Changing technology, economic growth and port development: the transformation of Tianjin

Pergamon Geoforum. Vol. 25, No. 3, pp. 285-303. 1994

Copyright 0 1995 Else&r Science Ltd Printed in Great Britain. All rights reserved

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Changing Technology, Economic Growth and Port Development: the Transformation of Tianjin

DANIEL TODD,* Winnipeg, Canada

Abstract: Ports, traditionally, did not lend themselves to efficiencies and this state of affairs persisted until well into this century when a series of technological developments in shipping, the whole climaxed with unitization, radically transformed the manner in which port operations were conducted. Tianjin succumbed to this transformation in full, but only after forcibly overcoming severe site limitations. Reminiscent of the ‘Anyport’ model, Tianjin’s port bodily moved downstream. Nailing its colours to the mast of containerization, it continues to prosper today--like yesterday-as a gateway port. However, as stressed in this paper, its future turns on the twin questions of draught restrictions and hinterland accessibility: the two everlasting regulators of port viability.

Introduction

Since time immemorial the archetypal port has been

synonymous with ‘break-bulk’ transactions; that is to

say, it was set up with the object of handling a vast

assortment of commodities and goods, delivered by a

host of consignors in small parcels and earmarked, in

equivalent small packets, for a multitude of consig-

nees. Of necessity, the port was the transhipment

point and answered the purposes of trade, both

nationally by virtue of coastwise shipping and inter-

nationally by means of deep-sea shipping. Yet it was

only just equal to the task because numerous difficul-

ties intervened to sorely try traders and port opera-

tors alike. The difficulties encountered were natural

outcomes of the conditions prevailing and, as such,

were not easily surmounted. Cargo in small lots was

inimical to economies of scale in the basic port-

handling activities of loading and discharging.

Heterogeneous cargoes were expensive in use of time

‘“Department of Geography, University of Manitoba, Win- nipeg, Canada.

and labour for sorting, storing and transferring be-

tween shore and ship. Marching in tandem with this

general character of ports was the unspecialized

nature of shipping. The typical freighter was a ‘gen-

eral cargo’ vessel designed to accommodate cargo in

all its variegated forms. This ‘break-bulk’ property

was antagonistic to economies of scale in the oper-

ations of ship loading and discharging in a manner

that exactly mirrored the port’s inability to achieve

such economies. Port transactions in consequence

were marked by delays and needless expense; penal-

ties which filtered through to the economy at large as

concealed surcharges. Emblematic of this situation

was the fact that general cargo vessels could be

expected to spend up to three-quarters of their ser-

vice life either tied up in port or waiting to berth, with

a corresponding reduction in the time available for

voyaging. Even today the costs associated with mis-

use of time amount to staggering proportions: by one

reckoning ports account for more than half of all

transport costs incurred in international trade and

fully 55% of these are occasioned by delays in port

turnaround (Frankel, 1987). It stands to reason,

285

286

therefore, that elimination of the obstacle posed by

inefficient ports becomes a mission of overriding

importance in those countries-not least certain

LDCs like China+ager to grasp the promise that

trade affords economic development.

Historically, success eluded the seeker after port

improvements until specialization set in. For several

centuries overall growth in trade and shipping,

together with sheer physical expansion of port facili-

ties, tended to detract from the urgency of addressing

the inefficiency problem and the need for improve-

ments via specialization which that entailed. How-

ever, changing market circumstances, combined with

technical innovation, opened the door to the inaugu-

ration of new forms of specialized shipping after

World War II. Specialization, to be effective, re-

quires that changes in one aspect of the maritime

trade nexus-as often as not initiated by the shipping

side-be paralleled by commensurate changes in the

other, usually the ports. To resort to a catchword,

synergy must occur between ship and port operations

before efficiencies can be realized. How specializ-

ation has come to bear on maritime activities is a

serious study in its own right (Gubbins. 1986), but the

gist of it has relevance to what follows in this paper.

Expressed in the most abbreviated fashion, specializ-

ation transformed the general cargo vessel, be it a

liner (undertaking scheduled voyages between desig-

nated ports) or a tramp (fulfilling spot and time

charters), and effected the virtual eclipse of its break-

bulk manifestation in favour of a number of replace-

ments, each tailored to a specific market. New types

of general cargo vessel were propagated, types which

eventually crystallized into today’s container ships

and roll-on/roll-off (RORO) ships (Couper, 1992).

What sounded the death knell for the break-bulk

general cargo vessel in the major trades was its

inability to engender scale economies beyond tightly

circumscribed limits. Larger ships could be built to

haul larger cargoes and yet this ploy availed the

operators little because it ran foul of a basic oper-

ational conundrum. Put succinctly, the carrying or

cubic capacity of the ship, a volume measure, in-

creases with the cube of the ship’s length whereas the

amount of equipment marshalled to load or unload

the cargo-ship or shore cranes, derricks and the

like-increases only in direct proportion to the

length. As a result, bigger vessels took a dispro-

portionate time to load and discharge, monopolized

Geoforum/Volume 25 Number 3/1994

valuable berth space to the detriment of other port

traffic and, to cap it all, presented their owners with

less time for voyaging owing to their inclination to be

tied up alongside, an inclination forthcoming with

extra port charges. All the same, the potential savings

inherent in bigger ships were not lost on shipowners

and this group, collectively, persevered in encourag-

ing innovation.

In the event, overcoming the impediment to econo-

mies of scale required a revolution in cargo handling

and that, in turn, rested on a revamping of the way

cargo was packaged. Unitization-pallets, truck-

trailers, containers-was the upshot in those situ-

ations where general or heterogeneous cargoes

reigned, with the first two variants of it reliant on

ramped access to the ship’s holds while dispensing

with cranes (although forklift equipment is essential

for pallet handling), leaving the third dependent on

the slotting of standard size boxes into cellular guider-

ails in the ship by means of big gantry cranes. Conse-

quently, ROROs were designed round ramped access

while container ships were designed for carrying

boxes and together they ousted break-bulk vessels

from those trades susceptible to unitization. In all

instances cargo handling could be expedited to give

reasonable ship turnaround times regardless of the

growth in ship size. Comparable economies sprang up

in the bulk field: grain, coal, ore, oil, all homogcne-

ous commodities in unpackaged form. were each now

carried on a dedicated ship type built to a size com-

mensurate with optimum scale economies for the

trade in question. This outcome was rendered poss-

ible by the appearance of high capacity ship (un)-

loaders and their attendant special purpose

terminals. The hourly handling rates of these

machines were improved until they achieved a stan-

dard equal to one-twentieth of the weight of the

largest ship (measured in deadweight tonnage or dwt)

using the terminal. For general and bulk cargoes

alike. then. the barrier preventing optimum ship sizes

was broached. reliance on old style break-bulk ves-

sels was sharply curtailed and specialized shipping

became the rule. At the same time. this shipping

revolution was conditioned by corresponding port

improvements which confirmed the mutual depen-

dence of shipping and port investments.

