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eptember 11th, 2001 has become thedate used most frequently by the

media, diplomats, politicians, the military,academics and ordinary citizens across theworld in discussing current affairs or try-ing to anticipate what the future holds.The horrendous terrorist attacks againstthe United States, perpetrated on that day,have profoundly shocked the world com-munity. The destruction of the WorldTrade Centre in New York and a part ofthe Pentagon building in WashingtonD.C. with the loss of 3,000 lives, were thefirst attacks on the United States since theJapanese offensive against Pearl Harboron December 7th, 1941 and were even

The World After September 11th:Change and Continuity

By Assistant Professor Tomas Jermalavicius, Deputy Director of Strategy and Political Studies Department,Baltic Defence College

more outrageous given that the absolutemajority of the casualties were civilians.Just as in the wake of Pearl Harbor, theSeptember atrocities set the United Stateson the path of war. This time against theglobal terrorist network al Qaeda led bypariah Saudi dissident Osama bin Laden,who allegedly masterminded these atroci-ties and rendered support to their execu-tion, as well as against the regimes whichharboured or sponsored the terroristgroups.

Soon after the attacks, the United Stateshaving secured backing of a broad inter-national coalition and assisted by its al-lies, launched a multidimensional cam-

paign with the aim of disrupting al Qaeda,capturing Osama bin Laden and dissuad-ing the so-called �rogue states� from fur-ther pursuit of policies of supportinginternational terrorism. The Taliban re-gime in Afghanistan, which has been host-ing bin Laden and his training camps forseveral years, became the first target ofthe war on terrorism as the USA employedits formidable air force against the Talibanmilitary assets and infrastructure and, inconjunction with the offensive of theAfghan opposition on the ground, suc-ceeded in evicting the Taliban frompower. The war goes on and probably willcontinue on different fronts and in dif-

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ferent theatres for a long time to come.Its outcome and effects remain to be seen.However, although bearing in mind theuncertainty that war brings into theworld affairs, the implications of theSeptember 11th events can already beassessed and generalised with a measureof confidence.

This article will explore the ways thatSeptember 11th has already influenced andstill can affect the world politics in thefuture. It will attempt to provide someperspectives on what these events havebrought or can possibly bring into theinternational relations and what the im-plications are to the international systemas a whole and to the processes within it.The major aim of such an effort is toclarify whether September 11th should beconsidered as a new departure point inworld politics where one can start talkingof different characteristics of the interna-tional system, new dynamics of processesin this system and new nature of interna-tional relations, than of those prior toSeptember 11th. The reason for address-ing this issue is that the developments in

the aftermath of the terror acts in theUnited States have led many to believethat September 11th heralds a dawn of anew era in international relations and thata completely new world order is likely totake shape as a result.1 Significant shiftsin the policies of the major actors such asthe USA or Russia, as well as ensuing revi-sions of security policies may indeed jus-tify this interpretation. By some accounts,worrying isolationist connotations of theU.S. foreign policy, especially with regardto regional conflicts across the globe, andthe unilateral instincts of the U.S. admin-istration arguably have been replaced withthe policies of deep engagement andmultilateralism. At the same time Russiahas made an impressive u-turn from be-ing more or less antagonistic vis-à-vis theWest towards seeking rapprochementwith, if not lasting integration into it.These are just a few aspects of the devel-opments which have taken place since theterrorist attacks, provoking thoughtsabout fundamental change. The psycho-logical shock also adds to the tendency ofadopting a stand where the world is be-

ing looked upon through different lensesthan before the attacks.

Legitimate as it may seem, however,interpreting September 11th as a new de-parture point for the whole functioningof the international system and conductof international relations can prove to bea too radical and, at the same time, a some-what simplistic way of conceptualising theimportance of the September 11th events.While acknowledging the fresh facets ofworld politics, brought about by the ter-rorist attacks, the paper will argue thattheir impact should rather be assessed inthe light of developments preceding themand dating back to the end of the ColdWar when the bipolar international sys-tem collapsed and the new world orderstarted taking shape. This would entailSeptember 11th being the most instruc-tive and the sharpest symptom reflectingthe characteristics of the post-Cold Warinternational environment that we haveexperienced so far, rather than a triggerof the entirely new processes leading todisintegration of the current architectureof world politics. To a certain extent Sep-

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tember 11th has removed some of theambiguities about the world we are fac-ing, at the same time bringing other un-certainties in, which are reinforced by thewar on terrorism and the results it mayproduce. In addition, it will be suggestedto supplement this conceptual approachwith interpreting the September 11th at-tacks as the event accelerating and catalys-ing the processes which have been inmotion for some time already. In accom-plishing this task, the inquiry will com-pare post-September 11th developments,frequently cited as an indication of theupcoming dramatic changes, with the set-ting which has emerged since the end ofthe Cold War. It will address the majorunderlying questions such as: to what ex-tent have the characteristics of a post-ColdWar international system been altered (ornot affected) by September 11th? Is thepost-September 11th pattern of interac-tion between the actors in this systemindiscernible prior to the attacks andtherefore completely new? Have any sig-nificant modifications been made in away that the nature of conflict within the

system is understood? It is these threeinterrelated areas - international system,international relations and internationalconflict - which will constitute an organ-ising analytical framework for dealing withthe task.

By looking for the connections be-tween the post-September 11th events andthe processes before the attacks, the paperwill largely ignore the strategic issues ofthe ongoing war on terrorism, althoughthe already visible effects of the war willcome into play in the discussion. Themilitary realm as such remains beyond thescope of this inquiry, just as more or lessconspicuous shifts in domestic politics andsocial attitudes in the USA or its allies atthis war, caused by September 11th. Omit-ting from the analysis the latter certainlymakes this effort less comprehensive.However, it rests on the assumption thatas profound as their effects might be,domestic developments do not translatedirectly into change of the internationalenvironment, although they can facilitateit and serve as one of the sustaining fac-tors for a specific mode of international

relations. Finally, the effects of the ter-rorist attacks upon the prevailing secu-rity paradigm will not be examined on apremise that the September 11th eventsare not inducing any significant changesin this area, since terrorism and relatedthreats such as proliferation of weaponsof mass destruction have been alreadyincorporated into the notion of compre-hensive security, which obviously will notbe revisited.

