Cebik L B - Understanding Narrative Theory

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Wesleyan University

Understanding Narrative TheoryAuthor(s): L. B. CebikSource: History and Theory, Vol. 25, No. 4, Beiheft 25: Knowing and Telling History: TheAnglo-Saxon Debate (Dec., 1986), pp. 58-81Published by: Blackwell Publishingfor Wesleyan UniversityStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2505132

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UNDERSTANDINGNARRATIVETHEORY

L. B. CEBIKDoes the Eagle know what is in the pit?Or wilt thou go ask the Mole?

William BlakeNarrativeheoriesemerge rom nquiriesust assurelyasdo historicalnvestiga-tions.Therefore,understanding particularheoryrequireshat we attendtothe questions t puts to narrative.Expressedanotherway, we cannotfully ap-preciate he terms of a narrativeheoryunlesswe also appreciatets purpose.Hempel's overing-lawmodelsprovided istorywithasingular unction: o serveasexplanationsor explanation ketches)of crucialevents.HaydenWhite'spiv-otal studiesof historicalnarrative s a literaryentitysupportthe values (anddangers) f history's reativeunctions.Ricoeur'smimeticdialecticdevelopsnar-rative's unctionto configure ime in humanexperience.However,all of these (and other)theories are incomplete in some cases,justifiablyo.Forexample,ntheinterests f literaryriticism,Whitewould eavetoepistemologists thequestionof theveracity f agivenkindof discourse,withrespect o the 'object-world'f whichit speaks. 'Likewise,n their concentra-tionuponhistory's xplanatoryunction,Hempeliansargelygnored verythingin historicalnarrativehat they could not translatewith ease or by forceintocausal tatements.Wehavemadesomerecentnroadsnto theconnecting roundbetween heseseeminglypolarperspectives.Nonetheless,we mustalso recordtwo majordifficultieshat remain: he denigrationof epistemologyandits in-terestsand the failure o developa comprehensiveiewof what a theoryof nar-rativeshouldcontainin its finishedstate.AlthoughWhite'sremarkon epistemology'sask seemsinnocentenough,itreflectsa moregeneralview thatepistemologydeserves ittle placewithincon-temporary arrativeheory.Ricoeur choes hisidea,despitehisappreciativeri-tiqueof Anglo-Americannalysesof narrative.n characterizinguchworkastheepistemology f the historical ciences,he absorbswhathe callsWhite's irstpresupposition,he settingasideof methods n whichobjectivityand proofde-termine hecriteria orclassifyingmodesof discourse.WhiteandRicoeur allintothis sharedviewby equatingquestionsof objectivityand proofwithques-

1. H. White, Commenton RobertAnchor 'Narrativeand the Transformationof Historical Con-sciousness, ' 2, presented at the History and Theory conference on narrative, August, 1985, BadHomburg.

2. P. Ricoeur, Time and Narrative (Chicago, 1984), I, 161.


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UNDERSTANDING NARRATIVE THEORY 59tions on themethodsof science,butalso andmore fundamentally byvirtueof anuncritical eferential iewof historical tatements,f not of historicalnar-rative tself.WhereasWhitecansetasidesuchquestions,Ricoeurmustembracethemin his triplemimesesof prefigured, onfigured, ndrefiguredime andinhis analogicalsolutionto the questionof historicalreality.In short,currentnarrativist heoryand phenomenological nalysismiscon-strueepistemology'selationshipo narrative heoryby focusinguponone sortof epistemic heory.In rejecting overing-law pistemology andmostcounter-covering-lawersions),hey gnore pistemology'smoregeneral oncernsnwhichscience,explanation, bjectivity,proof,andreference egin as problemata, otas presuppositions.n addition, theyfail to notice epistemology'sunctiontoformulatewhattheoriesmayandmust contain.If we ignorehistory's egulativecommitmentotelling he truth howeverweanalyze he term)andto beingboundwithinthe limitsof reliableevidence, hen of course historybecomesno morethan a variantof literatureather han beinga disciplinednvestigation. f therelationshipf historical onstructionsndcolligationsodeterminablevidenceandpublicdebate s not to disappearnto shadow,such theoreticaldeas mustequally llumine he creativeresultsandthe justifiedfoundationsof histories.Andnarrativereation tselfmust either oldbackuponbasicconceptual truc-turesor be left floatingamidmerelyaestheticclouds.If fiction andart at theirbestcanpersuade s to alter he ways nwhichwe perceive ndconceiveheworldaroundus, theyhaveepistemicdimensions.Every heoryhasepistemic imensions ndremainsncomplete ntil tgrappleswith them.We haveperhaps ailedto appreciateullythis factin payingatten-tiononlyto particular evelopmentsnpartial heories.Thus,amidtheseemingcrisisoccasionedby therapidspreadof narrativism t the expenseof other ap-proaches o narrative,he time maybe ripe for some metatheoretica-l--rumina-tions.For more is at stakethan a debatebetweennarrativehistory'scognitiverespectabilityndits rhetorical orceandpersuasiveechniques.At stakeis anunderstandingf philosophicalheorizationtself.However, einga secondstepaway rom hedoingandwritingof history tself,metatheorywillinevitablyputoff practicingand teachinghistorians,even thoughit shouldnot do so. Suchworkmay also offendcertain heoristswho have already raveledoo farto re-traceeasilyanyof theirsteps.Yet, he risksof ametatheoreticaloraypalebesidethe cost to our understandingf narrative heoryif we continueto refusetheventure.Let us examine everal evelsof theoryto seewhat theorizingtself mightde-mandof anynarrativeheory.The resultswillbe instructiveo the extentthattheyreveal he incompleteness f most extant heories.Indeed,anycomprehen-sivetheorymustaccommodate oth the justificational nd the creative lementsof narrative,he activities eading o narrative, nd reflectionuponthe finishednarrative.ndistinguishingevelsof narrative,we may akeas a guidingprincipleourability o posequestionsat a lower evel and to reframehem at a moread-vancedevelwithout hereversebeingthe case.Thus,we may posethe questionof truth(insome proper orm)at all levelsfrom thelanguageof narratives p-


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60 L. B. CEBIKward. n contrast, o ask the consequences f narratives avinga central ubjectmakessense in termsof narrative bjects,but not necessarilybelow that level.Weshall nvestigateourlevelsof theory:1.narrative iscourseandtemporallanguage,2. narrative nd historicalconstructions,3. narrative bjectsor sto-ries, and4. narrativeunctionsandpurposes.Withina contextof justification,each successiveevelpresupposeshepreceding.Froma creative, ctive,or crit-icalperspective,owever,we wouldnecessarilytartat the highest eveland searchthe lower ortools, techniques, nd imitations.The boundarieswe drawbetweenlevelsare argelyheuristic, erving o focusour attentionrather han to separateabsolutely he facetsof historical-narrativeheory.This fact willbecome emi-nently clear when we take up narrative onstructions.

I. NARRATIVE AND TEMPORAL DISCOURSESince Hempelbroached he questionof narrative's xplanatory unction, mosttheorieshavebegun their studiesat the levelof narrative bjects,thatis, histo-ries,novels, ournalistic eports,and thelike. Regardless f theoretical ommit-ments, he typicalaccountproceeds rom he object n twodirections.One direc-tion leads toward he structural artsof the object.The other leads toward heobject's unction.Together, hese elementsconstitutea theoretical ccount hatmust be consistentwith the genusinto which the theoristplacesthe object.If we subsumehistoricalnarrativeunderthe genus explanation, hen ourtheories ake a particular orm.In exploringhistory's unctionto explainor tobe a form of explanation asforLouchor Danto), wemusthighlight ust thosefeaturesof narrative hatenablethe function.3Wemight (withMortonWhite)emphasizehe causalstatementsnhistoricalnarrative,inding hereinwhatdis-tinguisheshistories romchronicles.4Or (withStover),wemaydenyto narrativeaninherent fundamentalchemeof intelligibility f its own andconsignnar-rative o the class of forms that expressdetermining onditions.5By contrast,if we categorizehistoricalnarrative s principallya form of literature,hen adifferentmosaicemerges.Withallgreat iterature, istory so saysHaydenWhite)imbueseventswith meaningor significance, mplottingmereevents nto trage-dies, farces, t al. Structuralo this functionaretheelementsof storytelling,heeventsandcharacters f storybooks ndthetropesof storytellinganguagetself.6Tobeginwithnarrativebjects thefinished tories hatmark hehighest efine-ment of our narrative ompetence holds danger.It can lead to an academicelitism,as it does forRicoeur,whorelegateso mereprefiguredimethe narrative-linguisticabilitieswe all shareapart romany talentforcreatingorperceptively

3. A. R. Louch, History as Narrative, History and Theory8 (1969), 58; A. C. Danto, AnalyticalPhilosophy of History (Cambridge, Eng., 1965), 142.4. M. White, The Foundations of Historical Knowledge (New York, 1965), 222-223.5. R. C. Stover, The Nature of Historical Thinking (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1967), 70.6. See H. White, The Historical Text as Literary Artifact, in The Writing of History, ed. R.