All this is by way of saying that effective port oper-

ations are the outcome of judicial investment in what

Geoforum/Volume 25 Number 30994

is decidedly a process driven by technological inno-

vation. Yet, like any other technical solution, the

process is only worth pursuing when it lends itself to

economic viability. In other words, so far as major

ports are concerned, investments are only justified

when trade rises to such a pitch as to keep fully

employed large ships and the large scale port installa-

tions associated with them. Should trade fall short of

a ‘threshold’ consistent with the returns anticipated

by investors in the expensive capital plant that is an

invariable precondition for economies of scale, both

shipowners and port authorities would be better

served by shunning specialization and sticking to the

amortized technology that is more of a piece with

modest throughput requirements. This dilemma con-

fronted, and continues to confront, ports far and

wide; more to the point, it constitutes the backdrop to

the case highlighted in this paper, namely, the north-

ern Chinese port of Tianjin. As the window on the

world for Beijing and the heartland centred on it,

Tianjin has long ranked among the leading seaports

of China. For that reason alone it merits close study.

It also commands attention, though, as a signal

example of a port beset by site limitations; a port

compelled to function in spite of severe handicaps

incident to its setting. In this respect it bears compari-

son with many other estuary ports in China (including

Shanghai, Guangzhou, Yingkou, Fuzhou and

Ningbo) and, by the same token, provides them with

pointers as to how to come to terms with such limi-

tations in the light of the challenges posed by shipping

specialization in general and containerization in par-

ticular. Before enlarging on these issues, however, it

is necessary to establish the foundations. That re-

quires, first, an appreciation of Tianjin’s special place

among the set of Chinese ports and, secondly, a

thorough review of the manner in which technology

encroaches on port operations and enforces site ad-

justments. Looming in the background throughout is

the trade environment, the ultimate arbiter of suc-

cessful port investments.

The Evolution of Tianjin Seaport

Situated on the lower reaches of the Haihe, the

seaport of Tianjin had greatness thrust upon it by

virtue of its privileged access-riverine as much as by

road-to the national capital. Inland waterways link-

ing the Haihe to the five rivers of Daqung, Nanyun,

287

Beiyun, Ziya and Yongding were useful in another

respect too: they enabled goods brought by sea to be

dispersed inland across the northern lowlands with-

out the bother of transhipment and permitted, at the

same time, the entry of inland produce into the

coastal trade with a minimum of interference (Figure

1). In short, Tianjin assumed a gateway function from

the outset, a function which grew in step with the

growth of the capital and the consolidation of central

government authority over a widening swath of terri-

tory. That territory, sequestered by Tianjin port as its

hinterland, is impressive by any measure. In area1

terms it sprawls over 1 million km2 of north China,

embracing in their entirety the 2 municipalities of

Beijing and Tianjin, the 5 provinces of Hebei, Shanxi,

Shaanxi, Qinghai and Gansu, and the three auton-

omous regions of Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang and

Ningxia, to say nothing of inroads into portions of

northeastern, southwestern and eastern China. Dot-

ted about it within striking distance of the port are

important industrial centres: Tianjin itself, of course,

together with Beijing (170 km away), Tangshan (less

than 100 km away) and a knot consisting of Shijiaz-

huang, Xingtai, Hengshui, Dezhou and Cangzhou

(all within a 300 km radius). Unlike the hinterlands

attending western ports which usually display shifting

boundaries, the one surrounding Tianjin is much

more immutable, institutionalized by the integrated

transport system feeding into the port that has been

built up in the years of communist rule since 1949.

The railway, by far the most far-reaching mode,

funnels port traffic to and from the vast hinterland. It

constitutes a network with Tianjin as the linchpin.

Thus two trunk lines, the Beijing-Harbin and Beijing-

Shanghai, form a junction at Tianjin and give access

to others penetrating rich resource areas, most no-

tably the Shanxi coalfield.

Historical antecedents

The 1858 Treaty of Tientsin (Tianjin) not only ad-

vanced the ways and means by which the Western

Powers imposed their collective will on Imperial

China, the so-called ‘Treaty Port’ system, but it

elected Tianjin as the springboard for implementing

that system in the north. While it lasted, this system

wrested control of China’s trade away from the Chi-

nese themselves and vested it in the hands of the

Powers. The treaty ports, and they embodied every

Geoforum/Volume 2.5 Number 3/1994

NEI MONGGOL

YELLOW SEA

.A./

Figure 1. Tianjin and North China.

port of consequence, became foreign enclaves. Top-

ping them all on the score of international com-

plexion was Tianjin. It came to host ‘concession’

areas for Austro-Hungarian, Italian, Russian, Japa-

nese, French, German, Belgian and, especially, Bri-

tish traders; all enjoying political privileges bordering

on sovereignty and economic privileges approaching

those found in free trade zones. In return for the

privileges heaped upon them, the traders set about

affirming hinterland links, initiated what were to

become port industries and, most conspicuously,

took in hand port works. Ensconcing themselves next

to the Chinese city, a city some 60 km upriver from

the sea, the traders lost no time in erecting riverside

wharves and their attached warehousing. Once on a

firm footing, the traders began forging a network of

liner services which ultimately provided the port with

a global reach.

However, the energies of the newcomers were soon

exercised by the problem of rendering the port navig-

able to Western shipping, a task made insistent by the

combination of larger ships now using it and the

silting that perennially plagued it. Since the shallow

and winding channel was not conducive to vessels

larger than moderately sized junks, silt deposited by

the many rivers converging on the Haihe threatened

to deny access to the steamers upon which outside

trade increasingly depended. A conservancy commis-

sion, in all but name a port authority, was given

Geoforum/Volume 25 Number 3/1994 289

formal standing in 1901 and immediately began pro-

secuting major dredging schemes. Even so, serious

obstacles remained. Besides the silt brought down by

the rivers, other accumulations at the mouth of the

Haihe were responsible for the notorious Taku Bar.

