ISTORIATIMPULUIPREZENT

Colecþie coordonatã deADRIAN CIOROIANU

Ileana Racheru, Stanislav Secrieru, Angela Grãmadã

Caucazul de Sud dupã 20 de ani

Regimuri politice, securitate ºi energie

South Caucasus20 Years After

Political Regimes, Security, and Energy

BUCUREªTI, 2012

Ileana Racheru este absolventã a masterului de RelaþiiInternaþionale, Facultatea de ªtiinþe Politice, Universitateadin Bucureºti. În prezent, este doctorandã a ªcolii Doctoralede ªtiinþe Politice a Universitãþii din Bucureºti. Este autoa-rea unei dizertaþii cu titlul „Dezbateri de politicã externã înrelaþiile UE ºi ale Rusiei cu Georgia ºi Ucraina“ ºi a mai mul-tor articole academice despre relaþiile României cu statele dinCaucazul de Sud. A scris numeroase articole despre evoluþiilepolitice ºi de securitate din spaþiul ex-sovietic în revistele 22ºi Foreign Policy Romania, prilej cu care a realizat interviuri cudiplomaþi, experþi, decidenþi ºi lideri politici regionali.

Stanislav Secrieru este bursier la Colegiul Noua Europã încadrul programului “Black Sea Link Fellowship” ºi cercetãtorasociat la Centrul de Studii Est-Europene ºi Asiatice (Bucu-reºti). Este doctor in ªtiinþe Politice (SNSPA). A desfãºuratcercetãri la NATO Defense College (Rome) ºi Institute forEuropean Politics (Berlin). A colaborat în proiecte de cerce-tare cu European Council on Foreign Relations (Londra),DemosEuropa (Varºovia), Europeum (Praga), Heinrich BöllFoundation (Berlin), Finnish Institute for InternationalAffairs (Helsinki). Domenii de interes major: politica internãºi externã rusã, relaþiile UE-Rusia, politica europeanã devecinãtate.

Angela Grãmadã este doctorandã în ªtiinþe Politice, spe-cializarea Relaþii Internaþionale, ªcoala Naþionalã de StudiiPolitice ºi Administrative, Bucureºti, ºi licenþiatã în RelaþiiEconomice Internaþionale, Institutul Relaþii Internaþionale„Perspectiva“, Chiºinãu (2004). Este cercetãtor la Centrul deStudii Est-Europene ºi Asiatice, Bucureºti. Interesele de cer-cetare prioritare sunt orientate spre studiul evoluþiei rapor-turilor dintre Federaþia Rusã, Statele Unite ale Americii ºiUniunea Europeanã în spaþiul ex-sovietic, al proceselor dedemocratizare din Republica Moldova, Ucraina ºi Georgia,al politicii europene de vecinãtate, precum ºi spre studiulredefinirii geopolitice a spaþiului ex-sovietic.

Ileana Racheru, Stanislav Secrieru, Angela Grãmadã

Caucazul de Sud dupã 20 de ani

Regimuri politice, securitate ºi energieDescrierea CIP a Bibliotecii Naþionale a României

RACHERU, ILEANACaucazul de Sud dupã 20 de ani : regimuri politice,securitate ºi energie = South Caucasus 20 years After :Political Regimes, Security and Energy / Ileana Racheru,Stanislav Secrieru, Angela Grãmadã ; pref.: Octavian Manea ;trad.: Mihnea Gafiþa. - Bucureºti : Curtea Veche Publishing,2012

ISBN 978-606-588-274-4

I. Secrieru, StanislavII. Grãmadã, AngelaIII. Manea, Octavian (pref.)IV. Gafiþa, Mihnea (trad.)

94(479)32.01(479)

Coperta: S.C. TRI DESIGN S.R.L.

© CURTEA VECHE PUBLISHING, 2012 pentru prezenta ediþie

ISBN 978-606-588-274-4

Cuprins

Mulþumiri ...................................................................... 11Introducere .................................................................... 13

Regimuri politice în Caucazul de sud.Democraþia care ascunde autoritarismecompetitive (Ileana Racheru) .................................... 19

Ce este autoritarismul competitiv? ......................... 22

GeorgiaAlegerile democratice, marele succes al revoluþiei

trandafirilor ................................................................ 23MNU, atotputernicã în politica georgianã .................. 27Scena politicã georgianã între revoluþie ºi reformã ..... 27Elite noi, reþele clientare de putere noi ........................ 29Mass-media — convieþuire imposibilã cu regimul

politic .......................................................................... 31Societatea civilã, singura voce criticã la adresa

regimului .................................................................... 34Democraþia care limiteazã presiunile Rusiei ................ 37

Aceastã carte a fost realizatã în cadrul programului„Promovarea valorilor europene în bazinul Mãrii Negre“al Fundaþiei Soros România. Îmbunãtãþirea dialogului ºi acooperãrii între organizaþiile societãþii civile de pe þãrmurileestic ºi vestic ale Mãrii Negre reprezintã prioritatea acestuiprogram, prin care dorim sã contribuim la cunoaºtereareciprocã a societãþilor din regiune, precum ºi la dezvoltareaunei conºtiinþe ºi adeziuni faþã de un spaþiu european extins,perceput ca un areal comun de valori ºi principii sociale ºipolitice.

Scopul programului este de a încuraja cunoaºterea reci-procã ºi o apropiere între societãþile civile din regiune prinstabilirea unor legãturi puternice ºi schimburi de resurseintelectuale între Fundaþia Soros România ºi alte organizaþiidin România, pe de o parte, ºi organizaþii similare dinArmenia, Azerbaijan ºi Georgia, pe de altã parte.

Sergiu PanainteCoordonator Programe

1.4.2. Est ....................................................................... 861.4.3. Vest ..................................................................... 871.4.4. Sud ...................................................................... 89

II. Dinamica intraregionalã în Caucazul de Sud ...................................................... 91

2.1. Armenia-Azerbaidjan: pace improbabilã, rãzboi posibil ................................................................ 91

2.2. Georgia-Armenia: „resetarea“ pragmatismului ......... 1002.3. Azerbaidjan-Georgia: tot mai aproape ...................... 109

III. Caucazul de Sud: raporturile cu puterileregionale .................................................................. 116

3.1. Armenia: complementaritatea variabilã .................... 1163.1.1. Rusia ................................................................. 1173.1.2. Iran .................................................................... 1213.1.3. SUA ................................................................... 1243.1.4. UE ..................................................................... 1263.1.5. Turcia ................................................................ 1293.2. Azerbaidjan: independenþã strategicã

prin multivectorism ...................................................... 1323.2.1. Turcia ................................................................ 1333.2.2. Rusia ................................................................. 1363.2.3. SUA ................................................................... 1403.2.4. UE ..................................................................... 1423.2.5. Iran .................................................................... 1453.3. Georgia: spre Occident ............................................ 1483.3.1. SUA ................................................................... 1493.3.2. UE ..................................................................... 1523.3.3. Turcia ................................................................ 1563.3.4. Iran .................................................................... 1593.3.5. Rusia ................................................................. 161

