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CHANGING PATTERN OF POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IN KARNATAKA
L.R. RAGHAVENDRA RAO INSTITUTE FOR SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CHANGE
BANGALORE - 560 072
A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE BANGALORE UNIVERSITY FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF
THROUGH THE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE BANGALORE UNIVERSITY, BANGALORE
1995
CERTIFICATE
I certify that, I h~ve nuided and supervised the
pre-parat i on and I~r i t i nIl 0 f tho pre-::lont th2::l i::l ont it 1 od
·Changing Pattern of Political Leadership in Karnataka U by
Mr L :~ :~a",havondra :~ao I~ho workod on thi::l ::lub.ioct 1n tho
Institute for Social and ~conomic Channe, ~annalore.
Si'lnaturo of tho Guide-
~l\'Y (Prof Alia) Ray)
DECLARATION
I declare that the thGsi3 entitled "Changing Pattern of
Pol it iCiJl LEiJdErship 1n Karnataka" is iJ result of my own work
3nd that it has noL either wholl y or in part been submi t ted
for any other degree. Due Acknowledgements have been made
wherever anything has been borrowed from other sources.
L R Raghavendra Rao
CONfiRTS
Acknowledgements
List of Tables
Chapter
I
II
III
IV
V
VI
Introduction
Political Hegemony of the Dominant CaEto~: Pre Devaraj Oro Era
Devaraj Ors Era in Karnataka: 1980
Gundu Rao and Decline of Congre~~
Janata Rulo in Karnataka Politics
Overview
Bibliography
1972-
Page No
1
36
79
173
203
230
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Thi~ the~i~ i~ ~n outcome of re~e~rch work undert~ken ~t tho In~tituto for SOCi31 3nd Economic Ch3ngo. B3ng3lore under the guid~nce of Prof runul R:lY. lowe u gre:lt debt to Prof Ruy for hi~ oncour<:lgomont und in~ightfu1 ob~orvation~.
Prof~ R L M P:lt i 1. B. 8. Bh:lrg~vil. P.8. Juyurumu, Dr~
S.N.S<:lngit3, <:lnd M.J.Vinod h<:lvO boon oxtromoly holpful 3t vur.iou~ ~t~ge~. The work ill~o benef i ted greilt 1 y from the ~ovor<:ll ro~pondont~ who ~p<:lrod thoir timo to di~c~~u tho nU:lnce~ of the politic~ of Karnat~k~.
Thi~ ro~o<:lrch work W<:l~ undortakon on ~ doctorul fellowchip from the Indiun Council of Sociul Science Ro~oarch. I am thankful to ICSSR for tho ~amo. Tho library stuff :It the Inctitute for Soci~l ilnd Economic Chilnge, Decciln Horald, India Today, and tho Logi~lativo ~~ombly, woro a gre~t help in collecting information.
Sadunandu, Kri~hnamurthy, Sriniva~u Murthy und Narayan of ISEC hilve been un enormouc Gupport over the yearc. I am deoply gratoful to all of thorn. Kri~hnappu, R~jondran,
Kubendr:ln, Gregory. Venk:lt. Sekhur, Madhu, Sundar. GaneGh, Subbu, Kri~hna Kumar. Vinay, Emm<:lnuol und B:I~uvuraj havo hclped in v:lriou~ w:lyc.
My father. Rekhu. und Bhilt hilve illwilY~ provided me with boon
MrG u fino <:lmbionco <:It homo. Suvurcha1u'~ ~upport h<:l~
unstinted illl through. I ilm indebted to illl of them. SWupn<:l Ray ha~ boon u mo~t ho~pitablo ho~t ovor tho yoar~.
L R Raghavendra Rao
Tilbl e No
2. 1
2.2
2.3
2.1
2.5
2.6
2.7
2. 8
2.9
3. 1
3.2
3.3
3. 1
3.5
3.6
LIST OF TABLES
Cilste-wise Membership of Legi~liltive ~sembly ( 1957, 1962 ;]nd 1967).
OCCUPilt ion-I'lise l\:>:;ombl y ( 1957.
Membership of 1962 ;]nd 1967).
Legi~liltivc
Cilste CompoGition of Kilrniltilkil Cilbinet.
Porcont;]go of SO;]t:; OppoGition Pilrtics (1956. 1962 ;]nd 1967).
Won by Congro:;:; ;]nd in ~scmbly Elections
Cultiviltors ilnd ~griculturill LilbourerG K;]rnilt;]kil (1961 ;]nd 1971).
in
DiGtrict-wiGe Levels of Tenilncy in Kilrniltilkil ( 1961 - 1971).
Pcrccntilge Distribution of Government JobG 63 botwoon Brilhmin:; ;]nd Non-Brilhmin:;.
Rcprcsentiltion Communitio:; in 1930,
of Milior CilGtCG ilnd the St;]te Government Service in
ReprcGcntiltion of Miljor CilGteG ilnd Communitie:; in the State Government Service in 1910.
Cilstc-wiGe Membership of LcgiGliltivc l\:>:;embly (1962 ilnd 1967).
Occupiltion-wiGc McmberGhip of LegiGliltive l\:>:;ombly (1962 ;]nd 1967).
PZlgC No
10
11
12
52
62
63
68
69
69
85
85
DetailG about DispoGill of Tcnilney 100 ~pplication:; ;]nd P;]yment of Promium ~ount.
DiGtrict-wiGe l\ppl iC<lt iori:;
Performilncc on Tenilncy 102
DiGtrict-wiGe DiGtribution of TcnilntG, their ~pplic;]tion:; for Occup;]ney Right:; ;]nd Succe:;G of Tenilncy LcgiGliltion in KilrnatilKa.
Cultiv;]torG ;]nd KilrniltilKil ( 196 L
hgricultur;]l L;]bouror:; 1971 ilnd 1981>.
in
103
105
3.7
3.8
3.9
3. 10
1. 1
1. 2
5. 1
5. 2
5. 3
Di~tribution of L3nd Lo~~od in 3nd Lo~~cd out in Kurnutuku in Eurly Scvcntieu
Doc13rution~
Under Ceiling 1971.
Filod by tho Potontiul Holdcr~
Provisionu of Lund Reformu hct,
hpplicutions Filed by Lundless Luboureru for Ownor~hip Right~ on Dwolling Unit~.
106
110
113
Custe wise mcmberuhip of Legislutivc huuembly 121 in 1978.
Performunce of the Purtieu und Independents in 193 1983 Eloction~.
Percentuge of Seutu won by Congress und 198 Oppo~ition ucr033 tho ~30mbly Poriod3
Custc-wiuc Membership of Legislutive husembly 207 (1983 und 1985).
Occupution-wiuc Membership of 1'l:::;~Qmbly ( 1983 und 1985).
Legislutive 209
1989 Electionu Pcrformunce of Politicul 225 PurtiQ~ und Indopcndont3
CHAPTER - I
INTRODUCTION
Every political system i~ ~UI generis. Nevertheless, a
common thread runs through what is often described as the
politics of the developing areas or the non-Western political
process.
The framework of non-Western politics has often been
described
generally
as a communal
shaped 1
by
one with political
com;iderations of
ident if icat ions. The stratified social setting
behaviour
communal
In the
developing countries has led to a close relationship between
the diverse primordial affinities and the nascent
institutions.
Primordially-based po 1 it i cal solidarities
abiding strength in most of the newly independent
democratic
have an 2
states.
This relationship has received the attention of several
social scientists. One political scientist. who has wor:ked
extensively on India, observes that the sub-continent has 3
been divided by a myr:iad of inter:nal cleavages. These
pr:imor:di,ll loyalties are not merely religious, but also rest
on assumed blood ties, race, region, C1Jstom, language and
particularly in India on caste.
Unl ike in the mature democracies. In the newly emerqent
modernizing societies. where the trudition of civil politics
is weak and the technical requirements for an effective
welfare qover nment ure poorly understood. primordial
attachments tend to be repeatedly proposed and widely
accluimed as preferred bases for 4
autonomous political units.
Most of these new nations,
the demarcation of
especially India. are
characterized by a heterogeneous mosaic in terms of religion,
caste. tribe. language and reqion. The political arena in
these countries has not been divorced from the various social
forces operating in their societies.
A variety of social forces impinge on the working of
the political sphere and the secular political culture common
to the non-Western political process IS marked by its
absence. In itv pluce, there still exists. In almost all
these countries, a largely parochial political process.
However, a sm<lll modernis ing pol it ica1 el j te ex ists in
most of the new states. oriented towards a modern. secular
development-oriented political process amidst the primordial
loyalties. Hence, what is characteristic of these states is a
modern-traditional mix In the political culture.
2
In societies with such cleavages, even secular
politicians have not hesitated to·turn towards religion as a 5
force for cohesion. Primordial strife in some new nations
has frequently risen above the surface. However, even in
those new states where such discontent has not openly
surfaced, there has arisen around the developing struggle for
governmental power a broad penumbra of primordial strife.
Along with the us ual po lit i c:; of party and parliament,
cilbinet or bureaucrilcy, or monarch and army, 1n these
countries there exists a sort of parapolitics of clashing 6
pubic identities and quickening ethnocentric aspirations.
I n I nd i Cl, more than in most new nations, primordial
distinctions are pronounced. Clifford Geertz observes that
India, a labyrinth of reI igious, linguistic, regional,
raciaL tribal and caste allegiances, 1S beset by virtually
the entirE ranOE? of primordial conflicts complexly 7
superimposed one upon the ot her.
Most of these new nations are not static: they are all
'ransitional nat10n~ or as 15 more commonly known moderniZIng
nations, goino throuoh the process of transition from
trad1tional to modern principles of sOGial orqanization.
In these modernizinq nations, what 15 interestinq 1S
that all too frequ8ntly, persunalities overshadow political
structures and processes. Conflicts arise more over power
1ssues than over pol icy issues. Nkrumah and Jomo KenY3tta,
Nyrcre and Nehru, Ind irCl Gandhi and 1-10 Chi Minh have all
aGsumed larger than life porGonalities and eclipsed the
institutional political procEsscS. In lis ia, power is seen
as r-esiding in the per-son of high officials and not in
offices or institutions. Leaders capt lire 8
change them to suit their own purposes.
While the fundamental framework of
institutions and
the non-WestErn
political process is a communal one, it is not accommodative
ethnic politics but hegemonic politics that 15 the hallmark
of these GtateG. HopeG of consociational power sharinq haG 9
been dispelled by eventG of the laGt few d8cadeG. The
patterns of hegemonic politics may vary in tErms of the units
exerciGing hegemony - language, religion, caste or tribe
but the results leave no one in doubt.
The MalayG dominate in Malaysia, the Sinhalese 1n Sri
Lanka, the Arabs 1n Mauritania and the Alawitss in Syr i a.
In India, there exist a host of hegemonic groups operating in
the different units of the federal system. The heterogeneous
mOGaic of India haG resulted in a Gituation, wherein there
exists not one or- two but many groups; each hegemonic within
its own doma in. "Nationalism", a::; Myr-on Weinl3[, observe::;, "in
mony of these countries IS the sentimEnt towurds the 10
national territory expro5Gsd by the dominant ethnic group".
'1
Most of these new n~tions have embarked on the n~tion
and state building proce33 with feeble institutions on both
the input and output side. Institution building did not keep
pace with modornisation leading to the phenomenon of
pol it ic~l decay. This phenomenon has been so perv~sive from
Latin America to Asia, that one notices an enfeeblement in
the institutional prop5 of the polities.
Increasingly, as the in3titutional props came under the
onsl~ught of various social forc8~, politics became more and
more an anomie and personalised process. As one percept i ve
political observer waf; to note, political institutions failed
to become more complex and authoritative even as social
forces becume more vurieguted. While ~ociul forces were
political in3t itut ions remained fragile and
disorganized. In other words. the development of the stute 11
lagged behind the evolution of the society.
With the weukening of politicul in~titutions. politicul
order declined and what wa3 ubiquitou3 300n enough wa3
po 1 it i cal decuy. At one time or the other. civil war ha~
erupted ln almost all the3G states. Ind i 3. Pak istan. Sudan,
Rwanda. Zaire. Ethiopia. Chile, Mulaysia <Jnd a host of other
modernizing nations have all been the playground for civil
strife. This civil war csscnti<Jlly stemmed from the
inabillty of theSe countries to exercise effective political
control over their entire territory.
5
barring a few exceptions Pakist<ln <lnd
Malays:! notably - almost all these ~tates have had their
po 1 it: = ~ 1 boundarie:~ int<lct. They have remained juridical
state: 3nd are given legitimacy in the international arena
even ~~Bn they fail to SEcure legitimacy among the various 12
groupE ~:thin their own society.
C~""e:nting upon the: inde:terminuncy in non-Western
Natior.;. Gabriel Almond has noted the gro~~ deviations in the
perforrr: :-,ce of the gove:rnme:ntul 13
functions
con~ti:.:ional and legal norms.
1:-. Ind i~, for instance. the Congress party.
from the
that was
once E.~Jgi~tically spoken of as a highly institutionalized
struct.:!. has seen considerable: erosion in its institutional
Nominations through fiats replaced internal
party e_~=tions with the result thut twice in the last forty
eight :.53rs - 1n the 1977 and 1989 election~ the Congress
lo~t i:= 'T1onopoly OVEr power at the: centre. and at the state:
::~ ha~ increasingly given way to regional parties.
In thE=! countries, the primury problem of politics is the
lag 1~ ~gvelopment of political institutions 14
behind social
and eC:~:~lC change.
Tl'." path to power in many of thE'F;8 countries, as has
been ::5~u8ntly demonstrated in Indian politics. 15 not
througr. :he in&titutlonul ladder. The entree to political
leadership often t~w~~ non-institutional routes: militilLY
coup, dynastic succo~3ion or even a career in fllm~.
Every gener~tion brings forth its own attitudes and
boliofs to tho political arena. But in most of the advanced
societies, there ~rc no sharp discontinuities as the torch is
passed on from one generation to another. However, the
politic<:ll proceEd::;
sharp differences 15
generations.
In the new nations is charactErized by
in tho political orientation of the
r In the Indian context. Prof AInal Ray h~s pointed out
that tho :;econd genoration political leader:;hip in the post-
IndEpendence era had stifled the growth of institutions and
the ro:;ultant Ie,
po lit i c:; .
:;hift from con30n:;ual to confrontationi:;t
Given a structurE of weak political institutions In
these now :;tatos, it i:; inevitable that the governIng e1 ites
In many of these nations have often been preoccupied with
u:;ing their control over the :;tate to extract re:;ources for
personal and sectional aograndizement rather than ildopting
policis3 to accolerate growth or improve income di:;tribution.
That the political elitEE In mOEt of the developing
countr io:; have often b8sn acrcl]:;ed of financial impropr iet i83,
the frequency of appoIntment of inquiry commIssIons
off8r:; ampl8 evidence that politic:; 1:; a HobbeSIan world of
7
unrelenting competition for the scarce resources that being
in power accord3 to the political elite. In addition to
accentuating the alreudy existing income inequalities In the
30cial thi3 kind of bGhaviour also results
cynicism, anomic behavioural patterns and a devolution In the
legitimacy of the political system.
I Income inequalities have been accentuated as a result of
the state u~lng it~ power to extract resources from one
section of society and transferring them to those with
political power or access to power. Corruption is not lust
restricted to the bureaucracy or the party. This phenomenon
has led to the transfer of resourcos to those who control the
leading many to look at politics as a career to 17
improve their material pro3pect3.
In fact, a high degree of corruption is a hallmark of
mo~t of tho developing countriG~. Mobutu, Duvalier and
closer at home a host of leaders including Karunanidhi, Arjun
Singh, and DGvaraj Ur3 have all boen accu~ed of dipping into
the till of thE state in the clientelist pattern through
which politic~ normally operate3 in tho3o 3tate3.
The clientellst pattern of politics is manifested In the
patron-client relation3hip. It ha3 boen arqued that in South
Asia and espeCIally in India. the politICS of patronage has 18
over~hadowed tho politic3 of policy implementation.
8
Whil~ th~ p~tron client n~twork IS visiblE In the
urban domain too, it I:::; part icularly pronounced In the rural
hintErland of most of these nations where the landless und
the tenant:::; are bound by a web of tie:::; to their patrons.
It has been arguEd that in severul rural communities there i5
a high degree of correlation between patron :::;tatu:::; and land-
ol4nership, ~nd cl ient 5t~tuS with poor cult iVCltors, dependent
upon the patron's land for their livelihood.
However, the relationship between the patron and client
lS inequitable as a large land-owner can well manage
without the esteem or loyalty of an individual peasant and
his family. Aga in::;t the backdrop of widespread poverty,
peasants need the patron more than the patron needs the
client. Hence, the bargaining capacity of the patron is by 19
definition greater than that of the client.
These patron-client networks, while they do help the
rural peasant:::;, who live In a hOGtile environment and are
helplESS against the dangerous environmental constellation
of force:::; ranged against them, al:::;o playa significant role
In the politiciJl prOCESS. ThE ties of thE PiJtron and client
are multifariou:::;, encompasslnq economic, :Jocia), reI iqious
po lit I c iJ I r€lat lom,hips, enabling the l<mdlord to 20
mobill::;e his followers to attain his pol it ieal object ive:::;.
This phEnomEnon IS particularly pronounced In India
'3
where the l~rge land- owners among the ~ocally dominant caste.
exerclse significant power over the majority of the poor
pe<lsantry. These land-owners act as patrons In providing
minimal economic security and protection to landless families
in return for deference and loyalty in situations of 21
rivalry Dr factional dispute.
social
In fact. many of the problems besetting the new nations
stem from weak parties. However, the creation and sustenance
of a competitive party system has proved to be a daunting
taSK In these nations. Most of these new nations have been
unable to develop parties which can ensure stable and
effective government in a competitive situation.
Of the various political instruments available to the
pol it ical actors. the party is of recent origin. All other
po 1 it i cal devices elections. referendums etc .•
eVIdent centuries back as they are today. But not the
pilrties. Purties and party system are the principal
institutional means of organising the expansion of political
part icipat ion.
Stute bUllding in modernising soci~ties is just not the
creation of bur.eaucracy but is also the establishment of an
effective purty system that can provide opportunities to
enable the participation of new forces into politics. Wh i 1 e
politlCul pacticipatioTi is orQanised by parties. its rate of
expansion IS determined by party systems. The stabil ity and
10
strEngth of a p~rty and of a party system depends upon the
levels of institutionalization and participation.
A high level of participation with low levels of
political party institutionalization results In anomie
politics und violence. While participation without
organization degsnsrates into masS movements, organizations
lacking partiCipation degenerate into cl iques. Further,
strong parties require a high level of political
institutionalization and high levels of mass support.
The party b£come~ the means through which the maSSES are
mobil ized into the political process. In the absence of a
strong institutionalized the meOlns of
mobi:ization run along traditional primordial groups. While
criticism has beEn freqUEntly voiced, right from the timE of
George Washington to the present, that parties are corrupt
~nd encouragE division and instability, political scientists
have argued that these are features of incomplete party
systEm~ rather than complete systems.
It has been contended that. corruption, divi:= ion,
inst~bility and susceptibility to outside influences are all
characteristics of incomplete party systems lacking 23
stable
and effective institutions. Countries whose party system
15 complete have eliminated/minimised the incidEnce of
violence 1n the political proceGs. However, unlike in the
11
mature democracies, violence in the newly independent
countries is an endemic trait.
In societies wh€r€ political parties ar€ not well-
entrenched and suffer from a low degLee of
inst itut ional iZ<lt ion, priv<lte or s€ctional
precedence over public interests. Defections are a common
phenomenon <lnd theAY<l Ram - G<lya Ram' pol it ici<ln is <ln
ubiquitous phenomenon.
How€vcr, In th€ case of well-institutionalized political
::; v:; t e m!3 ~ it i~ uncommon for a political leadeL to change
loyalties from one party to another and the movement of
social group~ and cla~ses from one party to another 15
usually a complex and lengthy historical pLocess. In
contrast, in the politics of the modernizing nations, the
inter-paLty movement 24
of individuals and gLoups IS very
frequent.
It IS not In India alone that this ph€nomcna of
dGfection~ l~ common (at least it wa~ till r(3cent I y), but
€VEn In other modernising countries like Philippines. B\lt,
nowheLG has thG magnitudG of the problem of defection~ been
as high as in India where political leaders have been known
to change their party affiliation~, ~ometimes more than twice
In the short span of forty eight houLs.
12..
The phenomenon of defection ~~sumed epic proprtions,
especially after the 1967 elections. Commenting on the large-
sc~le defection of politicians ~fter the victory of Indira
Gandhi in the 1980 Parliamentary elections, Lucian pye
observes th~t the defectors "understood that power means
access to the distribution of central government resources.
For them the governmental process took one elementary form:
the central government collected whatever Burplusen it could
from society, and following the flow of 25
patronage chains,
the resources were redistributed".
But the r~ison d' etre of these new st~tes - as of any
othar ~tate for that matter i~ development. In fact, the
battle cry in the e~rly ye~r5 of independence in almost ~ll
the new countrie~ wa~ development. But, a~ Geertz observe~,
" wh~t w~s not foreseen then, or not very clearly, was the
degree to which development could take place without
involving the mass of the popul~tion in the countries where
it occurred. the degree to which it could reduce modern 26
islands in unmodern ~eas ". The point 15 that economic
development c~n occur in a country with a large proportion
of popUlation slipping further down the poverty path.
In their incisive analysis of economic growth ~nd soci~l
equity in developing nations, Irma Adelman and Cynthia Morris
observe th~t "development is ~ccompanied by ~n ~bsolute ~s
well as relative decline in the average income of the 27
poor". They further note th~t the record of economic
13
intervention In underdeveloped countries, wh i Ie ha&
promoted economlC growth, ha~ been bad In terms of SOClal
justice. It has been further argued that only a major
rGdistribution of political power was likely to affect lncome 28
di~tribution ~ignificantly.
The st udy of political processes in most of these
moderni~ing countrio~ can be undertaken at three levels:
national, state and sub-state. In India, while much attention
been focusod on the national and sub--state polItical
prOCE'SSES, the study of state-level political processps has
traditionally not attracted the attention of most
reusLlrchsrs,
Consequent I y, there LlrE few extended macro studies :It
the level of tho ~tate. Whi Ie there have been ~everal
studies on most of the new nations, very little has appeared
on the Indian states though each of them is In area and
population alone larger than most memberu of the United
Nations, Additionally, the state~ in India also provide a
diversity not normally evident within a sub-unit.
In fact. it can be argued that an understanding of the
Indian political system demands a perception of
patterns of political dovelopment within the const ituent
states, The f;tutes, CIS one politicill analYut observeu "u'L£
truly the keystone of tho national governmental 29
sy~tem of
India",
14
This is especially so, in the context of implementing
public policy measures, where the role of the state
government is much more than that of the central government.
The role of the central government is more in the nature of
provi ding le~der~hip, advice and con~ultation while the onus
for implementation of the programme~ re~ts on the states.
Given the divE'rf;ity th~t is u holllmark of India, it is
inevitable that the pattern of politics in each of the states
if; bound to be different. One scholar observes that each of
the Indian states provides an unusual microcosm for studying
proce~~es of development: ~ microco~m since the states are
constituent units of a larger system, and a macrocosm because
the units are themselves 50 large that they can be studied uS
30 total systems.
Barring some exception~, very few full length studies
have been undertaken to explore the phenomenon of political
change at the macro level of a state.
This is ospecially SO in Karnataka where no maJor macro
~tudies have been attempted for the period beyond 1955.
Hence, the present study is an attempt at the same. The
advantage of an extended macro study stems essentially from
the fact that with the benefit of hindsight, we can attempt
to sort out the abiding from the transient in the panorama of
stats politics.
15
Historical Overview
Mysore <Karnataka> as a princely state in British Indico
experienced little democratization process.) Mysore was
virtually governed by an autocracy and the administration was
carried on largely by a bureaucracy responsible to the 31
Mahara ja.
Though there legislDtive council,
reprG~entative a~~embly and local di:;trict boards, all
largely dominated by Brahmins, these bodies exercised little
or no power. Tho ~ituation in the neighbouring Br: it ish
presidency of Madras presented a different picture in t ha t
thG GxtGn~ion of power to legislaturG~ and local boards had
drawn them into the political system. However, unl ike in the
~tatG of Madra:;, thB~e local board~ and IGgi~latures of
Mysore were mere 10058 appendages to a powerful 32
bureaucrvtic
structure.
The Vokkaligas and Lingayats are the dominant castes In
Karnataka both numerically and in terms of economic status.
The concept of dominant castes owes its existence to M N
Srinivas who dofined a ca~te a:; -dominant' when
preponderates numcr:ically over the other castcs an~ when 33
al~o wiGld:; preponderant Gconomic cond political power".
16
" it
it
ThE' Vokkal igas are by und laroe c-onC-E'ntrilted 1 n t hp
southern districts of Karnataka, .. hlle the ar.
present through out the state thouqh they ore partlC'ularly
concentrated in the northern districts. The Volt)callgas
constitute 11.82 per cent of the ~tute'~ populution while the
Lingayats account for 14.54 per cent.
ThE' Vokkoligar; are mainly a peasunt c-aste; wh I Ie
Lingayats form a hoterogeneous group comprIsIng merchants,
'pr jests Olnd pE'OlSunts. ThE' LinooyOlt emerged
Gssentially as an offshoot of the Bhakti movement in the
twelfth century.
~hE' origins of Lingayut community or the VeerOlrivCl fOlith
are still shrouded in mY5tery. Social scientists are divided
on whether the VecrOlsOliva faith pre-dated BOlsOlva. .. La clt of
histor ical records, absence of documented proof::: and
conflicting interpretation regOlrding this faith, hilve a I I
contributed their share to a problem which 31
is already
sufficiently confusing" observes one scholaL
The VokkaligOl community arose essentially by what may be
termed misdefinition by census'. Originally taken to mean
un occupational cult ivators, they
subs equent 1 y, however, lumped together as a single
wE'rE'
catE'qory 35
by the census takers in the early part of this century.
17
, To come bClck to pre-IndepEmdence Mysoro, tho formiJtion
of Vokkaliqa and Linqayat a3sociation3 brought forth 1 ittle
chunge in the than existing power scenurio. At thE' mos t ,
thase groupe could only wrest control of the district boards
from the Brahmins. At the heiJrt of the whole miJtter WiJS the
extreme reluctance of the princely authoritie3 to share power
with non-officiiJlu. Thc bureaucriJcy exercisod iJ tight rein
over tile state.
But, In October 1937, with the mcrgor of the non-
Brahmin People's Federation with the Congrenn, there wa:; a
distinct chiJnge in the proviJiling set-up. The Congres5
party invigorated by the infusion of fresh blood threw up a
new crop of leiJders whoue voice for the firut time commiJnded
the attention and alleqiance of people beyond the immediate
horizon. The PiJrty which WiJS hitherto dominiJted by the
Brahmins now came under the control of the Vokkaligas and
Li ngiJyiJt 5. JiJmC5 Munor obuerves thiJt the VokkiJligu5 with iJ
larger proportion of the population enjoyed a Glight pre-36
eminence ovor LinqayatG in both party and government.
The dominiJnce of these two groups ovcr politic!:'
continued even after independence. But wi th the
reorgiJniziJtion of the stOlte in 1956, iJnd the inclusion of
Bombay-Karnatak and Hyderabad-Karnatak regions into old
Mysore, the numericiJl 5trength of the dominant caste groupE-
has significantly changed. The Lingayats were now the
large5t ca5ts group with the VokkiJligiJS coming next. The
18
pol it ica I
Lingayats.
balance now came to be tilted in favour of the
While the politics of the st~te has been well documented
in the pre-1956 phase, there has not been an extensive study
on the state in the post re-org~nis~tion era exploring
complex and dynamic interactions between the po lit i ca I
inst i tut ions ~nd caste group~ ~nd the changing
'political
attempt
leadership. Bofore undertaking such an
would be made to identify the gaps in
pattern of
exerci:::;sl an
the exiE,tinQ
studies. The following section is an attempt at tho same.
ReviEW of Liter~ture
The principal rationale bEhind selEction of our research
problem, as explained earlier, stems from the fact that
politic~ in Karnat~k~ h~s not been adequately probed; hence
it was felt that it would offer good scope for an exhaustive
analysis of political developments in the state over the last
three decades. But, nevertheless, there have been some
studies on Karnataka by some social scientists - both
and foreign.
Indian
The studies on Karniltakil have either <lttemptsd to
explain thf"' pol it leal changes that havfJ taken place In the
or focussed on specific issues like l<lnd reforms "' nd
reservations in isolation without linking them up much to the
1'3
macro political environment. Thus, the studies on Karnataka
may be classified into those that have a broader canvas and
tho~c thDt hDv€ elDborated on specific programmes.
To the first category belong the studies by James Manor,
Bjorn Hettne, R K Hebsur, M N SrinivDs and M N POl n i n i , 37
Natarajs, Atul Kohl L Muna Gowda and Patil Okaly.
Milnor's work - "Political Change In Zln Indian
State: My::;ore 1917-55" offClr::; an elaborate account of
political developments in the state upto the reorganisation;
while Hettne'::; work - "The Political Economy of Indirect
Rule: Mysore 188 1- 19 -17 .. - of fer san ex c e I len t uccount cof
political and economic development::; In tho state from the
p~riod starting from rcstorution of the udministrution in
My::;ore to the Maharaja to attainment of Independence.
But, both the studieD have ncot touched upon the pcost-
1956 developments, aftar the reorganiZation of tha ::;tate and
inclusicon of t hE:
Madra::; -Karnataka and Coorg to old Nevertheles::;,
Monor huD elsewhere looked ot political developments in the
po::;t-re-organi::;ation phaso In a limited way with a specific
focus on the Devaruj Urs erU.
Similurly, work on Karnataka, SrinivDs llnd
Panini ::; ::;tudy on "Politic::; and Society In Karnataka",
Naturujs' work on Populist Politics, <Jnd Kohli 5 study con
20
politics of reforms h~ve ~ll dealt with political changes in
the Devaraj Ur~ era. As a consequence, even the~e ~tudies,
like those of M~nor, are limited in ~COp8 ~nd details of pre
Urs and post-Urs period~ are very ~ketchy.
Further, these studie~ h~ve ex~min8d the political
change~ during Ur~ era without taking into account the
environment
funct ioned.
in which both Urs ~nd his predecessors have
Es pe cia 1 1 y, with the erosion of the Congre~3
party from the lute 1960s ~nd the incre~sing concentrution of
power in the hand~ of Mrs. Gandhi, it would be impossible to
ignore the role of the centr~l leadership in the formulation
and implementation of policies at the state level.
In addition, there are two more studies that have
examined the political changes on a wider canvas. The work
of Mune Gowda has basic~lly examined the influence of caste
on Mysore politic3 from 1918-67; while Patil Okaly's work
focuses on the politics of one p~rty domin~nce by considering
the factionalism within the Congress party during the period
1952- 71.
These studie~ ~re ulso 1 imited in 'scope as they have
considered just one particular factor, caste or party
politics. Further, while explaining the influence of caste,
Hune Gowda's study makes sweeping statements without
substantiating them with specific instances, whereas Pat i 1
21
Okaly's study focuse~ mostly on individual political actors
and not on the institutions and environment within which
their roles are embedded. Hence, analysis of politics mainly
In terms of behaviour of individual political actor::; would
only skim the ~urface of the political process.
To the second category, belong the studies conducted by
Thimmaiah and Abdul Aziz. Narendar Pani, S V Deshpande, C B 38
Daml ~, <:Ind Thimma iah. The st ud ie~ of Thimma iah <:Ind Abd\ll
Aziz, Pani, Do::;hpando and Damle have e::;sentially focu::;ed on a
~pecific i~~ue - land reform mS<:ISUrES in Karnataka. Wh i 1 e
doing ::;0, the ::;tudie::; have attempted to explain the fa i 1 ure::;
of land reform~ and analYSEd such explanations in terms of
the politics of group intero::;t::; and dominant class tenancy.
Similarly, Thimmaiah's work on thE power pol it ics of
backward ca::;tes in Karnataka has also focussed on a specific
issue reservat ions. ThE ~tudy, by tracing the history of
reservat ions in the Gtate, provides an overview of different
backward class commissions and their re~ommendations.
Some studies have also focused on the sub-state
political processes: the Panchayat Raj system in Karnataka.
For instance, Prof Amal Ray and Jayalakshmi Kumpatla have, in
the wake of the January 19B7 Panchayat polls, examined tpe
social background of Zilla Parishad 39
president::; and its
implications for development. This Gtudy concludes that the
hold of the dominant castES In the governance of the Z ill a
ParishadG waG lik~ly to be enormous and unlikely to create
sub~tantial benefit~ for the rural poor.
Thus. the points that em~rge from the aforegoing
discussion are, fir:5tly.
analysed
that the studies conducted on
Ki:lrnati:lka have po lit i c a I changes prior to the
reorganisatio~ of states or by focussing in a limited way on
the specific time frame of Devaraj Urs era or by considering
influence of specific factors like caste or party politics or
have focused on the sub-state political process.
Secondly. the :5tudies have focused upon specific reform
measures like land reformE; and reE;ervations without
integrating them with the larger political procer>::;S5. In
of other it may be stated that both the categorieE;
~tudies are limited in their :5cope and hence, there appears
to prevail a need for undertaking a comprehensive study on
political changeG in Karnataka explaining reform
detail in the post-rc-organisation eri) and their
influences on reform measures undertaken.
issues ln
consequent
The prcE.'ent study attempts to fill ln this gap by
undertaking a full length analy::;is of political changes in
Karnataka from 1956-89 with the major focus on changing
patterns of political leadership and an added thrust on their
consequences in developmental policieE;.
Ob;ective~ of the Study
Keeping in view the g~p~ in the liternture, the
objective~ ~at for the ~tudy are a5 follow5:
1. To explore the changing pattern of political leadership in Karnataka
2. To ex~mine ~nd underst~nd the c~u~e~
for the shifts in political leader~hip
3. To ~ee whether the change~ in political leadership have also resulted in ~hift~ in reform mea~urcs
The key hypothe3is of thi3 3tudy is that the political
elite will initiate reform only when it perceives ~ need to
gain political legitimacy for maintenance in power. The
history of regime~ across the world has clearly demonstrated
that their fundamental positions are determined by the
desire to continue in power.
The study i. not intended to be the last word on .tate
politic& in India or evan politicB in Karnataka for that
.attar but aimB at understanding a crucial part of Indian
politicB.
Addition~lly, we mu~t emph~size here th~t we propose to
concentrate more on the theoretical underpinnings of the
politicol event~ rDther than on D graphic description 01 the
empirical reality. The aim, as noted earlier, is more to sort
24
out the cndu~ing f~om the t~ansient in the Ewcep of Ka~nataka
politics.
F~amewo~k of the Study
In an intereEting essay on the agrarian social
structure, Andre Beteilla contends that the problem of land
hunge~ has to be seen against the backdrop of the structure 40
of agrarian society in India. The agrarian structure in
India ha~ been characteri~ed by the existence of extremes of
social and economic inequality.
While in traditional Indian society, a~ in many other
traditional societies, inequalities not only existed but were
al~o accepted a~ legitimate: "extremes of social inequality
in the condltion of eXlstence were matched by an ldeology in 41
which they found their ~anction".
This kind of social system, which existed in the past in
India, ha~ been termed aG a harmonic social system i.e .• a
syEtem in which there is consistency between the existential
order and the normative order - inequalities that exist are
accepted aE legitimate. However in a disharmonic social
3y~tem, there iG a hiatu~ between the no~mative
the order of existence; while inequalities exist, 42
longer command acceptance a~ being legitimate.
25
order and
they no
If we accept the traditional order in India as harmonic,
then without doubt the present social order is disharmonic as
the inequaliti~s that widely prevail today no longer command
acceptance. In India, the nationali~t movement for
independence,
obligations,
ideology of
the Constitution, erosion of traditional
agitational politic~, increa~e in literacy,
every political party and the rhetoric of the
political leadership enjoining a commitment to broad
egalitarian values have ushered in a situation where existing
values no longer just are not accepted but al~o deprecated at
every step.
Of course, the alteration of the normative order was not
an overnight phenomenon but a process that was evolutionary
in nature and mediated by several factors listed above. The
hiatu~ between the existential order and the altered
normative order has inevitably accentuated the dissonance in
society.
over the la~t century and e~pecially since
Independence, therG haG been a growing belief that attempts
should be made to reduce and eliminate these inequalities.
But what stand~ out i~ the large scale failure of most
administrative measures to reduce the inequalities especially
at the lower level~ of hierarchy.
It is within this framework of a disharmonic social
3ystem and the need to bring the existential order in
26
conformity with the normative order that we focus just not on
land reform~ but also subsequently on the issue of protective
discrimination We proposE to examine to what
extent the normative rhetoric diverqes from existential
real ity and to r.Uqq8st expl21nat ions.
/:lethodolC2Q}'
The complexity in the study of any macro problem makes
it imporative for the researcher to adopt an eclectic method,
relying on varied data sourCEs. for a holistic understanding
of the phenomenon. Keeping in mind the same, we have
embarked on our study here tZlppinCT both primary Zlnd secondary
In additiC'n tLl r"Jlying on :,;"condary 50lJr(";ss
.3S News pa per!:. Articles. Books. Reports of varlous
comml:::;::Jlon::J, we have also reI ied on interviews across a
spectrum of people for a more exhaustive understanding of the
problem.
To understand the
dC'velopmental policie~
problem of consequences
that may accompany a change
in
in
the
the
I E'Cldershi p. we haVE felt the need to rE'ly on CaSE studies.
Ca::>s studie::> aro indi3psnsable tools for providing not only
depth and insight into the pollticZll phenomer.on being E;tudied
but a130 provide in thi::> in~tancG a comparative picture of
different reqlmes.
27
ThE' rolE' of SlJccessivE' E;tate qovEr nment s has
examined in two key policy area~ 1. Land Reforms and
or protective diE-crimination for the backward
<::las"e:3.
The importance of agriculture in the n~tional economy of
developinG countries cannot be over-emphasized. There is also
I,ttl€' doubt that land reform has been the key redistributive
in the developing countries.
Ad d i t ion a I I }' , the close relationship between a type of
land tenure and a specific power pattern in these countLies
has also been documented by political scientists. One social
scientist who has conducted an extensive survey of land
rEforms· In South !'.sia observes that "in thE rElations of men
and
SE'cur it VI 43
Asia."
The
to the land are embedded n,jar ions of po !-Ier.
\"ealth, opportunity, and st~ndjnq ln rural South
focus of our a na I ys i 5 has, how€'ver, been on
understanding land reform as a political process LatheL than
adoptlnG an Economic approach to the iS51.1€'. Far too often.
the political context of land reform has been ignored in the
rush to view land reforms as a numbers game in terms of
beneficiaries assisted, acres of land r.edistributed etc.
One pol itical analyst. who has undertaken an exhaustive
study of land reforms. plJtS forth the quest ion: "Hhy is land
reforms In India repeatedly urged by the federal governm6'nt.
frequently ~abotaged by tho ~tate~ and often evaded 44
In the
villages 7" C'l Eelr I y. the anSHer to this connundrum lies In
undEr-st3nding thf? political rroce~s of land r-eforms.
The ~n~lysis haE been undertaken within the overall
fr3meHork of 3 social system that is shifting from a harmonic
SOCIal sr5~Em to a dIsharmonic social system.
ThE st\Jdy IS divided Into SIX CHAPTERS including an
Introduction and an Overview Chapter.
ThE FI RST CHAPTER d i Ee·C UEe S es t hc f r <l mel'lor k of analysis.
ThE thr'J!:t ) S on examining the pol it iCed In the
developina countr-ie~. We would pr-im3rily look at the role of
prlmordied affinitiEs. institutionali::ation of o!'g<lni::ations
tho the p3rtie~ and the
cllcntel i£'·t pvttern of pol it i c s . This chapt ET
dolinGate~ the pur-po~e of the ~tudy. the methodology adopted
Dnd ExamInES thE gaps while reviEwing the current litervture
on the polltic~ of the state.
The SECOND CHAPTER focuses upon political changE' ln the
stutE' from 1956· 71. The E'mphusis is on understunding the
hegemony of the dominant ca~te~ - Lingayats and
VokkaliguS over the st~t8 political process. The social
base of the political leadership in the fifteen year period
is examined. The iE.sues of I and reforms and l:eSErvat ions elnd
moasures undertaken to implement them along with a
appraisul of their impuct have been studied.
Tho THIRD CHAPTER covers tho Devaraj Urs era
pol it ics from 1972-80.
considerod 35 an unlgue phase in Karnataka politics.
critical
in state
generally
14e ~hall
d")EII
sets
ut length on understanding the various factors that
apart thi:::; pGriod. Of part icular intere::;t, 1:; the rl:>e
Clf the non-dominunt CeU:;tes. decline in the power of
castes and the reform mGasurG~ undertaken by Urs.
dClminant
At the murgin. \-Ie shelll De examining Urs' rise tCl powel:,
th", ConQress spl it of 1'378, \Jr=:;' spl it with Mrs Gandhi and
defeat of llrs at the polls in 1980. \~oul d De
The FOURTH CHAPTER \·}otlld primarily focus on thE' decline
of the CC'nQrEs£', Gundu R<:\[l' 5 role in h<lsteninq it
:;tyle of funct ioning, and position of V3t:'lDU::;
me u S \.1 r eEJ.
30
by hlS
reform
ThE' focus of the FIFTH CHAPTER is on the Janata party's
victory at the polls 1n Karnataka and examine whether it
pr~:;aged a return to dominant ca:;te politic:;. The
controverE'Y behind the rCE'ervation pol icy and its subsequent
rejection, the :;chi:;m in the party, the sub:;equent split and
its defeat at the pollE' to the Congress have also Deen
examined.
The FINAL CHAPTER wotlld present an overviel~ of the study
and WeaVE thE findin05 together.
31
1.
2.
3.
Notes and References
Lucian PyE" Q.f. Politics,
"The Non-Western Pol it ical Vol 2, Spring, 1959.
Process",
Clifford, The: QueE;t Fl.lbl ish i ng
GeE'rtz, <cd), Old SocietieE; and New for Modernity in A!:;iu und Africa,
Company, New DelhL 1963. p.114.
Journal
StatE'E;: Amerind
Francine Frankel, India'::; Political Economy 1947-1977: The Gradual Revolution, Oxford Oniver3ity Pre::;::;. New De I h L 1'378, p. 20.
1. Cl iffo::-d, Greetz. ~-'-C;C~_ p.ll0.
5. Myron. Almond Area,
Weiner, "The Politics of South Asiu" and JamE'3 S Coleman, The Politic::; of
Princeton Univ'1r::;ity Pre::;::;. Princeton,
In Gabriel DE'veloping
1960.
6. Ibid. , p.121.
7. Cl ifford, Geertz, ~cit., p.139.
8. Lucian. Pyc. A!:;iun Power und Politics _ The Cultural Dimensio!1s of Authority, HClrvurd University Press. Cumbr idge. 1985, p.23.
9. Arend. Lijphurt, Democrucy in Plurul Societies: Compurutive Explorution, YalE' llnivE'rsity Press. Huven, 1977.
10. Myron Weiner and Sumuel l-Juntington. (ed). ap.cit., p.3E,.
11. Samuel P Societie::;,
Huntington, Political Order In Changing Yale Univer::; ity Pre::;::;, New Haven. 1'368. p.11.
12. Myron. Weiner und Samucl l-Juntington,(ed), QP.cit.. p.35.
13. Gabriol roliticE;
Almond. A Functional Approach to ComparativE' In GiJbricl Almond Clnd .lamE's Colcmun (E'd)
op.cit .. p.52.
11. Sumucl r HI.>nt ington. ClP~J::Lt'-L p. 5.
17.
Amu 1 Roy and Development and Fcdcrol System".
Myron \lieincr. op. cit. •
32
John Kincuid. "Politics. Second Generation Strain In
Publius. Vol 18. Na 2, Spring.
Economic India ::;
1988.
in Myron Weiner and Samuel Hunt ington.
18.
19.
Lucicln Pye, Asian Power Politics Dimensions of Authority op.cit., p.27.
The
John Duncan Powell, "Peasant Society and Politics", American Political Science Review No 2, June 1970, pp.412-413.
Cultur<ll
Clie:nte:list Vol L 14.
20. Samuel P Huntington, and Joan M Nelson, No Easy Choice: Political Participation in Developing Countries, Harvard University Press. Cambridge, 1976, p.51.
21. Francine Frankel, op.cit., p.6.
22. Samuel P Huntington. op.cit., p.402.
23. Ibid., p.405.
21.
25.
26.
27.
The issue: of defections in Indian Politics is well elaborated in Suba~h Kashyap, The Politics of Defection, National, Delhi. 1971.
Ibid. , p.112.
Lucian pye, Asian Powe:r Politics : The Cultural Dimensions of Authority. op.cit.. p.146.
Cl ifford on the European p.256.
Ge:ertz, "The Judging of Au~e~5ment of RGgime~
cTournal of Sociology,
Irma Adelman. Social Equity
Cynthi<l Morris, in Developing
tJniver~ity Pre~s. Stanford. 1973,
Nations: in the Vol 28.
Some New No.
Comments States", 2, 1977
Economic Growth and Countries, Stanford
p.189.