This obstruction forced larger vessels to lie off the

port beyond the bar and discharge into lighters which

were subsequently towed upstream to the port

proper. A comparable transhipment process in re-

verse was effected with loading. Winter ice in the

Bohai Sea added further to the costs and delays

imposed on cargo handled in this fashion. Sometimes

ice carpeted the mouth of the Haihe to such an extent

that ships were forced to divert to Qinhuangdao, 270

km up the coast, and their cargoes returned to Tianjin

by rail; at other times ice on the river closed the city

wharves, necessitating extemporary unloading at

Tanggu (Taku) within the bar (Abend, 1944). Partly

to avoid the challenging upriver passage under these

circumstances, several wharves were erected at

Tanggu nearer to the river mouth and these were

turned over to handling ships up to 5000 dwt. The

lion’s share of cargoes was carried in ships of 3000 dwt

or less and these continued to patronize the wharves

crowding the city port.

development belongs to the consolidation of hinter-

land links which the railway effected. Indeed, Tianjin

business interests were instrumental in introducing

this mode of transport into northern China. The line

connecting the port with what was to become its

outport at Tanggu dates from 1888, while a branch to

Tangshan, later extended to Shanhaiguan (Qin-

huangdao), was inspired by the desire of traders to

exploit the Kaipingcoalfield (Carlson, 1971). By 1912

Tianjin enjoyed rail links to places as far afield as

Shanghai and Wuhan, and the railway had assumed a

commanding position in cargo distribution: no less

than 54% of export cargoes arrived at the port on it

whereas 52% of imports left the port by courtesy of its

tracks. Before the port fell victim to civil disorder and

war in the late 193Os, the share of cargoes moved

through the railway system had grown to over 70%.

Tianjin, then, was unmistakably a railway port in the

same manner as was Tilbury in the U.K. The latter,

opened expressly as a rail dock 2 years before Tianjin

acquired its first railway, relied by 1939 on this mode

of transportation for moving 88% of transhipped

cargoes (Oram, 1965).

Early Technological Impositions on Tianjin’s

Operations Port consolidation

Tianjin throve, despite such impediments, and by the

1930s was handling upwards of 2.3 million tonnes of

cargo a year. What is more, it was accounting for lO_

12% of China’s direct foreign trade: a proportion

much inferior to the half share commanded by Shang-

hai but double that handled by Canton (Guangzhou),

the third port (Jones, 1940). Raw cotton and wool

dominated exports, brought from as far away as

Gansu and Xinjiang; while oil, timber and sundry

manufactures composed the bulk of imports. Japan

was the leading source of imports whereas the U.S.A.

claimed first place as a market for Tianjin’s exports

(although Japan took most of the raw cotton). A

tentative industrial endowment was discernible in the

city by this time. Revolving round cotton and woollen

textile firms that procured their material inputs by the

simple expedient of tapping into the flow of natural

fibres destined for export, industrialization was also

warranted on the strength of the entrepreneurial

talent and cheap labour which had grown up in the

port. Much of the credit for this burgeoning economic

Japanese incursions into China, the World War and

the civil war in its aftermath all wreaked havoc on

Tianjin port. Not only was its hinterland cut off for

extensive periods, but its stock of facilities was

severely depleted. Yet a lasting legacy of the Japa-

nese occupation was the conviction that the port’s

future depended on neglecting the upriver site in

favour of an outport. In the event, Japanese attempts

to operationalize a downriver site were rudely inter-

rupted by World War II, but the idea of relocation

was to return with a vengeance, eventually moulding

modern port developments. The rationale surround-

ing it evokes the ‘Anyport’ model explaining the

evolution of ports in general. Reduced to essentials,

the ‘Anyport’ concept systematizes the conversion of

a port from a makeshift assemblage of wharves to an

elaborate collection of wet docks and specialized

berths (Bird, 1971). The accretion of specialized

berthage and warehousing in response to changing

ship and trade requirements conspires to shift the

port’s facilities downstream. By the same token;

larger ships necessitate the provision of longer and

290

deeper berths or, where tidal conditions are adverse,

wet docks; again best consummated downstream.

Unsurprisingly, then, the centre of gravity of the port

forsakes its original location at the head of river

navigation for sites progressively closer to the sea;

indeed, by dint of constructing either artificial islands

linked by causeway to the land or fully detached

single buoy mooring systems, it may eventually settle

for sites in the sea itself.

Geoforum/Volume 2.5 Number 3/1994

larger ships was insufficient to justify the expense.

Similarly, the argument advanced by shipowners in

favour of deepening the river channel to permit the

passage of larger ships and hence foster scale econo-

mies was quashed by the counter-argument that any

economies consonant with larger ships were nullified

at the wharves by insurmountable cargo-handling

constraints. There the matter rested until the Japa-

nese seized the initiative and began an outport at

Tanggu, positioning the impending berths on mud-

flats far to the seawards of existing downstream

wharves (Figure 2). Hopes of gaining from this initia-

tive were dashed initially by the chaos of war and later

by the disruption in trade caused by the PRC’s antag-

onism with the Western trading community. Record-

ing throughputs that climbed from an insignificant 0.3

million tonnes in 1949 to a still meagre 1.4 million

tonnes in 1953, Tianjin not only failed to reach its

prewar levels of activity but fell short of the threshold

that would sustain both the nonrecurring and main-

tenance costs incurred through extensive port im-

provements. Against all odds-and certainly flying in

the face of Western commercial logic-the cash-

strapped central government nevertheless decided to

revamp the port in a fashion which implicitly

endorsed the reasoning behind the ‘Anyport’ model.

Draught considerations

While it is true that space for expansion of shoreside

infrastructure is of vital importance in this evolving

pattern, the ‘Anyport’ model really turns on the

question of draught restrictions; that is to say, the

depths of waters necessary for berthing vessels. As a

rule, the full-loaded draught of a cargo ship is given

by adding five to the square root of its dwt divided by

1000 (Thoresen, 1988). It follows that a 10,000 dwt

general cargo vessel, the sort so typical of ships plying

ocean routes prior to unitization, draws about 8.2 m;

and requires of ports that their approach channels

and mooring areas be dredged accordingly to accom-

modate it. Technical innovation forthcoming with

larger ships carries with it an obligation on the port to

deepen its water areas. The inception of the 100,000

dwt crude oil carrier in the late 195Os, for instance,

meant that ports with oil terminals had to cater for

ships drawing 15 m while the spawning of its big

brother, the 250,000 dwt VLCC, a decade later

increased draught requirements to 21 m. Channel

widening is a necessary adjunct to deepening and, in

line with the empirical rule that the width of entrance

channel should correspond to the length of the largest

vessels entering the port, this has translated into a

requirement to extend widths from 90 m or so to as

much as 350 m (the proportions assumed by the larger

VLCCs). Physical alterations of this magnitude are

acutely expensive to implement in the first place and

very demanding of upkeep in the second. Therefore

the decision to proceed with them is not taken lightly

and a fiscally responsible authority will only grant its

approval when persuaded that neglecting to do SO

would jeopardize the port’s future.

