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CHAP ICHAP I. THE PROBLEM . THE PROBLEM W/ W/ AMERICAN AMERICAN DEMOCRACYDEMOCRACY AA. FAITH - KEEPING. FAITH - KEEPING Americans chose:Americans chose:
- peace in ‘64 and got Vietnam- peace in ‘64 and got Vietnam
- law & order in ‘68 and got Watergate- law & order in ‘68 and got Watergate
- to restore an effective presidency in ‘76 - to restore an effective presidency in ‘76 and got a “crisis of confidence,” gas lines and got a “crisis of confidence,” gas lines and helplessness vs. a hostage-taking Iran and helplessness vs. a hostage-taking Iran
A. Faith - KeepingA. Faith - Keeping (cont)(cont)
Americans chose (cont)
- bold leadership in ‘80 but got a secret “arms for hostages” deal- prosperity in ‘88 and got a slump in ‘99- “the most ethical administration in history” in 92 and saw a president impeached on grounds of perjury and obstruction of justice
A. Faith - Keeping A. Faith - Keeping (cont)(cont)
Thus … the problem with American democracy is that it too often does not keep faith with the public
B. American Democracy Democracy divides and distributes
power much more broadly than any other form of government
B. American B. American Democracy Democracy (continued)(continued) With no single source of control,
tyranny nearly impossible in a demo.
Fragmentation and stalemated leadership and …
the consequent failure to follow through are much more typical of democracy
B. American B. American DemocracyDemocracy (continued)(continued) Fragmentation likely in the U.S. where
government was divided from the start Question: Is American democracy working? Answer: “No” or, at least, “not well
enough.” With weakened parties - the chief
instrument of democracy - American democracy delivers less dependably on paths the American public has chosen
B. American B. American DemocracyDemocracy (cont)(cont) Weak parties reduce the practical
consequences of voting The legitimacy of American
government suffers …. not because elected officials do not want to keep promises
but because they lack the means viable parties once provided
B. AmericanB. American DemocracyDemocracy (cont)(cont) With notable exceptions (?) , today’s
parties do not produce working governing majorities capable of keeping a promised public agenda
Nor do they have the power to curb special interests
As a result, victories of diverse interest groups have grab-bag effect on policy
instead of enacting a promised public agenda in recognizable form
B. AmericanB. American DemocracyDemocracy (cont)(cont) Participation declined in last 1/3 of
20th century Why vote if government does not
respond to “people like me” anyway? Feelings of cynicism and inefficacy
have increased Partisanship and the belief in the utility
of voting have decreased
B. Am. B. Am. Democracy Democracy (cont.)(cont.) The impossibility of holding officials
accountable = 1 consequence 2nd follows from the 1st: i.e.,
Democracy itself is an issue in the United States. - Democracy requires political institutions capable of proposing and insisting on public agendas and that, in turn, requires resilient electoral and governing majorities
B. Am. DemocracyB. Am. Democracy (cont)(cont)As coalition builders working parties: put the pieces together to achieve
majorities are the electorate’s means of making
and implementing public choicesWhen parties are weakened as
coalition builders power of interest groups increases … majorities do not drive policy-making
- - - - minorities do
B. Am. B. Am. DemocracyDemocracy (cont) (cont) Groups represent much narrower “publics” Governmental divisions + strong groups
+ weak parties = problems with American government’s :1. Efficacy of government
2. Accountability of government
3. Legitimacy of government
B. Am. B. Am. DemocracyDemocracy(cont)(cont) One could argue that
popular sovereignty in United States centers NOT in the public or electorate…
…but in the organized public (i.e., universe of interest group constituencies)
C. Democracy, C. Democracy, Pluralism and Elitism Pluralism and Elitism Democracy = making and
implementation of public choices through majoritarian means
Democracy may be direct or indirect (define.)
Necessarily indirect in the United States ... (Why?)
C. Democracy, C. Democracy, Pluralism & ElitismPluralism & Elitism (cont)(cont) Indirect democracy leads readily
lead to pluralism Pluralism = the
competition over policy between organized groups
Many would consider pluralism part & parcel of democracy
C. Democracy, C. Democracy, Pluralism & ElitismPluralism & Elitism (cont)(cont) BUT … pluralism responds to the
organized public democracy responds to the
general, or at least the attentive, public - especially as represented through electoral and public opinion processes
C. Democracy, C. Democracy, Pluralism & ElitismPluralism & Elitism (cont) (cont) The organized public is a subset of
the general or attentive public BUT … the organized public is more
advantaged demographically …. … and so, advantaged psychologically
and, … and so, more involved politically ERGO: two publics are not the same
C. Democracy, C. Democracy, Pluralism & Elitism Pluralism & Elitism (cont)(cont) Political associations (i.e., groups) are
a legitimate part of pluralist democracy Groups specialize in the vital function of
interest articulation = expression of support, expectations, needs, interests, preferences & demands to government
C. Democracy, C. Democracy, Pluralism & Elitism Pluralism & Elitism (cont)(cont) BUT … the group’s leadership - usually an
oligarchy - may act more on its own than out of responsiveness to the organized public or even to its own constituency
In that case, the oligarchy replaces the group and pluralism moves toward elitism
Political Elitism = the development of public policy by oligarchies
C. Democracy, C. Democracy, Pluralism & Elitism Pluralism & Elitism (cont)(cont) Pluralism and elitism merge as
interest group oligarchies or elites articulate interests not just to and from their own members, ….
… but directly to public policy elites or oligarchies (e.g., ?) who make policy
C. Democracy, C. Democracy, Pluralism & ElitismPluralism & Elitism (cont) (cont) American government - like any
other government - is not wholly democratic nor pluralist nor elitist
Rather … some issues are addressed by democratic process, others by pluralism, others by elitism and still others by some combinations or blends
C. Democracy, C. Democracy, Pluralism & ElitismPluralism & Elitism (cont) (cont) e.g.,
- Who shall lead and with what agenda? resolved democratically
- Policies having to do with various group stakes resolved pluralistically
- Policy oligarchies (elites) determine the most specific policies …. unless …...
C. Democracy, C. Democracy, Pluralism & ElitismPluralism & Elitism (cont) (cont)
Unless …. (continued)
- the oligarchy or elite represents a coalition - the broader the array of interest represented…the broader the oligarchy’s policy concerns- may then enact policy agendas - coalitional elites may represent a majority
C. Democracy, C. Democracy, Pluralism & ElitismPluralism & Elitism (cont) (cont) 1992 and ‘94 elections looked like
democracy or majoritarianism in action Public to Clinton: restore the economy BUT public expected moderate policies Promise re economy seemed to be
kept BUT public got liberal spending (e.g.,
health care proposals) initially
C. Democracy, C. Democracy, Pluralism & ElitismPluralism & Elitism (cont) (cont)
In apparent attempt to correct Clinton’s expensive, leftward leanings, public elected opposition party to Congress in 1994
BUT … 1994 results can just as easily be described as pluralism in action.