28. Ibid., p. 201.
29. BabulOlI FOldiOl, StOlte Pol it ics in India, Vol 1, Radiant Publ i:ihers, New Delhi. p.2.
30. Myron Weiner, (cd) StOlts Politics in India, Princeton tJnive:ruity Press. Ncw JersEY, 1968, p.1.
31. Jame~ Manor, Political Change in an Indian State: My~ore 1917-1955, Manohar Book Service, New Delhi. 1977. p.1.
32. Ibid.,. p.22.
33.
31.
M N Srinivos. "The Dominant Caste in ROlmpura", Anthropol~::;t. 6 L 1959 p.4.
B S Parcsh Kumar. ~ SociologicOlI Study of /o!o_l}o~tic Qrder. Unpublished Ph.D Thesis. tJniverE;ity. Bonqolore, 1976, p.16
33
Americ<ln
Veerosuiva Bungalore
35. James Manor, Political Change in ~ Indian State: Mysore 1917-1955, op.cit." p.31.
36. James Manor, "structural Changes in Karnataka Politics", EPW, Vol 12, No. 44, October, 29, 1977, p.1865.
37. James Manor, Political Change in an Indian State Mysore 1917-1955, op.cit.,
• !-
James Manor, "Structural Changes in Karnataka Politics", op.cit.,
James Manor, "Pragmatic Progressive Politics: The Case of Devaraj Uro", EPW, Vol 15, No. 5-6, February, 1980.
in Annual
Regional Number,
Bjorn, Hettne, The Political Economy of :Mysore 1881-1947, Curzon Press, London,
Indirect 1978.
Rule
R K Hebsur, "Karnataka", Seminar, No 278, August, 1978.
M N Srinivas and M N Panini, "Pol itics and Karnataka", EPW, Vol 19, No.2, January 14,
Society 1984.
in
V K Natraj and Lalitha Natraj, "Limits Devaraj UrI; and Karnataka Politico", EPW, 37, September 11, 1982.
of Vol
Popul ism: 17, No.
Lalitha Natraj, "Twists and Turns of CaDte Politics", EPW, VoIla, January 29, 1963.
V K Natraj, "Backward Classes and Minorities in Karnataka Politico" in Ramashray Roy and Richard Sisson, (ed) Diversity and Dominance in Indian Politics: Vol f-, Sage Publ icat ions, New Delhi, 1990.
Atul Kohli, State and Poverty in India: The Politics of R~form, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1987.
K S Mune Gowda, "The Influence of Caste in Mysore Politics" in Iqbal Narain,<ed), State Politics in India, Meenakohi Publ icationo, Meerut. 1967.
Pat iI, Okal y, B B, .. Karnataka: Poll tics of One Dominance", in Iqbal Narain, State Politics in Meenakshi Prakoshan, Meerut, 1957.
Pllrt y India,
38. 0 Thimmaiah and Abdul Aziz, The folttical economy of Land Reform, Ashish Publishing House, New Delhi, 1984.
Narender Pani, Reforms to Pre-empt Leqislat ion in Karnataka, Concept, 1983.
31
Change: Land
S V Deshpande, AdminisJer,Lr:!g !o-_a_l}~ Reforms 12 ra~g S_tu_d-1' 'I'~o I.:,-istr_lcts, llnpubl ished University of Mysore, 1'388.
inK_a. r n_ a.! ii_~_a : _ Ph. D Thesis,
C B Damle, "Land Reform Legislation in Karnataka: of SUCCE'SS", EPW, Vol 2'1, No 33, AUgllst 19, 1989.
Myth
G ThimmiliiJh, POI:I[CI;_ Politt£~_ iJnd BilCk1"lilrd Ct",-o;ses ill Karniltaka, SagE',
Soc) a I Just i-,,-~ NEI1 DE'lhi. 1993.
39. Mill RiJY Clnd ,1ayCllakshmj Kump<ltla, "CClste <lnd ZilliJ Par ishad Elect ions in Karnataka", EPW, Jul y 25. 1987.
40. Andre Betsille. Studies in Agrarian Social Stru~tur~, Oxford University Press, New Delhi. 1974, pp.1'34-200.
'11. lbj~. __ ,_ pp. 194-200.
42. Ibid., pp.194-200.
'13. Ron<lld HE'rring, Land to thE TillEr: Econo~y of ll.griJr~iln RElgrms jn South University Press, New DElhi. 1986. p.l.
ThE Pol it iC<ll India, Oxford
44. Hung Chao Tai. Land Reform and Politics' A Comparative Analysis. University Of Cal ifornia Press. Berkely. 1974, p.6.
IS E C lIBRAfH'· 8ANGALORE 35 Acc. NoYJ:LElO3.. ____ _
CHAPTER - II
POLITICAL HEGEMONY OF DOMINANT CASTES: PRB-DEVARAJ ORB ~
Liko In any othor Indian ~tato. po lIt I cal powor In
K~rn~t~ka has come to be vested in the h~nd~ of cert~ln
~oction~ of 30cioty. In Karnataka. tho~o ~2Ct ion~ thQ
Vokkaligas and Linguyats - huve owed their preponderance In
the political in~titution~ to a strong ba~e In tho rural
hinterlands of the state.
These communities ure the largest lund-ownIng sectlons
of tho ~tato. A::, tho roport of tho ~tato' G Third Backward
Classes Commission has pointed out. the two communities l-Icre
not only tho political ma~tor::; but alGa tho Gconomic ma~tor~
1 of rural Karnataka.
The emergence of the non-Br~hmin movement in the early
part of thiG contury and the Gub~oquont a330eiation of th2
dominant c~stec with the Congress p~rty paved the way for
thoir entry into tho formal political inGtitution~ of the 2
state. Independence served to institution~l iZE the heGcmony
of thcGO caGtoG in tho formal political ~tructure~ of tho
st ute. The preponderunce of theSE castes over polltlcal
in~titution~ continuod till 1972. Thoroforo. thoro l~ a neGd
to understDnd this long-stondlnQ hegemony of the domin~nt
castOG OVGr tho Gtato'G political inGtltutlOnG.
36
1he present chDpter, whil~ Dttcmpting to underctDnd the
;:;amc:, al~o GxaminG~ it~ implication~ for reform me3~ure~
the period betwEen 1956 to 1972. The chuptcr is divlded
four ~Gction~ including 3 conclu~ion.
In
into
The first section delincate~ thc naturE of po lit i cuI
leadGr~hip in the pre-Devaraj Ur~ ora by focu3ing on the
social ba~e of thc mcmber~hip of the legislative assembly and
3hift3 ln apex-lovel political leader3hip within the Congre33
party. The proce~s through which the dominunt custcs cume to
exerci38 hegemonic control over the political in~titution~ ln
the ~tute hus been exumined in the second section.
The third 3ection look~ at the implication3 of dominant
hegemony on reform mE'u5Ure~ ln the stute.
di3cU~3ion on reform wi 11 fOCU3 on land reform3
ThE
and
rescrV<lt ions. While doing so, the section ul~o <lttempts to
GXamlnG whether any other factor ha3 had a bearing upon
reform mC<lsurcs. Thc fourth ~ection conclude~ the discu~sion
by way of drawing 30me inforenc83.
Political Hegemony of Dominant Castes
In an ideal 3ituation, the political leader~hip would be
<l highly reprcscnt<ltive one; but ide<ll situ<lt ions <lre
con3plCUOU3 by their ab3snce, a3 ha3 been ob3erved ln the
pre-Dcvuruj Urs cr<l, in thE' ",orld of rC<lI politik.
37
In other wordsl politicZlI IS seldom
reprosontative of all groups in the society. "They never
do", note!:: DZlhl while probinq the i~~ue of r£pre~entZltiveness 3
of political leadership or parliaments. Political theory has
hcl d thZlt,
middle class and professional occupations are numerically
ovcr-rcpre~ented while blue coll~r occupZltion~ Zlnd farmer~
1 are numorically undor-roprosontod.
It has been Zlrgued thvt zl broudening of the suffr:tge,
together with political compotition maKGs legislativG bodies
In pvrticulZlr Zlnd politicLll lE'vder~hip In
considerably loss unrepresentativo in the statistical senSG.
However, the postulZlte i)ppeZlr~ to hZlve been turned on
it:; head In a country 1 ike India, where the strength of
professionul groups liKe DdvocZltcs hZls been continuously
declining In legislative bodios including in parliament whilo
thut of dominZlnt cu~te aqrlculturists hus been steZldily
lncroas 1 ng.
Thc~eforc, following Duhl's mode I, the regimeE in
Karnataka durlng the perIod 1956-71 can be characterized as
Inclusive hegemonies'; I.E' •• while suffrvge 15 universZll,
the prlnclpal contenders for powor aro drawn from a narrow
bi) S c.
38
Tr~dition~1 pCD~~nt ~oclctle~ h~ve ~ hiGh propensIty for ~
inequality, hierarchy and political hegemony. In a
society, L)nd i~ thc princlpol source of I ivel ihood for
million3 who live off the land. As a re3ul L power flow::;
from the po~~es~ion of l~nd. This point ha~ Decn well noted
by a ho~t of ~ocial 3cienti~t3.
In un ugr~ri~n ~ociety, possession of lund or right to
the produce of the land i~ the principal ~ource of ~tatu~,
Income ~nd we~lth, und incqu~lity in l~nd IS eq1.liv~lE'nt to
inequality In di~tribution of political re~ource3 1. 8. ~ In
agrwri~n societies, inequolitie~ ~re cumul~tivE' ond not
di~per~od.
Dahl's Model of the Dynamics of Peasant Society
Extreme inequalitie~ Extreme inequalitie~ Heqemonic in distribution of -----;k~n politicwl rE'50urces~----l>""PoiiticiJl land, in~trument:> of "" coercion. Reinforced ~~ by norm:; f3vouring ~ inequalities of cw~t8, centrully e3tate or cia:>:; ~ocial order
Source: Robert, Duhl, Polyarchy: Purticiwption Oppo~ition, Ywle University PrEE;s, New H~ven,
p.56.
and 197 ),
It i~ In thi~ context thot we would liKe to tuKe 0 brief
look at tho political hegemony of tho dominant ca3tG~ in
KClrnotoko: 1956- 1972. l'lt the outset. it moy be cs~cntiol to
dofine political hegemony. By political hegemony, WG moan
39
the prcponder~nt control over the political in~titution~ of
the ::;tate.
N~t ure of Pol it iC<ll Le<lder~h~ in Pre-Dev<lr<lj l1r~ ErOl
As h<l~ <llre<ldy been noted, the political leadership In
the ::;tate In thi::; pha~G wa~ under the control of the
Lingay~t~ ~nd Vokk~ligOlS. In order to aSEess the extent of
control, an attempt is made here to examine the social base
of pol it iCe11 le<lderEhip in the e;tOlte, both at intermediate
and apex levC31~.
SociOll B0l5e of PoliticOll LEader~hip
The e;oci<ll b<l~e of the politic<ll lCOldere;hip ie;
c::;::;sntially examined in term::; of the caste and occupational
background of the leOlder~.
Table 2.1: Caste-wise membership of the Legislative Assembly, 1957, 1962 and 1967
1957 C~[;tc
Total Asl:;cmbl y Strength
Lingayat 68 VokkJlig~ 12 Othar::; 87 Not Known 7
Totill 201
Congo E3trength
53 25 51
1
116
1962
Total Asl:;embl y Strength
61 50 82 15
208
Congo Strength
16 23 57 10
136
1967
Total Congo Assembly Strength Strength
81 15 86
1
216
51 23 19
3
126
SOl)rcc: Di::;cul:;[;ion5 with middle-level pilrty workEr~
10
k. Table 2.1 points out. thE dominant COlst£S OlccountEd for:
more than 55 per cent of the total ~trength of all the throE'
assembli£5 during this p£riod. Th£ rEpresentation of dominant
C33tos reached it3 acmo in the 1967 a3~ombly eloction~ whon
they account£d for 126 of the 216 membErs.
Even within the Congre~~, the proportion of thG~e
Cat;tes it; slightly more than 55 per cent. the
proportion of the dominant ca~t83 in the Congre~3 wa3 highe~t
in the 1967 <Jsscmbl y. hmong the dominant castes, thE'
proportion of Lingayat3 both in the total 3trength of the
hus£mbly and in the Congress party is higher than that of the
Voldca 1 iga~.
Table
Occupation
2. 2: Occupation-wise Assembly, 1957,
Membership of 1962 and 1967
Total Il.ssembly :;trongth
1957
Congo Strength
Total Il.ssembl y Strength
1962
Congo Strength
the Legislative
1967
Total Congo Il.ssembly Strength Strength
-----------------------------------------------------------------Agriculture 55
Othor Occupiltion118
Totill 201
35
110
115
75 11
133 95
208 136
Source: Government of Mysore, Who's Who, 1962, 1967.
101 56
105 70
206 126
Bungalorc, 1957,
With regard to the occupiltionul buckground, as Table 2.2
revoal:;, proportion of a:;::;embly member:; citing
1 1
-,
:>qriculturc Ll~ their Occupution i~ ~ub~tLlntiul. This i~ tn.1e::
aven In the C3~G of thG CongrG~~ party. ThG proportion of
ugriculturi~ts rcuched its peuk in 1367, both in the:: usscmbly
and in tho CongrG~~ party. Thi~ appoar~ to be in I ine with
the genervl trend in IndiD observed from the first purlivmcnt 7
to the ninth parliament.
The other occupations include professions like law,
journali~m, teaching and bu~ino~~. It ha~ boen doduced In
the course of discus~ions with p<lrty worke::rs thut se::ver<ll of
tho~o who li~ted othor occupation~ al~o pO~~o~~Qd Iinkago~ to
ugriculturc through lund ownership.
In accordance with the pattern of repre~entation in the
assembl y, the:: cLlbinet and the:: chief ministers huve largely
soma from tha dominant castG~ in general and Lingayat~ In
purt i cuI OJr.
Table 2.3: Caste Composition of Karnataka Cabinets
Custe 1956 1358 1362 1367 ----------------------------------------------------------LinguYilts 1 ( 33't) 1 ( 10't) 1 ( 27't) 5 ( 36't) Vokkaliga~ 3 ( 25't) 3 ( 301b) 1 ( 27't) 3 ( 21 't) Bruhmin 1 B 't) 1 ( 10't) 2 ( 13 't) 2 ( 11't) Scheduled C;)~ta 1 ( 8 't) 1 ( 10't) 1 ( 7 Ib) 1 ( 7 't) Othen; 3 ( 25't) 1 ( 10't) 1 ( 27't) 3 (21't)
Total 12 ( 100't) 10 ( 100't) 15 ( lOO't) 11 ( 100't)
SOllrce: Diccusr:;ions with middlc-le::vcl p:>rty workcrr:; Llnd K S Muno Gowda, "Tho Influonco of Ca~to in MYGoro Pol it icr:;", in IqbLll NurLlin (Ed), Sipic Politic!; in India, MGGn<Jk::;hi Prak<J::;han, MGGrut. 1967
12
>.
dominatGd by mGmbGr~ of thG dominant ca~t~~ 3cro~~ th3
~s~cmblict from 1956 to 1967. The: LinO<1y<1ts constitute:d il
maJor chunk of all th2 cabinet~ folloWGd by thG Vokkaliga~.
Furthe:r, in the:
con~titution of cabinGt~. the dominant ca3te mGmber~ have
retDined key portfolios like Revenue. FinDnce <1nd Home.
All the chief mini3ter3 in thi3 pha3e Ni jal ingappa.
K<lnthi.
Lingayat communi ty. Ni ial ingappa wa3 chief mini:;ter on four
OCCDE-IOnS - on the: e:ve of the: StDte:'S inte:gration in 1956, In
1957. 1962 and 1967 - while the re:;t served a~ chief
ministers for short durations.
Though the: chie:f ministe:rship re:ste:d with the LingDyat
commun i t y. tho political I Gader~h i P, howGver.
chDnges within the CongroslJ pDrty. While sdElction of the;
chi~f mini3ter wa~ largely smooth following an Glection.
occasionDlly fDctionDI strife within the: pDrty led to chDnge
In the chief mini~tGr.
F0r inst<1nce. factional strIfe: contributed to the: lJhifts
In apex-level political leader~hip In the :;tate when
NijDllngDPPo. Wo.S the: chie;f mini5te;r Dfte:r re-e;le:ction in the
1957 aJ~embly election:3.
13
Even at the time of his election, there had been
opposition by a section of Congressmen. However, a special
committee composed of three Pr~desh Conqress Committee
Presidents had prevailed upon the Congressmen to accept the
choice of Nijulinguppu u~ the chief minister.
However, by M;uch 1958, the dissidents among the
Congre~s legi~l~tors 5welled to more th~n 100 members.
signature campaign was launched to remove Niialingappa as the
chief mini5ter.
Seriou~ differencc5 ul50 erupted between the chief
minister and the Pradesh Congress president S. Chenna iah.
These differences hud their origins in the election of the
Pradesh Congress president.
Rcucting to the signature c~mp~iqn to remove him,
NIjalingappa said: "I hear signatures are being collected. I
do not know what the matter is and what they huve ullegcd
against me, my government or my colleagues. We are doing our
It i5 difficult to satisfy people who are not willing
to bo satisfied. That is my react ion. Office has never
at tracted me. Peoplc wanted me. I wus elected. If they do
not want me, I am not v~ry part icular to st ick on. a
left to the membors.··
It lS
Effort5 were alGo made by thc Congress High Commund to
avert a cr151S. Tho High Command expressed disapproval of
14
thE c~mpaign againr;t the chief minister and ~r;ked the
dissidents to :;top their activities in the interest of the
organiE;at ion. Further, the High Comm~nd also made it
that it wa:; not in favour of a change ln leadership and
declinEd to permit a motion of no-confidence against the
chief mini:::;ter.
The dissidence Congressmen were, however, inflexible and
pursued with vigour their movement to ou:;t the chief
minir;ter. There wau little that Nijalingappa could do in the
face of :;uch oppo:;ition from hi:; own partymen to di:;pel tho
dark clouds that hung over his government.
Finally, tho irreconcilable difference:::; led to
Nijalingappa r;tepping down uS the chief ministEr on May 8,
1958. B D Jatti, elected ~~ the a:;:::;embly from Jamkhandi
conr;tituency of Bijapur dlstrict of the state, wa5 then
elected a:; the new leader of the Congre:::;:::; legi:;lature party.
CleLlrly, factionalism within the Congress dur ing this
time wa:; not re:::;tricted ju:;t to Mysore (Karnataka). It had
k:, one pol it i czll obSErver Llptly
:;ummGd up the factionalism bedevilling tha Congre:;:;: "It
r;ccm5 to bc u feature of leGislativE wings of the pLlrty in
all the :;tates where tho ConqroGs rule:; that within tho party
It i5 not the leader but somebody else who commands u better
following, perhap:::; becauGr: mambers arc imbued with a
15
self ~erving spirit .:Jnd coo ~,t quickly dIsgruntled SInce :dl
cannot got an oqual ~haro of tho fi~ho~ and loavo~ of office 9
Thus it m.:JY be stated that the politicul leadership In
tho pro-Devaraj Ur::; ora, by and large. \~3::; undor tho control
of the dominant castes Lingayats In
particular. Their stranglehold over tho koy loador::;hip
po~itions W.:JS so pronounced that it may be necessary to
examine tho factor::; that facilitatod such a situation. In the
following p.:Jges, we shall make an attempt to understand the
mechanic::; of their control.
Mechanics of Control
Land --
In most devcloping societies, where substantial parts of
tho population I ivo in rural aroas. land con::;tituto::; tho main
source of livelihood, and power flow~ from the owner~hip of
land. Numorou::; ::;tudio::; havCl al::;o ::;hown that tho pooro::;t
countries arc also the countrie~ where the puttern of lund
owner::;hip i::; mo::;t inegal itarian.
The inequitable dietribution IS. notwithstanding the
attompt::; at redi::;tribution of land In tho::;e countrio~. Land
in Karnataka i~ principally ownEd by theSE two communitie~
Vokkaliga~ and Lingayat~. Thi::; ha::; boen notod by varl0U~
obeervcrc. l',r, it has becn po i nt cd out, the Vokka I i gal; and
16
LingDYDts constitute 27 ~ of the populDtion. but own most of 10
the cultivable land.
Further. these communities dominDted not only the rurDI
~ceno but al~o tho~o of hou~8hold~ owning land over and abov8 11
ten DCrCIJ. SeverDI mlcro level studiES conducted in
Karnataka havo al~o butro~~od thi~ point and highlightod tho
substDntiDl percentDgc of IDnd by the two 12
communitis::;.
The: IDndowning communitics appcDr to Deeount for D
::;ubstantial proport:on of tho logi::;lative a::;::;ombly. Though.
dDtD on IDndowncrship pattern is not DVDilDble, this point
galn::; erodibility from tho data on occupational background of
thc Dsscmbly mcmbers. It mDy be rElcvDnt to reiterDte that
the Vokkaliga~ and tho Lingayate are tho malor land owning
communities in the ~tDte.
It through thEir control over land, thOlt thE two
c:Jmmunitio::; are ablo to mobilize oxten::;ive ::;upport at the
villDgc lcvel through D web of pDtron-elient tie~, both with
tho poor from othor ca::;to5 and tho 10::;::; affluent from thGir
own CD!jtc~. Di~cu!jsion with somc 18gi~IDtor!j rEve:DI thDt thE
moan::; of mobilizing vote~ from the backward ca::;te::; run::; from 13
throat::; to phy::;ical injury in tho ca::;a of non-complianeo.
17
The poorer ~~ction~ from thc domlnant cust~~ 2l:rE 2150
linked to the landed ellte through prImordial affiliation 3nd
m:>tcri:>l dEpendence. Di~cussinq the same point. FrDnclne
Frankel ha~ noted that the largest landowners amono the
locally dominant ca~te, no lcs~ thun leading members of the
elite C3stB~. wielded significant power over the maJority of
the poor pCusantry by actino D~ patrons to provide minimal
economlc sscurity and protection to land poor families in
return for per~onal deference and loyalty in ~ituation~ of 14
social rivalry or factional disputes.
The introduction of electoral politic~ :>gainst this
backdrop h3s reinforced th~ strategic position of the
dominunt landowning caster; by enlarging their role
inte:rmGdiaries in rGlationships betwoon thG village: and
outside authoritie~.
Numerical Strength
The numErical strength of thE dominant castes who
together account for about 27 per cent of the state s
population also contributed to their heqEmony over the
po lit i c a I institutlons. Micro lovel studies
btlt t rcssed this po i nt. It hus been noted by H D
Lakshmi Narayan that tho gre3tor numbGr~ of candidates from
domlnant Vokkuliqa custc chows that numerIcal strength ~eem~
15 to play an important rolo in achieving political power.
18
In :oj.jition. the better resource p05:tion of the
dominant On tho
ot her hondo ~s 0 minorIty community legisl~tor pointed out.
the poorer ca~to~ and the minoritie~ have manpower but thGy }to
cannot mobilize and u~e thoir ~trength. Another factor
tovour of the domlnont costes was their sp~tial conccntrction
unlike the ~cheduled caste~ who are dispersed acr033 the
Conqres~ Party
The Congn::ss party has also been instrumental In
enabling the dominant ca~to~ to maintain their hold over the
5 tat e po lit i c s .
The Congrcss party at its inception was a pert y
dominated by a small we~tGrn educated elite mostly from tho
Brahmin community. Subsequent I y. 35 3 result of the advent
of Mahatma Gandhi on tho political hor izon. the party ;./a3
able to reach out and become a nation-bUilding party. But
even durIng thi3 nat ional ist phase. the party was never
reJlly radic:ll in its intent.
The post IndependEnce era 53W the Congress shedding
any 319ns of radicalism and becomIng the party of status quo.
The part y In its efforts to penetrate civil society and
mobIl iZQ 3upporL increasingly beQan to draw upon the
support of dominant caetes in different parts of the nation.
The Congrcs~ party m~sterEd the ~rt of political
accommodation to its hiahest deares. It succeeded by adapting
5tructur~~ c~stc ~ssoci~tions
cooperatives. and ~ub-~tate political institution~ u~lng
building blocks closest ~t h~nd. Within e3ch
rag Ion. thoy recruited from amonq tho~o who wero u~u3l1y
ICDding members of the domin3nt l~ndowning c~stcs.
Tho ~ituation In Karnataka morely paralleled the
phenomenon th~t existed elsewhere. hE it h~s been noted by
Manor, the recruitment of prominent momboro of tho dominant
c~stes such DS Sidd~ling3YYD ~nd Nij~lingDppD opened the W3Y
for the Congre~~ to develop ~upport among the landed elite in
the pre-Independence erD. Of the seVEn most prominent leaders
between 1937 and 1942.
five and tho Brahmin~ two.
the dominant caGte~ account ad for 17
This pattern of Conqress relionce on the dominant castes
In Karnataka h3~ al~o boon boen diJcu~Jod by Weiner. In hi~
study of the Congress party in Bclqaum cistrict. he has noted
that noarly half of tho active momber~hip como~ from the
dominant caste in the distrIct - Linoayats. Further.
Docial background of tho Belqaum party office bearor~ reveal~
the entrenched position of thE Lingayct at various levels of
the party hIerarchy; di~trict Conqro~~ CommitteD oxocutivOG. 18
mandaI preGldent~. taluk pro~ldontG. and lQgi~lator~.
Th~ re~sons for th~ continuEd dependence of the Conar~ss
on the dominant ca3te 3ppear~ to b~ two fold:
orauni=~tionDl nDture of the purty Dnd the Dbs~nce of ~trong
Opp03 it ion. The Indian party 3y3tem ha3 been characterized
~s ~ predomin~nt p~rty system.
Pr~domin3nt Party SY3tGm
A pr~dominDnt
pluralism i.e., partio3 other than tho major onG p033G33 a 19
logal and legitimate exi3tGnce. The mInor partio3 are
independent vntagonists of th~ pr~dominvnt pvrty. However,
the major party continue3 to win over a period time, an
vbsolute m~jority of scvts in parliament or the legislvtive
a3~embl y.
In v prcdominvnt pvrty system, th~ emphvsis is not on
the number of partie~, but rather on the di3tribution of
power among the parties. ThE k~y feature of thE predominant
party i3 the exi~tence of oppo3ition parties - one or more
which vctually compete for power. Thouah competition is real
unlike 1n the ca~G of hegemonic party ~y3tGm~, the rna jor
p<".rty has D monopol ist ic permvnEnr:T 1n off icE'.
Thi3 i::; domon~tratod in the ca~G of tho party ~y~tGm in
KDrnDtaka where the Congress not only cnioycd v monopoly over
office but al30 won a substantial percentage of ::;eat::; in the
elections to thE assemblies. This is IndicDted In Tvble 2.1.
51
T5ble 2.4: Percentage of Seats Won by Congress and Opposition Parties in Various Elections
Yoar Conoro::;::; 0ppo:::;itlon
1957 71.56 28.11
1962 65.38
1'367 58.33 11. 67
SOUrco: Govornmont of My:::;oro. Logi:::;lativo Aw:::;ombly Record:::;. Bung,llore. 1957. 1962. 1967 .
• "-'::; Tabl0 2.1 indic3to:::;, tho hiatu:::; botwoGn tho Congro:::;:::;
:>nd opposition is substontiol in terms of number of CCuts
\.Jon.
While there 1 [: equol ity of opportunity between the
tho eOngro:::;:::; Jnd the oppo:::;ition p3rtio:::; In
there ie :> dlsporlty of re~ource~ betHeen the
P:Ht Y In powar and thc partlc:::; out of power ~h3t Jr: VISIng
to ~ccomc qovcrninq portlcs. In f:>cL 1 t Ie :>rgucd th:>t In
prodomlnant p3rty :::;y:::;tom:::;. tho di:::;parity in ro:::;ourco:::; botwoon
the purty in power und the portiei out of powcr orc greoter 20
than in othor pluLlli:::;tic ::;y:::;tom::;.
Predomlnont port ics hove come into beinG mostly os
of tho high dogrce of fragmontation of 311 tho othGr
purt I E:[; In the the mojor po r t y.
Congro:::;:::; In IndIan and Karnataka politIC:::;.
52
The opposition p~rtieE in !ndi~ in gEner~1 ~nd K~r~~t~k~
In particular have had no Qovernm8ntal relevance durina thi~
~ p~rty m~y bE suld to hOVE govcrnmEnt~l
only if it actually govern~, enter~ a government ~r ~upport3
it o vote of confidence by giving .+ 1 _ m<ljority
nCCG33ary for tho government to continue or tJke up the
offic£.
Both ot the centre ond ot the ~tote lEvel~. including in
Karnataka, tho pre~8nco of a prodominant party ~y~tGm and tho
of other p~rt ic~ with government~l relevonce
contributod and reinforced the political heaemony of the
dominont ond gave the Congress littlE reuson to
di~turb the ::;tatu3 quo.
This. sittlvtion hO~IEver. hvs I-litne5sed 50me :-hanges with
the Congress losing support in the late 1 '360::; In ::;everal
stvtes vnd the split in thE Congress in 1969. This appvrent
trend of a ::;hift away from tho predominant p3rty sy::;tem led
to the Conqre,,!> looking towards new bvses of support. In the
r:ontoxt of Karnataka. thoir natural alliG~ were the non-
dominont This point huG been discussed
8xten::;ivoly ol~8wh6re in a different chapter.
Thuc. the ottitude of the Congress both towvrds the
reform and its lack of representativene::;::;. can also be
'/is1Jvlized 015 a function of the nature of the party system
that existed in the ::;tate.
53
Now HE move on to EXDmine the
particular pattern of political leadership on
The folloHing SEction is Dn Dttempt Dt the SDms.
The ~ection initially discusses the Issue of land reform and
~ubsequently focuses on reservations.
Implications for Land Reforms
ThE iSSUE of IDnd rEforms Dssume5 particulDr salience in
countries wherG a substantial section of thG labour forcG l~
engaged in agriculture.
modernizing countriGs.
This is especi~lly so in most of thE
It 15 therefore for thiS rEDson that land reforms· has
been perceived not to jUst result 1n improvement 1n the
economic \-lEIl being of thE peasant. but involVES also a
fundamental redi~tribution of power and status and a
the bDsic social relationships which hDd
prev10usly existed between landlord and peasant.
In the context of agrarian societies like India where
for cent 1JriG5 land ha~ served as the prinCiple source of
livElihood In the rurDI hinter-Iond. inE'quDlities have not
cumul at iva. pr Ivi IGqG, and
property arc combined In the SLime Individuals and the
socially underpriviloged are al::;o Gconomically and
pe,jitically deprived.
51
it is not surprlslnq th:.: ],'nd reforms
hiqh salience? ln India. IIher:' not .~:-.ly has
in~qua]ities in thE owners:nr of lClnd but <:1£,,0 0 S'ubstontlal
agricultural labour force?
Land reforms c~n bE undErt~ken with two bDsic intEnts:
to help strenqthen a new political order and to 3afsquard an
existing regimE:'.
However, the role of the political elite is cn.1cial to
the implementation of the land reform3 progrClmme:;. Reform,
for th8 pol it ical elite, is only of lnstrumentul value.
Hence, the proponent::; of r2form, 1.8., thG political elite,
wi 1 1 initiutc lund reform only in so fvr as it tCllliE's ",ith
thGir other goa13.
The pol it iCul el ites' dominJnt conCErn on Clny reform lS
how it3 :;tand ~Iill serve It::; own intere:;t, 1.e. the right to
continue to rule. If the bJlance of utilities 8nd li8bilities
are perceived to be in favour of reform, it will lnitiats
rEform, emph8sizinq to the public its devotion to the reasClnt
.'81fare a5 a m~Jor motivating factor:. Hc""ev8r, if the elite
percEives the balanCE to bE D08inst reform, it wi 1 1 not
initiate it not",ithstanding the Justification for reform and 21
even it3 sympathy for the pea3ant.
55
It has also been arqued that land reform throuqh
democtatic constitutional means. 15 a long frustratinq and
often impossible task as elected parI iaments are usually
dominated by land-owning intere~t~ which appears to be the
cas~ eVEn in the context of Karnataka.
Before proceed ina upon an exhaustive examination of the
courSE of lund reforms in K<Jrnutuka. it would be fruitful to
spend some time on obtainina a clear view of the concept of
land reforms. While there is a general agreement among
scholars of various hues that land reforms IS the most
meaningful und the most difficult - of reforms for
modernizing government. there exists considerable variation
In the way the concept hus been looked at by varIous
scholars.
forceful
While some scholars have looked at it
taking away of property from one group of 22
as the
people
and giving It to another • to others land reform comprises
the compulsory take over of land by the state from the large
land-ownErs. with partiul compensation; and thE furming of
that land in such a way so as to spread the benefits of 23
the
man-land relationship more widely than before.
To Wolf Lade]insky. reforms compriSE
distributIon of land amonQ "he landlsss. security of tenure.
fuir m~thodEi of cultiv<Jtion through
technological improvements. adequate credit, cooperative
miJrkctlna and other measures. However, Ladejinsky stresses
56
th~t the crucl~l
24 landles:.
IS~UE is th~t of providIng l~nd to the
On the other h~nd. P C Jo~hi. In his comprehensive work
on land reforms In India. also offers a comprehensive
definition when he identifies all governmental
governmental attempts to alter the agrarian 25
and non-
structure
dire~ as l~nd reforms. Land reforms in this study refers
to government progrDmme~ th~t ~eek to rEstructure equitably
and rationally a defectivo land tenure system by compulsory.
Dnd dr~stic mean~.
Following the examination of the variety of :n
which land reforms has been conceptualized, we shall proceed
to examIne the course of lond reforms in K~rnatak~ in the
pre-DGvaraj Ors era.
Lond Reforms in Karn~t~k~: 1956-72
The reorganlz~tion of K~rn~t~ka in 1956 led to the
Integration of thE Bombay-Karnatak. Hydorabad-Karnatak. Coorg
and Madras Karnatak regionu with Old Hysore. ht the time of
reorganlzat ion. dIfferent 13nd legislations prevailed in the
different regIons.
For i nst ance. on the iusue of tenancy. Coorg hvd no
legislation at a 1 I Hh i 1 e the Bombay-Karnatak and the
Hydcrabad-Karnatak reglonu had comprehensive legislations
In old Mysore and Madras-Karnatak regions. only ~h2
qu~ntum of rent and regulation of termination of tenancies
was covered by the legislation. Hence there arose
necessity to adopt a uniform land reform legislation for the
to/hole state.
Therefore. the Nijalingappa government In May 1957
appointed a committee under the chairmanship of B D Jatti,
called ThE Mysore Tenancy and Agricultural Land Law5
Committee. The basic purpose of the committee was to examine
whether it was feasible to have a common tenancy law and also
look into related issues lik~ fixity and security of ten1Jre.
right of rEsumption of land by landlords for personal
C 'J I t i vat ion, right of p1Jrchase by tenants and payment of
compensation to landlords, fixing the ceiling limit and
extent of basic, economic and family holdings, prohibition of
ownership by non-aqrlc1Jlturists, etc.
The report of this committee was presented in September
1957. After OJ caref1Jl study by a 10lnt select committee of
both the h01Jses, a bill ~as passed on the basis of •
this
report in 1961. Though it subsequently became law on March
S, 1962 after the presidential assent. its implementation wa:;
de13yed till October 2.191'.5. '3 ha 1 1 now examIne the
prfJ'J1310ns of the 1961 act which extended to the whole of
58
KDrn~t~ka, its implementation ~nd impljca~ions for tenants as
well as the landless.
The principal fEatures of the new act were the abolition
of tenancy, ban on leases with a few exceptions, fixing of
reasonablE rent and fixing of ceilings. Whi Ie the Act
banned leasing, exemptions were given to those serving in the'
defense forCES and in the Merchant Navy, widows, minors,
unmarried women, persons suffering from physical and mental
disability and also small holders.
In the categories where the leasing was allowed, rent
was determined on the basis of availability of assured
irrigation and the value of the yield: 25 per cent for land
with assured irrigation and 20 per cent for non-irrigated
land.
REcumption was allowed under certain conditions only:
land required for non-agricultural purposes, personal
cultivation by land owner, failure of the t8nant to pay the
rent or cultivate the land for two years or when the tenant
damaged the land or sub-let it unauthorisedly. HoweV8r, the
land owner could resume land only upto one half of the extent
of lilnd leaE('d. All tenanted lands were divided into two
categories: reslJmable and non-resumable.
The Jatti Committee had recognized that direct transfer
from the landlord to the tenant could lead to exploitation of
th2 tenant bocau~2 of th2 ~uperior paW2r of th? landlord.
The ol/nErship of the I ",no I·WE; theI:ef ore first VC,".~ C 0 ..,i t h the
Govornmont and ~ub~oquontly the land was aiven to the
t en:>nt s.
Mother me<:1S\lre, thE 1961 <:lct introduced w:>s thE
prohibition against aequi~ition of land by ~nyone not a
cultivator or <:In <:lgricultur:>l l<:1bourer.
was an exemption. If 3 member of a family which did not
possess <:lny l<:lnd dEsired to tuke up <:lgriculturE DS his sole
oecupat ion, he wa~ eligible to apply for per;miss ion to
iJcquire land. In the EvenL permiss ion was griJnted, it was
ordered that the applicant should personally cultivate the
l:>nd for at lE<:lst five ye<:lrs f<:1ilinq which ~he l<:lnd I-I<:1S
liable to bo taken up by the Government at the sarno rato a~
ch~t paid by thE ~pplic<:lnt.
The 1961 act fixed the CEiling for Buch family iJS 27
standard acres. Each standard aere referred to one acre of
firet cliJSS irriq<:1ted land which was udjudged equivalent to
about eight acros of dry land In an aroa with rainfall
than 25 mm per yeor. F<:1mily here meant dependent
children and grand children.
The ceilIng of 27 iJcres was for a fumily of five persons
or 1e:3:3. However, certain catogorie~ 5tud farm~,
60
plZlntations, i~ctories - were exempted from ceilIng
limit. ' The ceil inC! Has 50 high that in the case of dry land,
it could go ns high ~s 132 acres for n family of ten members.
The effect of these liberal provi~ion~ was that In 1971, one
GugDr factory wns ~llowed to retain 25,000 acres of
sugarcane land on the ground that its total requirGment 27
onG and half lakh acros.
wa:3
CompensDtion for lnnd in excess of ceiling tnKen over by
the Government was fixed at a multiple of the net income. For
lands with Dssured irrigation, the net income was considered
as half the yield and for lands without irrigation, the net
income was one-third the yield. The compens~tjon was fixed at
ten times the net incomG and payable in cash upto Rs 2,000.
For compensntion in excess of Rs 2,00Q, the balance was to be
paid in 20 annual installments through bonds carrying 4.5 per
cs n tIn tE1:: est.
The implementntion of the Inw was entrusted to Munsiff
Tribunals. The procedure of the enquiry was similar to that
of the cIvIl CelSOG in courts of lelw. Subsequently, In 1%8.
the M'Jn::;iff Tribunals WGre aboli~hed and the land reform
cDses were entrusted to the TaluK Level buroaucracy.
Outcome of the 1961 Act
The first thing that strikes anyone examIning the 1%1
act IS the long time taken - about seven years - for the law
61
to come into effect.
the leGi~latUre in 1958. we notic~ the notific3tion for the
li:lW to come into effect Wi:lS issued only on October 2. 1"'1",5.
Table 2.5
Co"cgory
Total Populution Cultivator~
flgr icult uri) 1 Lobourers
Cultivators and Agricultural Karnataka (1961 and 1971).
19 t, I A
2.35,86.772 58.06.661
l7. 6 L 110
1971 B
2.92.99.011 10.72,879
27.l7.537
Labourers
~ i nCTC:1Se
21.70 -29.85
51.30
Source: Ccnuu(} of Indii:l. 1961. Vol 11. My[;ore. P:1rt General Report ( Chapter 10)
Census of IndiCl. 197 L Serie:s I. Pilrt II-B General Economic Table~. pp. 12-15
in
I-l'l
( i).
While some: of thc foot-drugging could be i)ttributed to
the bureaucracy, there i~ no gain~aying the fact that th~
will to implement the lClw wu5 missing. The lonG
d81ay enabled the landlord~ to evict the tenant~. It
estimuted thilt during the period from 1957 to 1971. four
mill ion acre:J ~lGre cea:Jed to be held by tenant:J. A::, Table 2.5
the perccntClge of teni:lnts declined from 29.8 per
cent to 11.2 per cent during tho decade 1961 to 1971.
62
Table 2.6: District-wise Levels of Tenancy in Karnataka, ( 1'361-1'371>.
------------------------------------------------------------Region:; 5. Di:;trict:;
PC?rCGnt::JqG 1961
II
of Tonantod Holding~ 1971
8 -------------------------------------------------------------I C00ct~l Region
11
III
IV
1 D~kshinu Kunn~do 2 Uttara Kannada
Mulnud Region 3 ChickmZlgulorc 1 Ha:;::;an 5 Kodugu 6 Shimoga
Northern 7 Belguum 8 Bidar 9 BiJ~pur
10 Dharwad 11 Glll bell: 9 u 12 Raichur
Southern 13 Bonqulorc 11 B~ ll:JLY IS Chitrudurgo 16 Ko I.J r 17 MVf:dyu 18 My::;oro 19 Tllmkur
KDrnotDy.D Stote
77.7 74. 1
33.3 22. 1 36.8 50. 3
33.5 15. 1 23.5 34. 1 28.7 33.0
J 3. 7 J 3. {) 17.8 2,S,. 3 l~,. (', 25. '1 15.5
29.8
51. 'l 68.2
8.2 3. 5 1. 'l
21.5
15. 9 2.8 9.8
18. 2 10.6 3.7
5. 1 5.9 1. '5 6. ~ ") " 3.6 1.7
11. 2
Source: Ccnr;uc; of Indio. 1961. Vol 11. MYEiorc. Hou:;Ghold Economic Table:;, TablG B XI
Port III,
CCnEUEi of Agriculturvl HoldingEi In KDrnotvk~. 1970-71 (1971).
The huge number of opplicvtions for resumption vlso led
to con::;idorablG delay::;. Similar wa::; tho ca::;o with tho r8nt
control vppJ icot ions. Th E: h i 9 h c e iIi n 9 I C VB I ~lS[l yi121ded
very littlG ::;lJrplu::; land. FIJrthcoc, it ha::; boen noted by on!?
63
schol-'lr, th-'lt the pr~5ence )f the landlord lobby within th~ 28-
Congress contribut~d to the dilution of th~ leaislation.
Thus. though th~ 1961 Act hOld th~ st-'lted objectivE' of
altering the agrarIan ~cEnario, it failed to do ~o and
contributed to m-'lint~ining thE' 5t~tU5 quo. The point thvt
to bo Gxplainod i~ ao to th8 hiatus betweon rhetoric
~nd rE'-'llity: b~tw~~n the normative ~nd existential order.
Gunnar Myrdal ha~ arguod that a combination of
r3dic~lism In principle and conserv~tion In practice
woven into the fabric of Indian politico. Further. he has
noted thilt the dichotomy bctw6~n ide~ls ilnd rCillity, and
even between enacted legislation and implementation, should
be SEen against the b3ckground that India, J ike the other
South Asi~n countries is ~
29 . sot t ::;tate', unable to taKe
dEcisivE' action. But this is only on~ side of the coin.
The land reforms leqislation In thio
~dm I n i s te: n;;d in ways that frustrOlted its spi r it <Jnd
intent ion. The entrenched presence of the dominant ca~te~ in
thE' pliticaJ inutitutions frustriltE,d thE' Eff~ctive
implementat ion of land reform:::;. Thi~ i~ evident in a perusal
of the debatES of the auu~mbly 3nd the council.
There \'las conoiderable ')ppo::;itlon to the Jatti Committee
R~port ilcros5 thE legislators, 3nd especially among
Congressmen. Some members found a communist bogey in the land
64
Socialist or Communist ideoloQis~. even
o:>rgued that there wa~ no rush for land In M}'sore and L'lE'
landlsss agriculturists had vast tracts of fallow and 31
land including the big proJ~ct ar8a~.
that the members of the Jattl Committee were not
with the ryotwari system and were guided by the
W3ste
tEnancy legislation which did not have application to the 32
conditions in My~ore,
Ressrvat ions
The highly c-tratifiEd social order of Indbn SOCIEty
has re~ult8d in an inequitable di~tribution of key r8~ourcc~
necec;sary for advLlnccment in life, HOl-lever, the impoct of thE'
Briti3h rule and ideas of equality and ~oclal
had an impuct in termc; of thE' exsltent ial social ordEr beIng
subject to rigorous questioning.
It i c; aqa i nst thic; backdrop, that the policy of
reservations or compensatory discrimination evolved in India.
ThE backward class movemEnt in many partr of India In the
early part of the century also qave a fillip to thi~ policy
be i t thE demand of the non-Bruhminr for positions In
politics, government and educational institutions.
65
ruter Independence, the constitution also sanctiflEd
thi~ policy of compon~3tory di~crimin3tion tnrough inbuilt
provisions which provide for reservation in po lit i c =- ,
government and educational institutions.
These rcscrvut ions to compensate for
historical and ~ocial di3crimination that 30me 30ction3 of
society have been subject to. The reservations are providEd
for three 3ection3 of Indian society: the Scheduled Ca3tGS,
Scheduled Tribes ",nd Backward C101sses. Keeping in view the
general philosophy of reGervations, an attempt will be made
in the following section to examlne the policy of
reservations in Karnataka beh/een 1956 and 1972. While dO:TIg
so, an effort will be made to understand the linkagcs betWEen
the political leadership and the rGservation policy.
