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Chap - V
The Background of the Political Elite of Orissa
1~7
The Background of the Political Elite of Orissa.
Although there is a high degree of consensus, among
social scientists that the pnlitical elite by and large,
\constitute the socially, economically, politically, and
leducationally better off strata, there exists a wide diver
gence of opinion on the sources and processes of its recruit
ment. The theoretical positions taken by different schools
in political science and sociology reflect various shades
of the controversy. At one end the primary of politics and
supe~or qualities of an organized minority is considered as
basij (approximating the elite school), while at the other
extreme there is an equally firm conviction that political
leadership is a refledtion of the mode of production and
distribution, is entirely determined by the configuration of
socio-historical class forces controlling the major means and
instruments of productio~with occasional institutional
1. For instance, V.Pareto The Mind and Societi (London: Jonathan Cape, 1935); b.Mosca, The RUlint C ass (New York: McGraw Hills 1939); H.D.Lasswell et.a : The Comparative Study of Eliies (Hoover Institute ~tudiesl Series B. Elites No.1: Standford, 1952); c.R.Wright, Pubic Leadership (San Francisco: Chandler~ 1961); and also, D.R. Matthews, The Social Background of Political Decision Makers (New York: Doubleday, l954)o w-.
2 variations (approximating the Marxist theory of ruling class).
The former refers mainly to the process of decision making,
while the latter to th~ nature of the social system and 1he 3
internal socio-political forces. The two theoretical positions
with regard to the distribution of power, has been taken up
for an empirical investigation~see, whether there is any
agreement between the concept of political elite and the
Marxist concept of ruling class, notwithsanding their differen
ces at the theoretical level.
In this chapter, we are primarily concerned with
the analysis of the aspects considered important for the
background of the political elite at the macro-level at a given
period of time, with reference to the general ta ckground E of
the state, described in Chapter-III. In such a case, obviously
what is important is a formal, operational identification of
political elite at the macro-level.
In a broad sense, the political elite may cover a
wide spectrum of political leaders such as, village, panchayat
and municipality leaders, trade unionists, peasant leadem,
student and youth leaders, party leaders, M.Ps, M.L.As of the
2. For instance, K. Marx, "A Contribution to the Cri tlque of Political Economy" and F.Bngels, "Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State" in Marx & Engels Selected Works (Mo~: Progress Publishers, 1970)· V.I.Lehln, The State (Peking: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1970), p.7; Mao Tse-•tung, On New Democracy(Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 196?); M.D.Irish and J.W.Prothro, The Politics of American Democracy (Englewood Cliffs, ~ Prentice HallL l965); P.Baran and P.N.Sweezy, Mono~ly Caprtal (New york: Monthly Review Press, 1966); M. herman Had cat Political Economx (New York: Basic Books Inc. 1972) etc.
3 For a detailed argument refer to the Chap. I oft he dissertation.
1 t ~J
past and.present, and so on. The section of political elite
identified somewhat restrictively, were contestants in 19741
Orissa Legislative Assembly mid-term elections. At the}tate /
level this group appears to be the highest power holders.
They take major decisions of the state which influences ::tin' the
total population, one way or another. Unlike many other
political groups, they are· in a sense accountable to the
electorate, their investments and attendant risks are greater.
Moreover, elections are said to be· the single important 4
event of "genuine competition between political groups", and
in that the Assembly elections are the most important ones ~ 5
to the local voters. Besides, it was not possible, given the
resources and the constraints of time to enlarge the scope
of·_work by including other categories of political elite
covering the entire state.
Few attempts have been made in this country to
study the electoral phenomena by relating political variables . 6
with other structural characteristics of the state. As all
cannot hold political · elite positions the phenomenon of ·
political leadership can be explained only by certain relevant
4. W.H.Morris J'ones and B.Diisgupta1 "India's Political Areas 11 , !ian Survey (Jum 1969 ), p. 399.
5.e1 M.Welner and h.Kothari (eds), Indian Voting Behaviour (Calcutta: Firma K.L. Mukhopadhyay, l965), p.7.
6. Gopal Krishna, "One Party Dontance-Development and Trends" in Rajni Kothari (ed), Part~ ~ystem and Election Studies (New Delhi: Allied Publishers, l967); and also, R.Chandidas, "The Fourth General Elections - Madhya Pradesh" Economic and Political Weekly, Special No., August, 1967, B.B.J'ena, "Feudal Grip11 seminar, October 1966, pp. 26-33, and P. Mohapatrol 11 ~ongress vs. Swatantra" Economic Weekly, July 24, 965, pp. 1168-1170.
150
variables, which help individuals to reach the said positions.
Since the entire electoral activity takes place within a
complex social mileu and a host of diverse factors are likely
to inf'luem e voting behaviour, any single factor approach
to the stuQ1 of' political elite, is ~ought with the danger
of tenuous findings. At the same time, however, there is
· no meaning in taking up all the structural variables ~ q__ ProfLrf &vndd'~~ _ 6 /k__ &_~c,}!Yl_ eih.k ·
cte:r.'±de the ~m e~::Jxiea ef the ·Mi tJ.gal \ildicfl'em
wbli:eh: the MLAs axe eleetee.. SUch an aggregate approach would
appear to be comprehensive but much of it was likely to be
of' minor or no significance at all. Rather at times, :iit can
detract one from the actual structural analysis of' the problem.
Accordingly, th~~major thrust of this analysis would be to
use certain explanatory demographic, socio-economic and political -~-----
variablesQ This by no means exhausts all the possible 'socio
economic and political indicators. The variables included
in this analysis have been taken from powerful theories and
therefore was considered adequate for an understanding of the
empirical reality under investigation.
Before reporting the findings, it is worthwhile to ~ discuss b:eiefly, the universe of the analysis. Olt of' the
.J 147 Assembly Constituencies of Orissa, in February 1974,
there was election to 146 constituencies. Election to the
other one, was conducted on 7th July, 1974, where a Congress
candidate won the election by defeating his nearest rival of
the Swatantra Party. Data was collected from 146 constituencies
Table-1
DISTRIC~ISE INFORt1ATION COLLECTED ON THE BACKGROUND OF THE CONTESTING CANDIDAT8S FOR OLA.
Sl. District No.of No.of No.of Total No.of No.of Total Infonna- Info.r:mation Total No. No. gene- Sche- S/T No.of Party In de- No.of tion co- collected of infor-
ral duled Cons- Cons- cand- pen de candi- llected on Indepen- rnationo eons- Caste titu- titu- idates nts dates on Party dent candi- collected titu- Const enci- enci- cont- cont- cont- candida- . dates. encies ituen es. es. ested estes ested tes.
cies ted.