Adhering to such rectitude, the old regime at Tianjin

had refrained from eliminating the Taku Bar because

it was convinced that the volume of traffic carried in

Demise of the upriver port

Conditions in the riverside port found within the city

lent an element of urgency to the government inter-

vention. By the early 1950s port managers were

assailed from all sides: already in the throes of crisis as

a result of political upheaval. they were confronted

with both steeply rising offshore transhipment costs

following the failure to prevent the enlargement of

the Taku Bar and impaired upriver port operations

stemming from heavy silt deposition. Vessels as small

as 3000 dwt were compelled to anchor in the road-

stead 10 km from the entrance to the Haihe on

account of the port’s inability to cope with silting. The

resultant discharging into barges (lighterage) was not

simply needlessly expensive, boosting cargo transfer-

ence costs to a figure 70% higher than alongside

unloading, but was costly in demurrage as well (Hu,

1992). A pathbreaking joint venture shipping line

with Poland galvanized the port authority into re-

medial action; for the Poles insisted that their 10,000

dwt ships must not be subjected to such glaring

Geoforum/Volume 25 Number 3/1994 291

0 Port Planning P

= Finished Railw:

in 1

:

1 k”

‘ea ?

317

rrea

3Ys

‘Ys

Figure 2. The Tianjin port setting

Geoforum/Volume 2.5 Number 3/1994 293

Table 1. Fading traffic in the upriver port

Year

1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972

(A) Port throughput in total (‘000 tonnes)

2890 3700 4.550 5220 4790 3910 3860 4840 5490 6020 5660 6350 7080 8170 8010 8040

(B) Traffic in upriver port (‘000 tonnes)

645 756 828 807 480 367 402 378 537 518 395 306 316 346 277 132

Share (B/A. 100)

22.3 20.4 18.2 15.4 10.0 9.3

10.4 7.8 9.8 8.6 7.0 4.8 4.5 4.2 3.4 1.6

Source: Tianjin Port Authority

inconveniences. The crash programme begun in 1951

placated the Poles in part, since the entrance channel

was deepened to 6.5 m and broadened to 60 m along

its entire 15.2 km length. Yet while adequate for

taking 8 m draught vessels running light, this was

clearly just a stopgap measure. In fact, port develop-

ments through the 1950s constituted a kind of halfway

house between clinging to the old upriver site and

commissioning a new outport.

Efforts were redoubled to keep river navigation

viable, culminating in 1959 with the inauguration of a

tide-regulating barrage and lock system. Pierced by

two ship locks, one for minor craft and the other

accommodating ships up to 8000 dwt, the object of

this system was to control water levels so that at any

state of the tide 3000 dwt vessels could reach Tianjin

city and 5000 dwt ships could berth at Tanggu

Xingang, the new port materializing on the site orig-

inally discovered by the Japanese. It was envisaged

that the old port would continue to fulfil a useful

service as the entry point for an extensive inland

waterways network whereas Xingang would be dedi-

cated to serving ocean traffic. Subsequent events

dictated otherwise, however. Contrary to expec-

tations, the water control system exacerbated the silt

situation bearing on the city port, distorting the

river’s scouring action. Ironically, by 1972 some 10

million tonnes of silt had been dumped in the channel

downstream from the dam, reducing depths by any-

where from 1 to 3 metres and raising the river bed to

the same critical levels that had provoked dredging in

1902. By way of contrast, the advent of the dam was

providential for Xingang. Annual silt volumes flow-

ing into the outport fell by 95%) from 6 million tonnes

to 0.3 million tonnes, and reasonable alongside

depths (8 m) could be maintained for its berths

(aided, it is true, by the building of moles). Admitting

defeat, the port managers resolved to abandon

further attempts at renovating the upriver port and

elected instead to concentrate all their energies on

downriver expansion. Left to its own devices, the city

port withered away, finally succumbing to a combi-

nation of bridge building and city rebuilding conse-

quent upon the devastating earthquake of 1976

(Table 1).

Inception of the new port

As intimated, Tanggu Xingang’s revival occurred in

the 1950s but it remained a very modest affair until

the second port development programme was pushed

through after 1958. Inspired by the Japanese

precursor-which had bequeathed on the site a gen-

eral cargo berth, coal berth and railway accessory-

the new port was to benefit from the introduction of

five extra berths over the next four years (wet docks

were judged unnecessary owing to the moderate

spring tidal range of 3.9 m). With 11 m depths, 3 of

294

these could handle 30,000 dwt vessels while the other

2, at 10 m, were suitable for 10,000 dwt ships. More

berths together with ample warehousing appeared as

the 1960s unfolded. Thus, while conditions in the

older branches of the port left much to be desired,

those associated with the new port were on a par with

modern facilities elsewhere in East Asia. In compari-

son with the languishing traffic on the river, that

frequenting Xingang took off. Port throughput as a

whole almost doubled between 1958 and 1969 (Figure

3), and much of the increase was attributable to

bulkers discharging imported grain at the larger

berths. Port productivity rose in tandem. Shortage of

handling equipment had capped monthly throughput

at 0.38 million tonnes in 1959 with the unenviable

result that ships not only had to wait for protracted

periods merely to berth, but their lay time alongside

was prolonged owing to capacity limitations attend-

ing the equipment. Relief was sought in mechaniza-

tion. The sparse endowment of cranage (only four

had been inherited in 1949 and the priority of the

1950s had not been cranes but berths) was soon a

thing of the past, for some 440 cranes and other pieces

of loading equipment were added in the 1960s.

Mechanization impacted on labour practices in the

port, generally for the better. For example, it can be

elicited from Table 2 that labour productivity

improved considerably between 1952 and 1990. The

improving trend, admittedly prone to lapses brought

about by inflexible hiring rules and pauses in through-

put growth, is particularly striking for the late 1980s

25


Table 2. Productivity of port lahour

Productivity Year No. of stevedores (tonnes handledistcvedore)

lY52 4398 246 1953 3623 1135 1954 2891 110x 1958 2826 2168 1959 3407 2012 lY62 3078 1721 lY63 2.538 1932 I’)64 2630 2238 lY6X 3x33 2134 1969 4252 2122 1972 4174 24Yl lY73 3718 3112 lY74 3830 3101 lY78 5x00 263 I 1979 5280 3247 1082 5506 3188 lY83 5369 3x07 19x3 5714 4116 198.5 5981 472s lY86 61X2 4362 1987 SY6Y 4105 1988 5X6 1 5366 lY8Y 5X61 6182 1990 57x1 5261


when, as we shall see, containerization took hold.

However, beginning in the late 1950s sedulous atten-

tion to bulk handling began to pay off. The first area

to benefit, coal loading for the coastal trade, decisi-

vely endorsed the advantages forthcoming with

mechanization. Installation of a funnel loader and

1


belt conveyor served to cut labour requirements by

two-thirds while at the same time boosting coal

throughput by one-third (as recorded in the rise from

0.6 million tonnes in 1958 to 0.8 million in the follow-

ing year).