Reservations are not 3 new phenomenon in Karnatvka. T~ey
date back even to the days before Independence. The Brahmins,
who constituted 3.39 per cent of thc state population, then
enjoyed a di3proportionate sharG of 70 per cent of jobs ln
the government. Studles on reservation policy in KarnataKa 33
have attributed this to nepotism and favourtism.
lIE a consequence of the protests by non-Brahmins O1q01inst
the i r low representation, the Princely state of Mysore
appointed a six-membEr committEe undEr the chairmanship of
66
Leslie Miller in 1919 to study the problem.
The committee was asked to examine whether changes were
needed in the existing policy of recruitment in the publIc
~Grvice; recommend special facilities to encourage higher and
professional education ~mong members of the
communitie:;; and al~o to suggest other measures to increase
representation of backward communitie~ in public service 34
without materially affecting efficiency.
The criterion used by the Committee to determine
educational backwardness was percentage of literacy
English in each caste and community. This methodology w~s
adopted as the committee considered English to be an
essential qualification for government service. The
Committee suggested that all castes and communities whose
percentage of literacy in English was less than five as
backward. The Committee also noted that castes and
communities whose proportion of English literates was less
than five per cent and not adequately represented in
Government servIce 35 backward classes.
The report, which Ha:; submitted 1n August 1919,
recommended that within seven years, non-Brahmins should hold
at least 50 per cent of the higher appointment:; and two-
thirds of the lower appointments in each grade of
with preference to be given to candidate3 from the depre33Gd
classe5 (Scheduled Castes).
67
SomE of the othEr recommendations made by the Committee
included award of ~cholar~hip to backward class candidates.
setting up government hostels. grants-In-aid to private
hostels. abolition of competitive exam~ for selection of
candidates to the civil SErvice and a raise in the aoe lim it
for these exams from 25 to 28 years.
The rEcommendations of the Committee with regard to
reservations were accepted by the government In 192 1. The
government also Enhanced the maximum age limit for Entry into
government ~8rvice from 25 y8ar~ to 28 year~.
TablES 2.7 to 2.9 reveal the representation of various
cornmlJnitie" in the administrat ion. The improvement in the
represEntation of thE non-Brahmins following the acceptance
of the Hiller Report i" 0130 evident from the t3bles 01 ven
bE low.
Table 2.7 Percentage Distribution of Government Jobs between Brahmin and Non-Brahmins
------------------------------------------------------------
'if:. J r
Gazetted Posts
Totol l\. B Totol
Non-Gazetted Posts
l\. B --------------------------- ----------------------------------
1918 370 61.86 35. 11 13.916 69.91 30.36 1936 760 61. 32 38.68 22,615 49.65 50.35 1917 1/29e. 1( •. 89 53. II 37.820 37.50 62.50 1957 L 797 35.72 61.28 57,516 27.65 72.35 -------------------------------------------------------------Source: Government of Y.arnataka. Report
Bock.'Llrd Clas!::!::; Commission. Vol. 1986, P.17. 1\: BrLlhmins; B: tJon-BrLlhmim;.
of L
!: h o Second BLlng1l1ore,
Table 2.8 Representation of Major Castes/Communities in the State Government Service in 1930
--------------------------------------------------------------Cast<3/Communlty Po~t~ Hold in the State Civil
Sf: r v i c€ (~)
1918 1930 -------------------------------------------------------------Br::lhmins LingaY3ts Vokkuligus Muslims
69.6 3.6 '"' 1 ... 7.7
~4 . 1 7. 7 1. <l
l'j 'i ~. -
-------------------------------------------------------------SOUl:ce: James Manor, Politic3l Change in 3n Indian State#
MZlnC'hur, N€w Delhi. 1977, P.eo1.
Table 2.9: Representation of Major Castes/Communities in the State Government Service in 1941 (~)
-------------------------------------------------------------C:n;tel Community
Br<lhmins Linoayat:::; Vokkill i ge.S Kuruba:::; Pcdus ['::prc:::;:::;cd ~~lslims
AppolntmEnts
Gu::ett€d PostE; Non-Gu::€tt€d Posts
31. 15 13. 3 b 10.63 7. 10 8.08 ~ 50 -' . 1. 63 0.80 0.85 0. H,
C~3::::;:JC:J 1.58 t,.95 10.52 7."'5
Source: S Ch:.nelr::lcekhilr, DimE:m;ions of Socio-Pol it ieul ChO'nge in Hy:::;or8, 1918-80, A:::;hish, Ne\~ ['<:21 hi, 1985, P.81.
How€vc[", d8til g~thercel by thE Venk8t~cw~my commission
anel Lelah Duskin ["8v8als th3t whil8 th8 rGsorvation policy
bus€el on Mlller committee diel h~vc D positivE i mp,.ct of
lncre3slng the proportion of non--8rahmin~ In governm,"nt
ccrvic€, l' elid not bring Dbout :.ny elr"mutlc ChunCl€s. This
IS rev8alc1 by a pGru:::;al 'Jf 35
r::handra~8kh~r .
69 .
the studies of Hanor 3nd
Keepinq In view the effects of the Miller Report. and
the heterog8neity in the list of backward classes from the
different regions due to reorganization. the state government
i~~ued a fresh order in July 1958. The order d8clared all
non-Brahmins. except Muslims and Christians, as backward with
57 per c8nt r8servation.
Along with the 18 per cent reservation provided for the
Schedul~d Castes and Scheduled Tribes, the total reservation
came to 75 per cent. Following the striking down of t h i f:;
order by the High Court In 1959, the government issued
another order treating all cast8S except Brahmins. Banias and
Kayasthas as backward.
When this order too came under questioning in the High
Court. another order was :ssued in which the populat ion was
divided
provided
into 14 groups with compartmental reservation. and
for 67 per cent reservation In educational
institutlons with 57 per cTnt in Qovernment Jobs.
However. when this order too was struck down by the High
Court. the government appointed the NaQanna Gowda committee
In 1960 to identify 3nd suqgest reservations for the
~oclally and educationally backword cla~sE5.
submitted two reports - interim and final.
The Committee
70
The comm i 'L t ee from consideri~~ socio>l and
educational baCKI1ardness h3d also used representation of
VOlrlOUc. cOl;;tes and communIties In government serv1ce
relation to its state average. The committee u3ed dual
for p\lrpOSes of interim and f 1nal
reports. While the literacy levels of a particular caste In
rel~tion to C.t~tB averDge was used for interim report; the
percentage of students of different caste3 and communities
studying 1n the la~,t three years of high school in 1'35'3-60 in
relation to the state average was the criteria used for final
report.
In the interim report, the committee recommended
I:C23ervat ion of 36 cEO'nt for 168 communitie3 for
OlppO i nt ment s In government HOHE'VE'r,
qovernment, implementing th~ recommendation of the
report in l'3t.O. provided for only 25 per cent re5erv~tion.
Committee in its final report classified the
b~ckw~rd classes into More Backward Class8s and Backward
Classes. to the committee. the Hore Backward
Cl:>o;s8s
\01 a 5 50 per cent le33 than the state average?, Hhi 18 other
communitl<:'S whose- e-ducat inned level He's lESS than the state
average were classified as B3ckward.
71
In its recommendBtI0~S. the Committee recommended tha:
50 per cent of the seats in teshnical in~titutions and 45 ~~r
CE nt of jobs In governmEnt should be reserved for the
backward classes. For 3dmi~~ion to educational inst itut ions.
the Committee suggested 28 per cent for More Backward Classes
and 22 per cent for Backward Classes; while for appointment
to government jobs. it suggested 24 per cent for More
Backward Classes and 21 per cent for Backward Classe~.
Together. with the 18 pEr cent reservation for the Scheduled
Castes and Scheduled Tribes. the total reservation worked out
to t,e, pEr cent.
by its recommendations. the committee
excluded Lingayats from its list of backward classes. both
for provision of rE~ervation~ in educational institutions and
government service while the Vokkaligas (except Bunt section)
was classified as backward.
the stste government. which was under the
leadership of a Lingayat chief minister. would not accept
this r8commendation In 1962 included
Lingayats also in the 1 ist of backward classes. This \4a5 done
by redUCing thE educational status of Lingayat students by
n(Cr"l:laslng the stat8 averagE of educational status by 0.1 ps["
cent.
72
In this order. 22 per cent was r~served for
Backward Classes. 28 per ~pnt fer the Backward class group
~nd 18 per cent for the Scheduled castes and Scheduled
tribes.
However. this order ~s well as the E'arl ier ordEr of
1961 was ~truck down by the High court and Supreme Court. In
the B~l~ji vs St~te of Mysore case. 1963. the Supreme Court
held that caste could not be the 301e criterion for
determining the soci~l and educational backwardness and that
reservation~ should not exceed 50 per cent.
Following the SuprE'me Court Judgment. the state
government came out with a fre~h order on 16 September 1963
wherein Economic criteria was prescribed for idEntifying the
backward classes. The order held that ;
"3 cand i dat e \,/hos" p,n- ent - s I guard i an - 5 income IS Rs 1.200 per annum or less and who . parents/guardian\ IS engaged anyone of the occupation3 mentioned below, viz .• (1) actual cultivvtor. (2)artisan • (3) petty businessman. (4)
inferior ~ervices (i. e .• clas:; IV In government service and corrEsponding class ln private employment) including casual labour; and (5) any other occupution involving manual labour. should be considered a~ backward for the purpose of
36 Article '16(4) of the c':n~titution".
The t'lltent of n:servZlt lon for the bacKHZlrd classes was
fixed at 30 per cent 50 th~t the total reser'l3tion (including
those for the Scheduled GZlste and Scheduled Tribes) would not
exceed 50 per cent.
73
The attltude of the qovErn~ent tcw
thi5 phase clearly demonstrated th3t to
accept the recommend21tlons ,·,hen It '_ent "G,':~,,·~ ':.'. ::.:.:est
of one of the dominant castes. Llnqayats In thIs Instance, In
other word5. thE pilttern of distrIbution C'f polltic-al
in the state did not provide for 3 Greater dIspersion in the
flow of developmentul beneflts,
Thus. to summarize the discus::;lon. It may be noted that
during the pre-Devuraj Urs period frC'm lQ~6 to thE'
political inJtitution::; were under the ::;way of the dom I nant
The hegemony of the domlnont costc~ Wos predomln3nt
and their strenqth In the 3::;::;embly W3::; mor~ than 50 per cent,
Further. ~Iithin the Congress too, the prcponcleronc-e of
ca5te5 was ob5erved. Across the a::;sembl iEs, thE str;:ngth of
dominant caste5 witnessed an increase and rEoched lts peak In
the YEar 1967.
The preponderance of the domlniJnt costES was also
observed at the apex level - chief ministershlp and the
c<:lbinet. All the chief minl~ters In thIS perIod haIled from
the dominant caste::; In oeneral and Linoayat::; In partlc-');ar.
The political hegEmony of the domInant c~stes appEiJrS to h3VE
been facilitated by control over re:;olJcce:; land,
numerical ~trenqth. thE' n:JtIJre of the CanorEsr porty, and the
dominant party syst~m that prevaIled In the state. The
abE>EnCe of the any serIous crISES on the pOll t iCill E;ystE'm
alGa thwarted the impl~m~nt3tion of 3ny meanIngful reform::;.
ThE' cotlrE'C C'i impl€ment~tion C'!
reservations 1n the state also reveals _the hiatus b8twe~n
precept and perfQrmunce. In both the lnstZ'lnCESI
government
implemented
policie:3 appear to have been formulated
50 as to benefit the dominant cCl5tes. ThllS,
the
and
t his
preponderance IGd the Congce'3s party to !lJrther the interests
of those groups on which they were dependent for support.
leading to the maintenance of the status guo.
Notes and References
1. Government of Kornotoko, Report of the Kornotoko Third Bockword Closscs Commission, Bongalore, 1990, p. 53.
2.
3.
JomEls Myson: 1977.
Manor, Politicol Change in on Indi2ln State : 1917-1955, Monohar Book ScrVicE. New Delhi.
Bjorn Hctncc. The Pol it icol Economy of Mysore 1881-1917. Curjon Prcss. London.
Robert Dahl. Polyorchy :Participation Y2lle Oniversity Press. New Hoven, 1971,
Indircct 1978.
~t11c:
ond Oppos i ti on. pp.22-23.
4. Ibid .•
5. Ibid .•
6. Ibid. ,
7. Amol Ray ond Development and Fcderol System",
John Kincaid, "Politics Second Gener3tion Strain ln
Publim" Vol 18, No 2, Spring,
Economic Indias
1988.
8. Deccan Herald, March 19, 1958.
'? DEccan H€rald, May 9, 1958.
10. G Thimmai3h and Abdul Aziz, "Political Economy of Land Rcforms ln K2lrnotako: A South Indion Stotc", Asivn Survey, Vol 23, No.7, July, 1983. pp.811-812.
11. Ibid. , pp.815-816.
12. D V Roghavo Roo, Ponchayats A:;hish, New Delhi. 1980.
Rurol Development,
H D Lokc;hmi NorilYilno, Rurill LegiE;lators in on Indiiln State, Inter Indio Publiciltionc;, New Delhi. 1985. ----
Hodimoni. Pol it ics of Poverty, &hish, New Delhi, 1984.
T S Epstcin, Economic Development and Social Change ~ South Indio, Manchester Univcrsity PreSE;, Mancher;ter, 1962.
13. Interview Hith Hindosqiri. Bongolorc. August 20. 1989.
14. Francine Frankel, Indi3·s pol iticaJ Economy The Gradua I Revol ut ion, Oxford Oni verG it y De 1 hi. 1'37 8 .
1947-1977: Pross. NOH
15. H D L"kE;;hmi N<:lr<:lY<:ln<:l, op. cit,
16. Interview with HinduGgirL B<lng<llore, lluguGt 20, 1989.
17.
18.
Jamo::;. p. 120
Manor, Political Chango in My::;oro, op. cit. n
Myron Weiner, P<:lrty Building in N<:l t i oniJ I Congre[;[:;, Pr i neet on Jcn:;y, 1967, pp.272-273.
~ New NiJtion: The Indiun Univer~ity PreE;;~, New
19. Giovanni Sartori, Partio::; and Party Sy::;tom::; in ~ Now N3tion, Cambridgo Univor::;ity Pro::;::;, London, 1976, p.195.
20. Ibid. ,
21. 80muel Huntington, op.cit.,
22. Hung Choo Toi, Lond Reform ond Politic~
Comprehen~ive hnaly~iG, UnivcrGity of C<lliforniiJ Berke1y, 1971.
23. Michoe1 Lipton, "Toword~ il Theory of LiJnd Reform~", in David Lohman, (od), Agrarian Roform and Agrarian Roformi::;m . Studio::; Q.L Poru, Chilo, China and India, Fabor and Fabor, London, 1971, p.270.
21. LouiE;;, WiJl in~ky, (ed) The Selected Popen:; of Wolf Ladojin::;ky: Agr3rian Roform a::; Unfini::;hod Bu::;ino::;::;. Oxford Univor::;ity Pro::;::;, London. 1977, p.356.
25. P C Joehi, LiJnd Pcn:;pcct i vee, 1\11 i cd,
Ref or mE;; Bombay,
in Indiu: 1975.
Trend~ ond
26. Government of My~orc. The My~orc Tenuncy llqriculturu1 Land Law::; Committoo, My::;oro, 1958.
27. M II S RiJjiJn. LiJnd RcformE;; in KiJrniJt<:lkiJ: hn Account £y ~
PiJrticipunt Obcervor, Hinductun Publiching Corporution, New Delhi. 1986, p.20.
28. S ShiJ~hikuliJ,
l'IgriJriun Chunqe KurniJtukiJ, Ph.D p.219.
The 80ciu1 und Pol it iCiJ1 Dimcncionc of ~ hn EViJluiJtive Study of LiJnd Reformc in Thee; ie;, My~ore Uni ver!:; ity, Mycore, 1985,
29. GunniJr MyrdiJl. AuiiJn DriJmD ~ hn Enquiry into Poverty Of Nut ione;, Penguin Book~, London. 1968, pp.276-277.
30. The deb<ltce; Logi::;lativo e1<1boriJte1y 1958.
on the Jotti Committee Report in both the A:J::;embly and Logi::;1ativo Council have boon described in Deeciln Heruld, Murch 1 30,
77
31. Docc;:w Horald, March 12, 1958.
32. DeccZln HerZlld, MZlrch 9, 1958.
33. G Thimmaiah, Powor Politic:; and Social Justice: Backward Ca:::;to:; in Karnataka, S3g0, New Delhi, 1993, p.61.
31. Government of My~ore, Princely Rcport of the CommittcE hppointcd to Con~ider thc Step Nccc~~Zlry for thc hdeguZltc Repre~entution of Communitic~ in Public Servicc, My~orc, 1921. p.1.
35. Government of KnrnntuKu, Report of thc Kurnutuku Third BacKward Cla:::;::;o:; Commi:;:;ion, B<Jngaloro, 1990.
Lelah DU:;Kin, "Backw<Jrd Cl<J:;:; Bonofit::; and Social CIa:;:; in Indiu, 1920-1970", EPW, Vol 11, No. 11, hpril 17, 1979.
Jumc~ Munor, op. cit. ,
S Chundr<J Sekhnr, Dimem;iom; of Socio-politicZll Ch;:mgc In My!:;orc 1918-1980, khi!:;h, New Delhi, 1985.
36. cited in G Thimmuiuh, op.cit" p.92.
78
CHAPTER" - I II
DEVARAJ URS ERA IN KARNATAKA: 1972-1980.
ThG DGva~aj Or~ Gra in Ka~nataka, f~om 1972 to 1980, i~
widely con~idcrod to occupy u unique pocition in the hi5to~y
of thG ~tiltO. Whi 10 ~omo ~chola~~ hold tho viow that U~~
b~ought ubout ~t~uctu~ul chungec in Ka~nataku politicu. to
~omo otho~~ ho symbolizod il now O~il ilnd wa~ a politicul 1
phonomonon of con~idorablo impo~tanco.
Hencc, wo uhall makc no apologicu fo~ dculing ut length
on thi~ phil~o - 1972-80 - of Ka~natilka politic~. Kooping in
mind the objectivcs of thc ~tudy. un uttcmpt huc been mude in
this chapto~ to oXilmino and undo~~tilnd tho ~hift~ in tho
pCltte~n of politicul ICCldc~chip in 1972 from the dominunt
ca:;to:;; ilnd to GOO whotho~ it haG had any effect on ~oform
meucu~e5.
While doing co. an endeavou~ ic mudo he~e to highlight
tho political onvi~onmont undo~ which tho govo~nmont took up
~efo~mc In the a~cna of land ~efo~mc und ~ece~vution.
Furthor. this chaptor alGo alms to undorstand tho chungo In
po lit i c <:>1 leude~chip in 1980 by looking ut Urc' Gpl it with
M~s Gundhi. his dofout ut tho poll~, dofoctions from his
pu r t y. Gubcequent full from power und the Urs' lcgucy on
stuto pol it iCG.
79
Thc chilptcr it; divided into fivc t;cctiont;. The firr;t ilnd
~oeond ~oetion~ diGeU~G tho ~hift in political loadorGhip in
1972. thc uociul bur;c of politicul Icuderr;hip in thc Uru cra,
and whether the chilngo in political loadorGhip haG had any
effcct on rcform mCL:lCiurcr:; rct;pcct i'>1el y. The c;hift in
pol i tical loadorGhip in 1980 - in tormG of Ur::3' Gplit with
Hrr:; Gundhi und hit; purty'r:; defout in the 1980 Lok Subhu
pollG, GubGoquont dofoction~ from hiG party - aro delinoated
in the third ccction. The fourth ceetion coneernu with Uru'
legacy whilo tho fifth Goction GummarizoG tho chapt~r.
Shift in Political Loadership in 1972
UrG' Path to Powor
Devuru:i Ore. who wur:; born ut Killl:lhillli in Hum:;ur t:lluk
of MYGoro di~triet on huguGt 20, 1915, hailod from tho
numericillly umilll hrur:;u cuete. to which the rOyul f:lmily of
princoly Myuoro, tho WodoyarG alGa bolongod. But birth In
thic uuguut lineilge did not ilccord ilny cpeciill privilege to
Ur::;.
Mter grvduilting from Mycorc Oniverr;ity. he joincd thc
fraodom movomont in 1939. Ho wa~ GubGoquontly a mombor of
the Rcprc(;cntutivc huuembly in thc r:;tutc from 1911-18. The
Quit India movomont al::;o witno::;::;od him playing an activo rolo
in it. Mter Indepcndenec. Orr:;. though bcing u membcr of the
80
&i)t:;u 1 ino<lgo. pilrt 1c1piltod in tho -MYuore Chillo' movement
in Octob~r 1917 to forco tho M~har~ia to relinqui3h powor.
In the pODt Independence eril. he WilD il member of illl the
having novor l03t an oleetion unti 1 hi3
demiDe. UrD' firot entry into the cilbinet in
Nii~lingapp~3 government of 1962. But, it W~3 only aftar
the Congreoo oplit of 1969 thilt Uro really came into hiD own.
Ignoring tho political currant in the 3tato, ha ca3t in
hit: lot with Mrt:; Gandhi. The undivided Congreoo WilD, aD it
h~3 boon notod o~rlier, under the hegemonic control of tho
dominunt cilDteG. Simililr WilG the uituation with the Congreuu
(0) ho~dod by Nii~lingapp~ with Veorendr~ Patil a3 tho 3t~to
leilder.
It hilc been oboervod th~t while Mru Gilndhi'o foeuo
boforo tho parliamontary eloction of 1971 wa3 to fight tho
Eiyndic~te bODceD. her mil:ior tilck ~fter the election Wilu to
impo:::;o hor no~inoo:::; il:::; tho chiof mini3tor3 of Congro:::;:::; 2
:::;tato3 in ardor to o:::;tabli:::;h hor firm rulo in the country.
While doing co. Mrc Gandhi took cpeeiill Cilre not to
~ppolnt anyono 3:::; chiof mini:::;tor who had an indopendont b~:::;o
of power ~nd could withDtilnd the vilgarieD of ut~te po11tieu 3
without her ilt:cictance. She ilppointod ueverill people from
hor own Dilbinot - Gh~n3hy~m OZ~, P C Sethi. S S Ray, ~nd
81
DeVilr<l i Un::;, who wuc not even a member of the legicliltive
a~~ombly to hOud tho ~tato govornmont~.
Other ctudentc of Indian pol it icc hilvc alco commented on
Mr~ Gundhi'~ murkod tondoncy to appoint chiof mini~tor~
1 irro~poctivo of the backing thoy enioyod in their ~tato~.
By doing co. che reduced the role of the inctitutional 5
ctructurec at variouc levelc. She wac of the view that thecc
loador~ would be more dopendent on hor than tho~o with
fo1lowingc of their own und did not even hecitate to eace out
leador~
c;yndicate.
who had ~upportod her in hor battlo 6
again~t
Frequent 1 y. thic led to inc;tabi 1 ity ilnd high 7
turnovor of mini~trio~ and a populi~t ompha~i~ on policio~.
Thio paint. however. would be eluboruted at a later c;tage.
Following tho 1969 ~plit in tho Congroo~. Mr~ Gandhi wu~
looking for il leader in Karnataka not belonging to either of
tho dominunt caotoo. Hor choico foIl on Dovuruj Ur~ a~ tho
Pradech Congrcc;c; Committee prec;ident. The key factor behind
tho doci~ion to look for a now buoo of oupport wao promptod
by the fact that the Congrcc;c; (0) hud become the fortrec;c of
tho dominunt cu~too.
The 1972 ilc;c;cmb1y clcctionc in thc c;tate. in fact. markc;
a w,)torohod in tho politic~ of Karnatilka. For tho fir::;t timo.
Urc;. uc the KFCC (R) chief. in ilc;cociation with Mrc; Gundhi.
brought ilbout <l chungo in tho pilttorn of allotmont of tickoto
82
for the uccembly eleetionc. In u bid to break the
:;tr:mg 1 eho I d of tho dominunt cu:;te:; Lind
Linguyat!::; over ctate politiec, Urc reduced the number of
tickot:; ullottod to thorn.
The two ca~te~ could cccurc only 15 tickct~ cuch u~
uquin:;t 85 tickot:; for the Lingayat:; and 63 for Vokkaliga:; in 8
tho 1967 election:;.
Urw de:;cribed the proce:;:; of allotment of ticketu
a:; un attompt to roduco tho inoqualitio:; in tho political
reprecentation. "~ll I cun way it:; thut wc have tried to do
di:;tributivo iu:;tico.
to do uocial iuctice. '3
in thi:; diroction".
Thi:; i:; tho fir:;t :;top in our attompt
We have gone :;uffieicntly a long way
Fred ictabl y, there wat:; reuictance from the dominant
CJJ:::;tO::i .. with :;ovoral of tho:;o doniod tiekot:; docluring that
they would contct:;t at:; independent candidatcc. "We cun now
undor:;tund that tho:;o pooplo had ioinod tho party with tho
main hope of getting party ticketc und their motive ic now
cloar. They ioinod tho party to :;erve their own ::;elfi:Jh end::;, 10
declarod Ur:;".
The recult of 1972 clcctionc cignuled the oupport of
tho oloctorato to Ur:;' and Mr:; Gandhi':; offort:;. Tho
Congreoc (R) won an overwhelming victory at tho polIo
133
11 trouncing tho CongrQ~~ (0) by a largo margin.
The final tully chowcd thut the Congrccc (R) hud cccurcd
165 Joat~, whilo tho Congro~~ (0) could win only 21 ~oat~ out
of a totul of 21& ueatu. Indepcndcntu won 20 ucutu. whi I e
tho GocialiJt Party and tho CommuniJt Party won throo ~out~
12 ouch.
SUbucqucnt I y. aftcr thc victory of thc Congreuu (R> in
tho aJ~ombly poll~ 1n 1972, Mr~ Gandhi choJo UrJ do~pito hi~
not cvcn contccting thc electionu. Uru' coloction ac thc
oighth chiof mini~tor of tho ~tato WUJ not Jmooth u~ thoro
wcre othcr contenderu 13
for the poct. purticularly
Sidd<Jvccrappu. But. what cwung thingu in hiu favour on
March 20. 1972 waJ MrJ G3ndhi' J Jupport.
~Juving diucucued the emergence of Uru uu chief miniuter.
1'10 ~hall now mov~ on to oxamino tho ch3ngo in tho ~ociul ba~o
of politicul lcadcrwhip in the utatc.
Social Buuo of Political Loador"hip
hn oXumin3tion of tho "ocial bUJo of tho politicul
leaderuhip - in termw of cuwte . offeru intcre!:iting in!:iightu
into tho political chango" that Mr" Gandhi and Ur~ woro
uttempting to introduce for concol idating their power bawc in
tho "tato.
B1
Tuble 3.1 preuentu the euute· wiDc Congrccc (R) und
Congro~~ (0) mombor~hip of tho logi~l~tivo u~~ombly uero~~
the yeurD 1967 to 1972.
Table 3.1: CaDte-wiue Membership of the AsDembly: (1967. 1972 and 1978) •
Legislative
. . - - - - . - - _. - . -. - . - .. -- -- - - -- --- ---------------------------
CuDtc 1967
1'1::; ~ 0 -
mbly Cong
1972
1'1::; ~ 0 - Cong mbly (R)
Cong ( 0)
1978
1'I::;~o - Cong mbly (1)
Junutu
--------------------------------------------------------------LinguY<:lt 81 Vokku 1 igu 15 Otherc 86 Not Known 1
51 23 19
3
56 11
117
35 28
102
11 6 1
52 13
129
29 20
102
18 29 12
.. ------- _ .. -- .. -- -. ----------------------------------------Totul 216 126 217 Hi5 21 221 151 59 .... -_ .. ------- ---. --------------------------------------------Soureo Intorviow~ with middlo-lovol purty workor~.
Table 3.2: Occupation-wiDe MemberDhip of the Legislative Assembly (1972 and 1978).
Occupution
~riculturo Other Occup<:ltion
Totul
Source
1972 1978
1'I::;~ombly Congro~~ 1'I::;~ombly Congro~~ Junutu
87 60 101 71 21
129 66 100 BO 35
216 126 221 151 59
Interviewc with middle-level purty workcrD.
1'1::; Tublo 3. 1 indicuto~, tho ~trongth of Linguyut~ <lnd
Vokk;)l i g<lC had decl ined in 1972 comp<:lred to 1967. The
docl ina l~ not moroly conf inod to tho Congro~:;. but i~ ill~o
95
reflected in the memberchip of the uccembly. !Jr, elcewhere
notod, tho ~hift of politicul lOudor~hip from tho dominunt
cuctec uppeurc to be u concequence of the 1969 cplit und the
ougorno~~ of Mr~ Gundhi und Ur~ to o~tubli~h u now politicul 11
bu~o of ~upport in Kurnutuka.
!Jr, Tuble 3.2 indicutec. the proportion of uccembly
mombor:; citing ugriculturo u~ thoir occupution ~till
continued to be cubctuntiOll und increOlced in 1978.
Intoro~tingly, it Wol~ in thi~ pha~o that mOuningful lund
reformc were curried on.
It mOlY be noted further thOlt Urc' COlbinet compriced of
ubout fivo mombor~ from tho dominant COl~to:; (throo Vokku1iga~
Olnd two LinguYOltc).
Thuc the po int thut emergec from the foregoing
di~cu~~ion i~ thut thoro occurrod a ~hift in tho ~ociul bu~o
of politicOll leOlderchip Olwuy from the dominOlnt cOlctec.
boing tho ~ituution, un uttompt will bo mudo in tho following
cection to exumine und underctund whether cuch u chift uWuy
from tho dominunt caeto:; during tho Ur:; ora hu~ hud uny
effect on reform meOlcut"ec. While doing co. the iecue of lOlnd
roform::J would bo unulyzod ;:Ind ro:;crvution:;
cubcequent 1 y.
86
Bffoct on Roform M08UUrS&
L<lnd Roform:;
"Would there h<lve been l<lnd K~rnataka without Dovarai
15 Dov<lr.:li Ur:;
reformc Ur:;? .. in
Implicit in the rhetorical que~tion that Ur~ po~e~ i~
tho contontion that all roform:; ~ttomptod in tho pro -1972
period W<l~ infructou~ and in vain. Uru aluo appe<lru to imply
that tho land roform:; carriod out in tho 1971-80 poriod W.:l:;
entirely due to hiu effortc.
Given the nilture of the ela-im. Ure' ar:;r:;ert iont; need~ to
bo critically to:;tod on two front:;:
1. War:; Ure really the fount of land reforme in Karnat.:lkiJ ?
2. To what extent wa~ the land reform mea~uret; :;ucco:;:;fu1.
In order to addreeu the~e i~uueu. we ehall analyze the
niJturo of tho politiciJl onvironmont in tho country in tho
Jilte 1960e ilnd eilrly 1970e. The role of the prevailing
onvironmont iJ:;:;umo:; addition.:ll import.:lnco in tho contoxt of
the enfeeblement of political inetitution~ which ctarted in 16
thi:; ph.:l:;o.
87
rolitic~l Environment in ~~te 1960~ und E~rly 1970~
The politicul environment in the country in the lute 60~
~nd o~rly 70'~ witno~~od ~n incro~~o in tho pitch of tho
uoci~li~t rhetoric. The ideologiCul intcn~ity in the country
i. o. , tho tompor~turo or tho offoet of ~ givon idoologic~l
17 uett ing, witne~ued u uh~rp inereu~e in thiu eru muking it
imporutivo for ~omo kind of lund roform mou~uro~ to bo
undertuken.
Mr~ Gundhi her~elf uet the tone in 1965 when ~he ~tuted:
"No ~ingl0 progr~m ~o intimutoly ~ffect~ ~o m~ny million~ of 18
our pooplo ~u l~nd roformu."
In f~et, for u better under~tunding of the originu of
l::Jnd rcformu In tho po::;t -1970 poriod. wo nood to probe into
the reuult~ of the fourth generul election~ in 1967 which
c~mo u::; ~ rudo jolt to tho Congrou u . Tho Congro~u lo~t it~
muiority In ueverul ut~tc~. It~' perform~ncc in the Lok
3~bh~ eloction::; wuu ~luo di::;mul. Tho p~rty could win only
201 ~eutu u~ uguinut 361 ueut~ it held in 1962. Prominent
lo~doru liko K K~m.)r~i. C Subr~m~ni~m. ~nd S K Putil woro
humbled by the eleetorute.
]n the hcuembly poilu. the purty could rctuin only 18.58
p~r cont of tho ::;o~tu. Tho Congrouu lOut ~ lot of uo~tu in
Bihur, Kerulu. Mudru~. Funjub. Ruju~thun. Uttur
eo
Frudeuh; thc lo~~ runging from u decreuoe of 1.6 pcr ccnt in
n~i~~thun to ~ 16 por cont drop in T~mil N~du (M~dr~~).
Thc unnuul report for thc ycar 1966- 67 prcparcd by thc
Gonoral Gocrot~rio~ of the Congro~~ purty ob~orvod that tho
primury tuuk of the purty wau to do u ccriou~ bit of
intro~poct ion. both ut organiz~tion:ll und purl i~montury
levelo. The iuoue addre~ocd by the Rcport wuc: whether the
implomont:ltion of tho purty programmo w~~ wo~k or dofoctivo
and un~ati~fuctory or were there ~ome inadequucieo with the 19
programma it~olf.
The intermd debate in the Congreo~ brought forth
variou~ roa~on~ for tho poll dob:lclo. Tho common thro:ld
running through much of the criticism within the party
concornod with tho hi:ltu~ betwoon promi~o~ and porforrn:lnco in
implementing the programmcu. "We moved a lot of re~olution~
.,i thout gotting 20
thorn implomontod", ob~orvod Guchota
Kripalani.
Mohun Dhuriu poced the rhetorical que~tion to the party
"MO wo u ~oei~li~t p.:lrty? He want an to ~ay that whila it
w~c true "we make thic claim. 21
growing in thi~ country".
in fact capitalictc were
Borne purtymen launched u otrident attack upon the old
guurd for thoir con~arv.:ltivo uttituda ~nd fuiluro to u~hcr in
89
coeio· economic reformc "If you ~re not ~ble to rev~mp the
party for tho ~oci3l t3~k~. for God'~ ~3ko got out. 22
Othor~
wi 11 do it". Mrr:; Gandhi here;elf obe;erved: "we mue;t m~ke
all offort~ m3ko 3 boginning ~o that tho yawning Qap
between the h~vec ~nd h~ve· note; can be n~rrowed'·. She ulso
eallod for ~top~ In many diroetion~ to curb tho tondoncy
which e;ought to perpetu~te the die;tinctione; between the 23
privilogod and tho undor 'privilogod.
It w~r:; out of thie; introe;pect ion. eiJrr ied out in the
wako of tho Congro~~ dob3elo. th3t tho ton point programmo
emerged and wac; adopted by the ~ll India Congrec;c; committee
on Juno 23, 1957. ~ important componont of tho ton point
programme wac; to provide a better c;ocio-economic clim3te for
tho rural poor. Tho point that wa~ roitoratod wa~ the need
to acceleriJte the implementution of tenuney reformc; thut hud
boon onactod in ~ovoral ~tato~.
hnother factor that led to introe;peetion within the
Congro~~ party wa~ tho growing incidonco of violonco in tho
ruriJI hinterlandc; of the country. In fact. the legitimiJcy of
tho political ~y~tom wu~ it~olf quo~tionod in ~ovoral pockot~
of the nation. ~ICC rer:;olutione; and Congrec;c; party meetinge;
of tho p~riod di~playod comploto iJwarono~~ of tho growing
incidence of violcnce and luwlecc;nee;c;. "It ic; now ~ccepted
on all hand~ that tho ri~o of NiJxal movomont or forco~ of
violeneo in the rural areac; nre deeply interlinked with the
growIng agrarian unro~t in tho country~ido cau~od by lack of
90
21 iu~t ~nd oquit~blo l~nd l~w~". Tho lloma mini::;tor'::; roport
25 in 1969 ~l:lo oxplicitly w~rnod of ~gr3rian ton::; ion.
~g~in~t thi~ b~ckground. thc Congre~~ felt it nece~~~ry
to ::;poll out the crucial role that land roform::; h~d in tho
p~rty'c policie~. Noting the ~ignifie~nt role of l~nd
reform::;. tho Genor~l Soerot~rio::;' Roport for tho per i ad
Dccember 1959 to M~y 1970 pointed out th~t l~nd reform~ muct 26
h~ve the priority of higho::;t n3turo in government pl~n::;.
Com:;equent 1 y. it w~~ felt imper~tive for ~ome l~nd reform
mOi)::::iuro::; to be undert3ken to fore::;t311 further violence in
the country~ ide.
To give further impetu~ to l~nd reform~. the Congre~~
Working Committoe m~do ~ttompt::; in June 1970. to t3ke ::;tock
of the progrecc in implemcnt~tion of l~nd reform~ in
difforont ::;t~to::;. Subeoquontly. ~t tho chiof mini::;tor::;'
conference in September 1970. Mr~ G~ndhi her~elf g~ve the
lo~d whon ::;ho ob::;orvod th3t "land roform io tho moet cruci31
te~t which our politie~l
27 ~yctem muct in order to
curvivc". !l centr~l 13nd rcform~ committee to dr~ft
rocommond3tion::; for n3tion31 coiling policy W3::; :lot up in tho
~~me month.
!l perut:;~l of the Congrecc m~nite[jtoe[j of the period
both in tho 1971 p~rli~mont~ry poll::; ~nd tho 1972 l\:::;:;ombl y
election~ reve~lc pointed refcrence~ to the urgent need for
'31
]OJnd reformr:. The 1972 munifer:to dir:pluyed the importZlnce
tho purty uccordod to tho i~~uo: "Lund roform~ hold~ tho koy
to greuter efficiency in ugriculturul production und the
ovolution of u moro ogulituriun ~ociul
28 ordor in rurul
Cleurly. the opinion in the Congrer:w purty wur: in fvvour
of lund roform~ in conjunction with othor mou~uro~ to improvo
the r:tvtur: of thc poor in the rurvl vrevr:. The r:tupendouw
victory of tho Congro~~ in tho 1971 mid-torm poll~. ~orvod to
r:trcngthen the rcr:olve to implement the poll promir:eu.
Tho ~11 Indiv Congro~~ Committoo ob~orvod in tho fir~t
fluuh of the 1971 victory thvt the pvttern of vgriculturul
growth witno~~od in lu~t fow your~ hu~ tondod to uccontuuto
dir:puritier: between different regionr: Zlnd clvur:ew of fvrmerc
within tho ~umo roglon. Furthor, tho Committoo folt thut tho
economic inequulitiec in thc countrYwide were vccentuvted by
tho now vgriculturul ~trutogy.
Hence. it cvlled for vigorouw implcmentvtion of lund
roform~ with roforonco to tho guidolino~ luid down by tho
Centrvl Government. The committee regretted the exiutence in
mo~t ~t~to~ of u wide gup botwoon formulation ~nd
implementution und culled for the hiutuw to be bridged.
Thoro wu~ ul~o J growing concorn thut lund roform~ hud
been u fvilure in Indiu. &:, the Pl<:lnning Commir:cion'r: Tuck
Force on ~grGriGn RelGtion~ observed in 1973. "in no sphere
of public 3ctivity in our country ~ince indopondonco h3~ the
hiutu~ between precept und pructice. between policy
pronouncoment~ 3nd 3ctu31 oxocution, 29
boen 3~ gro3t J~ in tho
domJin of lund roform."
The con~tellution of the ubove circum~tunce~ reveul thut
tho introduction of lund roform~ in thi~ p~riod JpPo3rod to
be lurgely G respon~e to u convergence of cri~e~ impinging
upon tho politicJl ~y~tom: 3 cri~i~ on tho politic31 front
for Mr~ Gundhi, u cri~i~ on the purty front und u crl~i~ in
tho 13w 3nd ordor ~itu3tion. purticulurly with 31urming
incidcnt~ of of lund grubbing und rurul violence, In e~~ence,
it m3Y bo ~tutod. th3t tho govornmont 3nd tho Congro~~ wu~
fuced with u cri~i~ of legitimucy ut thi~ juncture,
Tho th~ory th3t l3nd roform~ follow~ 3 eri~i~ h3~ 3
ccrtuin respcctubility und proven vulidity demon~truted by
oxumplo~ in othor countrio~ ul~o. Both,
lund reform~ eume in the wuKe of mujor cri~c~ in
In thi~ rogurd. Horrinq muko~ tho p~rtin~nt
ob~ervution thut promulgution of u lund reform in the wuKe of
3 cri~i~ ~orvo~ tho gonorul ~ymbolic function of 3~~uring 311
grDup~ in ~ociety thut the government know~ whut to do und i~
30 c3publo of 3cting forcofully.
93
ThUG" l~nd reform W~~ ee~enti~lly ~ mech~ni~m
tool the ruling elito 3doptod to comb3t tho mon3cing
thrc<:>ts looming l~rgc on milny front~. % u result. one of
tho o~~ontiel condition~ for lend roform~. thet tho political
\1tilityof l~nd reforme should override the politic<:>l
Ibbility. t43~ fulfillod. Ur~' rolo in tho introduction of
the reforme per se wes minimel. confined merely e~ ~
'politicel actor' in tho ~tate ut thet timo.
Given the n~ture of this environment~l situ~tion. it i~
hardly ~urpri~ing that land reform moa~uro~ woro undortakon
ln Kern~t~k~ or Myeore e~ it we~ then known. In other words.
it mily not bo inilppropriato to view tho impotu~ to lilnd
reforms in K~rn~t~ke during this ph~so il~ iln extcn~ion of the
Congro~~ perty policy to ovorcomo tho cri~i~ of legitimacy ..
Hence. it i~ doubtful whether the Deverej Ur~ government
could havo u~horod in land roform~ without tho concortod
efforte of the centrill government ilnd the CongreeG party.
Mora ~o.
po lit icc I
in tho contoxt of ~tate~ like Karnataka whoro a
leuder like Ure could become a chief mini~ter ilt
tho in~tanco of Mr~ Gandhi do~pito lacking broad
independent power b~se.
lbving eXilmined the force~ behind the initiation of land
rofo["m~. wo ~hall now movo on to oxamino tho 1971 hmondmont
llct and its implementation both in grunting lund to the
ten:lnt~ and to tho land -lo~~.
91
1371 ~endmont net
The 1971 oct \~ur:; b::n:; i c;:lll y un umended ven:; i on of the
1361 1\ct. 1\ comprehon::;i vo bill WCl:::; drClftod ::lnd referred to :l
Joint Select Committee in 1971. Mter extenvivc divcll:::;::;ionv.
tho :::;t:lto government p3:::;:::;ed the L:lnd Reform (l\mendmont) 1\ct
in 1973. Subvequently. the oct received preDidentiul u.!Jccnt
1n M::lreh 1971.
Tenuncy Reformc
One of the mo:::;t importunt fcut tlre:::; of the 1971 ~endmcnt
1\et W3:::; the remov3l of exemption from re:::;umption of ten:lnted
lund for oil cutegoricc except :::;oldier:::; und ce:lmen. It hu::
been 3rgucd th3t :::;ince the exemption provi:::;ion:::; for widow:::;,
llnm:lrried dOllghter:::; und mentully or phycicully hundicuppcd
member:::; of 3 f3mily were being gro:::;:::;ly 3bu:::;ed. it W3:::; decided
th~t they :::;hould be dropped.
Thi:::; provicion m:lrked 0 clcur brcuk from thc 1961 :lct
which en:lbled re:::;umption of l::lnd provided ::l l::lndlord or 3
member of hi:::; fumily. per:::;onolly :::;uperviDed eultivution.
em.:!ll
But thi:::;, howovor, re:::;ulted in 3 :::;itu3tion wherein oven
holder:::; who could not undertake cultivution und had 31
therefore le::l:::;od it out 31:::;0 lo:::;t their l:lnd. 1\11 le3:::;ed
land ctood vected in the government D:::; on MDrch 1. 1971.
')')
Con~titution of L~nd Tribun~l~ --- ---- -----
he ~ purt of the implementution of tenuncy reforms. the
3tJte government de~iqned J PJrticul~r modu~ opcr~ndi for the
tcnuntc to obtuin the IJnd. The government Jppointed lund
tribunJI~ before whom ~pplicJtion~ wero to be m~de to obt~in
the leuced lund.
The principul tuck of the tribunulc wuc to uccertuin the
fJct~ with regJrd to the tenJncy CJ~e~ ~nd decido upon thorn.
The tribunul WDS ussigned the recponcibility of encuring the
gonuinonec~ of the ~pplicunt Dnd if co. to ox~mlno whether
the DpplicDnt hDd eligibility to oceupuncy rightc to the
lund. In uddition. it JI~o hud tho powor to OXDmlno tho
cuces reluted to imposition of ceilingc on lund holdings.
Tho tribunJI WJC heJdod by In ~cictJnt Commiccioner.
~ho wuc given come speciul truining. und hud in uddition
four non-offiei~lc uc memborc. Tho IOCJl membor of
Legiclutive uccembly wus UCUJlly u member of the tribunul.
tho
It
WJC mJdo compulcory for one mombor to bo from tho Schoduled
Cuctec or Scheduled tribes.
