Challenging the politics of rescue between Mare Nostrum and Triton

7/26/2019 Challenging the politics of rescue between Mare Nostrum and Triton

1/19

Border displacements.

Challenging the politics of rescuebetween Mare Nostrum and

Triton

Martina Tazzioli

University Aix-Marseille, LabexMed, LAMES, MMSH, 5, Rue du Chateau de lHorloge, Aix-en-Provence, France. Email:

[email protected]

Abstract

This article deals with this ongoing spatial and political recrafting of the Mediterranean

sea as a space of migration governmentality. It retraces the recent political and spatial

transformations occurred with the starting of the military-humanitarian operation Mare

Nostrum in the channel of Sicily and then the handover to the Triton operation coor-

dinated by Frontex. The two specific angles from which it tackles this issue are the

politics of and over life that is at stake in the government of migration at sea and the

politics of visibility that underpins it. In the first section it analyses the politics and thescene of rescue that has been put into place with the start of Mare Nostrum, tacking

stock of the re-articulation of military and humanitarian technologies for governing

and containing migrant movements. Then, it discusses the recent transformations

occurred with Triton operation and the effects on the level of political actions under-

taken by activist migrant groups. The article moves on by taking into account the

peculiar politics of visibility that is at stake in the government of migration in the

Mediterranean.

1. Introduction

Over the last two years, the spotlights on the central Mediterranean switched on and off

according to a desultory rhythm. After years and years of migrants dying at sea and with the

alternation of moments of high visibility and others in which the island of Lampedusa

disappeared (Sossi 2005; Cuttitta 2012; Pezzani 2014), the two huge shipwrecks that

happened on the 3rd and on the 11th of October 2013 near the island of Lampedusa,

causing the death of 636 people in total, restaged the channel of Sicily and Lampedusa as

objects of focus. Indeed, a few days later Italy launched Mare Nostrum, the military-humanitarian operation,1 for rescuing migrants in distress at sea: the Italian Navy was

MIGRATION STUDIES 2016 119 1 of 19

doi:10.1093/migration/mnv042

! The Author 2016. Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email:

[email protected]

Migration Studies Advance Access published January 24, 2016

byguestonJanuary

26,2016

http://migration.oxfordjournals.org/

Down

loadedfrom
http://migration.oxfordjournals.org/http://migration.oxfordjournals.org/http://migration.oxfordjournals.org/http://migration.oxfordjournals.org/http://migration.oxfordjournals.org/http://migration.oxfordjournals.org/http://migration.oxfordjournals.org/http://migration.oxfordjournals.org/http://migration.oxfordjournals.org/http://migration.oxfordjournals.org/http://migration.oxfordjournals.org/http://migration.oxfordjournals.org/http://migration.oxfordjournals.org/http://migration.oxfordjournals.org/http://migration.oxfordjournals.org/http://migration.oxfordjournals.org/http://migration.oxfordjournals.org/http://migration.oxfordjournals.org/http://migration.oxfordjournals.org/http://migration.oxfordjournals.org/http://migration.oxfordjournals.org/http://migration.oxfordjournals.org/http://migration.oxfordjournals.org/http://migration.oxfordjournals.org/http://migration.oxfordjournals.org/http://migration.oxfordjournals.org/http://migration.oxfordjournals.org/http://migration.oxfordjournals.org/http://migration.oxfordjournals.org/http://migration.oxfordjournals.org/http://migration.oxfordjournals.org/http://migration.oxfordjournals.org/http://migration.oxfordjournals.org/http://migration.oxfordjournals.org/http://migration.oxfordjournals.org/http://migration.oxfordjournals.org/http://migration.oxfordjournals.org/http://migration.oxfordjournals.org/http://migration.oxfordjournals.org/


2/19

in charge2 of monitoring and rescuing migrants in a sea-zone spanning from Italian waters

up to the beginning of Libyan waters. Mare Nostrum officially ended in November 2014,

but actually it was operative until the end of the year from which point Italy pushed the EU

to take charge of the operation in the frame of a burden sharing logic; it was replaced by

Triton, a EU operation coordinated by Frontex that, nevertheless, has been firmly criticized

by activists, human rights groups and even by some politicians for being primarily an

operation to intercept and block migrant vessels.3 Indeed, the vessels that patrol as part

of Triton should operate only up to 30 nautical miles from the European coasts.4 And its

principal activity consists in ensuring effective border control and not in rescuing migrants

at sea.5 However, the Italian Navy didnt stop its patrolling activity in central

Mediterranean, but it no longer operated within the framework of Mare Nostrum

operation.

Actually, more than a restaging of the same desultory visibility (Tazzioli 2015b), which

was already in place, the two deadly shipwrecks have triggered major transformations in themechanism of capturing migrants lives. The first one consisted in a spatial amplification of

the stage of rescue. Indeed, from the epicenter of Lampedusa, the scene of rescue6staged by

states, humanitarian agencies, migration agencies and journalistsimmediately reached

the southern shore of the Mediterranean Sea, including migrants points of departure

(Libya) and the sea-space of transit between Libya and Sicily. The second one concerned

salient re-assemblages in the politics of containment of migrant movements and in the

intertwining between humanitarian and military interventions. Therefore, the space of

governmentalityas a space of interventionwhich has been crafted in the last two

years in the central Mediterranean region, is the outcome of these two main displacements.

Moreover, the re-crafting of the Mediterranean Sea as a space of governmentality has alsobeen generated through the staging of what I call a humanitarian, real-time politics of

visibilitythat does not merely show how mechanisms of rescue and capture operate, but

rather contributes to the production of aborder-stagethe Libya-Sicily sea-space as a space

of rescue. Humanitarian real-time politics of visibility indicates the real-time gaze (Walters

2014) that national authoritiesthe Coast Guard and the Navynon-governmental

actors, European agencies (Frontex) and media mobilize on the space of the sea to perform

the good border spectacle (De Genova 2013) that is thespectacle of migrant rescue.

Before moving on, some methodological clarifications are needed due to the changing

political dynamics that are repeatedly underway characterizing the space of crossing that

this article focuses onthe central Mediterranean as a migration space. While this article

was being written a series of transformationsboth at the level of institutional political

responses and of migrant movementshave occurred, undermining the possibility to have

a comprehensive analytical standpoint. Confronted with the frantic attempts by EU states

to reassess the politics of migration management, in this article I date the descriptions I

make of the ways in which practices ofrescueandcontainmentare simultaneously at stake.

In this sense, the article could appear in part outdated to readers. Nevertheless, the goal here

is not to make a chronology of the events but, starting from the specificity of events and the

data gathered during the research fieldwork, to propose an analysis about the border dis-

placements that occurred in the military-humanitarian government of migration since thelaunch of the Mare Nostrum operation. Building on Michel Foucaults approach to a

history of the present (Foucault 1984), the theoretical challenge of writing about events

2 of 19 M. TAZZIOLI

byguestonJanuary

26,2016


Down

loadedfrom


3/19

that are still underway consists in situating the analysis within the present by stressing the

effective way in which migration governmentality operates in response to the migration

turmoil, in order then to mark discontinuities and continuities with previous moments.