The first part of the paper will pro-vide an overview of the post-Cold Warinternational setting prior to September11th. The argument that the internationalsystem became unipolar after the collapseof the Soviet Union and that the USAhas been acting as a hegemon in the in-ternational system ever since will be cen-tral and lay ground for placing Septem-ber 11th into a broader context. The majorlines of international conflict in the post-Cold War environment will be elaboratedhere, including some discussion of amodel suggested by Samuel Huntingtonand known as a theory of the �clash ofcivilisations�. This account will build a

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basis for the second part, where the ef-fects of the terrorist attacks on the uni-polar structure of the international sys-tem will be appraised, where the reactionsof the USA and the rest of the world willbe taken to support the argument thatunipolarity has been strongly but notunequivocally underlined. For obviousreasons, the focus will be set on the USAand its foreign policy. Shifts in the waysthat the USA perceives and is likely toshape its hegemonic posture in interna-tional relations will be analysed and it willbe argued that though the United Statesis becoming a mature hegemon, the ex-pectations of multilateralism in the U.S.foreign policy are not likely to be ful-filled. The post-September 11th rap-prochement between the USA and Russiawill be dwelt upon to emphasise continu-ity in international relations and the ac-celerating impact of the terrorist attackson the processes already on track beforeSeptember 11th. Finally, the effects uponthe major strands of international con-flict will be assessed in this part, arguingthat only one of them has been at least

temporarily inactivated and that theHuntingtonian vision of the �clash of civi-lisations� remains inapplicable but poten-tially plausible.

I. The post-ColdWar setting

The post-Cold War international sys-tem, which has been evolving during the1990s, has several key features built intoit and discernible quite well in the fluidinternational environment. This is neces-sary in the effort to detect changes of sig-nificance to the whole system after Sep-tember 11th. First of all, it is unipolarity,which replaced bipolar world of confron-tation between the two superpowers, theUnited States and the Soviet Union. Theywere at the centre of the two conflictingblocks of states and acted as their consoli-dating forces, as well as drivers of the in-ternational conflict generated by the ideo-logical differences. The United States, byvirtue of its economic, military and po-litical power, has been the only superpower

in world affairs for the last decade, sincedisintegration of the Soviet Union. Thus,almost by default, the USA emerged asthe hegemonic state in the internationalsystem, capable of promoting its valuesand interests across the globe with un-precedented efficacy and virtually with-out any serious resistance from the sys-tem. The ideological dimension, built intothe US post-Cold War foreign policy andcentred on the issues of human rights andfreedoms as well as free markets, has beenboth appealing and intrusive. A numberof countries, previously not renowned fordemocratic practices, have chosen thedemocratic path of development, associ-ating themselves with the worldview pro-moted by the hegemonic power. Thoseremaining outside this trend have beensubjected to a strong external pressure,orchestrated by the USA and rangingfrom diplomatic and economic sanctionsto military intervention. The last elementof the American hegemonic position wasa ring of credible and loyal allies, associ-ating their security with the U.S. guaran-tees and ability to project military power

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globally and directing their foreign poli-cies in such a way as to ensure continu-ous U.S. presence and commitment. Thus,America has firmly established itself at thecore of the international system, exercis-ing significant influence on its processesand serving as the arbitrator, seeking sta-bility of the system. The phenomenon wasgiven the name of a new Pax Americana inthe early 1990s by a number of authors(William Odom, Charles Krauthammer,etc.).2

Being in a position to pursue unilat-eral solutions as well as wielding enormousinfluence, it nevertheless remained reluc-tant to explicitly adopt and exercise itshegemonic posture in the internationalrelations, especially with respect to theregional conflicts requiring a prolongedmilitary commitment and involvement inpost-conflict reconstruction. Althoughhaving been conspicuous in the MiddleEast and Northern Ireland conflict reso-lution efforts as well as restoring democ-racy in Haiti in 1994, it was hesitant tobe fully involved in the Balkans in theearly 1990s. This feature of avoiding the

role of the �global policeman�, which canbe seen as being tailored to the hegemonicposture, was further reinforced by thefailure of intervention in Somalia in 1993and led to ignoring the genocide inRwanda in 1994. At the same time, evensuch a selective or even half-hearted U.S.engagement, sustaining its hegemonic sta-tus and unipolar structure of the interna-tional system, evoked unfriendly andsometimes hostile reaction from some ofthe system�s actors. To a higher or lesserdegree anti-American policies have becomea determining characteristic of a numberof states. An interesting aspect of this re-action is that some states, such as Russiaor China, showed displeasure not aboutthe U.S. power per se, but about the uni-polarity that this power created. Enter-taining the concept of multipolarity,where the international system was envis-aged as organised around several balanc-ing each other power centres possessingtheir own spheres of influence, theymoved to challenge the USA not on thebasis ideology, but for the global scopeof its hegemonic outreach. At the same

time, another group of states, mostly char-acterised as undemocratic, felt a far big-ger threat from being exposed to the val-ues and ideology that accompanied theU.S. hegemony than to the hegemony it-self and saw resistance as a prerequisitefor survival of their regimes and ideolo-gies. These two types of anti-Americanmotivation can be discovered in mixtureas the case of China suggests. However,the latter motivation produced one ofmost sustainable lines of the internationalconflict during the last decade � the UnitedStates and its allies versus so-called �roguestates� such as Iran, Iraq, Syria, Cuba,North Korea, Sudan or Libya. Contain-ment of the rogue states, which are em-barking on policies of acquiring weap-ons of mass destruction and sponsoringterrorism, has occupied a large propor-tion of the US foreign and military policyagenda since the Gulf War in 1991, al-though the policy itself dates back to theyears of the Cold War. Then overshad-owed by and subordinated to the con-frontation with the Soviet Union, thisconflict has become one of the major pri-

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orities in the post-Cold War era. In addi-tion, it falls into a more general trend ofconflict between the democracies andundemocratic regimes, which has re-as-serted itself during the last decade. Deriv-ing legitimacy of its hegemony from thecause to spread human rights andfreedoms and also by virtue of represent-ing those values most robustly, the UnitedStates has appeared at the front-end ofthis standoff, reserving the right to inter-vene, on behalf of the international com-munity and with its support, in internalconflicts where human right violationswere leading to the spread of violence andhumanitarian disasters. The air campaignof NATO against Yugoslavia to stop theethnic cleansing in its separatist provinceof Kosovo in 1999 heralded the full ma-turity that this doctrine had reached.Moreover, once the destabilising effectsof internal conflicts to the internationalsystem have been acknowledged, the hu-manitarian justification of interventionto a great extent overlapped with the com-pelling need to prevent internationalisa-tion of the domestic conflicts. In this re-