These tribunulc were conctituted in the period between
Octobor 1971 ~nd June 1975. Ono tribunul WD~ con~titutod for
every tJluk. By the end of 1976. the ctute hud 175 tribun~lc.
36
Dut. ~ub~equently the number of tribunolc incre~ced to
182 a~ a con~equence of the ri~e in their number in Dak~hin3
32 Kannada duo to the hoavy work load. By mid -19G L their
number hod further gone upto 191. f\goin. the increo(;e wor:;
mainly in Dak~hina Kannada 7 followed by Uttara Kannada - 2
and Shimoga. Belgaum ond Gulborgo - one each.
By lato 19131. thore Ha::; a qU::lntum jump 1n the tot:::ll
number of tribunal~ from 191 to 292. Once uguln. the
increa::;o WC)::; mainly in Dak~hina Kannada - a 150 per cont
incrcasc ICuding to a rice in the number of tribunalc to 55
in tho oight taluk~ of the di::;trict.
While initially the 13ct dote for filing of upp]icationc
W3::; fixed 3::; Docombor 31. 1971. it .'3::; ~ub::;oquontly extonded
upto June 30. 1979. To help the tenunt::;. st~mp duty on
application and tho affidavit to bo filed by the tonant wu::;
exempted.
The tribun31's decision was fin31. Thcre wac no
gUQ::;tion of approval by or 3ppo:ll to a highor Cluthority. ]\1]
that thc aggrieved porty could do was to file 3 writ petition
in tho High Court under flrtlclo 226 or 227 of tho
Const it ut ion.
Interest ing] y. 3dvDe3tcs were not 3]]OHCd to 3ppeClr
bofore tho tribuna]~. The rationale for thi~ i~ ovident from
97
...
:J comment mvoe by 0 legicl:Jtor ln the occembly on Mvy 23.
1~73 th:Jt "If l:Jwyor~ :Jco 3110weo to 3pp0:Jr. <:l di~pute which
cvn be cettled would toke v year. flundred und one 33
lC!Jl1CC;
could be r:Ji~ed to prolong tho procoodinq~"
Recognizing the precariouc pocition of the tenont
when eviction from the lund by tho landlord for oven ono
ceaeon could lead the tenant eloce to marginalization und to
back on the landlord for cuccour - the 1971 act alco
permitted thc tribunalc to iccue interim orderc with no
prejudice to the final cettlemont.
In addition. the tribunul could even appoint a receiver
to 3dminicter tho lund. The 3ct <:llco containod provicionc
for providino leoal Dceictonce to the tenantc who were in 3n
indigent ct3te, 3ubccquontly. 3 logal <:lid eoll \~<:lC cot up to
3e~ict the tenantc.
The interecting feature of the 1971 oct wac that neither
did tho tenantc qot the land froo nor did tho 13ndlordc loco
their londe without compencotion. The compcncation amount
wa~ true to :Jny land rCGumod by tho govornmont: much lowor
thDn the market V<:lluc of the lund.
Whilo ownor~ of wot l:Jnd would recoivo 150 timoG lund
revenue pluG 150 timec truncated water rate upplicablc to
tho elacc of land. dry land ownorc would roceivo 200 timoc
the 1 and revenue. The mode of compencation varied for
different eutegories of lundlords.
For purticulurly vulnerublo ~cction~ of the lundlord~
minor!::, HidoHc. physicolly und mentully dicvbled percons
who~o unnuul incomo Wuw Rw 1.800 or lo~~ und for unmurriod
women the mvximum lumpcum pvyment wvc fixed vt Rr:; 50.000
with tho Lomuining to be givon in gUuruntood bond~. For
other evtegoriec. the government ruled thvt the lumpcum could
be puid if tho umount involved wu~ lo~~ thun R~ 2.000. In
the event the umount exceeded Rr:; 2,000, v lumpr:;um of Rc
2.000 W3~ puid in cu~h und the remuining in gUuLuntood bond~.
!J::, for the tenvnL he hud to pvy 15 timec the vnnuvl
incomo In tho cuwe of irrigutod lund~ und 20 time~ in tho
cuee of dry lund. Hcre vguin. if the vmount involved wvc
leww thun Rw 2.000 it h3d to bo puid in u lump~um. In tho
event. the umount exceedcd 2.000. it h3d to be pvid 3r:; v down
p3ymont of Rw 2.000 with tho bulunco to be puid in equill
inetullmente not exceeding 20 yevre. To envble the tenvnt to
puy the premium. fucilitio~ wero provided to obt3in 3 I03n
from the Stute Lund Development Dunk.
Implic3tion~ of 1971 hat on Tonuntc
Tho implicution~ of the 1971 hct on ton3ntc h3w boon
llr:;eecced differently by vvriouc ccholure. While r:;ome hvve
tondod to VlOW it u~ f3cilituting lund tL3n~for to tho
99
31 domin:lnt ~ome other~ h:lve veered to the other
extrema by ob~orving th~t "vory ~ub~t:lnti:ll g:lln~ h~vo boon 35
m~do in tho ~~~3ult on ton~ncy".
Tilble 3.3: Dotail~ about Di~po~ill of Tenancy Application~ and Payment of Premium Amount
[}1 No.
Number Extont o'f ocre~
i) i i )
~pplic3tion~ Rocoivod ~pplicution~ Diepo~cd of:
(3) By Confirm3tion (b) By Relection
ii i) Cortific3te~ of Occupuncy
8.18.933
1.88.885 3,31.111
Righto Ieeucd 1.75.612 i v) ~pplic~tion~ Ponding
Dicpocul 13,601 v) Porcont~go of Diopoo31
in fuvour of Tenunto 59
vi) vii)
vii i! i x)
Premium Fixed Premium Recovercd Promium Wuivod Compeno:ltion Fuid
(;]) In C;]oh (b) NSCe
Tot31
Number
1.39.709 2.78,572 2.75.818
2.12.357
12.17.881
20,00,281 22.61.871
16,19,653
62.726
!.mount in L~kho
2325.77 1255.00 2292.00
6696.00 1502.00
7198.00
Source: C T. Goniumin. St:ltuo P:lpor on Lund Roformo in Kurn:lt~ku. Pupor prooontod ut Sominur on L:lnd Reformo. ISEC. Dung~lore, 1993. p.3.
36 with tho oxcoption of Duml0 h;]vD
udopted u oimil:lr methodology to :looeco the impuct of the
1971 :let. They huvo lookod ut tho numbor of
1971 und eorreloted it with ten~ney opplie:ltion~ received und
100
di~po~ed of 1n fuvour of ten~nts while uGscssing thc impClct
on tenoncy. The rc~ult~ obtoined from adopting ~ ~imil3r
methodology urc presentcd in Tuble 3.3.
!\::, the T:lbla~ 3.1 :lnd 3.5 indicate. 59 cent of tho
applicutions were disposed in f3vour of the ten3nts. This
tran~l:ltad into 1.99 million ucre~ of lond decidod in favour
of the tcn3nts. The perccntuge of ureu decided in fuvour of
tcn3nt~ wa~ 15 per cent.
}lowever. there is u wide v3ri~tion in the imp1ic3tionG
of the oct on tenuncy ;:Icro:::;~ tho di:::;tr iet:::;. For in:::;tanco. in
D3kshin3 Kunnudu. the percentugc of applicutionc decided in
f3vour of the tenunt:::; wa:::; a:::; high u~ 81.B por cont whilo it
\~uS uS low aEo 17.7 per cent 1n Gulburgu.
It 1:::; ul~o evident from tho ubove t:lblo~ that 75 pcr
cent of the tenunts whose claimc were u110wed belonged to six
d i:::;tr iet:::;: Bo1g:lum. Oi i:lpur. Dhurwad. Uttar KanniJdiJ. Shimogu
und Dakshina Kannvdu.
Studies on lund rcforms have caught to explain the
v;:lriation~. o~poci:llly the low rato:::; of implemontation in tho
four dictrictc of Gulbvrgu divicion in termc of poor quality
of l;:lnd record~. backwurdno~~ of tho 37
onvironmont and low litol:";:Icy r;:lto~.
101
I:"ogion. foudal
Ta.ble 3.4 Dl~trlct-wiee Performance on Tenancy Applioations
~------- ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ ----:: I . It -' .: .' \" f t h t! h u :: t.. ~ r 0 r /,(-. ~.~~,:;!<t JppllC3-
t 10ns
r~ceived
E~l~nt of ~ucbcr 01
LJnd
c\.)tllC'd tions
( in .. ere sid e c i d ed
so tar.
Nuober of
decldp.d appllca-
so r a r ( in
acres)
tlons decioed In tavour
Are. dH ldod
In favour of
E .-tenJnts
(jn ~cres)
of Ex-tenants
NVQt.)('r o!
applIcations rejected
A.rea tn\'oly(>J
in re)rction
(in acres)
-------~---------------------------------------------- ------------------------------------------------------ -------------
4 7 8 9 10 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
f·
, . , " , -. ,
U.I . .):ln(id.l
[). ~ .. 1 ... n:~ d d.
:' t, : " " \j:
. . - ••• , ,~ ~1 , :J r e
," .1 - , • "
~. ". ~.
f, '- .. , ~
99702 176237 70300 60733 19533 6.: 162
36692 :~695
~:S98
2~669
r . .:., ,;;,c. 29326 E~~,·:'.cre(RI 36692 . .
~ ;,....;:,. \
-, '. c.:ur[;.l
Bp; ,.):-1
Bant:.,tore 81dar r.oda~u
Raichllr Gulbarga
1 <315 7408
16066 13934 6091 3760 21754 61265
2091 '9 ~58244
5:;25~5
53910G 67308 22~535
95374
290!3 725777 63H5 59nO 94503 56834 594B2 119316 38366 "' 65560 254(9 242287 742030
98647 :76223 70300 60731 IS~83
6q24 36584 ~~641
~l598
2<6G9 29326 36593 14290 7379 17941 13934 6083 3760 21754 61265
20802 45E264 552625 531202 67303 222307 95098 20761
53446 59~7()
9'206 51 729
S'. 310 1 11529 38368 65517 25U9 242287 742030
80674 136974 51042 37410 11 115 32943 20868 7061 25817 12776 13836 16774 5060 :?eZI 6635 05015 1641 9~7
H96 108H
176350 3572() 340026 315182 30236 99778 40042 11810 295426 23833 20974 40318 17179 13535 38746 11345 18942 3391 43462 102069
17973 39249 19:'~ 6 ~3321
8368 31 181 157 I 7 5580 IS 781 I 1893 15490 19819 8426 ~556
11308 8919 4442
2813 16956 50391
32091 1004":' 212599 216019 37066 122528 55046 16950 430351 39613 38496 53867 39545 45774 7281 1 27023 46526 22056 199000 639961
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------St~te 616933 4<465076 817325 1999905 -------------------------------------.---------------------------------------------------------------------- -------------~-
Source:- Revenue Oep~rt •• nt. Gov.rn.~nt of K~rn~taka.
102-
Table 3.1 : ~l.trict-Ille Distribitiol of ftallll, f~lr 1,.ileltloa. tor ~OI'lIcl Il'~t. II. ltoet,' of TeLlICY ~e.lliatiol il iaralltll
Sl ie(IODS l Wo ot Wo ot 10 of Tenancy Applications X Tenact! X hunts 1 of Soccess '0 Dlltrlcts Tenu tl !pp 11- Tecutl l ~cilions up to in 1971 to Nho Applied I Hili I Hili
in 1917 callonl in 1971 H-e-mI Total fena- upto 1979 A D iecei Hd ~o.of Mo. of bts il 1957 to Tohl Irol Teu- Appll- Applications ~ILIli Tebuts i. ants .pto cations Decided in A 1957 Q *IS!! 39-8-1& h,our of A
h-teunts & B C 0 I , G B
--- ---
I Coastal I Uaklbiu UUIl ~8, 923 7U91 I,T6,m 1,36,889 IU9 3U2 27.98 77 .61
luuda 2 Uttara 1,81,239 52,m 7U~6 98,976 88,968 39.98 ~UI 41.67 8U8
(nuda
II ~alud l CblCl- 3UII US) 'I ,515 IUB 11,131 21.38 5U6 31.66 ~ 7.1li
n,alore I Ha!5ao 18,(71 6 , 29'1 1,769 29,)26 13,881 31.23 m,H 75.11 (7.33 ~ lodara ,3,871 268 \3i 3,768 1,852 2.3B IUB 1.56 28.9(! 6 Saito,a 1,11,788 11,188 31.688 59,m 33,119 28.35 53.29 29.65 5UB
Illlortben I be L,an 2,27,815 19,m 17,511 79,389 \ L, 912 29.85 30.85 22.18 72.6B 8 ~ ldat 32,m 816 2,146 6,991 l.617 1.58 18.89 U8 27.91 3 Bi)apar 1.B9,8il9 IU82 21,353 IU9l 21.291 2U5 41.59 21.29 58.1B
19 Dharlld 1, IU~6 J8,152 49,921 68, J 3J 37,m 31.15 12.68 26.28 61.68 II Galbar,a 86,989 1,168 22,951 61.265 1~,S33 25.97 IU2 12.16 17.81 11 laiclar 41 ,l'I9 1,387 8,177 21,111 1,796 2U9 51.83 11.65 22,85
li Soathen 13 ba~(alore 69,m 8,128 12 , 181 10,616 21,181 LU8 73.e5 31.13 13.82 Ii Bellary 11,841 6i8 7,101 18,066 6,618 16.73 18.18 11.76 36.63 II Cbitradar,a 33,85i 336 2,m 'I,m 2,111 '1.92 2UI 1.79 lUJ 16 lolar H,m I , 4'19 13,il'18 21,m 12,1'16 3U9 63.92 33.111 51.79 l'I Kud, a ,un I,M I,2lS I i,833 8,282 lUI 73.32 le.H 55,33 18 K,sore 71,616 9,168 9,728 36,692 1B,787 lUI iU8 21. J7 56. (J
I~ Tailor U, 17 1 I,m 1,769 11,38~ U32 11.78 31.35 lU7 38.66
IH~ataka
State 18,13,1~1 2,41,91~ 3,97,182 8,1),781 1,81,119 21.ge 11.98 26.71 59.58
--------
)OQfCe . C ~ Daile, " L.ld ieforl' Le,i!iltioo in lar~ltlll -K,th of Sacce!s", ~PM, Vol 21, No 33, Au,ult, 1m I H .opala lrislla GOlda, °Telalcy lefora II Ilrlltatl-, Paper pr"eDted at the Workshop 0.' ~aad ~Iforll II larlltah, ISIC, 841,llorl, Septelber 1-3 , 1993, Apeldl[ 11.
103
Dc~pite the wide vuriutionc in performunce, the overull
offect of tho 1971 ~ct appear~ impre~~ivo with a ~ucce~~ r3to
of 59 per cent.
However. there haD been eritiei~m by come Dcholarc over 38
the adoption of tho above methodology. The~o ~cholar~ h3VO
preferred to anulyze the 1971 ~et with the number of tenuntD
in 1957 a~ a ~tarting point. The re~ult~ obtained from u~ing
thiD methodology are indicuted in Tuble 3.5
~ Table 3.5 indicate~, tho percentage of ~ucce~~. which
Wu~ 59 per cent in the former mode of unalYDiD, now Dlip~ to
26.79 cent. To olaborato. tho oxtont of land hold by tonant~.
which waD about cix million aereD of land in 1951-55 in the
jrea~ forming part of Karnataka. had fallon ~teoply to 2.1 39
million acre~ by 1970-71.
It hac been argued that four million acreD of land were
coa~ed to bo held by tenant~ mo~tly owing to thoir oviction 10
by their landlordc. Clearly. the period from 1951 to 1971
ha~ proved to bo co~tly for tonant~.
hD the Table 3.6 indicutcD. during the period 1961 to
1971. the proportion of agricultural labouror~ ha~ incroa~ed
by about 51 per cent and that of cultivatorD decreaDed by
Jbout 30 per cant.
101
Table 3.6: CultivatorD and Karnataka (1961.
C::!taqory 1961 1971
!l. B
i'.qricultural 1971. 1981>
'l5 incrc:l:Jo 1961-71
C
LabourerD in
1981 't incraa::;a 1971-81
D E - . - . - . - - - - - - . - - - ---- -- -------- - - - --
Tot::!l Population 23586772 29299011 21.70 3713571 26.7
Cultivator::; 5806661 1072879 -29.85 5222032 28.2 hgr ieu It ur u I Lubouren:; 1761110 2717537 51.30 3655197 31.5
Source: C B Dumle. "Land Reformc Leqiclution Myth of Succe::;::;". EPW. Vol 21. No. 33.
in Kurnutuka 1989 p.1899.
The incrcuce In the proportion of uqrieulturul
l3bourer::; m::!y be ::!ttributed ta the eh::lnqe In definition of
Cultivutor in the 1971 Census und eviction of tenuntc by
l::lndlord::;. Tan::lncy h::ld it::;alf daclined can::;ider::lbly in
Indiu in thc period from 1917-71 followinq the Zuminduri 11
!l.bolition !l.et 3nd rel::lted lcqi::;l::ltion .
• Jowever. the eVuluution of uny lund reform meucure - in
thi::; in::;tance. the 1971 hmendment Act - hu::; to viewed aguin::;t
3 cituution thot eXlsted ut thut point of t imc. In other
decrea::;a In tan::lncy 3::; 3 re::;ult of implementation of
the 1971 Act muy need to be uccecccd by eoncidcrinq the
proportion of tenunt::; on dJto.
Yet unothcr point thJt hoc been mJde by ctudiec on lund
roform::; in the ::;t3te i::; thut the ::;mall lundholder::; m::ly h::lva 12
lo::;t thoir: l::lnd to the l::lrqe holdor::;. Givon tho nJture of
105
this usc;crtion, it moy be nece~s~ry for extencive prim~ry
::;urvoy::; to oX3mino thi::; l::;:;UO.
It huG been contended thut l~ndlord~ bcnefited tenunte
to bocomo ownor::;. 13
thi::; wu::; only in tho C3::;0 of 3b::;ontoo
13ndlordicm The key f~ctorc impelling the le~eing out of
l3nd by ::;m3ll holdor::; 3ro lock of 3CCO::;::; to C3P3City.
mClneuverobility of holdingo. i nClb i lit Y to develop
::;upplomonting ontorpri::;o liko onim31 hu::;bondry ond gr03tor
eeneitivity to the role of ouch uncertuin condition prefero
omploymont to cultiv3tion.
PrimClry dutCl buced etudiee conducted Clt the micro level
do not offer much by W3Y of ovidonco to ::;ub::;tontioto tho
Clrgument thClt lClrge holders benefited much from the tenuncy 11
roform::;.
T3blo 3.7 : Di~tribution of Land Loa~od in and Loa~od out in Karnataka in Early SovontioG.
L3ndownor::;hip CCltcgoricc
LiJnd 1 0::;::;
SmiJllholdcro ( O. 00 to 2. 19
iJcrce) FiJmi I y F3rmere (Z.50to 9.99
iJcree) LiJndlorde
( 10 3ero::;o. 3bovo)
L3nd in 100e of 3cre::;
- - - . .
1.695 12.517
1 L 085
8,259
L03::;od in 't of
totiJl ICiJoed 1 :md
L3nd L03::;od out in 100e ~ of totiJl of <:lcro::; lO<:l:;od
lund
------- ----------------------13 31 1153.2 6.6
30 8556.1 19. 1
23 7736.1 11.3
. - ----------------------------------------------------------Sourco: htul Kohli. ~~u.,-'-pp.170-171.
Ho \ole vc r I doto oVuiluble on lvnd leu~ed in by different
typo~ of 13ndowner~ doo~ ~oem to indicate that ~mall holdor:::;
may havc lo~t land to large furmer~. Tvble 3.7 indicvte~ the
Further. it may be in~tructive to look at the
functioning of tho l::lnd tribunal~. Though tho tribun;)l~ woro
cet up octencibly for the epeedy dicpo~ul of coee~. thc lvrgc
numbor:::; who queued up bofore thom inovit::lbly lod to do lay:::;.
Mdcd to that. the caeee pending before the ~ligh Court tl}c;o
contrlbutod to the del;:)y~. It h::J:::; boon ob~orvod that many of
the Cilee~ which came before the ~ligh Court pertvined to
procodural dofect:::; on m::Jttor:::; liko non-i:::;:::;uo of notico to tho
IClndlordc. non-considerution of arguments put forth by the 15
landlord ote.
It hile been further argued thvt eeveral of the lilnd
tribunal:::; woro corrupt. Ono :::;onior momber of the judiciary
obeerved thvt the land tribunvlG functioned in v hvphilzard
m::lnnor ::lnd woro bogu~. It h::l~ boon furthor notod that tho
court hvd vl~o come vcro:::;~ innumerable in:::;tvnce~ of :::;tvndilrd 16
cyelo:::;tylod judgmont:::; of the tribunol:::;.
The memberehip of the tribunvlc were frequently v mevne 17
to di:::;tribute pallt le.::l! p;)tron::lqo. studio~ h::lvO a 1:::;0
revealed that thece tribunCllc functioned like legvl court
thouqh thoy were expeetod to be a poople:::; court. It W::J:::; only
1(17
Dome ~reoc of the ct~te like Korn~t~k~ th~t thoDo tribun~lc 18
worked like ~ re~l peoplcD court.
Aiding the land leDD:
Whilc ex~mining the iDCUC of ~iding tho landleDc, ~n
~ttempt would b~ m~de hare initi~lly to examine the relevant
proviClonD of the 1971 hct ond Dubcequcntly the outcomc of
itD implomont~tion.
Thc 1971 hct fixcd 0 ceiling on onc'c holding either oc
a family or an lndividual. The family waD defined to mean
hUubond, wife, unmorried dilughter ilnd minor con. l"m ildul t
Don W~D pcrmitted to Dtake clilim ~D a Depilr~tQ filmily.
Duch ~ f~mily w~s ~llowed to hold upto 10 unitD of lilnd.
In a family eODDiDting of more thaD five memberD. un
ildditionol two unitc for every ildult member in exceDC of five
unitD waD allowed subieet to an aggregute holding of not mere
thiln 20 unitc.
~ unit WilD defined ilC lond with 0 Doil claDcificiltion of
ilbovo eight annas with faeilitiaD for aSDured irrigution from
cuch Government c~nolc ilnd tilnkD eilpilble of cupplying wilter
for growing two crops of paddy in an year.
Thc 10 unitc of l~nd, ~c per the ~C"L w~c equivillent to
51 aereD of dry l3nd (D claDS) or 30 aere= of C elasD land
W8
Hith 101> coil cl:n;cific~tion or 2S ~crec of C cl~cE: l~nd with
high coil cl~ccification or 20 acroc of B clacc land with low
r:; 0 i 1 cl~ccific3tion or 15 ~crec of D elacc J~nd with high
coil cl~ccification or 13 aeroc of h clacc land with low coil
c13ccifieation or
cl:Jccific3tion.
10 acree of h c13ee l~nd with high coil
More lund wac brought under the ceiling luwe ~c the
exemption grantod to dairy farming. poultry farming and
livectock breeding In the l"ltd hct WuC now removed ~nd were
troatod ac agricultural land.
Section 55 of the hct provided for filing of declaration
by pereone holding an oxtont of 10 aeroe of dry land or
equivalent extent of other claccec of land.
Furthor. In 1979. tho govornmont providod mora
concecClonc to the poor. hny agricultural labourer, who on
Janu:ny 1. 1979 roe idod in a dwoll ing not bolonging to him.
w~c eligible to ~pply for ownerchip righte of the cume ulong
wlth tho currounding 3r03 eubjoct to a maximum of 1~20 of an
ilet c.
Subr::;equcnt 1 y,
,il13go articanc
In 1982, this fucil ity wac extended to
with tho moduJ oporandi too b t a in tho
!'cncfitc being the c~mc 3C in the eClce of tcnClntc.
10'")
Implement~tion of Ceilin~ Meuwures
We Gh~ll now ~ttempt to underwtund the implementution of
tho coil ing lilw:::; in tho :;tato. Effort:::; would ~ll:::;o bo mildo to
wupport the mucro- level dLltu wlth micro-level obuervut ionu.
Tho parformanca undor coiling provi:::;ion:::; hLl:::; baen
indicuted in Tuble 3.e
Tilble 3.8: Doclarationo Filod by tho Potential of Land
61 No
1-2. 3. 1.
5.
6.
7.
G. 9.
Holdora undor Coiling Provioiono Roforrno Amondmont ~t, 1974
Number Extent of l:.crec
Doclariltion Fi10d Declurutionc Dicpoucd of No.of Doclaration:::; Ponding Extent of Lund Declared uu Surplu:::; Extent of Lund tuken POuueuvion Out of L3nd tilkon Po:::;:::;o:;:;ion Surpluc Lilnd Dictributed Tho Extond of in Li t ig<J.t ion:
Land Tribunil1:; fligh Court
Tot31
L 11. 066 L 10,913
315
No. of Ca~QO
Pending
1221 2869
1090
71,28,920 73,13,336
38,125
2,75,298
L 59. 537
L15,337 1,62.869
Extent of 1':.crec
13,178 1.19.391
1.62,869
Sourco: C T, Bonjamin, StiltU:::; Pap~r on K3rnat<J.ka, Papar pro:;ontod ilt Rcformc. 18EC. Bilngillore, 1993.
Lilnd Roform:::; in Seminar on Lund
Of tho 1,11,066 doc1ariltion:::; rocoivod, 1.10,913 h;lVQ
been dicpoccd of. wherein 2.75,298 ucrec hilve been declilred
:::;urplu::; land, out of which 1,59,737 uera:::; of lilnd h;l:::; boon
110
tClken possessiCln of Clnd 1. 1:_,337 Clcres distributed. The :>reCl
undor litig::ltion 1:; 1.62.869 :1cro:;. HO~lcvor. the dccl:lL)tion::;
filed pertDin to 7.12 rnilliCln Dcrec of IClnd.
Tho guo::;tion thot ori:;o:; now I::; whot foctor:: h:lve
constrDined the irnplernentDtion of lDnd ceiling 1 ~W!:i. To
undec:;tand the :;arne. wo :;holl roly on micro lovel :;tudie:;.
hccording to one such sClmple curvey. which covered entire
:;t:lto. rocour:;e to writ:; in the high court:; hod beon lorge 1'3
ond provod to bo 0 mojor bottlonock in implomcntotion.
This ctudy hos oleo pClinted out thDt the performonce of
tho :;tatc eomp;:)ro:; poorly with tho other :;tatc:;
1netituting l::lnd ceiling C::lsec through Ddminietrotive CUD
motto initi:ltivc.
It hoc been noted thDt only 7.1 per ccnt of the
l:lndownorc woro m:ldo to filo docl;:)r;:)tion through :;uo motto
odminir:;trJtive initiotive while 92.9 per cent of the
;::lndowncr:; filed docl;:)ration on thoir own initi3tivc. In
controst. the 011 IndiD level of 10nd ceiling cucee detected
through :;uo motto initially i:; 35.6 por cont . "Such low
pcrformoncc of KornCltoko ic indicutive of luck of prompt
odmini:;tr;:)tivc initi::ltivo to c;:)pturo and dotoct tho concoalod 50
0:; ::l1:;0 bonomi l;:)nd coiling co:;o:;." ;:)rquo:; tho ::;tudy.
1 11
It ic interecting to vn~lyze ~c to why thc problem of
l:lndlcGGneGG waG not tackled by OrG. Scholars on Karnat:lka
politics h~ve considered thc ~ct ~c ~n ~bjcct 51
f~ilurc in
~iding the l~ndlecc. It 1C ~rgued th~t the ~ct w~c ncver
intended to aid tho landlesG and tho ~ct waG only a first 52
Gtop 1n :1 long~r and more r3dic~1 proeess.
th:lt vn ~tt~ck on l~ndlecsnecs would have ~ffected the
in northorn Karnataka and it waG tho
fC3r of the urb~n and the rur~l Ling~y~tG joining together
impollod Drs to defor hiG attack on tho problems of 53
l:lndloGs labourors.
hs T~ble 3.9 indic~tec only 13.687 3pplic~ntG benefited
from the policy to confer agricultural labourers with tho
right to ownerchip to the dwelling unitc on land not
belonqing to them along with the Gurrounding aroa subjoct to
3 m3y.1mum of 1/20 of 3n ~crc. Given the cubGt3nti31 growth
1n :lqricultural labourers 1n tho docado 1961-197 L it i:i
curpricing t h3t GO few l~bourerc responded to this
in i t i :1 t i ve.
While m3cro- level data on thc c~stc composition of I~nd
ownership is not avail~blo. micro lovol studioG havo rovoalod
th3t thc surplus ceiling owners were m~inly dr~wn from the
upper castes (32.9 ~) and othor backw3rd c~stos (29.3 ~) with 51
the averago araa at the state laval baing 215.28 acros.
112
Th 1 c t.
:;ucvcy rcvr;)
. ,,0 t, JPported by other curycyc. One
• h3t :. :.; ''I.Jt:. .lCcountod for 16.)0 por co' ~~
tho::;c who t I. ! doel)r " ,0n::: of :::urplw: holdlnq:::.
T ol b 1 0 3. 9: Ap p 1 i Colt i 0 m; F I 1 0 d by Lol nd I 0 e; e; L. bo u r are; Ownof~hlp RightG on Dwell InQ Unite;.
ROQ Ion:::; 6. Dletf IctC
No.of I\ppl I co
t 1 'In:.
No.of I\ppIICLl
t Ion:;
No. of I\pp I I COl'
• of
I Co;):::;t.:ll I D.:llrchlno
KLlnnLld<J -, Utt;)f;)
K<J nno d:.
II M;)ln::ld 3 C"hiccr.mo-
9;)lofC 1 fJuc.:::.:.n 5 Kod:lgu 6 Shimoqo
III Nocthorn 7 Bclqoum 8 Bid:lf 'J Bi:i::lpul:
10 Dh:ll:w::Id 11 Gulb.:ll:'go 12 R::I iehuc
Eiouthcl:'n
RcC'clvcd
!\
I ~6
77 I g 1 :176
1 .. (l~3 11
115 111
L 570 2.716
13 D.:lnq.:l\Ol:'c ~Q5
1113011ny lIS 15 Chitrodurqo 101 16 Kol::lf 1 17 M<Jndyo ~I
18 My:::;orc 61 19 Tumkur foC'
~ 5. 11'1 -- - - - _.- - - - - - - - . - - - .
Di C pClt:cd
L't·
7"7
191 321
606 11 76
110 L 570 2.716
.,,,-. .. '-'-1 1 <.
380 1
.:! 1 5("> ~c.
22.010
.. lon:;
h.cidc:d In F.lvour 01 I\ppllcont c
C
f,
"l
• 15 16
1.11'7 1.399
•
bUfC-C: C B DLlmlc. "Lund Rcform 1 l'Jl::I.,t lC'n
9...2.!.ci~ p.l'303.
1 1
. 10 e
H.e
63.9
65. 1
92.2 31.0 39.3
70.8 6'.3 98.'7 32.8 '7 1. 1 18.8
.:!l. )
10 .• 2~. (, 61. ' . 2."
88. -
62. 1
To huvc better perception of l~nd reforms In the
:;t3tO. it i:; in:;tructivo to undor:;tand tho natura of lClnd
reforms In other countries.
~ perusal ~f highly successful land reforms in countries
like Moxico. Taiwan. Egypt and Iran rovoal:; ono common
clement: the high degree of political commi tment to land
roform:; in tho:;e countr ie:;. In oach of tho eountrie:;. tho
emergence of po lit i e~ 1 leaders wi t h a high degree of
commitment and idontific3tion with land reform:; contributed
in no smDll meDsure to the success of land reforms.
It ha:; beon 3rgued dynamic 3nd re:;oluto
po lit i cal
onorglze
leader with compDssion for the peasantry,
tho reform movemont. provide it with :;pir ito 5~,
dramatizo tho ro:;ult:;.
can
and
The committed efforts of GenerDl Chen Cheng In TaiwDn,
Lezaro Cardona:;. Alvara Obrogon 3nd Emilio Porte:; Gi 1 in
Mexico, Mohammed NDguib iJnd GiJmal llbdel NDsser in Egypt. Dnd
tho Sh3h of Ir3n indic3tod the crucial differonce betwoon
succes:; 3nd failure of land reform:; In their countries. The
politic3l environmont W3:; conducive to the implemontation of
lund reforms with viqour, following the intense efforts of
the:;e 3ctor:;. Furthcn. til,; .nq3nizCltion of tho poa:;ant:; In
Mexico und Taiwun ul:;o aIded lund reforms.
1 11
Did diwpl~y the s~me degree of commitment to thc
implomont~tion of l~nd roform ? Unliko in tho c~~o of tho
lc~derw In Mexico. T<:dw<tn or Ir<tn. Urw functioned under the
con::;tr~int of boing ~ v~s::;~l of ~ lo~dor liko Mr::;
whowc commitment to reform <lppe<lrw <lw <l political tool.
Commont ing on tho Ind L:m offort~ ~t l~nd roform::;. ono
cchol~r obccrvcd th~t the government'w l<lnd ref orm
progr~mmo:::;. whilo comprohon~ivo in ~copo worD not givon ~ny
effective centrDI direction or the necewwary politicDI 57
~upport to bring thorn to ~ ~ucco:::;~ful conclu~ion.
l'lt the ut<lte levcl too. no uep<:lr<lte Dgency to implement
l~nd roform:::; w~~ :::;et up ~nd tho t~:::;k w~:::; l<:lrgoly <:l~::;igned to
the bure<lucr<lcy of the revcnuc dep<:lrtment.
L~nd reform involve:::; ~ fund~mont~l ro~tructuring of
power. economic Dnd uOCiDl rel<:ltionuhipc between the pe<lu<lnt
~nd tho landlord re:::;ulting in the ~ltoration of the ~gr~ri~n
order.
The hiutory of l~nd reformu tewtificu th<:lt <:lchieving it
through domocr~tic~lly oloctod govornmont l~ tho mo:::;t
d<lunting tauk. The domin<ltion of legiul<:ltive <:luwcmblieu <lnd
P~rl iamont by l~ndod interu:::;t~. h;):::; m;)do undort;)king of l;)nd
reforms frl1str<:lting exercise these countriew.
"P;)rli<:lmont:::; good or b<:ld" ob:::;orvod the Ir;)ni<:ln Prime Mini:::;tor
115
58 1\1 i Mini. "::lI:O 3n ob:::;t3clo to r:ofor:m." The exper:ionco of
Pukistun, Egypt, Ethiopiu und muny of thc Lutin hmer:ic~n
countrio:::; I i ko Ecu3dor. Br::lzil ::lnd poru. 3tte:::;t:::; to tho
impossible tusk thut democr:utic gover:nments f::lce in ushcring
in mO::lningful r:oform:::;.
The histor:y of successful l::lnd reforms demonstr~tes thut
it h3:::; inv3ri::lbly t3kon pluce through ::l revolution or pl::lnnad
~ct ion. It hus been urgued thut comprehensive l~nd reforms
::lftor World W3r II wer:o produced. oithor by communi:::;t 59
rovolution or by Moric::ln military ::lction.
However. there is ~dequute r:eason to believe thut the
l::lnd roform:::; 3Ct di:::;turbod tho oquilibrium in tho rural 3re::l:::;
of the st~te 3nd 3ltered the stutus quo.
!\nothor koy f::lctor that impodod tho progre:::;:::; of 13nd
reforms in the state is the l~ck of strong orguniz3tionc from
bolow unliko in tho noighbouring :::;t::lto of Kor::ll::l. Sovor::ll
cchol::lrc huve highlighted the need for strong orgunizutionc
from bolow to givo ::l thrust to 13nd roform:::;.
However: • or:guniz::ltionc from below ~re pronounced by
thoir ::lb:::;onco I imi tod oxtent
fbssun ~nd D~kchinu K,lDnud~ dictr:icts. It may be noted thut
tho :;itu3tion tho
gener~l [; it u~t ion prevu iIi ng In Indiu on the poor:
or:g3niz::ltion of the P0::l:::;::llltr:y. Ono :;tudy h::l:::; o:::;timated the
116
membership. in Indio. of poor pCu[j~ntr:; ond ogricultl1rol
l:lboror:::; 60
to bo not moro th3n fivo per
cont.
However. the creution ond foctering of such
1:::; :l daunting t a:::; k. o:::;pocially with a
ruling purty like the Congresc which preferred to operute
through the 13ndod intere:::;t:::; in tho rural hintorland:::; 61
th3n :::;trike :::;trong root:::; with tho rural ma:::;eoe.
The weukneue of the left purtie!: in mOut purt:::;
rathor
of the
country. coupled ~Iith tho economic dopondoncy of tho poor.
the nuture of. poverty. the coercive power of the propertied
cla:::;:::;o:::; 3nd poor implomont3tion of tho:::;o law:::; oxi:::;ting on tho
ctCltute books mode orgunizution of the rurul poor
Severi:ll studied hi:lve highlighted the crucii:ll need for
organization:::; of tho poor to build up political pro:::;:::;uro:::; for
reforms their involvement in 62
formuli:lt ion.
implomontation 3nd monitoring progro:::;:::;ivoly.
If li:lnd reformu i:::; tuken i:lS the high point of the Uru
or (), thon rc:::;orv3tlan:::; for tho backwClrd c13:::;:::;o:::; h3:::; to be
[;ccn ;:lei the uecond mi:ljor prop on which c]uimu of cocii:l]
]\J:::;tice woro frequontly mado. Ilonco. in tho noxt :::;octian • .::In
117
:lttempt would be m:Jdc to eXilmine the nilture
implement3tion of the preferment policy introduced by Ur~.
Rcccrvutionc;
Sociill scientists, who huve exumined reserviltionr; in the
Ur::; er3. 3re of tho view th3t Ur~' b3ckw3rd c13~:::;e~ policy
WuC the most comprehensive ilnd rildicill to be 63
introduced by
:lny chiof mini::;ter in Indi3.
Soon ufter ussuming office in July 1972, Urr; conr;tituted
:l b3ckw3rd c13:::;::;o:::; commi:::;::;ion undor tho ch3irm3n::;hip of L G
HilV:lnur. The report of this commission Wilr; submitted In
1971. In hi:::; Roport. ch3irm3n L G H3vanur commonted upon tho
:lbiding interest thilt Urs hils for the Ciluse of the weilker
::;r.ction::J. But for Dov3r3j Ur:::;, the commi:::;:::;ion would not h3vo 61
been:l re31ity.
The terms of the reference of the commission were:
1. To :::;ugge::;t tho criteri3 to be 3dopted for determininq whether 3ny c1ilsses of persons in the ::;t3tO other than tho Schoduled caste[j :::;oci311y c}jJcccs;
ilnd tribes milY be 3nd educ3tionally
treilted ilS backward
2. To investigilte into the living ilnd working condition:::; of all :::;uch c13:::;::;e::; of po r:::; on:::; with r;oeiill reforence to the difficu1tier; under which thoy m3Y bo 13bouring 3nd to milkc recommendiltions ilS to the cpeciill provi:::;lon:::; which 3rc noco:::;:::;3ry to bo m3da by the Government for their ildvilncement ilnd for tho provi:::;ion of thoir :::;OCi31.
Ilti
educCltionvl gonor:lll y;
economic intcrc~ts
3. To mvke v list of vII clvsses which mvy be rogardod a~ backward cla~~o~ in tho ~tate;
1. To suggest whvt reservvtions should be mvde for ~uch cla~~o~ In tho educational institutions mvintvined by the stvte or receiving aid out of tho ~tato fund~;
5. To suggest whvt other ~cholar~hip~ otc. mClY cl.Jss;c~;
constitutions bo givon to
like ~uch
6. To determine to whvt extent such clvsseu aro ropro~ontod in tho ~orvico~ undor tho stvte vnd to recommend whvt reservvtions of po~t~ in ~~ch ~orvico may bo mado for thorn;
7. To genervlly vdvise the government vbOtlt tho ~top~ to bo takon to on~uro adequate svfeguvrds for the bvckwvrd clvsses of citizon~ in tho ~t3tO.
The report of the commISSIon wvs submitted
Sub~oquent 1 y. it wa~ placed boforo the logi~lature
In 1975.
in 1976
vna vfter vpprovvl by the cvbinet. v new reservvtion policy
wa:::; announcod in Fobruary 1977 on tho eva of tho
elect ion.
The avtv necessvry for the purpose of determining the
backward cla~~e~ wa~ collectod through a ~ample ~urvoy. 193
villvges vnd 185 urbvn blocks were covered. l'll together. dvtv
colloctod from 63.650 familio~ with a population of
3.55.000. The percentvqe of the populLltion surveyed wvs LIB
por cant of tho ~tato'~ population.
I 1 Q
Exhul1st i ve SOC10-
oconomlc indicJtor:3 like oducJtion, omp I oymant, land
holdings, 1 iving condit ions, triJdit ioniJl OCCUPiJt ion, etc. In
addition, information collactod about
cooperutives, money lending, edueOltionul institutions iJnd
ho~t of other factor~ at the villago, ward and taluk lovol:;.
For purposes of reserviJtion under hrticle 15( 1>, the
commi:3~ion ob~orvod thJt 3 ca~te or community who~e pa:;:3
percentage IS below the ::;tiJte iJverage (1. 69 per thousJnd of
population> :3hould be treated educationally
biJckwiJrd. ~tcr iJsccrtiJining further detiJils on the sociill
backwardno~~ u:Jing multiple choico te~t~. the C3~tO::; and
communitics wcre cutegorized into three groups.
1. Backw3rd communit ie~ (who::;o ::;tudont 3vorage populiJtion per thol1sond of populiJtion i!J below Gtate 3voroge but abovo 50 por cont of the stOlte iJveruge)
2. Backward ca::;to::; (who::;e ::;tudont ovorago por thousiJnd of populiJtion is below 50 per cent of the ::;tata avarJqe).
3. BiJckwJrd tribes (whose student iJveriJge is bolow 50 par cont of ~tato averago excopt DombJrc iJnd VoddiJrc ond iJre nomOldic ond donotifiod tribo::;)
The extent of reserviJtion cuggected by the committee for
b3cKWCJrd communi t ios. bockwcu-d C3:3te::; and b3ckw3rd tr iba::; i::;
}t •. L 10. 1 Zlnd 6. I per: cent rec.peet i vel y.
120
In iJddition. if the 18 per cent rcccrvat ion for
Schadulod C3~to~ and Tribe~ i~ 3ddad. tho total
would comc to 50 per cent. which WD~ in DccordDnce with thc
Suproma Court·~
My~orc.
The most
axclu:;ion
vordict in tho ca~e of Ba13ji v~
intercuting feDture of the report
whi 10
the
tho
Vokkuligu::; were rctuincd. Thi~ ilu::;umeu further uignificilnce
Vokkaliga~ account for 50 par cant of tho population in
thc bDckwilrd community group which cOlluiutu of ju!::t 15
communiti:>~.
Thc eomml::;::;lon ill::;o ::;uggeuted other mcwuureu to improve
tho lot of tho b3ckward ela:;:;o:;: ~upport for live~toek
breeding
::;orieulture
dwiry <Jctivitic~. cott<Jgc induutricu. fiuhcrieu.
otc .• 3nd tho :;otting up of a directorato 3nd a
function<Jl corpor<Jtion for the bilekw<Jrd cla::;::;cu. Thc H<Jv<Jnur
Commi:;:;ion arguod that ca~ta inoqualitio:; had par:;i~tod in
Indi3 dc::;pitc the country hilving ~con il number of rcformcru.
But. whilo implomonting tho H3V3nur roport. made
uomc importwnt chilnge::;. In::;pite of the
roeommond3tion that Mu~ 1 im:; ought to bo treated 3~ a
reliqiou~ minority. Uru' government included them in the
b3ckw3rd communitio:;.
121
In ~ddition, the gove~nment int~oduced a new catego~y _
tho backwa~d ~poci3l g~oup. Fivo po~ cont of job~ and p13cc~
in educ~tion~l institutions l~te~ ~cvised to fiftcen pc~
cont woro ~o~orvod fo~ thi~ g~oup who~o mombo~~hip W3~
dcte~mined pu~ely on the g~oundG of occupation and lncome
without ~oforonco to ca~to.
Fu~thc~, thc gove~nmcnt o~de~ fixed an income limit on
tho~o ~ooking ~o~o~vation undor tho bacKwa~d community and
bacKwa~d c~stes. It p~csc~ibed a family income ceiling of Rs
8,000 for backward ca~te~ 10,000 fo~ backward
communities while no ceiling w~s p~esc~ibed fo~ the bacKwa~d
t~ibo~. The govo~nment o~der providod for re~orv3tion for 205
communities.
The government orde~s on H~vanur·s repo~t were,
howevor, challonged in tho KarnataKa High Court on ~ove~al
g~oundc by m~ny peoplc. ~t a cubsequent hea~ing In the
Gup~omo Court, tho ~tato govornmont gavo an und~rtaking that
new bacKward claGces commisGion would be appointed to
dotormino tho backward cla~~o~ in tho ~tato.
However, the Ure government did not remain In power to
implomont thi~ a~~uranco givon to tho Court. Tho appointmont
of the commission awaited thc Ramokrichna Hcgdc government in
1993.