(1) ( 2) ( 3) ( 4) (5) (6) ( 7) (8) (9) (10) (11) ( 12)
1. Ganjarn 12 2 1 15 32 23 55 31 0 31 2. Koraput 3 1 10 14 30 18 48 27 2 29 3. Sarnbalpur 8 2 2 12 32 21 53 26 26 4. a Puri 13* 2 15* 52 42 94 33 3 36 s. Balasore 10 2 12 42 13 55 37 1 38 6. Cut tuck 21 5 26 78 55 133 56 4 60 7. Dhenkanal 6 2 8 23 27 so 21 2 23 8. Sundargarh 2 5 7 16 31 47 14 3 17 9. Kalahandi 5 2 1 8 21 16 37 18 18 10. Bolangir 7 2 9 18 13 31 19 19 11. Mayurbhanja 1 9 10 33 30 63 25 3 28 12. Keonjhar
/ 1 1 4 6 14 20 34 12 12
13. Phulbani 1 1 2 4 13 9 22 9 2 11
Total: 90* 22 J'34 146* 404 318 722 328 20 348
A. Coastal Region 67* 14 13 94 266 172 438 210 10 220 B. Inland Region 2J 8 21 52 138 146 284 118 10 128
Total: 90 22 34 146* 404 318 722 328 20 348
Note: -b indicates that election to one constituency was not he1tl in Feb.74. 1--
The material is collected from Orissa Review, Election Special, Feb-Mar. ~~
74 Vol. XXX No. 7-8 PP• 24-25. .._
152
of Orissa. Out of 404 party nominees for these constituencies,
we have data on 328 candidates, and of the 318 Independents,
only 20 were covered. The total of 348 contestants includes
all the 146 successful candidates. The exclusion of 76 party
candidates and 298 Independents was unavoidable in view of the
paucity of time and the availability of the candidates themsel
ves and/or information on them. These candidates by and large
belonged to parties with hardly any influence on contemporary
Orissa politics, like the Bharatiya Jana Sangh (12 contestants,
no return), Congress (0) (17 contestants, no return), Jana
Congress {47 candidates, one elected), Socialist Party of India
(17 candidates, 2 elected), and such other parties li~ the
v Jharkhand, the Socialist Unity Centre, the Forward Block and
the Revolutionary Communist Party of India. However, not all
such party candidates were excluded, wherever they were found
to have some strength to oppose the other parties or the strong
Independents, attempts were made to include them (Table-1).
I Demographic Background:·
In this section, let us ccwer sex, age and residence
of the contestants to ~issa Legislative Assembly. Though the 7
sex ratio of females in Orissa is 988 per every 1000 males, and
~Census of Orissa-l97l, Series-16, Part II-A.
women coptributed a higher percentage to the total polled 8
15J
votes in the 1974 elections, there were only 15 women contes-
tants (i.e. about 2 per cent of the total) and only mf four of 9
them won the election, thus constituting 2.7 per cent women
representation in the Assembly. The earlier Assembly elections 10
also conform to the pattern of female representation (Table-2).
Year
1952
1957
1961
1967
1971
1974
Table-2
Representation of the Femal' Candidates in Oris sa Assembly
No. of women contestants
4
15
10
11
9
15
No. of women Elected
3
4
4
4
4
Percentage of success
75.0
26.6
40.0
36.4
o. 0
26.6
Source: Qrissa Review, Election Special, Feb.-March, l974t p. 128.
a. See, S.C.Dash, "Orissa", in S.V.Kogekar and R.L.Park (eds), Report on the Indian General Elections (Bombay: Popular Book Depot. , l9 56).
9. The claim cifi P.Desai and J.Bhagwati that the wanen candidates have a phenomenal chance of winning elections as compared to the average male candidates, seems untrue in case of Orissa (Table.-2). ·see their article "Women in Indian Elections"! in M. Weiner and J. O.FielA (eds) Electoral Politics in the Ind an States (Manohar Book service, l975).
10. ofcourse, wit~egard to women representation, it constitutes a disadvantaged sector in the Indian polity, ibid.
154
Age distribution
Regarding the age distribution or the 348 contestants,
it is round that the maximum number of the contestants belong
to the age group between 25-40 years (46.5%), but the probabi
lity of success tends to be high with increase in age, particu
larly after the age of 55, (T~ble-3). In 1967 and 1971, the
maximum number of MLAs were recruited from the age group between
41-55 years, but in 1974, the maximum was in the age group
bet~een 25-40 years, (Table-4). This is definitely a minor
change. It is interesting to note that more than 50 percent
assembly seats go to age group 40 plus. But percentage of
·.representation in the below 40 years group is slowly yet steadily
increasing from 39.2% in 1967 to 46.5% in 1974. Thus there
is a trend towards progressively greater recruitment of younger
people in Assembly.
- However, the younger elite are not poised in competi
tion with the older l.eadership, on the contrary, they seem to
strengthen it. For instance, in 1961, the then young turks of
the Congress, like Biju Patnaik, initiated enrolment of the
younger people to fight the established, old clique of the same
party. In 1967, H.K. Mahatab, defe~ing from the Congress,
recruited young leaders to contest in the Assembly elections on
behalf of his newly formed party - the Jana Congress. Again
in 1971 Biju Patnaik 1 s creation- the Utkal Congress, welcomed
a few young recruits, particularly, student leaders. Similarly
·Age group
25-40 (N=179)
41-55 (N=145}
56 + (N=24)
Age group (1)
25-40
41-55
56+
Table-3
Age Distribution Pattern of the Assembly Contestants of 1974 Elections
155
(in percentage) Elected Not elected Total (N=l46) {N=202) (N=348)
46.5 55.0 (38. 0) (62.0) {100.0)
41.1 42.0 (41. 0) (59. 0) (1 oo. 0}
12.4 3.0 (75.0) (25. 0) (1 oo.o)
1 oo.o 1 oo. 0 1 oo.o
2 X = 11.507 Significance at 1%
Table - 4
Distribution of Orissa MLAs by Age Group (1967-74)
(in percentage)
1967 19'71 19'74 (2) (3) (4) _,
39.2 43.3 46.5 (N=55) (N=61) (N=68)
47.1 44.8 41.1 (N=66) (N=62) (N=60)
13.7 11.9 12.4 (N=19) (N=17) (N=18)
1 oo.oo ••• 1 oo.oo 1 oo.oo (N=l40) (N=l40) (N=l46)
Source: Column (2) and (3) are compiled from the Orissa Legislative Assembly Who is Who of 1967 and 1971 6Rd respectively.
v
156
in 1974, the Congress to an extent, opened its door to the now·
comers to strengthen the hands of Nandini Satapathy in the
Congress organization itself. Hence uptil now, the political
history or Orissa suggests that whenever the important persona
lities in the Congress have had differences amongst themselves
leading to the creation of splinter. parties, young people.have
been recruited to their organizations. However, the younger
people, lack their own leadership both in the established parties
and in the new parties of the etablished leaders, with a minor
exception of a few new parties like sue, FB, BJS etc. In this
context age by itself cannot be a significant variable for the
structural analysis of the political leadership.
Religion and Langgage
So far as religion and language are concerned, they
have almost no importance in Orissa politics. The population
of the Muslims and the Chri.stians are very insignificant in the
state, being 1.2 and 1.1 per cent of the total population. Hence -- -
where more than 90 per cent of the people have Oriya as their . I
mother tongue. Thus more than 75 per cent of the contestants )
and the elected candidates are Qriya and more than ~ per cent""
have different tribal dialects, while only about 5 per cent have
v
157
Hindi, Bengali, Telugu, Gujarati and Urdu as their mtk mother
tongues (Table-5), English, of course, is known to little
more than 40 per cent of the candidates who contested in the
election.
Table-5
Mother Tongue of the Political Elite of Orissa
Sl. Mother No.of Per Elected Percent No. Tongue centes- cent candida-
tants tes ( 1 ) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1 Oriya 267 76.7 111 76.0
2 Tribal dialects 64 18.4 29 19.8
3 Telugu, Bengali 17 4.9 6 4.2 Urdu, Hindi & aujarati.
Total: 348 100.0 146 100.0
Antagonism between linguistic groups has hardly been of
any significance in the power politics of Orissa.· However
as the Bengalis in Northern Orissa dominate in administration
and Gujaratis, Marawadis and Punjabis in the ~let~hel'a aDi
Western Orissa, possess an appreciable share in the business
and transport, sometimes, linguistic feelings are aroused by
the vested interests to demoralise the government. However,
barring such occasional short -lived tensions, there are no
.r
l5S
antagonistic feelings between Oriyas and non-Oriyas, Perhaps,
this is due to the lack of control over land by the non..Oriyas
which is the maj.or means of production in the state.