Coal, as it happened, was not of prime concern to

Tianjin port (since the government had determined

that Qinhuangdao should have pride of place in coal

shipment) and the accent on bulk cargoes increas-

ingly fell on grain. In 1958, for instance, only 45,000

tonnes of foreign grains were imported through Tian-

jin, a figure which paled in comparison with the 1.223

million tonnes entering in 1960, the 1.63 million

imported in 1964 and the 1.83 million arriving in 1970.

In marked contrast, coastwise coal shipments suf-

fered a precipitate drop, declining from 789,000

tonnes in 1959 to 56,000 by 1972. While exaggerated,

what occurred in the coal trade was typical of the

faltering fortunes of domestic trades. Throughout the

1950s coastal traffic had substituted for the vanishing

foreign trades, essentially underwriting the port’s

reconstruction. By the 1960s though, the share of

overall throughput held by coastal traffic stagnated

despite absolute increases in cargo volumes (Figure

3). In large measure the void left by the disappearing

coal trade was filled by incoming shipments of oil,

iron and steel products and building materials, along

with outgoing shipments of salt and grain. Far more

significant was the revival of Tianjin’s international

trade, and by the early 1970s iron and steel products

and fertilizers had joined grain as major imports from

overseas. The heavy reliance on foreign trades told in

the influence exerted by international shipping on

Tianjin’s port facilities, an influence manifested in

demands for accommodating steadily larger ships.

Trade diversity and port expansion

These pressing demands coincided with a crucial

change in direction occasioned by China’s induction

into the U.N. in 1971, the normalizing of relations

with Japan and the U.S.A. soon after, and the up-

surge in international trade which came on its heels.

In 1973 intra-Asian trade through Tianjin amounted

to 2.75 million tonnes, of which Japan accounted for

2.41 million; North American trade recorded 1.8

million tonnes, roughly evenly divided between

295

Canada and the U.S.A; while European trade regis-

tered 1.46 million tonnes, with France answering for

the largest share. All in all, throughput in 1973 was

18.4% higher than the preceding year, and foreign

trade increased its proportion from 65 to 71%. From

the early 1960s the port had been furnished both with

berths and the deeper approach channels able to take

ships in the 30,000 dwt class, but it was not until 1964

that a foreign bulker of 24,000 dwt-the largest vessel

hitherto admitted to the port-was allowed to avail

itself of them. Thereafter, however, progressively

larger foreign ships began knocking on the door: a

31,000 dwt vessel entered in 1966 while a 42,500 dwt

bulker arrived to discharge grain in 1971. A glance at

Table 3 is enough to confirm the trend to larger

foreign ships entering the port, a trend that did not sit

well with complacency on the part of Tianjin’s plan-

ners. Already, nominal throughput capacity of 8.75

million tonnes a year was being exceeded in practice,

reaching lOmillion in 1974 (note, Figure 3 omits these

years owing to the disarray in data collection which

followed from the Tangshan earthquake of 1976).

Other signs were not wanting of the congestion; for

example, average waiting time in the offshore

anchorage had risen from 3.4 days for foreign ship-

ping in 1969 to 16.3 days in 1973.

Clearly, the inventory of berths, fixed at 18 since

1966, needed to be supplemented, to say nothing of

the requirement to deepen and extend the complete

water area. Accordingly, in the five years following

1973 a number of projects were prosecuted, cumulat-

ively adding or restoring 18 berths inclusive of an oil

terminal and, portentously, a dedicated container

handling terminal. Most of the new berths boasted 11

m alongside depths, but the three set aside for the

container terminal had enlarged dimensions; namely,

12 m depths along an 875 m-long frontage. After a

prolonged bout of dredging, the main channel was

widened to 150 m and excavated to 11 m, all in

keeping with the desire to serve larger vessels. A total

of Y492 million was sunk into these projects-an

amount some 4.9 times greater than the entire sum

invested in port improvements between 1950 and

1972-testifying to the importance that planners

attached to Tianjin at this time. These developments

were just coming on stream (in the face of adversity,

given the 1976 earthquake) when the momentous

‘Open Door’ policy, in force from 1979, put them to

the test.

296 Geoforum/Volumc 25 Number 3/ 1 Y94

Table 3. Draughts of incoming foreign ships, 1962-74

No. of foreign ships entering

Tianjin Draughts (m) Year (A) <8 8-9

1962 302 210 54 1963 448 329 42 1964 579 410 115 1965 739 568 100 1966 748 unknown lY67 671 351 132 1968 700 533 92 1969 730 557 105 1970 777 595 96 1971 733 541 113 1972 809 unknown 1973 778 562 100 1974 702 512 88

Source: Calculated from data supplied by Tianjin Port Authority

> 10 ratio

9-10 (B) (B/A)

38 0 0 77 0 0 50 4 0.006 68 3 0.004

71 17 0.025 51 24 0.034 44 24 0.033 48 38 0.049 35 44 0.060

55 61 0.078 70 32 0.046

Adjustments Dictated by Unitization

Seen as vita1 cogs in the export-led growth engine, the

ports were accorded high priority by the central

government in the sixth Five-Year Plan beginning in

1981 (Shen, 1990). The Ministry of Communications,

moreover, insisted that much of the expansion in

store for the ports must be tailored to the export of

manufactured goods. This shift in emphasis would

not dispense with the need for bulk-handling

facilities-for, after all, it was intended that domestic

economic growth should be fuelled by raw material

imports, not to say the earnings deriving from con-

tinuing commodity exports-but it would elevate

genera1 cargo to a position of prominence. Unitiza-

tion, of course, had revolutionized shipping else-

where in the world and, as latecomers, the Chinese

were eager to embrace it. Containerization was up-

held over other forms on the grounds that, first, it

promised the greatest benefits in the long-distance

trades which China wished to enter and, secondly,

that it was already the standard in the short sea and

near sea trades run by Japanese, Hong Kong and

other international shipping lines. By one reckoning,

a container vessel scored over its break-bulk counter-

part to the tune of 57% improvement in operations;

that is. the difference between the 64 days in port a

year typical of the former and the 149 days character-

istic of the latter (Stopford, 1988). Yet Chinese plan-

ners were at pains to make clear that they wished to

realize not just savings of this kind but also those

ensuing from the use of larger mainline container

ships. In other words, they were seeking to benefit

from economies of ship size.

Adoption of containerization

Several empirical studies bore witness to this

phenomenon in the container trades. U.S. Maritime

Administration observations were among the most

sanguine, claiming that a 308% increase in ship size-

the kind occurring when feeder ships are replaced by

mainliners-would exact much less than proportio-

nate increases in operating cost (27”/u), construction

cost (161%) and crewing (Chadwin, et al., 1990).