spect, interventions into so-called �failedstates�, where the central government wasbarely functioning or not functioning atall and the hostilities between various fac-tions or warlords led to massive humanrights violations as well as regional insta-bility, became yet another element woveninto the broader framework of post-ColdWar international conflict. Bosnia, Soma-lia and Sierra Leone stand out as the mostprominent examples during the last dec-ade. Failure in Somalia has made theUnited States lukewarm to this kind ofinterventions, especially if regional insta-bility did not directly threaten the U.S.interests and humanitarian considerationsprevailed. The Clinton Doctrine, articu-lated in 1994 by the U.S. President BillClinton, specifically argued for the pres-ence of national interests to bring the USAinto such conflicts.3 As a result, othernations had to take the lead in such mis-sions (the UK in Sierra Leone, Australiain East Timor), which testifies both theselective use of the hegemonic power bythe USA and the US ability to set a stand-ard for addressing challenges to the inter-

national system to be followed by others.These three interweaving and overlappingfacets of international conflict, with theUnited States more or less at their centrebecause of the unipolar nature of the in-ternational system, are supplemented withthe friction, generated by the globalisationprocess and its consequences. It manifestsitself as a social protest against theglobalising world, when disaffected groupschallenge the social groups and commer-cial structures, considered winners of arapid technological, economic and socio-political transformation, as well as the stategovernments and international institu-tions, viewed as tools facilitatingglobalisation. Globalisation, perceived asa threat to identities, welfare and valuesof some groups, provokes backlash whichsometimes turns into violence (e.g. theanti-globalisation movement protests dur-ing the World Trade Organisation sum-mit in Seattle in 1999 or during theGenoa summit of G8 in 2001). It canhardly be called an international conflictin a strict classical sense, since the chal-lenge that brought about the conflict

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emanated not from the state actors, butfrom societies. However, born within thestates, it transcended their borders by tar-geting foreign governments, internationalorganisations and even other societies.Furthermore, it had a propensity of trans-lating itself into the inter-state rivalrybetween the rich, developed states and thepoor, less developed countries vulnerableto the pressures of globalisation and hav-ing large segments of their societies un-able to adjust to and capitalise on thisprocess. In geographical terms it has be-come common to draw the line of con-flict between the North and the South(the rich North versus the poor South),which has replaced the East-West axis ofthe Cold War confrontation. The UnitedStates emerged as the biggest beneficiaryof globalisation and, to a certain extent,its strongest driving vehicle through thepromotion of free trade and throughcompetitive advantage stemming from itstechnological leadership. According toPeter Van Ham, ��the swell of economicand cultural globalisation is often seen asthe USA�s ultimate soft-power resource.�4

Hence one of the most prominent targetsof the social discontent over globalisationand a scapegoat for the plight of the un-derdeveloped states of the South.

The post-Cold War picture of interna-tional conflict presented above is neitherexhaustive nor attempting to incorporatea vast array of theoretical approaches for-mulated in the last decade or so. Sincethe end of the Cold War a number ofconceptual visions on how the future in-ternational conflict will look like have beencompeting for recognition. In the cur-rent context, the one espoused by SamuelHuntington is worthwhile mentioning.In the early 1990s he argued that the ideo-logical confrontation between the twosuperpowers for a number of reasons wasbeing gradually replaced by the �clash ofcivilisations�. He argued that ��the prin-cipal conflicts of global politics will oc-cur between nations and groups of dif-ferent civilizations.�5 Huntington definedcivilisations primarily as cultural entitiesand argued that there was an inherent fric-tion between them, leading to violentconflicts in the regions where civilisations

overlapped or came into a direct geo-graphical contact with each other. Armedconflicts in the Balkans, Trans-Caucasus,the Middle East, Kashmir and other placeswere explained in these terms. TheHuntingtonian model has been criticisedand contested on various grounds, espe-cially for a not so much reliable criteriaof defining civilisation as well as for thetendency to see the clash of civilisationswhere it was absent in the origins ofsome particular cases of conflict. How-ever, Huntington�s observations retainvalidity in what is perceived as a conflictbetween the West and the rest of theworld. He argues that �the West in effectis using international institutions, mili-tary power and economic resources torun the world in ways that will maintainWestern predominance, protect Westerninterests and promote Western politicaland economic values.�6 This behaviourprovokes responses from the non-West-ern states and societies unwilling to ac-cept and internalise Western values andbeliefs such as liberal democracy or hu-man rights. The four lines of conflict,

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outlined previously, can easily fit intothis notion as its different strands. Forinstance, Huntington essentially explainsthe existence of �rogues states� as one ofthe forms of response to Westerncivilisational hegemony and expansion.Yet again putting the dominant trendunder the title �the West versus the Rest�can pose difficulties in analysing specificcases. But, flawed as it may be, Hunting-ton�s theory provides some valuableinsights into the dynamics of internationalconflict and brings to the attention ofthe academic discourse cultural differencesas one of the ingredients feeding into thedynamics of international conflict. �TheWest versus the Rest� aspect encapsulatesquite well what has been taking place inthe unipolar international system underthe hegemonic sway of the United States,although it does not necessarily carry theexplanatory power sufficient to under-stand and explain all the frictions andconflicts in international relations. Cul-tural differences should not be viewed asthe primary cause of conflicts despite thefact that they do play their part in exacer-

bating the tensions over which conflictserupt.

International relations have been evolv-ing within the parameters of the unipo-lar international system and under theinfluence of the aforementioned tensionsin it for the last decade. This rough out-line of how the world looked like priorto September 11th does not suggest, how-ever, the presence of clarity and simplic-ity, conducive to rational and effectivedecision-making necessary to address chal-lenges and threats, as it may seem. Themultidimensional character of the inter-national conflict inevitably produced flu-idity and ambiguity, making it difficultto prioritise policies and to come to gripswith the whole complexity of the post-Cold War world and the direction it hasbeen heading to. For the USA in particu-lar it raised a number of questions onwhat the nature of its hegemonic policyshould be, whether the unipolarity couldbe sustained in a long term, where the USnational interests and priorities lie andwhat the major sources of threats to themare. As a result, the U.S. policy seemed to

lack coherence and, in many instances, wasreactive rather than proactive. Its remark-able feature was that the U.S. reluctant andselective engagement in the world affairshad continuously aroused fears among theU.S. allies over the possibility that thetremendous U.S. power would allow it toretreat into self-isolation from the worldaffairs in order to reduce the costs ofbeing the world hegemon and, at the sametime, seek and impose unilateral solutionsonce the vital U.S. interests were threat-ened or challenged. The policies of thenew administration of President GeorgeW. Bush, who took office in the begin-ning of 2001, aggravated these concerns,as the administration was clearly inclinedto pursue the unilateralist policy schemes.The plans to deploy the National MissileDefence (NMD) system, designed to pro-tect the continental USA from the missileattacks by the hostile regimes, emerged asthe ultimate manifestation of the �go-it-alone� approach. A string of decisions notto co-operate or even to undermine mul-tilateral efforts in various fields, perceivedas inconsistent with the U.S. national in-

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terests (such as the Kyoto Protocol onthe greenhouse gas emissions, strengthen-ing the verification regime of the Bio-logical and Chemical Weapons Conven-tion, ratification of the ComprehensiveTest-Ban Treaty, etc.) seemed to confirmthese worrying trends and stirred fur-ther controversies over the gap betweenthe actual U.S. behaviour and the respon-sibilities inherent to the role of the glo-bal hegemon as perceived by the rest ofthe world. In this respect, the September11th events have indeed introduced moreclarity on how the hegemon should be-have and what kind of challenges shouldbe given a higher priority. However itcan be easily noticed that the post-ColdWar international system has not beenshocked to an extent, as to start shiftingaway from unipolarity, although it is lesscertain whether this pattern will endurein a long term, as it will be suggestedlater. These observations as well as thetrends in international relations and thecharacteristics of international conflictwill be elucidated in the second part ofthe article.

