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Chapter 1

ThePresident’sSecretCrimeReport

RonaldReaganwaselectedpresidentinNovember1980withanagendathatincludedmakingthecountrysaferfromviolentformsofstreetcrime.Thisgoalseemedquitesensibletomostvotersatthetime.TheReaganadministrationprom­iseda“gettough”approachtothepunishmentofcrime.Therewouldbereasonsforquestionslater,especiallyabouttheverypunitiveresponsetocrackcocaine,thedrugwhoseepidemicuse spread rapidly through America’s racial ghettos andspikedafearful,massive,andenormouslyexpensivegrowthinAmericanrelianceonimprisonmentthathaslastedformorethanaquartercentury.

But therewas steadfastagreement in the innermost circlesurroundingPresidentReaganin1980,acirclethatincludedhispersonallawyer,WilliamFrenchSmith,whobecameattor­ney general, and Reagan’s closest political adviser, EdwinMeese, who succeeded as attorney general when Smith re­turnedtohisCalifornia lawpractice.BothSmithandMeesebelieved it was time to lift what a presidential board sooncalled“theveiloffearovercrime.”Fearofcrimewasthead­ministration’soverridingconcern.

EarlyinhisadministrationRonaldReaganappointedapresi­dential advisory board with the mandate to, in conjunction

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withtheNationalInstituteofJustice,recommendjusticesys­tempoliciesandresearchpriorities.Theappointeeswerere­placementsforboardmembersselectedbyJimmyCarterbe­fore he left office, some of whom filed lawsuits about theirremoval.ThenineteenReaganappointeesconsistedofafor­merspeechwriter,campaigncontributors,andcriminaljusticeofficials, as well as enduring political figures such as MitchMcConnell, presently the U.S. Senate minority leader fromKentucky. The board held hearings in LosAngeles,Atlanta,NewOrleans,andNashville,andmetwithpolicechiefsfromalloverthecountry.Theexperienceoftheboardoffersinstruc­tive insights intohowcrimepoliciesandprioritiesareoftenadvancedinAmerica.

Thepresident’sadvisoryboardreportedfindinggreatfearofcrimewhereverthememberswent.Theboardchairmanre­portedthatAttorneyGeneralSmithhadwalkedthestreetsofNewark and “talked with residents and shopkeepers andheardtheirdailyconcernsabouttheperilintheircommunityandthreatstotheirlivesandproperty.”Boardmembersvis­ited high­crime areas of Los Angeles, where they “saw thebarredwindows,lockedstorefronts,graffiti­riddenbuildings,awalled­inshoppingcenterandfelttheapprehensionofthepeople on their streets.” They found that homicide was theleadingcauseofdeathinLosAngeles,withsome1,700crimi­nalassaultsoccurringdaily.

Theadvisoryboardmemberswereconvinced that fearofcrime was growing and that the president urgently neededtheirinput.Theywantedtogiveclearvoicetotheirconcernsandrecommendations.Theytookasthesubtitleoftheirreport“ThePolice,Court,andCorrectionalOfficialsWhoAdministerAmerica’sCriminalJusticeSystemSpeakOutforChange.”

A Hired Pen

Giventhegravityofthetopicandthecircumstances,theboardwasdeterminedtowriteapersuasivereportwithrecommen­dations that would “strengthen the hand of the law in thecontestwiththelawless.”Theboardtookthiscommitmentso

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seriouslythatitdecidedtohireaprofessionalwritertosharpentheirmessageandthepoweroftheirrecommendations.TheirchoicewasJosephPersico.

Theboard’schoiceofPersicowassomewhatsurprisinginthathecametothetaskwithameasureofskepticismbasedonhisfirsthandexperiencewithNelsonRockefeller’spassageofdruglawsinthestateofNewYork.Persicolaterwouldwriteaward­winning books about Franklin Roosevelt and theNuremberg Trials, and he co­authored Colin Powell’s auto­biography.Hehadalreadydisplayedacapacitytowritenon­fictionwithabest­sellingbiographyofNelsonRockefellerthatincluded a chapter titled “The Imperial Governor.” PersicowasinanidealpositiontowriteaboutRockefellerbecausehehadbeenhisprincipal speechwriter formore thanadecadeand had observed firsthand the development of New YorkState’sdruglaws.

NewYork’sdruglawswereamongthemostpunitiveeverpassedintheUnitedStatesandhaveonlyrecentlybeenmod­erated.NewYork’slawsforeshadowedReagan’swarondrugs,as reflected in an anecdote told by Persico. He recalled thatRockefellerwaswarnedabouttheconsequencesofhispuni­tive proposals by an adviser who presciently predicted that“thejailscouldnotholdalltheprisonersthatthislawwouldgenerate,andthatpusherswouldrecruitminorstocarrytheirdope”(Persico1982:146). Iwillhavereasontoreturntothisprediction later in thebook.At the time, thisadvicehadal­readyledPersico(148)towonderabouttheroleofresearchinthedevelopmentofcrimepolicy:“WheredidNelsonRocke­fellergetthisidea?Hadpenologistsandjurists(likethePresi­dent’sAdvisoryBoard)urgedhimalongthiscourse?Was ittheproductofprofessionalinvestigationandresearch?”