Rural.Urban differentiation
Orissa is a predominantly rural state, and according
"' to the 1971 Orissa Census data, 91.6 per cent of the people of tbe
state, live in rural areas. The percentage of the rural contestants
to the AssemblYO' in proportion to the rural population#" is very
low. :i:t is interesting to note that about 70% seats have gone
to 55% of the rural contestants, nearly 8% of the urban population
mfxtim is representet! by 30% legislatcllrs. ~Thus the rural
v population remain disproportionately under represented and the
urban population, loy the same count, in over represented.
Description
Villages (N=l93)
Table-6
Birth place of the Political Elite of Orissa (in percentage)
E'lected Not Elected Total Contestants (N=l46) (N=202) (N=348)
69.9 ~ .. 45.1 (52.9l (47 .1) ( lOOoO)
Towns and cities 30.1 54.9 (N=lSS) ( 28.4) (71.6) (lOOoO)
(100.0 . (loo.o (lOOoO) _(N=la16) ~N=202)
x2 = 21.95 Significant at 1% level.
159
Table-7
Residential Mobility of the Political Elite of Orissa
Sl.No. Description No.or Per No. of 5/3%age Percent conte- cent elect- elected stants ed can-
didates
( 1} {2) {3) {4) (5) (6) {7)
1 No mobility 265 76.2 106 40.0 72.6
2 From Village to 76 21.5 37 48.6 25.3 TO\tln/ city
3 From Town/city 7 2.3 3 42.8 2.1 to village
-----------------------------------------------------·-----------However, considering the low level of urbanisation
with 8.4 percent of the total population living in 81 towns,
the fact that 45% of the contestants were from urban areas is
significant. Further about 21.5 per cent of the contestants
and 25.3 per cent of the elected candidates·have changed their {,~
places of residence from rural to urban~course of their
education, profession, and/or political recruitment, prior to
1974 elections (Table-7). Also those who have changed their
residence from village to towns have greater chance of return
than those who have no mobility."} All these indicate the
growing importance of urban areas as political centres and
increasing ~centralisation of powers. This often leads to an
estrangement between the centres of power and the sources or
bases of political support. It is not unusual to hear that
candidates once voted to power find little time for their
constituencies.
160
Table-8
Political Background of the Household Members of the Elite
(in percentage)
Description
( 1 )
Without political members (N=209)
With political members (N=l39)
Total:
Elected Not Total Elected contestants
(N=146) (N=202) (N=348)
(2) (3) (4)
50.7 66.8 (35. 4} (64.6) (100. 0)
49.3 33.2 (51.8) (48.2) (100.0)
1oo.oo 100.00 (100. 0)
2 X = 9. 23
Significant at 1% level.
Families with some political background or connec
tion stand a somewhat better chance of success in elections
tha.r. those who are without such an advantage. TI:Ii.s is
reflected in the better returns to the Assembly from house
holds which have members with political affiliations other
than the candidate (Table-B).
~ucational Background:
Elite theories have always emphasized education
as an important criterion for the recruitment of the political 11
elite. With 26.18 percent literacy Orissa is ninth in the.,
11. See Chap.I, particularly the sections on the theories of Elite and Indian elite studies.
161
,,_ c,ountry. But the rate of literacy in the state is lo'ltrer than
\ the national rate mainly because of the sizeable isolated
~ Scheduled Tribes and a high percentage of SCheduled Caste •· population. They together constitute about 40 per cent of the
v state's population. The literacy rate among Scheduled Tribes
./ is only 7 per cent and among the Scheduled Castes, it is only
11 per cent/ (lal;k-Cf) ..
Table-9
Educational Background of the 6ontestants to OLA 1974
(in percentage)
Qualification Elected Not Total6ontestants Elected
(N=l46) { 1 ) (2)
(N=202) (3) (4)
--Belov Matric 29.4 41.5
(N=l27) (33. 9) (66.1) (100. 0}
Matric and Intermediate 24.7 19.3
(N=75) (48.0) (52.0) (100.0)
Bacheolor & Masters 24.0 14.4 ~64) (54. 7) (45.3) (100.0)
Law! Medicine & En1 nearing · 21.9 24.8
. N=82) (39. 0) (61. 0) (100. 0)
*OO.O 1 oo. 0 1 oo.o
2 X = 9.03
Significant at 5% level
J:A . .)R-e. I (t11Jfr./.J r5} @,<.u~ - ;4 '7 1 ,. ff e . .-r.
162
The educational background of the contesting and
elected elites reveal the following:
{1) that there is an association between education
and success in election;
{2) that the higher the ed~cation, the better the
chances of return, on the whole;
{3) that the proportion under matric con•~ts, in comparison to the other groups is high,
' although th~# percentage return is low,
{36.5%~ as compared to 21.5% Matri« and Interme
diate, 18.4% graduate and post graduate, and
23.6% in the professional group);
{4) that inspite of the direct association between I
education and success in election the proportion
of under matric in the elected elites stands
highest {29.4%);
(5) that only among the graduate and post graduate
contesting elites do we find the proportion of
elected elites exceeding the proportion of non
elected elites; (see from Table-9)
~ ~hat the pFOportiOR Of graduate ana ~est-graduate
comestants to total eontestants ia. lOl-rest,
(6) that over the years, the proportion of the under
matric group is showing steady though marginal
increase (Table-10).
163
Table-lo
Educational Background of the Orissa MLAs, 1967-74
(In percentage)
Qualification l967 l97l l974 (1) (2) (3) {4)
Under Matric 23.6(N=33) 27 .a(N=39) 29.4(N=43)
Matric & Intermediate 37 .a(N=53) 22.l(N=31) 24.7 (N=36}
Bachelors & Masters 17 .9(N=25) 23.6(N=33) 24.0(N=35)
Law l Medicine and Eng neering 20. 7(N=29) 26.4(.N=37) 21.9(N=33)
' .
Total: 100.0(N=140) 100.0(N=140) 100.0(N=l46)
Source: Column 2 and 3 are collected from the OLA, Who is Who of 1967 and 1971.
Sl. No.
( 1 }
1 •
2.
3.
Table-11 Places of Study of the Political Elite of 1974
Place of study
(2}
Village
Village and Town/city
Town/city
Total:
No.of Gontestants
(3)
120
137
91
348
Per cent
(4)
34.5
39.4
26.1
100.0
No. of Elected
(5)
56
il
39
146
Col.5/Col.3 percentage
(6)
48.0
37.2
42.8
Percentage of the Elected
(7)
38.6
34.8
26.6
100.0
164
Thus it appears that there is a definite erosion in
correlation between education and political elite composition~
However, it must be realised that this •anomalous' incipient
trend is possibly, a reflection of sharp difference between
the coastal and the backward western r~gion. The professionals
and the other College/University educated persons, mainly belong
to the coastal region, while the western~ region is represented 'fTIP.#J't-
../ largely by matric or below ).._qualified persons.
Needless to say that in a rural socie~y-as in the
case of Orissa, higher studies mean changes of educational
ins ti tu tions and places. In our case, sine e maj ori ty of the
contestants have a background of high school or less, such
changes are considerably less. But with regard to college
educated contestants, they have changed more than one institu
tions.- As per bble-11, most of the contesting eli t&S. have
studied in both villages and small towns {39.4%), while next
to that comesthe elites whose education has been confined to
villages. But the electors bias records a preference for
elites educated at the village level {38.6%). That the voters•
selectivity has a predominantly local and rural bias is indica
ted by the fact that 73.9% of the contesting elites have either
village level or village cum small town level education and they
represent 73.4% of the elected elites.
Some of the conspicuous features of this analysis are
a steady increase of the younger age group in the demographic
composition of the political elite; an incipient trend for the
165
elected elite to move to urban areas; a disproportionate number~
of contesting elites from the urban areas who however have
found a less than proportionate response fl'\mD: the electorate,
a definite, though marginal trend towards an increasing
proportion of elected elites who have education below high
school level; and a predominantly rural bias~ in voters•
selectivity for elites who have had their education in the
village or at least not far from it.
