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RP vs. CA and CIRCULO BANTAYANO FOUNDATION, INC.,

In its application for registration before the RTC, respondent Circulo Bantayano Foundation, Inc. allegeis the owner in fee simple or thru a possessory information title of a parcel of land including the buildinimprovements thereon at Cebu, containing an area of 108,711 s.m. thru purchase on 1974. that 'The soccupied and possessed openly, continuously, notoriously and peacefully in the concept of owners for than 40 years by applicant and its predecessors-in-interest.

Petitioner opposed the application alleging that private respondent did not have title in fee simple or

imperfect title to the land and it was disqualified under the 1973 Constitution, being a corporation, to olands of the public domain.

RTC ruled in favor of respondent.

petitioner appealed to the CA.

ISSUE: WON respondent is qualified under the 1973 or the 1987 Constitutions to acquire and subsequeregister in its name the disputed lot.

It is true that under both the 1973 and the 1987 Constitution, a private corporation (even if a domesticcannot acquire (and therefore cannot register) lands of the public domain, but in the present case the involved, at the time it was acquired by the corporation in 1974, was no longer part of the public doma

long years of exclusive continuous, and adverse possession of the same by its predecessors-in-interestgiven ownership thereofipso jure to said predecessors, enabling the latter to convey title to saidcorporation. True, the Corporation's acquisition was in 1974, or after the 1973 was already in effect. Buthen as of that time, the land was no longer public land, It was private land.

As found by the Court of Appeals - the application by respondent-corporation is not actually for the graland of the public domain but for the confirmation of an imperfect title acquired through long years ofpossession through the predecessors-in-interest of applicant corporation. The appellee court in ruling tconsidered the fact that oppositor Republic of the Philippines failed to present any evidence whatsoeveduring the trial showing that the property applied for is land of the public domain as against the undispevidence presented by applicant.

Thus, the prohibitions referred to in the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions can no longer apply.

[G.R. No. 129401. February 2, 2001]FELIPE SEVILLE vs. NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMPANY

Facts: By virtue of Presidential Decree No. 625, Leyte Sab-A Basin Development Authority (LSBDA) wascreated to integrate government and private sector efforts for a planned development and balancedgrowth of the Sab-a Basin in the Province of Leyte, empowered to acquire real property in thesuccessful prosecution of its business. Letter of Instruction No. 962 authorized LSBDA to acquireprivately-owned lands circumscribed in the Leyte Industrial Development Estate (LIDE) by way ofnegotiated sales with the landowners.

On June 14, 1980, Calixtra Yap sold to LSBDA Lot No. 057 SWO 08-000047 consisting of 464,920square meters, located at Barangay Sto. Rosario, Isabel, Leyte, covered under certain Tax

Declarations, to LSBDA.

On June 1, 1982, LSBDA filed a Miscellaneous Sales Application with the Bureau of Lands covering saidlot together with other lots acquired by LSBDA. The application was granted and was issued in thename of LSBDA on the basis of which Original Certificate of Title No. P-28131 was transcribed in theRegistration Book for the Province of Leyte on August 12, 1983 in the name of LSBDA.

On December 14, 1989, LSBDA assigned all its rights over the subject property to NationalDevelopment Company (NDC) as a result of which a new Transfer Certificate of Title was issued onMarch 2, 1990 by the Registry of Deeds for the province of Northern Leyte in the name of NDC. Thesubject property was leased to three lessees.

On November 29, 1988, the Estate of Joaquin Ortega represented by judicial administrator Felipe

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Seville filed with the Regional Trial Court of Ormoc City, a complaint for recovery of real property,rentals and damages against NDC and the lessees.

Seville and the heirs of Ortega alleged that LSBDAs title to 73 hectares of the 402-hectare LeyteIndustrial Development Estate (LIDE) was void, having allegedly been obtained from Calixtra Yap whohad no right to it. They maintain that they acquired title to the disputed property by acquisitiveprescription, because they and their predecessors in interest had been in possession of it for morethan thirty years. Although it was the subject of settlement proceedings, Sevilla and the heirs furtherclaim that Yap sold the same to LSBDA without the permission of the trial court.LSBDA maintain that Seville and the heirs have not shown that the land had previously been classifiedas alienable and disposable. Absent such classification, they argue that possession of it, no matterhow long, could not ripen into ownership.