Concluzii ..................................................................... 166Bibliografie .................................................................. 167

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Armenia ........................................................................ 38Alegerile care reconfirmã acelaºi câºtigãtor .................. 39Un regim legitimat de conflictul din

Nagorno-Karabah ....................................................... 43Drepturi ºi libertãþi, doar dupã dorinþa discreþionarã

a regimului politic ...................................................... 44Mass-media de la putere ºi presa de opoziþie .............. 47Sprijinul Rusiei este indispensabil, UE este

prea departe ............................................................... 49

Azerbaidjan .................................................................. 51Alegerile care au întotdeauna rezultatul cunoscut ....... 51PNA — rege pe scena politicã de la Baku ................... 52Corupþia care funcþioneazã perfect .............................. 54Drepturi ºi libertãþi cu existenþã precarã ..................... 56Mass-media nu poate fi decât la putere în

Azerbaidjan ................................................................ 59Un petrostat atotputernic ............................................. 61

Concluzii ....................................................................... 62Bibliografie .................................................................... 64

Geometrie variabilã în acþiune:politica externã ºi de securitateîn Caucazul de Sud (Stanislav Secrieru) ............. 69

Introducere .................................................................... 71

I. Problema regionalitãþii Caucazului de Sud ........ 721.1. De la Transcaucazia la Caucazul de Sud ................... 721.2. Este Caucazul de Sud o regiune? ................................ 731.3. Caucazul de Sud — un complex subregional

de securitate .................................................................. 781.4. Caucazul de Sud în contextul eurasiatic ..................... 821.4.1. Nord .................................................................... 84

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Caucazul de Sud între economie politicã ºipoliticã energeticã (Angela Grãmadã) ................ 183

I. Contextul macroeconomic de dezvoltarea regiunii ................................................................... 185

1. Promovarea reformelor economice — între necesitateºi incapacitate ............................................................. 187

2. Importanþa dezvoltãrii mediului de afaceri ºi factorii care influenþeazã evoluþia lui ........................................ 206

II. Economia politicilor energetice în Caucazul de Sud .................................................. 211

1. Resurse energetice, economie ºi politici energetice ........... 2132. Proiecte energetice ºi coridoare de transport

în Caucazul de Sud ..................................................... 227

Concluzii ..................................................................... 246Bibliografie .................................................................. 247

Mulþumiri

Studiul de faþã are peste 200 de pagini, numãr care estemult mai mic decât mulþimea cuvintelor de Mulþumim! /Ñïàñèáî! / Thank you! pe care autorii trebuie sã le adresezecelor care au fãcut posibile susþinerea financiarã, cãlãtoria ºidocumentarea în Caucazul de Sud.

Prin interviurile realizate în cele trei capitale caucaziene,am avut prilejul de a intra în contact cu elitele intelectualegeorgiene, azere sau armene, specialiºtii cei mai cunoscuþi aizonei, care ne-au împãrtãºit informaþii importante ºi ineditedespre actorii statali ai regiunii. Am discutat cu jurnaliºti deseamã de la cele mai importante publicaþii, care ne-au permissã cunoaºtem lumea presei caucaziene ºi sã înþelegem specifi-cul relaþiilor dintre mass-media ºi regimurile politice. Ne-amîntâlnit ºi am discutat cu reprezentanþii societãþii civile, de lacare am obþinut o descriere a imaginii ONG-urilor care în-cearcã sã clãdeascã democraþia în regimuri politice ostile.

Am intrat în contact cu membri ai parlamentului,miniºtri sau alþi oficiali de rang înalt care ne-au arãtat cumfuncþionezã elaborarea politicilor, cum gândesc elitele con-ducãtoare în Caucazul de Sud.

Am discutat cu oficialii europeni din regiune de la care amaflat ce înseamnã negocierile diplomatice în Caucazul de Sudºi am obþinut informaþii necunoscute publicului larg despreregimurile politice din Armenia, Georgia ºi Azerbaidjan.

Introducere

Discursul public din România abundã în referinþe despreCaucazul de Sud, dar perspectiva asupra regiunii este mereuredusã la câteva teme constante: Georgia, rãzboiul dinaugust 2008, sursã vitalã pentru asigurarea securitãþii ener-getice a Europei. Demersul autorilor reinventeazã discursuldespre Caucaz în spaþiul românesc, oferind o radiografiepoliticã, economicã ºi de securitate a regiunii. Destinat insti-tuþiilor care articuleazã politica externã a României faþã deregiune ºi experþilor din societatea civilã, studiul realizat subegida Fundaþiei Soros devine, totodatã, un instrument ºi olecturã obligatorie pentru jurnaliºtii ºi studenþii care vor sãînþeleagã complexitatea unei regiuni esenþiale pentru secu-ritatea Europei. Demersul analitic se fundamenteazã peaplicarea celor mai recente perspective de interpretare dinliteratura de specialitate asupra evoluþiilor politice ºi eco-nomice din Caucazul de Sud. Însã cel mai semnificativaspect este faptul cã autorii au mers on the ground, la firulierbii, materia lor primã fiind regiunea însãºi. Au avut posi-bilitatea sã acceseze, prin interviurile fãcute la Erevan, Bakuºi Tbilisi în perioada mai-iunie 2011, experþii din ONG-uri,formatorii de opinie, dar ºi tehnocraþii din birocraþia guver-namentalã (uneori pânã la cel mai înalt nivel).

Prima parte a studiului, redactatã de Ileana Racheru,se concentreazã pe radiografia politicã a regiunii. Din per-spectiva tipologiei regimurilor politice, Caucazul de Sud

Am aflat din simple conversaþii ºi plimbãri prin Erevan,Baku ºi Tbilisi cum gândesc, cum trãiesc ºi care sunt obice-iurile armenilor, azerilor ºi georgienilor.

Mulþumim! / Ñïàñèáî! / Thank you! tuturor celor care auacceptat sã fie intervievaþi pentru studiu, pentru cã ne-aualocat o parte din timpul lor ºi pentru rãbdarea cu care aurãspuns întrebãrilor noastre.

Mulþumim! Soros Romania pentru iniþiativa unicã ºi pen-tru cã ne-a selectat pentru a scrie primul studiu românescdespre evoluþiile politice ºi economice din Caucazul de Sud,bazat pe documentarea directã la Tbilisi, Baku ºi Erevan.

Ñïàñèáî! / Thank you! Open Society Georgia, OpenSociety Azerbaijan, Open Society Erevan pentru agendelede interviuri, transport, acomodare.