II Socio-Economic Background:
Cross-national studies about the social origin of
legislators indicate that they tend not to be the represen
tative sample of the po~ulation that they are supposed to 13
represent. In the case of Orissa legislators, one way of
examing this hypothesis would be to study the data on caste l and economic background of the legislators. Here it is
necessary to mention, that the SchedUled Castes and the Schedu
led Tribes in India have been assured almost proportional
represent~tion in Indian legislatures through constitutional 14
protection.
13.
14.
See Rosalie Wences, 11Electoral Participation and Occupational Composition of Cabinets and Parliaments", l@erican Journal of SociologY, Sept, 1969? pp. 117-192. Article 332 of Indian Constitut~on ensures such reservations in the state Assemblies.
loa
Accordingly in Orissa Assembly, 34 seats are reserved
_ . for the Scheduled Tribes, and 22 seats: for the Scheduled 9astes
~ in the house of 147 seats. In the mid-term poll of 1974, out
of 722 contestants, 163 were scheduled Tribes and 195 were
Scheduled Caste candidates. The corresponding figures of can
didates in the previous general elections of 1961, 1967 and 1971
were 96:81, 133:81, and 189:125, respectively. There are 62
L- Scheduled Tribes and·93 Scheduled Castes in Orissa15
constitu
ting 23.1 and 15.1 per cent to the total population. Anyway,
while analyzing the caste profiles of the contestants, it is
important to bear their reservations in mi~d, since from these
constituencies individuals belonging to upper castes cannot
contest in the elections.
The distribution of various caste groups among the
contestants to the orissa .Assembly suggests a number of patterns.
First, the representation of certain caste groups is slightly
; out of proportion. Brahmins and Rarans, the dominant castes
in Orissal constitute nearly eight per cent of the state's 6 .
population; however, in 1974 elections, their representation
in the contest was 39 per cent and among the elected candidates
it was 43.6 per cent. Next to these upper castes, the Scheduled
15. For a detailed discussion see Chapter-III. 16. Seat.. M.K.Mohapatro, norissa Legislators", The Indian Journal
of ~olitical Science, vol.34, no.3 (July-Sept. l973),p.303.
167
Tribes and other communities comprising about 28 per cent of the
population have a share of 23 per cent among the contestants, and
I they contribute 25.2 per cent of the total elected candidates.
Their success rate is similar to the upper castes (Table-12).
Among the Scheduled Castes and a~so the backward castes, the la
tter consisting of khandayats, vaisyas, goldsmith (sunari), oil
pressure (tel!), milkman (gauda) and sweet maker (gudia/churtia)
castes, the percentage of contestants, elected members, and
also the rate of success, are considerably lovrer.
Table-12
Distribution of Caste Groups among the Political Elite
Caste groups
( 1 )
Upper eastes (N=l36)
Backward Eastes (N=60)
Scheduled Castes ( N='72)
Scheduled Tribes and other communities (N=80)
Total:
Elected
(N=146)
(2)
43.6 (4'7. 0)
16.0 ($8.3)/
15.2 (30.5)
25.2 (46. 2)
1 oo.o
(in percentage)
Not Elected (N=202)
(3)
35.6 (53.0)
18.3 (61.'7)
24.8 (69. 5)
21.3 (53.8)
1 oo. 0
2
Total Eontestants
(N=348)
{4)
(100.0)
(100.0)
(100.0)
(100. 0)
(100~,0
X = 6.1966
Not significant at lo% level.
Secondly, the proportional representation of the
Scheduled Tribes and Scheduled Castes in the Assembly is clearly
v· due to the constitutional reservations. There is not a single
Scheduled Caste person who is elected from the non-reserved
constituencies, and there is only one tribal candidate, elected
...1 from the general constituencies. Interestingly in the reserved
constituencies also, the recruitment is largely confined~o4
a few castes like the fis~erman {keota/kandara) liquor seller
·(sundhi), pott~r {kumbar/bhoi), washerman (dhoba) and bauri ")
belonging to Scheduled Castes; and the kandha, santal, saora,\v ~ J
~ ho and paraja~belonging to the Scheduled Tribes.
Thirdly, the Scheduled Tribes are almost similarly " ~ represented both from the Congress and the Swatantra, while in
·· the Utkal Congress and the •left parties 1 , the upper castes
have a decisive percentage (Table-13). An¥way, major political
parties in Orissa ostensibly seek the support of different
castes in Orissa, and tend to recruit candidates for offices
from different caste groups. In short, notwithstanding the
reservation of constituencies for "weaker sections", the
(upper castes, who are also economically dominant in the state,J
have higher representations. And the political parties,
irr~spective of their ideologies recr~it people from different
~ !castes, particularly upper castes for the general constituencies.
Unlike the information on demographic and social back
ground of the political elite the information on economic
background mf remain limited. This has to be admitted even
l
169
Table-13
Distribution of Caste Groups by Parties {1974)
(in percentage)
Caste groups All Cong- Swata- u.c. s. P./ Others Legis- ress ntra CPI/ lators CPI(M) tkl46) (N=69) (N=21) (N=35) (N=l2) (N=9)
{1) (2} {3) (4) (5) {6) (7)
Upper Castes 43.8 .. 37.6 38.1 57.2 58.2 33.3
Backward Gastes 15.8 16.1 19.0 14.3 33.5 22.3
Scheduled 6astes 15.0 17.3 14.3 11.4 33.3
Scheduled Tribes & other communi-ties. 25.4 29.0 28.6 17.1 8.3 11.1
Total: 1 oo. 0 1 oo. 0 1 oo. 0 1 oo. 0 1 oo. 0 1 oo. 0
after attempts of checking and rechecking through maD1 possible
}
sources. The propertied classes, do not disclose correct
information on economic holdings, particularly on land and labour4
Taking this for granted, there are also specific problems •. Fbr
instance, information on land-holding is inaccurate not only
because of the attempts to keep the amount of holding secret
' ~\but also because of the lack of proper land survey in many parts
~~of the state as well as high variation in the yielding capacity
of land from region tor egion. Simple number of acres do not
mean much. In coastal districts due to irrigation, cash-crop
17U
cultivation, use of fertilizer and hybrid seeds, the market . ·1'1'l~
value of land is sometimes even 10 times~than its counter-
part in the hill regions. Simultaneously, the land relation
in different regions vary from one another.
Anyway, with these limitations in mind, we revimv the
landholding pattern of the political elite. .Among the
contestants, 26.1 per cent own between 20-40 acres of land,
followed by 1?.9 per cent between 40-80 acfes. Howeve~ most of
the 22 candidates who were without land engaged in business,
two of them are industrialists, one a teacher, one an editor
and another a trade union leader (skilled labour). This shows
that though 22 candidates out of 348 have no land, most of
them are in a more profitable 'position in comparison to
small and middle landowners.
Among elected candidates, the maximum percentage
(24.0) also fall in the category of holding between 20-40 acres,
followed by 5-10 acres (1?.8) and 40-80 acres (15.1). ~So far as the rate of success of each categor~ is concerned
~ the owners of more than 160 acres of land have the highest
success, followed by those who have no land, and those holding J
between 10 to 20 acres (Table-14 )~ Though the statistics 1?
alone may not be a sound basis for analysis, the large value
of landholding with relation to pow~~ is so conspicuous
1?.
18.