Issue: Who is the owner of the subject land?

Held: The LSBDA.

Under the Regalian doctrine, all the lands of the public domain belong to the State, which is the sourceof any asserted right to ownership of land. All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly withinprivate ownership are presumed to belong to the State. In Menguito v. Republic, the court held thatunless public land is shown to have been reclassified or alienated to a private person by the State, itremains part of the inalienable public domain. Indeed, occupation thereof in the concept of owner, nomatter how long, cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a title. To overcome suchpresumption, incontrovertible evidence must be shown by the applicant. Absent such evidence, theland sought to be registered remains inalienable.

A person in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of a public land for more than thirtyyears acquires an imperfect title thereto.

Petitioners had no certificate of title over the disputed property. Although they claim that their titlewas based on acquisitive prescription, they fail to present incontrovertible proof that the land hadpreviously been classified as alienable. They simply brush aside the conclusion of the CA on thiscrucial point by saying that it was without factual basis. Instead, they maintain that the privatecharacter of the land was evidenced by various tax declarations, Deeds of Sale, and Decisions of thetrial court and even the Supreme Court.

Petitioners arguments are not convincing. Tax declarations are not conclusive proofs of ownership, letalone of the private character of the land. At best, they are merely indicia of a claim of ownership. InSpouses Palomo v. CA, the Court also rejected tax declarations as proof of private ownership, absentany showing that the forest land in question had been reclassified as alienable.

Equally unmeritous is the argument of petitioners that the title of LSBDA is void. As earlier stated, theyclaim that such title was derived from Calixtra Yap, who was allegedly not the owner of the property.Petitioners assume that LSBDA, having acquired the rights of Yap, resorted to a confirmation of herimperfect title under Section 48 of the Public Land Act. This argument is devoid of factual or legalbasis.

Petitioners fail to consider that the title of LSBDA was based, not on the conveyance made by Yap, buton Miscellaneous Sales Patent No. 9353 issued by the director of the Bureau of Lands. In fact, after

LSBDA had filed an application for patent, the Bureau of Lands conducted an investigation and foundthat the land was part of the public domain. After compliance with the notice and publicationrequirements, LSBDA acquired the property in a public auction conducted by the Bureau of Lands.

Petitioners insist, however, that LSBDA was estopped from claiming that the land was public, becausethe Deed of Sale executed by Yap in its favor stipulated that the seller is the absolute owner in feesimple of the xxx described property. It is scarcely necessary to address this point. To begin with, thepower to classify a land as alienable belongs to the State, not to private entities. Hence, thepronouncements of Yap or LSBDA cannot effect the reclassification of the property. Moreover, theassailed misrepresentation was made by Yap as seller. Hence, objections thereto should be raised notby petitioners but by LSBDA, the contracting party obviously aggrieved.

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In any case, the actions of LSBDA after Yaps conveyance demonstrated its position that the disputedland was part of the public domain. That this was so can be inferred from LSBDAs subsequentapplication for a Miscellaneous Sales Patent and, in a public auction, its purchase of the property fromthe Bureau of Lands. Indeed, Yap merely conveyed a claim, not a title which she did not have.

[G.R. No. 122824. September 26, 2001]

AURORA F. IGNACIO vs. VALERIANO BASILIO

Land Registration Case (LRC) No. 1489 74 applicants for registration of two large parcels of landsituated in barrios (now barangays) Rosario and Maybunga, Pasig, with the then Court of First Instance(CFI) of Rizal, Branch 1. The trial court rendered judgment adjudicating the entire 29 lots of Psu-107981 in various undivided shares to the barrios (now barangays) of Rosario and Maybunga of Pasig,the heirs of __ etc.