II. The September11th attacks and

their impact

The attacks perpetrated against thehegemonic power of the unipolar worldare inevitably set to reverberate throughthe whole international system. Septem-ber 11th was the first time in the post-Cold War era when the United States waschallenged with such destruction and hitat the heart of its financial and militarypower. Dramatic as it is, the attack shouldnot be assessed as the focal point at whichthe previous international system to-gether with the dynamics of internationalrelations and international conflict builtinto it have ceased to exist and some-thing entirely new have replaced them.A strong case can be made to suggest thatSeptember 11th should be analysed interms of continuity rather than drasticchange.

Unipolarity highlightedbut not unequivocal

First of all, the international systemremains fundamentally unipolar. The at-tacks have done nothing to underminethe U.S. power (economic, financial, po-litical and military), the ability to projectit globally or dependency of the rest ofthe world upon the United States, even ifit was the original motive behind them.On the contrary, this characteristic hasbecome more significant, as the strongincentive for the United States to exploitmore vigorously its unique position inthe international system has appeared. Astrong assertion of unipolarity is notice-able behind the words of President Bush,aired during his address to the Congressin the aftermath of the attacks, where heframed the imperative for the world com-munity by saying that �every nation, inevery region, now has a decision to make.Either you are with us, or you are withthe terrorists.�7 Thus little choice has beenleft for the rest of world but to rally be-

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hind the USA or bear the consequencesof either indecision or opposition. Theworld reaction to the terrorist attacks fol-lowed this imperative word by word. TheU.S. allies, driven by moral repulsion ofthe atrocities and a strong commitmentto support the USA as well as by com-mon threat perception, offered all possi-ble assistance, as evocation of the Article5 of the NATO founding treaty on col-lective defence demonstrates. Some states,such as Russia or China, responded alongsimilar lines, but more out of expedienceand pragmatic considerations, hoping toreap benefits such as legitimisation of theirdomestic policies (Russia�s war in a breaka-way republic of Chechnya, for instance),more favourable treatment by the USAin the areas of trade and finance and, inthe case of Russia, the U.S. assistance indealing with the threats to its nationalsecurity. Even some countries featuringon the list of the �rogue states�, such asSudan, Libya and Iran, felt compelled tocondemn the attacks against their ideo-logical enemy and if not to co-operate,then at least to avoid obstructing in any

way the U.S. response.8 All this revealsthe extent to which the U.S. policy hasbecome central to the world affairs andto which the world has become depend-ent on the United States. It can be con-cluded, therefore, that September 11thevents have become yet another landmark,accentuating the unipolar nature of theinternational system.

On the other hand, certain connota-tions appeared after September 11th whichused to underpin the bipolar structureof the international system, as the historyof the Cold War shows, and which mayupset the above account. Firstly, it is thesense of the overwhelming threat to secu-rity and value system of the Americansociety, echoing perception of the Sovietthreat of the Cold War years. The terrorof September 11th has created the samesense of profound insecurity, vulnerabil-ity and uncertainty as the fear of nuclearattack by the Soviet Union, and the ef-fort to redress this threat equally domi-nates the U.S. security and foreign policyagenda. Furthermore, a strong and pow-erful sense of the U.S. mission ensues both

from the need to respond and from thefreshly acute realisation of the U.S. posi-tion in the international system as theonly nation capable of delivering thatresponse to protect the status quo. At theAsian-Pacific Economic Co-operation(APEC) summit in Shanghai, PresidentBush succinctly defined this new sense ofmission claiming that �this conflict is afight to save the civilised world�.9 Onecan easily draw parallels with the Cold War,when the United States acted on behalf ofthe free world to fend off the communistideological expansion. Yet another facetresembling the bipolar confrontation isthe renewed usage of the word �contain-ment� to shape and define the U.S. strat-egy, only this time aimed at containingthe terrorist threat in general rather thanthe state actor.10 The impression of a non-coincidental parallel with the Cold Warcontainment strategy is being strengthenedby the warnings of the U.S. leadershipthat the USA as well as the allies should bepreparing for a long haul in this struggleto contain terrorism.11 To push the par-allel even further, it is obvious that the

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war on terrorism, just as the Cold War,will not see a continuous and sustainedmilitary action. Intelligence operations,covert action, financial and law enforce-ment measures will probably be moreimportant tools employed to cope withthe threat. Finally, it is obvious that Sep-tember 11th will be followed by a deepU.S. engagement and global activism as itis being realised that any unresolved re-gional conflicts or continued existence ofthe �failed� states will be a breeding groundfor extremism and the terrorist activitiesand that eventually the United States willbecome their ultimate target yet again.Having dismissed the U.S. role in stateand nation building prior to September11th, the U.S. administration seems to berevising this approach as campaign inAfghanistan draws to a close. The emerg-ing U.S. determination not to leave anyvacuum for extremism to thrive thor-oughly resembles the effort to be activelypresent in all regions as a part of the anti-Soviet strategy. The only element missingin this picture to complete the bipolarstructure is the second pole of the inter-

national system. However, the pole couldbe conceptually constructed if one definesit not as an equally powerful hostile statewith its sphere of influence, but as anamorphous structure, comprised of theterrorist networks, �rogue states� and evenlarge segments of some societies exercis-ing strong anti-American sentiments, allunited by ideology. President Bush hasalready showed determination to add stateactors along the terrorist networks to theadversary�s profile by declaring that �anynation that continues to support terror-ism will be regarded by the United Statesas a hostile regime�,12 although carefullyavoiding any allusions to the social di-mension of the conflict. In such a case,the notion of an asymmetric confronta-tion would apply, where one side is easilyidentifiable, well structured, organised andhas an obvious leader (the USA), whilethe other side remains more or less elu-sive, complex and without the centre ofgravity inherent to the opponent, butnevertheless capable of inflicting signifi-cant damage to the interests of the adver-sary as well as keeping him mobilised and

insecure and commanding the level ofindividual and social loyalties that are tobe reckoned with. This account wouldcertainly be a huge departure from theconventional and modest assessment of theconsequences of the September 11th eventsto the international system. However, tran-sition from the unipolar to bipolar worldis a possibility rather than the currentreality and can materialise only if the newdefinition of what constitutes the pole inthe international system is universally ac-cepted and if the U.S. resources becomeso overstretched as to lead to the worldless dependent upon the USA as an arbi-ter and the source of security and whereloyalty to the U.S. hegemonic leadershipis easily traded and shed. The latter possi-bility has already been noted by the U.S.Deputy Secretary of Defence PaulWolfowitz, who observed that �one of thedifficult things in the next few months isgoing to be establishing which of our al-lies of convenience�can become real al-lies over the longer term�and which onesare going to just switch sides.�13 It is alsoimportant to note, that application of thestrategies of the bipolar system can be