Ileana RacheruStanislav SecrieruAngela Grãmadã

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ºi al sensibilitãþilor de securitate. Din perspectiva relaþiilorinternaþionale, Caucazul de Sud reprezintã un „complexsubregional de securitate“ coagulat în jurul unei relaþii desumã zero (Armenia ºi Azerbaidjan), la care se adaugã oserie întreagã de raporturi de cooperare pragmaticã saucompetiþie conjuncturalã pe diverse compartimente întreGeorgia ºi Armenia ºi Georgia ºi Azerbaidjan. Natura inter-acþiunilor dintre statele complexului subregional formeazãun veritabil puzzle al interdependenþei: Georgia este o piesãvitalã pentru funcþionarea Armeniei (70-75% din tranzitulcomercial al Armeniei acoperã teritoriul georgian, iar portulPoti este o verigã esenþialã în asigurarea securitãþii alimen-tare; în plus, accesul Armeniei la internet depinde tot deracordarea sa la teritoriul georgian); în acelaºi timp, Georgiadepinde maximal de livrãrile de gaz din Azerbaidjan, întimp ce accesul azer spre piaþa europeanã se face prin infra-structura care traverseazã teritoriul Georgiei. Interacþiuneacu puterile adiacente Caucazului de Sud are, de asemenea,un impact deosebit de semnificativ în interiorul complexu-lui local de securitate. De cele mai multe ori, instinctulstatelor din regiune este acela de a-ºi externaliza securitateaprin curtarea unei mari puteri capabile sã le ofere garanþii deapãrare: dacã pentru Georgia conteazã apropierea de struc-turile de securitate europene (în special NATO ºi SUA caoffshore balancer), pentru Armenia garanþia securitãþii salerãmâne Rusia, sub umbrela organizaþiei de apãrare colectivãOTCS. ªi Azerbaidjanul, deºi mult mai autosuficient,cautã sprijin în domeniul securitãþii, prin tratatul cu Turciaºi relaþia bilateralã militarã cu SUA. Studiul aratã însã cã,dupã rãzboiul din august 2008, spaþiul de manevrã macro-regional al Georgiei este unul tot mai îngust. Este o realitateconsolidatã de politicile contradictorii ale unor state euro-pene care au sprijinit vânzarea de heliporturi Mistral Rusiei,dar ºi de tot mai evidenta îndepãrtare a Turciei de UniuneaEuropeanã. Pentru Tbilisi, intenþiile regionale ale Ankareisunt tot mai neclare, Turcia nemaifiind perceputã ca o puterecare proiecteazã interesele Occidentului.

reuneºte state care consacrã autoritarismul competitiv caformulã predilectã de guvernare. Este în ADN-ul regimurilorlocale sã colonizeze ºi sã mobilizeze statul în folosul puterii,înclinând balanþa structural în defavoarea opoziþiei ºiîngrãdind, totodatã, posibilitãþile opoziþiei de a participa laalegeri. Societatea pare ontologic plasatã într-un raport ine-gal, de subordonare faþã de stat ºi de regimul aflat la putere.În Georgia, deºi formal existã presã independentã, totuºiputerea a gãsit imediat mijloacele de a influenþa conþinutuleditorial prin crearea unei reþele extinse de investitori apro-piaþi regimului care sã o controleze. Efectul? Convertirea saîntr-o portavoce a puterii. În Armenia, mediul alternativstatului, non-guvernamental, este prea slab pentru a coagu-la în jurul sãu o masã criticã democraticã. Activismul civicreuneºte mai degrabã o elitã izolatã, care nu penetreazã ºinu are aderenþã la populaþia obiºnuitã. Imaginea regimuluicondus de preºedintele Aliev, verificatã empiric în ministe-rele de la Baku, pare desprinsã direct din depeºele Wikileaks:este un regim construit pe loialitãþi personale care au trecutproba timpului. În Azerbaidjan, figura centralã în arhitec-tura puterii e preºedintele Aliev, care, dupã modelul tatãluisãu, „încearcã sã pãstreze puterea în familie ºi înþelegeputerea statului ca pe o afacere de familie“. Conºtient delimitele puterii sale, Aliev este un tactician abil, dar înacelaºi timp ºi un foarte iscusit acrobat printre alianþe carese exclud. Face o distincþie clarã între ceea ce este personalºi ceea ce înseamnã business. Preºedintele Aliev promoveazão politicã externã echilibratã, combinând deschiderea cãtreNATO ºi UE cu mãsuri de conciliere a marilor puteri vecine,Rusia ºi Iranul. Dimpotrivã, pe plan intern este o persona-litate impulsivã, care are o încredere oarbã în guvernareaprin forþã ºi coerciþie. În aceeaºi logicã, orice provocarepoliticã este perceputã de Aliev ca o ameninþare existenþialãla adresa dinastiei sale politice.

A doua parte, redactatã de Stanislav Secrieru, descriecomplexitatea raporturilor regionale de la nivelul politicilor

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care sã asigure fundarea unui sistem regional stabil ºi care sãse concentreze pe cooperarea intraregionalã. Dar oare suntcapabile statele din Caucazul de Sud sã accepte concesiilenecesare pentru a-ºi crea propriul model caucazian de inte-grare?

Studiul Caucazul de Sud dupã 20 de ani: Regimuri politice,securitate ºi energie este realizat în cadrul programului„Promovarea valorilor europene în bazinul Mãrii Negre“ alFundaþiei Soros România. Agenda programului urmãreºtereducerea deficitului de cunoaºtere despre Caucazul de Sudîn rândurile elitelor politice, administrative, academice ºijurnalistice româneºti, pe de o parte, încercând plasareatematicii pe agenda instituþiilor publice de profil — Preºe-dinþia României, Ministerul Afacerilor Externe — ºi trans-formarea ei într-un subiect de interes public, pe de altã parte.Fiind la graniþa esticã a Uniunii Europene, România poateºi trebuie sã devinã un liant între Caucaz ºi restul Uniunii.Din aceastã perspectivã, studiul e destinat inclusiv factorilorde decizie de la nivel european, care pot sprijini ºi încurajacandidatura României la rolul de coordonator al politicilorcomunitare în regiune.

Octavian Manea,Redactor politicã externã

Foreign Policy România ºi Revista 22

Ultima parte, redactatã de Angela Grãmadã, oferã oprezentare economicã a Caucazului de Sud. Studiul evi-denþiazã rolul foarte important pe care îl joacã în politica ºieconomia regiunii structurile de putere oligarhice ºi mono-poliste. O constantã sud-caucazianã ar fi aceea cã deciziileeconomice ºi politice sunt decisiv influenþate de intereseleunor grupuri private coagulate în monopoluri ºi oligopoluri.Deºi structural se prezintã ca o realitate comunã, existã de-sigur o serie de nuanþe naþionale specifice: dacã în Georgiaºi Armenia oligarhia este prezentã deopotrivã la guvernareºi în opoziþie, în Azerbaidjan opoziþia nu are în spatele sãuoligarhi care sã le sprijine iniþiativele. În cele din urmã, toþiaceºti parametri biologici ai mediului economic ºi politicsud-caucazian vor descuraja investitorii strãini sã intre pepieþe unde concurenþa neloialã e un dat natural. În absenþaunor legislaþii antimonopol care sã confere stabilitate ºi pre-dictibilitate, regulile jocului vor depinde în continuare debunãvoinþa diverselor structuri clientelare.