122
The implement~tion of reuerv~tion pol icy in the Uru eru
domon~trutod thut tho mobilizution of tho non-dominunt cu~to~
by thc Congrcuu (1) hud puved the wuy for greuter diuperuul
of dovolopmont bonofit~.
Shift in Political Leadership in 1980
Tho politicul lOudor~hip in tho ~tuto witno~~od ~trungo
twists und turns in 1980. In ordcr to underutand the geneuiu
of tho~o chungo~, it muy bo o~~ont iul to oX:lmino tho outcomo
of the 1978 uuuembly elcctiom:;. The Februury 1978 electionu
witno~~od Ur~ con~oliduting hi~ purty in tho ~tuto.
The Congrcuu (I) won 151 ueuts leuving the Junutu Furty
tr:lil ing fur bohind with 59 ~O:lt~. Ur~' victory cumo ut :l
time when hiu ministry hud been diumiuued by the Centrul
govornmont in Junu:lry 1978. tho party hud ~plit for tho
second time, und the ccntrul government wuu under the Junatu
On the oecuuion of the victory. Uru noted thut the
ro~ult~ of tho oloction~ woro un outcomo of tho "effectivo
implemcntution of the economIC policicu und progrummcr:;
propo~od by our gro:lt lO:ldor Mr~. Indira G:lndhi" in fuvour of 65
tho wOilkor ~oction~.
The uociul buue of the politicul lcuderuhip once uguin
123
reveoled the n~ture of ehonges th~t Ors ~nd lndir:> were
br1nging 1n the ~t3te. In line with the trond of the 1')72
el ect ions, thc strength of the dominunt c~stes declined
furthor in tho a~~embly a~ pro~onted in Tablo 3.8.
Table 3.10: CaElte--wiEle HemborElhip of tho Legislative Assembly in 1978.
C3~te
Linguyat:::; Vokk.ll ig~s Othor~
Totul
Total i'lssembly Strongth
52 13
131
225
Cong ( I)
Strength
28 23
100
151
Junut3 Strength
17 15 27
59
Other Opposition Strongth
7 5 1
16
Source: Interview~ with middle-level p~rty worker:::;
SimilZlrly. the proportion of dominunt custe members of
the legi~13tivo 3~~embly in the Congre~~ (I) al~o went dot-m
further to 51 (~bout 33 per cent). Intere[;t ing1 y, out of the
won by tho Janata Party. the dominant ca:::; t 0:::;
3ccounted for 32 sc~ts (~bout 51 pcr ccnt). The f irst c~binet
con:::;titutod after the election:::; compri:::;od of two Vokkalig3:::; 56
3nd throe Lingayat~ out of a total ~trongth of 20.
Howcver. despitc the changes in c~utc composition of
mcmbor::::::i of the logi~lative a:::;:::;ombly 3nd Congro:::;:::; 1n
purticular. the politic~l lcudcrship ut the upex of the st3tc
We):::; :::;ubjectod wi t h the p3 r t y
!cildership. I'm 3ttempt hilS been mude In the following
121
p~r~gr~phs to underGt~nd the strDins thDt fin~lly led to the
ch3ngo in pol it iC31 I03der::;hip in the ::;t3to,
Split with Hru Gandhi
Struined relutionchips in the higher echelons between
politic31 contompor3rio::; belonging to tho ::;3mo p3rty W3::; not
to Indi~n politics, Commenting upon the differences between
Nohru 3nd R3dh3kri:;hn3n. S:lrvep311 i Gop31 in hi:; biography of
Rudhukrishnun huG observed " It ic cold in the high
mount3in::; 3nd porson3] rol3tion:; 3t tho top of 3ny kind of 67
politic:; 3ro r3roly considorod cord i <:l 1. "
This dict1Jm huc been ubly demonctrutcd in Urc'
rol3tion:;hip wi th Mr:; G3ndh i, It i:J ironical that Urs who
hud ::-tood by Mrs Gundhi for co long und who W~E:; once 68
rog3rded 3S "hor most vociforous supportor" ::;hould bro3k
with her und sn:3p the tieG th~t bound them for long,
Thoro 1:; littlo rO<:l:;on to boliovo th<:lt i~:;uc::J of
substunce or ideology pluyed 3ny role 1n the purting of w~yc
botwoon tho two I03dors, Ono contompor3ry pol it iC31 ob::;orvor
~luE:; ccuthing in hiG ucsccsment of the cplit: "It would be
unch3rit3blo to Indi3n pol it ics 3nd Indi<:ln pol itici3n:; to 13Y
too much importunee on ideology in :3 wur of
dospito tho piou::; ::;t3tomont:; m3do by both ::;ido::;,
this nLlturc ..
Tho ::;t<:lko::; 69
uro powor. powor in tho pro::;ent und powor in tho futuro",
125
Urs cle~rly owed his chief ministership initi~lly to Mrs
G;)ndhi. But hi:::; :::;ub:::;eguent performance had left nono in doubt
he wus umong the formiduble chief ministerw of the
country with;) commitmont to altering the :::;ocial :::;tatu:::; guo.
He hud ulso curved out 3 support b~we Jmong the buckwurd
cl3:::;:::;e:::; and the poor. It ha:::; 31:::;0 beon ob:::;orvod how Ur:::;
wywtcmutic~lly wet ~bout demolishing the exiwting wocio-
oconomic ordor characterizod by a :::;y:::;tem of - cumul at i ve
inequulitiew'.
If it wus Indiru who put him In the sJddle, (Jrs hud
demon:::;trated often and ably that he wa:::; not lacking In
grutitude. Munor. os ulGO ~omc of our interviewees, huve
commonted upon the enormou:::; fund:::; mobilized by Ur:::; to be :::;ont 70
to Do I hi.
Ur:::; 1n the 0ftermuth of the 1977 parliumentury electionw
had :::;tood by her when :::;0 many of her other co lleaguo::; had
deserted her. And it is to Urs that the credit should
largely go for fa:::;hioning Mr:::; Gandhi':::; electoral victory at
Chickmugulur when her stock in the country WuS not so high.
Tho dramati:::;t:::; por:::;onao in tho event:::; leading to tho
r;pl it Jre SunjuY G~ndhj, Urr:;. Mn; Gundhl. und SilnjuY's storm
trooper:::;. Mo:::;t politic;)l <lnaly:::;t::; are of the conviction that
Su n -j u y Gu nd h i w~w lurgely responsible for the schism thut
dovolopod betweon Dcvaraj Ur:::; <lnd Mr:::; Gandhi. Ur:::; had a 1:::;0
~rouscd Mrs G~ndhi's lrc by criticizing S~nj~y G~ndhi ~t the
All India CongroJJ Committoo mooting on April ~l. 1978.
Subsequently he was to spcak out to party workers
againJt tho porJonality cult. "You havo Joon a puppot Jhow?
that fellol-l is the show m~ster." lashed out Drs after the 71
spl it. Mrs G3ndhi's biographcr Indcr M3lhotra. ellso
noted political commontator, obJerved that the Jplit
largcly an outcome of Drs' resentment of SanjuY's influence
over MrJ Gandhi and led to tho acrimoniouJ parting of wayJ in 72
1979.
Sanjay GDndhi wus Mrs Gandhi's younger son.
once had the dubiouJ diJtinction of boing callod 73
Sunjuy. who
- the mOJt
JiniJtor and monacing figure' waJ the kind of profoJJional
politician for whom cnds rather than mCelns counted.
gonorally rogardod aJ a braJh and tactloJJ perJon who troatod
hiw mothcr's elder colleDgues with weant regard.
entry into politicJ camo about after hiJ
forayw into other had come to nought.
rolo in Jtato politicJ bogan whon Haryana chiof miniJtor
BunG i Lui arranqed u bigger reccption for SDnjuy Gundhi in
Chandigarhin hiJ bid to out do Zail Singh. 'fhuJ bogan
SunjuY' Ci journey into Indian politics. Chief ministcrs
unaccoptablo to Saniay had to onduro humiliation with only
Drs and S S Ray of West Benqal 71
wrath.
127
managing to cscape his
Son5ay was inducted into the porty ond q1ven
pO:3ition:3 of impor:tance. But it 1:3 an indication of
vit iClt ion in the pol it ical cuI tur:e thot minister!:;, membErs of
Parliament and buroaucrats vied with oach othor to do hi:3 76
behect. Inevi tClbl y, the Congr:ecc pClrty was to witnEcc
furthor doinstitutionalization incroa:3ing i t:3 pat r: imoni:d
fe.:lturec. Ouch WCl!:; thc deinctitutionCllizCltion in the PClr:ty
that by the time of 3aniay':3 death. tho party was con:3iderod 76
a:3 hi:3 and Indira':3 bailiwick.
Ur:e had .:llways bcen reecntful of SClnjay'e influence
wi th i n the part y. Urs's colloague:3 have rovoaled that
earlier he had not been in favour of promoting R Gundu RClo ae
cabinot mini::;tor, but W.:J.:::; forced to do so on Sanjay':3 77
bidding. It WZl~ ulso unClcceptClble to Urs Clnd hie friends
to allow 8anj ay :; storm-troopers, Gundu Rao, F M Khan and a
few others. to indulge in "violent and illegal eupport 78
of
Indira Gandhi in the street:; of Bangalore··. Urs by natura
wac not a eycophant Clnd moet rcluctant to follow the biddingc
of 3anjay Gandhi for whom he had scant re:3poct.
Thc cpl it. 1n fact. occurred when both Mre GClndhi and
8anjay Gandhi wore in political wi\dorne:;:3 with tho Janata
party in power Clt the centre. While inereacing interferEnce
by 3aniay and hi:3 cohort:; compounded by thair ins u 1 t i n9
behaviour contributed to Urs Cllienation from Mrs Gandhi.
certain other: factor:3 al:;o contr:ibutod to tho :3 pi it.
1~8
rrincip~l ~mong thosc wcrc lndir~-s dccply suspicious n~turc
3nd Ur-::' n3tion3l 3mbition. In 3ddition, thcr-c W3:: al::o the
insistent
Ur:: In Jny
dcm~nd for incrc3sing thc massive pZlyments 79
cJse routinoly mJdo to tho high commJnd.
that
But the immediZlte iesue over which matters rose t 0 ~
crc:::icondo tho presidentship of the
Congr-cse Committee ( 1> . Ure In Zlddition to being chief
ministor prosidont of tho KPCC (I) . In her-
inimit3ble etyle. Mrs GZlndhi hZld nominZlted S BZlngZlrZlppZl. Zln
Urs b3itor. 3S tho p3rty prosident on the ground that no
individuZll ehould hold two poets.
This was ch3r3ctori::tic of Mrs Gandhi. who 3S has boon
obcrserved. WZle Zl decply suspicious pereon reluctZlnt to Zlllow
anyone to share the politic3l limelight. time
with closer obscrvZltion 3nd experience. I h3ve come to the
conclu::ion that 80
doclared Ur::.
:Jhc does not tolorato anyono coming up"
It is perhaps not unique to Mrs Gi.lndhi. for 3ny
political lCJdor is 3lw3Ys on gU3rd against rivals and Cl 1 I
thc more 3qainst political rivals growing in etature. But
thi:: chJr-Jcter In Mr:: G3ndhi was too pronouncod and ha:: of tan 81
Jttr-actod tho attontion of most scholar::.
In f 3Ct. Mrs G3ndhi's decision to qr-oom S3nj3Y 31so
bcspoKO of hor- chronic incapacity to repose hcr tr-u:;t in
J -, 'I
~nyone outside her bloodline. Ikr biographers. ClS ",Iso other
political analy~t~. have commented that while Mr~ Gandhi had
a remurkable ability to reach out to the masses.
"::;cvcroly 1 imi ted 1n her ability to reach poople at 82
intermediate 1 eve 1 ~" . Mrs Gandhi Wile; a loner who felt
uncomfortable with political peer~ and independent
colleagues. neither trustina them nor inspirirg their trust.
She su~pected rather than u~ed autonomous political netwerk~.
fler purty colleagues with independent viewG did not 83
remain
long in her cabinets or ~ervice.
The argument has been convincingly put forth that MrG 81
Gandhi had monopolized chariJma. While her charisma may
have occasionally waned in purts of India (and even this IS
doubtful beca\J~e though ~he lost tho elections. her name
s till evoked a magnetic resonunce).her stock In Kurnataka
remained hiqh. The ill -of fects of the emergency that
maimed her politically In the north waG largely abGent In the
south and ospecially so 1n Karnataka but for a few ~tray
incidents. In fact. one leading politicul leader in
Karnataka vehemently protests that Urs had no chariJma while
MrG Gandhi was a charismatic figure with a direct pipeline to 85
the voters.
She WZiG J\mmv' (mother) to the mi II ionG of the poor.
pa r tIC \J I :>r I y In the V3~t hinterlands of
hi mse If had substvntially reinforced the . J\mma image' In
130
Kornotoku by his frequent rem~rks th~t Mrs G~ndhi the
forco behind many welfare measure~ initiated in the ~tate.
Urs' behuviour wus chur~cterictic of most leuders in the
Congr~ss - I. whoro s~curity on the soat of powor dopondod on
muintaining u posture of servility und deference to Indiru.
Urs was cloarly awaro of this and though it continuod to irk
him. he hud maintuined the poshlre.
But unliko in othor Congross -I rulod statos of tho
time, Urs an enormously popular leader and had a
charismatic pull of his own. It was this indopondent base of
Ure thot aroused Mrs Gandhi innate political aggression. ~ler
acute insecurity stommed from the fear of emorgonce of
ulternutive centres of charismu. She attempted to cope wi th
her fears by locating subsidiary centres of powor in loyal
but power I esc, individuuls (Gtlndu Roo and F M Khan, 86
for
instance) rathor than institutionJ or organizations. l\.
cloee confidant of Urs ond a senior cabinet minis,ter uls:o
acquainted with Mrs Gandhi obJorved that sho could not romain
anybody s fr iend. She gove
whisperings' .
lit the t imo. [JrJ W:JS
lot 87
ulso
of importance to
dovoloping vaulting
ambit ione of hie own. Ibvinq been ot the helm of affClire in
Kar:nataka for noarly oiqht Urs Wu:::::; ineroaJingly
perceived o notionol leuder. The 1977 pur Ii .,ment Dry
cloctlonJ' as alJo tho 1978 3sJombly oloctions. sharply drove
home the indicput:Jble f Cl c t the CongrCGC
131
performancc hDve verged on the
di~a~trou~. it had put up a creditablo ~how in Karnataka.
It is observed that Ors at this timc was also developing
prime mini~terial ambition~. The whi~pering~' ~oon reachod
Mrs Gandhi. hnd this to Mrs Gandhi, leader who~c
leador~hip ~tyle W3~ bu~od on comploto loyalty and deference
could only be an anathemD Dnd a repudiation of all her
political ambition~ to como back a~ Primo Mini~tor.
She choc.e to Dct fa~t, unflinchingly and decic.ively.
The ob~e~~ion with loyalty amid~t har continuing in~acurity
led Mrs Gandhi many a time to di~card competent leaderu
and appoint bumbling non-antitie~ a~ loader~ who had only one
thing g01ng for them: an abc.olute and uervilc devotion to 88
Indira. Thiu trait, manifcuted on ueveral occauionu,
particularly evident in the solection~ of Baba~ahob Bho~ale
Prade~h re~pactivaly.
hnd now, with Uru entertaining high ambitionu. such
unflinching and total loyalty form him to Mr~ Gandhi wa~
ruled out.
prudenco",
"Oru' national ambitions got the better of hiu
claim~ a veteran iournali~t in tho ~tate who 89
cloarly blamo~ him for the ~plit. It ha~ al~o boon
suggestcd that Urc.' astroloqer friendu had al~o led him to 30
believo that he wa~ do~tinod to bocome Primo Mini~tor.
l ~· ,-' .
But it hus been obcerved curlier, iEEjUC over
which m3ttor~ C3mo to 3 h03d W3~ tho p3rty pro~ident~hip. In
tunc with Indir3c decision, the Congresc I purliumentury
b03rd 3~ked for Ure' roeign3tion from the proeidentehip of
the purty in conforming with the purty'c policy decicion thvt
no per~on ~hould ~imult3neou~ly hold po~ition~ in both tho
purty und the government.
Ur:; I recponce to the recignvtion demund WuC thut the
KPCC-I W3~ not 3n 3d hoc body 3nd th3t he h3d boon eloeted to
the precidentship in Jvnuvry 1978. He wuc even willing to
~tep down from the po~t on the condition th3t tho pro~idont
be elected by the legislvtorc vnd not nominuted from Delhi.
Clo3rly, Ur~ W3~ willing to meet tho high comm3nd h3lf W3y:
"I 3grcc with the contention thvt no person chould hold two
po:;t:; ( chiof mini~tor:;hip 3nd PCC pro~ident:;hip). I 3m
willing to etep down. Dut I only S3Y let ue huve 3n elected
pro~ idont. It l~ not f3ir to nogloct
reprepent3tivec In electing 3 new prepident.
tho oloctod
There 3re 91
rocord~ to ~how th3t I W3~ eloctod 3~ the pr3do~h chief".
Urs 31eo suggested 3nother compromise. He offered to
re~ign pro~idont 3nd propo~od th3t till
org3nizJt ion31 electionc were held, Siddh3rJmv Reddy,
mombor of PJrl i3mont 3nd vieo-pro~ident of the KPCC-I ~hould
function 3S the pvrty president. Even thic compromlce
olicited no responee from Mr~ G3ndhi who by now
determined on unseating Urs from the prcsldentship of the.
KPCC - 1.
The manoeuverc had by now accumed an acrimoniouc tone.
Tho KPCC-I general ~ecretary and an avowed ~upportcr of Ur~
lashed out that Indirac antagonicm towards Urs stemmed from
hor intolerance of the fact that Ur~ wa~ becoming an 92
increa~ingly important per~onal on the political ::;cono.
The struggle wac alco the subject of editorials in leading
"( T) he miracle i~ that Mr Ur~ had been ablo to
stymie every move of Mrc Gandhi in the pact to dethrone him.
What had irkod hor wa~ that ho wa~ ~po3king timo and again in
termc of democracy when che expected the pledge of 93
loyalty to her".
perconal
(;ubcequently. Mrc Gandhi wac to exacerbate matterc by
having the Congro~~ Working Committee -I di~~olvo the KPCC( I)
on June 7. 1979. The KFCC( I) obcerved that in the context of
the all round challengo~ and attack~ tho party wa~ facing.
open manifectation of indiccipline and defiance would
immon~ely harm tho party bo~ido~ putting it to public
ridicule. Concequently.
became
urgent and remedial 91
action has
inevi tablo. S Bangarapp3
appointed Precident of a cleven member ad hoc panel including
Dov3rCl j Ur~. Ur~ ret31iated by di~mi~~ing BanQ3rClpp3 from
thc Minictry and maintained that he was the rcc -I president.
The KPCC'I executive 31~o ~tood by Ur~.
131
By nOH, the b~ttle lines Here cle~rly dr~wn ~nd the
breach was too wide to be bridged. The denouement was only a
m", t t c r 0 f time. f<£ Urs ob!:crvcd, IIIndiun politics is
state of turmoil and many thinking politicians are groping 1n
the d,nk un",ble to sec the vir;ion of the future. ill1 event
like th i s may help In :::;triking out the right path. It IS now '35
time for tho:::;e who think al ike to dare and .:let".
The overwhelming mvjority of legiclvtors 118 out of
155 ML~ and 25 out of 28 MLCs reaffirmed their allegiance to
llrc ",nd undertook to "cupport him in ull 96
dcci!jionc tvken
under all circumstances".
But the moc;t reveuling indictment of Mrc; Gundhi'c;
action:::; among the Congre:::;s logi:::;lators is evident in tho
recolution propoced by N ~ Siddique end pecscd by most
Congre:::;:::; I member:::; of the ~:::;ombly:
We, the members of the Kernetake Congrec;s Legi:::;lature party note with concern and resontmont, the vctions tvken by the working committee of the ~ICC (II in di:::;mi:::;s ing the elected KPCC (1) and the e;tvte executive headed by Mr Devvraj llrc; and nominating an ad hoc committee. Tho action takon by the high commvnd ie; undemocrvtic, illcgel Llnd unethical bo:::;idc:::; being again:::;t tho wi:::;hos and intcree;te; of the party in the c;tLlte. The dissolution of all the subordinate committoes confirms the culpebility of the high commend in destroying the organization it:::;elf.
It is therefore resolved not to recognize the adhoc committee and to reaffirm our allegianco to the elected KPCC (I) heeded by DeverLlj llrc;. Tho :::;OC10 -economIC and pol itical interest:::; of tho Scheduled Cestec, Scheduled Tribec;, Backward
135
Cl21SGCw,
Hith tho KLlrnLltLlkLl und~r the
HeLlker section~ ond minorities. together ovdrall intoro~t~ of tho pooplo of lies in continuinq the qood Hork done
loadorship of Mr Dovaraj Urs.
While Llppreei3ting the ~t3nd tLlken by our lC3dcr Mr
Ur~ we ro~olvo to ~upport him in all the decision::;
which he tDkes under DII circumstances. m3king it Llmply cleDr
that 3ny action taken by the high command will be con~idered
97 a~ action 3g3in~t the whole lagi~13turo p3rty."
Me3nwhile. D~ the politic3l drama WDC being enacted in
Karn3taka, tho Ur::;-Mr::; Gandhi rift draw attontion throughout
the country. ~ttributing thc dl~cord betHeen Urc and Indir3
to Sunjay::; doings. Nasikrao Tirpudo. loader of the Congro~s
( I) lcgislLlture p3rty in M3harLlchtrLl noted thLlt Sunjny wu!j 98
grooming hi~ OHn people to cn~uro hi~ pol it icu 1 futuro. It
WLl~ further noted thLlt the iscue of presidentship of the KFCC 99
(I) Ha~ only an excu~e moant to teach Ur~ a le~~on.
SimilLlrly. the Bihor FCC (I) chief Dr Ram Karan Fnl
flayed Mr::; Gandhi'~ 3bu~e of tho party to ~orvo hor own end~
and noted thLlt the country "badly needs his (Urc) 100
great
::;tato::;man~hip and leader~hip".
Dicqu~ted Hith Ganj3Y s behaviour. the Keraln PCC (I)
gonoral ~ocrotary al::;o ob::;ervod that Ur::; only ropro::;ontod our
views when he raised the role of SanjLlY G3ndhi 3t the recent
AICC ( I) ::;0::;::; Ion. Ilo further noted that no ::;olf-ro~pocting
percon could continue in the p3rty under Gonjay Gnndhi'c
101 le.:>der~hip. Welcoming the revoft of Ur~. CPM Le~der EMS
Namboodaripad not ad that it wa~ a hoavy blow to tho plan~ of 102
tho caucu~ to rot urn to power.
Ur~' ctature by now clearly tran~cended the confinec of
Karnataka. Tho oulogi~tic comment~ that hi~ action drow
could only have ~erved to reinforce hic ambitionc. IJowever,
1nd1ra vehemontly deniod that Ur~' ou~ter from tho party po~t
h~d Jnything to do with SonJay Gandhi and there wa~ no truth 103
in ~uch allegation~.
The denouement 1n this political drama wac fa~t drawing
noar. In hi~ roply to the ~howcau~o notico. Ur~ adopted a
~trident note:
Public organizations in a democratic ~et up cannot be ~tructurod according to an individual or coterie~ will and they cannot be repudiated at will We. the KPCC (I). tho KarnataK:a Legiclature Congrecs (I) party, memberc of the di~trict and taluk committoo~ ~hall under no circum~tancec accept the adhoc committee you have triod to hurl upon u~ like a bolt from bluo. Our commitment to democracy etande euprome and final ... You ~caro away all good, capablo and officiant moan and women and then you hope to adminicter the vaet nation with mediocroc and ~ycophant~. It i~
1mpoccible. ~uthority rule and India cannot go togother..... I may al~o romind you th<lt KPCC (1)
hac an elected precident and he doee not owe hie off ico to the l'lICC ( 1>. CWC (I) or tho congro~~ (I) preeident. If there ~Iac on irregularity 1n the eloction of a pro~ident. it wa~ at tho national level of the party.... who hae violated the
101 di~ciplino: We in Karn:ltaka or you in cwe (I)".
The Congresc workinG committee meeting on 21 June
l~n
1979
found DevurClj Ore guilty of the worst type of nnti-pClrty
indiGciplino and of tho betrayal of tho faith tho activity,
CongreGe repoced in him nnd not belonging to the mninstreum 105
of tho Indian National CongroG~.
Ure wnG expelled from the Congrees und wns nsked to
ro~ign hi~ mombor~hip of tho logi~lativo aG~ombly ~inco ho
hud obtnined it on the Congress ticket. Reacting to the
oxpul~ion, Ure. quotod John Gunthor: "Hitlor could bocomo a 106
wolf bocauGo tho GormunG choGO to romain Ghoop". Ho
further noted that he would prefer to go down in history as
ono who h~d fought again~t Indira Gandhi and lo~t rather than 107
a~ one who ~urrondorod to hor and ~tayod on.
Thc GUpport enjoyed by Ore among the legislators was
overwhelming making a mockery of tho di~ciplinary procoodingG
of the fligh Command. Only about 15 MLhc and 3 MLCe opted for
the Banqarappa camp though this numbor incroa~ed lator.
Clcarly. Urs' confrontation and break with Mrs Gandhi
ropro~ent~ u di~tinct phu~e in un ora when Gho dominatod much
of thc epaco in the Indinn political syctem. Very few
political loador~ had brokon with Mr~ Gandhi in tho po~t-1972
period In thc manner Ure did; and an even emaller eet who
aftor making a cloan brouk with Indira, did not rot urn to her
protect i ve fol d.
~ a conscqucncc of the split, a rival Congress purty
owing allegiance to Mr~ Gandhi W3~ ~et up. R Gundu RaD
became the leader of this group comprising 12 MLAs by ~ugust
1979.
But the political situwtion wt the centre was soon to
taKa ~tormy twi~t~ and turn~. Tho Janata government,
with internwl wrwngles and fwctionwl bickerings since its
inception, now collap~ed.
The hll Indiw Congress Committee observed on September
13, 1979 that "tho national ~cene i~ ono of do~olation.
diDtrcDs, disgrwce wnd dicintegrwtion thwt cwme ws politic~l
108 mia~ma to Indira and incroa~ed hor maneuvorability.
The Jwnwta Government hud been India·s first n~tion~l
altornative to tho Congro~~ and had como to power in March
1977 on an anti- emergency platform. Essentially, the party
wa~ an amalgam of different partio~ that had como togother
with the intention of dethroning Indira.
Howovor, given tho hoterogonoou~ compo~ition of tho
party, ctresccs and ctrwinc were evident from tho bcgining.
The fi~~ure~ in tho party appoarod largoly a~ a con~oquonco
of intenee personal rivalriec betwcen the three geriwtricc
Morarji Docai. Jaqjivan Ram and Charan Singh. An intonGo
luct for power, particularly for the Prime Ministeriwl chwir,
waG tho charactoriGtic foatura of the throa loadorG during
lJ9
thi~ or~.
Their egocentric cl~~he~, uided by un obdurute behuviour
on tho p~rt of Mor~rii, con~tant machination~ by Charan Singh
~upportcd by cronie~ like Ruj Nuruin und the muneuver~ of
J~gjivan Ram - ~orvod to ~ot tho ~taqo for tho final
down in July 1979. Churan Singh wu~ now to realize hi5 grund
ambition of bocoming Primo Mini~tor on tho ba~i~ of tactical
eupport extended by Mrs Gundhi. Not unexpectedly in u
tactical mov~, Mr~ Gandhi ~oon withdraw tho ~upport to tho
Chur~n Singh government thu~ precipit~ting ~ mid-term poll.
Tho Janata intorrognum in Indian politic~ wa~ porhap~
beet described by MrG Gundhi thut "they (Junutu Purty) h~d
109 their chanco and whut did they do ? Thoy made a big mo~~".
The swift moving events ut the centre hod their
ramific~tion~ through tho party and tho tromoru woro faIt
ucroee the epuD of the country. Uru' split with Mrc Gundhi
and his sub~oquont victory in rotaining a largo chunk of ML~
with him~elf coon proved to be u pyrrhic victory. While Urc
had cloarly won tho battlo, ho doci~ivoly lo~t tho war.
Defeat at the Polls
With your eupport, the Congre~~ (U) Cun form tho crux of the coalition govornmont at tho centro and pluy u mujor role in purliamcnt". Devuruj Ur~ during hi~ oloction campaign, 31 Decomber,
110 197~.
110
But Urs h~d not reckoned with th~ fickleness of the
electorate. Thc vici~~itude~ of political life wa~ brought
home shurply to Devuruj Ur~ during the 1980 purliumentary
election~. Thc re~ult~ of thc election rudcly proved that
the ultimutc sovereign~ in u democrucy. the people.
ea~ily and a~ ~uddenly ca~t any loader. however big. howevor
choriGmutic on thc du~t hoop of politicG u~ they cun
re~urrect a f31len leador. The olectorate knocked Ur~ off
the po 1 it i col pedeGtol and instolled Indira uG the now
prc~iding doity.
UrG did not ju~t lose the elections.
routod at thc hu~ting~. Hi:::; party, the Congro~~(U) f3ilod to
win cven a Gingle Geut in KarnutukD Dnd polled u mere 16.7
par cant of tho total voto~. Many of thc lcading light~ in
the CongreGG(U). notubly T A Pai. M Y Ghorpude und Tulsi
Da:::;appa wore dofoatod at thc husting:::;. T A Pal. a formor
union minictcr. hod to suffor the <lddition<ll ignominy of even
lo~ing hi~ dopo~it.
In alL 12 candid<lte~ of the Congres~(U). lost their
dopo:::;it~ while nono from the Congro~~( I> and only ~ix from
the J<lnatD purty IOGt their deposits. The resultG were 111
do~cribod 3:::; 3 "Bulldozer victory for Congre~~( I)"·.
The Congrcsc (I) heDded by Mrc Gandhi swept t he po 11 c
winning 27 of the 28 :::;oat:::; and managed to poll 56.3 per cant
11 I
of thc tot;:)) votcs. In fJct. the Congress (U) suffered the
mortification of coming third in 20 of the 27 con~tituencie~.
~t the national level too. the Congress(U) won a mere 13
out of the 212 ~eat3 conte~tod which worked out to about ~lX
per cent of of the tot<:ll candidates. 113 out of 212 Congress
(U) candidato~ lo~t tho ir dopo~ i t~. In contra~t, tho
Congress (I) party won 353 of the 192 ueatu contested. i.e .•
72 per cent; and a mere 7 candidateG lo~t thoir dopo~it~.
Uru obucrved in his reaction to the electoral defeut. 112
"We hud not been 3blo to c3rry conviction to the people".
In a geuture tot<:llly unch<:lr<:lctcristic of th<:lt period. Urc;
immediately re~ignod: "Gince the election~ havo provod that I
and my party do not enjoy the confidence of the majority of
tho votcr~, I do not wi~h to cont inuo in off ice."
But. the moot point ic what accountr:; for the rer:;ounding
blow which tho oloctorute adminiGtorod to Ur~, whon ju::;t
over u year <:lgo they hud given him a ctanding oV<:ltion in the
1978 a~~embly oloction3. During the 1978 a~~ombly election::;,
thc CongreGG (I) in Karnutaka hud won 119 r:;eatc. Urr:; had not
only wor~tod tho Janata but alGo the Congre~~ party lod by K
Bruhmananda Reddy.
Prior to thut. in thc 1977 parl iamentary elections. the
ConqroGG with Ur~ at tho helm in Karnataka had won 26 of tho
112
•
28 ~eut~ contested und sec~red 56.8 per cent of the totul
voto:;. Much of tho credit for tho victory of tho INC( I) both
in 1977 und 1978 in the stute belonged to Devuruj Urs.
Tho powor of Ur:; to pull voto:; wa:; :;uch that Acharya J B
Kripuluni hud remurked in his response to Indira's victory ut
Chickmagaloro;
"Even u school oirl would huve won with the un:;tintod :;upport of Chiof Mini:;tor Dovaraj
113 Ur:::::; "
/',guinst this buckground, the totul rout
Congro:;:;(U) cortainly appoar~, a:; Ur:; do:;cribod it,
of the
a:; "a
fre<:lk child" und "something ultogether strunge und 111
unoxpoctod" .
Urt; himself believed thut there WuS confut;ion in the
mind:; of tho pooplo a:; to tho rolation:;hip botwoen him and
Indiru. The crux of Munor's urgument ul!:iO is that the 115
election re:;ult:; wero "a ca:;o of mi:;takon id~ntity".
Eluborat ing on the point, he argued that the results of the
1980 Lok Sabha olection:; did not ropro::;ont a nogativo
populur verdict on the Urs regime but ought to be read as a
porvor:;o ondor:;omont of Ur:;' achiovomont:;. Tho vot~r::; had
believed t ha t Indira wa~ the source of the post 1972
roform:; with Ur::; baing meroly hor in::;trumont. Ur:; him:;olf
had helped to create the impresu ion, becuuse in the
113
deinstitutionDlised environment of the pcrty eueh ccte were
116 nece~~ary to avoid interference from the High Command.
But is the reDlity DC cimple DC the fDct thDt l1rs'
electoral defeat WD~ merely due to cenfu~ion in the mind~ of
the voters. The explunution for l1rs' defeut. i nst cud, muy
need to be :::;oon in a con~tellation of factor~ or
ci:rcum!:;tunccc, uS no single foctor cDticfoctorily expleinc
the inten~ity of the drubbing Ur~ rocoivod at tho hu~tingj.
There ie no doubt the 'I uW of unintended
con~equence~' operated to Ur~' dijadvantago. Ur~ by hi:;
overzeuloue proteetDtione of IOyulty end his cluime thet
Indira wa~ the fount of all hi~ reformj partially vijitcd
upon himself the dieuster et the pol Ie.
Even before the electionj a perceptive objervor of the
stDte politicul scene hed obeerved thet Ure end hie teem hed
:;uccoj:;fully :;old the image of Mrs Gandhi to the peeple of
the ctDte and now to disubuce their minde of tho imego would
be an uphill ta~k. The formidable ta~k confronting Ur~ WD~ to
convince the voters thut the eocio-economic mODsuree from
which they had benefited in tho Pil~t 10 yearj wore the
policiec of the l1n:; government und not gifte from Mn:; 117
Gandhi.
The conf uc ion in the minde of the people wuc Dlco
evident during the poll camp~iqn at Chickmagaloro: "La~t yoar
111
I
the ~~me peonlc ~~kcd us to vote for Indl" ~ • r Cl "mmCl. bccuusc she
W3:; the ~ymbol of everything good. Today the ~3me people
s:>y thut shc is thc symbol of cvcrything bud. 118
We cunnot
1jndor~tand thi~".
Yct :>nothcr election incident :>t Sirsi ulco tendc to
conf irm the confu:; ion among tho elctorate. lit a Congre~~ (I)
clection mecting. when ~logune hCliling Mre GClndhi wue ruiced
it wa~ greeted with applauso. But ~urprisingly or perhaps
not surprisingly. lohen Dcvelruj l1rs' nume vlClS mentioned. the
audionco again responded with equally vociferous applauso. 119
Thic certainly nonplu~ed the organi3erc.
"fJc (l1re) did cvcrything in her nelmc :md thc deposit vlelS
enc3~hed by her ". wa~ the obsorvat ion made by a conf idant of 1:; 0
Ur" . Thc dcfcelt in thc Lok 8ubhu polls ellso cutulyzed the
chi f t in the political loadorchip through tho moans of
defcctions from lJrs' pur-ty to thc Congreee( 1). I'm ut tempt
would bo made in tho following part to oxamino tho defections
to the Congr-ess (I) und emcrgence of Gundu Ruo ue the chief
minlcter.
Nobody is stopping unybody from leuving the 12 I
par-ty" - Devaraj Ur-~"
The tr-ogedy wus lJr~ could not hJVC stopped hie purtymen
fr-om deserting hiln oven hud he attempted to do co. The lure
of pOI.;er. pelf und privilcge ':Ius too ovcrpowering for llrs'
ML.'\:::; to let ~uch mundane con~iderations loy;:llty to thoir
ICDder construin them from de~erting him in his hour of need.
The floodgate~ were open.
The precidcnt of thc KFCC( I) D,mg<:lruppn c<:ltulyzed the
movement of legi~13tor~ to the winning ~ide by announcing
thut the door~ of the Conqre~[; (1) were open to the Congre[;[; 122
- U legislators.
Ure W<:l[; clenrly being overconfident when he initinlly
voicod aloud hi~ optimi~m that 80-85 per cent of the party 123
legislators would remain loyal to him. lI:::, the tr ickle
started. he wn[; to ob~crvc thut tho[;c who wunt to go could
I 03 ve: "1 am not worried about the number now. an effectivo 121
opposition can be forged through openness of mind ., Was
it sheer bruvudo or wus it politic .. l n()ivctc or WZlw it
wi~tful thinking? The scale of the desortion~ ~hatterod Urs
though he muintuined u bruvc fuGe.
One of the earlie~t to leuvo wa[; II C Srikantaiah who
resigned .. c Municlpul ~dminietr .. tor .. nd S M y .. hyu. The
exodu~ from the Congross was such that by tho timo Ur~ was
elected le<:ldcr of hie legielutive p .. rty. the Congreee (U)'[;
strength had boon reduced to a mere 10.
Even hie trusted uidec did not [;t .. nd by him. On 23
M:lrch 19131. Bu~3val ing3pp3. tho ~choduled Cil~te MLl\ who owod
his politicol prominence more to Urs thon to his intempcr<>te
utter3nCQ~ quit Conqro~~ (I)' and joinod tho Conqre~~ 1'. In
one of his chorocteristic outbursts just over 0 ye<>r before,
8a~3valingappa had fumed again~t Indira. Indir3 Gandhi. tho
observed, H:lS :lq:l inst the Helfure of thE'
cla~~e~, ~choduled ca~te~ and Hoaker ~oction~ of the ~ocicty
ln her heort ond hel: t:>ll .tillk WuS only 1 ip symputhy.
Ba~avalin9appa ~tre~~ed that ~hQ had no ~ympathio~ at all for
the dOHntrodden Hhich 110s evident from her post uct ions. flc
had cven leveled the allegation that Indir3 Gandhi 125
tolerate loader~hip cmerglnq from the South.
did not
In the course of on interviE'H one of the MLhs from Kolur
di~trict remarked that it Ha~ pre~~uro from bolow from hi~
126 con~t ituent~, that in~plrod him to cro~~ the floor Tho
l:ll:ge ~C:llc defection:::: demonstruted the enfeE'blE'mE'nt of
political in~titution~ and the weak natura of partie~ 1n tho
Gundhi's cro. Shifts ln purtie!J by leqislutor!J 11ere not
on the ba~i~ of or idoology. but rather on
con~idcrotion~ of ~cccc~ to power.
By tho ond of the term of the ~ixth a~~ombly, tho
Congl:esc U had lost llC! of its legi!Jluton:; illl of whom hod 127
defected to the Conqress J. The Jilnotil pul:ty hod IO!Jt 29
of whom 10 h~d defected to the Con9re~~-I. Tho
Congrcr;r:; I in oIl odmJtted 111 defectol:!J into thE'ir runk!J.
I , l:..i intero~t imJ tu nntf? that dur inq the cour~o of the::; ixth
1'1'
Lcqisl<:ltive l'>.ssembly. 158 out of 221 legisl<:ltors h.:.d shifted 128
their allogi<:lnce~ in the game of political ~kulldugqery.
There were some legisl<:ltors who defected twice • .:.nd some
avon thrico in tho cour~o of tho Sixth AJ~ombly in Karnataka.
Commenting upon the phenomenon of defections in Indi.:. one
~cholar ob~orvod that tho principal motivation for tho ~hift
129 in loyaltio~ wa~ tho con~idoration of roward.
Defections were not a new phenomenon in Indian politics.
having boon evidont a~ carl y a~ 1937. Howovor, tho ~calo and
intensity of defections re<:lched new heights <:lfter the 1967
election~. In tho yoar~ from 1967-73. ovor 2,700 in~tanco~ of
defect ions by
toppling of
legisl<:ltors werc reported. 130
leading to the
15 stato govornmont~. In contrast, in the
prc· Mrs Gandhi ph<:lse from 1952- 1967. there were only <:lbout 131
512 case~ of political defoctions.
In the context of weak parties. attempts to control
dofoctions yioldod littlo rosult. Tho appointment of tho
Chavan Committee was an exercise ln futility. Defections are
"national malady eatinq
domocracy." obsorved Chavan.
into the vary vitals of n::
our
Intorostingly, tho Committoe
had recommended <:lmonq other thinqs that political defectors
should bo bar rod from becominq ministor~ for one yoar from
the date of )]3
ro~ igni nq.
defcction unless they got re-electcd after
l1e
" Development mU!Jt be for the people; wh<lt docE; not chango pooplo'~ life for the bottor i~ not
131 deve 1 opment.. - Devara j Ur~.
The of the leq<lcy of any political leader
po~o~ a daunting ta~k to a re~earcher. Political ~cienti~t~
have iJrgued thc the critical queE;tion raiDed by
leador~hip, of it~ offect. l~ al~o the mo~t difficult
question to handle, aD it encompaDDeD two Deparate
that of the action~ of tho leader~ and that of tho nature and
reactionD of the environment.
In his theoretical work on politic<ll leadership'
Blondel make~ the point that while in the domain of foreign
affiJirD "there clear criteria by which the
3ction~ C3n be 3~~o~sGd. The ~ituation i~ much le~~ definite
on the economic and Docial frontD : S;UCCCSGC[; arc often
difficult to perceive, e~pecially becau~e ~hort-term benefit~
muy leud to long term problemc and CUCCCE;CCE; arc oftr'n
obtained at the expon~e of ~ome member~ of the community, for
inctLlnce through redistribution of wealth. The contentment 135
of ~omG i~ thu~ off~et by tho qriovance~ of other~.
The <lc!Jecsment of a political leader iD not merely with
reference to certain dcod~ or tackling of certain i~~ue~; it
ic alco an assessment with reference to both the past and the
prc~ent and hence inevitably onL:lil:; comparative
11 c,
per~pectivQ in pl .• co~.
with the benefit of hindsight. .~n Clttempt to
leader::;hip In the ::;tate will be made In the
present section. There IS little doubt th;:>t llr!: left Cln
indoliblo imprint on tho politic::; of tho ::;tato. But. doubt::;
surfClce when we eXClmine the nClture Clnd permClnencc of the
change::; that he initiatod. To date, Ur::; ha::; had tho lonqe::;t
innings 3S chief minister of the st3te.
It i::; an indication of Ur::;· chari::;ma and popularity that
the memory of Urs still lingers strongly even a decudc Clfter
Gonior political load~r::; to thi::; day talk of 137
wanting "to tako tho ~tato back to Dovaraj Ur::; ora".
The question thut ;:>riGeG now is whot w;:>s unique to the
. Dovara j Ur::; ora' in tho ::;tato, what oxpla in~ tho my~t iquo
and holo 3ttached to Urs. M N SrinivuG urgueG thot
from tho ::;pecific policio::; and programmo::; which ho pur~uod.
he ch3nged tho political climate of Karnatako for good. He
o::;tabli::;hod tho norm that the ta::;k of any elocted government
wos to work for the betterment of the living conditions of 138
tho poor who con::;titutcd the majority.
UrG pOGGeGGed u considoroble repertDire of politic;:>l
::;kill~ and a relontlo::;::; drivo to achieve hi::; ooal::;.
flowe-vee, [}ociul Gcientists ;:>re divided in their respDnse to
the variou::; moa::;ure::;. Ur::; undortook to amol ior;)tc the lot of
150
the b~ckward cla~~o~.
While lJome have ~ccn 'lJtructuriJl chOlngec' in his
moa:::::;urc:J, otherG havo Goon hiG roformG aG limitod 139
In naturo
Qr popul ict ic. While conceding thClt the concciousnesc
confidonco of the non-dominant c~~toJ grew during tho Dovaraj
Dr c; , regIme, Frof RClY ClrgueD thut he lOlcked the 110
porGpoctivo ~nd will to uGhor in tar-roaching roform~.
In the fOlce of conflicting clClimD by GOCiCll
thc quoJtion that noodG to bo anGworod t h iJ: Do tho
mC.JSllrC!J undertiJken by Urr:; qUulify to be ciJlled reforme.
roform. obJorvo~ Hirochman i~ ~ chango in which tho power of
hitherto privileged groupe ie curbed whi 1 e the economic
pOGition and Gocial ~tatu~ of 111
corro~pondingly improvod.
undorpriviloged groupG
Fo1iticul theory hOle triJditionully viewed reformr:;
o~~entially in two conflicting mannorG: a blitzkriog approach
wherein the ruler uttemptr:; Cl root Olnd briJnch uttuck on the
problom at hand and publicly announCOG hiG goalG and proGGoG
fOI: them in the hope of uchieving uG much ue poeeiblc; the
othor Gtr~togy io a fabian approach whoro the rulor GoparatoJ
the VuI:IOUC componcnte of hie I:eform from each other.
concoalG hiG aim and pUGhoG Glowly tor chango uGually for one
mC~Gurc ot ~ time.
