this technology. Only if richernations genuinely assist their poorercounterparts by providing cheap access to suchtechnology will they be able to persuade themto be greener.

Reviewing the history of the Simon/Ehrlichwager is instructive. Simon challenged Ehrlichand other environmental scientists to a bet thatthe price of natural resources would go down,not up as they had been predicting, and offeredto let the environmentalists pick the specificcommodities and the time frame. Ehrlichaccepted the bet for $1,000 worth of copper,tin, nickel, tungsten and chromium, wageringthat the price of the five would increasebetween 1980 and 1990. When Simon andEhrlich checked their predictions against realprice movements in 1990, Simon emerged theclear winner – indeed, the price decline of themetal-commodity basket was so steep that hewould have won even without adjusting forinflation.

What if the bet had been extended? Taking1980 prices = 100, in 2000 copper prices weredown by 48% since 1990, and although theprices rose slightly after that, in 2005 (averageuntil the end of November for this andconsequent figures) the price was still about18% lower than in 1990, instead of rising asthe pessimists had predicted. Similarly, tin priceshad fallen by nearly 26% in 2005 vis-a-vis1990, while they were down by 32% in 2000,whereas tungsten prices plummeted by nearly48% between 1990 and 2000. Although theyhave subsequently risen, they are still below the1980 mark.

The US Bureau of Labor Statistics has aninteresting consumer-price-index tool thatcalculates the purchasing power of money in agiven year and compares it with how much itcould purchase in another year. Although this isbased on US inflation rates, it does give a roughindication of what the current prices actuallyimply. For example, if we were to calculatecrude-oil prices in 2005 dollars, then the figurefor 1980 would be $85.61 a barrel and the2005 counterpart about $55 a barrel. It needs

to be kept in mind that 1970 oil prices would beeven higher. Similarly, the price of rice hasplummeted from $1,039 a tonne in 1980 to$288 a tonne in 2005, whereas wheat has sunkfrom $414.19 a tonne in 1980 to $151.34 in2005.

I am no hardcore Simonite. I have my ownreservations about whether the intentions ofactors in the global market will spontaneouslyreach equilibrium with the demands of the globalenvironment. I still believe that self-interest willlead to short-termism, and an awareness of thewider picture is necessary. But Simon provokesthe question of whether such awareness can onlycome when the machine of capitalism is leadingto constant innovation and developing newertechniques to extract and use resources. Histhesis on population being the ultimate resourceadmittedly does depend on the capability ofcountries to build institutions that turnconsumers into producers, but it is a thought-provoking argument nonetheless.

The outcome of this latest episode in the legacyof Julian Simon – as this latest bet might prove tobe – will raise important questions, and perhapsprovide some answers to the lasting validity ofhis ideas. Certainly, we will know the answer onJanuary 1, 2011, when either Tierney orSimmons will collect his $10,000, plusaccumulated interest.

- Source: Aruni Mukherjee (University of Warwick), Asia Times, 03 April 2006.

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Why should they be left behind on thepretext of damaging the environment whenEurope and the West virtually industrialisedon the corpse of their own (and the world’s)environment and by stretching theirempires’ resources? The only long-lastingresponse must come from those who canafford this technology. Only if richer nationsgenuinely assist their poorer counterpartsby providing cheap access to suchtechnology will they be able to persuadethem to be greener.

Population and globalisation

The population debate as it is commonly presentedtends to focus on events and examples at a localscale, ignoring the implications of an increasinglyglobalised world and the movement of resourcesand, increasingly, people across borders andboundaries. Such narrow thinking is heavilyinfluenced by the concept of population carryingcapacity, defined by the United Nations Conferenceon Environment and Development (UNCED) as‘…the number of people an area can supportwithout compromising its ability to do so in thefuture…’

The problem with this concept is that the populationof any specific area (be that city, country or evenregion) is often supported by resources beyond itsphysical boundaries, thus artificially extending itscarrying capacity. By default, the area from whichthose resources derive may suffer a correspondingreduction in its own carrying capacity. In an era ofincreasing globalisation such transfers of populationcarrying capacity can not be ignored. The simplepopulation-environment-resource nexus thatdominates the ideas of both pessimists and optimistsneeds to recognise that it does not exist in avacuum, but is subject to political and economicforces. As things stand, these forces favour moredeveloped regions of the world with their morepowerful governments, wealthier economies andglobal corporations. As a result, there is a nettransfer of resources (this includes human resourcesand particularly skilled labour) towards moredeveloped regions. Less developed regions can findthemselves depleted of key resources (including theskills base that might deliver the innovation theoptimists talk of) that otherwise might havefurthered the development of their own people andeconomies.

The complexity of the global era makes the trueimplications of such transfers on population anddevelopment very difficult to assess. There are,however, some very clear examples such as thecurrent trend for more developed nations such asthe UK and USA to actively recruit trained medicalpersonnel from less developed regions. These are thesame less developed regions in which improvementsin healthcare are considered essential to loweringfertility levels and, therefore, population growth.One method that makes a broader attempt to


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introduce a political and economic facet to thedebate is the concept of ‘ecological footprints’ (seechapter 4).