Atunci când vorbim la Bucureºti despre Caucazul deSud, spunem instantaneu energie. Este avantajul compara-tiv al Azerbaidjanului (ca stat cu resurse de petrol ºi gaz) ºial Georgiei (ca þarã cu potenþial de tranzit). Din aceastã per-spectivã, potenþialul economic al regiunii depinde de capa-citatea sa de a se conecta cu marile pieþe consumatoare deenergie (UE, Rusia ºi China). Însã, deopotrivã economic ºipolitic, regiunea rãmâne dezbinatã, fragmentatã, la anti-podul funcþionãrii ca un întreg unitar. Economic, uneledintre state sunt atrase de modelele europene de dezvoltareºi cooperare (în special Georgia ºi Armenia), în timp ceAzerbaidjanul manifestã mai degrabã o afinitate orientalã.Politic, Georgia este interesatã de implementarea unor re-forme instituþionale interne la standarde europene, Armeniade restabilirea relaþiilor cu Turcia, în timp ce Azerbaidjanulpare preocupat de o politicã externã pur energeticã, adeseoriîn contradicþie cu interesele vecinilor sãi. În esenþã, studiulpledeazã pentru cãutarea unui model economic de succes

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Ileana Racheru

Regimuri politice în Caucazul de sud. Democraþia care ascunde autoritarisme competitive

Capitolul acesta analizeazã evoluþia regimurilor politicedin Georgia, Armenia ºi Azerbaidjan în perioada care aurmat instalãrii în funcþie a actualilor preºedinþi. Demersulacoperã mandatele prezidenþiale ale lui Mihail Saakaºvili,Ilham Aliev ºi Serge Sargsian.

Analiza porneºte de la premisa cã cele trei regimuri suntautoritarisme competitive ºi studiazã modul în careautoritãþile au reuºit sã creeze ºi/sau sã perpetueze mecanis-mele de consolidare a puterii. Prima parte explicã ºi descriece este autoritarismul competitiv. Demersul analitic se vaconcentra apoi pe fiecare stat în parte ºi va urmãri evoluþiacelor trei regimuri politice în raport cu organizarea alegeri-lor, relaþiile puterii cu opoziþia/mass-media/societatea civilãºi influenþa presiunilor externe asupra deciziilor politiceinterne. Analiza foloseºte surse directe (interviuri realizatede autoare în Caucazul de Sud ºi datele publicate de OSCEºi Freedom House) precum ºi studii de specialitate (teore-tice sau analize despre regimurile politice din cele trei state).Comportamentul regimului în relaþia cu opoziþia, presa ºisocietatea civilã va fi urmãrit în momente politice cheie:alegeri, legiferare a unor proiecte considerate de importanþãmajorã pentru democratizare, proteste.

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Levitsky ºi Way (2010, 10) au stabilit trei condiþii pen-tru existenþa unei competiþii neloiale: instituþiile statuluisunt folosite constant pentru scopuri partizane în folosulputerii, puterea e tot timpul avantajatã în dauna opoziþiei,posibilitãþile opoziþiei de a participa la alegeri sunt seriosîngrãdite.

GeorgiaAlegerile democratice,

marele succes al revoluþiei trandafirilor

Actualul regim politic de la Tbilisi este, în mare, rezulta-tul revoluþiei trandafirilor din 2003, când, prin îndelungiproteste paºnice ale opoziþiei politice ºi ale societãþii civile,sprijinite de Occident, regimul autoritar al lui Eduardªevardnadze1 a fost înlãturat. Dupã fraudarea alegerilorparlamentare din noiembrie 2003, ªevardnadze ºi-a anunþatdemisia, cedând presiunilor occidentale ºi miºcãrilor de

Prin urmare, capitolul îºi propune sã afle cât de puterniceste guvernul/partidul aflat la guvernare ºi care sunt mijloa-cele prin care exercitã controlul autoritar asupra regimuluipolitic.

Ce este autoritarismul competitiv?

Autoritarismul competitiv este un regim hibrid rezultatdin îmbinarea practicilor democraþiei cu autoritarismul(Levitsky ºi Way, 2010, 5). Într-un regim autoritar competitiv,puterea politicã nu respectã cel puþin una dintre condiþiiledemocraþiei: alegeri libere, garantarea libertãþilor civile, exis-tenþa unui spaþiu al jocului politic unde se pot exprima atâtputerea cât ºi opoziþia (Levitsky, 2010, 7).

Autoritarismul competitiv a fost definit prin diferenþiereaacestuia de democraþie ºi autoritarism.

Autoritarismul este regimul politic care nu permite opo-ziþiei sã exprime legal nicio formã de contestare (Levistsky,2010, 7). Autoritarismul competitiv este regimul politic carepermite existenþa constituþionalã a contestãrii din parteaopoziþiei. Într-un regim autoritar competitiv, alegerile nusunt întotdeauna libere ºi se desfãºoarã într-un climat carenu asigurã ºanse egale pentru opoziþie, deºi legal aceasta sepoate înscrie în cursa electoralã. Puterea poate manipula lis-tele de alegãtori ºi falsifica rezultatele scrutinului sau îngrã-di accesul opoziþei în mass-media ºi la resursele financiare(ibidem, 8).

Regimurile autoritare competitive garanteazã formallibertãþile civile, dar acestea sunt violate frecvent: opoziþia ºimass media libere sunt þinta abuzurilor forþelor de ordine/poliþiei/sistemului judiciar. Protestele, deºi organizate prinrespectarea normelor, sunt adesea reprimate în forþã. Re-strângerea libertãþilor civile poate avea ºi forma „represiuniilegale“ prin metode mai subtile cum ar fi elaborarea ºi apli-carea unor prevederi legislative, cu scopul de a da o formãlegalã acþiunilor represive.

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1 Fost lider al PC al RSS Georgia/Gruzia (1972-1985) ºi ministrude externe al URSS (1985-1991), Eduard ªevardnadze a condusGeorgia din funcþia de ºef al Parlamentului în perioada 1992-1995 ºica preºedinte ales în mod direct între 1995 ºi 2003. În perioada încare s-a aflat la putere, ªevardnadze a încheiat cele douã acorduri depace care au pus capãt confruntãrilor armate din Abhazia (1994)ºi Osetia de Sud (1992) cu medierea Rusiei ºi a încheiat cu Moscova,în 1995, un acord care prevedea staþionarea pe teritoriul Georgiei apatru baze militare ruseºti pentru o perioadã de 25 ani. Guvernareaªevardnadze a coincis cu primele încercãri de construcþie a statuluigeorgian: identitatea naþionalã diferitã de manifestãrile violente dinperioada Zviad Gamsahurdia.

În 1994, ªevardnadze, care avea o bunã imagine în Occident,a reuºit sã lanseze cu sprijin financiar vestic un program de reformeeconomice.

