Ch-04- Social perception by Areti

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Book Title: Integrated Coastal Zone Management (ICZM) The Global ChallengeArticle Title : Social perception of risk informing integrated coastal zonemanagement on accidental oil spill pollution: The reason you pollute matters, notnumbersEditor/Author : Prof. A. Kontogianni

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December 27, 2006 19:20 RPS RP002/06: ICZM ch10 Ist Proof

Social perception of risk informing

integrated coastal zone management on

accidental oil spill pollution: The reason

you pollute matters, not numbers

A. Kontogianni, and M. SkourtosDepartment of Marine Science, University of Aegean, 81100 Lesvos, GreeceDepartment of Environmental Studies, University of Aegean, 81100 Lesvos, GreeceCorresponding author E-mail: [email protected]

This chapter represents an effort to apply qualitative methods interpret peoples risk perceptions about

oil spills. The main research goal is to integrate subjective risk and fairness perceptions into the design

of effective risk management policies through deliberative and participatory processes. This we consider

to be an important component of any Integrated Coastal Zone Management (ICZM) strategy, calling

for transforming old and adopting new coastal institutions. The results of the present study will feed a

subsequent, stated-preference-based estimation of the economic values of coastal resources.

This case study was carried out in Lesvos Island, Eastern Aegean Archipelago, Mediterranean Sea.Local people were invited in three focus groups (January to March 2005), whereas in a fourth insti-

tutional representatives also participated. Analysis of results suggests that what stakeholders oppose

is not the dangerous activity per se (oil transport), but oil-spill pollution cases which they believe to

be the malevolent ship owners profitable intention and/or human negligence. The important factor is

why pollution occurs, and this is clearly connected to issues of blame and accountability. Accordingly,

they ask for strengthening of the relevant institutional frame. Stakeholders expressed mistrust toward

state agencies, media, ship owners, and courts. For integrated coastal zone management, building of

trust between local stakeholders and institutions involved is a necessary requirement. To this end, as we

hopefully have gone some way of showing for Greece, building of trust presupposes a deep insight and a

widespread recognition and validation of differential perceptions of risk by local stakeholders.

Introduction

Coastal zones are generally recognized as a valuable source of natural capital that has beendestroyed and degraded to a great extent. The situation is, as expected, crucial for island statesand/or nations with a long shoreline. In Greece, for instance, a handful of indicators aptlydemonstrate the importance of the coast and its vulnerability to human pressures: coastal areasrepresent 72% of total territory, 86% of population, 88% of employment in manufacturing, 90%of tourist activities, and 90% of energy consumption (OECD 2000). On a global scale, 70% ofthe world population lives in a one-day walking distance from the shore (Turner et al., 1996),

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2 A. Kontogianni and M. Skourtos

two-thirds of the world metropoles are situated on the coast, while 90% of the world fish har-vest (representing 510% of the world food production) emanates from the exclusive economic

zones, most of which are located in sight distance from the coast (Brown et al., 2002).Though the loss of valuable assets, such as the coastal resources, is well documented, this isnot the case with the consequent, indirect, or second-order losses in economic values that thisprocess entails. Efforts to highlight the economic or value side of the process of coastal changeare scattered in a number of reports and studies addressing predominantly North Americanand to a lesser extent European and Third World coastal resources (David et al., 1999, Spurgeon,1999, Dunn et al., 2000, Turner et al., 2001, Ledoux and Turner, 2002). In a recent metareview ofeconomic valuation studies of coastal wetlands, Brander et al. (2003) observed a wide range inestimated values, with GDP being the most important factor to explain the variance in the dataset. Their findings (Table 1) confirm the notion of high private and social values generated bythe coastal resources put forward by Ledoux and Turner (2002).

In spite of their considerable economic value (Ledoux and Turner, 2002; Skourtos et al., 2005),

coastal zones are subject to a number of severe, development-related pressures exposing to risk1.2 billion people worldwide (Nicholls and Small, 2002). In Table 2, the percentage contributionof each main source of marine pollution is presented. It can be seen that shipping activities,where oil spills are included, are accountable for only 12% of the total marine pollution, whereasland-based waste discharges amount to 44%.

The accidental oil spills from the vessels Torrey Canyon (1967) and Amoco Cadiz (1978)in the Straits of Callais caused widespread pollution at the coasts of France and England andprompted the coastal states to turn their attention to the short- and long-term impacts of similarmarine accidents. What causes accidental in contrast to operational oil spills? It is aptly docu-mented that in most cases, the main factor responsible for accidental oil spills is human negli-gence (Lloyds Register of Shipping 1990, ICS & OCIMF 1990). ICS & OCIMF (1990), analyzing

Table 1. Range of estimated values of coastal resources for four importantfunctions generating goods and services (as US$2000 ha1 y1).