LRC No. N-164-M - private respondent Valeriano Basilio filed LRC No. N-164-M with the CFI ofRizal, Branch 15, for the registration in his name. CFI affirmed Basilios title over the Lots. CFI orderedthe Land Registration Authority to issue a decree of registration and an Original Certificate of Title(OCT) in favor of Valeriano Basilio. Pursuant to Decree No. N-137158, OCT No. 9010 was issued infavor of Valeriano Basilio, who proceeded to subdivide the lots and sell the same to various purchaserswho relied upon his clean title to the properties.

Petitioner then filed CA-G.R. SP No. 16830 with the appellate court for the annulment of the decisionin LRC No. N-164-M, contending that the defunct CFI of Rizal, Branch 15, never acquired jurisdictionover the subject matter of LRC No. N-164-M, since said lots fell under LRC No. 1489, a case that wasfiled and decided earlier.

ISSUE: Did the Court of Appeals err in not declaring the proceedings in LRC No. N-164-M before thedefunct CFI of Rizal, Branch 15, null and void for want of jurisdiction?

It is contended that the proceedings in LRC No. N-164-M before the then CFI of Rizal, Branch 15, isindeed void for want of jurisdiction because the applications for registration in LRC No. N-164-M were

filed only in 1971 or thirty (30) years after the former CFI of Rizal, Branch 1, had acquired jurisdictionover the disputed property with the institution of LRC No. 1489 in 1941. Admittedly a court which firstvalidly acquires jurisdiction, takes it to the exclusion of the other courts. [2] However, certain legalconsiderations militate against a doctrinaire application of the foregoing principles with regard to theproceedings in LRC No. N-164-M.

First, land registration proceedings are actions in rem. It is not necessary to give personal notice tothe owners or claimants of the land sought to be registered, to vest the court with authority over theres. Instead, it is the publication of notice of the application for registration which serves to apprisethe whole world that such petition has been filed and whosoever is minded to oppose it, may do sowithin 30 days before the date set by the court for hearing the petition. It is the publication of suchnotice that brings in the whole world as a party and vests the court with jurisdiction to hear the case.[3] In this case, petitioner did not oppose the institution of LRC No. N-164-M, despite notice by

publication. Failing to oppose the same at its institution, petitioner is now estopped to contest thevalidity of the decree issued in LRC No. N-164-M.

Second, as a proceeding in rem, the decree of registration issued in land registration cases is bindingupon and conclusive against the entire world. [4] Under Section 38 [5] of the Land Registration Act(Act No. 496), which was the law in force at the time of the institution of LRC No. N-164-M, petitionerhad one year after the entry of the decree to file a petition for review. However, he failed to contestsaid entry. Thus he is bound now by the rule that upon the expiration of one year, every certificate oftitle issued in accordance with Act No. 496 shall be incontrovertible.

Worthy of note, despite the foregoing rule, petitioner is not without a remedy. The landowner whoseproperty has been wrongfully registered in anothers name, after the one year period, could not ask

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the Court to set aside the decree, but he could bring an ordinary action for damages if, as in this case,the property has passed unto the hands of innocent purchasers for value.

[G.R. No. 117734. February 22, 2001]

VICENTE G. DIVINA,petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and VILMA GAJO-SY, respondents.

FACTS:

Lot No. 1893 located at Gubat, Sorsogon, was originally owned by Antonio Berosa (Tax No. 13038). OnJuly 22, 1960, he sold it to Teotimo Berosa (Tax No. 13039). Then Teotimo sold it to Jose Gamos.

On April 26, 1960, Gamos acquired from the heirs of Felix Arimado, a boundary owner of Lot 1893,a 20,687 sq. m. parcel of land identified as Lot 1466, also in Gubat. It adjoins Lot 1893. On March 28,1961, Gamos had these two parcels of land under Tax Declaration No. 13237 and declared it had atotal area of 4.0867 hectares. He also had the property resurveyed by private land surveyor Antonio

Tiotangco. In 1967, Tax Declaration No. 13237 was cancelled by Tax Declaration No. 9032 in Gamosname.

On November 23, 1968, Tax Declaration No. 12927 which cancelled Tax Declaration No. 9032 was

secured by Gamos and declared therein that the area of the consolidated property was 10.0034hectares with 2500 sq. m. planted to coconut, 3.8187 irrigated for rice planting and 5.9347 werethickets.