At a regional level the ecological footprint becomeseven more insightful. The latest (2004) report findsthat North America (population 319 million) had anecological footprint of 9.2 global hectares per personin 2001 and Western Europe (population 390 million)a footprint of 5.1 global hectares per person. Thiscompares with the Asia Pacific (population 3407million) whose footprint per person was 1.3 globalhectares and Africa (population 810 million) at 1.2global hectares per person.

Of course, to fully assess the implications of theecological footprint you have to also consider therelative bio-capacity of the region. This finds that in2001 all regions except Africa, Latin America and theCaribbean and Central and Eastern Europe, hadecological footprints that exceeded their bio-capacity.North America and Western Europe were the regionsto exceed their bio-capacity by the biggest margins at3.9 and 3.0 global hectares per person respectively.

There are many things the ecological footprint doesnot account for, and the availability and reliability ofthe data upon which it is based is questionable.Nevertheless the ecological footprint adds a furtherdimension to the population debate and in thecontext of development, challenges the oftenreplicated notion that the ‘population problem’ isconfined to less developed regions. Ecologicalfootprint analysis informs us that North Americaexceeds its ecological limits by 74 per cent andWestern Europe (an area of population decline) by242 per cent! Where now then is the populationproblem?

The power of choice

“The world population in 2050 will be decided bythree billion women. If every second woman decidesto have three rather than two children, the populationwill be 27 billion… If, however, every second womandecides to have only one child instead of two, theworld population will sink to 3.6 billion.”

- Population Politics by Virginia Abernethy cited in The LittleEarth Book (2nd Edition) by James Bruges, 2001.

Choice is central to questions of population anddevelopment, or at least it should be! The reality is


that through poverty, lack of education, inadequatehealthcare facilities, and oppressive socio-culturalattitudes, women are often deprived of choice. Thisis not just a denial of their basic human rights, butalso means that many women have more childrenthan they would otherwise choose. This has obviousimplications for fertility rates and population growth,but also for development as a whole. It is harder, forexample, to keep a large family in food and shelter,harder to send more children to school or for properhealthcare in times of sickness. Accordingly, these

children too may grow up deprived of the basicrights and opportunities that enable them to chooseand so the cycle is perpetually replicated.

Breaking the cycle requires an approach thatrecognises parents may not have large families out ofwant, but because prevailing levels of developmentdeny them the ability to make, and act upon, aninformed choice. Recognition of this came, at least inpopular terms, in the form of a populationconference in 1974 (see box below).

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Development is the best contraceptive

For many years governments and demographers treated population growth as something to becontrolled. Population control through contraceptive use, sterilisation (forced in the case of Indiaat one stage) and social stigmatisation in the case of China’s infamous one child policy, were allthe norm. It was at the 1974 World Conference on Population and Development held inBucharest that things started to change. A social view of population growth emerged, togetherwith a now famous statement that “Development is the best contraceptive”. This recognised thatempowering parents, and especially women, to make choices regarding their family size was moreeffective and sustainable than any form of control policy. This new approach would be deliveredthrough development and, in particular, the delivery of basic education for girls and improvedaccess to health services. Reproductive healthcare emerged as a result and the analysis ofpopulation growth broadened to become more explicitly connected to development.

Following the Bucharest conference, the idea of development playing a central role in slowingpopulation growth gathered momentum and, together with a general heightening of concernaround human rights, led to a distinctly human rights approach to population and development.This acknowledges reproductive choice, especially for women, as a basic human right and isfocussed on the provision, through development, of an enabling environment in which people arebetter able to exercise the right to choose.

The value of children

Social approaches to population demonstratethat a population will continue to grow whilethe net transfer of benefits flows from childrento their parents. Children in many less developedcountries form an important component of thehousehold, assisting in both domestic andeconomic roles. In fact from the age of 12many children will contribute as much tohousehold income and sustenance as adults. Insuch societies, having many children (highfertility) boosts family well-being and providessecurity (in the near universal absence of stateprovision) for parents in their old age. Highinfant and child mortality creates a furtherupward pressure on fertility levels in order toassure that a critical level of population ismaintained.

As countries develop, however, and children areremoved from the household through theirgreater participation in the education system,the benefits of a large family begin to diminish.Over time, the net transfer of benefits switchesto flow from the parents to the children andencourages parents to make rational choicesabout the number of children they have. Inaddition, improvements in primary healthcare(immunisation, child health, etc) reduce infantand child mortality, creating downward pressureon fertility levels as children’s chances of survivalimprove.


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Creating an enabling environment

“With greater opportunities for education(especially female education), reduction of mortalityrates (especially of children), improvement ofeconomic security (especially in old age), andgreater participation of women in employment andin political action, fast reductions in birth can beexpected to result through the decisions of thosewhose lives depend on them.”