Coastal resource function Median value (range; number ofobservations for each function)

Recreation 491 (5200086; 52)Water quality 288 (2102300; 30)Fisheries (commercial) 201 (0.0555861; 72)Biodiversity 214 (8200086; 12)

Source: Brander et al., 2003.

Table 2. Sources of marine pollution.

Source Percentage contribution to totalmarine pollution

Land-based waste discharge 44Air borne pollution 33Maritime transport activities 12Extraction of submarine ores 1Dumping 10Total 100

Source: Various UNEP publications on the state of the marine environment.


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Social perception of risk informing integrated coastal zone management 3

Table 3. Oil spill causes 19742002.

7 < tons 7700 tons > 700 tons Total

Routine operationLoading 2772 301 17 3090Cleaning 542 25 0 567Other 1167 47 0 1214

AccidentsCollisions 164 260 87 511Groundings 222 203 107 532Structural failure 563 77 44 684Fires-explosions 150 16 19 185

Unknown reasons 2221 165 38 2424

Source: ITOPF statistics.

the causes of the 50 bigger oil spills caused by tankers, come to the conclusion that:

(a) In 14 cases (28%) the cause was grounding.(b) In 12 cases (24%) the cause was fire and/or explosion.(c) In 11 cases (22%) the cause was collision.(d) In 11 cases (22%) the cause was structural failure of the vessel.(e) In 2 cases (4%) the cause remains unidentified.

Recent data highlight the role of routine operations in oil-spill pollution. 92% of the operationalpollution concern oil spill of less than 7 tons. Collisions and groundings appear to cause biggeroil-spill events, one-fifth of which concerns quantities of over 700 tons.

What are the environmental impacts from oil spills? A number of factors influence the fate ofan oil spill after it is released into the sea and during its physical and chemical transformations(i.e. dispersionevaporationdilutionbiodegradationsedimentation as shown in Fig. 1).

As a natural consequence, the impacts and the cleanup cost of oil spills differ in a way thatcannot be unambiguously related to the amount of oil released into the sea. It is therefore simplyunsubstantiated to identify oil spills with ecological catastrophic events, as is often the casein the media. In Fig. 2, no linear relationship between oil-spill cleanup cost and the size ofthe vessel (indicative of the amount of oil leakage) can be statistically validated. In such cases,

Figure 1. Oil spill transformation in the sea (ITOPF).


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Figure 2. Cleanup cost of major accidental oil spills (www.itopf.com/spilcost.pdf).

the most important factor influencing cleanup cost is the type of oil: some of the most cost-intensive oil spills have been caused by accidents of relatively small vessels, such as the oiltankers Nakhodka and Erika, transporting crude oil, which biodegrades slowly while affectinglong shorelines.

This fact fully contradicts the widespread public belief that oil spills represent a major pol-lution threat for the marine environment compared with other sources. An interesting researchquestion then spontaneously evolves: Why is this so? What factors influence the social percep-tions of oil-spill risk and its hazard potential? What parameters explain the beliefs and attitudes

of lay people toward environmental risk, in general, and the possibility of oil spill occurring atthe coast, in particular? What role do perceptions of fairness play in determining the acceptanceof risk and its allocation among stakeholders?

This chapter represents an effort to apply qualitative methods to interpret peoples risk per-ceptions about oil spills. The main research goal has been to integrate subjective risk and fair-ness perceptions into the design of effective risk management policies through deliberative andinclusionary processes. This goal is pursued on both the level of risk communication as well ason the level of supplementing a subsequent, stated-preference-basedestimation of the economicvalues of coastal resources. Stakeholder risk perceptions identify what matters to participants,and, in turn, highlight the consequences that require most careful attention, and the tradeoffsthat matter most (Gregory, 2000). According to Hammond et al. (1999), meaningful involvementin the decision-making process requires not only an invitation to participate, but also a forumfor careful deliberation, and a mechanism for incorporating the results of technical analysis.On the other hand, individual preferences and perceptions for coastal goods and services aredynamic and evolving, as much revealed as articulated within the deliberation process. If thisis so, careful, noncoercive deliberation processes are an important part in the design of effectiveenvironmental policy measures (Brown et al. 2002). The present case study was implemented onLesvos Island, Eastern Aegean Archipelago, Mediterranean Sea (Fig. 3), a most suitable regionfor conducting such research, for 30% of the world oil transport crosses the Mediterranean Seaand uses its 286 ports.