At the same time, writing while events are underway allows us to follow a cartography

in-the-making (Tazzioli 2015a: 3) about the internal transformations of migration govern-

mentality. The article deals with the ongoing political re-crafting of the Mediterranean as a

space of migration governmentality, retracing the recent political and spatial transform-

ations which occurred with the starting of the military-humanitarian operation Mare

Nostrum and then the handover to the Triton operation coordinated by Frontex.7 It is

structured around two temporal stages: the first from January 2014 to April 2015, and the

second starting the 18 April 2015, when a huge shipwreck occurred near Lampedusa,

triggering transformations in the EUs response to manage and contain the movements

of people coming to Europe in search of asylum. The two specific angles from which this

article tackles this issue are the politics of and over life that is at stake in the government ofmigration at sea and the politics of visibility that underpins it. In the first section the article

analyses the politics and the scene of rescue that has been put into place with the start of

Mare Nostrum, tacking stock of the re-articulation of military and humanitarian technol-

ogies for governing and containing migrant movements, focusing on the specific politics of

lifeandover livesthat sustains itnamely the peculiar biopolitics mobilized upon subjects

who have become shipwrecked persons.8 Then, the article discusses the recent transform-

ations that have occurred with the Triton operation and the effects on the level of political

actions undertaken by activist migrant groups.

The article moves on by taking into account the peculiar politics of visibility that is at

stake in the government of migration in the Mediterranean. It concludes with an analysisof the ongoing re-crafting of the EU politics ofrescue and containmentafter the huge deadly

shipwreck of 18 April 2015, arguing that a critical understanding of the military-

humanitarian government of migration at sea requires going beyond the scene of rescue.

This means refusing to engage in the same act of visualization performed by governmental

actors, highlightinghumanitarianism at a distanceandhumanitarian spaces of containment

enforced at the borders of Europe. The expression humanitarianism at a distance refers to

the financial support given by EU member states to countries such as Turkey and Jordan to

host asylum seekers fleeing wars9instead of opening legal points of access for safe entry

into Europe. The expression humanitarian spaces of containment designates both the role

of pre-frontier played by Neighborhood Countries in blocking migrant departures and the

political project for externalizing the asylum in the so-called EU Neighborhood Countries.

What happens to those who do not even arrive in Europe and who, consequently, are not

detected by the radars and the patrols of Triton operation?

The main argument that sustains this analysis is that in order not to mobilize the same

gaze of military-humanitarian politics of rescue we should look at the humanitarian fron-

tier in terms of mechanisms of capture, selection, and apprehension of migrants lives.

Finally, I suggest that in order to take stock of the series ofborder displacementsthat have

taken place since the start of Mare Nostrum, or that are still underway, it is important to

shift the attention away from the space of the sea and investigate the heterogeneous mech-anisms of hold over migrants lives that the humanitarian regime puts into place ( Agier

2011;Pallister-Wilkins 2015).

BORDER DISPLACEMENTS 3 of 19

byguestonJanuary

26,2016


Down

loadedfrom


4/19

2. Rescue-politics and humanitarian saturation of

political actions

In place of humanitarianism, I deliberately use humanitarian (Fassin 2007a) in thisarticle, further articulating the adjective by adding technology of government, in order

to delimit a specific focus of the analysis, i.e. humanitarian politics as part of different

mechanisms of capture and regulation of migration governmentality. Thus, humanitarian

technology of government is used here to refer to a set of policies, discourses, and inter-

ventions whose purpose is to manage and channel migration movements. If, on the one

hand, humanitarian technology of government is situated in the broader field of a politics of

andoverlives that find their measure in body counts, and the real or potential harms of

ordinary people (Redfield 2012: 452), on the other it designates a specific way that mi-

gration policies have a hold over migrant lives: channeling their mobility and differentiat-

ing between subjects of humanitarian concern, in all its degrees (refugees, asylum seekers,

beneficiaries of humanitarian protection, etc.) and its remnants(bogus asylum seekers,

rejected refugees, economic migrants). Moreover, if the term humanitarianism historic-

ally recalls interventions made in the name of the alleviation of human suffering (Wheeler,

2000;Barnett 2011;Ticktin 2011;Redfield 2012), the deliberate purpose of humanitarian

technology of migration government is to allocate people in space, leaving some of them

without a space to stay.

But far from being an autonomous domain of intervention, the humanitarian technol-

ogy of government is taken here in its hybridizations with military forms of selection,

protection, and containment of peoples mobility. Actually, it is important to observethat, as a broad field of literature has shown, the articulation between military and hu-

manitarian interventions in the field of migration is far from being something new (Fassin

and Pandolfi 2010;Walters 2011). However, firstly, what matters here is not the entangle-

ment between military and humanitarian per se but, rather, the peculiar way in which it has

been recently re-crafted with military forces in charge of performing a humanitarian task10.

At the same time, humanitarianism itself is reconfigured, I contend, as a politics of rescue.

Secondly, the point here not to reaffirm that humanitarianism is historically imbricated

with military and security issues, as many scholars have in fact already demonstrated

(Watson 2009; Jeandesboz 2015; Pallister-Wilkins 2015; Vaughan-Williams 2015).

Instead, what this article intends to show is that humanitarian techniques work in them-

selves also as a way for containing and channeling mobility.

This involves stressing theprotean natureof the humanitarian border, i.e. its ability to

transform into different mechanisms of government and to relate to other strategies and

tactics of governmentality, namely surveillance, securitization and militarization (William

2015: 13). Drawing on critical migration literature that mobilizes a Foucaultian perspec-

tive11 for conceptualizing the humanitarian in terms of reason (Fassin 2011) or frontier12

(Walters 2011), I focus on the government of migration at sea for bringing attention to the

forms of capture that humanitarian technologies put into place acting on migrants lives

and the spatial re-crafting they generated. Humanitarian forms of capture and humanitar-ian spaces are not self-standing objects but rather represent modulations of the migration

4 of 19 M. TAZZIOLI

byguestonJanuary

26,2016


Down

loadedfrom


5/19

regime characterized by the dislodging of peoples freedom channeling their movements

and transforming subjects into lives to rescue or into remnants in excess.

Over the last two years the duty of saving migrant lives at sea has been put on the agenda

of many EU meetings and documents. On the one hand, the two huge shipwrecks that

happened near Lampedusa in October 2013 marked a turning point in the EU discourse

and practice of migration management, since the image of a massive number of dead bodies

on the beach of Lampedusa appeared as the limits of tolerability. However, on the other

hand, the restructuring that occurred in the government of migration at sea is not merely

the effect of a prompt, responsive strategy in the wake of those two shipwrecks; rather, due

to the escalation of wars and conflicts in many parts of the worldSyria, Eritrea, and Libya,

to name only a fewthe number of people who were escaping to seek protection in Europe

had already become massive at the end of 2012. Indeed, given the tough restrictions

imposed on peoples mobility by the Visa regime13, which prevented those people from

coming to Europe safely, many of them decided to cross the Mediterranean. Thus, thereadjustments in the strategies of intervention of EU countries regarding migration at sea

were in part already about to be put into place.

However, saving migrant lives at sea has also become the main discursive tenet of non-

state actors and of activist groups, tracing in some way the boundaries of their field of

action: what I call here rescue-politicsdesignates an humanitarian approach to migration

that puts the rescue of migrants at the core both of discourses and of effective interventions

made by governmental and non-governmental actors. In August 2014 the first Migrant

Offshore Aid Station (MOAS) rescue operation started. MOAS was put in place by a

Maltese couple and consists of a private rescue operation to support vessels in need of

assistance, coordinating its efforts with other search and rescue authorities around theMediterranean.14 Equipped with vessels and drones, the MOAS team started as a mission

alternative to state rescue operationswith the idea that saving migrant lives at sea should

also be an issue that involves civic responsibility; then, in a second stage, it worked in

collaboration with the Italian Navy, assisting them during rescue operations and detecting

migrants in distress at sea. In autumn 2014 a transnational group of activists based in

France, Germany, Italy, and Tunisia set upAlarm Phone,an alarm number that migrants at

sea can call in case of distress. However, different from MOAS, the Alarm Phonegroup is

not equipped with vessels and thus it is not a rescue service; rather, it acts according to a

watching the watchdogsstrategy, calling national coast guards to put pressure on them and

following up on the rescue operation on their response, making known to them that we are

informed and watching them15. The idea behind the project is to intervene in spaces that

are usually restricted to state authorities, controlling and demanding that they operate in a

prompt and adequate way for rescuing migrants at sea.