H. Canary and H. Kozicki (Madison, Wisc., 1978), 51ff. Cf. White's Metahistory and the essays inTropics of Discourse.


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UNDERSTANDING NARRATIVE THEORY 61following sophisticatedhistories,novels,or epics that properlyconfigure imefor us and nfluencetsrefiguringnus.7 Tobeginwithobjectsandtheassociatedactivitiesof production whichseemever o dominate he activitiesof followingor usingthe object-a Romantichangover)withoutsome vested nterestmaynot be possible.HaydenWhiteandhis narrativistollowers eemunable o theo-rize at all withoutsome few words n behalf of the humanitiesas distinctfromthesciencesor someotherwordsof worryaboutthedeployment f power.Some-times they are the samewords.8Althoughmost narrativeheoriesbeginwithnarrative bjects,narrativeogi-callyoriginateswithin hepossibilities f languagetself.(Wherenarrativerigi-natedhistorically,we cannotsay withany assurance, inceeventhe most ancientrecorded ourcesgive us all levels of narrative.)Dantodemonstratedong agothe originativepotentialwithin anguage n his analysisof past-referringermsand tensedsentences.His moststrikingdemonstrationnvolvedheclass of nar-rative entenceswhich refer o atleasttwo timeseparated vents,and describethe earlierevent, husallowingsubsequent peakers o assert rulywhat somehistoricalactorscouldnot themselvesassert.Since we may use anysuchpossi-bilitywithinconversationalontexts arremovedromthe formalities f stories,histories,or similarobjects,we cannotplausiblyclaim them as structures hatoccuronly withinthose objects.9Dray,Fain, and others have shown some of the possibilitiesfor narrative-organizationaltructureswithin anguage.DoingA leadsto B,whichcausesC,and C - along with D, E, and F - amount to G.... 10Stringingthese possibilitiestogether,withattention o bothtemporalandcontent inkages,showshow onemightbuild a narrativeornarrativistic)ccountwithoutnecessary ecourseoformalstorystructuresfor example, o beginningsandendings,characteriza-tion,orevenfactualplausibility).Yet,withoutsuchelements, ormalstoriesandhistoricalnarrativeswould not be possible.Wemayalsouse thesepossibilitiesnwhollynonnarrative ays. nthisregard,we shouldnot confusecontextsof their usewithcontextsof their ustification.Tosay, Mothers preparingdinner a projectverbin Danto'sterms)entailsno narrative. However, omeformsof justificationorsuch a statement, uchas a step-by-step eportof heractions,might yielda narrative f sorts.Equallyjustifying he assertionwouldbe aglance nto the kitchenbyeven he most ordi-nary membersof this sort of society. Moreover,we neednot use the sentenceinquestion or anyof the purposes ecognized s belonging o narrative bjects.The statementmight functionas an answer o a questionsuch as What s shedoing? ora reminder ot to disturbheror a suggestion or one to set thetable

7. Ricoeur, Time and Narrative, I, 54-64.8. See, e.g., R. Anchor, Narrativity and the Transformation of Historical Consciousness,

3-5, presented at the 1985 History and Theory conference on narrative.9. Danto, Analytical Philosophy of History, 72-75, 156-165.10. See my Concepts, Events, and History (Washington, D.C., 1978), 175 and associated notes.11. Danto, Analytical Philosophy of History, 164-166.


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62 L. B. CEBIKor the occasion or one to ask What's or dinner? All of these humanactivitiescall for narrativediscourse,but not for formal narrative bjects.Narrative iscoursedoesnot standalonewithoutregardor andrelationshipto nonnarrative iscourse. n context, everynarrative-organizationaltructurepresupposesr assertsnonnarrativetatements. Lee urrenderedtAppomattoxpresupposes in part)that surrenderingwassomethingpossiblefor Leeto do,that Leewas a personone capableof surrendering,hat Appomattoxwas aplace and one possibleforLee'ssurrender. husdo thepresuppositions angeoverboth factualandconceptualmatters.Additionally,neven he leastextendedcontextof narrative iscourse,narrative tructuresmust be consistentwithnon-narrativessertions ndwithothernarrative-organizationaltructuresomprisingthe context.12Narrativediscourseor language s at once a set of necessaryconditionsfornarrative bjects and also a set of independentpossibilities or framingnarra-tivelyorganized ssertionsna myriadof othercontexts.Atjustthis leveloccurmanyof the phenomenaheoristshavenotedwithin he formaldisciplineof his-tory.Goldstein'spast constitutions,Walsh's olligations,and Ankersmit's ar-rativeproposals,along with the rationaldisputability f almost any givenorga-nization,can all occurat the conceptual-sententialevelsof languagewithoutregard o a specificallynarrative ontext.Thus, theoryrequiresby one meansor another he abilityto distinguishbetweenwhatdemarcates ertainuses oflanguageand whatdemarcates ertainuses of thingsbuilt fromlanguage.Once t waspopular o claim that all language s metaphor,with the possiblequalificationhatsome metaphors realive,othersdead. Morerecently,we findnarrativist heory optingto treat all event reportsas already nterpreted asforBecker).3 Withoutregardo thetruthor falsityof such a claim,it certainlymakessense,at least withina theoretical ontext hatbeginswith a recognizablenarrative ext. However,we must use care not to importsuch theory-laden o-tions to the everydayworldwhereinwespeak everso sensiblyof literal as op-posedto figurative)tatementsandof dataor factpriorto interpretation.De-nied these distinctions,many ordinaryactivitiesfor example, aw or policework would eithercease or reinvent he distinctions n otherwords.In thesemundane ontexts,suchdistinctionsare as Watersnotedof anothermatterunlesspragmatic,hen surelyPickwickian.14Theoriesbasedupon certainfeaturesof narrative bjects cannot wholly setasidethequestionof whether ndividual tatements retrueorfalse,even f pri-mary nterest estsupon patternsof meaningfulness writer reates.At the levelof narrative iscourse, stablishinghetruthor falsityof variousstatements e-

12. Oddly, some theorists (e.g., Ricoeur, Time and Narrative, 149-150) leap over such matters intheirattempt to get from narrativesentences to emplotment, following stories, and formal narrativetexts. Perhaps it is only Ricoeur'spreoccupation with time that leads him to overlook the significanceof content relationships in and among narrative statements.13. C. L. Becker, What are Historical Facts? in The Philosophy of History in Our Time, ed.H. Meyerhoff (New York, 1959), 120-137.14. B. Waters, Historical Narrative, Southern Journal of Philosophy 5 (1967), 214.


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UNDERSTANDING NARRATIVE THEORY 63vealssome interesting eatures. f the claim n question s Mother s preparingdinner, we may establish he claim as true by watchingMom in the kitchen,askingherwhat she is doing,orjust smelling he householdair. Wemayestab-lish the claim's alseness n equallynumerousways,as by learning hat she hasfinished,by discoveringhat Dad is doingthe work, or by hearingher answerourquestionwith a No. The desiderata or truthand for falsityare not coter-minaleven nso simpleaneveryday ituationasdinnerpreparation. ometimeswe cannotwithassurance stablisheither ruth or falsity.Theindecisivenessfthe situationmaystem eitherfrominsufficientacts (we saw pots on the stove,but not Mom) or from doubts over the scope of the key term of our question(everythingooked ready,but Mom stayed n the kitchenmaking no movetoset out the food).Questionsof truth and falsity arisewithincontextsof justification. n suchcontexts,we call for the evidencesupportingour statements.Danto has distin-guishedbetween factual and conceptualevidence, the former seeming self-explanatory,he latterrestingupon logicalconnections, onceptual mplications,andwhat stypical. 5Forexample,adiaryentrymightread, It s 6P.M.Motheris preparing inner. Asked for a justification, incethe writer s far from home,thediaristmay note that Motheralwaysprepares innerat that hour,or he/shemightreporton a 6 p.m. telephonecall.History,Danto notes, uses a combina-tion of factualandconceptual vidence,whereasiction requiresolelyconcep-tual evidence. 16Notably,both bodiesof evidenceconsist of true statements.At the levelof narrative iscourse,we may betterspeakof fact or fiction hanof historyorfiction.Nonetheless,at whatever evel,the distinctiondoesnot or-dinarily abel what level of justificationa segmentof narrativediscoursehaspassed. Instead, t indicateswhat sort of justificationwe shall demandof thediscourse,f the demandbecomesrelevant nd appropriate.Withformalobjects,such as novels and histories,the producersoften tell us how to treat them.17Everydayentences re essself-certifying,ndwe often make he wrongdemandsuponthem.Theseeverydayituationsind heirway nto historical arratives,ndwe shouldnot overlookPassmore's mportant uggestionsabout the relationships mongscience,history,andeverydayife,evenif he originallyconfinedhis remarks oexplanations.8 Undergirdingverynarrativeheory or explanation heory)mustbe,inGorman'serms,a rational tandardor theacceptabilityf truthand rele-vanceclaims,consistingof a theoryof meaning,of grammar, nd of organiza-tion of theworld, or moresuccinctly a theoryof language.19 t present,

15. Danto, Analytical Philosophy of History, 122-128. See my Fictional Narrative and Truth(Washington, D.C., 1984), Chapter 7, for an analysis of the typical.16.. Danto, Analytical Philosophy of History, 123.17. See Fictional Narrative and Truth, Chapter 3.18. J. Passmore, Explanation in Everyday Life, in Science, and in History, n Studies in the Phi-

losophy of History, ed. G. Nadel (New York, 1965), 16-34.19. J. L. Gorman, The Expression of Historical Knowledge (Edinburgh, 1982), 105. Whether werequire a metaphysical conception as well we here leave moot.