On January 19, 1967, Teotimo Berosa conveyed to Vicente G. Divina, herein petitioner, a portion of Lot1893 referred to as Lot 1893-B.

On November 28, 1968, two years from the date of said sale and five (5) days after November 23,1968, when Gamos secured Tax Declaration No. 12927 declaring the consolidated property ascontaining 100,034 sq. m., the deed of sale was registered. An undated Subdivision PLAN of Lot1893, was prepared for petitioner. The plan, without Bureau of Lands approval, showed that Lot 1893was divided into two, Lot 1893-A and Lot 1893-B.

On July 24, 1970 Gamos sold the consolidated property to private respondent Vilma Gajo-Sy, forP20,000.00.

On August 28, 1972, she filed an application for registration of title to the property. The applicationwas amended on March 8, 1973, on order of Branch II of the said court to include therein the postaladdress of Inocencio Erpe, adjoining owner of Lot No. 1893 described in Plan AP-9021.

The land registration court, by Decision of July 29, 1975, ordered the registration of privaterespondents title over Lots Nos. 1466 and 1893.

On July 13, 1977, pending issuance of the final decree of registration petitioner filed before the samecourt a Petition for Review of the July 29, 1975 judgment. He alleged that he is the owner of a portion

of Lot 1893 consisting of 54,818 sq. m. conveyed to him by Teotimo Berosa on January 19, 1967; thathe was unaware of the registration proceedings on Lot 1893 due to private respondents failure to givehim notice and post any notice in the subject lot; and that private respondent fraudulentlymisrepresented herself as the owner of the disputed portion despite her knowledge that anotherperson had acquired the same.

Private respondent opposed the petition alleging that the registration case had long become final andthe court no longer had any jurisdiction thereon; and that lack of personal notice to the petitioner ofthe registration proceedings did not constitute actual fraud.

The trial court, in its Decision dated June 7, 1979, found that the petition for review was timely filed. Italso ruled that the failure of private respondent to include a known claimant in her application for

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registration constituted deliberate misrepresentation that the lot subject of her application is notcontested when in fact it was. Private respondent, according to the trial court, should have included inher application at least the person of petitioners cousin, Elena Domalaon who had, beforerespondent filed her application for registration, made known to the latters sister her apprehension oftheir land being included in respondents application for registration. This misrepresentation,according to the court, amounted to fraud within the contemplation of Section 38 of Act 496. The trialcourt in its decision disposed as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:

(a) Setting aside the Decision rendered in the land registration case and revoking the order for theissuance of a Decree;

(b) Declaring petitioner Vicente G. Divina the owner of the portion of the land applied for containing anarea of 54,818 square meters which is described in paragraph 3 of the Petition for Review of

Judgment; and

(c) Allowing this land registration case to proceed as to the portion applied for which is outside thelimits of the portion herein awarded to the petitioner Vicente G. Divina; and

(d) Ordering a subdivision survey of the lots applied for, delimiting therein the area not contested andwhich is registrable in favor of applicant Vilma Gajo-Sy, and the area herein adjudicated to petitionerVicente G. Divina, as to whom the land registration proceedings shall likewise be allowed to proceedafter he shall have adduced such other evidence as are appropriate in land registration cases.

The CA reversed the trial court and dismissed the petition. It ruled:

In the case at bar, petitioner-appellee did not indeed appear in the survey plan as an adjoining ownerof the subject property. Neither was he a known claimant or possessor of the questioned portion ofLot 1893 which was found by the court a quo to be untouched and thickly plantedwith bigaho. A fortiori, there was no need to mention in the application for registration theapprehension or claim of at least petitioner-appellees cousin Evelyn (sic) Domalaon inthe application for registration, nor to personally notify Elena about registration proceeding.

There could, therefore, have been no misrepresentation in any form on the part of respondent-appellee.

ISSUE:

Whether or not, there was deliberate misrepresentation constituting actual fraud on privaterespondents part when she failed to give or post notice to petitioner of her application for registrationof the contested land, such that it was error for the trial court to declare private respondent owner ofthe disputed land.