It is estimated that 7,200 commercial vessels per year cross the Eastern Aegean in the vicinityof Lesvos (Lesvos Port Authorities, personal communication, January 2005). Moreover, Lesvos


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Figure 3. Map of Greece showing Lesvos Island.

Figure 4. Lesvos coasts: typical examples of aquaculture and tourism activities.

represents an island economy which is not exclusively dependent on tourism, with a lively andprosperous fishing sector and a number of fragile coastal ecosystems protected under the EECNatura 2000 network. The island and its coasts (see Fig. 4) are accordingly characterized by highexposure and vulnerability in the case of a potential oil-spill event.


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Methodological approach

Risk is an elusive concept. According to Adams (2006), we can distinguish between three types

of risks (see Fig. 5): directly perceived risks, risks perceived through science, and virtual risks.There are three different approaches to analyzing risks: on the basis of population parame-ters (i.e. epidemiological approach), individual parameters (i.e. economic approach), or socialparameters (i.e. cultural theory). Scientific approaches on risk evaluation and management(Gerrard, 2000, Rodricks and Taylor, 1983) give what could be called an objective risk assess-ment, usually based on the interpretation of relative frequencies of occurrence for a specifictime period and the probabilistic assessment such as event trees and fault trees. Neverthe-less, it has become apparent to the researchers from the beginning of objective risk assessmentthat an integrated and effective risk assessment should include the person perceiving the risk,opening the stage for the introduction of subjective parameters into risk assessment and man-agement. A number of economic/psychological approaches have been accordingly developed,laying emphasis on the subjective risk perception by studying individual preferences leadingsometimes to risk-prone and sometimes to risk-adverse behavior. Parallel to these approaches,the sociological approach has added the study of risk as a social artifact.

In their informative review on expert and lay perceptions of climate change, Thomson andRayner (1998) discern three main lines of research on public perceptions: the knowledge-basedapproach, according to which people worry about the things that are worth worrying about,the ethical approach, which sees environmental concern rising from changes in ethical frame-works, and lastly the social solidarity approach. This latter approach recognizes the need tohold together something shared leading to different forms of shared beliefs and creating alter-native forms of social solidarity (op. cit. p. 266 ff). An alternative path of modeling lay per-ceptions on risk is taken by Zepeda et al. (2003), based on the econometric investigation ofthe influence of green labeling and outrage factors (Hadden, 1989) together with attitudinal,

economic, and demographic factors on consumers behavior toward biotechnologically modi-fied milk in the USA. The above-mentioned approaches have the concept of a specific men-tal model in common: they assume that local communitys behavior toward risky choice aregoverned by an internally consistent pattern of causeeffect relationships delineating the mainfactors influencing risk perception and accordingly risky choices. The existence of a mentalmodel in the realm of risky environmental choices has been contested by Morgan et al. (1992)

Figure 5. The three types of risks by Adams (2006).


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and Bostrom et al. (1992, 1994). These authors conclude that local community has a so-callednonspecific mental model of environmental risk in general and climate change in particular

(Thomson and Rayner1998, p. 271).How stable is then local communitys risk perceptions and how far can a mental modelapproach take us? In this respect, Kaspersons invention of social amplification of risk offers anew, promising avenue of research. Leschine (2002) exemplifies Kaspersons approach by exam-ining the social risk perception from oil spills. The author notes that such a complex problem canbe analyzed in a number of factors and institutions leading, on the one hand, toward an ampli-fication of risk, and on the other hand toward an attenuation of risk. Only the combinedstudy of these factorsargues Leschinecan shed light in understanding of the dominant socialperception of risk. Within this framework, one can evaluate the scientific and technical contri-butions on the basis of a deontological model of risk modulation. The term risk modulationsignifies the process of correcting the distortions anchored in the amplification and attenu-ation of risk factors, a task which the scientific community is called upon to tackle. The author

ends with the conclusion that in order to avoid in the future a process of learning throughdestructions, new, participatory institutions of social deliberation and learning are required,through which the role of the scientific community as risk modulator will be strengthened.

The questions on which the present research is focused are:

Which are the stakeholders beliefs and perceptions about environmental risks in generaland oil-spill pollution in particular?

What do they believe about human uses and values of islands coastal ecosystems? Which are their perceptions for the implicated risks of a potential oil-spill accident? What do they believe about the institutions (markets, formal law, and tradition) delineat-

ing appropriation of coastal values through property rights? What do decision-makers believe about the effectiveness of compensation policy mea-

sures? What are local communitys perceptions concerning the establishment of property rights

on public goods, e.g. their islands coastal ecosystem? Finally, which is their choice on the proper welfare measure (willingness to

pay/willingness to accept), concerning the protection of the coastal environment fromaccidental oil-spill pollution? This information will allow the application of the quantita-tive part of our research through economic valuation.