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carried out in the unipolar world all thesame, as the containment of the �roguestates� through the mechanisms of interna-tional sanctions during the 1990s shows.This may especially be the case given, thatthe key policymakers of the Bush adminis-tration are much more familiar with thestrategies of the Cold War and eager toemploy them rather than innovate. Beingmindful of the reactions to September11th within international system, discussedearlier, it would be premature to announcedemise of unipolarity, although the high-lighted aspects of the post-September 11thdevelopments should lead the analyst tobe more flexible and open-minded in fu-ture categorisations. Enthusiastic use oftechniques and rhetoric, intrinsic to thebipolar structure of the international sys-tem by the Bush administration, can be-come a self-fulfilling prophecy in the end.

II.2 The maturing hegemon andinternational relations

In the international relations, one candiscover a mix of change and continuity

of the pre-September 11th patterns ofinteraction. The most significant changeperhaps should be associated with the waythat the hegemonic power (the USA) hasbeen acting since the terrorist attacks.Having been averse to the role of a globalpoliceman and hesitant to commit itselfwholeheartedly to building security andprosperity wherever such a need arises forthe last decade, the United States seems tostart interpreting its position in the worldpolitics more robustly, appreciating thatthe selective engagement, let alone self-iso-lation, cannot prevent hostile acts andchallenges. As the U.S. secretary of defenceDonald H. Rumsfeld wrote: �Forget about�exit strategies�; we�re looking at a sus-tained engagement that carries no dead-lines.�14 It is more likely now that the U.S.engagement will be far deeper and widerthan previously, even in the places wherethe U.S. interests seem to be largely ab-sent. The conflict between India and Pa-kistan over Kashmir, the Muslim insur-gency in the Philippines, failure of statesin places such as the Democratic Repub-lic of Congo or Somalia, the Palestinian

intifada and many other developments andevents, are set to receive or are alreadyreceiving a far bigger U.S. attention, thanprior to September 11th. Essentially, theUnited States is undergoing transforma-tion from being a reluctant into being amature hegemon, ready to throw its powerand resources into the troublesome spotswhere opportunities for the U.S. oppo-nents to undermine the U.S. interests canpresent themselves. The declared readinessto stay in Afghanistan and assist its newlyformed government as long as it takes tobuild a viable state can serve as a precur-sor of the revised U.S. approach to itsinternational responsibilities.15 The will-ingness to sustain the global engagement,though, can still wither away as a sense ofcrisis and pressure for action subside.Some analysts have expressed their doubtsover whether such a transformation willbe sustained. As Professor Niall Fergusonof Oxford University puts it: �The U.S.has the resources: but does it have theguts to act as a global hegemon and makethe world a more stable place?�16 Mean-while, the expected reversal from unilat-

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eral to multilateral methods of formulat-ing and implementing the U.S. policies17 ,which implies more consensus buildingand appreciation of the interests of theother states, has failed to materialise. Abroad anti-terrorist coalition which theUSA sought to assemble before taking anymilitary action, represents the pursuit ofa theoretical imperative of isolating theenemy diplomatically and strategically,rather than introducing multilateralmodes of policymaking and implementa-tion. To be accurate, multilateral elementshave indeed emerged in the U.S. policy.Reinvigorated interest in the opportuni-ties offered by the United Nations, largelyabsent until recently, can be presented asan example.18 Concern over not alienat-ing valuable allies in the war against ter-rorism is also playing its part. But theoverall trend of the United States beingready to consult but seeking to avoid anyconstraints that the multilateral actionusually entails, especially in the militaryrealm, continues unabated just as priorto September 11th. Furthermore, thepolicies of eluding or even undermining

some multilateral binding arms controlagreements, seen as an undesirable con-straint to the U.S. freedom of manoeuvreand set on track during 2001 or even ear-lier, remain firmly in place. The UnitedStates further refuses to ratify the Com-prehensive Test-Ban Treaty and has ruinedany chances of making the Biological andToxin Weapons Convention more cred-ible through strengthening its verificationregime,19 despite the risk of upsetting itsallies and creating the atmosphere of dou-ble standards so readily endorsed by thefoes. The same holds true for the U.S.determination to dispense of the 1972Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, viewedby the former adversaries and current al-lies alike as a cornerstone of the strategicstability, in order to open gates for thedeployment of the NMD system. Presi-dent Bush has already announced that theU.S. withdrawal from the treaty is immi-nent. Thus the USA did not grow anymore sensible to the concerns of the in-ternational community after September11th. Instead, it is exploiting the momentto make the cause for a new strategic

framework stronger and more acceptable.Relations with Russia perhaps best exem-plify the continuity of the same patternof interaction as prior to September 11th.

The U.S. relations with Russia have beendeveloping as an uneasy mixture of co-operation and disagreement for the lastdecade. A number of issues such as NATOenlargement and the Alliance�s �out-of-area�operations as in the Balkans, the NMDsystem and the fate of the ABM Treaty,non-proliferation, Russia�s two wars inChechnya and its meddling in the so-called�Near Abroad� have been poisoning thenew agenda of bilateral relations almostall the time. With President Bush takingoffice, it was widely expected that the U.S.policy towards Russia would be far moreassertive and less conciliatory, than un-der his predecessor. As Russia�s PresidentVladimir Putin was also seen as a personpreferring a tough stand in foreign policyto regain Russia�s lost status in interna-tional affairs, it was tempting to concludethat the two states would slide back intopermanent confrontation, although lessdangerous than during the Cold War, but