The duty to rescue, which represents the technical and specific way of saving migrant

lives at sea, is currently the landmark of activist groups, human rights campaigns, and

national authorities involved in maritime patrolling. In fact, in the face of the deadly effects

of borders, the humanitarian rationale has absorbed and redefined all forms of engagement

in supporting migrant movements. Far from being the other pole of the mechanisms of

containment and control, the humanitarian rationale (Fassin 2011) is one among the mosteffective technologies for governing, selecting, and containing migrant livesand indeed,

we can call it the humanitarian technology of government.16 As far as the government of


byguestonJanuary

26,2016


Down

loadedfrom


6/19

refugees at sea is concerned, in the face of massive migrant deaths the humanitarian logic

grounded on the duty of rescuing lives in danger has also permeated activist groups,

saturating the space of the critical discourse.

3. The protean borders of humanitarian

governmentality

The success and the pervasive character of the humanitarian rationale in the context of

migration at sea is partly given by the difficulty both in opposing such a discourse and in

building an alternative way of preventing deaths, to the extent that one does not step out of

the discourse on the deadly effects of borders and stop to accept the exceptionalization of

migrant movements. Indeed, to focus exclusively on a politics of rescue involves taking for

granted, or at least accepting, that in order to escape wars and seek protection certain

people have to put their lives in dangerby crossing the sea and risking death. It could

be argued that what is dislodged from the beginning in the humanitarian government is

subjects freedom (of movement). Similarly, the emphasis on the deadly effects of borders

and on the necessity to provide assistance to the migrants contributes to upstaging the

regime of mobility containment that is actively supported by the same EU countries that

engage in rescuing migrants. In order to step outside of rescue politics, I suggest looking at

the humanitarian technology of government as a mechanism of capture and apprehension

exercised on migrant lives: not only is it very often difficult to distinguish between rescue

operations and patrolling operations for intercepting migrant vessels17

; it should also beobserved that the operation of rescue and the humanitarian regulation of migration at sea

have a two-fold effect: to make migrants safe and to capture them for channeling their

mobility (Kasparek et al., 2015). As detected and rescued, migrants become shipwrecked

persons whereas the recent rescue and patrolling operationsMare Nostrum and Triton

have contributed to opening new spaces of governmentality (Tazzioli 2015a). The two-

sided function of the rescue and, more broadly, of humanitarian governmentsaving and

capturing migrantsactually results in what William Walters calls the humanitarian fron-

tier (Walters 2011). This frontier, I contend, on the one hand produces an enlargement of

the border-linesaborderizationof spacesand on the other makes drowning migrants

the targets of border activities and mechanisms of detection. In fact, in order to be saved,

migrants have to be one of the primary objects of border surveillance; and in turn, border

surveillance is broadened to rescue activities. Indeed, as Sergio Carrera and Leonard den

Hertog explain, in the recent EU Regulation for the surveillance of its external borders, the

notion of border surveillance has operationally widened to include search and rescue

operations:

Border surveillance is not limited to the detection of attempts at unauthorized border

crossings, but equally extends to steps such as intercepting vessels suspected of trying to

gain entry to the Union, as well as arrangements intended to address situations such as

search and rescue that may arise during a border surveillance operation.

18

However, at the same time this means that humanitarian migrations become objects and

targets of border activities. Moreover, the distinction between rescue operations and

6 of 19 M. TAZZIOLI

byguestonJanuary

26,2016


Down

loadedfrom


7/19

interceptions is finally blurred into the broad definition of border surveillance that includes

humanitarian and securitarian tasks. Therefore, looking at the politics of rescue as a

double-sided hold over migrant lives (Basaran 2015)which makes migrants safe and,

at once, captures and channels their movementsenables us to grasp the weaving between

military and humanitarian tasks that have been at play in the Mare Nostrum operation and

in Triton, too. Indeed, it is important to remark that Mare Nostrum was presented as a

military and humanitarian operation, in which the Italian Navy was in charge of rescuing

migrants in distress at sea. In this light, the handover to Triton, which with respect to Mare

Nostrum marked a further border displacement in the government of migration at sea

towards a renewed strategy of not letting people arrive, should not be seen as a form of

drifting away from the humanitarian concern. Indeed, humanitarian techniques of inter-

vention are among the heterogeneous mechanisms for governing migration, exercising a

hold over migrants lives.

Thus, both the intertwinement between military and humanitarian (Mare Nostrum) andthe handover to an operation whose primary tasks are border control and the withdrawal

from rescue duties19 shed light on the protean bordersof migration governmentality: mi-

grant movement is actually selected, hampered, and monitored by different regulative

mechanisms that become holds over the lives of migrants, and the humanitarian technol-

ogy of government is one of them.

If on the one hand I have highlighted how humanitarian techniques, far from being the

other pole of mechanisms of control and containment, work inside the politics of moni-

toring and channeling migration, on the other I would like to dwell now upon the specific

functioning of humanitarian politics. I look at the recent re-assemblages of humanitarian

and military interventions in the field of migration from the point of view of the subject that

they shape and postulate. Indeed, as Didier Fassin illustrates, the humanitarian government

can be conceived first of all as apolitics of life(Fassin 2007b): in particular, what is at stake in

the humanitarian way of governing, according to Fassin, is the right to live as such more

than human rights (Fassin 2014: 31). Thus, a politics of life postulates a specific meaning of

life any time that it addresses certain subjects. What I suggest is that together with a politics

of life, the government of migration at sea involves also a politics over lives: through that

expression I aim to stress, first, that the fact of becoming a shipwrecked person is the result

of specific migration policiesthe visa regime, which does not allow people to move

freelyand second, how borders impact people (differently). Indeed, beyond postulatinga specific meaning of life and concretely shaping migrants livesfor instance treating

them as shipwrecked persons or as bogus asylum seekersthe humanitarian technology

of government also acts upon (migrant) lives mobilizing mechanisms of capture

(Jeandesboz 2015). In this sense, I build on Foucaults definition of biopower as regulatory

political technologythat brings life and its mechanisms into the realm of explicit calcu-

lations (Foucault 1998: 143)and at the same time as a dispositif captureof livesa power

over life (139) that takes hold over the bodies and life at large (Lemke 2012). It is important

to stress this twofold engagement with life enacted by humanitarian techniques, I suggest,

to the extent that we want to draw attention both to the implicit meaning of life such

techniques presuppose in addressing migrants and the effort in taming and channeling

troubling subjectivities or unexpected movements.


byguestonJanuary

26,2016


Down

loadedfrom


8/19

4. Humanitarian visibility and the government of

migrant multiplicities

Hence, focusing on rescue politics in the Mediterranean from such a standpoint, we caninterrogate the kind of subject that is produced and posited as the target of military-

humanitarian intervention, going beyond legal categories. A first thing to notice is that a

considerable border restructuring has occurred since the starting of Mare Nostrum in the

way of addressing the people on boats that are rescued by the Navy or by the Coast Guard:

indeed, despite the mixed use of different denominations in the European and the Italian

media (migrants, refugees, profughi), I contend that the referent of life, which is the object

of rescue politics, ultimately corresponds to the image of the shipwrecked person. Actually,

in the moment of the rescue operations at sea, migrants are saved as people about to drown

who could not arrive in Europe other than through rescue by military forces: from being

people escaping wars, once at sea they become shipwrecked persons to rescue. In a nutshell,

it could be stated that from being asylum seekers they turn out to be shipwrecked lives, i.e.

from being subjects who should benefit from protection, migrants at sea become people to

rescue. In this regard, the politics of life that is at stake in the government of migration at sea

works not only by defining who is worthy of rescue and who is not ( Basaran 2015: 3), but

also through a more radical operation that consists in presenting migrants at sea as ship-

wrecked personsand not as subjects in need of protection.