- Amartya Sen, New York Review, September 1994

The argument for creating an enabling environmentin which reproductive healthcare engenders optionsand choice is premised on the notion that, givensufficient opportunity, parents, and especiallywomen, will make the best choices for boththemselves and society. The logic for this argumentis partly based around the idea of children having avalue (see box opposite), but also on the fact thatsome 80 million annual pregnancies are unwanted –more than the present annual addition to worldpopulation.

The main instruments for delivering choice areeducation and primary health care (PHC). Wherewomen have benefited from education there is anoticeable reduction in infant and maternal mortalityrates and a subsequent fall in fertility levels. Thegraph below demonstrates this correlation clearly incomparing recent total fertility rates with femalesecondary enrolment rates. Other historical studieshave demonstrated that even a relatively basic level

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Total fertility rates and female secondary enrolment, 2000-2004


of education can have a considerable impact onchild mortality rates. The graphic ‘Educating girlssaves lives’ above provides evidence from one suchstudy conducted in the 1990s. This shows that eventhe completion of primary schooling alone can leadto a virtual halving of under five mortality rates. Itallows women to read instructions and advice, givesthem the confidence and awareness to seekprofessional advice, and in many instances willdirectly educate them in areas such as familyplanning and sexual education.

PHC initiatives are just as influential on parents andpopulation growth and are the primary motivatorbehind falls in fertility experienced in moredeveloped regions. The provision of potable waterand effective sanitation for example can have adramatic impact on illness and mortality rates byreducing the incidence of water related diseases.Simple measures such as teaching people to washtheir hands before preparing or consuming food andwater have been shown to reduce cases of diarrhoea– the world’s leading cause of child mortality – by atleast 35 per cent. Where PHC has been extended topromote immunisation against childhood diseases,awareness and prevention of malaria, andinformation about and access to contraceptives, the

results have been equally impressive. The fact is thatin addition to the 80 million unwanted pregnancieseach year, it is estimated that up to 150 millionwomen wish to better plan their pregnancies andthe spacing and number of their children.

Education and PHC are enshrined within theMillennium Development Goals set for 2015. If thesegoals are met (and to date that looks unlikely formany of the least developed countries) they wouldhelp create an environment in which manyunwanted pregnancies are avoided and enableparents (especially women) to better choose the sizeand timing of their families. All the evidencesuggests that this would lead to conditions in whichparents themselves limit the size of their families,fertility is lowered and population growth slows.Under this scenario it would be possible to reducepopulation growth to near replacement levels (totalfertility of 2.1 children is classified as replacementlevel) within just a generation or two, but this is byno means the end of the issue. The size of thepopulation would continue to grow for some timeas younger generations entered the reproductivestages of their lives (albeit at lower fertility levels) – a phenomenon known as population momentum.

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Colombia1995

0 50 100 150 200

Jordan1990

Nigeria1990

Philippines1993

(under-5 mortality rates – deaths per 1,000 live births – by mother's level of education)

No education Primary incomplete Primary complete Secondary/higher

7441

2925

6241

3124

211190

138113

15295

7042

Educating girls saves lives


Reading

■ World Population Prospects: The 2004 Revision, Volume III (Analytical Report)

■ United Nations 2006(http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/WPP2004/WPP2004_Volume3.htm)

■ The Little Earth Book (2nd Edition) by James Bruges, Alastair Sawday Publishing Co. Ltd 2001

■ Beyond Malthus: nineteen dimensions of the population challenge by Lester R Brown et al,Earthscan 2000

■ The Living Planet Report 2004 by WWF, WWF International 2004(http://www.panda.org/news_facts/publications/key_publications/living_planet_report/index.cfm)

Conclusion: A Changing Climate?

If efforts to bring reproductive rights to all prove successful then notions such as populationmomentum are likely to shift attention back towards the age old debates of population andcarrying capacity. Indeed, the apparently looming spectre of climate change is already witnessing arebirth of the pessimists and doomsday theorists. The danger of this is that it is occurring at atime when millions of people, particularly in the less and least developed regions of the world arestill denied the basic rights that afford then reproductive choices. There is a danger that eventsand political pressure could turn policy makers away from an era of enabling and empoweringand back towards one of control and restraint. Such measures have proven ineffective in the pastand there is little evidence to suggest they would be any more successful in the future. What ismore, they would change the climate back towards a single issue approach, divorcingdevelopment from population and ignoring the interrelationships and complexities that are thecrux of the issue.

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- Source: Paul Bairoch, Economics and World History, 1993, Harvester Wheatsheaf

Estimates of the ratio between the wealth ofthe ‘developed’ world and the Third World.

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19501975

2000 20252050

World

Asia

Africa

Europe

Lat. America & Caribbean

North America

The evolution of population by continent(1950-2050)


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Market scene, Lusaka, Zambia by Stary Mwaba. To see more of Stary’s paintingsgo to www.8020.ie/gal_stary.htm

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Chapter 21 Population and Development - CyberArts Grade 8