Theanswerwasperhapssurprising.RockefellerhadsimplyheardfromaninterestedfamilyfriendaboutlowratesofdrugaddictioninJapanandtheuseoflifesentencesfordrugpush­ersinthatcountry.ThefriendwasWilliamFine,presidentoftheBonwitTellerdepartmentstore,whohadadrug­addicted

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sonandwhochairedacitydrugrehabilitationprogram.Rock­efellerlaterattendedapartyatwhichReaganaskedFineforfurther informationabout Japan’sdrug laws.Worriedabouthisreputationasaliberalandhislimitedcredentialsasacrimefighter, Rockefeller diverted Reagan’s request and movedswiftlyaheadwithhisownseverestatedruglegislation.ThisgavePersicoananswer tohisquestionabout the roleof re­search in Rockefeller’s crime policy: “the law under whichthousandsofnarcoticscaseswouldbetriedinthecourtsofagreatstatehadbeen...improvisationwithoutthedeadeninghandofoversophisticatedprofessionals”(Persico1982:148).

SoPersicoapproachedthepresident’scrimereportwiththeskepticismofahiredpenandadisillusionedpoliticalspeech­writer,yethealsobroughtanotablewritingtalenttothetaskofdraftingapresidentialreport.Hecraftedaninterestingtitle,“TooMuchCrime...TooLittle Justice,”andintroducedthethen innovative techniqueof interposingprovocativequota­tionsfrommembersoftheboardasboldedsidebarsthrough­outthereport.

Therecurringthemeofthereportwascapturedinaquota­tionfromthepresidentoftheNationalOrganizationforVic­timsAssistance,whoominouslyremarkedthat“Ifthereisanyproblemasdestructiveascrime,it isthefearofcrime”(Na­tionalInstituteofJustice[NIJ]1984:5).JamesK.“Skip”Stew­art,thedirectoroftheNationalInstituteofJustice,notedinhispreface to the report tworesearch literatures that channeledthis fear: (1)data revealing that themajorityof crimeswerecommittedbyasmallminorityofhighlyactiveoffenders,and(2)studieschallengingthevalueofindeterminatesentencesinreducingcriminalbehavior.Chapter4showsjusthowimpor­tant these two research sources were to a “developmentalcriminology”thatsetafoundationforcrimepolicyduringtheageofReagan.Indeed,muchthathasgonewronginAmeri­cancriminology,andtheroleithasplayedintheformationofnationalcrimepolicy,maybetracedtothemisguidedinflu­enceoftheabovetwoareasofresearch.

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Yet these research lines were not what focused Persico’sdraftingof the report to thepresident.Rather, theveryfirsthighlighted quotation, from Houston’s police chief, in theopeningchapterofthereportreflectedasenseofuncertaintyinPersico’sapproach,perhapsresultingfromhispastexperi­encewithRockefeller.HechosetoleadinboldletteringonthefirstpageofthereportwiththefollowingoverviewbyHous­tonpolicechiefLeeBrownoftheadvisoryboard’swork:“Wehavelookedatthecausationofcrimefromperspectivesrang­ingfromeconomicfactorsandphasesofthemoontobiologi­calphenomena....Doweknowwhatweneedtoknow?Areweaskingtherightquestions?Iamafraidatthepresenttimewearenot”(NIJ1984:4).

The Reagan administration never allowed “Too MuchCrime...TooLittleJustice”toseethepubliclightofday.Al­thoughtheInstituteuseditsownbudgettoprintmorethanathousandcopiesofthereport,whichweredramaticallyboundinadark,bloodredcover,thesecopiesofthereportneverlefttheloadingdockfordistribution.Atthelastmoment,some­oneintheDepartmentofJusticehaltedthereleaseofthere­port.TheonlyboundcopyIwasabletofindispreservedinthecollectedpapersofJosephPersicoattheStateUniversityofAlbanyLibrary.TheboardquietlywentoutofexistencewhentheReaganadministrationpassedtheAnti­DrugAbuseActof1986.

Too Much Crime . . . Too Little Justice

WhywouldtheworkofnineteenprominentAmericansandatalentedprofessionalwriteronatopicasimportantasseriousandviolentcrimehavebeensuppressedwhentheworkwasalreadycompletedand the reportwasboundand ready forpublic distribution? Joseph Persico’s answer is perhaps dis­cernible from his reaction to his own exposure to GovernorNelsonRockefeller’searlierdevelopmentofdrugenforcementpolicy.Persico(1982:149)writes:

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IneverfullyunderstoodthepsychologicalmilieuinwhichthechainoferrorsinVietnamwasforgeduntilIbecameinvolvedintheRockefellerdrugproposal.Thisexperiencebrought to life with stunning palpability psychologistIrvingJanis’descriptionofgroupthink:“theconcurrence­seeking tendency which fosters over­optimism, lack ofvigilance and sloganistic thinking about the weaknessandimmoralityofoutgroups.”

It may have been the déjà vu nature of this experience thatframedPersico’swritingofthepresident’sreport.Itwasprob­ablytheuncertaintoneandcontentofthereportthatcausedReagan’sJusticeDepartmenttoblockitsdistribution.