Appearing in political discourses and in the media as lives to saveand to be saved in the

technical sense of being rescued at seais the result of a humanitarization of migrants

insofar as their presence cannot be overshadowed because they try to be detected at sea as ameans of being rescued and because, as people fleeing wars, they cannot be depicted by

states as merely bogus refugees. Indeed, being aware of the Mare Nostrum operation,

migrants started to equip themselves with Turaya satellite phones making sure in this

way of being traceable and seen. In fact, migrants from Libya facilitated their traceability

by national authorities and monitoring systems, anticipating in space and time border

patrols by sending an SOS as soon as they entered international waters. Since for people

in distress at sea being visualized on the map by real-time monitoring tools means opening

and highlighting a space of rescue intervention, migrants staged their own capture by the

mapping gaze and demanded to be rescued. In this way, the humanitarian visibility has

been in part yielded by migrants exposure and traceability that demanded their being seenand saved. At the same time, riding on the humanitarian visibility that governs their

movements, and becoming traceable to monitoring eyes, they promptly made themselves

visible as objects of the humanitarian and of the good border spectacle: the capacity to

detect was turned into an inescapable duty of rescue. By speaking of humanitarization of

migrants I want to highlight, on the one hand, the unquestioned exceptional mobility of

certain people who, in order to escape wars and find a safe space to stay, must redouble their

risky condition as escapees by risking death at sea; on the other hand, humanitarization

refers to a broader trend that is underway in the politics of asylum and that consists in the

degradation of international protection and refugee status into temporary humanitarianprotection. More than people deserving protection, they are subjects whose right to live can

be assured only by becoming lives rescued by military actors.

8 of 19 M. TAZZIOLI

byguestonJanuary

26,2016


Down

loadedfrom


9/19

Coming back to the humanitarian technology of government as a politics oflife andover

lives, it is necessary to analyze how the twofold level at which migrants are addressed as lives

to be rescued, i.e. as part of a temporary multiplicitythe group of the rescued persons

and as singular individuals. Imagine the harbor of Pozzallo, Sicily, on 24 July 2014. A day

like many others in Pozzallo, one of the main harbors in Sicily at which the vessels which are

part of the Triton operation disembark migrants rescued at sea. Before being identified and

sorted into different reception centers, among the group of the migrants rescued at sea, two

of them are arrested by the police as supposed smugglers. Before the arrival of the vessel of

the Coast Guard, the presence of the migrants rescued on the vessels is announced by the

personnel of the Coast Guard in terms of an approximate number, about 600, among

which about 30 [are] women.20 What matters, at that stage, is not who they are, and not

even how many they are exactly. They do not form a coherent group, in terms of nation-

alities or of migration experience, but while on the boat what is important is their number,

rough as it may be. Ultimately, for the military-humanitarian actors that go and rescuethem, the governability of that temporary multiplicity depends on the approximate

number of people on the boat. This focus on approximate multiplicities to govern is not

a secondary matter: the politics of rescue in the Mediterranean save migrants in groups

an undefined number of people on a vesseland once disembarked, they will be parti-

tioned between those who will enter the slow channels of the asylum system, and those who

will be put in the fast channels of deportation.21 It could be argued that the rescuing power

saves and acts on migrants as multiplicities and stops with rescue operations at sea, while

singular individuals are then governed not as lives to save but as possible fake refugees.

Singular migrants at sea are saved as part of the x number of shipwrecked persons on a

vessel in distress; but once migrants are identified and disembarked, it is not the logic ofrescue that they are governed by, but rather the exclusionary channels of the asylum to-

gether with mechanisms of fast deportation. Thus, the humanitarian governmentsloughs its

skin:from rescue politics that act on x number of migrants on a vessel in distress, to the

selective sorting criteria of the asylum articulated with non-humanitarian mechanisms of

deportation. Ultimately, as Pallister-Wilkins incisively argues, those categorized as at risk

become a risk when they enter the space marked by the border and policed by the border

police (Pallister-Wilkins 2015: 54). In this sense, it could be suggested that in the govern-

ment of migration at sea, we witness a displacement of the pastoral paradigm described by

Foucault: the politics of saving lives at sea is exercised only at the level of migrant multi-

plicities; differently from the pastorate that acts upon omnes and singulatim and that,

although the population is its main object of government, it is an individualizing

power (Foucault 1979: 227) for which the salvation of a single sheep calls for as much

care from the pastor as does the whole flock (Foucault 2009: 256).22 Moreover, the verb to

rescue nicely captures the distinction between the rescue politics that act on migrants at sea

and the salvific power of the pastorate: indeed, migrant lives are saved at sea in the

technical sense of being rescued, i.e. not left to die, but once brought to safety they are

subject to the exclusionary channels of the asylum system or even treated as irregular

migrants.

Nevertheless, shifting the gaze beyond the sea is necessary so as not to narrow the hu-manitarian government to a specific figure of a humanitarian subject (in this case the

shipwrecked person). Indeed, not only is the humanitarian government, in its different


byguestonJanuary

26,2016


Down

loadedfrom


10/19

forms, far from being a uniform political technology and, rather, takes into account and

produces different subjectivitiesrefugees, rejected refugees, shipwrecked persons, etc.

but also the same individuals are often subjected to various mechanisms of capture, selec-

tion and labeling during their migrant journeys, as objects of humanitarian concern or as

targets of military and securitarian measures. Therefore, what characterizes humanitarian

regulatory mechanisms is their heterogeneity and their hybridization with military meas-

ures, as well as the transformative nature of these techniques of government, which clearly

emerges in the handover from Mare Nostrum to Triton and the coexistence of rescue

operations like Mare Nostrum with EU Police Joint Operations against migrants in the

European territory, such as Mos Maiorum.23 More importantly, in order to grasp this

heterogeneous functioning of humanitarian techniques and the protean character of the

mechanisms of migration governmentality,24 we must bring attention to the identity

reshuffling to which migrants are subjected: migrants escaping wars, to shipwrecked per-

sons on a boat, to asylum seekers on national land, and finally to rejected refugees or peoplewho are granted temporary protection. To this purpose it is important to go beyond the

scene of the rescue at seawhere migrants are depicted as lives to be rescuedand take

into account the border effects on migrants lives, building on a longer temporality that

looks at what happens to shipwrecked persons both before and after the moment of the

rescue.