Republican members of Congress had convinced interests to switch contributions to Republican candidates for Congress
C. Democracy, C. Democracy, Pluralism & ElitismPluralism & Elitism (cont) (cont)
It is difficult for a president to keep promises if pluralist and elitist elements in decision-making (d/m) supplant the majoritarian election processes organized by parties
P.S.: 2000 election was extremely partisan - but can pres keep promises?
1. 1. TwoTwo MandatesMandates Compounding the difficulties
that arise from pluralism and/ or elitism is that the president must respond not to one but to TWO mandates:
One DOMESTIC the other INTERNATIONAL
1. Two 1. Two Mandates Mandates (cont)(cont) It is to this double mandate - NOT
to a specific promise - that the public holds presidents to account
Public will forgive breaking 1 or several promises
BUT it will NOT forgive breaching the domestic NOR international mandate
1. Two 1. Two Mandates Mandates (cont)(cont) In the last 1/3 of the 20th century
a less partisan and more evaluative public has required a passing grade on both agenda tests for a president to be returned to office
1. Two Mandates 1. Two Mandates (cont) (cont)
Since Eisenhower (1952 - 1960) only two have earned passing marks on both tests
Both unable to keep specific promises (Reagan: balanced budget, Clinton: health care reform)
(JFK did not get the chance) Both RR & WJC were judged to have kept
faith w/ public expectations domestically and internationally (not always the personal faith - e.g. Lewinskygate)
1. Two 1. Two Mandates Mandates (cont)(cont) Today’s public can be very supportive of
a president judged to keep 2 mandates RR reelected & helped successor, Bush (R) WJC reelected in 1996 plus his party
gained 5 seats in the mid-term elections of 1998 during impeachment of him by Republican Congress
1.Two Mandates 1.Two Mandates BUT … public in last 1/3 of 20th swift to punish
for failing to keep faith with either mandate LBJ passed domestic but failed international
test RMN was the other way around GF healed but pardoned domestically JC failed both Domestic & International tests GHWB passed “big I” but failed “big D”
(Public classic: What have you done for me lately?)
“Dubya”??
2. 2. Partisanship and Political Partisanship and Political ConsumerismConsumerism Weak partisanship results in “shopping” ..
.. discarding of incumbent presidents Voter/shoppers may “buy” 1 candidate’s
appeal over another whatever “brand” (i.e., party) label
Results : change over continuity in gov. more than in more partisan eras and …...
2. 2. Partisanship & Political Partisanship & Political Consumerism Consumerism (cont)(cont) …. and (continued), in today’s
“fix-it,” technocratic society, the public expects presidents to solve problems (i.e., lead) BUT ..
without supplying structured and dependable (i.e., partisan) support to do so
2. 2. Partisanship & Pol.Partisanship & Pol. ConsumerismConsumerism (cont) (cont) Public mandates would be easier for
pres to honor if public more inclined to stick with a party choice
BUT … w/ decline of partisanship in the last 1/3, 2nd terms were rarer than in middle 1/3 (‘32 - ‘64: Democratic) or the first 1/3 (1900 - ‘32: Republican)
2. 2. Partisanship & Pol.Partisanship & Pol. ConsumerismConsumerism (cont) (cont) A more apartisan and evaluative
public disposed to judge a president as failing either at home or abroad or both
Also less likely to empower a winning candidate as president with a partisan maj. in the leg. to enact their promises
2. 2. Partisanship & Pol. Partisanship & Pol. ConsumerismConsumerism (cont) (cont) Increasingly, dividing vote meant
divided government 5 of last 7 presidents (prior to
Dubya) have faced opposition Congresses during all or parts of their term(s)
(i.e., Nixon, Ford, Reagan, Bush & Clinton) Dubya may in 2004
2. 2. Partisanship & Pol. Partisanship & Pol. ConsumerismConsumerism (cont) (cont) Contrast: in 1st 2/3 of 20th only 2
of 9 pres.s were frustrated in staying pres
Hoover was defeated in 1932 Truman would have lost in 1952 had
he chosen to run Two presidents died prior to running
a 2nd time (Harding and Kennedy)
2. 2. Partisanship & Pol. Partisanship & Pol. ConsumerismConsumerism (cont) (cont) Only 3 of 9 presidents in the 1st
2/3 of 20th faced opposition Congresses for all or part of their term(s)
i.e., Woodrow Wilson, Truman S Truman and Dwight David Eisenhower
3. Weak 3. Weak Parties and Strong Parties and Strong GroupsGroups Interest Groups operate in a widened
sphere of influence when parties fail to organize consistent, resilient majorities
Fluidity in public support for parties leads to policy-making w/o clear pattern
… groups pursue particular and diverse goals not public mandates nor party agendas (grab bag not agenda politics)
3. Weak 3. Weak Parties and Strong GroupsParties and Strong Groups (cont) (cont) In 1992 candidate Clinton promised the public affordable health care rates.
BUT coalition of anti’s nickeled & dimed
Every bill in Congress is time limited Pressure groups compromised &
delayed health care bill to death.
3.3. Weak Weak Parties and Strong GroupsParties and Strong Groups (cont) (cont) Moreover, 1 group coalition may
win only to see opposing coalition win the same issue the next time.
e.g., organized labor got a minimum wage increase in November of 1997.
Clinton tried to give them another when he needed political support (“Lewinskygate”)
3. Weak 3. Weak Parties and Strong Groups Parties and Strong Groups (cont) (cont) A conservative coalition defeated the
2nd attempt to raise labor’s wages So… policy zigzagged in 1 year
because of shifting fortunes & the resultant opportunism of groups coalitions
Little sign of a public or party agenda
3. Weak 3. Weak Parties and Strong GroupsParties and Strong Groups (cont)(cont) In U. S., pluralism/elitism largely supplanted
majoritarianism in policy-making… .. due to party/group imbalance (mediation) Narrowly based group power fills the vaccuum
left by weak parties - minoritarianism Historically parties - more than groups -
have been chief link between public majorities and gov policy-making elites
4. Prospects 4. Prospects Party/Group RedressParty/Group Redress What are prospects for solving
mediation problem (strong groups / weak parties)?
One possibility: Restore Parties That would check groups somewhat
and improve majoritarianism. But is it possible?