The methodological tools used for the present research include the social perception of riskas the theoretical background for the design of the empirical part of our research, the focusgroup methodology as a technique for implementing the deliberative part, and content analysisto interpret the results.

The empirical part was structured in four steps. First, according to Morgan et al. (1992),we tried to identify a prototype for a lay persons dominant mental model on the risk of oil-spill pollution. Through an open questionnaire and relevant photo material, we encouraged therespondents to express themselves openly, allowing place for any false or exaggerated per-ceptions on the oil-spill risk. We collected similar information from 15 respondents during one-and-a-half-hour interviews. Second, we tried to validate the above results by executing threelocal community focus groups. Another focus group was implemented to elicit the formal opin-ions of institutional representatives on economic issues. Third is the construction of the mentalmodel (planned for the end of 2006). The fourth step is the construction of the final question-naire, pilot survey execution, and potential reconstruction of the questionnaire (planned within2007).


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All focus groups were implemented in Mytilini, capital of the Greek Mediterranean islandof Lesvos (Fig. 3). Local people were invited in three focus groups (January to March 2005),

whereas in a fourth group institutional representatives were asked to participate. The focusgroups took place from the 19 January 2005 to 30 March 2005. The three local community focusgroups consisted of 7, 7, and 8 persons, respectively, while in the fourth 8 representatives werepresent. The protocol used to elicit answers and convene the discussion was a preconstructedquestionnaire.1 This questionnaire (used only by the facilitator) included six groups of ques-tions: the first five groups of questions were those used also for the construction of the relevantmental model, whereas the sixth group of questions aimed at identifying economic aspects oftheir perceived property rights on coastal public goods and their willingness to pay or be com-pensated for coastal protection. We left questions relevant to the economic aspect of the problem,to be asked on purpose in the last phase of the focus group discussions. Since the issueto be decided by the participants was the decision on the proper welfare measure, and sincethe discussion and the expression of opinion of an individual promotes self-consciousness of

his/her own perceptions, the research team decided that the relevant choice would be elicitedby the participants at the end of our discussions. Thus, the attitudes toward compensation mea-sures expressed by the respondents would be more consistent with their inner beliefs. All theseassumptions take into consideration the fact that in the daily practice of environmental pro-tection, the nature of the problems make the concepts of damage and compensation quitecomplicated.

Results

The analysis of the three local community focus groups highlighted the following: Televisionremains the main medium of information for local community concerning the oil-spill pollu-

tion problem. Most of the participants referred to a TV trailer, repeatedly played by the Greekmass-media, showing a tragic cormorant covered black by oil, trying to clean its wings. This wasmemorized as the main key picture for a catastrophe of this kind. All respondents expresseda great interest in replacement of the experienced ship crew by low wage unskilled labor force.This parameter was recognized as decreasing the operational cost for ship owners, but respon-dents worried that a side effect is the decrease of the ship safety.

Responsible scientific information is regarded as a key in estimating oil-spill impacts, theexisted risks, the extension of the problem. An internal conflict arose at this point within theparticipants of one focus group: . . . information has nothing to do with risk is of no help inavoiding the risk. In this case it is a matter of proper ship inspection.

The discussion on the oil-spill risk encouraged the expression of deeper participants fears.Expressed fears concerned (a) being deceived by mass-media, (b) increase of competition forjobs and products within a global economy, (c) impact of degraded environment on availabilityand quality of food. Depletion of fish-stocks, air and sea pollution caused by the local ElectricityGeneration Company (a long-standing problem for the island), potential environmental catas-trophes from military actions in the region, was also mentioned as serious environmental prob-lems. Skepticism was expressed by participants about the application of different cleanup strate-gies such as chemical oil cleaning and the implicated risks for ecosystem health and restoration. . . I read somewhere that chemical liquids for treatment of the oil spill does not disappear, goesin the seabed and destroys marine life, so this is no solution. Risk always exists. Technological

1Available upon request.


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Figure 7. Cleanup of Vatera beach oil spill Greece (June 2005).

innovations gain local communitys confidence through contribution in weather prediction forsea travel and construction of safer ships. Fatalism also came up in this point . . . no-one canever predict nature and sea, . . . when one travels at sea anything can happen to him.