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64 L. B. CEBIKperhapsonly three main lines of languagetheory inform current heories ofnarrative.By the weightof twomillenniaof tradition,Aristotelian iewsof languageseverelymodernized stillpredominate.Restingupontherelationship f termsto their referents, uchtheoriesgive rise to correspondencend semantic he-ories of truth and consequentproblemswithpast reference.Secondarilyarisequestionsof history's elationshipo science.Whether r not thisbodyof theorycanlong sustain tself in the face of popularnewideas concerninghuman an-guage activity s uncertain.However,as McCullaghhas shown, sucha view oflanguagedoes not necessarily ommit us to positivisticconsequenceswhen weanalyze historicaldescriptions.20

A second theorydiscardsnamingand reference s primitives or a criterialaccountof languageooselybasedupontheworkof Wittgenstein.inding riteriaof warranted ssertion specially pt to event anguage, hisviewneither mportsobjects necessarilynto assertions hateventsoccurrednor reifiesevents hem-selves.Withinsucha theory, hetruthof statements akeson pragmatic imen-sions nherentn Kuhnian aradigmsnd nordinary iscourse.tthus mmunizesmany ormulations,uchascolligation, romonslaughts f traditional pistemicdistinctionsamong knowing, believing, and the truth of event assertions.21Nonetheless, he criterialheoryhas yet to gainwide acceptance ndusein nar-rative heory,even thoughsuch a view of languagewould obviate he problemof historicalreferenceo which White and Ricoeurhave made the most recentcontributionsn a vaineffortto set it aside.Mostrecently nEnglish-speakingoil hasarisena commitment ynarrativiststo versionsof linguistics raceableo Saussure ndJakobson.Relating ignifiersto signifiedsna pool of languagewhose referentialourcewecanpostulatebutneverdetermine, hetheoryallowsus to eschew ruthas correspondenceored-dies of meaning.Theonlytruthrelevant o narrativeiesincoherence, lthoughthescopeandimportance f that notionremainunderanalysis.Narrativists aveyetto formulatehetheory nanysignificantetail nrelationshipotheepistemicsof narratives.nstead, ikeHaydenWhite,theyuse the theoryto justify givingprincipal ttention otheliterary,meaning-givingimensions f narrative.22hus,the narrativists ttend to the rhetoricof historicalnarrative ather hanto itsepistemic oundations.As a result,one cannotsaywithcertaintywhat drivessuch termsas metaphor,emplotment,argument,or ideological mplicationnWhite's heory:discourse tself or the functionalobjectswe createout of lan-guage,suchasstories,poems,reports,and histories.Onemustwonder,however,to whatdegree uchuncertaintiestem fromsimple ncompleteness nd to whatdegree heyrestupona willful refusal o dealwith both the contextof creationand the contextof justification.

20. See C. B. McCullagh, Justifying Historical Descriptions (Cambridge, Eng., 1984), especiallyChapters 3 through 5.21. See J. W. Meiland, Scepticism and Historical Knowledge (New York, 1965), 41ff.22. See, for example, H. White, The Value of Narrativity in the Representation of Reality, inOn Narrative, ed. W. J. T. Mitchell (Chicago, 1981), 3f., 15ff.


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UNDERSTANDING NARRATIVE THEORY 65II. NARRATIVE AND HISTORICAL CONSTRUCTIONS

Out of the possibilitiesof discourse narrative ndnonnarrative and of evi-dence,historians onstruct.Theoriesof narrative onstruction averanged romthe mostly nonnarrativestablishment f historical dentifications o narratios(to use a termfromAnkersmit).At leastpartof Walsh's ormulation f colliga-tion, Dray's explainingwhat, 'and Mink'ssynoptic udgmentsbelongto thisaspectof narrativeheory.Morerecently,McCullaghhasdefended argumentsfrom criteria s one of severalmodes of justifyingsingularhistoricaldescrip-tions.Inthe faceof all thesedevelopments, riticspersistnrefusing o historicalnarrativests constructions.Constructivismn anyform in historyhastraditionally ttached o a certainmetaphysicalhesis, namely, hat historydoes not record he past, referto it,representt, or recapturet. Rather,historycreates he past byconstructing t.Whateverhe meritsof thisposition, tsgeneral ejectionhasstigmatized lmostallattemptso findsomeplace orhistorical ndnarrativeonstructions, hateverthe claimedrelianceupon evidence.Only now has sufficientworkemerged obegin understandinghe placesof constructionn historywithoutthreateningthe discipline's ustificational oundation.At perhaps he mostrudimentaryevelare whatMcCullagh ermsargumentsfromcriteria.Statementshistoriansmakethat characterizer assertactionsre-quireno argumentso the best explanation,but only justification n terms ofthe behavioral riteria hat warrant heir assertion.Historians,of course,needcite suchjustifyingmaterialonlywhere heyneed to argueor wheresuchmate-rial may serve other functionsas well. Essentialto the assertionare the rulesof language, he linguisticconventionsbywhichany suchassertion,presentorpast,achieveswarrant.Theevidence or the truth of such assertionss just the

evidence or thefactualness f thecriterial lements.Thus,werequire o specialformulae orassertionsof intentions,consequences, reven emotionalstates.23Criterial nalysismakeseach assertiona constructwhenviewed romtheper-spectiveof itsjustification. ndeed, f one takesa broaderview of eventandac-tion languageas criterially rather han referentially) ased,then virtuallyalldiscourse has a constructivecharacter.Discourse does not lose its truth-functionalness,inceone mayset truthconditionsat the propositionalevelintermsof satisfyingsome criteria et relevant o the eventor action.Ordinarilywe discourse;only occasionallymustwe justify our assertions.However,ustsuchcasesattracthe mostattention, speciallyhoseinwhichweencounter on-testingcriteriaets (suchas Gallie's ssentially ontested oncepts)oranoriginalconceptual roposalor amoreaptcriteria et. Theconstructive'naturef criterialjustification omesto lightin suchsituations,especially o the degree hat thetermsof disputemay concerna proposal's onsequencesor utility rather hanits correctnessn terms of preexisting onventions.24

23. McCullagh, Justifying Historical Descriptions, 78-85.24. For a more complete account, see Concepts, Events, and History, Chapters I through III.


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66 L. B. CEBIKRelated o thesenotions,but moredistinctlyhistoricalroma methodologicalpoint of view,areGoldstein's onstructions,whichhe calls the constituted is-toricalpast. Rejectingperception s the paradigmatic ctivityfor establishing

true historical assertions, he examines those intellectual . . . activities in termsof whichhistoriansometo have ome deaof whatwe mayhavereason o believeoncetranspired. owever, istorical onstitutionsnot forGoldsteinhegener-ationof narrative roducts,but ratherresides n those partsof history hat re-veal historical thinking about historical evidence leading to historicalconclusions.25Goldstein'sogic of historicalconstitutionbeginswiththe bodyof historicalevidence hatpresents he historianwith a questionof what it is reasonable obelievehappened.Within he limitsof available videnceand the prevailingon-ceptionof plausibility,he historianby trialand errorproposesan orderingoftheevidencehat ispersuasive f whatoccurred.As Collingwoodhasremarked,thegame is wonnot by the playerwho can reconstitutewhat reallyhappened,but bytheplayerwho can showthathis viewof whathappened s the onewhichthe evidenceaccessibleo allplayers,when criticizedupto the hilt, supports. 26Collingwoodhimself once beganwith a puzzling ombstone n Silchesterandreasoned o theexistenceof an Irishcolonyin the locale. Indeed,CollingwoodwasmoreexplicithanGoldsteinn his ownformulationsf constitutiveeasoning,distinguishingelicsfromevidence, nterrelatingvidencewiththe questionathand, and rejectingboth fixeddata and fixedprinciplesof evidence.Theprag-maticnature f historicalnquirypotentiallyallsuponthe entire angeof humanknowledge,but activatesonly those parts of it that contribute o the questionposed, whichmust n turnrelate o andemerge romprevioushoughtandhavegood reason orbeingposed.27Whenwelldone,theactivityprovidesan answerto thequestionposed,a statement f whathappened.AsGoldsteinntentionallyoverstateshe matter,Collingwoodhad no interest n the Irishcolony untilhehad virtually o call it into existence o accountfor the tombstone.28The resemblance f historicalconstitution o criterialargumentss cleartothe extent hatbothmayassertevents,actions,or humanproductions.However,thereare at leasttwo major differences etween he two typesof construction.First,criterial rguments enerallypresume ccess o the materialwhichsatisfiesanydemand orjustification,hat is, instantiationof a relevant riteria et. Bycontrast,constitutive easoningmayinvolvecomplexcases thatdo not satisfyanymodelsof straightforwardustification.Subtlemeanderings f interpreta-

25. L. J. Goldstein, Towarda Logic of Historical Constitution, in Epistemology, Methodology,and the Social Sciences, ed. R. S. Cohen and M. W. Wartofsky (Amsterdam, 1983), 19, 21, 29.26. Quoted in Goldstein, Towarda Logic of Historical Constitution, 47-48; see also Goldstein's

Collingwoodon the Constitutionof the HistoricalPast, n CriticalEssays on thePhilosophy of R. G.Collingwood, ed. M. Krausz(Oxford, 1972),257-266, and Historical Knowing (Austin, 1976),espe-cially Section V of Chapter3, 82-91. Cf. R. G. Collingwood, The Limits of Historical Knowledge,in Essays in the Philosophy of History, ed. W. Debbins (New York, 1965), 90-103.