4. Prospects 4. Prospects for Partyfor Party/ / Group RedressGroup Redress (cont)(cont) Historically, parties achieve new
life via new mandates stemming from realigning issues
i.e., a “realigning” election (e.g., 1800, 1828, 1860, 1896 & 1936)
electorate’s partisanship & voting predispositions were realigned by such elections for the next 28 – 36 yrs
4. Prospects 4. Prospects for Party for Party / / Group RedressGroup Redress (cont)(cont) May never be another nat. realignment :- power of media in mediation- multiplication of primaries- finance reforms & individualization of candidate donor bases - candidate more than party-centered
campaigns
4. 4. Prospects for Party Prospects for Party // Group Group RedressRedress (cont) (cont) More than party cues, TV transmits
candidate appeals into voter/ viewer’s home
Political consumers less loyal to a party “brand” than traditional partisan voters
Results: one-term presidencies, divided gov’ent and policy-making NOT constrained by a majority agenda
4. Prospects 4. Prospects for Party for Party / / Group Redress Group Redress
SO… democratic and majoritarian politics have lost ground to pluralism & elitism
At times, policy-making is driven by elect/gov majority w/ policy agenda ...
But … often the result of various groups articulating demands to responsive elites in government especially mid-term
4. Prospects 4. Prospects for Party for Party // Group RedressGroup Redress (cont)(cont) chief instrument of democracy =
party Party must regain strength if
majoritar - ianism to be revitalized Realignment less likely today than in
past (why?) Alternative Scenaro: “New Machines”
5. The 5. The “New Machines”“New Machines” A theory: The New Machines A set of new oligarchies in
government will emerge called the- “President’s Party”- “Speaker’s Party” and …- “Majority Leader’s Party.
These would be the “new machines.”
5. The “New 5. The “New Machines” Machines”
(cont)(cont) Like old party machines, new machines would have resources to influence office seeking & so office holding
How? … By putting party and group
resources (i.e., #’s & $’s) together.
Examples ------ ?
D. D. Structural/FunctionalisStructural/Functionalis
mm 1. The Point is Decision
• Politics stresses decision-making
• government the implementation of decisions
•Decision-making plus decision - implementation = leadership within social collectivities
2. Political 2. Political Functions Functions and and StructuresStructures So pol or gov functions = activities involved in making or implementing decisions for social collectivities.
Pol or gov structure (or agency, institution, organization, etc.) = adaptive yet patterned behavior affecting decision- making & implementation over time
2. Political Functions 2. Political Functions & & StructuresStructures (cont)(cont) For every function there is
structure(s) many structures perform several
functions as society changes, structures (etc.)
evolve to ensure decision-making and implementation (i.e., patterned yet adaptive)
2. Political Functions 2. Political Functions & & Structures Structures (cont)(cont)Political Socialization Function : = learning pol. relevant attitudes &
behavior = induction of individuals into citizenry … collectively creates political culture Socialization Structures = family, peer
group, church, media, formal & informal associations, parties, etc.
2. Political Functions 2. Political Functions & & Structures Structures (cont)(cont) Recruitment Function = special form
of socialization - goes beyond citizenship
… inducts people into specialized political or governmental roles
Structures = election systems, parties, groups, bureaucratic exams, appointive processes & co-option (?) into pol/gov structures
2. Political Functions 2. Political Functions & & Structures Structures (cont)(cont) Communication Function = dissemination of pol info or propaganda
Structures of Political Communications: e.g. formal (?) or informal (?) media
via primary (?) AND secondary or reference groups (?)
e.g., parties or interest associations
2. Political Functions 2. Political Functions & & Structures Structures (cont)(cont) Interest Aggregation Function = activities that combine interests into coalition that determines leaders & paths in social collectivities
Elect & gov coalitions - majorities may be formed thru interest aggregation. If so …
insures majority rule or majoritarianism
2. Political Functions 2. Political Functions & & StructuresStructures (cont) (cont) Structures: interest aggregation =
central party function since 1790s Other institutions: temporary or
“per issue” coalitions of groups. BUT …
…. latter are temporary and … … have less behavioral constraint or
pattern (little commitment to public policy agendas)
2. Political Functions 2. Political Functions & Structures& Structures (cont)(cont) Function: Interest Articulation = act’s
that express demands for policies It is via interest articulation that
leaders learn of constituent needs AND …
minority rights are protected Structures: interest group’s primary
function, other structures ____ ???
2. Political Functions 2. Political Functions & & Structures Structures (cont)(cont) Parties share in function of interest
articulation to some degree BUT … interest aggregation & articulation
are negatively related parties have broad (inclusive)
membership base SO... if they get too specific (articulate) about policy their coalition will divide
2. Political Functions 2. Political Functions & & Structures Structures (cont)(cont) Groups have a narrow (exclusive) base If groups stress aggregation more than
articulation they become too broadly structured to get specific about policy
Ergo: inclusive parties specialize in interest aggregation and exclusive groups in interest aggregation
2. Political Functions 2. Political Functions & Structures& Structures
(cont)(cont) Structures & Functions of political social., recruitment, communication, interest aggregation and interest articulation together = overarching function of political mediation
Political mediation = linkages of support, expectations and demands from society to government
2. Political Functions 2. Political Functions & & StructuresStructures (cont)(cont) Rule-Making, rule-application and rule - adjudication are phases in transition from decision-making to decision-implement.
Handled respectively - but not exclusively - by leg., exec. and jud. branches
all occur w/i broad process of converting societal inputs into governmental outputs
2. Political Functions 2. Political Functions & & Structures Structures (cont)(cont) rule-making, -application & adjudication together = conversion function.
Gov’tal elites (oligarchies) perform the conversion function. (e.g., __?)
Parties are formally involved in convers. Interest groups are informally involved
2. Political Functions 2. Political Functions & & Structures Structures (cont)(cont) (Again, agg & art negatively related) U.S. politics tend to move from stress
on interest aggregation toward stress on interest articulation ….
…then toward a new balance that is itself redressed all over again (cycle)
E. Mediation in Am. E. Mediation in Am. PoliticsPolitics
Mediation may emphasize democracy, pluralism or elitism
Emphasis is determined by the relative powers of structures (i.e., parties, groups and oligarchies)
1. Democracy and 1. Democracy and the the Building of Building of MajoritiesMajorities Demo= provision & implementation of public choices in leaders and paths thru majoritarian means
Electoral & governmental majorities are aggregated thru such agencies as elections, public opinion and parties
a. the a. the Public Public ThreatThreat Am. electorate can “fire” elected officials … by voting other majority party in power to hire and fire = the public
threat Demo requisites of democracy
guaranteed by public threat most fundamental democratic requisite
= public choices in leaders and paths
a. thea. the Public Threat Public Threat (cont)(cont) The cacophony of sound bites and
kaleidoscope of photo opts along with the horse-race & hoopla created by infinite # of candidate appeals is reduced in U.S. to …
…two enormous public alternatives by the Republican & Democratic Parties as …
public choice-definers (i.e., choice-givers)
a. thea. the Public Threat Public Threat (cont)(cont)
Efficacy, dependability & legitimacy of democratic gov are underwritten to extent parties effective in implementing public mandates
ERGO: working majority parties are choice-givers and faith keepers
a. thea. the Public Threat Public Threat (cont)(cont)
In the process of choice-making and implementation there is the enormous gift to democracy of the peaceful resolution of conflict: e.g., leaders vs. led &/or public v. gov. choices in paths
parties resolve such conflicts by offering alternatives in leaders and paths
a. the Public Threat a. the Public Threat (cont)(cont) While election results are subject
to much interpretation re paths, their answer to the question of “who shall lead” is determinative (except 2000!!)