The severity of such an incident in the area of Mediterranean and East Aegean is estimated asalways existing. Only 1 out of the 22 participants had a personal experience from an oil spill inthe Aegean Sea, but they all recognized a repeated pattern of oil-spill pollution accidents in otherseas; therefore, they concluded that a serious danger also exists for their island . . . I believethat since an accident of a big magnitude has happened sometime in the past, it may happenagain in the future . . . it will happen again . . . if several social groups show no interest andenvironmental awareness to prevent it . . . for such a closed sea like the Mediterranean andthe Aegean especially. . . even a small oil-spill pollution accident could cause serious damage.Table 4 shows principal events of oil spill in Europe. It is evident that no major oil spill happenedin the Aegean Sea in the period 19672002.

Concerning the factors responsible for accidental oil-spill pollution, there was an agreementbetween all focus group participants on the role of ship owners intention, for reasons of easyprofit. Bad ship maintenance, lax monitoring strategy by the Greek Marine Ministry andtolerance of the State towards ship-owners were also mentioned . . . because a ship has anexpiration date and the preferred policy by ship owners is to get compensated from the insur-ance company by deliberately sinking the vessel. This is more profitable than dismantling itand buying a new one with money from their pocket. Some of the participants also referredto blackmailing strategies by the ship owners toward the employees (captain and the crew)for collaborating in such money-making schemes, . . . otherwise they may lose their jobs.


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Table 4. Principal events of tanker oil spills in Europe.

Vessel Date event Place event Waste (tons)

Torrey Canyo n 1967 UK/France 11,900Urquiola 1976 Spain 100,000Amocco Cadiz 1978 France 223,000Betelgeuse 1979 Ireland 44,000Haven 1991 Italy 144,000Aegean Sea 1992 Spain 74,000Braer 1993 UK 85,000Sea Empress 1996 UK 72,000Erika 1999 France 20,000Prestige 2002 Spain 77,000

Source: European Commission (2000): COM (2000) 142/2, 22.6.2000, Brussels.

Although such skepticism was expressed by participants without reference to relevant docu-ments and data, they asked for a modification of the existing institutional framework referringto the employment contracts in marine business, and the adoption of more strict legal controlsfor oil tankers.

Considering the damage to the marine environment, representatives of local communitytended to connect the magnitude of the damage to the size of the ship. In one focus group theteam gave a second thought to this opinion, concluding that damages of an accidental oil spillare directly proportional to the magnitude of the oil spill (which in turn is connected to the sizeof the ship). Pollution was considered as a permanent degradation factor for the marine environ-ment, especially in the absence of human cleaning intervention . . . . so an oil spill is an eternalrisk, which potentially goes from one region to another. We may say that it has disappearedfrom our region, but may have gone to the seabed. The persistence of consequences is declared

as affecting some future generations or . . . I wont live to see the solution to this problem,thats why I call the damage permanent, because we measure time by the circle of our life. Itwas obvious through all focus groups that the spatial dimension of the damage depends on thesize of the ship and consequently on the magnitude of the oil spill, but the time dimension isexaggerated extensively almost to infinity and regarded as irreversible.

When participants were asked by the facilitator for potential vulnerable groups mostlyaffected by an oil-spill incident, they identified fishermen, tourism-related activities, and con-sumers as the end users in the food chain. The magnitude of the oil-spill impact was also associ-ated with marine fauna and flora, and lost recreation opportunities for residents. Here it is worthnoting that passive/nonuse values were repeatedly mentioned by participants. Usually socialcost of an oil spill includes private costs and collective or public damages (Fig. 8). The Inter-national Oil Pollution Compensation (IOPC) compensates for private costs and direct expenses(cleaning/restoration) of public damages. Both types of compensable damages are based onmarket values. Private costs are associated with a limited group of individuals with economicactivities such as fisheries, the seafood sector (extractive, transport, processing and marketingfirms) and to tourism on coastal areas. For example, regarding the Prestige oil spill, the tourismincome in Galicia fell from 1829.26 million euros in 2002 to 1695.51 million euros in 2003 (Garza-Gil et al., 2006). On the other hand, public losses affect the whole population living in the area(possibly further than that), and are associated to passive use losses (cultural, option, existence,and bequest values) as well as lost recreation opportunities for residents. In the current interna-tional liability framework these claims are still not allowed, which implies that risky strategiesof maritime transport are still profitable, Garza-Gil et al. (2006).


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CleaningMarketed

Restoration

PUBLIC Recreation _ active useNon-marketed

Biodiversity _ passive use

Fisheries and seafoodPRIVATE Marketed

Tourism

Figure 8. Components of social costs of an oil spill (after Garza-Gil et al., 2006).

The complex character of marine resources is reflected in the uncertainty with which par-ticipants deal with matters of economic compensation and damage assessment. While the ideaof pure economic losses from oil spills is prominent, nevertheless participants also stressed theimportance of nonuse values for compensation purposes. More specifically expressed opinionscan be categorized as follows:

1. They do not believe that they personally own the coastal zone, but they consider the relevantproperty rights to be of a collective nature, owned by the community.