RULING: YES

Both the trial and appellate courts found that petitioners name did not appear in the survey plan asan adjacent owner, nor claimant nor possessor. However, the trial and appellate courts differed intheir conclusion on whether or not there was deliberate misrepresentation constituting fraud in privaterespondents part when it failed to give notice or post notice to potential claimant and include theirnames in the application for registration. The trial court said there was, but the appellate courtdisagreed.

Section 15 of P.D. 1529[12] is explicit in requiring that in the application for registration of land titles,the application shall also state the full names and addresses of all occupants of the land and those ofthe adjoining owners if known, and if not known, it shall state the extent of the search made to findthem.As early as Francisco vs. Court of Appeals, 97 SCRA 22 [1980] we emphasized that a merestatement of the lack of knowledge of the names of the occupants and adjoining owners is notsufficient but what search has been made to find them is necessary. The trial court was correct

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when it took notice that respondents sister Lydia Gajo-Anonuevo admitted that she had aconversation with petitioners cousin Elena Dumalaon about the latters apprehension that their landmay have been included in respondents application for registration of the disputed land.Respondents omission of this material information prevented petitioner from having his day incourt. The trial court in its decision more than amply supported its conclusion with jurisprudence tothe effect that it is fraud to knowingly omit or conceal a fact upon which benefit is obtained to theprejudice of a third person. Such omission can not but be deliberate misrepresentation constitutingfraud, a basis for allowing a petition for review of judgment under Section 38 of Act No. 496, The LandRegistration Act.

Additionally, it should be noted that petitioner acquired the bigger portion of Lot 1893 long after theinitial survey of Barrio San Ignacio. Teotimo Berosa sold Lot 1893 to Jose P. Gamos who in turn sold itto respondent in 1970. Clearly, going by the records, petitioners name would not be found on thesaid survey plan approved by the Bureau of Lands in 1961, years before his purchase of the portion ofLot 1893. Petitioners claim is clearly meritorious.

Republic v. Candy Maker, Inc.

Sometime in 1998, Candy Maker, Inc. decided to purchase Lot No. 3138 Cad. 688 of the Cainta-TaytayCadastre, a parcel of land located below the reglementary lake elevation of 12.50 meters, about 900meters away from the Laguna de Bay, and bounded on the southwest by the Manggahan Floodway,and on the southeast by a legal easement.

On April 1, 1998, Geodetic Engineer Potenciano H. Fernandez, prepared and signed a Subdivision Planof the property for Apolonio Cruz. The property was subdivided into two lots: Lot No. 3138-A with anarea of 10,971 square meters, and Lot No. 3138-B with an area of 239 square meters. The technicaldescription of Lot No. 3138 was also prepared by Fernandez, and was approved by the Regional

Technical Director of the Bureau of Lands on April 14, 1998.

On April 29, 1999, Antonio, Eladia, and Felisa, all surnamed Cruz, executed a Deed of Absolute Sale infavor of Candy Maker, Inc. The buyer declared Lot No. 3138 for taxation purposes in 1999 under TaxDeclaration Nos. 004-18929, 004-18930 and 004-18931.

On June 16, 1999, Candy Maker, Inc., as applicant, filed an application with the MTC of Taytay, Rizal,for the registration of its alleged title over Lot No. 3138-A and Lot No. 3138-B under PresidentialDecree (P.D.) No. 1529.

Acting thereon, the MTC issued an Orderon June 18, 1999 directing the applicant to cause thepublication of the notice of initial hearing and for the Deputy Sheriff to post the same. TheAdministrator of the Land Registration Authority (LRA) and the Directors of the Land ManagementBureau (LMB) and Forest Management Bureau (FMB) were also instructed to submit their respectivereports on the status of the parcels of land before the initial hearing scheduled on October 29, 1999.

The Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer (CENRO) of Antipolo City filed on August18, 1999 his Report declaring that "the land falls within the Alienable and Disposable Zone, underLand Classification Project No. 5-A, per L.C. Map No. 639 certified released on March 11, 1927 and thatthe property is the subject of CENRO Case No. 520(97) entitled Perpetua San Jose v. Almario Cruz. Onthe other hand, the LRA, in its September 21, 1999 Report, recommended the exclusion of Lot No.3138-B on the ground that it is a legal easement and intended for public use, hence, inalienable and

indisposable.

On December 15, 1999, applicant amended its petition to include only Lot. 3138-A.

On July 20, 2001, the Republic of the Philippines, the LLDA filed its Opposition to the AmendedApplication in which it alleged that the lot subject of the application for registration may not bealienated and disposed since it is considered part of the Laguna Lake bed, a public land within its

jurisdiction pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 4850, as amended. According to the LLDA, theprojection of Lot No. 3138-A, Cad-688-D Csd-04-018302 in its topographic map based on theMemorandum of Engineer Christopher Pedrezuela of the Engineering and Construction Division of theLLDA indicated that it is 'located below the reglementary lake elevation of 12.50 meters referred todatum 10.00 meters below mean lower water and under Section 41(11) of R.A. No. 4850, the propertyis a public land which forms part of the bed of the Laguna Lake.

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Issue: WHETHER THE LAND IN QUESTION MAYBE THE SUBJECT OF REGISTRATION.

Ruling: NO.

Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, provides:

SEC. 14.Who may apply. 'The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance [nowRegional Trial Court] an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through theirduly authorized representatives:

(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the publicdomain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier (emphasis supplied).

Applicants for confirmation of imperfect title must, therefore, prove the following: (a) that the landforms part of the disposable and alienable agricultural lands of the public domain; and (b) that theyhave been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the same undera bona fide claim of ownership either since time immemorial or since June 12, 1945.

In this case, the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office, Antipolo Rizal, certified thatthe property falls within the Alienable and Disposable zone, under Land Classification Project No. 5-A,per L.C. Map No. 639 certified released on March 11, 1927. However, under R.A. No. 4850 which wasapproved on July 18, 1966, lands located at and below the maximum lake level of elevation of the

Laguna de Bay are public lands which form part of the bed of said lake.As gleaned from the Survey Report of Magalonga, Polanco and Medenilla of the LLDA based on theocular inspection dated September 14, 2001 as well as the Memorandum of Engineer ChristopherPedrezuela, the property is located below the reglementary level of 12.50 m.; hence, part of the bed othe Laguna de Bay, and, as such, is public land.

Property of the public domain is beyond the commerce of man and not susceptible of privateappropriation and acquisitive prescription. Occupation thereof in the concept of owner no matter howlong cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a title.

Under R.A. No. 4850 and the issuances of LLDA, registerable rights acquired by occupants before theeffectivity of the law are recognized. However, the respondent failed to adduce proof that itspredecessors-in-interest had acquired registerable title over the property before July 18, 1966:

First. Cruz failed to prove how his parents acquired ownership of the property, and even failed tomention the names of his grandparents. He likewise failed to present his father's death certificate tosupport his claim that the latter died in 1980. There is likewise no evidence when his mother died.

Second. Cruz also failed to adduce in evidence the extrajudicial partition allegedly executed by hisparents in 1980 where the property was supposedly deeded to him and his sisters, Felisa and Eladia,to the exclusion of their five siblings.

Third. Cruz claimed that he and his parents cultivated the property and planted palay and vegetablesand that they had been paying the realty taxes over the property before his parents died. However, notax declarations under the names of the spouses Apolonio Cruz and/or Eladia Cruz and his siblingswere presented, or realty tax receipts evidencing payment of such taxes.

Fourth. When he testified on October 5, 2001, Antonio Cruz declared that he was '74 years old.[82]Hemust have been born in 1927, and was thus merely 10 years old in 1937.It is incredible that, at thatage, he was already cultivating the property with his father.Moreover, no evidence was presented toprove how many cavans of palay were planted on the property, as well as the extent of suchcultivation, in order to support the claim of possession with a bona fide claim of ownership.

Fifth. Cruz testified that he hired a worker 'upahan to help him cultivate the property.He, however,failed to state the name of the worker or to even present him as witness for the respondent.