Elections thereby resolve a profound and potentially violent societal question (i.e., “who shall lead.” )
a. thea. the Public Threat Public Threat (cont)(cont)
The peaceful transfer of power thru competing parties guarantees majority rule as well as minority rights
Also, the means by which a minority can become a majority which, in turn, ...
Insures political equality and individual freedoms
aa. the. the Public Threat Public Threat (cont)(cont) (One of the most neglected
lessons in all of politics is that protecting minority rights is in majority’s self-interest ….
… because the ultimate right of a minority is to become a majority and …
… if they do, they’ll remember !!)
a. thea. the Public Threat Public Threat (cont)(cont) Exercising public threat is popular
sovereignty & limited gov. in action Pop. consultation guaranteed when
officials worry about being “fired” Popular consultation also served by
“loyal opposition” party tattling on the party in power
a. thea. the Public Threat Public Threat (cont)(cont) Pol. parties stress #’s more than
$’s In fact, modern parties originated in
U.S. in 1790s to mobilize #’s vs natural political advantages of $’s
In aggregating majorities parties provide persuasive pol communication, stimulate voting & organize gov’ment
a. a. the Public Threat the Public Threat (cont)(cont)
Pol communication of parties serves to inform and mobilize the pubic and ...
helps insure gov’tal accountability of party in power
Once elected, the winning party organizes popular branches (i.e., leg. & exec.) – and, in time, …
affects jud branch (87 of first 100 judges)
a. thea. the Public Threat Public Threat (cont)(cont) Theory: Jefferson’s responsible party
gov. i.e., parties offer & honor public agendas then stand for public judgement
Practice: responsible party model is problematic & only sporadically successful
Model is especially difficult when parties are weak and groups are strong …
BUT ...
a. thea. the Public Threat Public Threat (cont)(cont) All democratic theory insists
individual liberties be guaranteed protection of such participation rts
(e.g., __?) insures broadest structuring of preferences in demo - e.g., elections
Elections = the making of public choices in leaders and paths.
a. thea. the Public Threat Public Threat (cont)(cont) Elections are democracy in action since public choice-making (&
implement.) is what democracies do Elections express public mandates
and agendas (i.e. paths) via majoritarianism
Ironically, public agenda is subject to many interpretations (i.e., hidden)
a. thea. the Public Threat Public Threat (cont)(cont) Since public alternatives in leaders
and paths are the 1st requisite of democracy, political theorists insist that
…parties must be competitive.
Party theorists also insist that party structures have to be inclusive (why?)
a. thea. the Public Threat Public Threat (cont)(cont) If parties are competitive & based on
enduring socioeco. divisions (e.g., ?) .. … issue and ideological differences
become well known over time … ergo: public choices clearer over time …parties will try to broaden support by
extending suffrage (esp. which party?)
a. thea. the Public Threat Public Threat (cont)(cont) Two important American Party
Theorists: Key & Schattschneider E.E. Schattschneider favored
“socialization” of conflict w/ nat issues. “privatization” dominated by haves
Parties socialize conflict since majorities or near majorities drive them - - not minorities
a. thea. the Public Threat Public Threat (cont)(cont) Schattsneider felt political power of
haves was their wealth whereas ... …political power of have-nots was
numbers In 2-party systems, parties consolidate
& mobilize masses of have-nots (1800)
In one-party system no countervailing power to eco & pol power of the haves
a. thea. the Public Threat Public Threat (cont)(cont) V.O. Key illustrates E. E.
Schattsneider’s point in finding $ interests stronger in 1-party areas (i.e., old American South)
Key: The grand objective of the haves is obstruction … Organization is not always necessary to obstruct; it is essential, however, for the promotion of a sustained ...
a. thea. the Public Threat Public Threat (cont)(cont)Key (cont) ….. program in behalf of the have-
nots … over the long run the have-nots lose in a disorganized politics
Conservative, moneyed groups become stronger in 1-party situations since can dominate funding of office seekers
a. thea. the Public Threat Public Threat (cont)(cont) In a competitive (e.g., 2-party)
situation, elected officials heed #’s of have-nots if mobilized by alternative party
Key & Schattsneider both note: when parties are not competitive, it is the have-nots that suffer
b. The Fluidity in b. The Fluidity in Am. Am.
MajoritarianismMajoritarianism Have & have-not orientations = fundamental & resilient distinctions between constituencies of 2 majority parties in U.S.
In addition - and often derived from - have vs. have-not distinctions are other demographic differences
e.g., regional, age, ethnic/racial, educational, religious & gender characteristics
b. Fluidity in Am. b. Fluidity in Am. Majoritarianism Majoritarianism
(cont)(cont) In addition to demographic differences, party coalitions differ by their constellations of allied political organizations
i.e., social movements and interest groups tend to favor either the have or have-not party coalition (why?)
b. Fluidity in Am. b. Fluidity in Am. Majoritarianism Majoritarianism
(cont)(cont) Psych characteristics in party motive structure also from have/ have-not characteristics
e.g., partisan strata w/in the public ID w/ one party over the other given their have or have-not predispositions
less partisan “leaners” favor 1 or other but not so dependably as strong partisans
b. Fluidity in Am. b. Fluidity in Am. Majoritarianism Majoritarianism
(cont)(cont) Non-partisan strata - i.e., most
evaluative or “pure” independents - - make party choices per vote per
election (T-splitters, switchers) Motive-structures w/in party
constituencies govern the party’s predisposition towards change vs. continuity in leaders & paths
b. Fluidity in Am. b. Fluidity in Am. Majoritarianism Majoritarianism
(cont)(cont) If a party constituency tends toward change, assumes & insists on responsiveness in government
Continuity in support for leaders & paths across elections favors gov’tal discretion ..
…. since public support is structured, enduring and dependable (i.e., partisan)
b. Fluidity in Am. b. Fluidity in Am. Majoritarianism Majoritarianism
(cont)(cont) Partisans = affective toward choices ….