În noiembrie 2003, când ªevardnadze a fost înlãturat de la putere,reformele economice erau un eºec în Georgia, care era consideratãunul dintre statele cu cel mai înalt nivel de corupþie din lume. Regimulcondus de ªevardnadze a fost considerat de specialiºti ca fiind unulautoritar.

delegate prin scrutin proporþional4. În noua cursã electoralãs-au înscris 16 partide ºi alianþe electorale, care s-au angajattârziu în campania electoralã, nu au exprimat oferte electo-rale sau programe ideologice, limitându-se la atacuri la adresacontracandidaþilor. Competiþia a consolidat poziþia alianþeidintre Miºcarea Naþionalã ºi Democraþii Uniþi, care a obþinut67% din sufragii (135 locuri) ºi a adus opoziþiei de dreapta(Noua Dreaptã ºi Industria va salva Georgia) 7,6% voturi(15 locuri)5. OSCE a remarcat îmbunãtãþirea condiþiilor încare s-a desfãºurat procesul electoral faþã de scrutinurileanterioare, dar a menþionat ºi „inexistenþa separaþiei întreadministraþia de stat ºi structurile de partid ºi potenþialulpartidelor de a folosi în interese electorale resursele adminis-trative“ (OSCE, 2004, 3).

Urmãtorul scrutin desfãºurat în Georgia, cel pentrualegerile locale din 2006, a fost considerat un element-cheiepentru evoluþia noului regim politic de la Tbilisi. Scrutinul,deºi calificat de cãtre observatorii internaþionali ca fiind, întermeni generali, în acord cu normele democraþiei, a arãtato repetare a practicilor în care resursele statului (angajãri înfuncþii publice, mãrirea temporarã a pensiilor, acordareaunor voucher-e sociale) au fost folosite de partidele aflate laputere pentru a obþine voturi. În competiþia electoralã,câºtigatã de MNU, s-au înscris 5 partide, o alianþã ºi câþivacandidaþi independenþi. În 27,5% circumscripþii majoritareºi 8,7% proporþionale, candidaþii MNU sau listele depusede aceasta au fost competitori unici (OSCE, 2006, 2).

În 2008, georgienii au fost din nou chemaþi la urne, pentruun scrutin prezidenþial anticipat ºi pentru alegeri legislative.Scrutinul a fost apreciat ca fiind „prima cursã electoralãprezidenþialã post-independenþã cu adevãrat competitivã“.

stradã, iar Uniunea Cetãþenilor din Georgia, partidul aflat laputere pânã atunci, s-a autodizolvat.

Noua configuraþie a puterii, cu o componenþã hibridã,a fost rezultatul coagulãrii forþelor de opoziþie care aveau caobiectiv comun înlãturarea lui ªevardnadze ºi câºtigareaputerii. Actuala putere de la Tbilisi, instalatã dupã organi-zarea de alegeri prezidenþiale în ianuarie 2004, a fost for-matã din contestatari din interior ai regimului ªevardnadze(Nino Burjanadze, Mihail Saakaºvili2 ºi Zviad Zvania),transformaþi în critici ai regimului ºi favorabili adoptãriinormelor democratice la nivel intern ºi apropierii de Occi-dent în politica externã. În urma scrutinului din ianuarie2004, Saakaºvili, candidat unic al Miºcãrii Naþionale Unite(MNU) ºi al Democraþilor Uniþi a fost ales preºedinte cu96,2% din sufragii, iar aliaþii sãi Burjanadze ºi Zvania auocupat funcþiile de preºedinte/purtãtor de cuvânt al legisla-tivului ºi, respectiv, ministru de stat3. Alegerile din ianuarie2004 au fost primul proces electoral, evaluat de observatoriiinternaþionali ca apropiat de standardele democratice ºia marcat începutul celei de-a doua tranziþii în Georgia, dupãproclamarea independenþei în 1991.

Scrutinul legislativ din noiembrie 2003 a fost declarat nulºi noi alegeri au fost organizate în martie 2004, hotãrâreconsideratã suspectã de cãtre observatorii internaþionali pen-tru cã a fost aplicatã doar pentru mandatele parlamentare

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2 Educat în SUA la universitãþile Columbia (master) ºi GeorgeWashington (doctorat), Mihail Saakaºvili a fost membru al Parla-mentului (1995-1999) ºi ministru de justiþie în regimul ªevardnadze(2000-2001). În 2001, a demisionat din funcþia de ministru alJustiþiei, acuzând guvernul de corupþie. În acelaºi an, a creat bloculde opoziþie Partidul Miºcarea Naþionalã, cu care a câºtigat alegerileprezidenþiale în 2004 ºi 2008 (CRS report, 2011, 1).

3 Potrivit Constituþiei din 1995, cea mai importantã funcþie înGeorgia era cea de preºedinte. Sistemul prezidenþial instaurat prinLegea fundamentalã nu prevedea existenþa postului de premier, ci afuncþiei de ministru de stat, care avea sarcina de a superviza corpulde miniºtri care erau responsabili în faþa preºedintelui.

4 Legea fundamentalã în vigoare în 2004 în Georgia statua cãParlamentul era compus din 235 aleºi, din care 150 erau votaþi prinscrutin proporþional pe liste ºi 85 potrivit sistemului majoritar — unmandat pentru un district.

5 În Parlamentul georgian 10 locuri sunt ocupate de reprezen-tanþii persoanelor dislocate din Abhazia ºi Osetia de Sud.

MNU, atotputernicã în politica georgianã

Partidul prezidenþial din Georgia este acum partidul deputere (Max Bader, 2008, 5), care, împreunã cu alte câtevapartide de opoziþie, construieºte imaginea unui regim politicprezidenþial cu practici în aceeaºi mãsurã democratice ºiautoritare.

Dupã patru ani de guvernare, MNU a reuºit sã menþinãmajoritatea parlamentarã, chiar dacã are o poziþie mai slabãfaþã de rezultatul scrutinului din 2004, dar opoziþia, carenu a cumulat nici mãcar jumãtate din sufragiile partiduluiprezidenþial, nu este un adversar redutabil. Rezultateleultimelor douã scrutine (legislativ din 2008 ºi local din2010) aratã cã MNU a reuºit sã menþinã majoritatea ºidupã ce preºedintele Saakaºvili a pierdut aproape jumãtatedin voturi la alegerile prezidenþiale din 2008. Prin alegerilelocale, MNU ºi-a consolidat reþeaua de putere ºi la nivellocal, fapt ce îi va oferi un avantaj electoral considerabil laurmãtoarele scrutine. MNU are în prezent o reþea bine con-solidatã de putere în întreaga Georgie, controlul electoral alpartidului variind între 50 ºi 70%.