Ominously, however. these economies were predi-

cated on corresponding improvements in port hand-

ling and that requirement, in turn, rested on two

provisos. The first asserted that a threshold level of

throughput must be reached in order to justify main-

liners and customized port facilities alike. Provided

that the port could generate high cargo volumes, the

hub or ‘load-centre’ role would follow naturally. The

planners held to the conviction that since Tianjin

already basked in the status of a gateway port, its

conversion into a container load centre should not

present und-Le difficulties. They were less confident

about the second proviso, the one concerning invest-

ment in port facilities. These had to be embedded in

advance of the inception of container liner services, a

course of action which, given the risk that traffic

might not materialize as planned, exposed the port


managers to charges of overinvestment in redundant

facilities (Evans, 1969; Faust, 1990). Thus, from the

outset berths had to be big enough to take large

container vessels and the shoreside gantry cranes

needed for filling and emptying them. The stumbling

block arose with respect to the expense of providing

the facilities: in short, containerization was prodigal

of capital. Even in the 1960s container gantry cranes

cost more than $1 million each and a self-respecting

hub port required three or four of them (Kendall,

1986). By the 1990s they were costing four times as

much (ESCAP, 1992). Creating new berths and the

generous open storage areas accompanying them was

even more costly. U.S. ports, for example, spent $3

billion in expansion and renovation during the decade

starting in 1973 and fully one-third of that enormous

sum was directly related to container terminals. Tian-

jin’s own incursion into container terminals was bud-

geted for Y128.6 million but, after encountering

delays occasioned by the Tangshan earthquake. in-

curred substantially higher costs before it could be

put to full use.

Tianjin’s container terminal

In the light of the heavy investment obligations, not

to mention China’s inexperience with unitization, the

viability of the container terminal completing in Tian-

jin concurrently with the inauguration of the ‘Open

Door’ policy hung in the balance. To be sure, the

honour of leading China into the container age had

been conferred on Tianjin and yet the signs were not

altogether comforting. Containers were introduced

to the port by the Japanese in 1973, but throughput

for that year amounted to a token 87 boxes or 305

tonnes. Two feeder services began in 1976, cementing

a link between north China and load centres in Japan.

While this example prompted Shanghai and Qingdao

to adopt container services of their own in December

1976 (subsequently emulated by Guangzhou in 1979

and Dalian in 1980), Tianjin continued to forge

ahead, initiating in September 1978 the first deep-sea

container service from China (to Australia) by the

COSCO state shipping line. These precedents, smac-

king of load centre functions, gave rise to services to

both coasts of the U.S.A., to Europe, the Red and

Mediterranean Seas, West Africa and, closer to

home, to south east Asia. Containerization crept into

coastal services. too, and eventually Tianjin was tied

297

into a network connecting Dalian in the north and

Guangzhou in the south, together with a host of

intervening ports.

In the first few years throughput remained woefully

small, however. In the 3 years 1976 to 1978 the

number of boxes handled rose from 1323 to 7017; by

comparison, best practice terminals overseas were

regularly moving 500,000 boxes. In 1979 when the

port switched to the larger 20 foot boxes then stan-

dard in international trades, it managed to handle

9106 TEUs (20 foot equivalent units) and 2 years’

later the total inched up to 25,649 TEUs: a level

falling far short of the terminal’s designed capacity of

100,000 TEUs when it fully opened at the beginning

of 1981. The effects of the policy shift had become

noticeable by 1983, though, and port traffic shot

upwards (Figure 3). Stirred by the aggregate surge in

trade the container throughput also took a turn for

the better. As Table 4 shows, the number of boxes

passing through the port rose by a factor of 31

between 1979 and 1990, abetted by the provision of

extra container facilities in 1985. Indeed, Tianjin had

consolidated its standing among Chinese container

ports, ranking second only to Shanghai (Figure 4).

Marring this record was the disturbing fact that

throughput, at 287,000 TEUs in 1990, utilized only

72% of the port’s 400,000 TEU capacity.

Contrasts in Port Performances

It is now appropriate to come to grips with the issue of

port adequacy; to consider, that is, whether the

planners have served Tianjin well in providing for the

needs of the trades using it. On first appearances,

they may have bestowed an excess of facilities if the

under-utilization of the container terminal is anything

to go by. In rebuttal they would maintain that the

surplus capacity is disappearing rapidly (throughput

climbed to 340,000 TEUs in 1991) and that some

surplus is desirable in any event because it acts as a

buffer allowing the port to guarantee berths for visit-

ing ships, a prerequisite for lines wishing to avoid

delays and abide by tight schedules. The planners

cannot easily dismiss 2 other causes of concern, how-

ever. The first reverts to the persistent irritant of

berths and channel depths whereas the second raises

questions about the suitability of hinterland links.

With respect to the first, a plethora of capacity cannot

298 Geoforum/Volume 25 Number 3/1994

Table 4. Tianjin’s mounting container throughput

Non-TEU Year boxes (No.)

1973 87 1974 600 1975 411 1976 1323 1977 5625 1978 7017 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990


Import

4756 8653

13,475 21,296 31,944 45,156 85,044 76,059 83,975

112,225 137,623 138,000

TEUs (No.)

Export Total

4350 9106 7259 15,812

12,174 25,649 20,622 41,918 29,345 61.289 39,659 84,815 64,367 149,411 91,557 167,616 78,567 162,542

101,903 214,128 128.131 265,754 148,660 286,660

,000 TEU

Shantou

Yantai

P Lianyungang

Fangcheng

0

Figure 4. Container throughput of China’s seaports, 19Y 1


be exonerated if future traffic cannot find a use for it.

This truism is germane to Tianjin because the new

container terminal coming on stream there in 1985

was designed to take 2 35,000 dwt (1800 TEU carry-

ing capacity) vessels and a single 23,000 dwt (1000

TEU capacity) vessel at any given time; that is to say,

its specifications were governed by the needs of third-

generation container liners. Unfortunately, tech-

nology had marched on in the interim between the

formulation and the execution of the terminal: the

third-generation vessels stipulating Tianjin’s design

had appeared in the mid 1970s but had been over-

taken within a decade, first by fourth-generation

types (carrying up to 3000 TEUs) and then by fifth-

generation (4000 TEU capacity) ships. Technical

intricacies apart, the significance of the new gener-

ation ships for ports lay in the fact that, in response to

the unrelenting drive to capture scale economies,

they were decidedly bigger than their predecessors

and, as a result, downright insistent on deeper berths.

Typically, third-generation ships require 11 m berths,

but fourth-generation ships need 12 m and those of

the fifth generation demand a metre more (Transpor-

tation Research Board, 1992). Evidently, without an

immediate extensive dredging programme Tianjin

ran the risk of losing the liner trades that were only

just becoming accustomed to operating from it.