2. Passive nonuse values tend to be valued infinitely high.3. They demand compensation for the loss of option values . . . I would ask a lot of money for

a damage like loss of swimming opportunity for me or my children.4. They opt for a collective claim of compensation (not an individual one), a fact consistent withtheir idea of the collective nature of coastal property rights.

5. They do not, however, trust the State in its role as a trustee of natural resources to representthem in the compensation claims procedure. They consider the State to stand by the side ofship owners in matters of litigation.

6. Participants expressed a positive willingness to pay in order to cover restoration costs, butonly under the provision that (a) the polluter has not been identified and (b) collected fundswould not be administered by Central State Authorities. Expressed willingness to pay is as expected proportional to their income.

As shown in Table 2, 12% of total marine pollution comes from maritime transport activi-ties, while 44% comes from land-based sources. We expected local community to underestimateland-based sources and overestimate the accidental oil spills in the open sea. A finding of thisresearch is that contrary to this, most participants mentioned the important participation ofa land-based source (the local Electricity Generation Company) in the marine pollution. Thisleads to the reversal of the established hypothesis (overestimated dreadful nature of acciden-tal oil spills versus underestimated routine pollution incidents). A possible explanation is thatbecause of the restricted island space, even minor land-based pollution events are widely publi-cized. Earlier studies (June 1997) with focus groups in Kalloni, Lesvos, on the local communityperceptions about marine pollution (Kontogianni et al., 2001), have shown that marine pollu-tion is rarely correlated to land-based sources. This documents that the functional continuumbetween watershed and the coast is not fully perceived by users.


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An interesting dilemma put to the respondents would be the valuation between the open seapollution versus coastal pollution. Does the location of the oil-spill pollution matter in the sense

that if it occurs in the open sea, it is not considered as pollution because no economic resourcesare degraded; on the contrary, when occurs at the coast even in small quantities of oil leak-age it is considered as pollution because it directly affects human activities. This questionwas not discussed in our focus groups and remains an interesting future research question.

Discussion

Our results shed light on a number of research questions that we discuss in this section. The firstquestion concerns the nature of the dichotomy between local community and expert perceptionson risk. According to the psychometric approach, experts base their risk assessment on knowl-edge of the quantitative, statistical parameters of hazard occurrence, whereas local community

is guided by the qualitative characteristics of risk. Local community perceptions differ in thatthey locate the problem of marine pollution from oil spills in accidental, and not in operational,discharges from vessels. A risk from accidental oil spill is therefore exaggerated by the publicsince operational discharges are more systematic and technically more accessible to control. Thisis confirmed by the fact that total discharges of oil into the marine environment from commer-cial vessels have fallen drastically from 2.13 million tons (1973) to 1.47 million tons (1981) andfinally to 568,000 tons (1989). Of these, only 121,000 tons are caused by accidental releases2. Sucha drastic sink in accidental oil spills is in part explained by the introduction of new preventiontechnologies (LOT, COW, SBT) on the vessels, initiated by the shipping industry itself as well asby the entrance in force of the international convention MARPOL (1973).

With the focus groups, it became evident that the citizens apply their own heuristics in shap-ing their opinions about risk: they did not ask to be informed about oil-spill statistics, expressed

wider fears about catastrophic events but not for everyday risks, extended drastically the timehorizon of oil-spill impacts. By doing so, they seem to substantiate in part the psychometricapproach. The extension of citizens fears from oil spills to known or unknown risks (competi-tion with unskilled, emigrant workers, depletion of fish stocks, potential environmental catas-trophes from military actions in the region) also seem to validate Kaspersons theory on thesocial amplification of risk.

Citizens did not mention only accidental pollution; they were also concerned with oper-ational oil discharges and attach special importance to the motives behind both kinds of oilpollution. What matters most is the suspected reason for polluting (malevolence) in both cases,especially in cases where compensation demands are raised. An interesting illumination of thispoint is presented in Adams (2006) as what kills you matters, not numbers. Adams refersto the comparison between deaths due to road accidents and deaths due to terrorist actions.

It is shown that the former death incidents by far exceed those of the latter type. Still theirrepercussions in the public opinion (in the form of demonstrations or risk-preventing invest-ments) are inversely correlated. This phenomenon has been examined by Slovic et al. (1979) andSlovic (2000) and attributed to the qualitative characteristics of risk (dreadful nature of risk,catastrophic potential). Without denying Slovics results, Kasperson (1988, 2004) correlates suchsocial reactions with communicative strategies and institutions.