151
While both pothc hove been tried in th~ course of reform
3ttempted by different ruler:; .. one 3ppoarc to bc
certLlin; "The f h re ormer w 0 ottempts to do everything ull ut 112
onco ondc up accompliching littlo or nothing". Thic IC duo
to the intensity 3nd m3qnitud~ of the opposition thot L'lny
reform proccsc aonor3tee.
l1rc lund reform me3eure:; h3ve often been criticized on
the ground of not going far enough. Urc himcolf wac aware of
this ond exp13ined thot obolition of ten3ncy WuS only th~
firet etop in hie echemo of thinge.
It qu i t e 13te In his politicLll C3reer th3t Urs
realizod the f3ilure of his offorte In bringing about the
orgunizution of the buckwurd c13ssec. to improve their lot.
l1e r031 izod politiciz3tion in3doquato without
orq3nizLlt ion. Dut even here Urs h3d to W31k 3 tight rope.
Any indopondont movec on hie p3rt to roetructure tho
Congress would h3ve been seen by Mrs Gandhi 3S 3n nttempt to
forgo an indopondont p3th. Thie in~vitably would havo
cre3ted hurdle:; in the form of diesidence orchcstr3ted In
Conarocc (Il ctatoc by the Hiqh Command.
Soci3l scientists huve urqued thut orqnnizutionc. provide
support from bo I ow to tho momontum of roform
mCJeurec. 3nd "given 3 me3sure of orqunizution nnd help_
can do much to help thomcclvoe. of ton moro floxibly:)nd
113 efficiently than int~rvention from above could manage".
In his clZlceic work - Who Governc:', Robert Duhl obsE'rve:c
that "any political leador who could help mombor~ of an
ethnic group to overcome the hundicape und humiliutionc
a~~ociated with their id~ntity, who could incroa~o the power,
preet ige, und income of un ethnic or religious out- group,
automatically had an offoctive ctratogy for earning cupport 111
3nd loyalty".
Coming from ~ non- dominant cuete buckground, DevurZlj
lIrc knew woll the mi~ery 3nd poverty that accompaniod the
ubsence of subetuntial numbe:rc of u community in position of
authority. Clearly, tho actionc of Ur~ did not como acrocc
root Zlnd brunch uttuck on the socio-economic
inegu31itiec that chur3ctorizod tho cocial cyctom. Following
Du hi, it muy be noted thut Ure' objective appe:ured to be
"cimply to on13rgo tho opportunitioc for ethnicc to rico
without undue dicerimination in u eyotem thut contuined built 115
in inogualitio~ in tho dictribution of ro~ourcoc."
Devara j lire believod thut in Indiu cuete ctruggle
cynonymouc with clacc ctrugglo and that the powor of tho
vote, the sole weupon in the hundc of the numericully etrong
weaker coctionc would take caro of tho voctod intoroctc In
couree of time. Ilo",cvcr. the decude und <J hulf eince lIrs loet
powor chowc that tho powor of tho voto i~ not ac poworful ac
u~~ made out to boo
In the absence of oppo~tunities in the ~ocio-cconomic
wo~ I d, politic~ bocamo tho moan~ by which tho backwa~d
clnswcG
in thi~
could su~mount the obstaclee in thei~ path.
~ogard that Ur~ providod them the
opportunities in the form of refo~m measures.
It wus
political
Thi~ ~ituation i~ quite tru~ not meroly of Karnataka; in
moet developing nations. a tiny elite that hus
di~proportionato acco~~ to tho ~ocio-oconomic ro~ourco::::;
firmly ~esiets all meusuree to alte~ the status quo. !-knce,
politic~ became tho ~ole moan~ if any moaningful chango i~ to
be brought out. But often as it happened in Karnataka that
option is al~o foreclosod a~ tho elite has cornered tho
uvailable p~incipal slots in the political cyctem und
logi~lato fo~ p~rpetuation of an invidiou~ status quo.
It uppeurs thut if U~s fuiled in uchieving his gouls. it
wa~ not a~ much duo to lack of offorts a~ an inability to
control ce~tuin aspecte of the outside envi~onment.
hi~ p~opo~als roqui~od - if they wo~o to pa~~ from
Most of
idoa to
~eulity an expenditure of critical recoureec - money, time,
onorgy. attontion, ~kill and political support. Ur~' command
over ull these recources was limited.
l\ny 3::J~o~:::;mont of Ur~' logacy in tho ~tatG olOuld bo
incomplete without focusinq on the iseue of corruption in the
151
Un:; • ~rD. Hence, on Dtt~mpt loould b~ m-:>dc In th~ following
paragraph~ to oxamino tho ~ame.
Corruption 1n tho Ura Era: ltD inatitutionalll1ation?
Corruption wa~ in~titutionalizod during tho Urj ora, 116
according to many jcholarj. It ij not aj if corruption did
not exist In Indiun or Kurnutaka politics befor~, they argue,
but tho intonjity and jCOpO of corruption during Ur~' era had
surpussed ull previous records. So much so, that th~ former
primo minijtor Morarji Desai had noted that the record of the
Urs ministry was the blackest in the history of corruption in 117
tho country.
EIDborDting thc point, it hus been noted by one scholar
that while political and admini~trativo corruption oxijtod in
Kurnutaka even curl ier, Urs, howover, 118
enlarged itj ~copo.
hud systemi5ed Dnd
How~ver, discu5siom:; with po:itical leuder5, journDlists
and roferonce to jocondary jource~ reveal that tho largo jumj
of money that Urs rDiscd WDS uscd mostly for party work.
Sub~tantial
119 jumj were aljo channeled upward~ to Mrs
Gandh i.
Corroborutinq thc SDmc point. J'l.K.SubbDiuh notes thut
"Urj adminijtration wa~ moro corrupt than tho prevlou~
155
:ldminictr:lt ion .... But. the mqm:y Orc collected, did not go to
hi::; hou::;e. All 150
that money went to hi::; political
uet ivit ic~lt. Yet another colleague of Orc also avers that
the money collectod wa::; u::;od only for political purp0=:;O:::i: 151
"Ur:::; did not u:::;o a :;inglo pie for him:; elf".
Intereetingly, a veteran journalist observes that Orc
corrupted evon lamp po::;t::; but add:; in tho :;ame breath that 152
hardly any money wont to Or:;' pockot:;.
There 1e aleo disagreement in the bureaucracy to the
not ion that tho Or:; rogime wa:; tho mo:;t corrupt in thG
hictory of the state. One bureaucrat, who has worked clocely
wi th Ur~,. noto:::;, "it i:; wrong to :;ay that Or:;
inetitutionalized corruption. In spite of my cloce
a:::;:;ociation with Ur:::;, I found no evidonco of it. HG madG no
uttempts to interfere in the administration.
mG to do anything impropGr. 153
ab::;olutely wrong."
Tho popular
He never asked
impro~:;ion i!:l
Ncvertheleee, the fact remaine that corruption was morc
vi:::;iblo during Or:;' tGnuro. In tho forthright mannor that wa:;
typical of him, Kemparaj Ure, Devaraj Ore' younger brother,
:;a id: "Okay, we admit that wo aro corrupt. But can Morarji
get up and eay that his people are not? Lot him say that,
thon wo'll GOO. 11.11 that monoy poured into tho oloct ion
where did ul1 that 151
come from? You think thut was not
coz:ruption." Kemparaj Ore clearly had a point when he
claimod that corz:uption wa:; not a phGnomonon ro:;trictGd ju:::;t
156
•
to the Congre~~ (I) alone.
Following wide~pre~d compl~intc. the Jan~t~ government
at the centre appointed the Grover Commission in 1977 to
examine the v~riou~ ch~rgeu of corruption. nepot ism,
favouritism and mi~use of governmental power against the Urs,
and come of hie colleague~.
While initi~lly, the Commi~~ion w~~ appointed to inquire
into 18 allegation~. by a ~ub~equent notifcation. 27 more
~lleg~tionc were referred to the commi~~ion. The Commi~~ion.
in the course of it~ proceodings. received in all 3512 files,
279 ~ff idilVi t~. 155
witno::i:::io::i.
76 ilppliciltionc and eXilmine;d 100
The Grover Commi~cion in it~ Socend (final) Report
recorded instancos of acts of favouritism and misuse of
governmentill power by the chief minister. Further. the
Commi~sion also notod instances ~f abuso of power by two 156
other mini~tors - Chikke Gowda and D.K.Naikar.
However, Urc took il cilcu~l vie;w of the Commicuion ilnd
di~missed its findings as "frivolou:;U. He boasted that 157
commissionG could not mako any dent ln hiG popularity.
Several of Urc' colleague~ ob~erve that while he never
misused the money for himself. thoGe near him made a fortune.
One Genior political leilder averG that thero wac a overdraft
157
in lJn::;' uccount ut thc t imc of hir:; dcuth. Hc ulr:;o notcE; thut
lJr~ had to pay con~iderable ~um~ of money to Indira Gandhi to 158
koep the party intact.
Intcreot ingl y, thc populur view thut lJrr:; uoed to POlY
monoy to hi~ legiolator~ i~ corroborated by a fow of hi~
collcuguco. But thcy urc ununimouo thQt ruther thun the
initiativo coming from lJr~, tho roque~t for money wao
frcquent from the legir:;lutoro on vuriouE; groundE;: functionE; 159
or a marriage in the family, financial trouble, otc. Thb
rebutr:; thc populur notion thut lJro puid money to hiE;
legi~lator~ to have their loyalty.
hnother V10W 10 now bcing enunciuted by u number of
prominent political per~onalitie~ in private but it i~ yet to
giJin credencc. Theoc leuderc:: note thut while corruption did
oxi~t during lJr~' tenure, it wa~ much lo~~ compared to
ouboequent Deocribing him ao ol humaniE;t, they iJver
that VOGtod intoro~t~ wore to a certain extent ro~pon~ible 150
for much of the hullabaloo over corruption in l ~' poriod.
lJrG himoelf iE; believed to havo oboerved thut whutcvcr
ho had colloctod from hiG loft hand, he had pa~oed out
through hie right hand. lJro iJverred thut he hud done: it for
tho party and that he had not uoed the money even for a cup 151
of coffea.
156
A ~tudy of corruption revealc that it wa~ not a new
phenomenon in the rough and tumblo of Indian politlc~.
Several Indian political figure~ had been charged with
corruption even in tho 1950~ and 1960~. Corruption wa~ not
unique to the political per~onalitiec alone but WilEi U 1 co
evident even in the buroaucracy, whero it wa~ noticed at tho 162
lower rung~ even during the day~ of the Raj.
~ early ac 1961, the Santhanam Committee had ob~erved:
"There i~ a wido~pread impro88ion that failure of integrity
ic not uncommon among miniutcrc and that come mini~terc, who
have hold offica during the la~t Gixteon year~, have enriched
themcelve~ illegitimately, obtained good jobc for their ~onc
and relation:; through nepoti:;m and have roaped other
advantilgoc 163
inconcictent with any notion of purity in public
1 ife ...
Corruption In the context of moct developing politiec ic
an ubiquitou8 phenomenon and the Gcale and inten~ity of
corruption merely of academic intercct. But what conctitut~
corruption?
One Politicill ccientict definec it ac "behaviour of
public official:; which doviato:; from acceptod norm~ in ordor 161
to corvo private endc". It wac further oboerved that the
extent of corruption corrolateG well with rapid and ~ocial
modernizat ion, Corruption io perceived au an indicator of a
low level of in~titutionalization. Particularly among the
159
pol it iCill inr;titutionu, wei:lkner;c; of politiCi:l1
providoG a conducivo atmoGphoro for corruption. To tho oxtont
thilt the Congreuu (I) in Ki:lrnilti:lki:l, i:lu eluewhere, hi:ld become
a weak party, it providod tho breoding ground for all kind~
of corrupt ion.
In Aziil i:lnd South Aziil in pilrticulilr, the extent of
corruption ha3 boon porcoivod to be high by 30voral 3cholarG.
Gunnilr Myrdill in hic work on poverty in Aziil notes thi:lt "in
South A3ia thoGe VOGtod with official authority and power
very often exploit their pOGition in order to mi:lke il gi:lin for
themGolvol:;, the i r fa mil y, or Gocial group. i:J :::;0
whether thilt poc;ition ic the high onc of il minic;ter, il member 165
of tho logizlaturo or a Guporior official".
"The weilkneGc of pilrty orgilniziltion it; the opportunity 166
of corruption", obzorvoG Honry JonoG Ford. Givon tho
illmoct completei:lbuence of il well-oiled pilrty orgi:lnizi:ltion
and tho fact that by tho 19700, porzonality politicz had
eel ipc;ed pi:lrty pol it iCE;, it ic; not Gurpricing thi:lt grilft
Ghould como to tho forofront of tho political prOCOZG in
Indiil.
167 While Gome Gcholi:lrc; i:lrgue thilt hwii:ln countriec; hi:lve
alwayG had a tradition of corruption, Myrdal ob30rvod that
the exictence of corruption in Indiil Wilu iln i:lupect of the
Goft state implying a low lovel of Gocial diGcipline In tho
160
168 country. From the Dforegoing. it ic cleDr thDt corruption
in politic~ i~ largely a feature of weak in~titutionalization
of org~nizutionc and procedurec.
However, a detailed examination of the corruption
currounding Devaraj 'Urr; indicater; that the folklore of
corruption - the popular belief~ about corruption - did not
accurately mirror the reality in Devaraj Uro' c~ce. While
there oxi~tod con~iderablo corruption in the ~tato, tho viow
of Urr;' colleaguec and journalictc io that money war; raiocd
for political purpo~e rather than for por~onal onrichmont.
Pol H ical theorir;tc have contended thut corruption,
where it i~ indulgod in for building a party organization
ruther than for perr;onal aggrandizement "underminec the 169
condition of it~ own exi~tonce". To tho oxtont that
Dcvaraj Urc uccd the moncy for party activitiec. he may be
bolioved to have played a role in party-building.
Thur;. the Urc' era occupic[; a dictinct pha&e in the
pol i tic~ of tho ~tate. Thi~ p~riod witno:;~od a oro~ion in tho
power of thc dominant ca&tcp. 1'..t variouc levelp, chief
mini~tor~hip, cabinet and logi::.lative a::.~ombl y, tho
reprepentation of the dominant captep witnepced a decline.
Thi::. pha::3o al::.o made a bogining in dirocting flow of
recourcc5 towardc hitherto neglected ccctionp of cociety.
Prominont among tho moa~uro::. that Ur~ introduced were land
161
reform~ vnd re~ervvtion~ which were undertvken with grevter
~incority than in tho pa~t.
The effortr:; of the government were ~uccezzful wh i Ie:
implomonting tenancy. liowovor, in aiding tho landlo~~,
little progrezr:; wVu mvde. But, Urr:; himzelf intended the 1971
Act a~ only tho fir~t ~tep in a longer and moro radical
proceDr:;. Further, the Uru government alzo mvde effortz
through othor pro-poor programmo~ liko dobt reliof, provi~ion
of houDing uiteu for the poor and v major houue-building
programma.
TheDe reform mear:;ureu were largely the outcome of a
combination of factor~, o~pocially cri~e3 impinging upon tho
E:i¥E:itcm. Further, in thiu phaze, the: effectz of
doin~titutionali~ation of political ~tructuro~ camo to bo
ueen in Urr:;' appointment au the chief mini~ter, large Deale
dafoction~ and corruption.
The UrD era wa~ marked by a conr:;picuouu increar:;e in the
ganoral porcoption that corruption had rearod it3 ugly haad
in a manner nevor evident before. However, it appean; that
largo 3um~ of money colloctod wa~ u~od for party activitia~.
However, by the end of the decade the r:;train~ in the
Ur~-Mr~ Gandhi rolation3hip finally lod to tho parting of
wayr:; in July 1979. uubr:;equently, the leaderzhip at the: ape:x
162
level witnesscd u chunge following the poor showing of UrD'
party in the 1980 Lok sabha eloction~.
Frequent 1 y. to
programmeG undertaken
regimc uS a bcnchmurk.
datc. referoncc to uny dEvElopment
in Karnataka are made with tho UrG
Urs hus been credited with u$hcring in
a Gilent revolution in tho state.
163
1.
., w'
Noto" und Roference"
J.:tmC!:i Milner, EPW. Vo 1 l~.
"Structurol Chunges No 11. October. ;;9.
in Kornutilkil Politic,,", 1977. pp. 1865 -'3.
R K Hcb!:1.'r, "KurnutClku", SCTT1.tnor, No. ::21, pp,26-26
l'..pe i I 1978.
L:d ithu Nctroj ond V K N:>te:>l, "Limits of EPW.
Populism: Dev3Ll"j l'r::; :lnd K3rn3t3k3 Pol it ic:;". Vo 1 17. No. 37.' SeF~2mber. 11. 1982. pp. 1503-5
K SZltYZlnuruYZlnil, "Deve:>; Dr,,: The Sturt of Zl New Eru in Pol it ic:;". Indi.Jn Expre::;:;. Febru.Jey 16. 1991.
Loui::;e. F:::rn3nde::;. "The H:ln Who Fought Odd::;". Vol 10. Ne 1. June 20-25. 1982 pp.18--21.
Sund3Y·
BhLlgwLln ["J:> , "Indiu: l'.. Study on the Puthology Feder.Jl Sy::;tem " The Jouen.Jl Qi. Commonwe.Jlth Comp3rutiv::: Politic::;. Vol 19. No 3. November. pp257 -275.
of u 3nd
1981
3. Ibid .•
1.
" .,).
6.
7 .
8.
9.
1 (J.
Krishun 1971. pp.
P:~:>t iu, Ind ir:>, :1)1-265.
Frueger Fubli"her",
St3nlcy Y.:'C'hunck. "Hes. Gundhi - s PyrClmid: Congrc::;::;". In Henry C H.Jrt. Indie3 G3ndhi -::; PolitlC3l Sy::;tem Re3ppr.Ji::;od. Wo::;tviow Pre::;::;, 1976, pp. :'6-97.
New York,
The New I nd i 3 : ll.
Bou 1 der.
Rum ,lochl' Kirt idev De!:u 1. "Dominunce wi th Difference: Str.Jin::; 3nd Ch311enge::;", EPW, Annual Number. February. 1973, p. 193.
SudiptLl EPW, Vo 1 1700.
Y.~vir:>l. "Indiru G.:Jndhi .:Jnd Indiun Politic,,", ::: L No 38 & 39. September 20-27. 1986. pp.1699-
Stunley Kc:-hLlnek, QP, oj L--, __ pp. 110-111.
SUdlptil K::'·!ir.J"j. OQ.._C_I t .. _
Decc.Jn Iler:.ld. Febr 1J3ry 6, 1972. --- --- ---------
I bid ••
[Jccc<:ln tlC;.f':- 1 d, Fcbru<:lry 12, 1972.
11. Reuct inq to the poll verdict:> stllnned Conqrcc.s (0' bcmo:>ned that the oppo~ition voice had been rendered "too feeble to be effective even :>s:>n instrument of public ~crutiny. critiel~m :>nd debate on policy and :ldministrut ion". Sec p~f'_e:>1l tJcruL<!. Murch 13. 1972.
12. Government of Socrotar iaL Tho Review = 1972-77.
K:lrnut :llt:l. KiJ r n~iiJ kiJ BiJng3] oro.
K:>rnut:>ku Logi~lative 1978. p.8
Leqislutive l\::;~embl y: ,'l
IS. Indi3 TodiJY. Novembor 15. 1981. p.l02.
16. Sudiptu KuvirQj. op. cit. " p. 1700.
17. Giov:>nni Surtor 1. P:>rt ies Cumbridge University Fress.
und Purty Systems. Cumbridge, 1976. p.126.
18. Hung Ch30 T3i. LiJnd Reform iJnd Politic:;: !l. Comp::lrative !l.n3Iy~i:; Univer~ity of C::llifornia Pre~:;. Borkely. 1971, p.291.
19. !l. M Zuid1. 1965- 67. Vol
Eneyclopedi:> £t Indi:>n NiJtionul Congress-19. S ChiJnd und Comp:>ny. New Delhi. 1983.
21. Ibid .. p.200
22. Ibid!_.
23. IbLd~~ p.202
25. Government of Indiu. ~grari3n Situ3tion.
Ministry of Home Mfuiru. Report on NeN Delhi. 1969.
26. !\ 3uidi. Eneyclopediu of Indiun Nutionul Congress 1969-70, Vol 21. S Chclnd und Compuny. New Delhi. 1981, p.168.
27. Government of Indiu, Chief Minicterc Conference on Lund Reform:;. InauguriJl Mdre~::; Indir::l Gandhi_. NeH Delhi. Sept~mb~r 26. 1970.
20. INC, Elec:LLon Munifect_Cl' tlcH Delhi. 1972.
29. Government of Indio. Flunninq Commicuion. Tuck Force on Mf-::l_,ian B.9-.l~lgn::;. New ['cclhi. 1973.
165
30.
31.
flerr i ng. Lund ~---
to the Ronul d Economy of llnivcr~ity
IIgruriun Reform:- In ~outh Prc~~. NCI-I Delhi. I Q 86. p.225.
The P~u.t C') I lndi"., Ox ord
N:lrender P::ml. Lcgi~l:lt ion ill p.62.
Reform~ t~ Pre-empt Ch3ngo: K:lrn:lt::llca. Concopt. NO~I Delhi.
L::md 1981.
32 HilS Ri) jun, Li)ng, Reforms l..!l KurniJtnltn: lin [lccount!2.Y " Pi)rt iculnr Obceryer, Hindust::>n Publ ishinq House. New Delhi. 19£16. p.136. .
33. Ibid .• p.131.
31.
35.
36.
37.
NDrender F:>1" i. op. cit .• pp.62-61 & 73-83.
J:lme::: Mnnor. "Pr<Jgm:>t Ie Pr:ogrcccivc ln 15.
Region:>l Polltic~". EPW. 1\nnu:ll Number. Vol No. 5-6. Febru:lry. 1980. p.205.
C B Dnmle. "Lnnd Reforms LegicliJtion in Knrn:>tiJk:l: of Sueco~~". EPW. Vol 21. No. 33. l>.ugu~t 19. 1989. 18'36 -1906.
K H Gopn 1 iJ Kr i~hniJ GONd... "Tennney Reforms K:Hn:lt:lk:l". P:lper Pre::;cntod:lt tho Work::;hop on RC'form~ In KiJrnDtDkn. ISEC. BDngnlore. September 1993. p.7.
Myth pp.
in Land 1-3.
38. C B D::> m 1 e. Q~ it .•
39.
11.
13.
M Rnlncekhor Murthy. "Volcdictory IIddrecc", Precented at the Work::;hop on L:lnd Reform::; in K3rnataka. ISEC. Bnng:l!ore. September 1-3. 1993.
Inderlit Singh. Tcnnncy in South /)r, in. Wor I d Bnnk Diccu~~ion Popere 32. W:lchington D C. 1988. pp. 9-10.
l\t u 1 Koh 1 i. The St nt e n nd Povcr-ty til J_n_g,i n: rb_~ t.'2 Ltt.Lcc g,t !{~_tsnm. C;;;;bridgc-·l1niverc-i-ty- Frecc. Ci:lmbrJdge. 1987. pp. 165· 179.
M V N:>duk<Jrni. "Tennntc from the DominiJnt Cl:lcc: Developing Contradict ion in Land Roform~". EPW. Vol Decembor 1976. p.137.
II 11.
11. S V Dechpunde. t.c:ll1l.j.nicterin...9. ~und \Leiorm!?, lJl. Kil.r..D.nJiilt<J:. /'. Cuse ~J:.~ of Two [)istrU:·t.~. Ph. d Disccrtntion. Un i ver~ i t Y of My~orc. MysorC', 1988.
166
•
15. M N Kul k:>rni :Jnd llmcshl.]ur f·:Jndcy. Fost L:Jnd Problem:; in Karn3t::ll~:J: ~ Stui!Y in --SUqgc""t iv:~ MCLQ.:;ure;;., l\dmini:;trat i':-e St3ff College of f-iydcr:Jbod, 1979. p.11.
f{eform~
S y:; .!.. e "'lndia.
16. Dcccun Her3ld, Junuory L 1978. 17. Jomes S Melchoir, "Implementution of Lund Reforms: Problem~ ond Pro:;pcct:;", EPW, Vol 15. M3Y 5, 1979. p.800.
l\tul Kohli. op.cit"
19. K Gop3l Iyer. "Implementation of L3nd Ceiling Programme In K:>rnutuk:> ", Lund Reform~ Unit, Lol Bohodur Shu~tri Academy of 2'>.dmini:;trat ion. Mu:;:;oor io. 1993. p.18.
50. Ib~ p.19.
51. J3mes Monor, "Progmutic Progressives in Politic:;: The C3:;C of Dcv3r3j Ur:;", op.cit..
Regionul p.205.
52. Ibid .•
53. Ibid ..
51.
55.
K GOPell lyer. op. cit .. p.28.
Government of K3rnut:>k:>. The Report of the Kornotaka Bockwurd Closses Commission, Bongolorc, Vol L p.51.
Third 1990,
56. Hung Choo To i. L:md Ref orm und Fo 1 it i cs: lJ. Compur 3t i vc hnolysis.Univercity of Culiforniu Precs, Berkely, 1971, p.258
57. Ibid .• p. 287.
5£1. cited in Somucl P Changing Sociotie:; 1986, p.385.
Huntington, Politicul Yolo Univor:;ity Pre:;:;,
Order in Now H3von.
59. Ibi.Q.,...! p.386.
60.
51.
62.
D Bondopudhyuy. "Lond Reforms in Indio: hn hnulysis", EPW, Vol 2 L June 21-28. 1986. p.53.
Fronclne FrdnlteL l£liLlP_~ roliticcd Econ~ The Gruduul Revoluti.p.n. Oxford University De 1 hi. 1 <J 7 8 , p. 2 3 •
1917-1977: Frese. New
F C Joshi. Lon.9 R_et2rms In ID.QJil=-. Tr~ndr;_ und Per_~peet iyS~' 1\11 ied P,-,bl isherc. Bomboy, 1975. p. 101.
V M R~o. "L~nd Reform Experience~: Pcr~pectivc~ for Stratogy and Programmo:.". EPW, Vol 27, No. 26, Juno. 1992. p. A-63.
63. M N Srinivil~ ~nd M N P~nini. op.cit.. pp.69-72.
61. Govornmont of Karnat aka. Backward Cla:.:.o:. Commi:'3ion.
Report of tho Bangalore. 1975.
65. Doccan Horald. Fobruary 28. 1978.
66. Deccan Horald. March i. 1978.
67. Silrvepillli Gop~l. R~dhilkri~hniln:h Biogr~phy. Univer~ity Pre~El. New Delhi. 1989. p.262.
KarnataK:a
Oxford
68. Indor Malhotra. Indira Gandhi: A Por:.onal and Political Biography. Huddor and Strongman. London. 1989. p.210.
69. Sunday. Jul y 1. 1979.
70. J~me~ M~nor. "Prilgm~tic Progre~Elive". op.cit .• p.211.
Intorviow with Aziz Saito Banga10ro. March 21. 1991.
Interview with M C N~nili~h. Bung~lore, Milrch 15, 1991
Intorviow with A K Subbaiah. Bangaloro. March. 13, 1991.
71. Sund~y. op. cit .•
72. Inder M~lhotril, op.cit .. p.216.
73. Ibid .•
71. BDDuil. op.cit .• p.275.
75. Inder MDlhotr~. op.cit .. p.177.
76. Lloyd Rudolph Lak3hmi: Tho Or ient Longman,
ilnd Su~~nnc Rudolph, In Pur~uit of Political Economyof tho Indian Stato
Bombay, 1987, p.111.
77. Sund~y. p. cit.. p. 12.
78. J~mc~ M~nor. "Blurring the Line~ Between the PDrticEl ~nd Social Ba30~: Oundurao and tho Emorgonco of a Janata Government in KDrniltilk~" in John R Wood (cd). StDte Pol it ic:! in Contomporary India: Cr il:; i:::; or Cont inui tv, W03tviow PrO:'3, Boulder. 1981. p. 112.
79. Ibid .•
80. Sund~y. op. cit. ,
168
81. Rudolph and Rudolph. op.cit.. p.137.
82. Zaroor Ma::;ani. Indira Gandhi: !'! Biography. Cromwoll Publ i::;hor::;. Now York. 1975. p. 52.
83. Rudolph ~nd Rudolph, op.cit.,
81. 1'l!::; hi Ij h Nil nd y, in CuI ture, 121.
~t Edge of Pljychology: EljljilYIj in Oxford University Preljlj, Delhi,
Pol it iCE) 1980. p.
85. Interview with 1\ziz Silit. Bilngillore. Milrch 21, 1991.
86. Sudipta Kaviraj, op.cit.,
87. Intorviow with Aziz Saito Bilnga1oro, March 21,-1991.
88. Stilnloy Kochilnek, op. cit.,
Sudiptil Kilvirilj. op.cit .•
89. Doccan Harald. Juno 9, 1979.
90. Doccan Harald, Juno 12, 1979.
91. Doccan Horilld, Juno 9, 1979.
92. Doccan Harald, Juno 12. 1979.
93. Doccan Horilld. Juno 17. 1979.
91. Doecan Harald. Juno 12, 1979.
95. Doccan Hor aId, Juno 18, 1979.
96. Ibid. ,
97. Decciln Herilld, Juno 19, 1979.
98. Ibid .•
99. Deccun Herilld, June 21. 1979.
100. Ibid .•
101. Ibid .•
102. Decciln Herilld, June 19. 1979.
103. Decciln Heril1d, June 22, 1979
101. Decciln Heril1d. June 25, 1979.
105. Decciln Heru1d. June 30. 1979.
169
106. Ibid. ,
107. Ibid. ,
108. Sund.:lY· op.cit •• p. 16
109. Docc.:ln Hor.:lld, JilnU.:lry l- 1980.
110. Docc.:ln Hor:lld, JilnU.:lry 8, 1980.
111. Ibid. ,
112. Ibid. ,
113. Dccciln Beru 1 d. J<lnuury 1, 1980.
111. Dccc.:ln Heru 1 d, Junuilry 9, 1980.
115. Jumcl:i Milnor. "Frugmutic Progreuuivc" op.cit" p.202.
116. DOCCiln Hor.:l1d, Junuilry 1, 19BO.
117. Docc.:ln Horu1d. Janu.:lry 2, 1980.
118. Docc.:ln Hor.:lld, J.:lnuury 2, 1980.
119. Interview with D B Chilndre Gowdu, Bilngillore, Murch 28, 1991.
120. Dccc.:>n Heruld. Junuury 10. 1980.
121. Dcccun Heru1d. Junuury 8, 1980.
122. Deccun Heru1d, Junu<lry 9. 1980.
123. Ibid .•
121. Dccc.:>n Hcr.:>ld, J.:>nuury 1, 19BO.
125. Ibid .•
126. Interview with R.:>mel:ih Kumur, Bungu1ore, September 25, 1989.
127. S R Rumunnu, ~ Study in the Shift£; of Furty Mfliiltion of the Mcmberu of the Kurnutuku Lcgiulutivc ~l:iembly 1967- 1981. B.:>ngulorc Univerl:iity. Bungulore, 1989. pp 85-BB.
12B. I bid .• p. 62.
129. B.:>bu1ill Fudi.:>. op.cit" p. 377.
130. Ibid .• p. 375.
170
131. S R Ramanna, op. cit" p. 7.
132. Ibid., p.l1.
133. Babulal Fadio, op. cit. , p.396.
131. Indio TodilY, November 15, 1981. p.l02.
135. JCLln Blonde!, Pol it ieal LeLlderuhip: Towilrdu !;!. Genero1 MLllysis, Silge, London, 1987, pp.62-63.
136. Ibid. ,
137. This comment Wilu milde by A K SubbalLlh. India, J'.pril 18, 1990.
Sec Timcs of
138. M N Srinivou ilnd M N PLlnini, "Pol it icu and Karnataka", EPW, Vol 19, No.2, January 11,
Society in 1981, p.73.
139. JLlmes MLlnor, "Structurol ChLlnge In Politic~" op.cit.,
V K NLltroj ond Lalitha NLltraj, "Limitu of Dl3varaj Ur:. and Karnataka Politic~", EPW, Vol 37, Septembor 11, 1982.
KLlrnLltuku
Popul i6m: 17, No.
110. Mal Ray and Jayalakshmi Kumpatla, "Caute and Zillu Pari~had Eloction::; in Karnataka", EPW, July 25, 1987. pp.1829-1830
111. l'..l bert 0 Hirchman, Journcy Toward Progress, Twent ieth Ccntury Fund, New York, 1963, p. 267, cited in Samuel Huntington, op.cit" p.311.
112. Samuel P Huntington, op.cit., p.317.
113. Boll, "Tho Political Rediutribution with Oxford, 1971, 52.
Framework", in Holi~ Chenery (ed) Growth, Oxford University Press,
111. .'Obert Dahl, op. ci t. , p.33
115. Ibid .•
116. James Manor, "Fragamtic Progressive", op.cit.
M N Sriniva~ and M N Panini, op.cit.,
J'.tul Kohli. op.cit.,
117. Doccan Herald, January 22, 1978.
118. M N Srinivas und M N PLlnini. op. cit. , p.70.
171
119.
150.
151
152.
Interview with J'.z i z S<> it. B<>ngu1orc. Mureh 21, 1991.
Interview with P K Sriniva:::;an, Bangalore, March. 1991
Interview with A K Subb<> i<lh. B<lng<llorc. M<>rch 3. 1991.
Interview with M C Nana iah, Banga1ore, March 15, 1991
Interview with V N Subb<lr<lo. B<lng<l1orc. 1991.
Februilry 22,
153. Interview with G V K Rilo. Milrch 20, 1991
151. Sunday., op.cit.,
155. Government New Delhi.
156. Ibid .•
of Indi<l, Report of the 1978.
157. Indi<l Tod<lY. M<lrch 16-31, 1978. p.39.
Grover
158. Interview with P K Sriniv<lu<ln. B<lng<llore,
Commha:; ion,
M<lrch 11, 1991.
159. Interview with D B Chandre Gowda, Banga10re, March 28, 1991.
160. Interview with P K Srinivuuun. 1991.
B<lngil1ore. Milrch 11,
161. Interview with M C Niln<li<lh, B<lngillore::, M<lrch 15. 1991.
162. Gunnar Myrda1, A:::;ian Drama: of Nation:::; Vol 2, Penguin p. 161
An Enquiry into Poverty Book:::;, London, 1968.
163. Government of Indiil, Report of Silnthiln<lm Committee on Corrupt ion, Now Do1hi, p. 9.
161. Silmuel Huntington. Po1itic<l1 Order in Chilnqinq SocioL -. op.cit." p.59.
165. Gunn<lr Myrd<ll. Au L:m Dr<lm<l: An Enquiry into Poverty of Nilt iom:;. Vol II Penguin. t1<lrmonduworth. 1968.
166 .• lenry Joneu Ford. RiGe <lnd Growth of Meric<ln Politicu, Macmi llan, Now York, 1858
If> 7. Guy Wint. Spot MyrdaL op.cit ..
Light p.919.
108. Gunnilr MyrdilL op. cit ..
in Auiil r 91,
169. Samuol Huntington. op.cit.. p.7!.
172
cited in Gunn<lr
CHM'TEn. - IV
ommo RAO AND DECLINE OF CONGRESS
Tho yo~r 198: onco uguin witno~~od u ~hift in tho
pol it iCill lc;sdcrt:hi;: of the t:tilte. Devuri:l:i Urt:, who hud CilCt
in hi~ lot with M~: Gundhi in 1969. p~rtod wuy~ with hor in
1979 und with powcr in 1980.
h lundt:lide vl::ory in the 1980 Lok Silbhil electiont: mildc
it po~~iblo for the :ongro~~ (I) to como back to powor in tho
ctilte. Following :je Wilve of defectionu from the Congrct:c
( U) • procodod by 0--' ro~ignution a~ chiof mini~tor. Gundu
Rilo becilmc thc ni~:~ chief miniutcr of the r;;tilte in Jilnuilry
1980.
The chilngc in ~:Jdert:hip Cilmc in il much t:imilur filuhion,
il~ in 1972. Gundu ~o Wu~ ul~o Mr~ Gundhi'~ choico u~ tho
chief minit:ter of t:J: ctilte.
Gundu Rilo, who ~Jilcd from Coorg, Wilt: picked by Dcvilrilj
Ur~ to hOud tho you:~ Congro~~ in tho ~tuto aftor tho
cplit in 1969. H-- fir[;t minictcriill inningc WilC
party
ilt: thc
miniutor of ~tuto ::r ~portu und information undor Dovarai
Or c in 1971.
17.3
Gundu Ruo's uctions were invuriubly surrounded by
cont rovor::;y. Ho croatod hi::;tory of ::;ort::; by iumping into tho
Juyunugur Dwimming pool to inuugurute it. ~ u minister for
Information. tho young loador oarnod tho wrath of buroaucrat::;
by Dcnding thc depurtment's cumerumen to the ruce course on u
working day to taka picturo::; of official::;
ruceD. insteud of being <It work.
watching tho
Tho contra::;t in loador::;hip ::;tylo::; botwoon Gundu Rao and
Urs iD murll:ed. even <lD a follower of Mrs G<lndhi.
maintainod a patrician dignity whilo Gundu Rao wa::; givon to
fl<lmboY<lnt postures.
~ Devuruj Urs' emisD<lry to Delhi. Gundu Rao got the
opportunity for dovoloping contact::; with kay por::;onnol in
thc CongrcDD. fle <lIDO managed to eDtablish cloDe contucts
with Saniay Gandhi. tho hair apparont. Sub::;oquont 1 y. during
the Emergency. Gundu R<lo organi~ed gr<lnd receptions for
Saniay Gandhi in Bangaloro and Bidar. Tho::; a rocoption::; ::;0
impreDDed S<lnjay G<lndhi th<lt he recommended to Dev<lraj Urs to
mako Gundu Rao a cabinot mini::;tor immodiatoly.
Even <lu the relationuhip between Devar<lj Urs <lnd Mrs
Gandhi ::;tartod dotoriorating, Gundu Rao cho::;o to romain with
the latter. Following the Congreus uplit. Gundu R<lo reDigned
from Ur::;' cabinot. Mtor tho rout of tho Congro::;::; (U) in tho
1980 J<lnu<lry Lok S<lbha electionu, Gundu Rao <lnd F M Khan
171
I
orchc~tratcd a wavc of defection~ from the Congre~~ (U) to
tho Congro~~ (I) onabling tho party to a~Jumo power.
Given the naturc of Dhift in leadcrDhip. and kceping in
viow tho objoctivoJ of the Jtudy. tho proJont chaptor makoJ
un attempt to underDtand the implicationD of the Dudden
chango in loador~hip on roform moa~uro~. Whilo doing JO.
the chapter aleo focu~eD on the CongrcDD debacle in thc 1983
oloction~.
The chaptcr ic organiced into four ~cctionc. Section
ono analyJo~ tho ~ocial baJo of the loador~hip. Tho Jtylo of
functioning of Gundu Rao ie oxamined in ccction two. While
doing ~o. tho ~oction-highlightJ tho moaJuroJ undertakon by
Gundu Rao on the ieDue~ of land reform~ and re~ervation.
GoctionJ thro~ and four delinoato tho doclino of CongrQJ~ and
itD dcfcat in the 1983 electionD re~pectivcly.
Social BaJo of LoadorJhip
The cocial bace of the legiclatorc in termc of cacte and
occupation did not witnoJ~ any chango aJ tho
leaderchip wac only at the apex level without any
Jhift in
e1ectionD.
~ ob~orvod oarlior, tho proportion of dominant CUJte~ in
1978 regictercd a decline from thc 1972 e1ectionc.
Tho proportion of hJJomb1y mombor~ citing agricu1turo UJ
their occupation wac ~ub~tantiaJ. It may be noted further
175
thut Gundu Ruo'u Gubinet compriued of one member euch from
tho dominunt cu~to~, two from tho Bruhmin community und oight
from the non-dominunt communitieu. ~lowever. uu we uhull E;ee
In tho following ~oction~, uny hopo~ of tho govornmont
uuhering in meuningful reform meuE;ureE; were belied.
Stylo ~ Functioning
oru.
"I urn u blind follower of Mudum. Shc iE; thc ruler of Kurnutuku. Boreft of hor ble~~ing~, nobody i~
1 unybody in my ~tuto" - Gundu Ruo
Politicu1 obuervcrE; huvc tended to pillory the Gundu Ruo
In fuct, ono ob~orver do~cribod tho p~riod from 1981-83
"hiluriouu period full of uound und fury. 2
uction und
colour".
Gundu Ruo. like mOE;t GongrcuE; (I) chief miniuteru of
tho 1970~ und 1980~. owod tho chiof mini~tor~hip to puluco
politicu ruther thun purty politicu. However, it iu now well
ucknowlodgod thut Gundu Ruo wu~ inudoquuto to tho tu~k thru~t
upon him by Mru Gundhi.
Tho fir~t fow month~ in powor wore devotod to attonding
fclicitution ceremonieu where Gundu Ruo wuu feted by vuriouu
orgunizution~ koon on politicul patronago.
Frequent 1 y, dcciuion muking wuu urbitrury, huuty und
176
mojor deci~ion~ oppeored to be token witLout cureful
con~idoration of tho i~~uo~ involvod. Tho chiof mini~tor
unnounced 100 per cent power cut on high tcn~ion
indu~trio~, only to repeal tho doci~ion the noxt day.
Such ho~ty deci~ion~ conveyed the imprc~~ion of u
govornmont not ~eriou~ about it~ bu~ino~~ and drow ~tridont
criti~ium from thc Oppo~ition.
Referring to Gundu Rao'~ penchont for gronting
conco~~ion~ without propor con~idoration of tho
involvcd. Devoroj Ur~ de~cribod the chief mini~ter o~ a
"modorn Karna" and ob~orvod: "whothor thoro i~ monoy in tho
trcouury or not. he i~ ready to ~anction whatever
domandod" (an allu~ion to conco~~ion~ grantod by Gundu Rao to 3
farmor~).
File cleurance drive~. the deci~ion to fence the Vidhana
Soudha, holding cabinot mooting~ in tho di~trict hoadquartor~
and appoin+mcnt of film ~tar~ for prominent po~itionu all
ca~t ~oriou~ doubt~ about tho ability of Gundu Rao to govorn
the ~tate.
The much proclaimed file clearanco drive drew only
dori~ivo commont~ from tho Oppo~ition loador~. D B Chandra
Gowda noted that "it take~ atlea~t one minute to teur or burn 1
a filo. How could ~ix filo~ bo cloarod in on~ minuto".
177
The chief miniDter alwo came under fire for hiw uctionw
in tho allotmont of comont to big buildor~. Tho Public
hccount~ Committee alleged that 1,000 tonne of cement wa~
grantod to tho buildor~ from an additional allotment moant
excluDivcly for Government work~.
Furthor, Gundu Rao'~ rolation~hip with tho pro~~ wu~
alwo weriouDly Dtrained. Faced with conwiderable criticiwm
ov~r hi~ action~. ho rotortod by calling iournali~t~ "barking
dogw" and in anothcr instance asked them 5
"to drown
themwelvew in the nabian Soa". Youth Congreww workerw laid
~lOgO to tho offico~ of tho "Doccan Horald" and "Indian
Expreww" prcventing the diotribution of ncwwpapcrc. "They
(now~papormon) aro not roporting prop~rly tho picturo of tho
hugc crowdw awcembling to hear uw und to cheer uw", wac Gundu 6
Rao'~ anothor rofrain again~t tho modia.
Even as Deveral partc of the stute wa~ reeling under
drought. tho chiof mini~tor wont about in hi~ helicopter
organiwing functions to celebrate tho first anniversary of
hi~ govornmont. Tho~e functionD al~o ~orvod a~ occa~ion~ to 7
colloct fund~ which Gundu Rao, iu~tifiod a~ "common".
The advcrDc publicity that his actionw inevitably
ongondorod. lod to furthor oro~ion in tho imago of tho
Congrew~ (1) • Howevcr, all this had littlc impact on Gundu
178
llr, one pol it iCul obr:;crver .in the r:;tute huc noted: "The . 8
d~m~go dono to hl~ roputution did not ~oom to both~r him".
However. mujor trouble during Gundu Ruo'c three yeur
torm ln offico ~ro~o ~~ ~ ro~ult of tho f~rmor~ ~git~tion,
public r:;ector employecr:; ctrike in Bungulore. lilnguuge
ilgit~t ion, Gtriko by-tho modie~l ~tuGont~ and doctDr~, All
thccc icr:;uer:; met with iln inept rcr:;ponr:;e from the r:;tilte
govornmont.
The furmerr:;' ugitution during thir:; philr:;e illr:;o
domon~triltod tho in~on~itivity of tho Gundu Rao govornmont
towu~ il prccc; ing iur:;ue. The filrmerc' ugitution hud itr:;
rootD in tho Mul~pr~bh~ Comm~nd ~rou of tho Dh~rw~r diDtrict.
Thc genecic; of thc problem luy in the movc of the government
to colloct ~ bottormont lovy with rotroDpoctivo off oct
following the introduction of irrigution in 1973-71 in the
command uro.:l.
Howevcr. decpite introduction of irrigiltion in tho ureu.
tho f~rmorD hild boon hit by ~ f~ll in tho prico of cotton ~nd
otcep increilr:;c in thc price of fertilizcrr:;. Wiltcr-logging und
~illinity WilD ~lDO roportod in tho ilrOil and addod to tho woo~
of the furmerc;. Furthcr. the problemr:; of thc furmerr:; wore
compoundod by tho gov~rnm~nt ordor to pily tho lovy for illl
thc lund owned in the commilnd ureil. even if only il pilrt
179
irr ig<ltod.