Hinterland concerns

The second proviso affects the port in the vital area of

cargo throughput; that is, in the mustering of a

sufficiency of traffic from the hinterland to guarantee

threshold levels of activity. Threshold levels, both for

the port in general and the container terminal in

particular, must be attained in order to provide a

satisfactory return on investment (a vital consider-

ation given that failure to do so threatens funding

from international lending agencies). Owing to a lack

of intermodal infrastructure in China there is a very

real danger that the hinterland potential may remain

latent, depriving ports like Tianjin of the volumes of

general cargo consistent with a true gateway function.

Ironically, the previous bout of dredging at Tianjin

had rendered possible the reclamation by the central

government of a large area of mud flats behind

Xingang, an area that could be used to supplement

the port’s own attempt at creating a bonded, free

trade district. Styled on economic and technological

299

development zone (ETDZ), this initiative copied the

format of the special economic zones (SEZs), so

conspicuously successful in south China. After the

fashion of Shenzhen and numerous foreign antece-

dents, the ETDZ would attract foreign investment in

manufacturing through generous tax concessions-

and harking back to treaty port days-would arrange

for the resultant goods to be exported free of the

encumbrance of excessive duties. While the ETDZ

could to a degree be justified on its own merits, it also

received the enthusiastic backing of the port auth-

ority because it promised to circumvent the problems

attending hinterland operations. Indeed, from the

inception of unitization, the port found itself strug-

gling with the problem of penetrating its hinterland.

The railways had been found wanting both in for-

warding containers to the port and in removing them

to customers. The hard-pressed road hauliers,

adjured to assist, could only relieve the pressure on

short distance moves.

While time series data are missing, Table 5 neverthe-

less serves to demonstrate most emphatically that the

influence of the new liner trades was largely confined

to the region closest to the port; namely, Tianjin

itself, Beijing and Hebei. The remainder of the vast

hinterland had to be content with about one-tenth of

the containerized cargoes. This state of affairs had

not altered substantially by 1990, signalling the stub-

born perseverance of a bottleneck in port trans-

actions. The ETDZ, in standing both as a source of

export boxes and a destination for import boxes,

provided the port with a potential means of generat-

ing threshold levels of business without having to look

much beyond its own boundary fence. Rapid take-up

of sites in the ETDZ in the late 1980s granted the

port-at least for the time being-the dubious luxury

of being able to discount hinterland bottlenecks.

Competitor ports

Competition is at the bottom of the feeling held by

Tianjin port planners that growth in container traffic

must be spiritedly promoted; for it is competition

afforded by other ports that Tianjin must contend

with and which, if not adequately countered, threa-

tens its continued standing as a load centre. Figure 4,

it must be said, endorses Tianjin’s position as the

second-ranking PRC container port, but competitive

300 Geoforum/Volume 25 Number 3/1994

Table 5. Containerized cargoes and Tianjin’s hinterland

Municipality or province (destination/origin)

Tianjin Beijing Hebei Shanxi Inner Mongolia Shaanxi Ningxia Gangsu Xinjiang Qinghai Henan Shandong Others

TOTAL

Import containers Export containers (1983) (1983)

Volume Share Volume Share (‘000 tonne) (X) (‘000 tonne) (%)

552.6 69.73 783.1 67.73 108.0 13.63 124.1 10.33 71.5 9.02 142.1 11.84 19.7 2.49 3.6 0.30 11 .o 1.39 2.2 0.18

1.4 0.18 2.9 0.24 1.1 0.14 0.3 0.03 6.7 0.85 29.6 2.47 2.1 0.27 42.9 3.57 0.9 0.11 7.1 0.59 6.7 0.84 25.4 2.11 1.3 0.16 0.5 0.04 9.5 1.19 6.9 o.s7

792.5 1200.5


pressure exerted by load centre rivals extends beyond

national borders. Even Shanghai’s performance

looks anaemic in comparison with the giants of the

greater region: Hong Kong, Kaohsiung, Busan and a

clutch of Japanese ports. Moreover, while Tianjin’s

tempo of growth in boxes accelerated during the

second half of the 1980s. it still fared poorly set

against the conduct of Hong Kong and the two

Taiwan load centres: Kaohsiung and Keelung (Figure

5). Indeed. Tianjin’s record seems much more akin to

that of the secondary Taiwan port of Taichung, a

container port frustrated in its ambition to acquire

load centre status and reluctantly having to make do

with feeder services (Todd and Hsueh, 1990). To add

insult to injury, embryo ports in the south of China-

and Figure 4 earmarks Zhuhai as the prime

example-are responding to the challenge posed by

Hong Kong and the Taiwan ports by diligently

attending to the provision of container terminals.

Interport comparisons, in truth. are fraught with

pitfalls, for no single measure or composite index

captures the wealth of capabilities characterizing

ports (Wilking, 1990). So, in default of a preferred

standard, we must have recourse to the simplest but

most vivid measure of all: aggregate throughput. This

will establish the merits of Tianjin’s claim to gateway

standing notwithstanding its less than outstanding

ability to make a mark in East Asian container trades.

Traffic volumes, combining bulk and general cargoes,

furnish a fair impression of the importance of a port

when all is said and done. In Tianjin’s instance they

reveal a throughput record which over the years

appears in a less than favourable light when com-

pared with other leading Chinese ports. In 1952 it

ranked fifth behind Shanghai, Qinhuangdao,

Qingdao and Dalian (Table 6). Its throughput

amounted to 27% of the premier port’s and 12.5% of

the national total. By 1962. after the port had been

Tianj% . _ . - . - .-._.

II Figure 5. Tianjin’s container traffic in context.

19

Geoforum/Volume 25 Number 311994 301

Table 6. Throughput of major Chinese ports, 1952-90

Throughput (million tonnes)

Port 1952 1957 1962 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990

Shanghai 6.6 16.5 25.6 32.0 55.8 84.8 112.9 126.0 139.6 Qinhuangdao 1.8 2.8 2.2 4.8 5.8 15.6 26.4 44.2 69.5 Qingdao 1.8 2.2 3.5 4.5 6.5 15.4 17.1 26.1 30.3 Dalian 1.5 5.9 7.8 10.6 15.1 22.9 34.0 43.8 49.3 Tianjin 0.7 2.8 3.9 5.5 8.2 8.3 11.9 18.6 20.6 Lianyungang 0.5 1.1 2.1 2.7 2.6 3.2 7.4 9.3 11.4 Guangzhou 0.5 1.9 2.5 4.7 6.0 7.2 12.1 17.7 41.6 Yingkou 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.2 1.0 2.3 Haikou 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.8 0.7 1.7 2.9 Zhanjiang 0.1 0.8 1.2 2.2 3.3 7.2 10.8 12.3 15.6 Ningbo - - 2.4 10.4 25.5 China 14.4 37.3 71.8 - 483.2

Source: State Statistical Bureau.

taken in hand, its share rose to equal 15.2% of the

throughput boasted by Shanghai. Emerging from the

upheavals of another major revamping in 1980, Tian-

jin’s throughput had slipped to a level only 10.5% of

that achieved by Shanghai, or about 5.5% of the

national total. The year 1990 found Tianjin placed

seventh in the list of chief ports and reliant on a

volume of trade that, while rising to equate with

14.8% of Shanghai’s volume, amounted to scarcely

4.3% of the country’s volume. Put otherwise,

whereas Tianjin oversaw a 29-fold increase in

throughput between 1952 and 1990 and Shanghai

witnessed a marginally less stirring 21-fold increase,

China’s overall seaport trade rocketed upwards by a

factor of 33. This national improvement was either

matched or surpassed by individual ports such as

Qinhuangdao, Dalian and Guangzhou (the latter

two, like Tianjin, handling significant amounts of

general cargo).