2See U.S. National Academy of Sciences, (1991), Oil Entering the Sea from Maritime Transport, in I.C.S, (1993), Ship-ping and the Environment. A Code of Practice.


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Paraphrasing Adams (2006), we may express our own focus groups findings as: The reasonyou pollute matters, not numbers. This wording refers to one of the basic conclusions of our

focus groups, namely, that citizens focus on parameters of fairness as they perceive them toaffect oil-spill incidents. This remains the main qualitative characteristic related to risk per-ceptions, either accidental and catastrophic events or operational oil discharges. Therefore, ourfocus group participants (and their expressed intentions to act) focused on pollution incidentswhere a deceitful behavior on the part of ship owners was strongly suspected. Uncertaintyabout the facts of pollution events enhanced the feeling of mistrust, a feeling felt by citizensalso toward state institutions in general.

The last point raises the issue of trust toward institutions in matters of risk prevention andmanagement. Do citizens trust the existing institutions in this respect? The issue of trust towardstate institutions responsible for risk management represents an important part of all theoriesof risk perceptions. Our citizens deliberation within focus groups showed that people trustexperts to manage similar risk events and especially in the case of oil spills they consider the

role of Port Authorities as crucial. Distrust has been expressed for mass media for not offeringreliable and objective information to the citizens, as well as toward state institutions for mis-management of relevant funds. Even courts were considered to be biased when compensationissues for affected parties were raised.

Especially in matters of citizens manipulation by the mass media, participants in the focusgroups admitted that their willingness to pay/contribute to the cleanup cost of an oil spillwould be substantially dependent upon potential marketing campaigns through mass media.This belief was based on a comparison of a potential oil-spill event in Eastern Aegean, with therecent (one month before the first focus group) December 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami disaster.Participants, obviously influenced by the huge coverage of the tsunami disaster in the media,referred to a recent unexpectedly successful 3 days TV marathon aiming at raising funds forthe victims of tsunami. According to the participants, if a similar mass-media action would be

undertaken on the event of an oil spill in the eastern Aegean, people would have expressedsimilar willingness to pay/contribute.

Figure 9. Sea fences for avoiding oil-spill spreading Lesvos Island, Greece.


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Distrust toward existing institutions leads to claims for reform. How could such a reformlook in the case of marine pollution? A major discussion topic during the focus groups con-

cerned the potential of incentive compatible mechanisms to supplement existing institutions inthe prevention of oil-spill incidents. Prominent among the several incentive mechanisms dis-cussed were compensation measures for damages to coastal private and public goods and thecorresponding procedures for legal claims. It was assumed that through the institutionalizationof strict liability in matters of marine pollution, ship owners would invest in prevention mea-sures and exhibit a greater concern about human negligence causing oil spills. Such an institu-tional reform is in the spirit of the new EU Directive on environmental liability and conforms tomost major international conventions in this area.

Successful implementation of strict liability and compensation rules in the domain of marineand coastal pollution depend on their social acceptance. Are public perceptions about propertyrights in this area in conformity with such an institutional scheme? Our focus groups showedthat this policy is strongly favored by citizens. Its attractiveness is raised considerably if not

only individual but also group legal demands (actiones popularis) were allowed under the law.Still, pursuing legal claims is a demanding process in many aspects, and therefore vulnerableand less empowered stakeholder groups, such as fishermen, express a rather pessimistic viewreferring to their possibilities of influencing policy outcomes and damage claims.

If media grossly manipulate the flow of information respecting environmental hazards andoil spills in particular, what could reverse this situation? Focus group participants proposed thecross examination of several sources of information (preferably by newspapers, not only onebut several in combination), the strengthening of environmental education in schools. Reliablesources for assessing risks are considered to be the research carried by Universities and relevantreports, which unfortunately are written in a technical and nonaccessible language by the pub-lic. Therefore, participants urged for supplementary, nontechnical summaries and popularizedversions.

Conclusions

In conclusion, this study re-affirms the rich diversity in the risk perceptions and motivations ofdifferent individuals and groups. Our next research step is the economic valuation for which,in order to be relevant, it is vital that this complexity is investigated thoroughly. Achieving thisgoal, a qualitative insight into social risk perception is regarded as a first step.

First, it is clear that the local population is willing to tolerate high levels of exposures to riskconcerning the oil transport by sea because they accept the risk as an unavoidable consequenceof one, in every other aspect socially desirable activity. This is in accordance with findings of thepsychometric approach (Sjoberg 2000, Slovic et al., 1979).3 What they oppose are not the activity

per se, but cases that they believe to be the malevolent product of ship owners and/or humannegligence. As we already mentioned, the important factor is why pollution occurs, and thisis clearly connected to issues of blame and accountability.