Scena politicã georgianã între revoluþie ºi reformã

Scena politicã de la Tbilisi pãstreazã atmosfera de con-fruntare extremã din anii ’90, nici puterea, nici opoziþia nuau experienþa negocierilor ºi a compromisului sau programeideologice. MNU nu are nicio ideologie ºi susþine cã repre-zintã întreaga societate georgianã (IDEA, 2006, 7), iar cele-lalte partide, deºi îºi proclamã apartenenþa la stânga sau ladrepta sau centrismul, nu cautã decât sã elimine critica„absenþei ideologiei“. Comportamentul ºi discursul partide-lor de la Tbilisi distinge mai degrabã moderaþii-reformatoriaflaþi la putere de radicalii-revoluþionari din opoziþie.Majoritatea partidelor din opoziþia7 de la Tbilisi reclamã

Mihail Saakaºvili a folosit resursele administrative ale sta-tului în campania electoralã, iar numãrarea voturilor ºi pro-cedurile de înregistrare au fost deficitare (OSCE a), 2008, 1).Principalul contracandidat al lui Saakaºvili a fost LevanGachechiladze, susþinut de nouã partide de opoziþie alianteîn Miºcarea Naþionalã Unitã. Saakaºvili a obþinut peste53% din sufragii din primul tur, Gachechiladze a acumulat25,69%, iar restul voturilor au fost distribuite între alþi cincicompetitori (fiecare a luat sub 1%). Primii doi clasaþi auavut agende electorale cu aceleaºi obiective de politicã externã(aderarea Georgiei la NATO) ºi viziuni diferite cu privire laconfigurarea regimului politic intern (semiprezidenþialism,eliminarea corupþiei ºi a sãrãciei ºi integrarea Abhaziei ºi aOsetiei de Sud — Saakaºvili; monarhia parlamentarã, încu-rajarea mediului de afaceri — Gachechiladze).

Alegerile parlamentare din 2008 „au oferit în mod clarpoporului georgian oportunitatea de a-ºi alege reprezentanþiidintr-o paletã largã de opþiuni“, dar ca ºi la scrutinele ante-rioare, MNU a folosit resursele administrative ale statului pen-tru a-ºi asigura voturi (OSCE b) 2008: 1) Partidul prezidenþiala obþinut 59,18% din sufragii (119 locuri), Blocul electoral alopoziþiei a acumulat 17,73% din voturi (17 locuri), CreºtinDemocraþii 8,66% (6 locuri), Partidul Muncii 7,44% (6 locuri),Partidul Republican din Georgia 3,78% (2 locuri)6.

La alegerile locale din 30 martie 2010, partidul aflat laputere a folosit resursele administrative în campania electo-ralã, iar membrii acestuia aflaþi în funcþii publice s-au impli-cat în campania electoralã. Rezultatul scrutinului a indicatcâºtigãtoare MNU cu 73,9% la nivel naþional ºi cu 55,2%(pentru primari) din primul tur ºi 52,5% (în consiliulmunicipal) la primãria oraºului Tbilisi, consideratã cel maiimportant pot în cursa pentru alegerile locale.

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7 În Georgia existã un singur partid de centru-stânga, PartidulMuncii.

6 La 28 martie 2008, Constituþia Georgiei a fost amendatã, iarnumãrul de parlamentari a fost redus de la 253 la 150 (75 aleºi prinscrutin proporþional într-o singurã circumscripþie naþionalã ºi 75 prinvot majoritar în circumscripþii inegale ca mãrime care se suprapundistrictelor administrative).

cont de specificul local. Anticomunismul sub forma lustraþieiradicale este de asemenea prezent pe agenda puterii.

Partidul aflat la guvernare în Georgia a creat un spaþiu aljocului politic în care opoziþia poate participa la alegeri cuºanse reale, dar nu a renunþat total la practicile administra-tive neloiale care i-au oferit avantaje electorale. Consoli-darea puterii MNU se datoreazã ºi incapacitãþii opoziþiei dea se autoconstrui în contracandidaþi importanþi pentru putere(la alegerile parlamentare din 2004, cei mai mulþi candidaþiau refuzat invitaþii din partea mass-media ºi nu au avut ac-þiuni de campanie televizate). MNU este cel mai puternicpartid din Georgia, dar ar putea fi contestat de o opoziþieputernicã, întrucât acesta le lasã contracandidaþilor posibi-litãþi largi de exprimare ºi un climat politic care nu excludecompetiþia. Deºi MNU are majoritatea în parlament, opo-ziþia poate penetra sistemul (de exemplu, în 2005, toatepartidele de opoziþie s-au coalizat pentru a propune alegereaprimarului oraºului Tbilisi în mod direct ºi au respins iniþia-tiva de a fi ales de consiliul municipal). Confruntarea dintrepartide în Georgia are loc în cadrul organizat: procese elec-torale, sau dezbateri parlamentare sau în stradã (manifestaþiipaºnice sau violenþe) ºi bãtãi în parlament. Confruntareaviolentã nu înseamnã doar mãsuri luate de forþele de ordinela adresa opoziþiei. Partidele din Georgia pãstreazã o tra-diþie, anterioarã „revoluþiei trandafirilor“, a confruntãrilorviolente — fiecare partid are un SonderKommando, grupuri debãtãuºi, care le ajutã sã facã faþã unor eventuale provocãriale adversarilor (Nodia, 2006, 117).

Elite noi, reþele clientare de putere noi

Imaginea ºi practicile elitelor politice de la Tbilisiamestecã moºtenirea sovieticã cu adaptarea la tranziþie ºi laobiectivul perpetuu al democratizãrii. Moºtenirea sovieticãse reflectã în existenþa unui lider puternic ºi eliminareaºefilor de stat care nu au acest atribut. Mihail Saakaºvili esteliderul puternic de la Tbilisi, poziþie construitã prin succesul

o ideologie de dreapta, valorile de stânga fiind negate, de-oarece sunt asociate direct sau indirect comunismului.

Scena politicã de la Tbilisi are un grad redus de polari-zare (Nodia, 2006, 109), care nu se manifestã la nivel ideo-logic, ci prin refuzul de a participa la dezbateri, acceptareasuportului venit din Rusia (Partidul lui Nino Burjanadze)ºi modul în care se raporteazã la revoluþia trandafirilor8

(ibidem, 115). Crearea de coaliþii/alianþe ºi desfacerea acesto-ra este un fenomen frecvent pe scena politicã de la Tbilisicare se petrece în orice moment al ciclului electoral sau doarconjunctural în parlament pentru a susþine anumite iniþia-tive/proiecte.

MNU a venit la putere cu o platformã revoluþionarã, pecare ulterior a reuºit sã o transforme, cu sprijin occidental,într-un program de reforme. MNU a încercat sã ofere unrãspuns pozitiv la întrebarea fundamentalã pentru georgieni:a fost revoluþia din 2003 ultima revoluþie din Georgia?Opoziþia nu a renunþat la obiectivele revoluþionare pe carele-a clamat prin proteste de stradã ºi pe parcurs numãrulcelor care s-au alãturat manifestaþiilor s-a redus foarte mult.O nouã revoluþie ºi demisia preºedintelui au fost principaleleobiective ale opoziþiei, cãrora guvernul le-a opus reformeleºi programul electoral „Georgia fãrã sãrãcie“. La toate dez-baterile care vizau reforma statului, opoziþia a ameninþat cãse retrage de la discuþii ºi a organizat proteste. În plus, opo-ziþia a acuzat puterea de fraudarea alegerilor, deºi observa-torii internaþionali au remarcat progresele fãcute de MNUîn organizarea scrutinelor.