… Independents more evaluative Evaluative support promotes change Affective support promotes continuity SO.. change in leaders/paths occurs
more often with weak partisanship … … (i.e., political consumerism goes ^)
b. Fluidity in Am. b. Fluidity in Am. Majoritarianism Majoritarianism
(cont)(cont) Demos & Repubs build temporary majorities to “throw the rascals out” - in periods of weak partisanship (consumption by voters of per election party appeals)
Both also favor change over continuity in paths - during periods of weak partisanship
Hypo: Changes in paths will not occur every 28 - 40 years or even in 4 year cycles in 2000’s
b. Fluidity in Am. b. Fluidity in Am. Majoritarianism Majoritarianism
(cont)(cont) As long as American major’ism is fluid, American electorate will alter paths or instructions to officials every 2 years (i.e., congressional sessions)
SO… party coalitions w/ evaluative public base do not endure across elections and Am majoritarianism …
…is very fluid as a result
b. Fluidity in Am. b. Fluidity in Am. Majoritarianism Majoritarianism
(cont)(cont) Another element in party motive structures involves material ($) and purposive (cause or ideological) incentives
Predominance of either haves or have-nots w/in a party’s constituency affects the party’s orientation toward change or continuity in leaders and paths
b. Fluidity in Am. b. Fluidity in Am. Majoritarianism Majoritarianism
(cont)(cont) Have-nots favor change in life situation whereas haves are more status quo
“the various and unequal distribution of property” always divides societies
So have vs. have-not differences in party constituencies insure bases for 2 opposing public alternatives
b. Fluidity in Am. b. Fluidity in Am. Majoritarianism Majoritarianism
(cont)(cont) Partisans w/ purposive incentives disposed toward change or continuity given party have or have-not predispositions
Purposive voters favoring change like the have-not or moderate to liberal party
Voters favoring tradition, the status quo or conservatism favor the party of the haves
b. Fluidity in Am. b. Fluidity in Am. Majoritarianism Majoritarianism
(cont)(cont) If material divisions are enduring
party bases, an individual’s SES should tie them to the have or the have-not party
It does, but not so as securely as past
Why?
b. Fluidity in Am. b. Fluidity in Am.
MaterialismMaterialism (cont) (cont) SES separated voters during Depression when some Republican voters switched their vote and..
w/ some, their allegiance, to the Democrats
Many non-voters joined the electorate to vote for the attractive alternative path offered by the New Deal
b. Fluidity in Am. b. Fluidity in Am. Majoritarianism Majoritarianism
(cont)(cont) BUT… the Depression was decades ago Party allegiances stemming from the ‘32
realigning election have eroded as one age cohort succeeded the last since then
Another realigning election should have occurred in late 60’s or early 70’s
That almost happened.
b. Fluidity in Am. b. Fluidity in Am. Majoritarianism Majoritarianism
(cont)(cont) The “social issue” could have
realigned but.. … two things happened 1. television and 2. Watergate Squeezed between Vietnam &
Watergate new voters said “a pox on both your houses.”
b. Fluidity in Am. b. Fluidity in Am. Majoritarianism Majoritarianism
(cont)(cont) TV- new under political sun - transmits candidate appeals more than party cues
So voters “shopped” for candidates via TV
Parties thus lost some cue-giving power precisely when a realigning issue was due
b. Fluidity in Am. b. Fluidity in Am. Majoritarianism Majoritarianism
(cont)(cont) Haves and have-nots alike remained less partisan for a time and …
Majority building became fluid & constant enterprise for parties
Electoral and governing party coalitions were still tied together by partisanship (albeit weakened)
b. Fluidity in Am. b. Fluidity in Am. Majoritarianism Majoritarianism
(cont)(cont) Party activists remain bound together and
to party leaders by affective or emotive ties ...
… for activists in the party organization (i.e., PO), by solidary (?) incentives as well
So parties continue to offer have and have-not alternatives to Am. democracy
BUT…who’s buying and what?
b. Fluidity in Am. b. Fluidity in Am. Majoritarianism Majoritarianism
(cont)(cont) Independents = @ 1/3 of electorate added only temporarily to the
affective base of identifiers by independent evaluations of party appeals.
But frequently, Independents “buy” the appeals of candidates rather than investing in party agenda or long term party appeal
b. Fluidity in Am. b. Fluidity in Am. Majoritarianism Majoritarianism
(cont)(cont) Despite SES divisions, even have AND have-not voters became less partisan and …
majoritarianism was more fluid as a result Parties left w/ a larger contingent who are
subject to rational persuasion or dissuasion and…
a smaller set of supporters who are resistant
b. Fluidity in Am. b. Fluidity in Am. Majoritarianism Majoritarianism
(cont)(cont) affective partisans remain loyal across elections because emotive loyalties not subject to rational dissuasion
evaluative Independents vote per office per election …. i.e., “shop”
“pure” Independents (@ 15%) are disproportionately political consumers ….
means governing support is more fluid
b. Fluidity in Am. b. Fluidity in Am. Majoritarianism Majoritarianism
(cont)(cont) rise of pol. consumerism during the
info age explains 2 yr. mandates independency and consumerism
explain the quicker and more exact adjustments in governing mandates
(every two years)
b. Fluidity in Am. b. Fluidity in Am. Majoritarianism Majoritarianism
(cont)(cont) In sum: fluidity in political majorities increased ….
from the 1960s until 1990s Majoritarianism weakened as
evaluative voting (i.e., consumerism) increased (or plateaued)
… and partisan or affective voting declined (or bottomed out)
b. Fluidity in Am. b. Fluidity in Am. Majoritarianism Majoritarianism
(cont)(cont) The “agenda politics” of democracy
and strong parties declined as …. … “grap-bag” pluralism increased. Electoral and governing majorities
have become less enduring and dependable
Change in paths is favored over continuity
b. Fluidity in Am. b. Fluidity in Am. Majoritarianism Majoritarianism
(cont)(cont) Majoritarianism has declined w/
party power in the U S minoritarianism has increased w/
group power ERGO: the problem with
American democracy = cannot keep the public faith well enough
b. Fluidity in Am. b. Fluidity in Am. Majoritarianism Majoritarianism (cont(cont)) All governments - whether demo., plural,
or elitist - must be responsive to some degree
BUT … all governments must also exercise some autonomy or discretion, too
Affective nature of partisanship strengthens government’s autonomy & discretion
…. even against popular sentiment
b. Fluidity in Am. b. Fluidity in Am. Majoritarianism Majoritarianism (cont)(cont) Affective (i.e., partisan) voters guarantee the electorate enduring bases for public choices and gov’tal autonomy (i.e., leadership)
BUT… evaluative voters (Independents) determine which choice taken in election
ERGO: evaluative voters guarantee change and governmental responsiveness
b. Fluidity in Am. b. Fluidity in Am. Majoritarianism Majoritarianism
(cont)(cont) As party power declined, affective/ evaluative balance changed > evaluative
… “shopping” reduced long-term service of parties to democracy …
In a majoritarian system, leadership is tricky
Followers have little loyalty to leader’s majority in a majoritarian system
(requires what in a president?)