27. See Collingwood:Action, Re-enactment,and Evidence, Philosophical Forum 2 (1970), 68-90.28. Goldstein, Collingwood and the Constitution of the Historical Past, 265.


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UNDERSTANDING NARRATIVE THEORY 67tion may eludethe untrained eader,andthe resultmaylack firmwarrant,buthave only the greatestplausibility.Second,criterialargumentsare largely in-guisticor conventional,whereas onstitutive easoningsdistinctively istorical:disciplined ndmethodologicallyased.Thesedistinctionshold, of course,onlyif we assume ixed andfirm inguisticconventionsand equallyfixedhistoricalmethods.Thedubiousness f the assumption uggests hat at some borderbe-tweencriterialarguments nd constitutive easoning, he two maymeld into alargerpatternof historicalconstructions.Moreencompassings the notion of colligationunderappropriate oncep-tions, derivedromWhewell,but firstemployedn distinctlyhistorical ontextsby Walsh.Supplementedy Dray,Levich,and McCullagh,he idea showsmuchpromiseas an accountof certain ormsof historical nterpretationnd even(inMink'sview)as a mode of historicalunderstandingn which he historian's on-clusionsand detailsremainnseparable.29he orderof conceptsWalshproposesanduponwhichmost writers ixincludes uch thingsas a newrenaissance,heemergencef a fresh ocialhierarchy, widespreadhiftof allegiance, ndsimilarcomplexparticularsaving emporal nd spatial spread.Walshnotesthateveryact of colligationmustdo justice o the evidenceand lluminatehe pastormakeit intelligible.30

Colligation s not solely an act of classification,althoughWalsh's xampleslendthemselveso suchaninterpretation. s Draynotes,the historian's iscern-mentof a certainunityin his materialofteneludescaptureby the current ocialvocabulary,hus forcingnewand sometimesmetaphoric oinages.Moreshownthan defined, he criteria or a coinage perhaps renaissance n the handsofMichelet- establish he possibilityof furtheruse for casessufficientlyike theoriginal.BothDrayandWalshagree hatcolligatory onceptsmaybedistinctlyhistorical,constituting ntities hat makepast actions andevents ntelligibleousby showing he generalnatureof the changesbroughtaboutwithoutreferenceto the motivesand aims of the agents.31McCullaghdistinguisheshese formalcolligatory onceptsfrom dispositional onceptswhichdesignatewholesde-pendentupon the shared deasof agents.32It is no accident hat colligationunderappropriate onceptionsbearsstrongresemblanceo both criterial rguments ndto historical onstructions. nemightwell arguethat colligationunder ordinaryor acceptedconcepts correspondsdirectly o an ordinary ventassertion,whereas he coinagethat Drayempha-

29. See W. H. Walsh, An Introduction to Philosophy of History (London, 1958),60-62, and Col-ligatory Concepts in History, n The Philosophy of History, ed. P. Gardiner(London, 1974), 127-144;W. H. Dray, Explaining 'What' in History, in Theories of History, ed. P. Gardiner (New York,1959), 403-408, and Colligation Under Appropriate Conceptions, in Substance and Form in His-tory, ed. L. Pompa and W. Dray (Edinburgh, 1981), 156-170;M. Levich, reviewof Philosophy andHistory, ed. S. Hook, History and Theory 4 (1965), 328-349; and L. 0. Mink, The Autonomy ofHistorical Understanding, in Philosophical Analysis and History, ed. W. Dray (New York, 1966),180-181.

30. Walsh, Colligatory Concepts in History, 139-142.31. Dray, Colligation Under Appropriate Conceptions, 165, 167-168.32. McCullagh, ustifyingHistoricalDescriptions,272ff.


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68 L. B. CEBIKsizesrepresents conceptualproposal.Moreover,Walsh's nsistence hat allcol-ligationsrestupon evidencereflects hemethodological lementscrucial o his-toricalconstructions.Where he accountsdiffer ies chiefly n the scopeof theformulations.McCullagh ppliescriterial rgumentso humanactions,whereasproponents f colligation ocusupon larger cale socialchangesormovements.This samefocusdifferentiatesolligations rom herangeof identificationsGold-steintakesto be the subjectof constituting he past.Whether heserepresentdifferencesf degreeor of kindhas yet to be established, incea comprehensivetheoryof historical-narrativeonstructionremainsa futuretask.The similarities mongthe threeconstructive otions givethem equalfitting-nessto Mink'snotionof synopticudgment, heact of seeing hings ogether.Minkattemptso show hatthe uniqueness f doinghistory ies notinitssubjectmatteror method, but in a kind of judgment hat is not, however, imitedtounderstanding ast events. Rather, ynopticjudgmentcharacterizesmany en-deavors, uchasliterary riticism, linicalpsychology, ndgroup eadership.Noris temporal rder he essence f such udgments,ince udgment rganizes atherthan selectsevents.Finally, ynoptic udgment sno substitute or methodology;that is, the historiancannot neglectthe needthat everyassertionbe justifiableaccording o evidenceof the appropriate ort.33

All of the constructionswe have noted so farmay occur outside the contextof an identifiablenarrative bject, such as a volume of history or a novel.Tothedegree hattheoristshave nsisted withoutregard o level upon methodo-logical ustification f the construction, hen no activeconstruction ould occurwithina fictionalnarrative, lthougha novelistmightuse an already xtantcon-struction.Moreover,he three evelsof constructionmightwell occurwithinanhistoricalnarrative, ut as only part of the narrative.To represent he histori-ographicalnarrative epresentation f the past achievedby an entirenarrative,Ankersmithas proposed he term narratio, hichconsistsof the sentencesofthenarrative ut is neither dentical o them noridentical o theirconjunction.34Thesentences, esides unctioningnormally sconfirmabletatements, lso con-stitute heproperties f a narrative ubstance, complexstructurewith its com-ponentsof historicalresearchand its view of the past. What a given narratiois oftendefiesprecisearticulation.35Mink has noted that articulatedhistoricalconclusionsatbestremindus of the topography f the events o which he narra-tivehas givenorder,a positionDrayaffirmed ysuggesting hat a narrative is-tory mayconstitutewithout abel or summary justifiableorderingof events.36UsingAnkersmit's igures, ike binocular enses,narratios ocus and guide ourviewof events, reating apointof viewfromwhichwe are nvited o see reality. 37Asthings,narratios reneither ruenor false.Rather, heyareproposals.They

33. Mink, The Autonomy of Historical Understanding, 186-191.34. F. R. Ankersmit, Narrative Logic (The Hague, 1983), 19, 59.35. Ibid., 101-103.36. Mink, The Autonomy of Historical Understanding, 181;Dray, The Nature and Role ofNarrative in Historiography, History and Theory 10 (1971), 169-170.37. Ankersmit, Narrative Logic, 139.


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UNDERSTANDING NARRATIVE THEORY 69functionmuch ike the proposal acetsof the otherconstructionswe haveexam-ined. They are subject o acceptance r rejection,but not withouta basisin ra-tional disputation.AlthoughAnkersmit electsas his unitof study he historicalnarrative, othing n principle revents pplication f the key deas o other ormsof factualor evidentiallybased formsof narrative.ndeed,courtproceedingsagainst ournalists or defamationof character ften treat a newsreport(or acollectionof them)asawhole,rather hanexaminingertain inesalone,asmightbe thecasein a libelsuit.Thenarratiodefames,not its individual entences ex-ceptin rare, implistic nstances).Likewise,wemaydiscovernarratiosn lesserunits of narrativewithinlargerworks.Thus,the idea of a narratiomayhavewider applications han Ankersmitoriginallyenvisioned or it.

All the formsof narrative onstructionwe haveexaminedwillnormallyoccurwithinnarrative bjects of recognized orts. However, hey logicallyneed not.Consequently, e cannotsubjectnarrative onstructionso rules hatobtainonlyonthelevelof narrativebjects.If storiesmusthaveopeningsandclosings,nar-rative ormsof historical onstructionsneed not, eventhough all constructionswillhave imits.The imitsof constructions renot necessarilyemporal,whetherwe speak chronologically r narratively. n fact, the key figureswe encounterin theoriesof constructions peak of perspectives, opography, nd seeing,allnontemporalmetaphors.Interestingly, arrative onstructions eednot be intentional, ven f most are.If a readermore especially, f an influential eaderor a consensusof readerscan seeoverarching atternsna pieceof narrative ndjustifythat claimon tex-tualgrounds supplemented y any extratextualmaterialappropriateo thetypeof justification),hen the reader's asefora construction s complete althoughnot indisputable).What we writers ryto do and what weaccomplishareoftenverydifferent.Thevery ntensityof our trialsmayblind us to accomplishments(or faults) hat othersmayseeclearly.A narratoroses exclusive ontrolof thatnarrativeust as soon as it occurs.Perhapswe may even see patternsnot opento the writer o either ntendor discover.Hypothetically,wemight suggest hatHerodotusanticipated ociocultural ausalexplanationpatterns hat we seeandregularlyuse today, but which werenot part of his conceptual ramework e-yondsome prototypical tage.In orderto developthe similaritiesamong narrative onstructions,we havepassedoverwithonly slightmentionmanyfeaturespeculiar o eachsort. Thosedifferencesmightmakea greatdifferenceo a fully developed heory.It remainsthe case that narrative onstructions-from the perspectiveof justification-presupposehe possibilitiesof narrative iscoursewithoutpresupposing arra-tiveobjects,even houghwemay indmanyof the constructionsn thoseobjects.Moreover, nly some of the possibilities or constructionbelong distinctly,notto mentionexclusively,o history. t is not clearwhetherAnkersmit an confinethenarratiowithinhistory.He restshis distinctionbetweenhistoryand the his-toricalnovelonopposingrelationships etween he pointof viewand thespecificstatement:or history,a point of view s a conclusion; or the novel t is a start.38

38. Ibid., 19-27.


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70 L. B. CEBIKThis distinctionholds promise, but requiresconsiderablymore attention tofictionalnarrative's odeof justificationo whichall too fewtheoristshavegivenattention.