Inboldcontrasttothereport,therewasstirringcertaintytoRonald Reagan’s message to the voting public about crime.Reaganvoicedastrongconviction that therewasaltogetherTooMuchCrime,justasthetitleofthereportindicated.Butthesubtitle,“TooLittleJustice,”soundedanoteoffatalambi­guity.Wastheretoolittlejusticeforthevictims?Orwasitalso,oralternatively,toolittlejusticeforthedefendantsaccusedofthecrimes?Orwastheproblemthetaxespaidbythepublicfor the justice system?Thereport signaleduncertainty fromtheoutset,admittingthat“traditionalapproaches—theaddi­tionofmorepolice,detectivework,more judges,probation,paroleandrehabilitation—ascommonlypracticed—havenotbeenprovensubstantiallyeffectiveinpreventingcrimes,solv­ingcrimesorweaningrepeatoffendersfromalifeofcrime”(NIJ1984:4).

Furthermore, the report acknowledged that U.S. prisonswerealreadyextremelycostlyandovercrowded.Thenumberof Americans imprisoned had more than doubled over thepreviousdecade,andthereportlaudedcertainjurisdictionsinwhich“prisoncrowding[hadbeen]reducedthroughresearch­inspiredmanagementinnovations.”Theadvisoryboardprob­ablycouldnothaveimaginedthatthenumberofAmericans

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inprisonwouldmore thanquadrupleover thenext severaldecades,buttheboardmemberswerealreadyworriedaboutthefinancialifnothumancostsofagrowingrelianceonim­prisonment. The report was fundamentally uncertain aboutwhattodoaboutthissituation.Thisuncertaintyunderminedtheadministration’sstrongviewsand“cando”messageaboutcrimecontrol.

ThereportlookedtofurtherresearchforitsanswerstothecrimeproblemandplaceditsgreatestemphasisontheworkofAlfred Blumstein, who would later become president of theAmericanSocietyofCriminology.BlumsteinbecametheageofReagan’smostinfluentialcriminologist,buthealsolaterbe­cameoneofthemostquotedcriticsofthepoliciesofthisera.Blumsteinwasanoperationsresearcherwithabackgroundinthe use of engineering principles to organize and conductmajorsocialandgovernmentalprograms.Hehadworkedonplanning for the Vietnam War and had played a prominentscientificadvisoryroleintheearlierJohnsonadministration’spresidentialcommission,namedforitstopic,TheChallengeofCrime in a Free Society. I briefly introduce Blumstein’s ap­proachhereandthendiscussitmorefullyinlaterchapters.

The aspect ofAlfred Blumstein’s research agenda (Blum­stein,Cohen,andNagin1978;Blumsteinetal.1986)thatcap­turedtheadvisoryboard’shopesinvolvedtheconceptofthe“careercriminal”andBlumstein’sbroaderinterestinthestudyofcriminalcareers.Theboardwasencouragedbutalsofrus­trated by the perceived promise of this research agenda. Itfoundthat

Wearepresentlyrefining,throughresearch,possiblythebestcrime­fightingtoolavailable—acapacitytoidentifytheminorityofcareercriminalswhocommitthemajorityofcrimes.Yet,toomanypoliceforces,prosecutors,judgesandparoleauthoritiesstilllacktheresourcestoputthistool to work and thus concentrate on these one­personcrimewaves.(NIJ1984:4)

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Theboardblamedtheunrealizedpotentialofcareercriminalresearch to reducecrimeonpoorcoordination in the justicesystem.Theboardsawthelosersinthissituationasthevic­timsofcrimewhowere“pawnsofthe judicialprocess”andwhoserights“aresubordinatedtotherights—eventheconve­nience—oftheirvictimizers.”

Allofthisledtheboardmemberstoanuncomfortablyam­biguousconclusion.Theywerepainfullyawareofprisonover­crowdingandescalatingcosts.Theyalsoknewthatcrimeratesin theearly1980swerenotactually increasing. In fact, from1980until1985,Americanratesofseriousandviolentcrimesdeclinedfromtheirpreviouspeaklevel.Thiswasthelongestsustainedbreakinrisingcrimeratesfromtheearly1960stotheearly1990s.So,despitetheReaganadministration’scon­cernaboutcrimevictims,seriousandviolentvictimizationac­tuallydecreasedduringthispresident’sfirstterminoffice.

Notwithstandingthisperiodofdecliningstreetcrimeandamuch longer and more sustained decline beginning in theearly 1990s, however, rates of imprisonment in the UnitedStates uniformly and unrelentingly increased. When JosephPersicolinkedhisearlierexperiencewiththeRockefellerdruglawstothepresentdownturninseriousviolentcrime,hemusthaverealizedthathewasahiredpencaughtinapotentiallycontradictorypredicament.