W.H.Morris-Jones and Biplab Dasgupta, among others, write: "No set of data can be 'perfect 1 and the conclusions rea-. ched by a statistical analysis are always tentative, subject to the nature of available data and to the techniques employed" in "India 1s Political Areas: Interim Report on an Ecologlcal Investigation, "Asian Survey (June, 1969), p.407. Similarly it is found that. 30 out of 52 members of the Congress Legislative Party in Hariyana, 96 out of 220--7
171
Table-14
Distribution of Landholding of the Elite
Landholding (in acres)
( 1)
No land
Up to 5
)5 - 10
> 10- 20
) 20- 40
) 40- 80
> 80-160
> 160
Total:
Elected
(2)
6.8 (45. 5)
10.3 (40. 5)
17.8 (50.0)
11.6 (45 .9}
24.0 {38.5)
15.1 (35 .5)
8.9 (39.4)
5.5 (5.7 .1)
1 oo. 0 (N=146)
(in percentage)
Defeated Total 6ontes-tants
(3) {4)
5.9 ... (54. 5) (100. 0) (N=22)
10.9 (59 .5) (100. 0) (N=37)
12.9 (50.0) (100.0) (N=52)
9.9 (54.1) (100. 0) {N=37)
27.7 (61.5) (100.0) (N=91)
19.8 {64.5) (100. 0} ( N=62}
9.9 (60.6) (100. 0) (N=33)
3.0 (42.9) (100. 0) (1~14)
1 00. 0 ( 1 00. 0) ( N=34 8) (N=202)
17l
among both the total contestants (348) and the elected members
of the Assembly that without much error one can safely estab
~ lish the predominant relation between land and politics in an
4 agrarian society like orissa.
Next to agriculture, at a far distance, is the
importance of business and industry in Orissa. Many of the
landholders sim~ltaneously engage in other business, while 60
per cent of the contestants and 65 per cent of the elected
members do not have any business. The other population also
largely, while leasing-out land to their tenants engage in
trade, business or own small mills and factories. The picture
will be more clear from the occupational distribution of the
members. However, for the present, it is obvious that agricul-
vfurists have predominance in the politics of the state. Among
J the contestants, 94 (28.0%) and among the elected candidates)
47 (32.2%) have tractor or pumpset or both.
To minimize the error caused due to the consideration
of only land status, and also undejrepresentation of 'the land
ownership by the bigger landowners, we have attempted to synthe~
size land and business (including industry), into a specific
indicator of the economic background of the political elite of
Orissa. At the same time, due consideration is given to the
18 contd •• in M.P., 37 out of 66 in Punjab are big landowners, seet D.R. Choudhry~ ·~erging Trends in Indian Politics", Soc1al Scientist, vol. I, no.5 (Dee. 1972), pp.l4-29o
ownership of important instruments of production in agricul
ture like tractor and pumpset, which may check the validity
of the reporting of landholding of upper strata. Accordingly
land, business and ownership of important agricultural ins
truments are categorised as per the following:
(a) Land
(1 ) No land, or less than 5 acres holding;
(2) 5 to 20 acres holding;
(3) 20 to 80 acres holding; and,
(4, above 80 acres holding.
~ (b) Business
(5) Big businessmen or industrialist employing
more than 25 persons;
(6) businessman or industrialist employing less
than 25 persons; and,
(7) no business.
(c) . Agricultural Implements
(8} Ownership of tractor and pumpset, or, more
than one of the two items;
(9) Ownership of pumpset; and;
(10) Without any ownership of implements.
Following from the above categoriesation, the total
contestants are divided into four economic categories. Each
category includes all the dimensions in various cumbinations
{see below).
Economic catetory I
Bconomic category II
171
= 1 +7 +1 0; 1 +G +1 0; 1 +7 -+9 •
= 2+6+10; 2+7+10; 2+7+9; 1+6+9;
1 +5+9
Economic Category III = 3+6+10; 3+7+10; 3+7+9f 1+6+8;
1+5+9; 2+6-+9; 2+6+8; 2+5+10
Economic category IV = 4+5+8· 4+6+8• 4 +7 +8· 4+5+9; ' ' '
4 +6+9. '
4+7-+9· '
4+5+10; 4+6+10;
4+7+1 0; 1 +5-t€· '
2+5+8· '
2+6+8· '
2+5 +9. '
3+5+8; 3+5-+9· '
3+5+10; 3+6-+9. '
3+6+6.
This method of economic categorisation though lacks
class perspective i~ a relational way, is more useful than
considering land, business and implements separately. Nmv it
is easy to compare between categories, and has at least mini
mised the und~#eporting of the ~ landownership btl )Y1'fi.C. ~.
A study of iable-15, reveals that though the highest
number of contestants belong to the economic category III,
their rate of success in comparision to the economic category-IV,
is low. Further, there is a consistant fall in the not elected
candidates and consistent increase in the elected candidates
from the lower economic category to higher ones, both in figures
and percentage. This infact is the most revealing aspect of the
,.,,
· Table-15
Economic Status of the Political Elite in Orissa
{in percentage)
Economic Status Elected IIJ"ot Total ltion-&lected testants
(N=l46) (N=202) {N=348) (1 } (2) (3) {4)
Economic category I 4.1 10.9 (N=28) (21.4) ('78.6) (100.0)
Economic category II 18.5 25.8 (N='79) (34.2} (65.8) {100.0)
Economic category III 36.3 36.1 (N=l26) (42.1) (57.9) (100.0)
Economic category IV 41.1 2'7.2 (N=l15) (52.2) (47.8} (100. 0}
Total: 100.0 100.0 (100.0)
economic position and success in Assembly elections of
Oris~a, in 1974. [In other words, the rich has the better
Jchances over the poor, in the matters of contest as well as
~· success in the electionsj
Further a cross tabulation of caste and economic
/status (1fable-16) reveals that neither all the upper £X castes ..
belong to upper economic status, nor all the lower castes and
..J tribes belong to low economic status. In a broad way they
correlate; but the fact that the lower castes are heavily
concentrated in economic categories III and IV, in comparison
to the I and II categories, shows that among the backward,
17ti
Table-16
Economic Status and Caste Groups of the Politicai Elite y:·
Cas~ Other Schedu- Backward Upper Total ~ E:ommu- '~tes Castes Castes
(OA/i:. nities
Ra- Ra- Ra- Ra- Ra-CJil""fJ' tio tio tio tio tio
(1) ( 2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (lo) (11)
l!:conomic 1t 0.29 far 0.13 .tsr Oo4 -&- o.s 6 0.27 Category-I (22)
Economic 7 0.39 cdr o.64 6 0.46 5 0.71 <H 0.52 C9tegory-II (lSf (13) m 52) ·'\ Economic (1~ 1.06 !L 0.44 (~ 0.83 12..., o.sa 2J. 0.75 Category-III (18) (33) ( 73)
Economic eM 1.5 4 0.40 5 0.71 li 1.3 a9. 1.09 (lO) -Category IV 7 30 55
Total: ,ll_ 0.86 <•r3r
6.6 o.44 61 o.62 64) o.s8 1~6) o.22 (SO) ( 37) ( 72 ( 202
25.3% 15% 15.8%
y
Note: Open figures indicate the elected members and the bracketed figures indicate the aefeatGd members in
1974 elections.
Figures in deeimals represent ratio elected and contested ccndidatQS.
177
~Scheduled;and Tribal people• the economically powerful ones have
.,/ far better chance of getting elected than those who belong to
I and II categories. It is however~t interesting to note that
/
given high economic status the success-ratio of the tribes
and other conununities is highest, even higher than the upper
castes. Thus the elites drawn from scheduled tribes firstly,
need not come from economically poorer cateqGl'ries,· and seconaly,
~.--" their success-ratio in comparisen to the socially privileged~
and economically dominant upper castes is relativelY better. However, in sharp contras~ scheduled castes tend to have a
low success-ratio inspite of high economic status. Thus~, while
there is a general increase in success ratio with increasing
economic statu~ the scheduled castes do not fall into this
general pattern. To a lesser extent, this is also true if
peasant castes.