The conclusion is inescapable: Tianjin’s absolute

growth, impressive though it may be, appears less

glowing when contrasted with the performances of

several other Chinese ports and, what is more, fails to

disguise the relative erosion of the port’s hold on the

country’s foreign trade. The crowning achievement

of Tianjin’s planners, then, lies less in boosting absol-

ute throughput and more in recognizing that the

port’s viability depended on buttressing its general

cargo function through adoption of containerization.

Their insistence on providing modern facilities, in the

teeth of opposition from an uncompromising fluvial

environment, served not only to endorse Tianjin’s

longstanding employment as a major port but went on

to encourage the assistance of foreign shipping in

sustaining that role.

Conclusions

Tianjin is a model for other Chinese estuary ports in

the vigorous prosecution of harbour works. It has

produced, at great cost, the largest artificial harbour

in the country; a harbour which embraces an inner

section at Tanggu and an outer section on reclaimed

land at Xingang, together containing 46 berths. It

remains the definitive general cargo port, relying on

non-bulk shipments for 70% of its traffic (Li, 1991).

Nevertheless, its planners feel compelled to press

ahead with further developments simply to keep up

with advances in shipping technology on the one hand

and the changing complexion of economic growth on

the other. The first, represented by container ship

enlargement, requires that Tianjin persist in the

seemingly neverending task of deepening channels

and berths. Aiming to retain its hub role in container

shipments, the port is in the process of adding 300,000

TEUs of capacity to its existing 400,000 TEUs by dint

of constructing a new pier complete with multiple

berths (Figure 2). This expansion programme dwarfs

similar schemes afoot in Dalian (200,000 TEUs),

Lianyungang (200,000 TEUs) and Ningbo (100,000

TEUs). All told, Tianjin will gain 18 new berths and

10 million tonnes of extra handling capacity when the

project is completed in 1995; the container terminal

will be able to take fourth-generation vessels, the oil

302

terminal will accommodate 50,000 dwt tankers, and

the whole will be linked by a new expressway to

Beijing. Despite these extraordinary efforts, Tianjin

will still be barred to the largest container liners now

plying the major ocean trading routes. Already, the

major lines serving the Far East-Europe trades are

well advanced in converting to ships carrying 4000

TEUs while those operating on the trans-Pacific

routes are not far behind (ESCAP, 1992). All the

more worrying for Tianjin, then, that the prospect of

a regional rival looks increasingly likely, one unen-

cumbered with this drawback. The rival in question,

Dalian, will be fully equipped to take the largest

container ships once its Dayao Bay terminal is fully

operational in the later part of this decade (Todd and

Zhang, 1993). There is a very real possibility, there-

fore, that some mainliners serving northern China

may be tempted to divert from Tianjin to Dalian,

consigning the former to feeder status in a hub-and-

spoke system centred on the latter.

Fortunately, 2 developments, both the consequences

of the dynamics of economic growth, may work to

moderate the worst consequences of this scenario for

Tianjin. First, the emergence of the ‘Bohai Economic

Zone’ embracing sixteen big and medium-sized cities

around the Bohai Sea (including Tianjin and Dalian),

complete with its own oil and natural gas supply,

promises to generate so much economic growth that,

rather than fighting for a fixed amount of cargoes, the

two rival ports are in danger of being overwhelmed by

new traffic (Hong, 1991). Indeed. anticipated growth

is such that a new port at Tangshan (Figure 1) is being

laid out to handle 35 million tonnes of throughput on

its inception in 2000. Under these circumstances,

there are ample grounds for planning expanded hub

container services at both Tianjin and Dalian pro-

vided that it is understood that the deeper draught

port should service the larger vessels. Secondly, Tian-

jin port has set about transforming itself into a highly

efficient operation, appealing to international ship-

ping on the strength of competitive pricing. To this

end, it has entered into a joint venture with the British

P&O shipping group (Fairplay, 1993).

Not to be overlooked, too. is the commitment of the

central government. Ever since the lY7Os it has

adhered to a form of division of labour among the

country’s ports. By its lights. Dalian and the other

major Bohai port of Qinhuangdao remain quintes-


sential energy ports, the first devoted to oil shipments

and the second given over to coal transfer (Chiu and

Chu, 1984). It has not wavered from the view that

Tianjin continue as a first rank general cargo port

and, to back this up, has done its utmost to encourage

economic development that would have a bearing on

port activities. In particular, it has firmly supported

local efforts to promote the growth of export manu-

facturing in the vicinity of the port. Symbolized by the

formation of the ETDZ in 1985, Tianjin port was

caught up in the export drive that was spawned by the

‘Open Door’ policy. By 1988 its exports were valued

at $3.9 billion, of which $1.7 billion originated in

Tianjin itself. The central government, keen to main-

tain this momentum, designated Tianjin an ‘econ-

omic base’; that is, a community which has been

accorded the highest priority for investments (par-

ticularly joint ventures with foreign interests) in tex-

tiles, motor vehicles, machine tools and electronics

activities (Woodward, 1991). Of course, while this

initiative undoubtedly promises continuing, indeed

growing. business for Tianjin’s container terminal, it

does not put to rights the shortcomings evident in the

moving of boxes further afield in the port’s immense

hinterland. Only a gigantic investment programme

aimed at road and rail construction can hope to

alleviate the problem of hinterland accessibility, and

the implementation of a scheme of that magnitude is a

longer-term proposition. For the foreseeable future,

draught restrictions and land transportation bottle-

necks, both spinoffs of technological change, will

conspire to cloud the port’s prospects. but in this

respect Tianjin is no different from a host of other

ports worldwide.

Acknowledgerrlents-The author is indebted to the Social Sciences & Humanities Research Council of Canada and the Tianjin Port Authority, both indispensable in permit- ting this project to proceed.

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Documents

Changing technology, economic growth and port development: the transformation of Tianjin