The advisory board and its writer came to a meeting ofmindsbyplacingtheemphasisofthereportonfearofcrimeratherthanoncrimeitself.Theyfudgedthefactsbyclaimingcrimeratesweresteadywhentheywereactuallyfalling,andtheyreasonedthatevensteadycrimeratesatanunacceptablyhighlevelwereasourceofdamagingfear.Ratherthanusethecrime decline to reduce the fear of crime, they emphasizedwhattheydiscernedasafearfulspiralofcommunitydecline:

Fearofcrimecontinuestoriseeventhoughactualcrimerateshave tended tobesteady (atunacceptable levels).Thisfearbyitselfhasproducedtangiblenegativeeconomic

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andsocialcostsparticularlyforour innercities.Crime­waryresidentsandbusinesspeoplemakedecisionsaboutwhereandwhentheywillwork,shop,locate,openandclosestoreswhichcanhastenadecliningneighborhood’sdescentintodecay.(NIJ1984:5)

Theboardworriedthat“despairhasbeguntosetinthatany­thingcanbedoneabout this condition.”The report tried toargue that a reasoned pursuit of research­led innovationscould prospectively show a way to more hopeful solutions.However,forpoliticaladvisorsintheReaganadministration,suchasEdwinMeese,thisconclusionmusthavesoundedlikeWaiting for Godot.Thereportneverlefttheloadingdockandhasremainedanessentiallysecretdocumentforthepastthirdofacentury.

IargueinthisbookthatthesuppressionofPresidentRea­gan’ssecretcrimereportcoincidedwithamissedopportunity.Themissedopportunitywastherationalethatthedownturnincrimecouldhaveprovidedforshiftingresourcesawayfromtherapidlyrisingrelianceonimprisonmentthatwasstillgain­ing momentum. However, this policy option was the “pathnot taken” throughout the lastquarterof the twentiethcen­tury, when imprisonment increased to historically massivelevels. To understand this outcome requires a better under­standingofthepoliticsofcrimeinAmerica.

From Roosevelt to Reagan and Beyond

Therewasatimewhenitwasthoughtthatpresidentialpoli­ticshadlittletodowithcrimeinAmerica.Mostcrimeswereprosecutedunderstatelawsandinstateandmunicipalcourts,withthoseconvictedofthecrimesthensenttolocalandstatejails.However,JonathanSimon(2007)arguesthatthisbegantochangeduringtheGreatDepressionandwiththeelectionofFranklinRoosevelt.Evenearlier,perhapsbeginningmostobviously with the national passage of Prohibition nearly a

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centuryago,crimebecameanincreasinglyimportantfocusoffederalaswellaslocalpolitics.

Inhisbook,Governing Through Crime(2007),Simonarguesthat crime,andevenmoreso the fearof crime, is today thedefiningproblemofgovernment.Indeed,SimongoessofarastosaythatthefederalroleoftheU.S.attorneyandhisleader­shipoftheDepartmentofJusticehasbecomethelatemodernequivalent of what the Department of Defense was duringthecoldwar:“theagencywithin... thefederalgovernmentthatmostnaturallyprovidedadominantrationaleofgovern­ment through which other efforts must be articulated andcoordinated”(45).

AsIshowinthisbook,thescholarlyunderstandingofcrimeiscloselytiedtothepoliticsofcrimeinthetworespectivelyprogressiveandmoreconservativeerasthatIcalltheageofRoosevelt(1933–73)andtheageofReagan(1974–).Themod­ernclassical theoriesofcrime,which I takeup inchapter3,mostlyevolvedduringtheratherpersistentlyprogressiveageofRoosevelt,whileamorerecentanddominantformof“de­velopmental criminology,” discussed in chapter 4, emergedduringthemoreconservativeageofReagan.Tobesure,therearepreludesandpostludestobothoftheseeras,andourcat­egorizationrunssomerisksofovergeneralization.Still,thereis considerable value in organizing our understanding oftheevolutionofmodernAmericancriminologyovermuchofthepastcenturyalongthispoliticalfaultline.

The Age of Roosevelt

IwillhavemoretosayinthisbookabouttheageofReaganthantheageofRoosevelt,butitisimportanttounderstandtheearlierperiod too, inpartbecauseRonaldReaganbeganhisownpoliticallifeinthemovieindustry’sunionpoliticsofthelateRooseveltera.Inchapter2,IdiscussthemajorincreaseinthenationalgovernmentrolewithregardtocrimecontrolthatbeganinresponsetoimmigrationduringtheProhibitionera.

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Then as now, immigration was an important “hot button”issue that was linked in the public mind and in stereotypeswithcrime.HereitisenoughtosaythatProhibitionunlockedadoorthatFranklinRooseveltopenedmorewidelywithhisNewDealagendaduringtheGreatDepression. Roosevelt’s first attorney general, Hommer Cummings,playedamajorrolethatbeganwithacrimeconferencein1934.Roosevelt (1934:17–18) may have been the first president tousethe“waroncrime”metaphoratthisconference.Heaskedthe participants to help mount a “major offensive” in “ourconstantstruggletosafeguardourselvesagainsttheattacksofthelawlessandthecriminalelementsofourpopulation.”