Accordingly, they ask for strengthening the relevant institutional frame. It was clearly appar-ent from the focus groups that the great majority of people were quite willing to vote for astrict liability and compensation regime, including the possibility of compensation for passive

3In reply to Starrs revealed preferences the Slovic group found that dreaded risks were not accepted but merely toler-ated. Peoplestill advocated the control and reduction of these risks. Tolerance for risks also appeared to be related to theperception of benefit.


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values also. Conscious about the difficulties of similar legal procedures, they opt for a collectiveclaim of compensation (not an individual one), a fact consistent with their belief in the collective

nature of coastal property rights. They do not, however, trust the State in its role as a trustee ofnatural resources to represent them in the compensation claims procedure. They consider theState to stand by the side of ship owners in matters of litigation.4

As citizens, they do feel responsibility for their environment, though this is often distortedin very different ways, as focus groups demonstrated, through mass media. In spite of a numberof positive examples of accurate and responsible information from mass media, the need for anactive risk modulating scientific community is stressed.5

However, when attempting to put technology in perspective, a clear result was that technol-ogy does not represent a panacea for preventing and mitigating the risk from oil spills. This is inaccordance with respondents belief in the often malevolent nature of oil-spill incidents; there-fore, technology can only affect the number of oil-spill incidents caused by weather or structuralfailure of vessels, but not malevolent ones.

It was obvious through all focus groups that the spatial dimension of the damage dependson the size of the ship and consequently on the magnitude of the oil spill, but the time dimensionis exaggerated extensively almost to infinity and regarded as irreversible.

Vulnerability issues were expressed in a number of ways: citizens feel vulnerable toward theway mass media communicate risk events, usually by amplifying it. They also feel vulnerableas final end users in the food chain, wondering how oil-spill pollution affects sea food industry.Finally, they feel vulnerable as islanders due to a greater exposure to an oil-spill event, and itsimpact on the islands closed economy.6

According to Fiorino (1990), standard approaches to defining and evaluating environmen-tal risks tend to reflect technocratic rather than democratic values. Based on this assumption,our chapter represents an effort to apply qualitative methods to interpret peoples risk per-ceptions about oil spills.7 In doing so, we tried to substantiate democratic values through

the examination of the underlying perceptions of fairness for achieving citizen participation inenvironmental risk decision choices. This we consider to be an important component of anyIntegrated Coastal Zone Management strategy, calling for transforming old and adopting newcoastal institutions (Evans, 1996; Lock, 1997; Turner et al., 1999; Brown et al., 2002; Kontogianniet al. 2005, 2006).

In our research, stakeholders expressed mistrust toward state agencies, media, ship own-ers, and courts. For integrated coastal zone management, building of trust between local

4Dunwoody and Peters (1992) have found marked differences between the expectations people have of different insti-tutions within society in the United States, namely industry, the government, and citizen groups. The government wasexpected to show a great deal of commitment to communicating information about environmental risks, but was not

expected to show much concern and care. In contrast, industry was expected to show concern and care when com-municating risks, as well as be responsible for disclosing information, while citizen groups should have high levels ofknowledge and expertise, as well as commitment. If particular groups do not conform to these prior expectations, thenthey are likely to lose the trust and credibility of the public.5As Bennett andDahlberg (1990) point out, informativeand well-presented documents or talks on a risk issue by trustedorganizations or individuals will be generally well received by the public; however, if an untrustworthy individualor organization makes such a good presentation, it is quite likely to be regarded with even greater distrust than if theyhad done nothing. Marris et al. (1997, 1998) asked members of the public in Norwich, UK, whom they trusted wouldtell them the truth about risks.6The link between risk and vulnerability is a complex one and a holistic perspective on this issue should address anumber of socio-economic and cultural aspects. See Heijmans (2001), Cardona (2004).7However, while attitudes may be good predictors of perceptions of risk and intention to behave, actual behavior maywell be connected more with perception of and experience of benefits.


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stakeholders and institutions involved is a necessary requirement as shown by ORiordan (2001)and ORiordan and Ward (1997). To this end, as we hopefully have gone some way of showing

for Greece, building of trust presupposes (Brown et al., 2002) a deep insight and a widespreadrecognition and validation of differential perceptions of risk by local stakeholders.

Acknowledgments

The authors are indebted to Prof. R. Kasperson and Dr. I. Lorenzoni for their valuable discus-sions at an early stage of this study. Valuable comments on the focus group protocol were alsoreceived in situ by Prof. Kasperson.

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