Occupational Background:
SOw coming to 1h e occupational background of the
political eli tel it is noticed that about half of the oontestanCO
and also half of those elected are argiculturists. 'Nhile lawyers,
teachers, journalists, ciioctors, engineers and other professionals
together count for abaut 40 percent of them. Businessmen and
industrialists are less than 10 per cent in both cases(Table-17).
Here the important point to note is that the contact of the
professionals with the peopl~' or clients or patients, helped· them
for their relatively better success in the elections than others
(excluding agriculturalists). On the whole# over 15 years, there
is no noticeable change on the occupational background of the
political elite of Orissa (Table-18).
In a predominantly agrarian state like Orissa. the ../presence of agriculturalists in the Assembly should be e::xpected.
Though the term agricul turoists in Indian parlance is comprehensive
enough to include big landlords as well as small peasants with less
than 5 acres of land#· our economic status data has already
revealed that in 1974 elections more than half (53.5%) of
the elected candidates owned land more than 20 acres. The
percentage is still higher (57.6%) in relation to the total
178
Table -17
Occupational Background of the Political Elite
m:. Occupation Elected Not Elected Total E'ontes-No. tants
(N=l46) (N=202) (N=348) ( 1 ) (2) (3} (4) (5)
1 • Agriculturalists 49.3 46.5 (N=l66) (43.4) (56.6) (100. 0)
2. Lawyers 12.3 10.9 (N=40) (45.0) (55.0) (100.0)
3. Teachers 12.3 9.9 (N=38) (47 .4) (52.6) (100. 0)
4. Journalists 3.4 3.0 (N=ll) (45.5) (54.5) (100.00)
5. Doctors 4.1 2.5 (N=ll) (54.5) (45.5) (100.0}
6. Engineers 1.4 2.5 {N=7) {28.6} (71.4) (100.0)
7. Other Services 5.5 11.9 (N=32) (25.0) {75.0) (100.0)
8. Trade Unionists 3.4 3.5 {N=l21) (41.7) (58.3) (100. 0}
9. Businessmen 6.2 6.9 (N=23) {39.1) (60. 9) (1 oo. 0)
1 o. Industrialists 2.0 2.5 (N=8) ( 37.5} (62.5} (1 oo. 0)
Total: 1 oo. 0 1 oo. 0 (1 00.0)
179
Tab1e-18
Occupational Background of the Orissa MLAs
Occupation l917 l97l l974 s1. No. ( 1 ) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1 Agriculturalists 73 (52.1) 68 (48. 6) 72 (49.3)
2 Lawyers 16 (11.4) 21 (15.0) 18( 12.3)
3 Teachers 19 (13.6) 20 (14.3) 18 (12.3)
4 Journalists 8 ( 5. 7) 7 ( 5.0) 5 (3.4)
5 Doctors 2 { 1.4) 4 ( 2.9} 6 (4.1)
6 Engineers 2 ( 1.4) 2 (1.4)
7 other Services 2 {1.4) 4 ( 2.9) 8 (5.5)
8 Trade Unionsists 4 {2. 9) 3 { 2.1) 5 (3.4)
9 Businessmen 6 (4. 3) 6 ( 4.3) 9 {6.2)
10 Industrialists 1 (0. 7) 2 (1.4 ) 3 (2.1)
11 Not Reported 9 ( 6.4) 3. {2.1)
Total: 140 (100.0) 140 (100.0) 146{100.0)
Note: (3) and (4) are col1ec·ted from the Who is Who of OLA, 1967 and 1971, respectively.
The bracketed figures denote the percentages to the total.
180
contestants, Thus in a broad sense, we can say, that
leaving aside a very small percentage, the agricul~sts
belonged to big farmer and landlord categories, and not to
small or middle farmers, They represent the rural interest,
which is made clear in the previous chapter,
[In comparison to the Indian Parliament, the Orissa
Assembly has a proportionately lower percentage of lawyers,
businessmen a»B but a higher number of teachers, government 19
servants and former rulers) However, the agricultural
representation over a period of time has shown a consistently 20
50 percent strength of the Assembly, The low representation
of businessmen exposes the weakness of merchant and industrial 21
capital in the state.
~ sum~he section, we have observed that irres-
>/ pective oft he reservations for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled .......-•
Tribes, there is the concentration of political elite positions
20.
21,
See, S.A.Kochanek, Business and POlitics in India (Berkeley~ 1974 ), p. 68; L.M. Singhvi, "The Legislative Process in IndJ.a11 , Journal of Constitutional and Parliamentary Studies 4 (1970), p, l26t and R. Dutta, "The Party Representative in 4th Lok Sabha •, EPW, 4 (Jan., 1969 ), For similar situations elsewhere see,_ M. Weiner! "Changing Patterns of Political Leadership in west Benga ", Political Change in South Asia (Calcutta;~.K.L,Mukhopodhyay, 1963), p, 20:?_j A.C. Mayer! "Rural Leaders and the Indian General ~ection"1. As an SUrvey! vol,l, No.8 (October 1961 ), pp, 23-29 · .tc·, G. Bailey Po i tics and Social c&ange (Berkeley, 1~63), .Part Iii; A,Beteille, IIP61itlcs and Social Structure in Tami1Midu 11 , The Economic Weekly vol,l5,no. 28-30 (July 1963);-pp, 1161-67; and G,Rosen, Democracy and Eeonomlc Change in Ind·ia (Berkeley, 1966)J chap, 7, See aLso, R.Wence, op,cit,, pp,l81-l92,
181
in the hands of a few upper caste groups. But that does not
mean that all upper caste Gmt contestants have better chances
to win over other castes, rather we have observed caste by itself
/ is less signi~icant in the politics of the state. It gets its
maximum·political retum only when it·~ combines high
v economic position. This is also very tJ:Ue of the tribal anc1 I v
other communities which rank lower in the social hierarchy.
Thus economic position, mainly land ownership,· exercises an . important influence in determing success in the elections#
' "' However,. as we have observed; the economic factor is less discrimi
nating in the case of schGduled castes and backward peasant
castes. The overall landed interest i::$ continues to he heavily
~represente<il in the ~tate Asssn0rly.
III POLITICAL BACKGRO~:
Since verifying political information ir "'-asier# a
far greater claim can be made on the validity of the political
info.r:mation over the economic ones. Anyway,· before reporting
the data on the political background of the elite, it is worth
while to recollect the regional variations in political partici
pation, party holds and general background of the leadership in
coastal districts and western regions. This however, is only
a brief addition to the elaboration made in Chapter-III.
An examination of Table-19 reveals that in the coastai
~districts, relatively liberal parties have more access than the '
conservative parties, Hence, the present Congress 'W!nistry
../
has provided 80 p~r cent of the Ministerial offices to the
candidates from the coastal region, while only 20 per cent
is allotted to the candidates of the inland region- constituting • 7 out of 13 districts of Orissa. In the ~nland region~
~ the cQnservative parties of the feudal lords, e.K ~R&r
ex-zamindars and princeo, tribal chiefs etc. have dominance over
the relatively liberal political parties. Particularly the
districts of Bolangir, Kalahandi, and Dhenkenal have always
remained under the spell of the respective former rulers and
their sons. Though nomenclature of the parties led by R.N. Singh
Deo have changed from GP?Swatantra~Pragati->BLD -, he
remained the fountain head of the politics of the area. The gap
created by his death m~ in recent month, can not be filled by
Biju Patnaik or his collegue P.K.Deo. These three districts
always remained a fortess of the Swatantra. Even in case of
Nandini Satapathy, she had won the poll of 1974 from Dhenkanal
Assembly by only a narrow margin of little over 2,000 votes.