5. The humanitarian border beyond the scene of rescue

So let us imagine Milan, June 2014, central rail station, almost any day since autumn 2013.Dozens of Syrians, sometimes even hundreds, stop temporarily in Milan, coming by train

from Sicily, where the Italian Navy disembarks migrants rescued at sea. When they arrive at

the train station Garibaldi, the police in Milan, who are regularly informed by Polfer (the

Italian railway police) of the arrival of groups of Syrians, takes them to the central railway

station where they are given food by the municipality of Milan and where they wait before

being sent to one of the temporary hosting centers in the city. This tacit free railway

channel, through which Italy de facto allowed Syrian refugees to move northward, was

the result of a temporary sync between Italys disobedience to the Dublin III regulation and

Syrians strategy of movement. Actually, for about one year Syrians were allowed to escape

by the Italian police and not fingerprinted, since the great majority among the Syrians aim

to reach Northern Europe (Germany, but also Sweden, France, and the UK). And in this

way, by not sending fingerprint data to EURODAC, Italy was not legally responsible for

processing Syrians asylum claims. Indeed, after stopping a few days in Milan, all Syrians

were used to trying to cross the Swiss border in order to continue their journeys. However,

not only were many of them blocked by Swiss authorities and pushed back to Italy25: in

September 2014, after being admonished by the European Union for its repeated disobedi-

ence of the Dublin III regulation, Italy adopted new regulations that required personnel in

the hosting center to take fingerprints also by force.26

And what happens to those who have not even arrived in Europe? Or, to put it differ-ently, what happens at the borders of Europe, at the edges of the scene of rescuestaged by

military-humanitarian operations at sea? First of all, it should be observed that deaths at sea

10 of 19 M. TAZZIOLI

byguestonJanuary

26,2016


Down

loadedfrom


11/19

actually have not stopped at all, as the many shipwrecks that have occurred in the last year

confirm,27 despite the hyper-visibility of Mediterranean migrations after the patrolling of

Mare Nostrum and the political focus on migrants at sea (Sossi 2015). Moreover, there have

also been deadly ghost shipwrecks that have not even been detected by national authorities

and of which I, together with other people, have been informed by friends of the victims

situated on the southern shore of the Mediterranean.28 However, at the same time that

shipwrecks and ghost shipwrecks continued to happen, political and institutional re-

assemblages of the border regime were also under way at the frontiers of Europe.

Indeed, in spring and summer of 2014 the Tunisian Coast Guard intercepted and rescued

many migrant vessels and disembarked the migrants on board in Tunisia.29 Once in Tunisia

some of them were transferred into provisional hosting centers and others put in jail,

in the prison of Whardia in Tunis, where migrants are told to pay for a return flight

ticket to their country of origin and, if they do not, threatened with deportation to

Algeria (Garelli et al., 2015). In October 2014 the push-backs of Syrian refugees made byGreek authorities toward Turkey started to be quite frequent,30 and in the following

months Turkish authorities started to block migrant vessels before they could reach

Greek waters.31 The construction of different pre-frontiers of Europe is certainly not a

new political project, since bilateral agreements of EU member states with Neighborhood

Countries that also include the engagement of third countries in patrolling maritime fron-

tiers for blocking migrants and the outsourcing of migration controls date back to the 90s32

(Boswell 2003;Cassarino 2010;Bialasiewicz 2012;Casas-Cortes et al., 2013).Yet, one year

after the start of Mare Nostrum, the enforcement of the Mediterranean pre-frontiers of

Europe has become the main EU strategy for containing migration movements and to

decrease the number of asylum seekers arriving in Italy and Greece. Moreover, what char-acterizes this planned enforcement of the pre-frontiers of Europe is that it would involve an

externalization both of border controls and of humanitarian protection. In Rome, on 28

November 2014, the Ministers of EU member states and the Ministers of some African

statesamong them Eritrea, currently governed by a dictatorshipsign the Karthoum

process,33 which establishes the engagement of non-European signatories states in activities

of migration control and migration management (Morone 2015).

To sum up, the EU politics of containment on the one hand, formed by the ongoing

restructuring of the pre-frontiers of Europe, and the staging of the scene of rescue in the

Mediterranean on the other hand, have been played out simultaneously. Yet, from the

northern shore of the Mediterranean the latter was much more visible than the outcomes of

the bilateral agreements with North African countries involved in blocking migrants de-

partures. In the aftermath of the huge shipwreck that happened on 18 April 2015, this two-

fold politics of rescuing and containing migrants at the same time, has been reshaped in the

direction of a more and more prominent politics of containment, enacted, however, in the

name of the need to protect migrant lives. Actually, soon after the deadly migrant shipwreck

of 18 April, that caused an un-presented and still uncertain number of deathsbetween

700 and 900, the EU reacted by tripling Frontexs annual budget34 and by extending the

Triton operational zone up to 138 nautical miles south of Lampedusa. Thus, the space of

rescue expanded again, covering a stretch of sea similar to which the Navy had under MareNostrum. This decision was welcomed by media and humanitarian actors as a restoring of

the politics of rescue and in fact no more deadly shipwrecks have been attested in the central


byguestonJanuary

26,2016


Down

loadedfrom


12/19

Mediterranean over two months. Yet, the European Migration Agenda established by the

European Council in April 2015 includes the decision to extend the Triton operation and,

at the same time, pushes for the strengthening of bilateral agreements with third countries

for tackling migration upstream,35 namely, preventing people fleeing wars from arriving

in Europe to seek asylum.

In summer 2015 the vessels operating under Triton again started to reduce patrolling

activities, although this retreat was not an object of political attention. Moreover, precisely

at the same time that Tritons range of action was officially extended, the EU politics of

containment was reframed by the launch in June of EUNAVFOR, the EU war on smugglers,

officially conceived to save migrants from smuggling networks identifying, seizing and

destroying suspect vessels.36 Actually, the politics of targeting (Chamayou 2015) envisaged

by EUNAVFOR that consists in fighting smugglers to protect migrants, reveals a refash-

ioning of the military-humanitarian rationale: would-be refugees are protected by ham-

pering them from leaving by boat. The attack to the logistic of migrant crossing (Garelliand Tazzioli 2016)by diverting and seizing migrant vesselsis a way to decrease the

number of potential refugees reaching the scene of rescue and becoming shipwrecked lives

to save.

In this regard, it is important to remark that the EUs fight against smugglers is certainly

not something new in EU migration politics and in fact it has represented, since the early

2000s, one of the main tenets for legitimizing practices of arbitrary detention and deport-

ation, as well as interception of migrant vessels on the high sea. Ultimately, also when Mare

Nostrum was in place, the chase against mother-shipsused by traffickers before transferring

migrants to smaller boats has been one of the main activities done by the Navy beyond

rescuing migrants (Cuttitta 2015).37

Nevertheless, without presenting EUNAVFOR Med asa radical rupture within the EU politics of control, it is important to stress the partial

discontinuities and to read the declared EU war against smugglers in the context of the

current military-humanitarian approach to migration in the Mediterranean. Indeed, as I

illustrated above, the politics ofrescue and containmentproducing shipwrecked lives to

save and blocking migrant departures at the same timeis at the core of the present

military-humanitarian government of migration. The launch of EUNAVFOR signals a

further twist in the politics of containment that consists in encapsulating the humanitarian

discourse on protection inside warfare: migrants will be saved not as they are rescued at sea

but rather, because they will be taken away from smugglers. More concretely, this entails

that by targeting smugglers, migrants themselves are actually hampered from the possibility

of leaving.