Rooseveltwassignalinghiswillingnesstouselawenforce­mentandthejusticesystemaspartofhiseconomicrecoveryeffort.Hesawthatthelawitselfcouldbeavaluableweapon,to be used against the “banksters” in the suites as well asagainst the “gangsters” on the streets. (I discuss the use offramedimages inappositioninchapters5and6.)RooseveltencouragedAttorneyGeneralCummingstousethelawbothas a symbol and as an instrument for change, the latter usemanifestedintheSecuritiesActof1933,theGlass­SteagallActof 1933, and the Securities ExchangeAct of 1934. Rooseveltalso worked closely with Cummings to pack the SupremeCourtindefenseofhisNewDeallegislation.

If Prohibition was the criminal law prelude to the age ofRoosevelt,theroleofRobertKennedyasattorneygeneralintheKennedyandJohnsonadministrationswasthepostlude.TheboldstrokewithwhichJohnKennedywouldchoosehisbrotherasattorneygeneralwasitselfanindicationoftheim­portanceheassignedtothisoffice.Wewillseeinchapter3thatRobertKennedy’sinvolvementintheMobilizationforYouthprogramwasanoutgrowthofa“differentialopportunitythe­oryofcrime,”andhisadvocacyofbailreformwasafurtherbuilding block in the War on Poverty, which focused manyof the most progressive hopes of the Kennedy and Johnsonadministrations.

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As attorney general, Robert Kennedy oversaw passage ofthe1964CriminalJusticeActandtheestablishmentofanOf­fice on Criminal Justice. This office was responsible for ad­vancingfairnessinthejusticesystemandprovidedforapub­lic defender system. Simon (2007:52) argues that more thananyofhispredecessors,notablybeginningwithRooseveltandCummings,“Kennedymadetheattorneygeneral‘America’sprosecutor.’”

The Age of Reagan

AlthoughRichardNixonisthefigurethatoverlapsandcon­nectstheagesofRooseveltandReagan,hisimportancepalesincomparisonwithRonaldReagan’s.ThePrincetonhistorianSeanWilentz (2008) is thesourceof theargumentabout thedistinctivenessofReaganandpersuasiveinregardingthisex­pansiveeraaslastingfrom1974to2008.WilentzemphasizesthelinksthatextendfromNixonthroughReagantothesubse­quentBushfatherandsonpresidenciesandeventoBillClin­ton,buthealsoseesdistinctions.AsWilentzremarks,“Rea­gan,acommittedideologicalconservative,attemptedtopushAmericangovernmentandpolitics inamoredecisivedirec­tionthanNixondid—andfarmoresothanhischiefRepubli­canrivalin1980,GeorgeH.W.Bush,wouldinlateryears”(5).Ofcourse,Wilentz’spoint is thatRonaldReagan’s influencewasnotonlyuniquebutalsolong­lasting.

TheviewthatWilentzfurtherprovidesoftheillegalitiesoftheReaganadministrationaddsperspectivetoourargumentthatReaganisakeyfigureintheU.S.crimeexperience.TheimportanceWilentzattachestoabusesoflawintheageofRea­ganstemsfromaworldviewthatstressedthepoliticalusesofthreat,risk,andfear:

TheReaganWhiteHouseestablishedapatternofdisre­gardforthelawasanythingotherthananideologicalorpartisantool.Lawsthatadvancedtheinterestsofthead­ministrationwerepassedandheeded;thosethatdidnot

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wereignored,undermined,or(ifnecessary)violated.Theadministration’ssorryrecordofcorruption,partisanfa­voritism,andinfluencepeddlingstemmedinpartfromtheshabbyvenalitythatisinherentinhumanaffairs.Butitalsostemmedfromanarrogancebornofthesameideo­logical zealotry that propelled... the belief that, in aworldeternally‘atrisk,’thetruebelieversmusttakemat­tersintotheirownhandsandexecute.Theruleoflaw,bythoselights,wouldalwaysbesubordinatedto,andasfaraspossiblealignedwith,theruleofpolitics.(286)

Ispelloutinchapter5theconsequencesofthisworldviewformoreordinarystreetcrime,andtheninchapter6fortheinter­connectedcrimesoffinancialandpoliticalelites.Thus,theageofReaganwasa turningpoint inhow theUnitedStates re­gardedandpunishedcrimethatwouldprovecostlyforyearstocome.

Nixon’spresidencywasclearlyapreludetotheageofRea­gan.Nixon’sattentiontothecrimeissueiscommonlyseenasanexampleof“backlash”politicsandanearlypartofthecul­ture wars (see also Garland 2001). However, Vesla Weaver(2007)arguesthatthetransitiontoanewera,especiallyinre­lationtocrimecontrol,actuallybeganevenearlier,intheJohn­sonadministration’sefforts to co­opttheangryresponsesofmanyincreasinglyconservativeAmericanstotheblackactiv­ismandghettorebellionsofthelate1960s(seealsoGottschalk2006). Weaver calls this a “frontlash” stage in the changingpoliticsofcrimeintheUnitedStates.Asignalofthischangewas that although President Johnson began by supportingRobert Kennedy’s reforms and making them integral to hisWaronPoverty,Johnsonlater launchedhisownmorepuni­tiveWaronCrime.