Effort~ by the fDrmer~ of the DrCD to ~cck rcdrc~~Dl of
a ranQo of thoir Qriovanee~ elicitod a poor and ham-handod
rc~pon~c from thc Qovcrnmcnt. Thc rc~ult WD~ protc~t~ by thc
ryot~ and violonce and firinQO at Nargund in Dh<lrwar.
& D rCDction to the NDrQund violence, the ryot~ from
all pDrt~ of Karnataka orgDni~od a march to Bangalore to
protc~t in front of VidhDn SoudhD undcr thc Dcgi~ of RDithD
HorDta Gamiti. Tho indu::.trial working cla::.~ ~upported tho
ryot iDtha by ioining thc mDrch.
Tho domand~ of tho ryot~ includod fixing of romunorativo
pricc~ for Llll fDrm producc; trcDting Dgriculturc D~ Dn
indu~try; and o~tabli~hment of adequate agricultural credit
~yGtcm linkcd to Ll Gchcme of rcmuncrLltivc prlcc~. Though,
announcod ~ub~oquontly, tho Qovornmont in July 1981,
cOnCCG~lOnG cOGting RG B5 crore includinQ thc ~uGPcn~ion of
bot torment levy and water rDte, tho damago had bean dono.
On thc eve of thc electionG in 1983, the KDrnLltDkLl RLljYD
RDitha SanQhD callod for tho ovorthrow of tho Gundu Rao
Qovcrnmcnt. Othcr Gtudie~ on the courGe of the fLlrmcr
movomont in KDrnataka havo Dl~o ob~orvod that an important
fLlctor behind the defeDt of thc Gundu Rao govcrnment in thc
January 1983 eloction wa~ tho farmor~ movomont in tho ~tDto
in Dddition to tho brutLlliticG with which thc pol icc hLlndlcd
180
thc <:lgitilt ionu, h<:lriluument by thc burcilucrilcy iln-d thc rul ing 9
party'J imago of boing corrupt.
The 77-dilY utrike in Bilngillore by ilbout 75,000 workcru
of Jovoral contral public Joctor undortakingJ alJo caJt a
uhadow on Gundu RilO'u government. While initiillly Gundu RilO
promiJod to rOJolvo tho criJiJ' ho JubJoquontly did a volto - .
face when the centre reuponded coolly to hiu <:lttemptu.
In an attompt to dofond hiJ failuro to rOJolvo tho
iuriUC, Gundu Rao wrote to tho 0ppouition leader~: "I cannot
ilecopt tho pOJition thilt tho Jtato Govornmont ha~ any diroct
re~ponuibility in the miltter cince the quection involved iu
one in rOJpoct of workorJ in tho public ~octor undortaking3 10
:lnd tho Govornmont of Indi;)".
The lilnguilge ilgitiltion ulco udded to Gundu RilO'C wocc.
Tho chiof miniJtor wa~ ch<:lrgod with 3howing caJto bia30J whon
he rcverccd the deeiuion of the Uru regime over the utiltuu of
Kannadil ;)~ tho firJt l;)nguago ;)nd favourod Sankrit.
Much to tho uurprice of Gundu RilO, the GOkilk Committee
• rocommondod Kannada aJ tho Jalo firJt languago in tho Jtato
up to mutriculution. The violencc in the Wukc of the Kunnuda
agitation again rOJultod in firingJ loading to 10J3 of moro
1 i vcr::;. Thc frequent firingc in thc ~tiltC addcd to thc
di~roputo of tho govornmont.
181
The indicriminute ~unctioning of medicul college~ bu~ed
to c3pit3tion foo~ to v3riou~ C3~to group~ W3~ 3nother of
Gundu Ruo'~ uction~ thut curned the govcrnment u bud nume.
Further. tho medic31 ~tudent~ went on 3 long :;triko
prote:;ting the commerciuli:;ution of medicul educution.
Littlo of fort W3~ mude in thi~ phu~e of Karnataka
politic:; to implement lund reform~ or undertuke the
3ppointment of a now b3ckward cla~~ commi~~ion with vigour.
Thic wu:; cymptomutic of u phu~e in Indiun politicu when
i~:;uo~ of policy, cloarly, took a back~oat to theatric3.
Cleilrly. between 1980 und the end of 1982. the period when
Gundu Rao wa~ 3t tho holm, tho~e programme3 underwent a 11
radic3l doclino in offoctivono~~.
For a government thut wu~ preoccupied by ito own
tho3tric~. land roform~ W3~, cloarly, tho la~t itom on it:;
ilgendu. the cume time. however. aWure of the potential
impact of tho land roform:; programmo. tho gov~rnment did not
wilnt to ilppeilr indifferent to the progrilmme.
hnothor rea~on for tho indifference of tho government
towurdc the land reform meilourec WUO the uwareneoo that the
po lit i cal c3pit3l out of tho programmo:; would go to Devarai
Uro. now in the Oppocition.
182
The Dtrotegy.thereiore. 12
WOD to rUDh through the
programmeD. Hence. the government announced that the lond
roform~ programmo would bo completod by fir~t of November
1981. To rUDh through the programme. the government initiated
now mea~uro~ liko con~titution of moro tribunal~ and creation
of uland reformD cell headed by a Dcnior civil judge. The
government ol~o appointed 1100 ~xtra ~taff to mon tho new
tr ibunulr;-. -~
SubDequent 1 y. the government unnounced on firDt of
Novembor 1981 that tononcy roform~ had boon completod.
However. the govcrnment'D cluimD were met with only
::;koptici~m.
The government'D committment to implement the
ro~orvation policy wa~ not cloar. Thi~ pha~o ~aw tho virtual
Da 1 e of cODte cert if icateD. The rocket in obtoining cODte
cortificato~ ~hattorod tho hopo~ of tho gonuinoly ~uppro~~d
DectionD for whoDe benefit the Devuruj UrD government hud 13
como out with ::;pocial mea~uro~.
Following the indicotionD given by the Supreme Court. in
tho wako of tho challengo of tho 1979 govornmont ordor ba~ed
on Havunur CommiDDion. which hud provided 78 per cent
rc~ervation undor 1S( 1) and 16( 1) of tho
ConDtitution to Dociully und economicully buckwurd cutegorieD
~nd backward ~pocial group~. tho ~tato govornmont had givon
~n undertoking to uppoint o now commiDDion. It WOD.
183
however. left to Gundu RilO'C; GUCccGGor. Rilmukric;hnu Hegde to
fulfill thi~ undertaking.
Thu[;. Gundu Rilo WuG both u product of the Congrec;c;
~y~tom of the 1970~ und ul~o ~imultanoou~ly a cau~e for the
pilrty'c; dcbilcle in the 1983 electionG. Dcinc;titutionuliGiltion
had reached it~ acmcr by thi~ time l2ading to eo11ap~c of all
uyc;temu ilnd procedurcu within thc Congrcuu. hu thc pilrty Wilu
~ilpped of it~ ~trength. chari~ma came to the forefront. ~
obc;ervcd curlicr. thiu philuc illGO uilW little ilttemptG by the
gov~rnment to implement roform mea~ure8.
Dir:;r:;idencc in CongreGu LlL
Diccidcncc within thc CongrcGu pilrty WilG not il new
phenomenon In Indiu. Right from Independence. di~~ idont
ilctiviticu hild rCilred ite hCild in illmoet illl thc Congrece-
ruled ~tilto~. Frequently. the di~~idont activitie~ wero
encourilgcd by the centrill lCildcruhip which Wile kecn to
prevent tho growth of leJder~ of national ~tature.
In Kilrniltilkil too, diGuident ilctivitie[; hild been evident
right from Indopendence. K C Reddy, Kengu1 Hilnumunthaiah, S
Niii:llinguppil. B D Jutti. Vcerendru Putil ilnd Devilril; Ore. il11
hild to filCO tho ira of il =ection of Congro~~ logi~liltor~ who
hild been left out of il ehilre in the epoilc of power.
181
However. by the end of 1970~, the di~~idence In the
Congro~~ took ~ difforont dimon~ion. The dofo~t of tho
Congre~~ in the 1977 Lok 8bbhn election~ led to crnck~ in
tho monolith. londing Congro~~mon in ~ovor~l ~t~to~ to
become more vociferouu in their demundu for u chnnge in
loador~hip.
Evon ufter the reuounding victory of the Congress (I) in
tho 1980 Parliamnotary poll~, di~~idont activitio~ in ~ovoral
states uhowed little signs of u ulow-down. By October 1981.
tho nuthority of ~ovor~l Congro~~ chiof mini~tor~ w~~ boing
questioned by their own purtymen. By lntc 1981. dis~idcnts
woro ~ctivo In tho ~t~to of K~rnntak~. Bihar. hndhr~ Pr~do~h,
Ori~sn. Punjnb •• Inrynna. Muharastra. Madhya Frndcuh.
and Uttar Prado~h.
Frequently. hordeu of lcgiulatoru in thesc
Gujarat
utatc6
do~condod on Dolhi with complaint~ ~ooking audienco with Mr~
Gundhi or Rajiv Gandhi. In Karnataka. more than 200 Congress
(I) workor~ ~ubmittod a momGr'nda containing ~ ~orio~ of
chnrgcu againut chief minister Gundu Rao. The diuuident
~ctivitio~ in Karnat~ka wa~ lod by Bangarapp~. KPCC (I)
preuidcnt K T Ruthod and Union miniutcr of state for
Railway~, Jaffor Sh~riof.
Following thc illicit liquor tragedy in July 1981. a
coction of Congro~~mon dom~ndod Gundu Rao'~ ro~ign~tion. "Wo
105
hold thc chicf minister solely responsible for all these
opi~odo~ of ma~~ doath~. Our party under his inoff icicmt
lcadcrship has suffered a setback. HiEi lcadership has
tarni~hod tho imago of the party in the ~tate. Popular 11
ro~entemont and di~content i~ ri~ing in a menacing way".
~ dissident Harijan Congress legislator Salappa wau
boaten up by tho Youth Congro~~ (I) workor:. for 15
hi~
complaint~ again~t Gundu Rao to Mr~ Gandhi. Thi~ only
scrved to alienate the Harijanu from the Congress government.
Violonco al~o oruptod between two faction~ of the youth
Congress (I) - betwcen the group led by K.J.Gcorge. ~ll India
youth Congros~ (I) socrotary and a section led by ~t3te youth
Congrcsl:; (I) leader led by B. K. Huriprasad.
Tho intra-party di~sen~ions wore furthor exacerbatod
with threats to prominent dissidents like Bunguruppa and
Raghupathy. The matt~r a~sumod much importance and wa~ ovon
discussed in the state's Legislative Council.
Thoso kind of intra-party di~sonJion~ and violonco
servcd only to provido further ammunition to the Opposition.
~ prominont mombor of tho Oppo~ition, ~ K Subbaiah,
in the Council: "If this is the kind of politics. 16
within your party. what will happen to u~ 7"
186
obsorvod
you play
Di~~idcnt ~ctivitic~ were further ~ccentuated by the
chiof mini~tor cho~ing to ~ct only ugain~t ~omo of the
miniutcr~ facing chargeu of corruption and miuconduct. For
in~tunco, Ronuku Raiendran wa~ droppod from tho Cabinot while
no action wau token againut C M Ibrahim, Y Ramakri~hna and H
C Srikantuiah.
In the ca~e of C.M. Ibrahim; ~ cloue ally and confidant
of the chiof mini~tor, tho chargo~ woro far moro gruvo than
in the caue of Rcnukha Raiendran. Ibrahim wau charged by the
Shimoga polico for abotting a ca~e of a~~ault, and wrongful
confinement of a midwife and attempted rape of her daughter.
(by Ibrahim'~ brothor)
But all that the chief mini~ter did wa~ to tran~fer the
Sup~rint~nd~nt of Police, Shimoga, B.N.Nagurui, who hud filod
the ca~e ugain~t Ibrahim. Such wa~ the ~tate to which the
Congro~~ (I) hud boen reduced to, that political ob~orver~ 17
dubbod Karnutaku u~ a "~candalou~ ~tute".
Seriouu difference~ aluo cropped up between Karnataka
Prudo~h Congre~~ Committoe (I) pro~idont K T Rathod and the
chief miniuter on the iu~ue of rovamping the Di~trict
Congro~~ Cemmittoo~. Rathed mountod a virulont attack on tho
"Gundu Roo" cult and revamped three di~trict Congre~~
Committoe~, appointod two goneral ~ecretarie~ and membor~ to lB
15 party coll~ without con~ulting the Chief Mini~tor.
187
The medi~tion of High Commend ennbled the chief mlni~tcr
and the KPGC (1) pJ:"e~ident to ~oJ:"t out theiJ:" diffol:C?nce::;. But
thc tJ:"uee W<l[; [;hoJ:"t-l ivcd. The diffcJ:"encec between the two
finally culminatad in tho GongJ:"e~::; liigh Command ou::;ting
who continued to cuJ:"J:"Y on e long c<lmpuion 3q3inct R<lthod,
tho chiof mini~tcJ:". Tho ou::;tcJ:" of Rathod and tho appointmont
of K.Mull<ln<l <l[; the new <lcting precident m3de little
difference a~ Rathod wa~ engaged in making a mockeJ:"Y of party
meeting[;.
Sever<ll memberr. of Purliument in the [;t<lte including K B
Choudhari af Biiapur, al::;o ioinod the choru~ of critic::;
<lg<lin[;t Gundu R<lo. In e<lrly July 1982. B<lng<lr<lpp3 <llong with
three other 10gi::;lativo momber~ ro::;ignod from the party.
which further <lccentu<lted thc problcm[; in thc pcrty.
Evon tho ::;how cauco notico::; i::;cuod to the di~cidont::; had
little effect on curbing their <lctivitiee which wac carricd
on with impunity. A ::;urvoy conducted by tho "Deccan Herald"
J:"cvealed di[;cidencc [;tcmmed from the ctyle of
functioning of the chiof mini~ter and J:"e::;ontment over tho
deni<ll of poete in the purty, in bO<lrde, cOJ:"por<ltione to
loyal worker::; in preference to tho "henchmen of Gundu Rao and 19
hi::; group".
The eurvey. further. notcd th<lt diccidcnce W<le f3irly
intonee in the di::;trict::; of South and North Kanara. Shimoqa.
HlO
Mundyu und Huuuun und muted in Bidur. 20
Gulburgu, Biiupur.
Boll~ry ~nd Chitradurga.
While the Congreuu (I) tried to wiuh uWuy the problemu
by ~t~ting th~t "di~~idonco i~ ~ part of party'~ domocr~tic
~tructurc"~ it cleurly demonutruted the weuk nuture of the 21
p~rty app~rutu~.
With diucidence uctivitiec in full cwing. intru purty
violonco broaking out within tho Congro~~1 followod by tho
reuignation of Bangurappa from the Cabinet and luter from tho
p~rty. thoro w~~ littlo timo for tho ~tato lo~dor~hip to pay
any uttention to building tho party or governing the ctute.
Corruption
While much hau been cuid ubout corruption reaching new
hoight~ in tho Ur~ ora. tho Gundu Rao admini~tration wa~ not
free from the churgoc of corruption either.
Whon tho Corp~ of Dotoctivo~ filod ~ chargo ~hoot for
alleged fruud uganict Renuka Rujendran miniuter for
~oriculturo and ~mall ~c~lo indu~trio~ - Gundu R~o w~~ forced
to drop her from the cabinet.
he diccucccd curlier. another minicter Ibruhim obtuined
notorioty. o~pecially by ~hielding hi~ brother~. ~nd w~~
189
ch~rged by the Shimoga_di~trict police for abetting u caGe of
aGG3ult and wrongful confinement. He waG al~o charged with
irregulariticG in uanctioning flour min liconGeu 22
prompting
Gundu Rao to rofer tho matt~r to the CBI.
Bangar~ppa charged Mru Gandhi with turning a blind eye
to tho corruption chargoD and maladmini~tration again~t Gundu
Ruo. The criterion for continuation in power wore, however.
differont in Mr~ Gandhi'G ora. Thoy wore. aG ob~orved by
~ICC general uecret~ry Kulpanath Rai. abuolute lOyulty to the
primo miniDtor and faithful implomentation of tho 20 point 23
programmo.
Deupitc the charge~ of corruption and mul~dminiutration,
aG Gundu Rao fullfillod both tho criteria, ho continued to
rule the utate. Since Bangarappa lout the race for the chief
miniGterGhip to Gundu Rao, he had remainod hOGtile to tho
chief miniutor and uerved au a rallying point for the
diG~idontG.
hu a conucquence of all the above factoru, when
oloctionG wore announced for the Gtato a~Gmebly, the
leaderuhip wau udrift umidut the infighting pluguing the
party and littlo prepared to moot the challonge pOGod by tho
OppOu it ion.
190
Tho 1983 E1oction~:
"It 1G Ind ir~ \~uve ~ll over. We h~ve anI y to CuGh it by giving iob~ to oach leader 3nd worker". Gundu
21 R:lO. in the cour~e of the election cump3ign.
The ent ire cumpu ign of the CongreGG (1) for the
election~ revolved around Mr~ Gandhi and R3iiv Gandhi.
of whom cump~igned in the Gtute for the purty.
1983
both
~ g3l3xy of other ~enior le3der~ - Shankar Dayal Sharma.
Butu Singh. Sutpul Mi ttul. R Venkuturumun, Ruo
Birendra Singh. Shankar3nand, C M Stephon. Jaffer Sharief.
Prunub Mukherii. und Ruiiv Gundhi. Hcre ulGO involved in the
c3mp3igning, The party H3~ optimi~tic of capturing betHeon
160 und 180 of thc 221 GeutG,
Gundu Ruo himcelf exuded immenGe confidence of returning
to pOHer. In hi~ u~u31 ~tyle. he c13imed that tho Congro~~
(I) Hould Hin 200 of the 221 Geutc und thut he himeelf Hould
win by 3 10.000 vote m3iority.
C~iticizing the oppoeition. he declured in the couree of
the camp3ign: "Do you think people Hill vote for partio:::;
whoee leudere epeuk in different lunguugeG on the ieGue? Let
thorn fir:::;t decido Hh3t thcy ~t3nd for before :::;take their 25
c13im to pOHcr",
M~e Gundhi herGe]f Wile a]eo dicmiGeive of the Junutu
p~rty's prospect~, She declored thot the Jcnote pcrty wos
"non-oxi~tont party, Thi~ ganging up botwoon tho oxtromo
right end the extreme left for opportunistic purposes like cn
election i~ dangerou~ and would lead to fi~~iparou::; 26
tendenc ie~",
tlowever. one perceptive observer wes to note well before
the election::; that "The m~in threat for tho Congre::;::; (I) in 27
the next elect ion i::; the Congre~::; (1) i t::;elf,"
In en effort to captDli~e on the coelition of the
backward cla~~o::; that Dovarai Ur::; built, the backward cla::;::;e::; 28
wore alloted about two-third~ of the Congro~::; (I) ticket::;,
Gundu Reo also mede extensive use of the stete Police 29
intelligenco beforo ~electing tho "right candidate::;",
In contrcct to the high profile ccmpcign of the Congresc
( I) the Janata party in alliance with Bangarappa'::; Kranti
Ronge. CPI and CPM. conducted a low-key ccmpeign. hem~trung
by tho lack of fund~ and facilitio~ on the ::;cale which tho
Congress (I) cnioyed,
Tho Congre~~ Debacle at tho Poll::;
The re~ult~ of the 1983 a::;::;embly election~ revealed that
the Congress (I) wes over optimistic over its prospects, The
f Ina 1 re::;ult::; werc cloarly a vote again::;t tho policie::; and
performencc of the Congrecs government heeded by Gundu Reo,
192
The Congress (I) suffered w humiliwting defewt in the
elections to tho sevonth KJrnatakJ hssombly.
Of the 220 SCutwJ' the Congrer;r; (1) eonter;ted, it mwnwged
to Nln only 81 :Jow-t:=;. Tho Janata PJrty won 95 :;oat:J out of
the 193 it eonter;ted. The BJP emerged wr; the third lwrger;t
PJrty wi th 18 :;out::::;. Gundu Rao h imso 1£ lo::;t tho election::; in
hiG constituency Somwurpet in his native dir;trict of Coorg to
B ~ JiviiJyJ of tho JanJta PJrty.
Of the 99 r;itting MLhG of the Congrer;s (I) who received
tho pJrty tickot to conte::;t tho olections, only 38 wero
elected. Further, 20 of the 92 r;euts that the Congrer;r; (1)
lost hJd been held by the pJrty ::;ince 1962. Mother 18
eonr;titutiencies where the Congress cwndidwter; hud been
roturned since 1967 wero Jl::;o lo::;t by the pJrty.
Table 1. I Performance of the Partieo and Independentu in 1983 Election:;
31 No.
1 2 3 1 5 6 7 B 9
10 11 12
Sourco:
PJrty Seats Contected
Janutu/KrJnti Rungu 193 Congro::;::; (I) 220 BJP 110 CPI 77 CFM 1 ~IhDMK 1 Congrer;r; (S)
Congres::; (J) Republicwn Fwrty (K) Lok OJ 1 OMK Indopondents
19 26
6 26
1 713
eLJI..
Se:lts won to thoce conter;ted
Karnatak:l
95 81 18
3 3 1
22
K H CheluvJ Raiu Elections ~ II Post Univor::;ity. I3JngJloro.
Election Survey. 19133. p.3.
lbsombly I3angaloro
1 <) 3
n surpriGed Gundu R~o admitted th~t "nobody expected
th:1t Congro:;:; (I) po:;ition would by I iko thi:3. I C3n't glve
.Jny rcu~Clnc. It iG the people's verdict . M~ybe they feel 30
th:1t 3 ch3nqo i:3 nOC0:3:::;3ry in tho :1dmini:;tr<:lt ion",
While Gundu R~o did not offer any re~Gons for the
defe:1L tho Congre:3:3 I) High Comm3nd W3:3 more forthcoming in
~pportioning the bl~me: cle~r1y on Gundu Ruo'~
:1dmini:::;tr:1tion. Tho Congro:3:3 (I) p3rty ob:3orver But3 Singh,
obcerved: "it W~G not the policies ~nd programmes of the
p3rty or Mr:3 G3ndhi':3 imaqo but tho conduct 3nd :3ty10 of tho
st3te <:ldministration ~nd Opposition ch~rges which we did not 31
count or th3t :3wayed tho oloctor3to". Mr:::; G3ndhi 31:30 blamod
the defeDt on the poor perform~nce of the E;tate 32
qovernment:::;,
ReDsonc for Def£~i
The dcf e~t of the CongreE;E; haE; to be underE;tood ~E; ~
con:3equonco of f3ctor:3 oper3ting 3t throe laval:::;. While 3t
one leveL the style of politic~l le~derE;hip of Gundu Rao ~nd
the In -fighting in the p3rty contributod to tho defo3t 3t tho
polls; nt 3nother lcvel. the nnture and functioning of the
Conqr-c:;:i p3rty it:301f :11:30 playod 3 rolo. F i n311 y, at tho
third 1 eve 1 • the Opposition parties took ~dvant~ge of the
er3ck:3 In the Conqrc:::;:::; (l) monolith.
1'J 1
lmother fuctor t hut contributed to the rout of the
Conaro:::;~ (1\ W.'J::3 the :;ymp:Jthy 'H:l vc 1n f,:l~-"our of Or::;. In
deuth, Ur::; hi:ld utt:lined :l stoture 'Ihere po 1 it i c i i:l ns of
v~riou::; hua::; cl~imad to ba hi::; politic~l hair::; .• \::; one ::;oci~1
::;cientist Wi:lS to ob::;erve, "Ur::; in deuth became more 33
pONerful
th~n Or::; 31 iva."
The lorger rei:l::;on for thc Congress debucle ::;hould be
::;ean in the dein::;titution~li::;3tion of tha p~rty which an~blad
men 1 ikc Gundu Rao to a::;::;ume positions of pONer.
Ur::; too bac~me chief mini::;tor in 1972,
de::;pitc the preccncc of strong contenders und the luck of on
independont powar ba::;e. he h:ld in J ::;hrowd move ::;ub::;equently
built 0 vote bonk. Urs' leuderchip ctylc ulso contributed to
the cffectivene::;::; with Nhich he could ::;urmount V:lr10U::;
obst<lcles thut hc fuccd in the course of his long tenure os
chief mini::;ter.
The fuding uWuy of Indiu's first generution politicul
la~der::;hip in the Congre::;::; :ll::;o h:ld profound implic:ltion::; for
the purt y. Decision muting in the prc-196? phuuc within thc
Congre::;::; pJrty W3::; bro3dly ::;ought to be m3de by the proca::;::;
of the uccommodution of vuriouc interests through compromIse.
However. with the 3::;::;umption of office by Mr::; G3ndhi.
the piHt.y slowly bequn to undergo u metumorphoci::;. The
PJrty ::;p1it in 1969 :lcce1erJted the proce::;::;. GCJduJ11y. t h i::;
195
led to the p~rty losinq its 31
institution~l coherence ~nd
el~n. Org~ni=~tion~l elections were suspended since
The p~rty slowly lost its lustre vis '~-vis tho parli3mentary
wina.
The deinstitution~lic~tion of the p~rty w~s
3ecompanied by a process in which candidate selection for
electionc underwent u tr3nsform3tion. E3rlier, selcction of
candidato~ within tho Congro~s hod beon a complex and
elabor~tc procecc involving the b~l~ncing of ~evcral criteri3 35
and consult3tion ~t tho state and district levels. But this
process had slowly been glven the go-by by the Congresc.
However, as demonstrated in tho 1983 Kornotaka ~sombly
elections. every le~dcr of ~ faction with 3 following,
however ~moll, went to Delhi to try and securo 3S many soots
as possiblc for his cupporterc.
On tho eve of the oloction~, Gundu Rao. Vooroppo Moily,
Veerendra P~til ond J3ffcr Shorief ~ll tried to ceeure ~s
many soots as possible for thoir support~rs ignoring 311
other concider~tionc. This led to eonsider~ble dicench~ntment
of the party workors. espocially at tho grossroots lovel.
In thc ncw politjeol environment. selection of
candidates ceDsod to be a m3tt~r of accommodation of div2rsc
interectc. Thic w~c inevitable in the context of ~ situotion
,.here the p~rty h~d met~morphosj~ed into In instrument of
rlJI~.
t his biJckdrop. ideoloqy iJnd policy stiJnces
sorv~d only to miJsqu~riJd~ tho struggle for power within the
PiJrt y. not revitiJlizing commitments intended to strengthen
th~ PiJrty orqiJniziJtionally iJnd ~loctoriJlly. It W:JS thc
exceptioniJl Conqresc ICiJder like Dev~riJj Urc who could miJkc iJ
contribution in this phaso.
This phiJce WiJS iJlco chiJr~cterized by the increusing uce
of plebiscitary techniques iJnd roliiJnco on the charisma of
the leiJder. SociiJI scientictc hiJve cought to
chiJrismiJtic powar iJS :J total ovorliJp of tho lOiJdors 36
define
<:lnd PiJrty ident i tV. III I control over distribution of
incantivos iJro monopolizod by the leiJder. Tho party is hold
toqether by 10yiJlty to thc leiJder. Thc Congress in this
phiJse, undor tho laiJdarchip of Mrs GiJndhi. incroiJcingly begiJn
to resemble u chiJrismiJtic piJrty.
In such chiJrismiJtic orgiJniziJtions, iJIl 10yiJlty is to tho
leiJder iJnd not to the piJrty. Further. the Conqrccc purty
during thic phiJCO WiJS iJlso chiJriJctorizod by iJ liJck of
procedure::; ond iJ hiqhly ccntr~lizcd PiJrty orgiJniziJtion.
Whilo politiciJl theory hos cotiJloqued savorol in:; t ·:lnC8:3
. t·t t· I· tl·on of chDrism~tic of the routiniciJtion or Inc I U lonu IZ~
part ios. Ind iiJn pol it icc du[ i nq this phosr] I)ffcJ(~s.
197
the sole illustrotion of on inctuitionoliscd porty sheddina
it::; in::;t i tut ion:d inheritonce ond tokinq on chor i:;mot ic
form.
The leDdcrchip'c chDrocter WDC well pronounced 1 n the
enfeeblomont of ::;y::;tem::; ond procedure::; ond the eclip::;e of the
orgilniziltion by the chilriGmDtic leilder. The presence of D
chori::;motic leuder meont weok in::;titution::;, often 37
unitended debilitoting con::;equence::; u::; in Kurnutuko.
Hith
In view of the rCGultG. it might be worth eXumining the
if the porty ::;y::;tom hud ut lu::;t moved uwuy from the
prcdominunt porty Gyctcm model. To underGtund the cume. we
!Jh311 exumine tho percentoge of ::;eot::; won by Congre::;::; (I)
over election yeurs.
Table 1.2
P,Jrty
Conqre::;::; Opposition
Percentage of Seatu 0ppouition acrOEu the
1957
71. 56 28.11
1962
65.38 31.62
1967
58.33 11. 67
Won by Congreuu huEembly Periodu
1972
76.03 23.97
1978
66.81 33. 19
Source: Compiled from ViJriouc Election Rec;ults
und
1983
36.60 63.10
l\::, Tobie 1.2 indicote::;. the Congre:;::;. ~Ihich hud OI~l::Jy:;
won more thun 55 per cent of the scot::; in cny election.
::;ucceeded in Gecuring only 36.60 per cent of the ::;eot::; in 'he
1983 elections. Thic; upPcLlred to indlc:>te thot the Congress
198
monopoly over pOwer W:lS :l thinq of the p~~t 1-_ I ;"1_' lL H.
Tho re~ult~ indicatod that whilo compotition for powor
h~d always been D fcature of KDrnDtDkD politics. the
competitivono~~ of tho party ~y~tom had been low. flo~lOvar •
the 1983 election results indicDted a chift towards D more
compotitiva ~y~tom. Tho party ~y~tem al~o appeared to be
moving away from the predominnnt party system.
Social ~cionti~t~ have ob~orvod that two approaGho~ ara
aVDilable to eXDmine whether a leader is dedicDted to the
common good: to havo acco~~ to the loador'~ innarmo~t
thoughtD or intcnt. or to determine this 38
intent from the
cour~o of hi~ Dct~.
We have chocen to examine whether the Gundu RDo
governmont wa~ dedicatod to tho common wODl by trying to
underctand itD intent from the cource of itc Dctions. This
examination, drawing from tho abovo di~cu~~ion, load~ u~ to
the conclusion that public weal wos wDy down on the agenda of
tho Gundu Roo govornmont. Thi~ undor~coro~ tho 1 imit~ of a
certoin Dtyle of leadership in promulgating public policy
maa~uro~ dodicDtod to tho public woal.
It may be inctructive to look Dt Gundu RDo's regime. not
ac an aborration in Indian politicc. but moro a~ a mlcrococm
of the malaice th~t Dfflicted the body po lit i c. It
199
represented deliDer:ttc enfeeblement ~nd relentlc-cE.
on~13ught on tho politic31 =trueture~ of the ~t3te. Boroft of
orgDnisotion coherence 3nd vit31ity. the Congress p3rty In
K3rn3t3k3 ~lowly bagan to lo~a it~ 013n and lu~tra among the
The politiciJl environment in the st3te during this
phu;>a thu~ mora conducive to unomic rathor
implementation of welf3re or reform meiJsures.
200
Note~ and Rcfercnec~
1. This w~s ~ typie~1 comment of Gundu R~Q. HIs propensity to mako ~uch uncon~idcrad commant~ lad to hlJ being pilloried. especii:llly by the MediCl. Sec Indi~ Tod~y. Novomber 15. 1981.
2. Indi~n Exprews. FebruClry 23. 1991
3. Decc~n Her~ld. FebruClry L 1981.
1. Dccc~n Her~ld, Fcbru~ry 2. 1981.
5. The file ele~r~nce driveG were usu~lly Clccomponicd by a groat deal of publ ieity. Soo Indi':ln Expre~~. Fobru:ny 23. 1981.
O. Decc~n Herald, Febru~ry 8. 1981.
7.
8.
9.
IndiCln Express, MClrch 2, 1991
Indi~n Express, FcbruClry 23, 1991.
M V Nadakarni, F~rmers Movement in India. Publ i:::;hor:::;, Now Delhi. 1987.
hIlied
10. India Tod~y. M~y 10-3 L 1981.
11. James M~nor, "Blurring the Lines Between P~rties Clnd Social 93:::;0:::;: Gundu Rao and the Emergonce of Janata Government in K~rn~t~k~··. in John R Wood. St~tc
Politic:::; in Contomporary India: Cri:::;i:::; or Continuity Wo:::;tviow Pro:::;:::;, Bouldor, 1981.
12. 1'1tul Kohl i. The St~tc ~nd Poverty In Indi~: The Pol it ics of Reform. op. cit., p.109.
13.
11.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
Decc~n Hcr<:lld, June 28, 1981.
This waG <:lmong the evrlier memor~nd~ wcnt (1) workor:::; to tho High Command against SeeDecc~n Her~ld. July 11. 1981.
Deccan Her<:lld, July 29, 1981.
Deccan Hcrald, 30 Jul y. 1981.
India Tod~y, July 16-31. 1981.
Indi~ Tod~ July 15. 1982.
Deccan ~lcr<:lld .• Fcbruary ')1 ~ _. 1981.
by Congrcc;s Gundu Rao.
20. Ibld .•
21. -Th i::; hClc fc]ct ioue: l\ugue:t 3.
been the ConoreGc' tr~dl-tl"on~l '-' rcs;ponsc to infightino in tho p3rty. S"" I d" E 1981." --- ~n_13n xprce:e:,
22. ndiCl TodCly July 15- 31. 1981.
23.
21.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
1981.
Indiu TodelY. J21nu21ry 15. 1983.
IndiCl Toduy, November 15, 1981.
Indi.:> Toduy, J21nUClry IS. 1983,
Indi21 TodClY, September 15, 1982.
IndiCl Todu'y. -- December 31. 1983
Ibid. , --~
Indiu Toduy, J21nUClry 31. 1983.
Ibid. ,
Hrs Gundhi WClS referring to the poor showing in Pr3dosh ClS well. Sec Decc<ln Hor31d • Jan1J3ry 8.
l'.ndhru 1983.
33. H N Sriniv<lG. cited in George Huthew, Shjfts in Indi<ln
31.
Politics , Elections tn l\P 3nd K3rn3t3k3. Concept. Now De 1 h 1. 19 8 1. p. 172.
Lloyd I Rudolph und Susunne .1 Rudolph, L3k:::;hmi: Tho Politic.J1 Economy of Indi3n Longm.Jn, New Delhi, 1987. p. 135.
In Pursuit of St.Jto. Or iont
35. Thie hue been illuGtruted in the cucc of Uttur Prudech by P.Jul Br.J:::;s. C3:::;te. F.Jction, .Jnd P.Jrtv in Indi3n Politic:::;. Vol 1 & 2, Ch;:mukY3 Publication:::;, DolhL 1983.
35. lmgclo P3nebi:mco, Politicul P3rtie[;: Org<lniz<Jtion <Jnd Powcr. C<lmbridgc Univercity Pre[;::;, C<lmbridge, 1988, pp. 113- 152.
37. Ibid .•
38. Sebuet i<ln de Gr<Jz i<J. Huchi<lvcll i In H£ll, Vintugc Booke, Newyork. 1991. p.308
CHAPTER - V
JhltATA ROLE IN KMNAThKA POLITICS
Tho formution of tho Junutu govornmont in tho ~tuto did
not re~ult ju~t in chunge of the govcrnment. It ul~o re~ultcd
in ~hift in tho nuturo of tho purty ~y~tom, uwuy from tho
predominunt purty ~y~tcm, u~ we huve ~een curlier.
Tho Junutu purty wu~ formod ut tho nutionul lovol in
1977 to combut the Congre~~ (I) ufter the Emergency Wu~
liftod. It wu~ muinly un ulliunco of tho Congro~~ (0) und tho
Junu Sungh.
The purty, in fuet, wu~ formed ju~t prior to the Murcn
1977 Purliumontury oloction~. Tho oxeo~~o~ of tho Emorgoncy
enubled the fledgling purty to win 13 per cent of the vote
und 55 por eont of tho ~out~. It~ victorio~ in both
Purliumentury und ~~cmbly election~ in ~everul
upPo3rod to murk tho ond of tho Congro~~ purty ~y~tom.
Whilc the Junutu purty notched up ~uccec~e~ in mo~t
purtJ of tho country, howovor, it wu~ unublo to muko much
heudw~y in the Congre~~ fortre~~ in KurnDtuku. In the
~Jombly oloction~ too. hold u your lutor in 1978, tho
JunutD purty lo~t to the Congre~~. The Congre~c (I) won 67
por cont of tho ~out~ in tho 1978 ~~ombly oloction~. A
203
strong Congrcss (I) government headed by Devaraj Urs provided
the bulwurk for Mr~ Gundhi. ovon u~ ~ho wu~ lo~ing in tho
North.
hw observed carlier, the Janata-Kranti Ranga combinc won
95 of tho 193 ~eut~ it conto~tod in tho 1983 ~~ombly poll~.
while thc Congress won 81 and the BJP 18 ~eut~. No purty,
howovor, ~ecurod u muiority.
Subcequently. the Januta-Krunti Runga combine ~taked it~
eluim to form tho govornmont following tho unconditionul
~upport lent by the BJP. CPI and CPM. During the eour~e of
di~cu~~ion~ on tho chiof mini~toriul cundiduto, tho Krunt i
Ranga, headed by D<:mgarappa, merged with thc Janu-ta- party on
Junuury 8, 1983.
The merger, howcver, did not accord uny bcnefit to
Bunguruppu who lo~t out to Hogdo ln tho ruco. On Junuury 10,
1983, the fir~t non-Congre~~ government, he<lded by
Rumukri~hnu Hogdo. il~~umod powor in tho ~tato.
Interect ingl y, Hegde wa~ not even a~ a legi~lator when he
bocumo tho chiof mini~tor.
However. high drama preceded IJcgde' ~ celection a~ the
chiof mini~tor. Tho muin contondor~ for tho top lob in tho
~tute S.Dangarappa, S.R.Bommai and H.D.Deve Gowda. With
littlo ununimity in tho purty on uny of tho ubovo namo~,
five-member committee wac ~et up by thc party to arrive at a
201
conGcnGUG on the choice of the chief miniGter. Bunguruppu
rofu~od to ovon purticiputo in tho mooting to docido on tho
new chief miniGter.
The five member committee eompri~ed of Niiulinguppu.
Biju Putnuik, Viron Shuh, hbdul Nuzir Sub and B Ruehuiah.
Thc Committee met every Junutu purty legiGlutor und finully
urrivod ut eon~on~u~ in favour of~mukri~hna Hogdo a
member of the Rajyu Subhu.
ReGentment broke out immediately after the announcement
of tho Hogdo a~ tho now chiof mini~tor of tho ~tato. Sovoral
uttemptG by leaderG of the Janata party including Hegdc to
placuto Bungaruppu with tho doputy ehiof mini~tor~hip yioldod
little recultc. Confucion alco arouced with come memberc
cluiming that tho Krunti Rangu hud not morgod with tho Janata
party. Even hbdul Nazir Sab'c ctatement that the merger wac
"final", fuilod to clour tho confu~ion.
~ advocate and agriculturi~t by profeccion. Hegdc, who
huilod from tho Uttara Kannada di~trict,
legiclator in 1951 ac a member of the Mycorc Reprecentative
nu~ombly. Ho wu~ ~ub~oquontly u mombor of tho 1957, 1962 and
1967 accembliec and had cerved in ceveral minictriec and
guinod political and admini~trativo oxporionco.
hfter tho Congrecc cplit in 1969. Hegde. however, ehoce
205
to rem,lln Hith tr.e Congrecc (0). He wac alco the V1C'C
pro~idont of tho Karnataka Prado~h Congro~~ Committoo (0) for
u while from 1971.
During the Emergency. along with cevcr<:ll
Oppo~ition loador~. H09do al~o ~uffored impri~onmont.
in jail that he cume in cloce contact with senior
Madhu Dandavato. L.K.ndv<:lni <:lnd ~.B.V<:lipayoo.
other
It wa~
lC<:lders
Given the chunge in purty in power and <:In apparent
10 in tho party ~y~tom, it would bo worthwhilo to examino
implicutionu of thcuc changcu on reform mcacurec. The
)~O of tho proJont chapt~r i~ tho ~amo.
The chapter iu divided into four cectionu. The firut
~~~~ion oxamino~ tho ~ocial ba~o of loador~hip of both tho
1983 und 1985 Legiclative huuembliec and the Cabinetc.
Soction two focu~o~ on tho implieation~ of ~hift~
political leaderchip on the key iucuec of recervationc.
panchayat rai and land roform~. Whilo doing ~o, it highl ight~
the factorc that affected the implementation of reform
mOi)!:juro::;.
In ccction three, an attempt would be made to underctand
tho ~hift in political loador~hip from Hogdo to Bommai, and
diccenuionu in the party. The final uection will examine the
dofoat of tho Janata party in tho 1989 hJ~ombly oloction~
paving the way for the return of the Congreuu (I).
206
Shift~ In Politic3l Le3dor~hip
The changc in party in powcr a140 brought forth a changc_
in the ~oci3l b3~O of tho political loador~hip. Tho ~ocial
baDe of political IcaderDhip i~ examined in termu of caDte
and occupation. Tho ~amo i~ indicatod by Tablo~ 5.1 and 5.2.
~ thc Table 5. 1 pointD out. the Dtrcngth of thc
dominant ca~to~ in tho Logi~lativo ~~ombly ha~ rocordod an
increauc from 95 in thc 1978 ADDembly to III in thc 1983
~~ombly and ha~ furthor incroa~od to 113 in tho 1985
1\[;Dcmbl y.
Table 5.1: CaDte-wise HemberDhip of Legislative Assembly (1983 and 1985)
1983 1985
C3~to Total 1\[;Dembly ~trongth
Cong ( I)
Janata Total ADDcmbly otrongth
Cong (1)
Janatil
Lingayat Vokkaligu Othor~
66 15
112
32 13 33
21 25 37
65 18
112
11 9
16 --------------------------------------------------------Total 223 78 86 225 66
17 36 56
139 -------------------------------------------------------------Sourco: Di~cu~~ion~ with middlo-Iovol purty workoro.
~croDu the two miljor political partieD. CongreDD (I) und
Jiln3til, tho proportion of dominant C3~to mombor~ i~ 3bout 57
207
per cent cuch. Thiu. howcver. underwent chungeu in the 1985
olection:::;.
hn exuminution of the memberuhip of the Junutu purty.
which returned to power in 1985 with ~ m~iority on it:::; own.
reveule thut 60 per cent of itu repreuentutiveu in the
k;:::;embl y h;:li led from the domin~nt c~:::;te:;. In other word:;. it
muy be noted thut 1 ike the Congreee. even for the Junutu. the
pol i t ic~l b~:::;e i:; rooted in the dominant ca:;te:;. The
proportion of thc dominunt cucte MLJI.c. in fuct. ehowu un
incroa:;ing trend indicating that tho docroa:;o in committmont
towurdc thc buckwurd clucucu. in contruct to the Devuruj Ure
or~.
Dcupitc thc prcponderunee of the dominunt cucteu in thc
k;:::;embly. the chiof mini:;ter':::; po:::; it ion wa:;. howevor. held by
u Bruhmin - Rumukr ichnu ~legde. lIftcr the rec ignut ion of Hegde
following tho telephone tapping :::;candal. tho chiof
minicterchip uguin returned to a member of tho dominunt
c~:;te: S R Bommai. a Lingayat.
Much in uccordance with itc politicul buco. tho Cubinet
of the Hogdo government w~:; al:;o dominatod by member:; of the
dominant caete. The proportion of the dominant cucto memberc
in the cabinet accounted for about 53 per cent.
208
T<lbl0 5.2: Occupation-wise Membership of the Legislative Assembly (1983 and 1985).
-------------------------------------------------------------1983 1985
Occupution -----------------~~ombly Gong Janata ~~ombly Gongro~~ Janata
----------------------------------------------------------~riculturo 138 Other Occupution 85
60
18
51
35
125 31 71
100 35 65 --------------------------------------------------------------Tot<ll 223 78 66 225 66 139 --------------------------------------------------------------
Sourcc: Interview with middle-level purty workers.
Tablo 5.2 indicato::;, tho logi::;lator~ cit ing
<lgriculture uS their oecup<ltion was about 62 per cent in 1983
and 55 por cont In 1985 a::;~omblio~ ro::;poetivoly. Tho
proportion of legi~l<ltor~ citing agriculture <lS their
occupation wa~ 77 por cont in tho Gongro::;~ in 1983 and 17 por
cent in 1965 <lssembliec recpeetively.
In tho Janata party, agrieulturi::;t::; accountod for 59 por
cent of the lcgisl<ltors in 1983 and 53 per cent in 1985
ro:;poctivoly. Such a high proportion of agriculturi::;t~ in
concomitt<lncc with the high reprecent<ltion of the dominunt
ca:;tc~ in tho Logi::;lativo hJ~ombly ~oom::; to indicato that tho
govcrnment would find it difficult to cerioucly consider <lny
roform moa::;uro:;.