b. Fluidity in Am. b. Fluidity in Am. Majoritarianism (cont)Majoritarianism (cont) BUT… w/o some fluidity in party support
the prospects for gov’tal responsiveness and policy change suffer …
… also a disservice to democracy SO… affective/evaluative balance in
public support governs policy change v. continuity AND governmental responsiveness vs. discretion
c. Majority Parties: c. Majority Parties: Republicans & Republicans &
DemocratsDemocrats Majority parties = inclusive & decentralized pol structures that specialize in interest aggregation most especially but, also, in pol recruitment, communications & conversion
Majority parties qualify as majority parties if they have the potential of building electoral and governing majorities
c. Maj. Parties: c. Maj. Parties: Repubs & Repubs &
Demos(cont)Demos(cont) Party leaders link gov’ning coalitions to elect’al coalitions by providing, explaining and implementing public choices
ERGO: Republicans and Democrats are the chief instruments of American Democracy
3rd parties = instruments of policy change balances w/i party motive structures
determine party’s stance toward..
c. Maj. Parties: c. Maj. Parties: Repubs & Repubs &
Demos(cont)Demos(cont) … towards policy continuity/change, governmental responsive./discretion
have/have-not balance w/in party motive structure provides enduring bases for public choice
Working parties are public choice-givers and faith-keepers
c. Maj. Parties: c. Maj. Parties: Repubs & Repubs &
Demos(cont)Demos(cont) Republicans and Democrats implement public agendas - if they are working
As yet there is no substitute for parties in American Democracy.
No other structure able to pull pieces of electoral and gov’tal majorities together
c. Maj. Parties: c. Maj. Parties: Repubs & Repubs &
Demos(cont)Demos(cont)If parties weaken as coalition builders: fragmentation occurs rule by groups and oligarchies occurs minoritarianism competes w/
majoritarianism &... public agendas and trust compromised
2. Pluralism & the 2. Pluralism & the Threat of Minority RuleThreat of Minority Rule
Pluralist theory = conflict arises among groups as each applies resources to struggle over policy (gov a means to that end)
Relative importance of different issues plus changing value & unequal distribution of political resources yields ….
highly fluid and situational decision-making
2. Pluralism & Threat 2. Pluralism & Threat of of Minority Rule Minority Rule (cont)(cont) Complexity is compounded by multi-
centeredness of pluralism (no 1 source of division in government) There are many policy fragments or
oligarchies (e.g., _?_ ) at nat. and state levels
These ally with some interests and oppose others in trying to win a policy victory
2. Pluralism & 2. Pluralism & Threat of Threat of Minority Rule (cont)Minority Rule (cont) Pluralism assumes activity by formal &
informal groups or networks of groups (e.g., iron triangles & policy networks)
Pluralism also assumes that groups or group networks operate both outside and inside government
- i.e., both private (e.g., ___?) & public (e.g., ___?) groups
2. Pluralism & 2. Pluralism & Threat of Threat of Minority Rule (cont)Minority Rule (cont) Importance of multi-centeredness
of pluralism = numerous points of access to policy makers
Importance of fluidity of pluralism = lose now, win later
In a pluralistic system everyone gets to play and nobody gets left out -- at least in theory
a. Groups and a. Groups and
MinoritarianismMinoritarianism If elections, parties and public opinion processes are majoritarian mechanisms that drive democracy,…
IGs = central structures w/i pluralism groups perform critical role of alerting
& pressuring government re needs in society or - at least - organized society
a. Groups and a. Groups and Minoritarianism Minoritarianism
(cont) (cont) Groups apply their resources in finances, visibility, expertise, prestige, organization & leadership and, possibly “nerve” issues toward winning policy contests
Added to these resources are constituent advantages in numbers, affluence, strategic location, time and education
a. Groups and a. Groups and Minoritarianism Minoritarianism (cont)(cont)
As with any other political agency, the motive or incentive structure within groups (e.g., ? ) explains much political behavior
For instance, material groups have a tougher time forming than purposive groups but they have much more endurance (why?)
a. Groups and a. Groups and MinorMinoritarianism itarianism
(cont) (cont) Have-not materialism w/in a group will tend to favor change while have predispositions tend > status quo
both material/purpose and affective/ evaluative motive structures in pressure groups may favor governmental responsiveness over autonomy and discretion
a. Groups and a. Groups and MinoritarianismMinoritarianism
(cont)(cont) In applying their political resources, groups inform, advertise, lobby, supply or deny grass roots and/or financial support and otherwise pressure decision-makers to act favorably towards their interest
ERGO & AGAIN: they specialize in interest articulation
a. Groups and a. Groups and
Minoritarianism (cont)Minoritarianism (cont)To a lesser extent than interest articulation, groups are involved in:
Political socialization - e.g., whether government responds to “people like us”
political communications: w/i group communiqués to mobilize, public ads, or persuasion re decision-makers
a. Groups and a. Groups and Minoritarianism Minoritarianism
(cont)(cont) Political recruitment of IGs: PACs, endorsements, “delivering” a vote, etc
Political Conversion: groups are informally involved in conversion - e.g., aid & pressure d/m’ers, recruit allies to office and to right committees, testify, lobby, etc.
(parties are formally involved in conversion)
a. Groups and a. Groups and
MinorMinoritarianism (cont)itarianism (cont) But (and again), special function for groups is interest articulation
in fact, it is the petitioning of gov that separates interest groups from all other voluntary associations.
ERGO: membership basis must be exclusive (why?)
a. Groups and a. Groups and Minoritarianism Minoritarianism
(cont)(cont) Group leaders and activists are motivated especially by affective (and solidary) incentives and ...
by either material or purposive goals Group leadership tends toward
oligarchy (iron law of oligarchy. R. Michelles)
Supporters may be affective or evaluative
a. Groups and a. Groups and Minoritarianism Minoritarianism
(cont)(cont) IGs narrowly based … may assert minority against majority in policy dispute
SO.. IGs criticized as serving minority rule (re policy) rather than just minority rights
Why control of policy rather than government as a whole? - exclusiveness
a. Groups and a. Groups and Minoritarianism Minoritarianism
(cont)(cont) Minoritarianism driven by groups refers to minority rule over policy rather than government as a whole
Pressure groups are not broadly structured enough to control government as a whole
May have a “confederacy of oligarchies” instead of a federal government
a. Groups and a. Groups and Minoritarianism Minoritarianism
(cont)(cont) In sum, Am IGs described as exclusive and centralized political structures that specialize in interest articulation but also > recruitment, communication & conversion.