6. Conclusion

Saved from the risk of dying at seathrough military-humanitarian convoys migrants

escaping wars are not envisaged to freely move, with no visa restrictions, as a condition

for moving safely and not becoming lives to rescue. If we concur with Nicholas De Genova

saying that if there were no borders, however, there would indeed be neither citizens normigrants (De Genova 2015: 13), it is simultaneously true that borders not only produce

migrants and citizens, they alsoact onsubjects freedom in order to govern it by activating a


byguestonJanuary

26,2016


Down

loadedfrom


13/19

complex regime of capture. Hence, it shows that one should focus on the productive

dimension of borders, in shaping and governing subjects as migrants and as citizens, and

at the same time that borders are apparatuses of capture activated for taming the recalci-

trance of subjectivities. In this way, freedomthe freedom to move and to safely find a space

for livingis not even contemplated in the narrative of the rescue politics. Migrants at sea are

not saved in the perspective of being then free to move without risking their lives: on the

contrary, once rescued they are put in the juridical channels of the asylum and the luckiest

among them will be granted humanitarian protection. Thus, the channeling and contain-

ment of migrants movements appear as the only way to make migrants safe. The handover

from Mare Nostrum to Triton has been critically described as a comeback strategy towards

a reinforced securitarian approach to the government of migration at sea. Corroborating

such a view, human rights associations are demanding the activation of an effective

European system of rescue,38 criticizing Triton as an operation of border control and

pushing for a kind of Europeanization of Mare Nostrum. In this article I have arguedthat rescue politicsand the humanitarian-military way of governing peoples movements

have also saturated the political horizon of the criticism and actions that challenge migra-

tion policies and the deadly effects of borders. Against a linear border narrative that con-

siders Triton merely as re-establishment of border control and a push-back strategy after

the stage of a politics of rescue, I highlighted the dismissal of migrants freedom that

humanitarian (and military-humanitarian) politics entails, producing them as shipwrecked

persons that can move only at the price of their lives and if demanding to be rescued. Thus,

instead of pushing for a disentanglement of humanitarian politics from securitarian and

military measures (Anderson 2014) I illustrated the common basis upon which they are

predicated in terms of containing and selecting (certain forms of) mobility. And, together, I

challenged a conception of humanitarian government as the opposite pole of the politics of

control and containment, showing rather the constitutive hybridization of heterogeneous

forms of governmentality and the protean character of the humanitarian borders.

Nevertheless, this does not mean that nothing has changed with the end of Mare

Nostrum and the start of Triton. On the contrary, I suggest that the indisputably different

tasks of Triton and Mare Nostrumborder control as the primary task instead of rescue

operations39and the different sea area officially covered by the two missions, should lead

us to interrogate what Triton and the changes that have occurred in the scene of rescue

mean. In other words, instead of comparing Mare Nostrum and Triton as such, it is im-portant to look through the spatial and political transformations in the government of

migration at sea and beyond the sea that the handover to Triton enables us to grasp by

gesturing toward the pre-frontiers of Europe.40 Indeed, the scene opened after the huge

shipwreck of the 18th of April, with a twist towards a politics of containment done in name

of protecting migrants should be read in the light of the attempt by the EU to build

humanitarian spaces of containmentin third-countries according to a strategy ofnot letting

people leave.


byguestonJanuary

26,2016


Down

loadedfrom


14/19

Acknowledgments

This work has been produced within the framework of the Unit of Excellence LabexMed-

Social Sciences and Humanities at the heart of multidisciplinary research for the

Mediterranean - which holds the following reference 10-LABX-0090. This work has bene-fited from a state grant by the Agence Nationale de la Recherche for the project

Investissement dAvenire A MIDEX which holds the reference n ANR-11-IDEX-0001-02.

Notes

1. It was launched 18 October 2013 by the Italian government and it officially ended in

November 2014. accessed January 12, 2016.

2. With the collaboration ofGuardia di Finanzaand Guardia Costiera.

3. Triton officially started in November 2014 but actually the Italian Navy continued to be

the main actor and was in the proximity of Libyan waters until the end of December

2014. accessed January 12, 2016.

4. While the boats of the Italian Navy under Mare Nostrum patrolled also very close to the

Libyan waters.

5. accessed January 12,

2016. This implicates that, actually, instead of ongoing patrolling operations for pre-venting migrant drowning, vessels operating under Triton operation go to rescue mi-

grants only when they receive a distress call.

6. By scene of rescue I mean the political and media attention staged on the rescue op-

erations made by the Italian Navy, reversing in some way the border spectacle of mi-

grant invasion (De Genova 2013) by focusing rather on the humanitarian task of

military forces.

7. This article is the result of a series of interviews conducted between January 2014 and

May 2015 with the Italian Navyat the headquarters in Rome (January 2014; June, July

2014) and at the Sicilian harbor of Augusta (August 2014) and Pozzallo (July 2015)

with the Coast Guard in Rome (April 2015) and in Lampedusa (February 2014), with

the Italian Home Office (July 2014; January 2015) and of the fieldwork conducted in the

city of Milan and Bologna between March 2014 and November 2014.

8. Indeed, as William Walters points out, if the humanitarian can be situated in relation

to the analytics of government, it can also be contextualized in relation to the biopo-

litical (Walters 2011: 142).

9. To date (December 2014) the European Union has supported Turkey with 28.5 million

euros for managing Syrian refugees displaced in the country:; 350 million euros have been given to

Jordan; ; 450 million euros to Lebanon; ; and the total amount mobilized by the EU


byguestonJanuary

26,2016


Down

loadedfrom
http://www.marina.difesa.it/cosa-facciamo/operazioni-concluse/Pagine/mare-nostrum.aspxhttp://www.marina.difesa.it/cosa-facciamo/operazioni-concluse/Pagine/mare-nostrum.aspxhttp://ecre.org/component/content/article/70-weekly-bulletin-articles/855-operation-mare-nostrum-to-end-frontex-triton-operation-will-not-ensure-rescue-at-sea-of-migrants-in-international-waters.htmlhttp://ecre.org/component/content/article/70-weekly-bulletin-articles/855-operation-mare-nostrum-to-end-frontex-triton-operation-will-not-ensure-rescue-at-sea-of-migrants-in-international-waters.htmlhttp://ecre.org/component/content/article/70-weekly-bulletin-articles/855-operation-mare-nostrum-to-end-frontex-triton-operation-will-not-ensure-rescue-at-sea-of-migrants-in-international-waters.htmlhttp://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-14-566_it.htmhttp://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/aid/countries/factsheets/turkey_en.pdfhttp://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/aid/countries/factsheets/turkey_en.pdfhttp://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/aid/countries/factsheets/jordan_syrian_crisis_en.pdfhttp://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/aid/countries/factsheets/jordan_syrian_crisis_en.pdfhttp://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/aid/countries/factsheets/lebanon_syrian_crisis_en.pdfhttp://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/aid/countries/factsheets/lebanon_syrian_crisis_en.pdfhttp://migration.oxfordjournals.org/http://migration.oxfordjournals.org/http://migration.oxfordjournals.org/http://migration.oxfordjournals.org/http://migration.oxfordjournals.org/http://migration.oxfordjournals.org/http://migration.oxfordjournals.org/http://migration.oxfordjournals.org/http://migration.oxfordjournals.org/http://migration.oxfordjournals.org/http://migration.oxfordjournals.org/http://migration.oxfordjournals.org/http://migration.oxfordjournals.org/http://migration.oxfordjournals.org/http://migration.oxfordjournals.org/http://migration.oxfordjournals.org/http://migration.oxfordjournals.org/http://migration.oxfordjournals.org/http://migration.oxfordjournals.org/http://migration.oxfordjournals.org/http://migration.oxfordjournals.org/http://migration.oxfordjournals.org/http://migration.oxfordjournals.org/http://migration.oxfordjournals.org/http://migration.oxfordjournals.org/http://migration.oxfordjournals.org/http://migration.oxfordjournals.org/http://migration.oxfordjournals.org/http://migration.oxfordjournals.org/http://migration.oxfordjournals.org/http://migration.oxfordjournals.org/http://migration.oxfordjournals.org/http://migration.oxfordjournals.org/http://migration.oxfordjournals.org/http://migration.oxfordjournals.org/http://migration.oxfordjournals.org/http://migration.oxfordjournals.org/http://migration.oxfordjournals.org/http://migration.oxfordjournals.org/http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/aid/countries/factsheets/lebanon_syrian_crisis_en.pdfhttp://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/aid/countries/factsheets/lebanon_syrian_crisis_en.pdfhttp://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/aid/countries/factsheets/jordan_syrian_crisis_en.pdfhttp://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/aid/countries/factsheets/jordan_syrian_crisis_en.pdfhttp://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/aid/countries/factsheets/turkey_en.pdfhttp://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/aid/countries/factsheets/turkey_en.pdfhttp://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-14-566_it.htmhttp://ecre.org/component/content/article/70-weekly-bulletin-articles/855-operation-mare-nostrum-to-end-frontex-triton-operation-will-not-ensure-rescue-at-sea-of-migrants-in-international-waters.htmlhttp://ecre.org/component/content/article/70-weekly-bulletin-articles/855-operation-mare-nostrum-to-end-frontex-triton-operation-will-not-ensure-rescue-at-sea-of-migrants-in-international-waters.htmlhttp://ecre.org/component/content/article/70-weekly-bulletin-articles/855-operation-mare-nostrum-to-end-frontex-triton-operation-will-not-ensure-rescue-at-sea-of-migrants-in-international-waters.htmlhttp://www.marina.difesa.it/cosa-facciamo/operazioni-concluse/Pagine/mare-nostrum.aspxhttp://www.marina.difesa.it/cosa-facciamo/operazioni-concluse/Pagine/mare-nostrum.aspx