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nevertheless potentially bruising and dam-aging enough to prompt concerns. Post-September 11th developments seemed torender those concerns irrelevant. Bothstates have found a common uniting is-sue since terrorist threat has been longregarded by Russia to be the most dan-gerous to its national security. Given thatshared threat perception is always a start-ing point for building an alliance, Rus-sia�s determination to join the anti-ter-rorist effort can be interpreted as draw-ing it closer to the West. Some Russianofficials went so far as to ponder onceagain the possibility of Russia accedingto NATO and to tone down objectionsto the accession of the Baltic States intothe Alliance.20 NATO also moved to re-shape and upgrade its relations with Rus-sia and make them to better reflect thepost-September 11th realities.21 Moreimportantly, Russia has become an indis-pensable ally of the United States duringcampaign in Afghanistan, sharing intelli-gence and expertise on the region andlifting objections to the U.S. military pres-ence in Central Asia, perceived as Russia�s

�backyard� in terms of influence and stra-tegic interests. Washington, in turn, wasquick to suspend criticism of Russia�smilitary campaign in Chechnya, acknowl-edging that at least some part of Russia�sargument for military action was valid andlegitimate.22 This was followed by theannouncement of bilateral cuts in nucleararsenals during the summit in Texas inNovember, applauded as heralding a newera in the strategic relations of the formerCold War adversaries and laying groundfor a new strategic framework, while ad-dressing Russia�s anxieties over the U.S.intentions to abolish the ABM Treaty.23

Although not abandoning their opposi-tion to the NMD, Russia�s officials soundmore realistic and more assured on thisissue than previously.24

Positive as they are, these developments,however, are neither entirely new norrooted solely in the events of September11th. The dawn of a new era in strategicrelations between Russia and the UnitedStates was declared during the June sum-mit between Bush and Putin last year inLjubliana, Slovenia. On the same occasion,

both sides pledged to work on puttingsubstance into the envisioned frameworkof their strategic relations.25 In a similarvein, Putin has been softening Russia�svehement opposition to further NATOenlargement quite for a while, replacingthreats of an adequate response with ar-guments questioning the rationale of theenlargement.26 Russia even failed to comeup with a usual counter-statement afterPresident Bush had outlined his visionof Europe �free and united� endorsingNATO enlargement project in Warsaw,Poland, last year.27 Not to mention thatRussia has been already talking of notexcluding the possibility of joining theAlliance some time in future, althoughtailoring this idea to a set of conditionsdeemed unacceptable by the West. Rus-sia�s drift towards the West, therefore,could be noticeable already before theSeptember 11th attacks. A more co-opera-tive agenda has been unfolding withoutthe effects of the terrorist attacks. Theobservers and policy analysts, taking noteof the pragmatic nature of Putin�s poli-cies, seemed to have somewhat underesti-

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mated his pro-Western credentials. Mean-while, after September 11th Putin is tak-ing stock of the pro-American sentimentin the Russian society and seeks overcom-ing the hardliner conservative elementsin Russia�s establishment by redefiningRussia�s interests in order to strike a chordwith the West.28 The USA has also uti-lised the moment to give a fresh momen-tum to the dynamics set into motionduring 2001. Both sides have reachedunderstanding of where the commonalityof their interests lies, which was blurredby mutual disagreements and suspicionsbefore the terrorist attacks. September11th has only accentuated the ongoingchange in the bilateral relations and helpedto remove the obstacles to the process ofrapprochement on both sides. Assessmentby the U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powellthat September 11th �did not start some-thing, it accelerated�29 is very much validin the post-September 11th U.S.-Russianrelations and perhaps is applicable in theinternational relations in general. The waythat September 11th events are influenc-ing the post-Cold War patterns of inter-

national conflict is somewhat more com-plex, but nevertheless does not redefineits lines as dramatically as it may have beenexpected. The next part of the article willdwell upon the September 11th impacton major cleavages in the internationalsystem, described previously.

Change and continuity ininternational conflict

On September 11th, three lines of in-ternational conflict out of four seem tohave blended together into one shockingblow to the USA, the state residing at thevery core of the international system andemerging as a nod where those lines ofconflict intersect. Firstly, the global ter-rorist network al Qaeda spreading wellover 60 states and born out of the patho-logical hatred to the United States as apower allegedly seeking to destroy Islamas the cultural and religious phenomenaand to subjugate the Muslims exemplifiesvery well the by-product of globalisationprocess and accompanying frictions.Osama bin Laden personifies those un-

able to accept the post-modern way of lifeand social values, brought about byglobalisation, and reacting with anger anddestruction to being pushed into obscu-rity and irrelevance in the contemporaryworld.30 In a way, anti-globalisation pro-testers causing havoc in the streets dur-ing the WTO or G8 summits and al Qaedaterrorists represent the two sides of thesame coin in terms of the origins of theirdiscontent. Also, just as the protesters onthe streets, while skilfully capitalising onfree communications, movement of fi-nances and new technologies which aresustaining globalisation, the terrorists at-tacked the state embodying globalisationitself, and accomplished this by selectingthe targets symbolising financial and com-mercial as well as military might of theU.S. dominated and led world. Further-more, they managed to strike a chord withanxieties and sensitivities of the societiesin the Muslim world, unveiling the ten-sions created in those societies by mod-ernisation and exposure to the effects ofglobalisation.31 Without going into de-tail and leaving the roots of terrorism for

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other inquiries to explore, it is enoughto record that the social and ideologicalcleavage in the international system,brought into being by globalisation, isstrongly present behind the September11th attacks. Secondly, the �rogue states�versus the United States line also manifestsitself here, as the former are long suspectedby the latter of sponsoring and support-ing international terrorism. The presenceof this conflict behind the terrorist at-tacks is obvious despite the fact that someof the �rogue states� were quick to issuecondemnations of the atrocities. At thevery early stage of war on terrorism, theU.S. administration made it clear that thisconnection would be central to the U.S.anti-terrorist strategy. During his addressto Congress, President Bush stated that�any nation that continues to harbor orsupport terrorism will be regarded by theUnited States as a hostile regime.� Argu-ments within the U.S. administration overwhether Iraq, one of the most prominentpariah states, should be the next targetafter Afghanistan in the anti-terrorist cam-paign, have further reinforced perception

that the terrorist attacks are closely associ-ated with existence of the �rogue states�.32