IGs leaders link group constituencies to gov by applying group resources toward the persuasion of policy-makers
a. a. Groups and Groups and Minoritarianism Minoritarianism
(cont)(cont) Evaluative/affective & material/ purposive balances in group motive structure may favor gov’tal responsiveness over discretion and either change or continuity in policy
Briefly defined, American interest groups = policy
advocates of organized publics.
b. The Benevolent b. The Benevolent GroupGroup
First of modern or “analytic” pluralists in the U.S. was Arthur F. Bentley
Bentley: The Process of Government (1908)
major break with “staatswissenschaft” Inspired political scientists toward
“group approach”
b. The Benevolent b. The Benevolent Group Group
(cont)(cont)Bentley’s major points re groups: wealth main source of divisions in
society “When groups are adequately
stated, everything is stated. When I say everything, I mean everything.”
individual interests were trivial in interpreting society. BUT …..
bb. The Benevolent . The Benevolent Group Group
(cont)(cont) (but) … group activity was “first, last and all the time” essential to such interpretations
National interest a myth. “The balance of groups pressures is the existing state of society.”
group pressures were the one and only determinate of government policy
b. The b. The Benevolent Benevolent Group (cont)Group (cont) Mostly, group pressures yielded decisions
= reasonably fair while class divisions were most common
basis for groups, numbers were more important than wealth as a group resource
Larger, more nearly general interests would defeat smaller, narrower special interests
closest thing to “control by the people.”
b. The Benevolent b. The Benevolent Group Group
(cont)(cont)David Truman another group theorist much influenced by Bentley also felt that groups were benign groups weakened and divided by greed overlapping memberships across
groups with different interests Some members would object as a
result
b. The Benevolent b. The Benevolent Group Group
(cont)(cont) Another check on greed = “potential group”
if, for instance, a tariff was excessive, consumers would organize an opposing lobby - specter checks group’s greed
(Truman is author of the “disturbance theory” - more later)
c. The Malevolent c. The Malevolent GroupGroup
Most group theorists are less optimistic
These authors assume that majoritarian government is often frustrated by the exclusiveness of groups and that …
minority rule re policy that can result
c. The Malevolent c. The Malevolent Group Group
(cont)(cont) Madison: important advantage of well constructed union was “its tendency to control the violence and mischiefs of faction.”
1 lesson of Am rev. clear: if loyalties attached more to groups than political community as a whole, unity of action was impossible, anarchy would result
c. The Malevolent c. The Malevolent Group Group
(cont)(cont) Madison’s thought always included the notion of balance in government
In fact, constitutionalism was a balance between anarchy on the one hand and tyranny on the other
BUT… which did Madison fear more: anarchy or tyranny (?)
c. The c. The Malevolent Malevolent Group (cont)Group (cont) Madison feared the suppression of factions
more than the violence of faction How to maintain a balance between T/A? Madison’s answer: structuring government
- (1) a republican form of government and (2) a division of governmental authority (How does that keep balance?)
c. The Malevolent c. The Malevolent Group Group
(cont)(cont) But Madison’s greater fear = tyranny - tyranny would be thwarted by divisions
and representativeness But still feared “tyranny of the majority” ?: What of power within divisions? Could fragmentation provide sufficient
minority power to thwart majoritarianism?
c. The Malevolent c. The Malevolent Group Group
(cont)(cont)E.E. Schattschneider: Group greed had worsened Depression -
i.e., U.S. tariffs spawned retaliatory tariffs Solution to group greed: broaden scope of
conflict - results more nearly nat’al or maj. Broadening conflict was better achieved
by inclusive parties than exclusive groups
FF.. CONVERSION IN CONVERSION IN AMERICAN POLITICSAMERICAN POLITICS
Parties & groups are part of mediation or the linking of society with government
What happens as a result of mediation is called conversion or the translating of demands into policy
Political conversion is necessarily a specialization of small groups or oligarchies or elites BECAUSE …..
F. Conversion in Am F. Conversion in Am Pols Pols (cont)(cont) ….. of the the unweldiness of
large bodies in the exact and detailer work of enacting specific and complex policies
SO …. political conversion inherently involves some form of elitism
1. Elitism & Decision 1. Elitism & Decision - - ImplementationImplementation Political elitism = public policy making by oligarchies.
Oligarchies are therefore the central structure in elitism
Some of the fragments in America’s fragmented political situation are elites or combinations of elites
1. Elitism & 1. Elitism & Decision- Decision- Implementation (cont)Implementation (cont) Structure of oligarchies ranges from
very narrow to representative coalitions
As the structure of elites expands so do their functions
At a minimum, oligarchies convert demands into policy or ….
…. articulate interests
1. Elitism & Decision 1. Elitism & Decision - - Implementation (cont)Implementation (cont) In their broadest form - i.e.,
representative coalitions - elites may aggregate and articulate interests as well as convert demands into policies
a. Kinds of Elites: single purpose and multifunctional
elites private and public elites, and ..combinations of these
a. Kinds of Elites a. Kinds of Elites (cont)(cont)
Example of combo: committees and subcommittees often ally with pertinent executive agencies and with private interest groups to form ….
“iron triangles” or, … in more elaborate form, “policy
networks.”
1) Single-1) Single-Purpose Purpose
Oligarchies Oligarchies Very exclusive, composed of only a few powerful individuals
narrowest of all political orgs would be a faction w/i a single-purpose oligarchy
In private sector, 1 purpose elites specialize in interest articulation
w/i public sector, specialize in conversion
1) 1 Purpose 1) 1 Purpose Oligarchies Oligarchies
(cont)(cont)Examples of governmental or public elites or oligarchies:
congressional subcommittees and committees, as well as
executive offices, agencies, bureaus and regulatory commissions
Federal courts are also oligarchies
1) 1 Purpose 1) 1 Purpose
Oligarchies (cont)Oligarchies (cont) 1 purpose elites in private sector stress int art in relating to gov’tal oligarchies
Examples: leadership components of most interest groups, third parties, social movements, etc.