Additionally,wemustmore fully develop he relationshipbetweennarrativediscourse nd narrative onstruction.Forexample,Meiland's perceptivevalu-ationof Oakeshott'sconstructivism 'hat Ankersmit itesmaintains tspercep-tivenessonly on the suppositionof a reference-basedheoryof language hatcansustainsharpdistinctionsbetweenour knowledgeof an event and the evi-dence oran event.39 s weearliernoted, suchcritiques ail underothertheoriesof languagen whichreference oldsa different lace.Likewise,we can see thatRicoeur's eap fromnarrativeentences o followinga story soarsover a wideplaincontainingnteresting nd significant ormsof narrativeife.40The lureofrealstoriessorely riesour analyticalpatience.At the sametime, historical on-structions, o thedegree heyconstituteproposals,containelementsof thecrea-tive capableultimatelyof determiningust how we shall view our world, past,present,and future.Thus, we need to develop urthernot only the logicof con-structions, utas well hemeansby whichconstructions chieveorfail to achievea place within our conceptualand perceptual rameworks.

III. NARRATIVE OBJECTSAlthoughmosttheoriesof narrative eginwithnarrative bjects,we can sayonlya limitedamountabout themper se. For the objects to which we must attendin narrativeheoryexistas culturalachievementswithinsocial frameworks frelationsandactivities.41Withinthese frameworks, bjects serveas functionalentitiesrather hanas naturalphenomena.Socialrecognitionof objectstendsto freeze ogetherobjectsand functionswithina systemof rulesthat a. definesthe functionalobject, b. guides evaluationsof success and failure n function,c.determineswhatbenefitordetrimentlowsfromtheobject's unctioning,andd. enables he processof teachingnew generationshow to producesuccessfulobjects.Within he fieldof narrative bjects,we canidentifya largenumberof distinctentitieson thebasisof theiruse of narrative iscourse.Oralandwrittennarra-tiveobjects nclude farfromexhaustively)okes;anecdotes;news,weather, ndsportsreports;police records; ourtrecords; xtended ournalisticaccounts;di-ariesandmemoirs; utobiographiesndbiographies;ome chronicles ndevensomeannals;histories;ong andshortstories;novellas nd novels andevencyclesof novels); omewrittendramaand scripts; omeminutesof meetings;ometech-nicalreportsespecially f accidents, atastrophes, rfailures); epositions; artsof insurance laims;some personal etters; ravelogues; picsand sagas;some

39. Ibid., 8; see Meiland, Scepticism and Historical Knowledge, 41ff., for the referencedargument.40. Ricoeur, Time and Narrative, I, 149. I twice note Ricoeur on this point because he is generallya carefulscholar.Many theoristswho make similar eaps soaron the uncertainwings of hastyerudition.41. Here we loosely follow M. Mandelbaum, TheAnatomy of Historical Knowledge (Baltimore,1977), 11-23.


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UNDERSTANDING NARRATIVE THEORY 71song lyrics; airytales,folk stories,andfables;mythologicalandreligiouscos-moldgical ccounts; xcuses; artsof medical, ocialservice, nd welfare eports;somecomedymonologues;lements f psychoanalyticndpsychologicalecordsand case studies; ome fancyrestaurantmenu-itemdescriptions; orporatean-nual reports;grantand contractfinal reports;partsof equipmentrepairre-ports.... As important s wemight ikehistoriesand literatureo be, theycom-prise only a minorityof our narrative bjects,whetherreckonedcategoricallyor bythe sum of instances.Theirseeming mportancearisesfrom the fact thatthey nhabitwell-definedocialinstitutionsseparate ut relatedones),therulesfor which ncludea. the formalpreservationnd evaluationof the objectsandb. ruminationuponthe foundationsof the activity.This fact, however, annotrelegateother narrativeobjects to derivativestatus unworthyof theoreticalanalysis.As objectsalone,narrativeshow ittleby wayof commonstructural lementsother hantheiruseof narrative iscourseandconstructions.Finishedproductsgenerally aveopeningsandclosures,althoughsome mayhaveonly beginningsandendings.Perhapswemayfind for all or most themcentralsubjectsor atleastcentral ubjectmatteraround or about whicheach tells a story.But whatverydifferent indsof stories hey tell. Indeed, t is not clearwhetheror not theverynotion of a story makessense withoutreferenceo the functionsof narra-tive objects.If not, wehavefurtherreasonfor not exporting he ideaof a story(withany or all its ramifications)o the levelsof narrative onstruction nddis-course.Moreover,f wecannot ntroduceheidea of storyhere,wemaynot evenbe able to speakof centralsubjects,but only of subject matter.Anothercommonlyposited constantof all narrative bjectsis change.Thisnotion grewpopular n narrative heoriesdevoted o historicalexplanation:henarrative rovideseither fully or sketchily he explanation or the changethatforms he narrative'subject.Draydemonstratedhenonuniversalityf this ideaby callingattention o descriptiveistory, hich eekssome unity ntheperiodandplacestudied.42 horter pansof narrativemay seek only to show the waysomethings (or was)as anhistoricalconstruction.Hence, eventhistraditionalessenceof history urnsout to apply, f at all, to narrative bjectsas functionalentitieswithinsocial institutions.Up to thispoint,wehavebeenexamininghe formalrequirementsf histor-icalnarrative.The logic of languageand certainhistoriographic oncernshavenaturallydominatedn discussionsof linguisticconventions, ules of evidence,and narrative onnections.Tothe degree hatnarrative ommunication s pos-siblebythesemeans,wemayfind certainrulesandtechniques, argelymasteredduringheacquisition f languageanddisciplinarykills.Any suchruleswe maybeableto formulateat theselevelswouldapplyto the broadest pectrumof so-cialactivities,as distinguished romthe narrower ontextsof producing ulturalartifactswithinspecific nstitutionsof society.While hesebroadrulesmightun-derlie he more pecificnstitutionalctivities,he reverse oesnot hold.Wecannot

42. W. H. Dray, Philosophy of History (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1964), 29-35.


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72 L. B. CEBIKuncriticallytransfer rules whetherepistemic, heuristic,or aesthetic fromspecific nstitutions o the overall rameworkwithin which we discoursenarra-tively and withinwhich we may generatenarrative onstructions.

What mayconstitutean illicitmovewithinthe constructionof anynarrativetheory may nonethelesshint at a naturalprocess.Although nstitution-specificrules generallyhose havingabearingupon evaluating he adequacy,merit,andutilityof narrativebjects)andtechniques for generating bjects hatmeetsuchstandards) btain within an institution,such as doing history, hey leakbackinto society nvariousways.Journalism nd report-writingidnotreinvent ar-rativeas social institutionsarosethat required hose activities.However,as ac-tivitieswithin heseinstitutions, hey are not beholden o theirsources or rulesof formationandsuccess.At a conceptual evel,Marxiancategories or thoseof the French ocialists)haveenteredourgeneral anguage,offeringus waysofcharacterizingocialgroups,ways hat werenot accessible o JeremyBentham,despitehis deepconcern orsocialjustice.To ook at a different ortof example,amateurhistoriansaccepttheirroleand relationshipo professionals, herebygeneralizingnsocietya distinction hat did not existacenturyago.Insuchwaysthetechnical equirementsnd creative ffortsof institutionsaltereveryday os-sibilities,evento the level of what t is possiblefor us to perceive.There s some-thingveryright n phenomenological xplications f humanactivityand in aes-theticclaims for the powersof our poetic creations and everycreation s-asHeidegger aid initiallypoetic).43However,hedetailedprocessesbywhichcul-tural creations nfluence not individualpsychology,but the very conceptualframework f languageand activity still await detailedanalysis.

IV. NARRATIVE FUNCTIONS

Althoughthe earlieraccountof narrative onstructionsproceeds rom a strictepistemicapproach,wemaysense in thedescriptions omethingof a techniquethatmayserveoneor morepurposes.Wemight earn o formulatenarrative ndhistorical onstructionsnorder o prove hesesor to educate eaders.Thesequitereasonable houghtsabouthistoricalnarrative emarcate changeof perspec-tiveto a heuristicapproach o the theoryof narrative, n approach hat seeksto analyze he functionsof narratives nd the meansbywhichwe achieve heirsuccessfulperformance.ndeed,mosttheoriesof historicalnarrative ave tartedwith and been drivenby a heuristicor functionalperspective n the subject.A heuristic pproach eginswitha narrativebjectof a social nstitutionwithinwhich t functions.Sinceinstitutionsarecomplex,a singleobject mayfunctiondiversely o educateor edify; to inform, correct,revise,or update; o entertain;to inspireactionsor attitudes; o imbuewith value (eitherpossessionsor-withNietzsche life and actionthemselves); o explain; o provea thesis or establisha theme; o persuadeor convince, or example,of the correctness f what hap-

43. See Fictional Narrative and Truth, Part 5, for one account of Heidegger's The Origin ofthe Work of Art and its applications.