Agenda politicã a ambelor tabere are ca obiectiv prioritardemocratizarea asociatã cu occidentalizarea ºi europeni-zarea, dar cu strategii diferite de realizare. Pentru opoziþiemijloacele sunt revoluþia, iar pentru putere reforme adeseoriradicale, care încearcã sã aplice norme occidentale fãrã a þine

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8 Partidul Republican ºi Partidul Conservator s-au implicat în„revoluþia trandafirilor“. Noul Partid Conservator, Industriaºii ºiPartidul Muncii nu au susþinut evenimentele din 2003.

pe strãzile din Tbilisi sau Batumi, nu a ajuns la majoritateapopulaþiei care trãieºte în sãrãcie.

Mass-media — convieþuire imposibilã cu regimulpolitic

Relaþia puterii de la Tbilisi cu mass-media este una spe-cificã regimurilor autoritare ºi suprapune o legislaþie demo-craticã peste practici nedemocratice. În cei aproape 8 ani decând se aflã la putere, MNU a reuºit sã aducã sub controlulsãu aproape întreaga mass-media. Deºi a creat condiþiilelegale pentru existenþa unei prese independente, regimulSaakaºvili a identificat foarte repede modalitãþi prin carepoate influenþa conþinutul editorial: aducerea sub propriainfluenþã a presei finanþate de stat ºi crearea unei reþele princare poate controla presa privatã (investitori apropiaþiregimului ºi chiar membri ai parlamentului), convertind-odin presã independentã/criticã la adresa regimului în porta-vocea puterii.

Legislaþia care reglementeazã audio-vizualul în Georgiaa fost calificatã de Freedom House ca întrunind toatenormele democratice. Parlamentul de la Tbilisi a completatdupã anul 2004 prevederile legislative cu privire la situaþiamass-media. Noua legislaþie a adus îmbunãtãþiri semnifica-tive legii din 1991: prin garantarea libertãþii de expresie ºiprin clarificarea constrângerilor legale la care sunt supuºijurnaliºtii, dezincriminarea calomniei (Freedom HouseGeorgia, 2006).

Televiziunea reprezintã principalã sursã de informaþiepentru georgieni, iar mass-media tipãritã are tiraje reduse ºiacoperã, în general, mediile educate ºi se distribuie mai multîn Tbilisi ºi în alte oraºe mai mari. În Georgia, existãmass-media finanþatã din fonduri publice (un singur post deteleviziune–TV1), trei canale tv private (Kanal 1, Rustavi 2,Imedi) ºi câteva ziare care sunt parþial subvenþionate de stat.Regimul Saakaºvili a preluat presa cu finanþare publicã desub controlul lui ªevardnadze pentru a o aduce, dupã 2004,

„revoluþiei trandafirilor“, câºtigarea alegerilor cu 97% sau53% ºi reforme. Adaptarea la tranziþie a însemnat creareaunui cadru legislativ care sã respecte normele democraþiei,dar care sã favorizeze puterea.

Reformarea legislativã a statului a fost un alt mijloc princare regimul Saakaºvili ºi-a consolidat puterea în Georgiaprin modificarea Constituþiei ºi configurarea unui regimprezidenþial puternic: preºedintele poate demite guvernul ºiparlamentul (dacã acesta nu acordã votul de încredere suc-cesiv pentru trei cabinete). Deºi formal a pretins reforma ºia oferit un paravan pentru aceasta prin introducerea funcþieide premier (care, în aparenþã, împarte puterea executivã cupreºedintele) ºi confirmarea acestuia de parlament, în prac-ticã a fost întãritã puterea preºedintului, în jurul persoaneicãruia a fost construit noul regim politic.

Noua elitã creatã de Saakaºvili este în primul rând dife-ritã de cea sovieticã din jurul lui ªevardnadze sau de radi-calii naþionaliºti din anii ’90: toþi miniºtrii au un trecutasemãnãtor preºedintelui — studii în Occident ºi susþinreforma statului dupã model vestic. Baza puterii MNU din-colo de susþinerea electoralã (explicatã în parte prin dorinþapopulaþiei de a obþine stabilitatea politicã) este reprezentatãde reþelele de patronaj de la nivel înalt, a cãror loialitate sebazeazã pe corupþie: „instituþiile publice au fost curãþate decorupþie în funcþiile de execuþie. Acesta este cel mai maresucces al guvernãrii Saakaºvili. Dar la nivel înalt nimeni nus-a atins de corupþi“9. În funcþiile superioare corupþia „ºi-aschimbat doar forma. Acum miza este controlul afacerilor ºial pieþelor“10. Regimul mizeazã pe loialitatea mediului deafaceri ºi a funcþiilor administrative, nu ºi a posturilorministeriale (schimbarea din funcþie a miniºtrilor este opracticã constantã la Tbilisi). Dar guvernarea Saakaºvili nua reuºit sã obþinã ºi susþinerea popularã ca rezultat al re-formelor iniþiate, deoarece schimbarea în bine, deºi vizibilã

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9 Interviu cu un expert, Tbilisi, mai 2011.10 Interviu cu un expert, Tbilisi, mai 2011.

ar fi temperat poziþia criticã a postului TV la adresa autori-tãþilor (Freedom House Georgia, 2005).

Situaþia financiarã a presei georgiene influenþeazã conþi-nutul editorial al informaþiilor transmise publicului. Adeseamass-media privatã se autocenzureazã pentru a evita presiu-nile finanþatorului. În presa georgianã au apãrut mai multescandaluri în care jurnaliºtii au acuzat imixtiuni ale inves-titorilor: retragerea unor documentare despre corupþia dinpoliþie sau interzicerea unor emisiuni ai cãror moderatoricriticau guvernul. Jurnaliºtii acuzã presiuni din partea pro-prietarilor trustului la care sunt angajaþi: „Este imposibil sãscrii ºi sã publici un articol despre un actor politic aflat laputere sau în opoziþie, implicat în fapte de corupþie, dacãºeful tãu nu este de acord“12.

Presiunile regimului asupra mass-media s-au manifestatmai ales în momente de tensiune pentru putere (alegeri,proteste ale opoziþiei, rãzboiul din 2008) ºi au ajuns laviolenþe fizice sau suspendarea transmisiei televiziunilor.La alegerile parlamentare din 2004, toate cele 16 partide ºialianþe electorale care au participat la scrutin au fost pre-zente în mass-media, dar tendinþa generalã atât a posturilorTV private cât ºi a celei publice a fost de a favoriza MiºcareaNaþionalã, aflatã la putere. TV 1 finanþat din fonduri pu-blice a transmis ºtiri cu caracter pozitiv în proporþie de 80%despre MNU ºi nu a oferit dezbateri electorale (OSCE,2004, 2 ºi 15). Rustavi 2, post privat, a acoperit campaniaelectoralã în mod similar. Urmãtoarele scrutine au arãtat operpetuare a practicilor de la alegerile din 2004.