Also some of the actual fragments in America’s fragmented political situation
2) “Per Issue 2) “Per Issue Coalitions” and Iron Coalitions” and Iron TrianglesTriangles Temporary or “per issue” coalitions
are short-lived coalitions of some of these fragments in Am. Politics. Namely, interest groups
“Per issue” coalitions are not single purpose oligarchies
Are a form of multifunctional oligarchies
2) “Per Issue” 2) “Per Issue” & & Iron Tri’s Iron Tri’s (cont)(cont) per issue coalitions disband after
an issue resolved and reformulate into other combinations to address subsequent issues
Per issue coalitions aggregate and articulate interests but they must persuade govern’tal elites to convert demands into policy
2) “Per Issue” 2) “Per Issue” & & Iron Tri’s Iron Tri’s (cont)(cont) Iron triangles (IT’s) and policy
networks (PN’s) endure across issues. “Iron tri’s” and “policy nets” are
unlike per issue coalitions because they last across issues
IT’s and PN’s are unlike 1 purpose oligs because they are multifunctional
2) “Per Issue” 2) “Per Issue” &&
Iron Tri’s Iron Tri’s (cont) (cont)
Broader structure of iron tri’s & policy nets means two specializations - not one
Iron tri’s and policy nets articulate interests (given private group component)
Given their legis. & exec. components iron tri’s and policy networks also perform political conversion
i.e. they enact and implement policy
2) “Per Issue” 2) “Per Issue” & & Iron Tri’s Iron Tri’s (cont)(cont) Policy nets and iron tri’s are
threesomes since they usually exclude the president
Exception: LBJ - particularly adept at negotiation
LBJ could make it in the trilogy’s self-interest to become a foursome
2)“Per Issue” 2)“Per Issue” & & Iron Tri’s Iron Tri’s (cont)(cont) Mancur Olson felt minority factions
in Congress have advantage re majorities
Iron tri’s, for instance, place group advocates within fragments that specialize in group concerns in the legislature and the executive branches of government
2) “Per Issue” 2) “Per Issue” & & Iron Tri’s Iron Tri’s (cont)(cont) Grant McConnell felt poor farmers,
conservationists and consumers hurt by iron tris operating w/in decentralized setting created by federalism
e.g., USDA and county agents + AFBF + pertinent members of Congress destroyed Farm Security Agency
set up by New Deal to help rural poor
2) “Per Issue” 2) “Per Issue” & & Iron Tri’s Iron Tri’s (cont)(cont) e.g., local business interests + Army
Corp of Engineers + Public Works Committee pushed for dams, etc.
profited local businesses who contributed $ to pertinent congress members who appropriated $ for Corp of Engineers, etc.
BUT … local environ’tal interests not part of the iron triangle
2) “Per Issue” 2) “Per Issue” & & Iron Tri’s Iron Tri’s (cont)(cont) McConnell felt stronger national
institutions were needed Agreed with E.E. Schattschneider on
stronger parties but ... also stronger presidency + Supreme Court Stronger national government broadened
scope of conflict counter power of state and local interests
2) “Per Issue” 2) “Per Issue” & & Iron Tri’s Iron Tri’s (cont)(cont) Andrew S. McFarland sees American
gov. as so many interests split into various policy domains controlled by iron triangles
e.g., a “turf” conscious “confederation of oligarchies.”
had several qualifications to fed government as confederation (of oligarchies)
2) “Per Issue” 2) “Per Issue” & & Iron Tri’s Iron Tri’s (cont)(cont)McFarland’s qualifications: Pres’tial elections rise of public interest lobbies social movementsSo majority rule does at times overcome
minority rule according to McFarland. But..
need stronger institutions of aggregation
2) “Per Issue” 2) “Per Issue” & & Iron Tri’s Iron Tri’s (cont)(cont)
Madison worried about the “tyranny of the majority” at state and local levels.
Olson, Schattschneider, McConnell & McFarland worry about minority factions
Madison: fed’lism thwarted tyranny Modern pluralists: too many divisions -
fragmentation - needed majoritarian national institutions
b. Leadership b. Leadership Networks Networks & the & the
“New Machines”“New Machines” Multipurpose oligs e.g., party leadership
networks in Congress may perform aggregation, articulation and conversion
network members may informally represent organized publics or interest groups
Results in a broader - more representative - outlook
b. Lead. Nets & b. Lead. Nets & “New “New Machines”(cont)Machines”(cont)Examples of voting blocs or caucuses demographic (women, blacks,
Hispanics or Sunbelt) ideological (conservative Southern
Demos or right-wing Republican freshpersons)
economic (“steel” or “cotton” caucus)
may be bi-partisan
b. Lead. Nets. b. Lead. Nets. &“New &“New Machines” (cont)Machines” (cont) Some governmental oligarchies created
by Constitution: e.g., Supreme Court or pres. and “principle Officer(s) in each of the executive Departments”
Usually occurred on their own over time:
e.g., committee system, White House entourage, various individual & allied Departments, ad hoc policy “czars”, etc.
b. Lead. Nets. b. Lead. Nets. &“New &“New Machines” (cont)Machines” (cont) Multipurpose oligarchies such as party
leadership networks may evolve into the “new machines.” (discuss)
new machines redress balance between interest aggregation and articulation toward former
If party leadership in government enacted a promised public agenda, a majority …..
b. Lead. Nets. & b. Lead. Nets. & “New “New Machines” Machines” (cont)(cont) … of the electorate could “buy”
into the party that delivered on an agenda
that would realign party loyalties in the electorate for at least as long as public support lasted for furthering that agenda
2. Elitism2. Elitism
Thomas Dye in Who’s Running America Corporate Directors, the Money Elite,
Governing Circles, the Media Moguls, the Civic Establishment
Gov policy-makers are proximate d/m ultimate oligarchies = CFR, Trilateral
Com., Business Roundtable, Committee on Eco Development, Brookings, Am. Enterprise Institute and Heritage Foundation, etc.
2. Elitism (cont)2. Elitism (cont)
Beginning place for Dye’s oligarchic decision-making is the corporate elite – funnel $ into?
Elites in wealth, government, media and civic establishment build an agenda that is representative - even includes poor at times
Policy planning oligarchies such as CFR, Business Roundtable and Brookings reduce consensus to specific policy recommenda’s.
Pluralism occurs when??
2. Elitism (cont)2. Elitism (cont)
So private elites are the actual
decision makers in Dye’s model Government agencies - e.g.,
committees - are “proximate decision-makers” - only carry out decisions made by private elites
2. Elitism (cont)2. Elitism (cont)
Difference in Dye and Davis: Davis: Dye’s proximate decision makers
are actually the decision makers private elites in Dye are actually
involved in interest articulation when they decide what recommendations to make to government
To the extent Dye’s elites reflect broad concerns they also aggregate interests
2. Elitism (cont)2. Elitism (cont)
Dye’s elites, like other multipurp. elites, do help drive the agg/art/con cycle
Dye’s private elites are oligarchies able to recommend (articulate) policies w/in an agenda given their broad societal concerns (aggregation)
Dye’s governing elites are actually involved in conversion according to Davis
2. Elitsm (cont)2. Elitsm (cont)
Other oligarchies go further in completing the aggregation/ articulation/conversion cycle because they are involved in all 3
Examples: party structures such as caucuses or conferences or leadership networks
G.G. INTERPLAY OF DEMO, INTERPLAY OF DEMO, PLURALISM & PLURALISM &
ELITISMELITISM 3 structures central to democracy (party), pluralism (group) and elitism (oligarchy)
interaction of these three drives the interplay of democracy, pluralism and elites
is a negative relationship between interest aggregation and articulation, both affect conversion so will affect structure and functioning of governmental elites or oligs
G. INTERPLAY OF DEMO, G. INTERPLAY OF DEMO, PLURAL & ELITISMPLURAL & ELITISM (cont) (cont)
Should there be another realigning election or
…the production of a promised public agenda through party leadership networks in government (i.e., the new machines) …
new life would be breathed back into parties, the aggregative function and American democracy