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UNDERSTANDING NARRATIVE THEORY 73pened or how to viewwhathappened; o reformor revolutionize; o teachbyexample how students and colleagues may do the things of history.... Just asthe types of narrative bjectsmay seem llimitable, o too willappear heirpos-siblefunctions,withouthowever necessary ne-to-onecorrelation etweenob-jects and functions.Institutionsprovide he framework or fabricating,using,and evaluating arrativebjectsand forteachingmembers f the institutionhowto perform hese tasks. Giventhis (overlygeneral)descriptionof institutions,a heuristic heoryof historical arratives ill formulate tandards ndtechniquesrelatingechniques o ends, deally n sucha way hat wemayboth teachanotherhow o do andwritehistory nd o assessandevaluateinished istorical arratives.Withfictionalnarratives,we can often divorce unctionalor heuristic heori-zation fromepistemic rjustificationalheorization.Behind hisseparationiesan importantdistinctionbetweenparadigmaticiction andhistory.In the caseof the former, he epistemicdimensionsof the institutionalactivity ie mostlyin the regionof presupposition, omingto the foreground nly in the contem-plationof fictionalized istory forexample, , Claudius)or historical iction suchas Warand Peace). Withhistory,no such separations possible.If it is at allcorrect o saythathistory schargedwithwriting actually ustifiedorjustifiabletexts,narrativernonnarrative, hichrelateorportraywhathashappened,hana fullheuristicheorymustencompassboththedistinctly ustificational nd thedistinctlynarrative spectsof whathistorydoes or can do. Perhapsheonlyac-ceptableexcusefor writingheuristically ponone or the other alonewouldbeforpedagogicalpurposesn muchthe mannerof teachingprotodoctors ow toadministermedicinesand how to performsurgeryn separateessons.Despite he current opularity f theories hat gnore he justificational imen-sionsof historicalpractice,a considerablehistoriographiciterature xists thatheuristicallypproachesustthis dimension.Fischerbeganhis studyof fallacieswiththree premisesavowing he existenceof a logic of historical hought,theability o be awareas anhistorianof that logic, and the purposefulapplicationof thatlogicin doinghistory. 4Fischer'swork s for historiansand showsthemhow,in theirworks, to be justifiedand to avoid being unjustified.Unlikeanepistemic heoryof history,which would formulate he structure ndlimits ofhistoricalustification, his heuristic tudy triesto showhistorianshow to useandhownot to use modesof justification ypresenting asesof use and(mostly)abuse.

Given he differentialoalsof epistemicand heuristic tudies,we mayantici-pateandfindextensive ategorical nd terminological ifferencesetween hem,justaswe doin basic ogictextsbetween overages f formaland informal alla-cies. As notedby Hexter,who hastreatedhistoriographys the craftof writinghistory,a heuristic odificationof history'srules wouldresemblea manualofmilitary trategymore than a handbook of physics, onsistingof a numberof maximsgenerally pplicableo the solution of recurrent roblems n writing

44. D. H. Fischer, Historian's Fallacies (New York, 1970), xv.


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74 L. B. CEBIKhistory. . . I'These statements remaintrue even if we were to treat only the con-structionalor justificational spectsof historicalactivity.Whatteachesus to do historycan also teach us to evaluatehistories.(Thereverses trueas well.)Inthe areaof historicaldisputeand debate,wehavegivenmost attention o thereasoningprocessesusedto reachconclusionsof the con-structiveypeexplicated yCollingwood ndGoldstein.McCullagh'slluminatingsurveyof common nferencesn historyoutlines numerouscase studiesof theprogressionf historical easoning ndjustificationhroughdebateand alterna-tive assessments f and searches or evidence.46 e therebybroadensour viewof historical easoning nddescription.However,we mustturn o HaydenWhiteandthe narrativistsn orderto acquirea framework ermittingan evaluationof narrative s a modeof presentationndependentf thepresenter ndof formalhistorical rgumentation,here he latter tillremains nder heterminologicalif not theconceptual graspof explanation.Tobe ableto saythatwhatweknowis as mucha functionof what we formulateand how we formulateas it is ofthe appropriate pplicationof methodsof investigation s an insightthat-howeverong knownsinceKantor beyondonly haspermeatedhistoryundernarrativistressure. venHexter'smmediately renarrativistotionof the craftof writingcouldnot escapethe splitbetweenknowingandcommunicating n-genderedby explanation heory.47Explanationheorybegan witha limitingcommitment o at leastquasiposi-tivisticcanonsof epistemology,but endedin an appreciation f the diversityof verbalacts that, in one or anotherway,answeredhe questionsthat posedandrevealed urpuzzlements.Aphenomenologistmightdoworse hanexplorethenotionofposinga question.48)o-called overing-lawheorists igidly ramedthe heuristicdimensionof explanationheoryby settingout narrative s a formof explanation,completeor incompleteaccording o individual ormulations.Other unctionsof narrativeeceived itherno orunappreciativereatment.Thisnarrowviewof historicalnarrativepersisted or nearlythreedecades n somequarters, ccasioningater heorists o despairof everescapinga perceived on-strictionof history'spurposes.49We haveyetto appreciateullythe theoretical onsequences f analyses hatbroadened urviewof explanations s a (not the)functionof historicalnarra-tive.LedbyDray,whopersonally ataloguednumerous xplanatoryormswithnoncovering-lawogics,the effortto understand xplanationgraduallymergedwith the effort o understand he colligatory unctionsof narrative n broader,if lessprecise, unctionalandjustificationalgrounds.50Within this movement

45. J. H. Hexter, The Rhetoric of History, in Doing History (Bloomington, 1971), 66.46. McCullagh, Justifying Historical Descriptions, Chapter 4, 91-128.47. Hexter, The Rhetoric of History, 68.48. To pose a question is, in part, to put it forth, to posit and position it, to frame it: all leadingfigures worth exploring.49. With a bit of arbitrariness,from Hempel's 1942 The Function of General Laws in Historyto (perhaps) Hexter's 1971History Primer and Doing History.50. See Dray'sPhilosophy of History, Chapter 2, for a summary of his work to 1964. See alsohis Colligation Under Appropriate Conceptions for seemingly slight but significant shifts, for ex-ample, in accepting the idea of saying what for the earlier explaining what.


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UNDERSTANDING NARRATIVE THEORY 75emergedan awareness f the everydaydiversityof functionsof both narrativeand explanation.The endresult,yetto be summarizedna strictlyheuristic on-text (for explanation heorystillclingsto its illusoryepistemicapproach o thesubject), s a complexweb of techniques orrules of procedure)orgeneratingan arrayof justifiedaccounts(in contrast o Fischer's allacies)withinformalhistorical-narrativebjects.Thearraywouldalso provide setof standardsgainstwhichwe mightmeasure he successof historicalnarratives,each students hemethodsof achieving ustifiedhistorical onclusions,andappreciateheinsight-fulnessof varied tylesof historical easoning. ucha setof standards lso wouldpermitus to recognizenovelmethodologies.Wehavenoted hat nanycomplex nstitution,we mustallowforpartial unc-tional accountsof the activities.Explanation heory, orallof its initialclaims,presents he heuristicsof one significant acet of doing history.Mandelbaumtook some further tepsin understandinghe multifunctional atureof histor-ical narrativewhen he formulatedhistory's equential,explanatory, nd inter-pretative forms. equential istorychoosesa subject hat has a degree f con-tinuity and traces he strands f eventsmakingup thathistory. Explanatoryhistoryseeksto answera definitequestion: Grantedhat this eventdid occur,what factorswereresponsibleor its occurrence? nterpretative istoryexistsforthe sakeof depictinga stateof affairstself. 5 lthoughthese threefunc-tions fall shortof adequately epresentingll of history's egitimateand impor-tantfunctions, heydo permitMandelbaumo treat heir nteractionwithin inglehistories,despitethe usual predominance f one of the forms or functions nagivenhistory.Moreover, eisalsoableto explore herelationship f somecru-cialepistemic actors,such ascausation, aws,andobjectivity,n thecontextofintertwiningunctions.The result s perhapsa schematicmodelfora full theorythat interrelatesmorecompletelydifferingapproacheso the full spectrumofhistoricalobjects and functions.Withrespect o Mandelbaum nd to virtuallyall the partial heorieswithinthe questfor an accountof historicalexplanationwe mustrecognizeanothersignificantact: all writefrom the perspective f thehistorian.Thisperspectiveseemsmostnatural, iven he intensive nd ndividual ature f doingandwritinghistory.However, othing nthe natureof historytself ogicallynecessitateshatwetake hisperspective. lthoughwemay reatHaydenWhiteandthenarrativistsfromthis perspective,we mayfind it moreprofitablen placingtheirwork tosee themas criticalreaders xaminingnot the activityof history,but only thefinishedobjectsthey receive rom historians. n literature, s one of our promi-nentsocial nstitutions,we havea specificmultifaceted oleforthe critic-analyst-college eacherwhois chargedo conveywhat iteratures, howit is made,whatwe can as readers get out of it, andhowwe can appreciatet properly.Somehistoricalworks, such as Plutarch'sLives or Gibbon'sDecline and Fall of theRoman Empire, have raditionalplacesamongthe collectionof literary bjects(justashavesomephilosophicalworks,such as Plato'sdialogues).WhatWhite