Johnson,ironically,wasledtoapunitiveresponsetocrimeintheaftermathofhis1964electoralvictoryoverBarryGold­water and Goldwater’s “law and order” campaign (Beckett1997).Johnsonattemptedtoco­optthelawandorderattackon

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hisownpresidency,whichrefusedtodisappearwithGoldwa­ter’sdefeat.ThemostimportantofJohnson’seffortswasthecreation of the Law EnforcementAssistanceAdministration(LEAA),whichatleastinpartwasalsoaresponsetoagrow­ing organized movement by and for crime victims in theUnitedStates(Gottschalk2006).

MalcolmFeeley(2003;FeeleyandSarat1980)explainsthattheimportanceoftheLEAAwasthatitsetthefoundationforfederalaidtostateandlocallawenforcement,indirectlyanddramaticallyexpandingthefederalroleincrimecontrol.TheeffectofthisnewfederalprogramandthelegalbureaucracyitcreatedwastomutecriticsofJohnson’ssupportforcivilrightslegislation. Critics claimed there were connections betweenthissupportforcivilrightslawsandtheblackpowermove­mentandghettoriots,aswellaslinkstoincreasesinAfricanAmericaninvolvementincrimeinthelate1960s.OnequarterofthefirstyearoffundingfromtheLEAAwasforstateandlocalcontrolofrace­linkedriotsandcivildisturbances,whilethe overall LEAA budget grew from about $100 million tonearly$700millionby1972(Schoenfeld2009).

AnironyofJohnson’sWaronCrimewasitsunanticipatedeffectonofficialcrimeratesandthefollowingNixonadminis­tration’s attempts to pick up on the law and order theme.Nixondeliveredstronglywordedspeechesonthetopicoflawandorderduringhis1968presidentialcampaign.Heattackedtheprogressiveperspectiveon the root causesof crime ina“FreedomfromFear”positionpaperthatargued,“wecannotexplainawaycrimeinthiscountrybychargingitofftopov­erty” (cited inWeaver2007:259).Meanwhile, Johnson’snewLEAAgrantstostatesandlocalgovernmentshadcreatedin­centivesforthesegovernmentstoactuallyinflatetheircrimestatisticsinbolsteringtheirclaimsforassistance.

Aresultofthenewincentiveswasthatofficialcrimerateskept increasing when Richard Nixon was elected president.Nixon’sattorneygeneral,JohnMitchell,eventuallywasforcedtodiffusethelawandorderissueintheNixonyearsbycalling

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theincreasesa“papercrimewave.”Thefactwasthatcrimerates were substantially higher when Nixon left office thanwhenheentered.Afurtherironywasthatthiswasalsotruefor Ronald Reagan, who left California and the nation withcrimeratesthatwererisingratherthanfalling.

LikeNelsonRockefeller,whoenteredpoliticallifeasgover­norofNewYork,RonaldReaganlaunchedhiscareerasgover­norofCalifornia.Hearguablydefeated the incumbentgov­ernorPatBrownin1966withhisstandinfavorofthedeathpenalty.JonathanSimon(2007)speculatesthatareasonwhygovernorshavedonesowellrecentlyinAmericanpresidentialpoliticsistheuniqueinvolvementtheyhaveintheuseofthedeathpenalty.

WhentheSupremeCourtnullifiedallexistingdeathpenal­tiesinthe1972Furman v. Georgia case,stategovernorshadtheopportunitytobecomeinstrumentalinpassingandenforcingnewstatedeathpenaltystatutes.PatBrownhadimposedthedeath penalty in California but also opposed it on religiousandmoralgrounds.ReaganrespondedthatBrownwasvalu­ing cold­blooded killers’ lives over their victims’ lives. ThismayhavebeenReagan’sfirsttasteofthepossibilitiesofwhatSimoncalls“governingthroughcrime,”ormorespecificallygoverningthroughthefearofcrime(seealsoSavelsberg,King,andCleveland2002;Scheingold1984).

ReaganpickedEdwinMeese,aCaliforniadistrictattorney,first as his closest political adviser and later as his attorneygeneral. Meese was already a veteran crime warrior whenReaganbegantorelyonhisadviceinCalifornia.Hisinitialat­tractionforReaganwashisreputationinthe1960sforfightingUniversityofCaliforniastudentradicalsandghettoactivists.DuringReagan’sgovernorship,MeesehelpedshutdowntheworkofradicalscholarsandstudentsattheUniversityofCal­ifornia’sSchoolofCriminology.DuringtheReaganpresidency,Meese ledfightsagainstdefendants’ rightsand successfullyreducedconstitutionalprotectionsfordefendants.Meesealsospearheaded legislation increasing the role of victims in thecriminaljusticesystemandfocusingonorganizedcrime.

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YetmuchofReagan’sapproachtogoverningthroughcrimewasmoresubtleandcovertthanMeese’sfrontalassaultsontheSupremeCourtandtheConstitution(Garland2001).Theseeffortsalso involvedMeese, forexample, intheIran–Contraarmsaffair,whichentailedignoringthesmugglingofcocaineintotheUnitedStates,andinthepassageofcriminalsentenc­ingguidelinesthatmandatedextremepenaltiesfortheposses­sion of crack cocaine, ratcheting up mass incarceration foryearstofollow.