NOw, on the political background of the elite,
attention is paid on the number and type of associations, with
which the elite members are associated. Secondl~ information
is collected on the participation of the candidates on different
political issues. Thirdly, we have collected data on the number
of elections the candidates have contested, number of times
Tab1e-19
District-wise Party Position in the 1974 Orissa Assembly Elections
Sl. District Swa- Utkal Jana Cong- CPI CPI SPI No. tan- Cong- Cong- ress (M)
tra ress ress
( 1) (2) (3} (4} (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
1 Ganjam 6. 7 2
2 Koraput 2 5 7
3 Sambalpur 1 3 7 1
4 Puri 4 6 2 1
5 Balasore 2 7 1 1 1
6 Cut tuck 2 9 1 1 2
7 Dhenkanal 1 1 6
8 Sundargarh 6
9 Ka1ahandi 6 1 1
10 Bo1angir 8 1
1 1 Hayurbhanj a 1 5 1
12 Keonjhar 1 3 2
13 Phu1bani 1 3
Total 21 35 1 69 7 3 2
A. Coastal (1-&)
Region 5 29 45 6 3 2
B.~and Region 16 6 1 24 1 ~-t3'2
Total: 21 35 1 69 7 3 2
1 S3.
Inde Total pen-dent
(1 O) ( 11 )
15
14
12
2 15
12
2 26
8
1 7
8
9
3 10
6
4
8 !46
4 94
4 52
8 146
18t
elected or defeated, and if they have shifted their original
constituencies, districts or parties this has also been taken
note of. Finally, the political posts held by the candidates
before entering into 1974 polls, is also included in the
political background of the candidates.
Among the 348 contestants, there are 41, who did not ._,/
v belong to aey association. Most of them are from the reserved (!Pi.)
~ constituencies for the Scheduled Tribes~and a few are Indepen-
dents or from ineffective political parties. The rest '307
contestants belong to broadly seven types of associations,
Il§ID81J, (a) professional associations of lawyers, teachers,
doctors, etc. (85 persons); (b) Government Committees and
advisory bodies (80), represented by the earlier elected candi
dates; {c) sports and recreational clubs {61), dominated by
ex-princes and a few talented artists; (d) institutional --------managemen~odies, like local schools and temples (43}, domi-
nated by upper caste local big landowners; (e) different
welfare boards (36), comprised by liberal politicians (f) Qriya
integrational organizations, like Prabasi Utkal Organisation
(22), dominated by the old Congress leaders; and (g) labour and
peasant unions (31). This means that 51 of them belong to
more than one type of association. Here, the interesting phe
nomenon is that only 31 candidates belonging to CPI, CPI(M),
Congress, .SPI, sue, RCPI, FB, and even one from Jana Congress,
have links with the labour and peasant bodies.
185
Not inconsistent with the pattern observed earlier we
find that only 58.04 per cent of the contesting elites are
associated with local level associations and organisations and
approximately the same proportion of elected elites ~ show
any interest by local level involvement. The rest, operate
beyond the local level in associational activities. This reinfor
ces the urban directed political orientation of the elite, and
consequent estrangement from the electorate they represent
(Table-20).
Another interesting feature of the contesting elites
ia that a sizeable ~per cent have never been involved in
any movement and yet they manage to constitute 29.4 percent of ~w ~ 11~ h~ Jo t.tff.t'Y~ ~ ~ 'j.Q_Ja.~~~~ a. • .c "J R_~tc. L~--.rsz. the elected elites •. "-. otherwise, specific and goal oriented
movements and sporadic demand oriented movements have contribu-.Jc h,~l.U.Y1 .
ted~the rest of the elites. Among the specific and goal oriented
movements, the participation of the elite in the national struggle
and in student movements, yield about 56 percent (in each case)
of the elected elites from amongst the respective contesting
elites. However, contesting elites who had been participants
in peasant movements, although smaller (9.8%), yield 35.3% returns
from amongst them. The other sporadic movements like price r"\
rise, anti_9orruption, professional etc. have also contributed in
various measures to the elected elites. It would be ±RXxR intri
guing to know the background of the elected elites who have not
participated in aHk any movement and yet found favour with the
electorate. (Table-21 & 22).
18a
Table-20
Level of Associations with which the Political Elite is Associated.
f>er Elected {Col.5/ Sl. Level of No. of Percent-No. Associations/ 'ontes- cent persons Col. 3) age
Counnittees tants {_h,~~J)
(1) (2) (3) (4) {5) {6) {7)
1 • Not associated 41 11.8 12 29.3 8.4
2. Local level 58 16.6 15 25.9 10.2
3. District level 32 9.1 15 46.9 10.2
4. Local & District level 68 19.6 33 48.5 22.5
5. State level 21 6.1 8 38.1 5.5
6. District and State level 33 9.5 13 39.4 8.9
7. Local, 1)1 strict and.State level 42 12.1 23 54.8 15.8
8. Country 1 evel 6 1.7 3 50.0 2.1
9. District! State & Country evel 13 3.7 6 46.15 4.2
1o. Local, District, State & £ountry 34 9.8 18 52.9 12.2
/'-1? -Total: 348 loo.o .. J;ts:. 1 oo.o
Table-21 ~
Participation in Political Movements by the Elite
Sl. Movements No.of €ontestants Total ~ge No.of Elected Total 5/9% Perc en-No. Participation as: per sons/ par- tage to
ticipation as total
Members Members Leaders Elected
Leaders
( 1 ) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) {7) (8) (9) (10) {11)
1. No participation 1~6 39.0 - 43 31.6 29.3 2. National Struggle 6 28 34 9.8 3 18 21 66.8 14.4 3. Integratio~ S.R.C.
Praja Mand 5 27 32 9.2 3 11 14 43.8 9.6 4. Professional 15 7 22 6.3 6 4 10 45.4 6.8 5. Student 8 16 24 6.9 6 10 16 66.7 11.0 6. Price-rise, anti-
- corruption etc. 2 17 19 5.4 7 7 36.8 4.8 7 Peasant and labour 7 19 26 7.5 2 8 10 M.5 6.8 a. (2) & {3) 6 12 18 5.2 2 6 8 44.4 5.5 9 •. (4) & (5) 4 4 8 2.3 2 4 6 75.0 4.2 1 o. {4), (5j & (6) 2 3 5 1 .4 2 2 40.0 1.4 11. (5) & {6) 2 7 9 2.6 1 3 4 44.4 2.7 12. (2) &(7) 4 4 1.2 2 2 50.0 1.4 13. (5) & {7) 1 3 4 1.2 14. (3), (4) & (6) 5 5 1.4 2 2 40.0 1.4 15. Others 2 2 0.6 1 1 50.0 0.7
·Total: 58 154 348 1 oo.o 25 78 146 - 1 oo. 0
( 1)
1 •
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
a. 9.
1 o.
11.
12.
13.
14.
lSS Table-22
Economic Status and Participation of Orissa MLAs in Political Movements.
status
No participation
National struggle
Integratio~ SRC & Praja Mand
Professional
Student
Price Rise, anti-corruption etc.
Peasant and labour
(2) &: (3)
{4) & (5)
(4), {5) & {6)
{5) & {6)
{2) & {7)
{3), (4) & (6}
others
Total:
Economic €ate gory
I
(3)
4
1
1
6
EConomic Economic Economic Total Category Category Category
II III IV
(4) (5) (6) {7)
7 12 20 43
6 4 11 21
4 6 3 14
1 8 1 10
4 4 8 16
1 5 1 7
5 4 10
3 5 8
3 1 6
2 2 2
2 2 4
t 2 2
1 1 2
1 1
27 53 60 14'6
189
According to Table-23, So per cent of the contestants and
little less than 40 per cent of the elected candidates were never
elected to the ~ssembly earlier, while about 25 per cent; in both
cases, were elected once. Among freshers the upper castes comprise
45% and about 70% of them belong to economic categories III & IV.