51. Mandelbaum, The Anatomy of Historical Knowledge, 25-29.


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76 L. B. CEBIKandhis followershave ntroduceds the general reatment f all historicalworksas literaryproductions.Reader-orientedriticism ntroducesnto historicalheuristic heoryseeminglynovelelements.Perhapsmost shocking opracticing istorians, t createsa placefor nonhistorianso assesssystematically istoricalworks.Tothis assessment,criticalheorybringstsownvocabularyndcategories.Often,especiallynliterarycircles hatallythemselves o the arts and its criticism, he operative ategoriesmix structural, unctional,and aestheticcategories.The reader-critic-analyst-teacher olerequires recisely hesortof categoriesWhiteadapts o his purposes.From Frye,we discover n historicalnarrative omance, ragedy,comedy,andsatire as modesof emplotment.FromPepper,we uncoverformist, organist,mechanistic, nd contextualist ypesof argument.Mannheim upplies he all-important deological typology that includes anarchism,conservatism, adi-calism,and liberalism.White notes that a historiographicaltyle representsa particular ombinationof modesof emplotment,argument,andideologicalimplication. 52lthoughWhitegivesfoundational tatus o the linguistic ropesof metaphor,metonymy, ynecdoche,andirony, n the endideologyforms andfocusesthepurposeof his theory.Ultimately,he would havehistorians recog-nize the fictiveelement n their narratives o free eachone frombecoming acaptiveof ideologicalpreconceptions nd tomovethe teachingof historiog-raphyonto ahigherevelof self-consciousnesshan tcurrently ccupies. 53hiscombinationof evaluative ritiqueandteachingprinciples omprisespreciselythe benchmark oalsof heuristic heory,andin termsof them wemustunder-stand White'sefforts.Thetraditions f literary riticism undeep nWhite's heorization.nviewinghistorical ccounts sverbal tructureshatmodel past tructures ndprocesses,Whitecan claimto penetrateo a preanalyticalevel of consciousness hat con-stitutesexperience. ust at sucha level we areto understand hat eachhistoriannecessarily mplots thewholeset of storiesmakinguphis narrativenonecom-prehensive r archetypal tory form. 54 his maneuverpermitsus to formulatethehistorian'sonstitutionf historynandthrough is narrativenmanydifferentways,withoutcontendingwiththe needforevidenceof conscious ntentorartic-ulatedpurpose.White'spreanalyticalonsciousness s thusnobody'sconscious-ness atall.Rather,na tradition temmingat leastfromColeridge's ostulationof a facultyof imagination,we canerectfor heuristicpurposesa quasigenetictheoryof literaturehatallowsa connectionbetweenperceived tructureswithinliterature ndtechniquesor anyindividual o create hem. The resultremains,however,a heuristicof achievement nd not of purpose.Nonetheless, he essentialpositionof the critic is that of a readerRomanti-callyfocuseduponthewriter. f Whitereceives romtexts the nasalperceptionof ideality,he writes hat to narrativizes tomoralize,o give o reality heodor

52. H. White, Metahistory (Baltimore, 1973), through 34, especially 29.53. White, The Historical Text as Literary Artifact, 61.54. White, Metahistory, 2, 8, 30, 33.


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UNDERSTANDING NARRATIVE THEORY 77of the ideal. 55n anequallymixedassertion,henotesthat to perceivehe classor type of a story is to have theeventsexplained o him, presumably y thestory-teller.56owever,erceivingclassortypeprecisely epends pon heclassesor typesthata readerbringsandcanapplyeffectivelyo the story.Thecreativecritic-analyst-teachernablesthe reader o accomplish his feat at everdeeperlevelsof significanceytheinvention f productiveategorieswithoutanyneces-saryregard or the intentionsor conceptual ramework f writers.Fora brieftime, readers oundit profitableo psychoanalyzeHamlet,a task that only areadercould perform.Althoughexperiencediterarycritics and analysts can easily readthroughWhite's eneticpostureotheheuristic ore,mostphilosophicheoristshave oun-deredonperipheralhesesandconcerns.Whitewishes o awakenandenlightenhistoriansandstudents o history's ackof ideological nnocence,regardless fthepoliticaldirectionof its source.57Whiteearlierdescribeddeologyas asetof prescriptionsor taking a positionin the presentworld of socialpraxisandactinguponit,... attendedby arguments hatclaim the authorityof 'science'or 'realism. 'Herein,perhaps, ies the theoreticalbattlegroundmost separablefromandsuperfluouso thecreativeheuristics.ForWhitebelieves hat historyis not a science,or is at best a protosciencewithspecificallydeterminable on-scientific lements n its constitution. 58y science,he means a vaguelyHem-pelianpositivisticonception f structurendactivityhatwouldallowhistoriansto explainthe real, whileleavingnovelists o dealwith imagined vents. 59Within he ideologyof historyas positivisticscience,Whitesees areluctancetoconsiderhistorical arrativess what heymostmanifestly re verbal ictions. . . 60 Thusdoes Whiteradically espond o a positionmany heoristshadviewedin the early 1970sas dead at least half a decade.Atfirstglance,White eemsembarked pon anepistemic rgumentoncerningthelimitsof history.However,wofactorsmitigateagainst heappearance. irst,to classifyany narrative s fictionis to decidewhatmodesof justificationweshalldemandof it andnot to discoverwhatmodesof justificationn factapplyto it. The modesof justification ptto fictionalnarrativeorma subsetof thoseweapply o historical arrativeexceptperhaps orsomeaesthetic ategorieshatweonlysometimesapplyto history).At a heuristicevel,we candecide o applyonly the subsetwithouttherebynecessarilyimitinghistory or historiography.Bycontrast, ttheepistemicevel,only f wecanvoidthemethodologicalustifica-

55. White, The Value of Narrativity in the Representation of Reality, 23, 20, emphasis mine.56. White, The Historical Text as Literary Artifact, 49.57. H. White, The Politics of Historical Interpretation:Discipline and De-Sublimation, Crit-ical Inquiry 9 (1982), 137.58. White,Metahistory,21-22. Involved in White'sdefinition of ideologies is a more subtle move:the incorporation of science into ideology itself. Thus, every swipe against ideologically biasedhistory includes a sideswipe against history as it really is. Only in this old formula can we conflatepositivistic science and the real so glibly. Outside this antique, science and the real are often verydifferentthings, as in the case of mystic, mythic, and religious bases for ideologies.59. White, The Historical Text as Literary Artifact, 60.60. Ibid., 42.


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78 L. B. CEBIKtion of historicalconstructscan we sustaina claimthat history s none otherthan fiction. This second factorleadsus to considerthe natureof historicalmethods,which neithercorrespond o White'snotion of the sciences(derivedfromearlyexplanation heorists)nor dependupontraditional iewsof referenceandostension.Relianceupon linguisticmodels hatseemingly efutesuch rrele-vant views without speakingto the pragmaticdimensionsof historical andeverydayustificationhus leaves he apparent pistemicpretensions f narrati-vism either llusoryor unfounded.Whether uchmodels can speak directly oepistemicquestionsremainspartof narrativism's nfinishedwork.Perhapsacademichistory's eeming ack of everyday unctionengenders heperceptionhat it has no differentmpactupon our worldthan fictionalnarra-tive. Theabstract ermsof ourlistof historical unctionsalmostdefies ransla-tion intopracticalerms.Yeteverydaynarrative onstructions howboth theireminentutilityand theirpragmatic roundingnfactualevidenceas a necessaryconditionof utility.As I write,a governmentalommission s investigatinghelaunchexplosionof an American pace shuttle.Itseffortswill yield a narrativereportof humanactions and physicalprocesses,a narrative hat hopes to ac-complishat leasttwoexplicitgoals:theredesignof launchpersonnel ommuni-cationsnetworksandthe redesignof certainrocketry lements.In the process,if presentnewsreportsare reliable, he investigatorswill discover havediscov-ered)newdatato be acquiredand preservedn the future (for example,solidrocketboosterprelaunchemperatures). s a consequence, uturenarratives fsuch ncidentswillnecessarilyakea (slightly)different onstructive orm. How-ever,partof the avowedaimof thepresentnarratives to precludehe needfora similar uturenarrative.Thusoccurs heeveryday ragmatic rowthof usefulnarrative-constructiveethods.Someday cademic istoriansmayalso earnhowto usetelemetry ata.Nonetheless,all thesenotes reflectmodesof narrativeon-structionand usethatmust evereludethe creatorsof fictionalnarrativesevensuch narratives s Cook'sBrain andMindbend).Totheseconsiderationsf theeveryday arrativeeportwemightaddnumerouspractical hings a readermight learnfrom history,matters hat a literary riti-cismfocuseduponideology mightmiss.FromstudyingBrinton'sand Hoffer'sworkon revolutions nd massmovements, ne might earnhowto organizeandrunan effective ebellion or at leasthow to surviveone).Frommilitaryhistoriesof thebattleof Cowpens,onemight earn o conducta doubleenvelopmentwithdueconsiderationor the qualityof one'sowntroopsas well as the qualityoftheenemy's.Fromhistoriesof eighteenth-centurycientific esearch, ne mightlearn as from no contemporarycientificpaperhow to trackwrongdirectionsof researchnorder o benefitwork ntherightdirection.Everyessonthatyieldssuccess ends o confirmts narrative ources.However, very ailureyieldsa treeof questions:Were he narratives eadaright?If so, whatneedscorrectionnthenarratives:heiroverallnarratios r the collectionof informationwhich n-formed hem(asviewed rom a justificationalperspective)?At the levelof theeveryday,he heuristicsof historicalnarrativemust make roomfor contextsofjustification hatgo beyondrhetoric, f the theoryis to be complete.