The failed states also inevitably come intoplay in the analysis, as Afghanistan con-stituted the ground for recruiting andtraining terrorists and the physical baseof the al Qaeda leadership. Mostly ne-glected since the failure to restore thegoverning structures and order in Soma-lia, they turned out to be the safe havenfor the training and operational activi-ties of the terrorist network. Afghanistanhas immediately become a target of theU.S. war on terrorism, and Somalia as wellas another state balancing on the edge offailure, Yemen, have been named to belikely to draw the anti-terrorist action ofthe USA.33 A sober realisation by the USAthat the existence of failed or weak statesis not favourable to the U.S. interests sim-ply because it can further stimulate theterrorist threat and, therefore, cannot beignored, will be shaping the Americanstrategy for the foreseeable future. Thusthree lines of international conflict, rec-ognisable well before September 11th andhaving led to the terrorist attacks, are

likely to remain in place. The only cleav-age that has been obscured by September11th is the one between the democraciesand undemocratic regimes for variousreasons not qualifying for the status of�rogue�. Pakistan and the states of CentralAsia serve as the best examples of howundemocratic regimes have ceased to bethe trigger for conflict and turned intopartners of co-operation. Pakistan, widelyregarded as gradually slipping into becom-ing a �rogue state� or even a failed state,or both, under the rule of General PervezMusharraf, is now one of the most valu-able U.S. allies.34 The United States seemsto be ready to tolerate undemocratic re-gimes as long as they remain loyal to theUSA in its war on terrorism and untilthese regimes retain a degree of controlover their territories and populationsnecessary to prevent the rise of extrem-ism and development of the new terror-ist �pockets�. Meanwhile, the authoritar-ian rulers can enjoy the legitimacy of theirrepressive policies, mocked as �fightingterrorism� long before September 11th,obtained as a result of the changed U.S.

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attitude.35 It remains to be seen whetherturning blind eye on the undemocraticpractices in the other states for the sakeof strategic co-operation will be a short-term U.S. strategy or a long-term trend asthe calls to prepare for a long haul maysuggest. The note of caution is that suchan approach during the Cold War pro-duced all sorts of troubles for thepolicymakers in the post-Cold War era,including anti-Western sentiment in manysocieties.

One of the biggest fears of the inter-national community, though, was that theU.S. response to the terrorist acts wouldindeed validate the Huntingtonian modelof international conflict by turning thewhole struggle into a clash of civilisations,between the U.S.-led Western world andthe Islamic world. At the outset of a bomb-ing campaign in Afghanistan, the argu-ments that the United States was punish-ing the whole Muslim society for theatrocities perpetrated by a group of crimi-nals and that it would antagonise the wholeMuslim world were at the core of criti-cism of the U.S. strategy.36 Signs of out-

rage, spreading through the Muslim soci-eties, over the bombing and the civiliancasualties were apparent as the demonstra-tions in Pakistan or lack of endorsementby the Gulf states coming under the pres-sure of their societies not to support thecampaign demonstrated.37 An unfortunateparallel between the crusades and the cur-rent war on terrorism, evoked by Bush,was not helpful at all in presenting thecampaign as an effort directed against the�rogue� elements and not as manifestationof the long-harboured Western hostilityto the Muslims.38 Talk of the West, andthe United States in particular, exploit-ing the opportunity provided by Septem-ber 11th to unleash its power against theMuslim states and societies has becomecommon among the Muslims.39 Giventhat any war tends to harden the attitudesand push them to the extremes, the ter-rorist attacks may well induce prolifera-tion and consolidation of anti-Muslimand anti-Western sentiments in Westernand Muslim societies respectively, thuspitting them against each other and bring-ing about something resembling the clash

of civilisations. However, this remains avery remote possibility, since the USA andits allies have made every effort to isolateand discourage any domestic anti-Muslimhysteria as well as to win the hearts of theMuslims by disassociating Osama bin Lad-en�s cause from their grievances. As a re-sult of a relatively measured and self-re-strained U.S. response and a carefullymastered public relations campaign toconvince the Muslim societies of the ab-sence of any broader anti-Muslim moti-vation behind this response, the views thatthis is a war between Western and Islamiccivilisations are confined to the marginsof those societies.40 Commitment to stayin Afghanistan and help to re-build thecountry destroyed by the decades of civilwar served very well to strengthen themessage of assurance. Nonetheless, Septem-ber 11th underlines the fact that percep-tions can be pushed by terrible events atsuch directions as to turn the theories,currently lacking credibility, into a domi-nant explanation of why the conflict istaking place. The terrorist attacks and thefollowing Osama bin Laden�s propaganda

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to unite the Muslims behind his religiouscause to destroy America and other �infi-dels� may have rendered Huntington morerelevance it has had before in the eyes ofmany, even though the terrorist attackscan be better explained in other termsthan the clash of civilisations. It takes andwill continue requiring a sustained andcarefully crafted policy and action to steerboth sides away from the overwhelmingperceptions of confrontation betweenWestern and Islamic civilisations in ac-cordance with Huntington. Huntingtonwas not entirely right prior to Septem-ber 11th, remains such afterwards, but hestill can become right as the war on ter-rorism continues.

III. Conclusions

Provoked by numerous accounts thatthe terrorist attacks against the UnitedStates on September 11th have dramati-cally changed the world, this article ex-plored a moderate avenue of interpret-ing the importance of these events to theworld affairs. Taking three interrelated

dimensions � international system, inter-national relations and international con-flict � as the analytical framework, it en-deavoured to place September 11th intogeneral post-Cold war setting whichemerged during the preceding decade.Preoccupied with the question whetherSeptember 11th should be conceptualisedas a trigger of change or a symptom ofwhat has been evolving already for sometime, the analysis leads to accepting thelatter way of interpretation. Certainly, thisdoes not imply that nothing has changedat all. Our perceptions and understand-ing of the terrorist threat, of destructive-ness it can bring and of the means whichterrorists can use to exploit ourvulnerabilities have acquired completelynew dimensions and, more importantly,are now rooted in a terrible experiencerather than theoretical models and hypo-thetical contingencies. But the world poli-tics, with some minor adjustments andsome new probabilities, remains a con-tinuation of the pattern set prior to theattacks. The unipolar international systemis not showing any signs of collapsing,

even though the strategies and character-istics of the bipolar world have appeared,causing to ponder the theoretical possi-bility of neo-bipolarity and the need torevise the notion of the system�s pole. Theworld-wide rallying behind the UnitedStates underscores the extent to which theUSA has positioned itself as the centralpower in the international system, ensur-ing its functioning, stability and security.The USA remains a hegemon in the inter-national relations dictating the rules ofthe game as well as the nature of responsesto the challenges from within the system.Its influence, interests and policies con-tinue formulating imperatives for theother actors. Only this time, reluctanceto exercise the hegemonic influence isgiving way to a wider and deeper globalengagement to prevent further challengeslike the one on September 11th, bring-ing closer the USA to the role of a �globalpoliceman� it sought to avoid but hascome to realise it has no choice but toassume. The hopes of multilateralists havebeen dashed, however, and the expectedshift towards multilateral decision-making