The latter sentencing guidelines were part of an omnibuscrimebill,passed in1988, that includeddeathsentences formurder resulting from large­scale illegal drug dealing. Thelawwasexpandedin1994duringtheClintonadministrationtocoverdozensmorecrimes,manyof them drug­relatedorviolent.ThereachoftheselawsbeyondReagan’spresidency,andthewillingnessofClintonDemocratstogovernthroughthedeathpenalty,isconsistentwithWilentz’sargumentthatthe age of Reagan lasted through both of the Bush and theClintonpresidenciesandatleastuntil2008.ClintonsocloselyheededlessonsfromtheageofReaganoncrimeandthedeathpenalty that he famously interrupted the 1992 New Hamp­shireprimarycampaignandreturnedtoArkansastooverseeasgovernortheexecutionofaprisonerwithdiminishedmen­talcapacitiesforthemurderofapoliceman.

AnotherlessonfromtheageofReaganisthattheforcesofpopularoutrageandmoralpanic,onceunleashed,arehardtotame.Evenpoliticianswhomightwishtocontainandreducetheoutrageandpanic feel theirself­fulfillingfury.PresidentReagan seemed bent on sustaining this fear even as he wasleavingoffice,lamenting,“Therecanbenoeconomicrevivaloftheghettoeswhenthemostviolentonesareallowedtoroamfree”(1985).

Savelsberg (1994) reminds criminologists that thegovern­mentfundingofresearchthatbeganinearnestwiththeLEAAandcontinuestodaycreatesself­reinforcingtendencies.Here­mindsusthat“publicopinionpollsandspeechesofpoliticiansreinforcedeachotheroncethepunitivetrendhadgottenunder

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way” (939) and that “when research is funded by politicalagencies, which to a large degree is the case in criminologyandcriminal justice studies, then it is rather likely thataca­demically produced knowledge will follow political knowl­edge”(934).Thispointisexploredfurtherinchapter4.

Thelinksbetweenandamongpublicopinion,politics,andthefundingofcriminologyintheUnitedStatesarelonglast­ing.Thepublichostilityandfearthattodaystillfeedpunitivepenalpoliciesspiked in the1970sandhavecontinued,withonlyaslightrecentmoderationthathasnotundonepersistentsupportforthedeathpenaltyandthepublicsenseoftennotedinopinionpollsthat“localcourtsaretoolenient”(Savelsberg1994).Neitherpoliticiansnorcriminologistscanignorethere­curringfeedbackeffectsofthesepunitiveattitudes.

John Sutton (2000) has identified the distinctivelyAmeri­cannatureofourpunitivepolitics.HenotesthattheUnitedStateshasahighlyfragmentedanddecentralizedgoverningstructure—aformoffederalismthatisintenselypolitical,local,andparticularistic.Asalientmanifestationofthisstructureisthatlocaljudgesandprosecutorsmustconstantlyreceivetherenewedapprovalofvoters,andthisapprovalrequiressensi­tivitytofearfulandoftenpanickedpublicresponsestocrime.One nationally famous American politician, Speaker of theHouse and Democratic congressman Tip O’Neill, made thistruthiconicinhisaptlytitledmemoir,All Politics Is Local(1994).O’Neillratchetedupalonglastingnationalpunitiveresponseto crack cocaine with just such a localized response to thehighly publicized death of a hometown Boston basketballplayer.Oftenlocaleventsresonateonawidernationalstageandareasourceofabroadmoralconsensusthatrespondstolatentandmorewidelysharedfears.TheageofReaganwasanongoingexercise in the recirculationof locally felt truthsthroughmorebroadlyprojectedsymbolsintendedtorecreateasenseofthe“shiningcityonthehill”inournationallife.

These were not new ideas: they date as far back as JohnWinthrop’s God­inspired vision of building the “city on the

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hill” and Beaumont and Tocqueville’s (1833) argument, intheirobservationsontheAmericanpenitentiarysystem,thatAmerica’s localizedpoliticsand itshistoricalobsessionwithpunishmentweretwosidesofthesameswordusedtoenforcethesevisions.Reaganhimself insistedon thismoral linkagebetweenthelocalandthenationalinoneofhismostfamousearlyspeeches.Hisformulawasnotcomplicated:“Thereisasimpleanswer—notaneasyanswer—butsimple:ifyouandIhavethecouragetotellourelectedofficialsthatwewantournationalpolicybasedonwhatweknowinourheartismorallyright”(Reagan1964).

What Presidents and the Public Need to Know

RonaldReaganwasnotamantoallowfactualambiguitiesoruncertaintiestointerferewiththedevelopmentofhisartfullycrafted rhetorical images. Instead, Reagan was preoccupiedwiththepersuasiveexpressionoftheloftyimagesthathecre­ated.Hisgiftwascommunicatinginspirationalmessages.Hewasthe“GreatCommunicator,”bestknownforhismysticalreferencestoa“newmorninginAmerica”andtotheidealofAmerica as the “shining city on the hill.” Ideological purityandclaritytookpriorityoverfactualaccuracyorcertainty.