209
Implic3tion~ for Roform M03~uro~:
hmong tho oarly promi~o~ that Ramakri~hna Hogdo made to
the electorute Wuu hiu government'u determinution to continue
Dovaraj Ur~' policy of "protoctivo dicrimination" in favour
of the weuker cectionc und buckwurd clucueu. However,
~ub~equent event~ were to domon~trate, the Janata goverrnmont
both under Hegde und Bommui were ulmoct wholly occupied with
internecine troublo in tho party.
Right from thc very begining, Rumukriuhnu Hegde fuced
challongo~. Fir~L he had to handle a ~ul1en Bangarappa, who
inu iuted thut the Krunti Rungu continued to retuin ltv
ident i ty.
But In u deft move, Hegde icoluted Bunguruppu by
appointing eight
Ru ngiJ. However,
of hl~ Cabinet mombor~ from tho Kranti
Bunguruppu coon luched out ut the Junutu 1
party for "con~piring" to d~ny him the chief mini~tor~hip.
Hegdc ulco hud to guurd uguinct iJttemptc by both the
Congrc~~ (I) and tho Kranti Ranga to topple hi~ government by
woolng come JunutiJ MLl..!:;. Congrocc (1) leiJder Veeruppu Moily,
In tho now famou~ "Tapa Scandal", wa~ ehargod with offoring
Re; two lilkh to lure u Jilniltil legiclutor to the Congrecc (1).
Further, Hogdo al::;o, at thi~ t imo, had to fight an
election ilt KilnilKupuru to get electod to the Legicliltive
210
k:;ecmbl y. But hie victory brought little chcer ~e the chief
miniGtor had to fight dotorminod offortJ by tho CongroJJ (I)
to enginccr defectione from hie party.- ~ weekened Congrecc
(I) had loarnt littlo from itJ dofoat in tho 1983 pollJ. Tho
party'c one point plank at thic time wac to topple the Hegde
govornmont. Tho Jtato CongroGG (I) loadorGhip waG aidod and
abetted in itc attcmptc by the party High Comm~nd.
Tho Gtylo of functioning of tho now governmont waG a
contract to the Gundu Roo government. hmong the early
actionG of tho Hegdo governmont woro the deciGionJ not to
attend any felicitation functionc and to uce tho ctatc
helicopter only for natural calamitioJ. ThoJO actionJ woro
clearly decigned at ridiculing the felicitation cpree of
Gundu Rao.
The fragilc nature of the government added by powerful
memborG of tho dominant caJtoJ liko H D Devo Gowda, and
J.H.Patel in the cabinet made it difficult for Hegde to
undertake JubGtantial reform meuGurOG.
The reculte of the 1981 Parliament~ry electionc alco
hit tho Janata party badly. Tho CongroJG ( I) won 21 :::ioat:i
conccding juct four ceatc to the Janoto. ~wore that
dofoctionG would Jwift I y omaGculato hiJ party, the chiof
211
mini~tcr c~llcd for thc diuuolution of the Houuc ~nd fre~h
oloction::;.
However. In the clcction~ held in M~rch 1985, the
oloctorato dolivorod a ::;urpri::;o. Tho Congro::;::; (I) :;tar
c~mp~igner W~D R~jiv G~ndhj who c~mp~igned in more th~n ,10
di::;trict::; of tho :;tato attacking tho porformanco of tho
J~n~t~ p~rty.
The J~n~t~ p~rty, howcvcr, won ~ re~ounding victory over
tho Congro:;:;, and thi:; timo could lay claim to form tho
govcrnment without the crutche~ of other p~rtieD. The J~n~t~
party won 139 of tho 207 :;oat:; it conto:;tod whilo tho
Congrc~D could man~ge to win in jUDt 66 of the 221
con::;tituoncio::; whoro it had put up candidato:;.
~ Gundu R~o de~cribed it, the Congre~~ (I) had been 2
"thrown into tho du:;tbin by tho pooplo of Karnataka". Tho
BJP W~D the wor~t Dufforor. itD ~eatD ~liding to jUDt two 3
from 18 in 1983.
The Congrec;~ (1). riven by infighting, had no ono to
match the chari:;matic pro:;onco of Hogde in Karnataka. The
party. therefore. could not portray anyone ~D thc ~ltcrn~tive
to Hogdo. Furthor. tho eloctorato romained unmovod by
Rujiv'~ critici~m that the performance of thc Janat~ party
wa::; zero.
212
However. the Junutu victory wu~ not pre-orduined. Senior
Janata party mombor~ thom~elvo~ ent~rtained dcubt~ over tho
purty'~ pro~pect~. In it~ bid to woo thc wCuker ~cction~. thc
Janata party wont the populi~t route: rico at R~ two a kilo.
free clothc~ once ~ yeur. louns without ~ccurity 1
~ub~idized intereGt for womon entreprenGur~.
und
Even in dcfeut, tho Congress (I) mude little effort~ ut
self-introspoction. The v;)rious leaderG were busy
apportioning the blume to euch other. Gundu Ruo luid the
blame squarely on Ker;)la chief minister K.Karunakaran and the
centr~l ob~erverc who effected "unneces~ary change~" in the
list of 111 candid;)te~ recommended by the Pradesh Election 5
Committoe to tho Parliamentary Board.
&, Tuble 5. I revoulu, the dominant c~~te[j now ~ccounted
for ovor half of tho memborship of tho 1985 AGGombly.
HowE:ver, cr~cku ct~rtod appearing in the Jan~tu
monolith. The Vokkaliga legislators in the Janata party. who
felt that their community w~~ getting ~hort ~hrift, ~turted
a campaign againr;t Hogde. The Vokkaligas were also sore that
a medical college which Hegdo had promi~ed for thE: community
had not mater-ialisod yet. Deve Gowda was also upr;et that ho 6
was not getting the importance he thought ho deserved.
the Linguyat Icgi~latorG in the Januta party Subcequent I y.
also started meoting soparatoly to diseusG their problems.
213
Ch<lrges of corruption were <llso levelled <lg<linst the
chief minister'J Jon in the medical Jeat i:;:;uo.
sitU<ltion
rI:?J ioned
In the state took a topsy-turvy turn when
following tho High Court iudgmont criticiJm on
<lrrack bottling contract.
Tho
Hegde
tho
The state High Court passed severe strictures on the
governmont holding that the awarding of 19 arrack bottling
contracts to eight companies in the state was unlawful,
capriciouJ and arbitrary.
Hegde promptly resigned, only to be persuaded by his
party men into continuing. Hogdo'J action drow conJidorablo
criticism from the Opposition who dubbed it <l dramu. ~ll this
~erved to erode the image of the gov~rnment and the party.
Meanwhile, the dissencions in the purty increased in
intenJity adding to Hegdo's woeJ. Tho rohufflo in tho Cabinot
<lnd dropping of five of Deve Gowda's supporterc only
Qxacorbated the problem.
he huc been seen in the above sections, Hegdc's first
priority in tho period 1983-85
hie government. Fight ing for
to 8n~ure the Jurvival
!Jurvivnl
of
the
manouovr ingJ of BangaI:app:l on one ~ ido and the CongroJ~ (1)
211
on the other c ide. th~ l~n t t ~ cu ~ ~ p~r y w~c not prep~red to ueher
in major reform~ that could provo to bo it~ undoing3.
Pol it ic~l theory h~c held th~t p~rtieu th~t form ~nd
dovolop in oppo~ition, to be mora prono to becoming ~trong
inutitutionc. Thic ic l~rgely becuuce the oppocition p~rtiee
do not command tho kind of re~ourco~ that partio~ 7
do.
In power
Unlike thc governmentul purtieu. the oppocition purticu
cannot rely on the bureaucracy, and lack~ tho financial
uupport +:h~t intereGt groupe recerve for thc govcrnmentul
partie~. Howevor, the action~ of tho Junat~ party - ~everal
uenior memberu of the p~rty were in the 0ppouition for
con~iderable length~ of time revealc; that inc;t i tut ional
strcngth iu not ~ function of jUut uge or being in thc
oppo~ition for a long time.
The J~n~t~ purty wuc. however. ueriouc in itu ~ttempts
at domocr~tic docentr~lic;ation and hold pollc; to Zilla
PuriehudG und vill~ge-level bodieu in J2lnu~ry 1987. In the
eloctionc;, tho party bagged 17 of tho 19 Zilla Pari3hadc;. Tho
Junut~ purty won 119 weutw uguinut 395 by the Congrcuu (1).
prof !una 1 Ray h~~ c;hown, about 56 per cont of the
bdhyukch~G to the Zillu PariehadG came from the dominant 8
CilGtOG.
215
the 16 pocitionc they held In tJcgde' c
council of mini~tor~. tho dominant ca~to ~way appeared to bo
predomin:>nt. "The hold of the dominant landowning cactes in
tho party i~ onormou~. It~ pol ieio:J and progrilmmo:J ilro not
therefore intended to imperil the intercts of the entrenched 9
e13:J~e~ a:J 3 wholo". arguo~ Prof. Ray.
Corruption in the administration showed an increasing
tondoney. Hogdo. him:Jo1f. admittod that hi:J biggo:Jt fililure 10
In eliminating corruption. Dovo Gowda. the Vokka1iga
1 euder. was ulso fileing serious ehurges of corruption, which
woro roforrod to tho Lok ~yuktu. ~ probo by tho :Jtato'~
corp of detectives had curlier established a prima facie case
again~t Dova Gowda.
Differences between Hcgde and national party president
Chandra ShcKar ~orvod to fuol the di:J:Jidenco in tho :Jtate
uni t. ~ dissident lobby was formed. the Janata Legislators'
Forum. to pro~~ for domand~ on pruning the Cabinet. toning up 11
tho udmini~tration and launching an unti-corruption drive.
The diminishing hold of Hegde on the party was
domon:Jtrated when two rebel cundidato~ won tho election to
12 the Leqislotive Counc i 1 . For Hegde, it was Ll swif t fall.
Ju~t ~lX month:J oarlior. from boing hailod il~ an Lllterniltivo
to Raiiv Gondhi to becoming u fLletional leader.
216
However, Hegde hnd to finnlly lenve under n cloud in
1988 ovor tho l~~UO of t~pping tho tolophono~ of prominont
politicol rivals including thoce from his own pnrty, mnkinq a
mockory of hi~ cl~ims of "v~luo-b~sod politics". S. R. Bomm~ i.
Lingayot from Dharwnr district acsumed office the new
chiof minist~r. Tho principlo contend~rs for the top post
in the state. npart from Bommai, had been B RDchDiDh Dnd H D
Dovo GO~lda.
Bommni'c election DS the chief minister left other
lo~dor~ uno~sy. lin upsot R~ch~i~h gavo vent to his fury: "i
am betrayed and Scheduled CDstcc have been betrDyed." He
further addod that powor in Karnataka appoarod to bo tho
monopoly of the two major communitiec (Vokkaligas nnd
Lingay~t~). His ~tatomont thilt "our ~trugglo will go on
irrespective of the party in power" cleDrly revealed that the
domin~nt caste hogomony was ~s pronouncod in tho Janata as it
wac in the Congre[;s (I).
The [;ociDI baec of the Bommai Cabinet alco reveals that
tho domin~nt ca~to~' propondorant sway. Thoy accountod for
about 16 per cent of the cabinet.
Thoro wa~ to bo littlo rospite for tho Bommai
qovernmcnt, which wac al[;o not free from diccencione. Deve
Gowda continuod tho b~ttlo ~g~inst tho govornmont culminating
in hie quitting the qovernmcnt in January 1989 and the Janata
217
(the J~n~t~ p~rty in JDnuDry 1989 merged into
J:1 n:1 t:1 D:1 I ) .
the
Intere~ting1y, ~t thi~ time, the chief mini~ter D~ well
the ~t3to J:1n3ta Dal pro~l'dent M P P k h . . ra a~ wore both
Linguy~t!;. Fo llowing prote~t~ by u ~ection of.
legi~l:1tor~. B.R:1chaiah. a Scheduled C:1~to logi~lator.
:Jppointed purty prec;ident ill Murch 1989.
the
wu::::;
Bomm:1i'~ Cubinet expan~ion 1n April 1989 proved to bo
the cutulyc;t for the co11upc;e of the JDnDtD Da1 government.
Bommai de~cribod hi~ now cabinet 3~ a "war c:1binet' with
which to fight the elect ion~ round the corner. The minic;try
~izo now ~wollod to 31, with 10 membor~ from the Lingayat~
und c;even from the VokkD1igD~.
The expun~ion elicited di~uppointment Dmong ~everal
~oction~: from tho Mu~lim community and more importantly from
mcmberc; of the Junutu Dul it~clf. Severul of the J~n~t~ DDl
hopoful~ who f:1i1od to ~ocure mini~terial berth~ became 13
di~onchanted wi th tho gov~rnment. Thi~ led to 19
lcgi~l~torG withdr~wing their ~upport to the government.
Tho~o logi~lator~ woro now clo:1rly bont on toppling the
Bomm~i government. ~ppe~lu to purty memberc; by ~enior JuntD
Dal leader~ including Ram3kri~hna Hogdo to refrain from
~ctionu that would dDmDge the imDge of the p~rty were
ignored. Bommai him~olf exudod confidonco ovor tho pro~peetG
218
of the purty curviving the rebel oncluught: "I know 11
I've got tho ~olution~ to the problem~,"
my
Bommui wuc not givcn uny opportunity to prove hic
muiority und the government wu~ di~mi~~ed on April 21. 1989.
ending CIX yeurc of Junutu rule in the ctute, Though the
a~~embly wu~ ~lutod to moot on April 27, no opportunity Wu~
given to the party to prove it~ ~trcngth on the floor of the
u~~ombly. The ~tato govornor P Venkatu~ubbaiah in hi~ letter
to the pre~ident, recommending pre~ident'~ rule. ~tated that
the atmo~phoro wu~ vitiatod by tho hor~o-trading that wu~
15 gOIng on.
Just In the eu~e of the Gundu Ruo government, the
Junata party undor Ramakri~hna Hegde fir~t and Bommai lator.
did not undertake uny ~eriouc reform meu~ureG. ThiG i~
clearly evident from the uction~ of tho Junutu party on the
iSGUC of reforms.
The lanJ -eform meacure~ initiated by Urc were continued
without any attompt~ to improve upon them. Thi~. however, i~
not the CuGe with the ic~ue of recervation.
In accordunce with tho ~ugge~tion of the Supr~mo Court,
the Hcgdc Government aPPOinted thc Second Backward ClacGcc
Commi~~ion in April 1983.
~19
M3io~ To~m~ of Rofo~oneo:
1> Thc eommilJlJion in order to identify the bClek"3~d cl.:t:i:io:; 3~ Cl fir~t ~top neod~ to review the cxilJting lillt of b<lckwClrd clutit;CD by con~idoring tho GO No SWL 12 TBS, l\rticle::; 15 ( 1) Clnd 16 ( 1) <lnd Supremc Court judgemont~.
2) To m<lke Cl Geie~tifie Clnd fCletuul inveGtigution of the eond1t10n::; of b3ckw3rd c13~::;o::; in the Gt<ltc und recommend Ilpecific mCuGurCIl for thair CldvClncamont.
3) To revicw the mCilllUreG tuken uo fur by the ::;tato govornmont for tho wolfClro of backward cl<luuell und ulJllCuu the effectiveneuu of uuch moa~uro~ o~pocially in mClttor::; rolating to educiltion ilnd reprellcnt<ltion in pUDlic ::Jc['vica.
1 ) To muke term Clnd
recommendutionu in reupect of ~hort term mOCl~uro~ to rCli~o
16 level of the b3ckward clu~~e::;.
long tho
The Commi::;::;ionlJ recommend3tionu werc buGed on il Gtute
wida ::;urvey 1n 1981 covering 90.19 por cant of tho projocted
populiltion of the IJtilte. For the purpollcll of dctermining
tho educCltionClI bClckwClrdne~::;. in' 1rmClt ion on ~tudont~ who
1985 SSLC cXClminiltion Wuu
colloctod. The commi::;~ion worked out tho porcontClgo of
pCllJlJelJ, eilGte/community wiue und the utute ilveruge Wilu worked
pcr cent of the populution which Wil::; tuken uu thc cut off
po i nt .
220
l'll 1
above
cu~tC!:j ~nd communities h~ving u
or ::;ame a::; the ::;tate average were
percE:nt~qE:
con::;idered
educutionully forward und thoue with percentugeu be~ow thE:
::;tate were taken a::; educationally backward.
The finul
bu!Jic indiciltor
identificiltion of sociill ilnd educiltionul
made with the SSLC pa::;::; ::;tati::;tic::; a::; tho
ilnd !lie soeio-economic ilnd educationill
indicator::; dorived from the ::;urvey a::; corroborative evidenco.
The commIssion used 17 indiciltoru and u cuute or
community wa::; troatod a::; backward if moro than nina of tho
17 indiciltors pointed towilrdu buckwilrdneuu. It identif ied 35
ca::;to/cJmmunitio::; for benefit::; undor hrticlo 15 (1). Tho
commission further divided thiu into two groupu depending on
whothor tho SSLC pa::;::; percentage wa::; below the ::;tate average
but above 50 per cent of the state averilge or below 50 per
cent of tho ::;t~to averago.
The Venkutilswilmy commisuion illuo
communitio::; for bonofit::; undor hrticl0
identified
16 (1) of
31
tho
Constitution. This wus done by considering those ciluteu und
communitio::; idontifiod for bonofit::; under hrticle 15 (1)
which hild inudcquutc reprcsentution in government uervicc.
Tho 31 communitio::; woro cla::;::;ifiod by tho commi::;::;ion into two
groupe. group hand D and thc quuntum of reuervation fixed
33 par cant. Furthor, tho commi::;::; ion f ixod an incomo
ce iIi ng of Rs 15,000 per ilnnum.
221
The commiccion ~lco ~bolichcd thc cpcci~l group
catogory, which had hith~rto onioyod 15 por cent recervation.
Intcrcctingly, the Vokk~lig~c and Ling~yatc were lcft out of
tho backward clacc lict.
Five membcrc of the Commiccion prccentcd ~ dicccnting
noto to tho ctato gov~rnment. Thoca member~quoctioned the
appro~ch, criteria, mcthodology and proccdure adoptcd by the
commi::;~ ion. Thay notod that tho rocommondationc of tho
commi~cion went ~g~inct thc coci~l. cconomic, cduc~tional and
omploymont intoroctc of tho backward claccoc in Karnataka and
hence called for thc rcjection of the report.
Tho dicconting momborc alco urgod tho govornmont to
conctitute u new commiccion to conduct u frech ccientifie
curvey of tho eonditionc of tho backward elaccoc among all
the eactec and communiticc in Karnataka and to make new
recommondationc for bonofitc undor Articloc 15 (1) and 16
( 1) .
Thc dropping of thc Vokkaligac and Lingayatc had upcct
tho two communitiec. Hogdo'c cabinot colloqauoc attacked tho
report opcnl y. "The report ic moct 17
unccicnt if ic and
ridiculouc." obcorvod one minicter. Throe legiclatorc cont
in their reciqnationc protecting the recommendations of the
Report.
222
Following the exten~ive violence and agitation in the
~outhcrn di~trict~ of the ~tutc. the Vokkuligu heurtland. the
government rejected the report of the commi~~ion o~ten~ibly
on the ground~ of fuulty methodology. lucunue in collection
of data and indicutor~ adopted and the conclusions arrived at
by the commi~~ion und it~ failure to proceed by the
guidelines luid down by the Supreme Court u~ the deciuion wau
receivod in May 1985 by which timo, tho commi~~ion had
completed mo~t of itw work.
While the generul perception wu~ thut the government hud
cuved into tho oppo~ition from tho dominant cu~to~. tho chiof
mini~tcr denied thut the deciwion wuw tuken under preuuure 18
from uny quurtor~
The government then announced that it would con~titute u
now commi~~ion to determine the buckward ela~~o~. In tho
interim period, the ~tate governmont announced u new
re~ervation policy which includod both tho Vokkaliga~ and
LingayatG if their annual income did not exceed Ro 10,000.
The totul re~ervution under the new policy wa~ fixed ut
50 per cent. Thc government al~o reduced the re~ervation for
the Buckwurd Special Group to five per cent from 15 per cent
while incrcaGing the income ceiling for eligibility to RG
8.000 per annum from R~ 1.800.
223
Under the new order, 92 t f per cen 0 the st~tc's
populiltion Wil::; eligible for re::;erv~tion undor l\rticlo 16( 1)
ilnd 89 per cent of the populution under ;\rticle 15 (1). The
incomo ceiling Wil::; fixed ilt ~ 10,000 par ~nnum for tho
Groupu B, e, ilnd D.
Bowever, the experience of the Jun~tu Qovernment in
Kilrnataka demon::;trato::; that whon In powor it m~de 1 ittlo
effort to conuol idute ilnd utrengthen. There wuE; little
attempt at organization con::;ol idat ion. The pro::;onco of
orgilnized dominunt cuute groupE; contending for control mude
orgilnization con::;olidution in the Janatil party an impo::;::;iblo
tuok and contributed to thc defeilt of thc pilrty in November
1989.
Shift in Politieill Leaderohip
"We guve it to the eongrcuu (I) on a pliltter" - Jeevaraj 19
~lvil, Jilnata Dal leader.
For the Janata Dill in Kurnataka. it wuo a double defeut
defeat both in tho Parliamontary ilnd ~::;embly oloction::;.
In the Par1iamentilry poll::;, the Jilnilta Dul uuffered u
::;evero rout, managing to win iu::;t one of tho 28 Lok Silbha
oeutu in the otilte. The eongreDE; (1), in contril::;t. bilgged 27
::;O<Jto. In ill1, the JanilL) Dill. which hild won four ::;Oilt::; in
1981. loDt thrce oeatD to the eongrcDD (1).
221
Thc pcrformuncc In thc ~~cmbly clection~ WuC fur
wor::;c. It W3~ u docimution for tho Junutu Dul und u m,3:i::; 1 vc
victory for the Congrcc;r:; (I). ~ TiJblc 5.3 rcvculc. the
Congro~~ (1) (pinod u four-fifth::; m<ljority winning 176 :;O:lt::;
iJguinr:;t jur:;t 21 r:;eiJtc; by the JuniJtu DiJl. One politicul
.commontutor do~cribod tho vordict :I::; :In "oloctor:ll torn:ldo" 20
ripping through tho J unut3 D3l.
Severul r:;enior Junutu DiJI leuderr:;. including S.R.Bommui
und J.H.P<ltoL woro humbled by tho oloctor3te. Of tho 76
J<lnutu DiJl cundidutec who were renominutcd. only 12 could get
ro -elected. ~mukri:;hniJ Hegde rotuined hi::; ::;out ovor hi::;
Congrer:;c; (I) rival Hurnulli RumiJc;wiJmy by iJ niJrrow miJrgin of
8,100 voter~.
TiJbl e 5. 3: 1989 ~r:;emb1y E1ectionr:; FerformiJncc of PoliticiJl Purtio:; 3nd Indepondont:;
PiJrty SeiJt:; won SOut:; Conto:;tod
Congro:;:; (1) 176 219 JanutiJ DiJl 21 20B JiJnutiJ PiJrty 2 215 BJP 1 119 CPI 0 18 C~ 0 7 RPI 0 15 1lI lillMK 1 1 Lok D<ll 0 15 KRRS 2 lOB Indopondont:; 13 10B6 _________ _
-- -------------------------------------------
222 2011
--------------- - - - - - -- - -- - - -._- ---S-- -d-··- ·S·h-::t-r--l··-~-J Vinod' Tho Dynumic:; of Eloctorul
Sourco: .:::In eop U~ • .,. EI t' Pol iticc: 11 CiJr:;c Study of thc KiJrnutiJk::. ~:;cmbly . cC_lom; 19B9 (Dopartmont of Political Scionce. Bungulorc Unlvor~lty. BangiJ lore. 1990).
225
While admini~tering a blow to thc Janatu Dal, thc
oloctorato had ro~urroctod ~ovoral Congro~~ (I) politician~
who had curlier been con~igncd to the du~theap of electoral
hi~tory. Tho~o includod Chandraprabha Ur~. Renuka Raiondran,
h. B. Jaknur and Nagamma. Ke~havumurthy.
For tho Janata Party lod by H.D.Dovo Gowda, tho ro~ult~
came a~ a rude jolt. Thc party won ju~t two of the 215 ~eat~
it conto~tod. Dovo Gowda. him~olf, lo~t in both tho
con~tituencic~ he conte~tcd. Howevor. the Janata Party
queorod tho pitch for the Janata Dal. Tho Janata Party wa~ in
the ~econd pOGition. behind the Congre~~. in a~ many a~ 38
con~tituoncio3.
The Congre~~ (I) wa~ able to make a complete ~weep in
tho di~trict~ of Ha~~an. Chikmaga1ur and Kodagu. The ~ucco~~
rate of the CongreGG (I) wa~ below 70 per ccnt in only throe
di~trictG: Bidar. Raichur and Bolgaum. The Janata Dal failod
to get even one ~eat in Gcven diGtrictG: Gulbarga. Dak~hina
Kannada. Mandya. Ha~~an. My~oro, Kodagu and Chikmaga1ur.
Clearly. a major reaGon for the Janata Da1 debacle waG
the debilitating infighting in the party. Evon ~onior Janata
Dal leaderu like Bommai conceded that "the 21
di~ruptod tho functioning of tho govornment".
226
infighting
The Janata Dal had been continuouuly riven by faction~:
between faction~ loyal to Hogde and tho~o oppo~od te him. S R
Bomma i, wau not far from the truth when he obuerved after
taking ovor a~ chiof mini~tor in Soptombor 1988: "Tho
government it; in u bl1d t;hl1pe. There it; a finClnciul crit;iu, un
udminiutrativo criui~ and tho exporionco of decentralization
fueet; teething problemt;. The purty iu in u uhumblet; with 1111
tho rivalry ilnd tho oloctioIl!:LilrO only a yoar and il hillf 22
But little heed wuu pilid to this observation and the
pilrty paid hOilvily for it~ complilconcy.
Whilo the infighting within the party had brought about
tho poor ~howing, tho failuro to ~triko allianco~ with other
0ppouition partioo 111~o contributed to the wce& of the Janatu
Dill. ll=, many ilG 60 ~eat~ wore won by tho Congre~~ (1) duo to
the diviGion in opposition purtiet;.
Subuoquently, on Novombor 27, Voorondra Patil wa~ chouon
ut; the chief minit;ter of tho ~tato, 11 poot he hud held in tho
lilto 1960:::;.
Thc functioning of the Junutu pl1rty reveulu thut. bogged
down by fructiou:::; infighting it undortook umall and co~motic
anti- povertry meuoureu. The preponderuncc of the dominunt
in tho pilrty and cilbinot ~howod that tho govornmont
hild little will to implGment bold reform meuuurct;. Hegdc,
him~olf, hild ildmittod thilt tho Cil~to ilnd communill lobbio~ hud 23
be como uct ive. The Junutu yeuru in power uppcurG to huve
227
Dffo~ded the oppo~tunity fo~ the dominDnt cD~te~ to ~etu~n to
tho politicDl 3~onD.
Thu~. in the po~t-DevDrDj U~C erD. bDrring the Gundu RDO
po~iod. liko in tho pro-DovDrDi Ur~ orD. thoro ha~ boon 3
p~cponderDnce of dominDnt cD~te~ in the key deci~ion mDking
bodio~ of tho political ~y~tom. Thi~ p~opondoranco hD~ had
ncgDtive implicDtionc for refo~mc and the .government~ in
powc~ havo not initiatod any moaningful roform~.
228
Notou and Rcforonco5
1. Ind i.:. Tod.:.y M:neh IS. 1983.
2. Indb Tod3Y. M.Jreh 31. 1985.
3. The Times of India. March 7. 1985.
1. Ind ia Toduy, Fcbruary IS, 1985.
5. The Timer; of Jndiil. March 10. 1985.
6. The Timer; of Indiil. Septcmber 13 ilnd 11, 1985.
Sec .:.1::;0 India TodCly, September 30. 1985.
7. hnqelo PunebiClneo. op.cit Clnd Giovunni SClrtori. op,eit
8. M.J I Ril Y P41r i sh.Jd p. 1830
ilnd JilYillilk~hmi Kumpiltla. "Ca::;to and Zilla Eleetionc in K<lrnCltilku", Ef'W. July 25, 1987.
9. Ibid .•
10. I nd i .J Tod.JY· July 31, 1987.
11. Indi.J To~. October 15. 1987.
12. Indi.J Tod.JY· June 30. 1988.
13. Decc.Jn Her:lld. l\pril 17. 1989.
11. Dccc.Jn Her.Jld. l\pril 19. 1989.
IS. Deccan ~Jer.Jld. l\pril 25. 1989.
16. Govcrnment of KClrnClt.Jk<l, Report of the Kilrn<ltaku Second CI41csec Commir;r;ion. B.Jngillore. Vol L 1986. pp.3-5
17. Indi.J Tod.JJ" October 15. 1980.
18. Tclcqr.Jph. Octobcr 10, 1986.
19. !nd i.J Tod.JY· Septcmber 15. 1989.
20. Indiil TodQ..Y. December 15, 1989.
21. Indi.J '!: '2 cl.:l J' ' December IS, 1989.
22. Indi.J 'I'0day, Scptember 15. 1988.
23. Tl}~ Tjmc.c. of I_nd i.R.' November L 1985.
CHllPTER - VI
OVERVIEW
h common throud runj through, whut ij of ton dOjcribed
uw, thc politicw of thc developing ureuw or the non-wewtern
po 1 it icu 1 procejj. Tho f rumowork of the nOn-\1ejtern
politicul proceww iw communul, with ull politicul behuviour
being coloured by conjiderutionj of communul idont if iCut ion.
The strutified sociul wetting hud led to u close relutionship
betweon tho divorjo primordiul uffinitioj und tho nujcont
democrutic institutionw.
While the fundumentul frumework of tho non-Western
politicul procejj ij u communul ono, it ij not uccommodutive
ethnic politics but hegemonic politics thut is the hullmurk
of Hopoj of con~ociutionul power jhuring huj
been dicpelled by events of the lust few decudes. The
puttornj of hegomonic politicj muy vury in tormj of tho unitj
exercising the hegemony - lunguuge. religion, cucte or tribe.
In Indiu thero oxijt~ u ho~t of hogomonic qroupj
operut ing In
hoterogonouj
the different units of federul
mo~uic of Indiu huj ro~ulted in
system. The
u :::;ituution
wherein there exiwts not one or two but muny heterqenouc
group:::; ouch hogomonic within itj domuin. With tho onjot of
nut ion und stute building process, the institutionul props in
230
developing countrie~ like Indi~ came under the onDlaught of
V;jrlOU:; hetorogenou~ ~ociDl foreo~ and politic~ bocamo marc>
and more of an anomie proceDD.
However thece macro level politic~l proceccec~ have not
trDditionally attracted the attontion of tho mOGt rOGoarchorG
in India. Thi~ is more ~o in KarnataKa. where no maior
GtudioG havo boon attempted for tho p~riod beyond 1955. tho
advantage of an extended macro study Dtemc e~~entially from
tho fact that with tho bonofit of hindGight. ono can attempt
to ~ort out the abiding from the trancient in the panoramaic
Gweop of Gtato politicG.
The preDent ctudy attempted to fill in the gap by
undortaking a full longth analYGiG of political chango in
Karn<:lt<:lKa from 1956-89. with the major focus on changing
patternG of political loadorGhip ~nd an addod thruGt on itG
concequenceD in development~l policiec. While doing DO.
emphaGi~, however, haG boon placod moro on undorGtDnding tho
theoretic<:ll underpinnings of the political eventD rather than
graphic dOGcription of tho ompirical reality.
The political cventD th<:lt have taKen place during the
~tudy poriod havo beon dividod into four phaGoG :
1> Political Hegemony of Dominant C~ste Pro-Dovarai UrG ora;
2) DevDrai Ure era in KarnatakD politics;
211
3) Gundu Rao und Decline of Congress;
1) Janata pha~e in Karnataka politic~.
The precent chaptcr uttcmpts to prcccnt the trendc
p~rtaining to tho patt~rn of political loadorchip in
Karnataka and itc implications on the re£orm measures - land
roformc and rocorvation in thece four phacoc.
The political leadership in pre-Devaraj Ura era by and
largo wac undor tho control of tho dominant cacto~ in general
and Lingayats in particular. The proportion of dominant
cactoc momborc to tho total ctrongth accountod for about 55
per cent and reached itc peak during 1967 accembly electionc.
Evon within tho Congrocc logiclaturo party, tho proportion of
thece cactec ic slightly mora than 55 per cent. Further the
proportion of Lingayatc and Vokkaligac roachod itc poak in
1967.
In addition in termc of occupational pattern. the
largoly aro involvod or havo linkc with
occupations. Much in accordance to the
agricultural
pattern of
roprocontation in tho accombly, tho cabinot and chiof
minicters were also largely from the dominant cactec.
Tho roprocontation of dominant cactoc in tho cabinet
however alco increaced gradually over the election years and
roaehod itc poak in 1967. ~ll tho chief minictorc in thi~
~32
ph~~c Nij~ling~pp~, J~tti, Kunthi ~nd Veerendr~ P~til
huilod from the doml"n~nt c~-tn- Ll"n t ~ ~~ ~~ - g:lY:l J.
The ctr~nglehold of the domin~nt c~ctec over the
politic:ll in~titution~ :lppo:lrod to huvo boon f:lcilitutod by
ceverul fuetorc. The prineipul fuct~r i~ control over lund.
L:lnd in Kurn:lt:lka i~ principally ownod by tho~o communitio~.
Further, the communitiec domin~te not only the rural ~cenc
but ul~o tho~o of tho hou~ohold~ owning lund ov~r and ubovo
ten ucrec.
It ic through their invovcment in agrieulturul related
occupation~ and control ovor the land that tho dominant
cuctec uble to mobil ice cupport at the village level through
u wob of p~tron cliont tioJ.
The Devarui Urc eru changed the political climate of
Karnatuka for good. Ho o~tubli~hod tho norm thut tho ta~k of
any elected government wac to work for the betterment of the
living condition~ of tho poor who con~titutQd tho
majority.
Urc po~cecced a eoncideruble repertoire of political
~kill~ und rolontlo~~ drive to achiove hi~ goulc.
However, the finul verdict on the meucurec he introduced ic
not in yot. Whilo ~ome ~ocial ~cionti~to huvo ~OQn
'ctructurul ch~ngec' in hic me~curec, otherc h~ve viewed hic
233
roform~ ~~ populi~tic.
UrD~ 1 d f un re orm meaDureD have often been criticized on
tho ground of not going far onough. Ur~ him~olf wa~ awaro of
thiD and expluined that ubolition of tenancy wac only thc
fir~t ~top in hi~ ~chomo of thing~.
It WaD quite late in hiD political career thot UrD
roalizod tho failuro of hi~ offort~ in bringing about tho
organizution of the bockword clODDeD to improve their lot.
Ho roalizod politicization inadoquato without
organization. But cven here UrD hod to walk a tight rope.
In a world rivon by cumulativo inoqualitio~, politic~
become the meanD by which the backword cloDDeD could Gurmount
the ob~taclo~ in their path. It wa~ in thi~ rogard that Ur~
provided them the politicol opportunitieD in the form of
roform moa~uro~.
ThiD Gituation ic quite true not merely of Kornatako; in
mo~t dovoloping nation~, a tiny olito that ha~
diDproportionate aeceDD to the Gocio-economic reDourceD
firmly ro~i~t~ all moa~uro~ to altor tho ~tatu~ quo. Honco,
politieD become the Dole meonG if any mcaningful chungc iD to
bo brought out. But of ton a~ it happoned in Karnataka that
option ic DIDO foreclODed aD the clite hOD cornered the
~v~il~blo princip~l ~lot~ in tho political ~y~tom and
legiDlote for perpetuotion of on invidiouD ctatUD quo.
231
It ~ppe~rs th~t if Urs f~iled in ~chieving his go~ls, it
not u3 much duo to luek of offort~ u~ un inability to
control certain aspectc of the outside environment. Most of
hi~ propo3als roquirod - if thoy woro to pa33 from idoa to
reality - ~n expenditure of critic~l reeourcee - money, time,
onorgy. attontion. skill and political ~upport. Ur~' command
over ull thece reGourcee was limited.
Thus. tho Ur3' ora oecupio~ a di~tinct pha~o in tho
politiCG of the Gtate. Thic period witnesGed a erosion in the
powor of tho dominant ca~tos and also mado a bogining in
directing flow of reGourcec towurdG hitherto neglected
soctions of ~ocioty. Prominont among tho moa3ur03 that Ur~
introduced were lund reformc and reGervationG.
Tho~o moa~uro~ woro largoly tho outcomo of a combination
of factorG, ecpecially criGec impinging upon the cyctem.
Furthor, in thi~ phaso, tho offoct~ of doin~titutionaliG3tion
of politicul Gtructurec cume to be Geen in Urc' appointment
as tho chiof mini~tor. largo ~calo defoctionG and corruption.
This phaGc aleo caw an awakening of the backward cacteG
a ro~ult of Ur~' and Mr~ Gandhi'~ offorts to build a now
buGe of power. However, differenceG between Ure and Mrs
Gandhi largoly ovor Sanlay Gandhi'~ rolo in tho party and
Urc' national umbitions led to u parting of waye between the
235
tHO 1 caders sowing the seeds for the change in leadership in
tho !:t3to 1n 1980.
Thus to summarise the discussion. the Devuruj UrG eru is
con!:idorod to occupy un uniquo pooition in tho politic!: of
the stute. The UrG eru witnessed u considerilble decl inc in
tho pOloor of tho dominant cuoto!:. l\.t v<:lriouo lovolo, > chief
ministership. cubinet usscmbl y. the
ropro!:ontation of tho dominant C<:lotoo witnooood docl ino.
This phuGe hus ulso witnesoed uttcmpts ut land reforms und
rc::;orv3tion::; .. which woro undort<:lkon with gro<:ltor oincority
thun in the pust.
The efforts of the government were successful while
implementing ton<:lncy. Howevor. in <:liding tho l<:lndlooo.
little progress wus mude. But. UrG himself intended the 1971
lI.ct ao only tho firot otop in <:l longor and more r<:ldical
process. Further. the Urs government illso mude efforts
through othor pro-poor progrummoo like dobt roliof. provioion
of housing GiteG for the poor und u mujor house-building
progrumme.
However. by the end of the decude the stresseG and
otruino 1n tho Ur!:-Mro G<:lndhi rol<:ltionohip finully lod to tho
purting of WuYG in July 1979. Subsequently. the leudcrship ut
tho apox lovol witnooood u chango following tho poor ohowing
of Urs' part y in the 1980 Lok s.:Jbhu elect ionG. The Urs eru
W<:IO 03100 noto<:lble for tho porcoption thut corruption had
cxpunded its tentucleG.
236
fJowever, frequent I y, to dOlte, reference to uny
devolopmont progr~mme~ undort~ken in KarnOltak~ ~ro m~de with
the Drc regime OIC a benchmark OInd Orc has been credited with
uchoring in ~ ~ilent revolution in the ~t~to.
~ hus been noted earlicr, no effort wus mude in the
Gundu R~o ph~~Q of K~rn~t~k~ pol it icc to implement l~nd
reforms or undertuke the uppointment of 01 new buckwurd cluss
commlccion with vigour. Thic wac cymptomatic of ~ phace in
Indiun politics when icsues of policy cleurly took u
b~ckceat . Cle~rly. between 1980 ~nd end of 1982. the p~riod
when Gundu Ruo WuS ut the helm, these programmcs underwent a
r3dic~1 doclino in offoctivQnoe~.
Thus, Gundu Ruo WuS both 01 product of the Congress
eyetom of thc 1970e and al~o cimult~noouely ~ cauee for tho
purty's debucle in the 1983 electionc. Deinstitutionulisution
h~d ro~ched itc ~cme by thie time lo~ding to coll~p~o of all
cystems und procedures within the Congress. ~ the party WuS
~~ppod of itc etrongth. ch~ri~m~ e~mo to tho forefront.
The Gundu Ruo eru in Kurnutuku politics demonctrutes the
limitatlonc of lo~derehip in uehor ing in chango and
development. Lucking the politicul will und ubilities,
neccccary for governance. the govornmont wac reducodo to
theutricc.
237
Po lit i Cu 1 theory hu~ held th:lt purtie~ which form und
develop in oppo~ition are more prone to becoming ~trong
in~titution~. Thi~ i~ lurgely becuu~e the oppo~ition purtie~
do not command the kind of re~ource~ that partie~ in power
do. Unlike the governmentul purtie~, the oppo~ition purtie~
cannot rely on the bureaucracy, and lack~ the financial
c;upport
p:lrtie:::;.
thut
However,
intere~t group~ rec;erve for the governmentul
the experience of the Junutu government in
Karnataka demon~trute:::; thut the u purty like the Januta, when
in power mude little effort to eon~olidute und ~trengthen
It:::;elf. There little attempt at organization
con~olidution. The precence of orgunized group~ contending
for control mude organization eon:::;olidation in tho Junata
purty un impo~ciblc tu~k und contributed to the defeut of the
party ln November 1989.
Thus, ln the poct-Devaruj Ur~ eru like in the pre-
Devarui Ur:::; era, thore hu:::; been a preponderunce of dominant
cuetec; ln the Key decic;ion muking bodie~ of the politicul
:::;y:::;tom. Thi:::; preponderance ha:::; had negutive impl ication~ for
reformc; und the then qovernment~ in power huve not initiuted
uny meaningful roform:::;,
The c;tudy hu~ been undertuken within the frumework of u
238
di~h:!rmonic soci:!l Gy~tem, chnrcteriGed by n hintuG between
the ox ir:;tcnt iJl Jnd normJt ive order:;. However. the rocord of
modernising countries hns shown thnt promoting the intereGts
of tho poor i:; 3t be:;t one 3mong muny gOul:; of tho l03dor:;
Jnd government::; nnd it is uGunlly u fnirly low priority
concern.
Whilc politicnl comiittmcnt is cruciul for uny reform.
political uctor:; 31:;0 bulanco all policio:; by calculation of
politicul ri~kG und the imperutive of politicul surviv<ll. The
implomontution of lund roform:; in Indiu domon:;trato:; tho
obstncleG thnt pro-poor me<lGurcr:; m<ly f<lcc. WCuk org<lniG<ltion
of tho poor hur:; 31:;0 m3do it impo:;:;iblo to oxort pro:;r:;uro
from bclow for the formulution und implemcntntion of welfnrc
ThUG our hypotheGi~ th<lt politicnl eliter:; will uGher in
reform:; only when thore is a nood to guin
lcgitimncy iG borne out by tho uttitude to reformG
:;uecor:;r:;ivo govornmont:; in Karn3taka r:;inco 1956.
political
of the
The yenrG since 1989 hnve nlco Gerved to buttrecG the
hypotho:;i:;. Tho Congro:;:; (I) h3:; :;hown 1 ittlo :;ign of huving
lenrnt lecGonG from itr:; pnGt debncler:;. The frnctiouc
infighting botwoon 1989-1991 only :;trongthon our conclu:;ion.
Concequcntly. the 1991 nccembly electionc GuW n repent
of tho 1983 oloct ion:::; - tho trouncing of tho party. With tho
cu •• ent government hewdcd by w Vokkuliga. Deve Go\~du. it
remain~ to bo ~eon if tho Dova.aj Ur~ ora will romuin an
aber.:ltion in Kurnataka politieu. But. <:Ill indicationu u.e
that tho pro~ont di~pen~ation. with poworful loador~ from tho
domin:lnt e:luteu. iu unlikely to takc uny me:luureu thut will
whittlo down tho powo. of tho dominant caotoo.
The f<:lilure of uucccuuivc govcrnmcnt in Kurnataku in
gonoral point~ to a lack of doto.mination in carrying out a
root und brunch attuck on thc ututuu quo. Thc maluiuc in
whilo it i~ dopro~~ing in tormo of amoliorating
the lot of thc deprcuued eluuucu. iu not unique in Indiu.
Evon the communi~t partieo have made littlo progro~o In
For inutance. recent utudieu
en We~t Bengal have highlighted the failure of tho loft-front
government in WCut Bengul in uuhering in meaningful reform.
Tho communiot partioo, oopocially tho CPM. havo boon
mOutly coopted into the democ.atic political proccuu lOuing
it~ .eformi~t orientation. and havo bocemo a party of tho
ctatuc quo. communiut in .hetoric but in practice unwilling
to int.oduco evon minimal .oformo.
The .adical left au u political fo.cc in India hau been
fu.the. oma~culated by reproooion. oomotimo~ by communiot
qove.nmentc themuelveu. Thuu. the weakening of communiot
210
forces, by coopt ion und reprecsion hus removed unother threut
to tho ~t3tu~ quo.
The luck of organisation of the poor, especiully in the
rural aroa~. h3~ alGo tondod to work again~t thorn.
The entry of opportunistic elite groups into the
communi~t fold al~o i~olatod tho lowor claGGoG from tho olito . -.
leuderchip of the party. Consequent I y, the distinction
botwoon tho communiGt and othor partioG haG alGo bocomo
bl urred. Under theDe circumstances - of little difference
botwoon tho contriGt and communiGt forcoG - thoro iG I ittlo
rCuson to expect that the status quo will witness any change
or moaningful roformG will bo uGhorod.
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