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in international relations has failed to takeplace as the USA remains unwilling toaccept any external constraints althoughdisplays more readiness to consult, beforemaking the decision. Finally, most of thestrands of international conflict remainin place after September 11th. Pressureupon the �rogue states� will persist andwill even intensify. Interventions in thefailed states will be as instrumental in en-suring security of the international sys-tem as ever before. And globalisation willcontinue generating social and economictensions with implications to internationalrelations. Only those who believe thatfurther expansion of democratic valuesand practices can guarantee peace and sta-bility will be temporarily upset as theUnited States needs allies in its war onterrorism, whether they are democraticor not. And the Huntingtonian clash ofcivilisations, which was not driving in-ternational conflict before September11th, is not becoming a reality, althoughits coming into being is another prob-ability exposed by the terrorist attacks.September 11th events are symptomatic

of the trends and developments preced-ing them. They accentuate the character-istics of the post-Cold War setting andhave also accelerated some processes, suchas rapprochement between Russia and theUSA, by making their rationale moreobvious. September 11th atrocities, thus,is not a new departure point from whichwe could start counting the days of a post-post-Cold War era. Certainly, the continu-ing war on terrorism may make differ-ence, but it is rather a war which will con-solidate the current world order insteadof installing a new one. Most probablyPresident George W. Bush will not enterhistory along with Woodrow Wilson,Franklin D. Roosevelt or even GeorgeBush Sr. as an architect of a new worldorder, despite his merits for fighting ter-rorism.

1 See Moisi, Dominique, �Welcome to the New,New World Order�, Financial Times, September13th, 2001.

2 See Tickner, J. Ann (1995), �Re-visioning Secu-rity�, in Ken Booth & Steve Smith (eds.), Interna-tional Relations Theory Today, Cambridge: Pol-ity Press, pp. 183, 184.

3 See Slim, Hugo (1995), Military Humanitari-anism and the New Peacekeeping: an Agenda forPeace? at www-jha.sps.cam.ac.uk/a/a015.htm(accessed on May 17th, 2000).

4 Van Ham, Peter (2001), �Security and Culture,or, Why NATO Won�t Last�, Security Dialogue,vol. 32, no.4, p. 398.

5 Huntingont, Samuel P. (1993), �The Clash ofCivilizations?�, Foreign Affairs, Summer 1993.

6 Ibid.7 Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the

American People, September 20th, 2001, atwww.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html, accessed on December 14th, 2001.

8

9 See �Defining the Challenge: Who Asked MrBush to �Save Civilisation?�, The Guardian, Oc-tober 24th, 2001.

10 See Hoagland, Jim, �America Can�t Wage theAnti-Terror War Alone�, The International Her-ald Tribune, January 14th, 2002.

11 See Grant, Tracy, �Bush Braces Country forWar�, Washington Post, September 15th, 2001.

12 Address to a Joint Session of Congress andthe American People, September 20th, 2001, atwww.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html, accessed on December 14th, 2001.

13 Dao, James & Schmitt, �U.S. Hawk Hints IraqWon�t Be Next Target�, The International HeraldTribune, January 9th, 2002.

14 Rumsfeld, Donald H., �A New Kind of War�,The New York Times, September 27th, 2001.

15 See The White House Report The Global Waron Terrorism: The First 100 Days, at http://

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www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/12/100dayreport.html, accessed on January 15th, 2002.

16 See the contribution by Prof Niall Fergusonto the joint Guardian-RUSI conference on NewPolicies for the New World, published in TheGuardian, October 31st, 2001.

17 See Naim, Moises, �Even A Hegemon NeedsFriends and Allies�, Financial Times, September14th, 2001.

18 See Remarks by the President to United Na-tions General Assembly, November 10th, 2001, athttp://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/11/20011110-3.html, accessed on January 15th,2002.

19 See �Bush�s Hang-ups�, The Economist, De-cember 15th-21st, 2001.

20 See �Why Not Accept Russia Into NATO?Interview with Sergei V. Stepashin�, Business WeekOnline, September 21st, 2001, on Johnson�s Rus-sia List (JRL), Issue 5454, at http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/5454-7.cfm, accessed on January15th, 2002.

21 See Finn, Peter & Baker, Peter, �NATO andRussia Reinventing Relationship�, WashingtonPost, November 15th, 2001.

22 See Politkovskaya, Ana, �Remember Chechnya�,Washington Post, November 14th, 2001.

23 See Sanger, David E., �Bush and Putin Agreeto Reduce Stockpile of Nuclear Warheads�, TheNew York Times, November 14th, 2001.

24 See Wines, Michael, �Facing Pact�s End, PutinDecides to Grimace and Bear It�, The New YorkTimes, December 14th, 2001.

25 See Charlton, Angela, �Bush, Putin Face Dip-lomatic Hurdles�, Associated Press report onJohnson�s Russia List (JRL), Issue 5037, June 18th,2001, at http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/5307.html, accessed on July 10th, 2001.

26 See �Putin Softens Tone on Baltic Quest ForNATO�, Jamestown Foundation Monitor, Sep-tember 6th, 2001 on CDI Russia Weekly at http://www.cdi.org/russia/170.html, accessed on Sep-tember 9th, 2001.

27 See Remarks by the President in Address toFaculty and Students of Warsaw University, War-saw, Poland, June 15th, 2001, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/06/20010615-1.html, accessed on January 15th, 2002.

28 See McFaul, Michael, �Putin�s Risky TurnWestwards�, The Christian Science Monitor, No-vember 9th, 2001.

29 See �U.S. and Russia to Complete Talks onArms Control Pact�, The New York Times, De-cember 11th, 2001.

30 See Neier, Aryeh, �Warring Against Moder-nity�, Washington Post, October 9th, 2001.

31 See Friedman, Thomas L., �One War, TwoFronts�, The New York Times, November 2nd, 2001.

32 See Woollacott, Martin, �Saddam Will be theNext US Target, One Way or Another�, The Guard-ian, November 16th, 2001.

33 See Ottaway, David B. & Ricks, Thomas E.,�Somalia Draws Anti-Terrorist Focus�, Washing-ton Post, November 4th, 2001.

34 See Keller, Bill, �The World According to ColinPowell�, New York Magazine, November 26th, 2001.

35 See �The New New World Order?�, The Econo-mist, October 5th-12 th, 2001.

36 See Ruthven, Malise, �This Man May BecomeOur Nemesis�, The Guardian, October 10th, 2001.

37 Hirst, David, �The West Ignores Arab Resent-ment at Its Peril�, The Guardian, October 9th, 2001.

38 See Ford, Peter, �Europe Cringes at Bush �Cru-sade� Against Terrorists�, The Christian ScienceMonitor, September 19th, 2001.

39 Freedland, Jonathan, �The War Bin LadenHas Already Won�, The Guardian, October 10th,2001.

40 See Fidler, Stephen, �Washington Wages aWar of Diplomacy�, Financial Times, November8th, 2001.