Interestingly';• among the leaders 60 percent of the MLAs had enjoyed
the position earlier to the present success. It seems that in 1974
elections, the success of the freshers were very limited in
comparision to 1967 and 1971 elections - Table-24. ". Suppringly ~
enough the advantage expected out of previous tenures as members
of the Assembly were not so much in evidence. The advantage, which
if at all exists can at best be marginal. The 56 freShers of
1974 OLA are distributed as follows: Congress 26, Utkal Congress
131 swatantra-7, SPI-2, CPI(M) -11 Independents 4 and others 7.
The picture shows that no party prefered freshers unless otherwise
the situation demanded. In 1974 elections, 22 former Ministers,
67 members of the dissolved Assembly have been reelected. Besides,
11 ex-MPs also got elected. It appears that the higher the
leconomic position, better the chance of getting elected many
~imes to the lAssembly ( Table-25). Furthe.t', 40.7% of those
in the higher economic categories were freshers. The number of
defeats of the contestants are no less either. About 40% have
experienced defeats one time ~the other (Table-26).
1~0
Table -23
Number of Times the P.oliti~ Elite have been Returned to the Assembly
Sl. No.of Times No.of con- %age No. of Lfi~CS) Percent No. Elected testants elected "n eAU.tUJ.
candida- f .. u-terrl- ~ tes.
( 1 ) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
1 • Never before 1?2 49.5 56 33.5 3tf.tj
2. Once .before 86 24.6 38 44.2 26.&
3. Twice " 34 9.8 20 58.8 13.,.
4. Thrice " 2? ?.8 15 ,5.5 10.3
5. Four times 21 6.0 ll 52.3 ?.fr
6. Five times 8 2.3 6 ?5.0 4.~
Total: 348 lOO.O 146 100.0
Tab1e-24
Number of Times Elected: The Orissa· MLAs.
Times !96? 19?! I974 sf. No. of No. No. % No. % No. % ( 1 ) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) {7) (8)
1 • Never before 66 47.1 80 57.2 56 3r'.~
2. Once before 35 25.0 29 20.? 38 26.0.
3. Twice 11 29 20.? 15 1o.? 20. 13.,-
4. Thrice " 10 ?.2 9 6.4 15 10.3
5. Four II ? 5.0 11 ?.~
6. Five tl 6 4.J
Total: 140 loo.o 11:40 100.0 146 1oo.o
191
Tab1e-25
Econanic position and Number of Times Elected, OLA, Manbers
ate gory ategory ate gory ategory otal I II III IV
(3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
1 • Never 2 8 28 18 56
2. Once 2 9 14 13 38
3. Twice 1 5 7 7 20
4. Thrice 1 3 3 8 15
5. Four 2 9 11
6. Five 1 5 6
Total: 6 27 53 60 146
Table--~6 Number of Times the Contes~tants Defeated
s!. Times No. of %ige Elected 5/3 Percent No. contes- candida-
tants tes ( 1 ) . (2) (3) (4} (5) (S} (7)
1 • Never contested 122 35.0 56 53.3 38.1
2. Never Defeated 87 25.0 35 40.2 23.9
3. Once 78 22.4 28 35.9 19.0
4. Twice 40 11.5 16 I!O.O 11.2
5. Thrice 15 4.3 9 60.0 6.3 6. Four 6 1.8 2 33.3 1.5
7. Five
Total: 348 100.0 146 1oo.o
1
1~2
Table--~7
Relationship between % of votes polled to % of votes secured by Elected Candidates
Percentage of votes polled in constituencies.
Percent
>50
Percentage Percent of votes secured by ( 50 elected candidates. Percent
Total
>50 per (50 per cent cent
36 30
43 37
79 67
Table-28
Defections of the Contestants of 1974 Assembly Elections Defected to
Parties Con- u.c. Swata- Jana- CPI/ Other gress ntra Cong- PSP
ress
Congress 45 4 l4 2 3 u. c. 1
Swatantra 9
Jana Congress 10
Total
66 (45·1.)
80 C»Yj
146
Inde- Total pen-dent
68 8
12 10 t CPI/PSP 19 2 21
Partiese Others 1 2 26 30
~ Independent 43 5 13 1 62
88 53 19 16 4 5 26 211
193
The picture of securing votes by the elected to the
polled votes of the constituency also shows that more than 55
per cent of the elected candidates have secured less than so
per cent of the voti~. (Table-27). But only a few have shifted
their constituencies. Among the contestants,: it is 76, out of
them 10 have also changed their districts: and among the elected
candidates the number i£ is 31, out of whom 6 have changed their
districts. Though, in comparison to the total contestants, the
elected members have changed their constituencies frequently; it
is obvious that the leaders select their own constituencies and
feel more secure there, than in the other constituencies.
An examination of Table-28 reveals that excluding the
freshers, the earlier participants have changed their parties.
In fact, 6ongresf!, was split into Jana Congress and Utkal Congress,
reducing the strength of the original Congress. We have discussed
this elaborately in Chapter-III, here only we point out that there
has been no bar for defectionsp Irrespective of the ideological
content of the party, shifts have taken place. Floor crossings
from Swatantra to Congress and vice versa, is not unusual. Several
party candidates also became Independents. Defections were so fre
quent that the table remained inconclusive • Within a single term,
a person might have changed twice or thrice or qa even four times,
back and forth.
It is found that more than 15 per cent of the contestants
and also elected ones, have had no leadership positions prior to the
present assignment, the other communities alost comprising half of
them. Around 45 per cent of them had the positions in Panchayats or
~Municipalities as Sarapanchs1 29. For the details on voting relations, refer to Chap.III.
Table-29 Mil
Distribution of the Po1i tical Posts)J>y the Elite
(5k3J Per-Sl. Description of No. of Percent No.of No. Leadership position 'ontes- Elec- tn cent
prior to contest tants ted P...t¥a:,+ persons
( 1 ) (2) (3) (4) (5) {6) (7)
1 • Without aey 58 16.5 22 37.9 15.1
2. Panchayat & Municipality 101 29.1 35 54.6. 23.8
3. Party Executives 37 10.'1. 14 37..8 ·g.t;
4. Student & Professional Unions 24 7.0 8 57·.5 5.5
5. l.fi ni st er s 12 . 3.4 8 66.7 5.5
6. MPS 7 2.0 2 28.6 1.4
7. {2) & (3) 58 16~6 28 48.3 19.0
8. {2) & (4} 21 6.0 10 47.6 6.9
9. (3}, (4),(5} &(6} 2 0.6 2 100.0 1.4
1 o. (4 ), (5) & (6) 1 ... 0.3 1 100.0 0.7
11. (4) & (6) 2 0.6 2 100.0 1.4
12. (3} & {5) 4 1.1 2 50.0 1.4
13. (2) & {5) 3 0.9 2 66.7 1.4
14. others 18 5.2 10 55.5 6.8
Total: 348 1oo.o l46 1 oo. 0
1~5
chairman or councillors/Ward membess (Table-29) o This emphasi
ses the importance of selection of the condidotes by different
parties from the local level elected.
To sum up this chapter, we have observed certain conspi
cuous features of the political elite of Orissa, sUch as n
G> steady increase of the younger age group in the demographic
composition, and that there is a trend of Qstran~ent of the elite' .. ® fttrm the local bases in terms of their residential mobil! ty4J
~involvement in only state and nation level associations, and
@n()n-participation in social movements with specific goalsG1
[Further, 'it is revealed that the politicians of the upper economic
category, especially of the landed class,· belonging to the
upper castes and the tribal communities dominate the political
elite structure of the stateJ In the tribal legislative .1_
elite represent exactly the member formally assigned to them ../
in the reserved.constituencies.
I