ForReagan,too­closeattentiontothefactsandtheirexpla­nationcouldlead,forexample,tothekindof“malaise”aboutenergy conservation that contributed to the unpopularity ofthepriorCarteradministration.Resistancetofact­basedpolicy­makingwasachallengefortheboardthatPresidentReaganappointed to advise him about crime policy. The board’schargewastoframeanoverarchingcrimepolicy.ItwoundupposingquestionsaboutthekindsofpoliciesthatRonaldRea­ganandEdwinMeesebroughtwiththemtotheWhiteHousebasedontheirpriorexperiencesinCalifornia.

Mostchallengingfortheadvisoryboardwasthatcrimeun­expectedlybegantodeclineevenbeforethenewadministra­tiontookoffice.TheresultwasthatatacrucialmomentintheageofReagan,apresidentialadvisoryboardchosetoignore

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thefactofdecliningcrimeratesandto justifyitspolicypre­scriptionsonamoreambiguousanduncertain fearof crimeratherthanoncrimeitself.Theadvisoryboardmimickedthefear­driven choices of the president, and with consequencesthatremainhighlycounterproductiveforAmericansociety.

ThisbooktellsthestoryofhowtheageofReaganledtoarealignment of priorities from the age of Roosevelt, leadingsimultaneouslytomoreseverepunishmentofstreetcrimeandderegulationofthefinancialsector.Theresultwasamajorre­distributionofriskandregulationinAmericanlife.Americanminoritiesandthepoorlostinseveralways:theywereprose­cutedandincarceratedforstreetcrimesatmassivelyincreasedrates,andtheywerevictimizedbyevolvingformsoffinancialmanipulation,includingsubprimemortgagelendingandsim­ilarkindsoflendingarrangementsforcreditcards,cars,andthe like. The unsustainable subprime mortgage lending andresultingdefaultsandforeclosuresdisproportionatelyaffectedminorityneighborhoodhomeownersandcounteractedeffortstoreducestreetcrimebystabilizingminorityneighborhoods.

PoliciesoftheageofReaganimposedafundamentalrealign­mentofconceptionsofthe“good”andthe“bad”inAmericanlife.Asthisera,andmorespecificallytheReaganadministra­tion,vilifiedrisk­takingonourcitystreets,itsimultaneouslyvalorizedrisk­takinginournation’sfinancialsuites.Thecon­sequencesofthesepoliciescontinuetounfoldingrowingevi­denceofcarceralandcommunitysocioeconomicinequality.Iargue that we need to more fully appraise and analyze theconsequencesofthesepoliciesinthestreetsandthesuitesintermsof theirco­dependency,and thatwhenwedo thiswecanbegintoseemorefullytheunequalredistributiveeffectsoftheageofReaganinAmericanlife.

In the following chapters, I trace the political and racialrootsof therealignmentof theregulationofstreetandsuitecrimestotheearlyyearsoftheageofReaganandtotheelec­tioncampaignofRonaldReaganasgovernorofCaliforniain

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1966.IshowthatmanypoliciesandconsequencesoftheageofReaganthatrealignedthecriminalcontrolofcitystreetsandsimultaneouslyderegulatedthefinancialsuitesremaininplacetoday, and that the age of Reagan aroused perhaps surpris­inglyrobustsourcesofbipartisanpoliticalsupportthathavemadetheinfluenceofthiseralonglasting.

Myanalysisposesquestionsaboutpossibilitiesandrespon­sibilities that extend beyond the age of Reagan. The age ofRoosevelt challenged narrow ideas about street crime withbroadenedimagesoffinancialcrimesandpassageoflegisla­tionsuchastheSecuritiesandExchangeCommissionAct.WewillseethattheCongressofthiserachallengedbankerswithhearings and legislation, and that many bankers faced bothcriminalandcivilprosecutionswhentheirbanksfailed.

Itisstillpossibletoreframeourunderstandingofthestreetsandthesuites,andIarguethatakeytodoingsoistoanalyzeand emphasize the link between the two. My argument isthat a new cycle of reform can rebalance the ledgers of thetwenty­firstcenturybyreconsideringourconceptionsof thefearedandthefearlessinourcitystreetsandcorporatesuites.I propose a critical collective framing perspective as an ex­planatorypathwaytowardthisgoalandtowardarenewalofcrimetheorybeyondtheageofReagan.

Crimepolicyoftenthrivesonfear,andthefocusofPresi­dentReagan’sadvisoryboardon the fearofcrime thereforemayhavebeenpredictable.Yetalthoughthefearofcrimeiscommonandmayevenbeinevitable,thecostsoffeedingthisfearwithsteadilyincreasingrelianceonimprisonmentshouldbynowbeapparenttocriminologistsandcitizensalike.Presi­dentReaganandhisadvisersalreadyknewwhattheywantedto do when they assumed office. They wanted to attend tovictimsofstreetcrimes,crackdownondrugsandorganizedcrimethroughmoreseveresentences,compeljudgestorestrictdefendants’ rights, and get on with their punishment. Theydidnotneedorwantanoverarchingplanthatraisedasmany

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questions as it answered. The president’s crime report wasdeadevenbeforeitsarrival.Thisbookisaboutwhythenationdeservesbetterthanitgotfromthisboard,andmorebroadlyfrom the age of Reagan policies that persist in the UnitedStates.