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UNDERSTANDING NARRATIVE THEORY 79Thejustification f a literary eader-critic-teachereuristics f historicalnar-rative ests,however, implyupon the fact that history hareswith fictional iter-ature (and with journalismand other everydaynarrativeactivities)a set of

justificationalmodes,even hough t necessarily as othersnotsharedwithliter-ature.The development f literary riticalcategories, swithanysetof heuristiccategories f analysis, equires ogrounding ther han ntheirproductivityndutilityfor the criticalenterprise.White'sown categoriesadmittedlyrestuponneither ogicnorepistemology,ut ratheruponanadaptation f the Aristotelianidea of rhetoric.Thus, it is perhapsunfortunate or the literary ritiqueof his-torythatWhite's nalyseshavebecomealmost nextricablymeshedwith periph-eral hesesregardingistoricaleality, ower, ndidealityaspoliticalphenomena,and theperennial loomyeconomicand class statusof the humanities.6 ntilnarrativism nderstandstsplacein theorizationand becomesveryexplicitanddirectlyargumentativeboutpreciselywhat thesesit wishesto sustain,we canonly deconstruct ts edificeone opaque brick at a time.The aim here s not to explain n detailnarrativist ategoriesof criticism,butto placetheoverall heoryamongothers.The rhetorical ocusof Whiteand hisfollowershas revealed,perhapsevenadmirably,hat historicalreasoningandwriting orma continuum hat ncludes hecreationof narrativetructureswhichconvinceas wellas communicate ndtherebymayalter heverywaysweperceiveandconceivehistory'sdata.If we learnno other essonfrom suchcriticalwork,we must acknowledge hat Sartre's dea of literature nvitingus to participateas readersn the reformationof our world is no passiveor neutralaffair.62 oinvite s to make inviting,to set a scene that lures us to participaten just thewaypresented y the text. Such s the powerof the narratiounder he categoriesof criticalanalysisso forcefullyand rhetoricallyurgedby White.If criticalheuristics eachesanything, t is that muchof what we learnfromhistorymaynot be historical.Ricoeur's ecentwork,currentlynfluential mongnarrativeheorists, ullyillustrates he adage. Often mistaken or a narrativist,Ricoeur nlycapitalizes ponnarrativist euristicsnpursuit f othergoals.Theseeffortsgo wellbeyondthe levelof ordinary iteraryheuristics o seek out whatnarrativen generalmay do to andfor the temporalmodeof humanexistence.AsRicoeur uts t, timebecomeshuman o theextent hat tis articulatedhrougha narrativemode,andnarrativettains ts fullmeaningwhen tbecomesacondi-

61. Out of such materials we make philosophical fads and, as fads fade into disinterest, we losethe benefits that lie at their core. White has perhaps encouraged such treatment of his work, notonly in the arguments he presents, but as well with his own rhetorical methods, which run the gamutof erudite persuasive techniques with or without logical foundation. To cite just one example, hefootnotes a piece of the etymology of narrative without explicitly arguing its place in his overallcase for his views. He leaves the conclusions about narrative and knowing to readerswho likely havenot explored the question of whether etymology can determine, given such linguistic phenomenaas meaning division and reversal, in any way whatsoever the current meaning and use of a word.See The Value of Narrativityin the Representationof Reality, 1. This and other articles teem withrhetorical techniques not easily absorbed by even White's categories.

62. Sartre also saw before White that at the heart of an aesthetic imperative lies a moral one;see What Is Literature? (New York, 1966), 38-45.


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80 L. B. CEBIKtion of temporal xistence. 63nterestn the heuristicor epistemicdimensionsof narrative heory seemingly nfluencesmanycommentatorso stop shortofRicoeur's xistentialendering f timeandfate.Instead, hey ocusuponRicoeur'sappreciative nalysesof White,Danto, Gallie,andothersfrom whomhe drawssalientpoints.YetRicoeur oncludeshisanalysisof these heorieswith theques-tion of historical ime ather hanthe questionof historical arrative.64e seeksto explicate evelsof temporalitywhich hold historicality etweena surfacewithin-time-ness alreadydifferent rom inear ime) and, at the deepest evel,the plural unity of future, past, and present . . . rooted in . . . care reflectinguponitself as mortal. 65RicoeurborrowsromHeidegger's nalysisof time for his goals and engagesinphenomenological ialecticso develop hethreemodesof mimesis hat com-prisehis contribution o the mediationbetween ime and narrative. n the dy-namic of emplotment, ur practicalunderstandingf narrativeprovidesdis-cursive ulesof compositionhatgovern he diachronic rder f a story.Uponthisprenarrativetructuref experiencereconstructedextual-literaryimetics.Tothis levelof prefiguredime,we addconfiguredime or plot as a mediationbetween ventsand the storyas a whole. Theintersection f theworldof textand theworldof the heareror reader marksthe pointof refiguringhe timeof experience nd the beginningof a radical ircularity. he finalexegesisofDasein in these ermsRicoeur eaves o anothervolume.66 e pointsout the direc-tionof hisworkby finding n bothhistoricaland fictionalnarrative repetition,actionin thefigureof the memorable,n and as accountsof how one (person,thing,orsociety)becomeswhat t is: here ndestinyiesthekey o narrativehangethat we tell in and througha story'sevents.67Ricoeur'sheuristicsof time is a metaphysicalndeavor hatraisesquestionsabout its relevanceo epistemicand methodologicalconcerns.Fromthis per-spective,wemayevenquestion he relationship f hisefforts o White's upraso-cial heuristics o which Ricoeurclaims some affinities.Ricoeuroperates roma cleartraditiondatingto Plato,who also wrestledwith the placeof literaturein not just the ideal society,but in the fundamental chemeof things.Withup-datedmethods,however,Ricoeur eeksnottobestowon narrative meaningful-ness derived rombasic forms,but to understandhe ultimatemeaningfulnessof a significant umanactivityntermsof its relationshipo human emporality.The legitimacy f this typeof theorization estsupon commitmentshatgo be-yondrecognizingocial nstitutionsalone; t restsuponourcommitments o themetaphysical nterprise. f commentatorsail to followRicoeur his far,how-ever,theyriskmisinterpretingis analysesof specificaspectsof narrative ndnarrativeheory,no matterhowappealing hoseanalysesmayseemfromotherperspectives.

63. Ricoeur, Time and Narrative, I, 52.64. Ibid., 1, 206.65. P. Ricoeur, NarrativeTime, in On Narrative, ed. Mitchell, 166-167.66. Ricoeur, Time and Narrative, I, 59, 64, 71, 86-87.67. Ricoeur, NarrativeTime, 176-178.


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UNDERSTANDING NARRATIVE THEORY 81Like White,however,Ricoeurremainswedded o a formulationof the prob-lemsof historicalnarrativehat restsupontraditional eferential iewsof lan-guage.Hence,his dialectical olution othe so-calledproblem f historical eality

under hesignsof thesame, heother,and theanaloguemighthavebeenunnec-essaryhad he attended o theextensiveworkdone so faron thejustificationofhistorical onstructions.68oreover,lthoughiterary-criticaleuristicsantreathistoricalnarrativess a collectionof cultural chievements,hedialecticof timecannot,for it is not in itself of a cultureor society.69n metaphysics,but nothistory, heentire panof narrative bjects and eventhepossibilityof the self-refiguring f timewithinordinaryactivitiesmust becomethe focus of study.Culturalachievements uch as storytellingmightbe a key for understandinghuman emporalitynGreco-Romanimes(although his is to be doubted),butthe myriadof narrative bjects todayrun theirtentacles romeverydaynessothe highestachievementswithoutlacuna. Thus, a heuristicof historicalnarra-tive need not expressan elitism for White'shistorical-literaryriticism,but italmostnecessarilydoes so for Ricoeur.Ricoeurdoesprovideus with an intriguingntroductory ccountof howourhighestnarrativereations eturn ntothepresuppositionsf everydayife.Themimetic ircledemonstrateshe need orany heory o finish hecourseof thought.Indeed,anyproper heoryof historicalnarrativemust attend n full circle o alllevels of the enterprise,providing ompleteand compatibleaccountsof each.Weremain ar fromthis goal. Metatheory tself cannotresolvethe mountainof outstanding uestions, ither hosewe havealready osedorthoseyetto come.However,metatheoryango somedistancenpermittings toposition onfidentlythe contributionsmade so far and to glimpsethe next fewsteps beyondthem.Byproperly lacing heoriesandpartial heorieswithina metatheoreticalrame-work, we can see moreclearly theirnature,ramifications, nd limits, therebydifferentiatingetween he contributionsand the philosophical ads. Muchofwhatwe need norder o improve urnarrativeheoriesalready xists nthebodyof extantthoughtfulanalyses.The task is to use thesecontributionswiselyinpursuitof a comprehensivend adequate heoryof historicalnarrative.The University of Tennessee

68. P. Ricoeur, The Reality of the Historical Past (Milwaukee, 1984), 5, 14, 25. See Time andNarrative, Vol. 2, for more on these questions, as well as his analysis of fictional narrative and thecompletion of the dialectic of temporal existence.

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Cebik L B - Understanding Narrative Theory