15/19

for the Syrian crisis, for supporting Syrian refugees out of Europe is 3.35 billion euros:

accessed January 12, 2016.

10. The Navy in charge of rescuing migrants at sea.

11. In particular using the notion of governmentality and its relationship to biopolitics, as a

political technology that acts over lives.

12. It is important to stress that, as William Walters also points out, in relation to humani-

tarian technology of government, border is conceived not as a frontier-line but rather

as a border-zone, a space of intervention in which humanitarian actors operate and that

is reshaped by those technologies of intervention.

13. Visa restrictions establish that people coming from certain countries must ask for anauthoritization (the Visa) in order to enter Europe. This is something relatively recent

as, for instance, in the case of people from Maghreb countries no Visa restrictions were

in place until the late 1980s.




17. This is particularly true in the context of Europes pre-frontiers, such as Tunisia orTurkey, where the migrant vessels are often blockedand then migrants are taken on

the mainland, avoiding possible shipwrecks but also de facto hampering them from

reaching Europe.

18. Art. 2(2), Parliament and Council (2014), Regulation on Frontex sea border surveil-

lance operations (cited in Carrera and Den Hertog 2015).

19. As the ex-Executive Director of Frontex declared: Triton is not a search and rescue

operation, but a border control operation.

accessed January 12, 2016.


21. For instance, migrants coming from countries like Nigeria, Egypt or Tunisia are de-

ported by Italian authorities without giving them the opportunity to claim asylum, due

to the bilateral repatriation agreements between Italy and those countries. Indeed,concerning fast deportation procedures it could be argued that with the starting of

Mare Nostrum nothing has changed.


byguestonJanuary

26,2016


Down

loadedfrom
https://www.google.fr/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&ved=0CCwQFjAB&url=http%3A%2F%2Fec.europa.eu%2Fecho%2Ffiles%2Faid%2Fcountries%2Ffactsheets%2Fsyria_en.pdf&ei=I-EaVZWVN8raU-DTgZgM&usg=AFQjCNEsXUh4fqGvQQwB31aLYpiycgugJg&sig2=dXqTDS2DV1dEkbQ5r96deghttps://www.google.fr/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&ved=0CCwQFjAB&url=http%3A%2F%2Fec.europa.eu%2Fecho%2Ffiles%2Faid%2Fcountries%2Ffactsheets%2Fsyria_en.pdf&ei=I-EaVZWVN8raU-DTgZgM&usg=AFQjCNEsXUh4fqGvQQwB31aLYpiycgugJg&sig2=dXqTDS2DV1dEkbQ5r96deghttps://www.google.fr/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&ved=0CCwQFjAB&url=http%3A%2F%2Fec.europa.eu%2Fecho%2Ffiles%2Faid%2Fcountries%2Ffactsheets%2Fsyria_en.pdf&ei=I-EaVZWVN8raU-DTgZgM&usg=AFQjCNEsXUh4fqGvQQwB31aLYpiycgugJg&sig2=dXqTDS2DV1dEkbQ5r96deghttps://www.google.fr/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&ved=0CCwQFjAB&url=http%3A%2F%2Fec.europa.eu%2Fecho%2Ffiles%2Faid%2Fcountries%2Ffactsheets%2Fsyria_en.pdf&ei=I-EaVZWVN8raU-DTgZgM&usg=AFQjCNEsXUh4fqGvQQwB31aLYpiycgugJg&sig2=dXqTDS2DV1dEkbQ5r96deghttps://www.google.fr/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&ved=0CCwQFjAB&url=http%3A%2F%2Fec.europa.eu%2Fecho%2Ffiles%2Faid%2Fcountries%2Ffactsheets%2Fsyria_en.pdf&ei=I-EaVZWVN8raU-DTgZgM&usg=AFQjCNEsXUh4fqGvQQwB31aLYpiycgugJg&sig2=dXqTDS2DV1dEkbQ5r96deghttp://www.moas.eu/4/Our-Missionhttps://www.google.it/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CCIQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.watchthemed.net%2Findex.php%2Fpage%2Findex%2F12&ei=y0UdVevfGsX0ULb0gMgI&usg=AFQjCNHmMc1QSXQNzv2whxHCMz8IoGm0gw&sig2=pANBJMicuIbbk1o6iZLlywhttps://www.google.it/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CCIQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.watchthemed.net%2Findex.php%2Fpage%2Findex%2F12&ei=y0UdVevfGsX0ULb0gMgI&usg=AFQjCNHmMc1QSXQNzv2whxHCMz8IoGm0gw&sig2=pANBJMicuIbbk1o6iZLlywhttps://www.google.it/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CCIQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.watchthemed.net%2Findex.php%2Fpage%2Findex%2F12&ei=y0UdVevfGsX0ULb0gMgI&usg=AFQjCNHmMc1QSXQNzv2whxHCMz8IoGm0gw&sig2=pANBJMicuIbbk1o6iZLlywhttps://www.google.it/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CCIQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.watchthemed.net%2Findex.php%2Fpage%2Findex%2F12&ei=y0UdVevfGsX0ULb0gMgI&usg=AFQjCNHmMc1QSXQNzv2whxHCMz8IoGm0gw&sig2=pANBJMicuIbbk1o6iZLlywhttp://www.moas.eu/old_site/ourmission.htmlhttp://www.euractiv.com/sections/global-europe/gil-arias-fernandez-immigration-problem-calais-not-so-bad-310239http://www.euractiv.com/sections/global-europe/gil-arias-fernandez-immigration-problem-calais-not-so-bad-310239http://agrigento.blogsicilia.it/in-arrivo-in-sicilia-mille-migranti-recuperati-10-cadaveri-in-mare/289242/http://agrigento.blogsicilia.it/in-arrivo-in-sicilia-mille-migranti-recuperati-10-cadaveri-in-mare/289242/http://palermo.repubblica.it/cronaca/2014/08/27/news/in_sicilia_sbarcati_800_migranti_altri_seicento_in_arrivo_ad_augusta_i_24_morti_dell_ultimo_naufragio-94505087/#gallery-slider=94525443http://palermo.repubblica.it/cronaca/2014/08/27/news/in_sicilia_sbarcati_800_migranti_altri_seicento_in_arrivo_ad_augusta_i_24_morti_dell_ultimo_naufragio-94505087/#gallery-slider=94525443http://palermo.repubblica.it/cronaca/2014/08/27/news/in_sicilia_sbarcati_800_migranti_altri_seicento_in_arrivo_ad_augusta_i_24_morti_dell_ultimo_naufragio-94505087/#gallery-slider=94525443http://www.migreurop.org/article1763.html?lang=frhttp://www.migreurop.org/article1763.html?lang=frhttp://www.unionesarda.it/articolo/cronaca_sardegna/2015/02/16/migranti_nuovi_sbarchi_a_lampedusa_la_sardegna_ne_accoglie_una_pa-6-408122.htmlhttp://www.unionesarda.it/articolo/cronaca_sardegna/2015/02/16/migranti_nuovi_sbarchi_a_lampedusa_la_sardegna_ne_accoglie_una_pa-6-408122.htmlhttp://www.unionesarda.it/articolo/cronaca_sardegna/2015/02/16/migranti_nuovi_sbarchi_a_lampedusa_la_sardegna_ne_accoglie_una_pa-6-408122.htmlhttp://migration.oxfordjournals.org/http://migration.oxfordjournals.org/http://migration.oxfordjournals.org/http://migration.oxfordjournals.org/http://migration.oxfordjournals.org/http://migration.oxfordjournals.org/http://migration.oxfordjournals.org/http://migration.oxfordjournals.org/http://migration.oxfordjournals.org/http://migration.oxfordjournals.org/http://migration.oxfordjournals.org/http://migration.oxfordjournals.org/http://migration.oxfordjournals.org/http://migration.oxfordjournals.org/http://migration.oxfordjournals.org/http://migration.oxfordjournals.org/http://migration.oxfordjournals.org/http://migration.oxfordjournals.org/http://migration.oxfordjournals.org/http://migration.oxfordjournals.org/http://migration.oxfordjournals.org/http://migration.oxfordjournals.org/http://migration.oxfordjournals.org/http://migration.oxfordjournals.org/http://migration.oxfordjournals.org/http://migration.oxfordjournals.org/http://migration.oxfordjournals.org/http://migration.oxfordjournals.org/http://migration.oxfordjournals.org/http://migration.oxfordjournals.org/http://migration.oxfordjournals.org/http://migration.oxfordjournals.org/http://migration.oxfordjournals.org/http://migration.oxfordjournals.org/http://migration.oxfordjournals.org/http://migration.oxfordjournals.org/http://migration.oxfordjournals.org/http://migration.oxfordjournals.org/http://migration.oxfordjournals.org/http://www.unionesarda.it/articolo/cronaca_sardegna/2015/02/16/migranti_nuovi_sbarchi_a_lampedusa_la_sardegna_ne_accoglie_una_pa-6-408122.htmlhttp://www.unionesarda.it/articolo/cronaca_sardegna/2015/02/16/migranti_nuovi_sbarchi_a_lampedusa_la_sardegna_ne_accoglie_una_pa-6-408122.htmlhttp://www.unionesarda.it/articolo/cronaca_sardegna/2015/02/16/migranti_nuovi_sbarchi_a_lampedusa_la_sardegna_ne_accoglie_una_pa-6-408122.htmlhttp://www.migreurop.org/article1763.html?lang=frhttp://www.migreurop.org/article1763.html?lang=frhttp://palermo.repubblica.it/cronaca/2014/08/27/news/in_sicilia_sbarcati_800_migranti_altri_seicento_in_arrivo_ad_augusta_i_24_morti_dell_ultimo_naufragio-94505087/#gallery-slider=94525443http://palermo.repubblica.it/cronaca/2014/08/27/news/in_sicilia_sbarcati_800_migranti_altri_seicento_in_arrivo_ad_augusta_i_24_morti_dell_ultimo_naufragio-94505087/#gallery-slider=94525443http://palermo.repubblica.it/cronaca/2014/08/27/news/in_sicilia_sbarcati_800_migranti_altri_seicento_in_arrivo_ad_augusta_i_24_morti_dell_ultimo_naufragio-94505087/#gallery-slider=94525443http://agrigento.blogsicilia.it/in-arrivo-in-sicilia-mille-migranti-recuperati-10-cadaveri-in-mare/289242/http://agrigento.blogsicilia.it/in-arrivo-in-sicilia-mille-migranti-recuperati-10-cadaveri-in-mare/289242/http://www.euractiv.com/sections/global-europe/gil-arias-fernandez-immigration-problem-calais-not-so-bad-310239http://www.euractiv.com/sections/global-europe/gil-arias-fernandez-immigration-problem-calais-not-so-bad-310239http://www.moas.eu/old_site/ourmission.htmlhttps://www.google.it/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CCIQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.watchthemed.net%2Findex.php%2Fpage%2Findex%2F12&ei=y0UdVevfGsX0ULb0gMgI&usg=AFQjCNHmMc1QSXQNzv2whxHCMz8IoGm0gw&sig2=pANBJMicuIbbk1o6iZLlywhttps://www.google.it/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CCIQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.watchthemed.net%2Findex.php%2Fpage%2Findex%2F12&ei=y0UdVevfGsX0ULb0gMgI&usg=AFQjCNHmMc1QSXQNzv2whxHCMz8IoGm0gw&sig2=pANBJMicuIbbk1o6iZLlywhttps://www.google.it/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CCIQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.watchthemed.net%2Findex.php%2Fpage%2Findex%2F12&ei=y0UdVevfGsX0ULb0gMgI&usg=AFQjCNHmMc1QSXQNzv2whxHCMz8IoGm0gw&sig2=pANBJMicuIbbk1o6iZLlywhttps://www.google.it/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CCIQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.watchthemed.net%2Findex.php%2Fpage%2Findex%2F12&ei=y0UdVevfGsX0ULb0gMgI&usg=AFQjCNHmMc1QSXQNzv2whxHCMz8IoGm0gw&sig2=pANBJMicuIbbk1o6iZLlywhttp://www.moas.eu/4/Our-Missionhttps://www.google.fr/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&ved=0CCwQFjAB&url=http%3A%2F%2Fec.europa.eu%2Fecho%2Ffiles%2Faid%2Fcountries%2Ffactsheets%2Fsyria_en.pdf&ei=I-EaVZWVN8raU-DTgZgM&usg=AFQjCNEsXUh4fqGvQQwB31aLYpiycgugJg&sig2=dXqTDS2DV1dEkbQ5r96deghttps://www.google.fr/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&ved=0CCwQFjAB&url=http%3A%2F%2Fec.europa.eu%2Fecho%2Ffiles%2Faid%2Fcountries%2Ffactsheets%2Fsyria_en.pdf&ei=I-EaVZWVN8raU-DTgZgM&usg=AFQjCNEsXUh4fqGvQQwB31aLYpiycgugJg&sig2=dXqTDS2DV1dEkbQ5r96deghttps://www.google.fr/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&ved=0CCwQFjAB&url=http%3A%2F%2Fec.europa.eu%2Fecho%2Ffiles%2Faid%2Fcountries%2Ffactsheets%2Fsyria_en.pdf&ei=I-EaVZWVN8raU-DTgZgM&usg=AFQjCNEsXUh4fqGvQQwB31aLYpiycgugJg&sig2=dXqTDS2DV1dEkbQ5r96deghttps://www.google.fr/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&ved=0CCwQFjAB&url=http%3A%2F%2Fec.europa.eu%2Fecho%2Ffiles%2Faid%2Fcountries%2Ffactsheets%2Fsyria_e

Documents

Challenging the politics of rescue between Mare Nostrum and Triton