Forþele de ordine au agresat fizic jurnaliºti, în special pecei care au transmis informaþii de la protestele din 2005 ºi2007. Preºedintele Saakaºvili a decretat în noiembrie 2007starea de urgenþã, interzicând transmisiunile TV cu excepþiapostului public. În aceeaºi perioadã, posturile Imedi ºiKavkasia Tv au fost suspendate pe motiv cã ar fi incitatprotestatarii (Freedom House Georgia, 2008). În timpul

sub propria influenþã. Situaþia a fost similarã cu mass-mediadin Ajaria, care fost plasatã de sub controlul ºi cenzuraautoritãþilor de la Batumi sub influenþa puterii de la Tbilisi.Dupã venirea la putere a MNU ºi a lui Mihail Saakaºvili,postul public de televiziune a devenit principalul vehiculmediatic folosit de regim în toate campaniile electorale.Deºi la nivel formal (prin legislaþia cu privire la dreptul laliberã exprimare ºi modul de desemnare a conducerii, postulrespectã normele democratice) postul TV public are toatepârghiile necesare pentru a informa într-un mod nepartizan,acesta a continuat practicile autocenzurii asociate preseidintr-un regim autoritar.

Mass-media privatã nu este capabilã sã se autosusþinãfinanciar, din cauza pieþei de publicitate extrem derestrânse, situaþie care o face vulnerabilã în faþa presiuniloreditoriale adesea cu caracter politic exercitate de finanþatori.Investitorii privaþi din mass-media georgianã sunt ne-cunoscuþi; companii obscure cu sediul în paradisuri fiscale,în spatele cãrora este speculatã prezenþa unor actori politicide la putere sau din opoziþie. Posturile tv private au marideficite financiare ºi „nimeni nu ºtie din ce se finanþeazã“11.Se pare cã dupã 2004, principalele trei posturi private deteleviziune (Rustavi 2, Imedi TV, TV Mze) au fost cumpãratede cãtre persoane apropiate guvernului sau parlamentari,dupã ce propietarii au fost supuºi unor presiuni.

Problemele financiare ale mass-media creeazã depen-denþa acesteia nu doar de investitori privaþi, ci ºi de modulîn care sunt achitate datoriile faþã de autoritãþi. Regimuls-a folosit de forme „legale“ de presiune asupra mass-media(sub forma controalelor poliþiei financiare) sau mesaje infor-male (critici ale oficialilor la adresa jurnaliºtilor, interzicereaaccesului la evenimente organizate de instituþii publice —practicã a Ministerului Securitãþii). În 2004, guvernul a re-eºalonat datoriile Rustavi 2, ulterior postul a fost cumpãratde un investitor apropiat guvernului, situaþie care se pare cã

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12 Interviu cu un jurnalist, Tbilisi, mai 2011.11 Interviu cu un jurnalist, Tbilisi, mai 2011.

în plus, de polarizarea extremã a mediului politic, de modulextrem în care opoziþia a înþeles sã negocieze prin retragereade la discuþii ºi organizarea de proteste.

Observatorii internaþionali au criticat frecvent modul încare au fost organizate consultãrile cu societatea civilã ºipartidele de opoziþie pe marginea modificãrii legislaþiei elec-torale ºi a amendãrii constituþiei: într-un interval de timplimitat14 ºi cu favorizarea puterii. În 2004, la iniþiativaguvernului, parlamentul a modificat legea electoralã, prinîncãlcarea procedurilor de deliberare. Dezbaterile cu privirela modificarea structurii parlamentului (reducerea numãruluide membri) au început în 2008, cu doar douã luni înaintede alegeri, iar iniþiativa a fost calificatã de OSCE (2008, 1)ca afectând egalitatea votului. În plus, mãsura e favorabilãMNU, deoarece acesta obþinuse la scrutinele anterioare celemai multe mandate majoritare. Legea electoralã în variantaMNU conþine ºi o prevedere controversatã, care le permiteoficialilor sã se implice în campania electoralã.

Regimul de la Tbilisi a promovat o dublã abordare arelaþiei cu opoziþia politicã: raporturi paºnice/conformenormelor democraþiei occidentale ºi mãsuri violente sauscandaluri/intimidãri.

Guvernul de la Tbilisi a oferit opoziþiei posibilitatea dea participa la alegeri cu ºanse reale de a acumula voturi (nua refuzat în mod abuziv niciunui candidat/partid înscriereaîn competiþiile electorale). Opoziþia ºi-a putut exercita înmod liber dreptul legal de a organiza proteste anti-Saakaºvili,însã forþele de ordine au reprimat prin violenþã mai multemanifestaþii ale contestatarilor. În noiembrie 2007, guver-nul a reprimat în forþã protestele partidelor de opoziþiegrupate într-un Consiliu Naþional pentru a solicita decalarea(mai devreme) datei alegerilor parlamentare ºi demisiapreºedintelui. Urmãtoarele proteste ale opoziþiei, organizate

rãzboiului ruso-georgian din 2008, toate posturile tv dinGeorgia au difuzat doar informaþii favorabile autoritãþilorde la Tbilisi, iar dupã noiembrie 2007, talk-show-urile ºi ana-lizele au dispãrut din grila de programe.

Regimul de la Tbilisi a reuºit sã elimine de pe piaþa demedia georgianã mass-media independentã, dar nu a supri-mat pluralismul, deoarece investitorii nu sunt doar politi-cieni sau persoane apropiate puterii, ci ºi membri/susþinãtoriai opoziþiei politice: „Acum în Georgia existã presã pentruputere ºi mass-media pentru opoziþie“ 13. În prezent, cel maiimportant post de televiziune de opoziþie este Maestro TV,apropiat de opoziþia radicalã reprezentatã de Nino Burja-nadze.

Societatea civilã, singura voce criticã la adresaregimului

Regimul de la Tbilisi a oscilat între practicile democraticeºi cele autoritare în relaþia cu opoziþia ºi societatea civilã.Controlul regimului asupra exercitãrii drepturilor ºi libertã-þilor civile este unul limitat ºi se rãsfrânge mai ales asupradezbaterilor pe marginea legislaþiei care vizeazã reformastatului ºi a dreptului de a protesta/contesta puterea.

A doua tranziþie în Georgia a presupus retrasarea cadru-lui legislativ în care s-au desfãºurat alegerile ºi reconfigu-rarea legalã a regimului politic. Imediat dupã instalarea laputere, MNU a anunþat cã va organiza consultãri pe mar-ginea proiectului de Cod Electoral Unificat ºi a amenda-mentelor aduse Constituþiei. Puterea de la Tbilisi a încercatºi a reuºit sã monopolizeze dezbaterile publice prin douãmecanisme: votul majoritãþii parlamentare ºi organizareaunor dezbateri de faþadã cu opoziþia ºi societatea civilã(pentru a aratã, cel puþin formal, cã respectã regulile dia-logului politic cerute de Occident). Puterea a beneficiat,

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13 Interviu cu un jurnalist, Tbilisi, mai 2011.

14 Pe 26 august 2006, preºedintele Saakaºvili a semnat un decretprin care anunþa cã alegerile locale vor avea loc pe 5 octombrie 2006.Timpul alocat dezbaterilor pentru modificarea legislaþiei privindorganizarea alegerilor locale a fost de doar douã sãptãmâni.

membrii guvernului au refuzat sã dea curs unor invitaþii dinpartea ONG-urilor pentru a participa la dezbaterile pe mar-ginea amendãrii constituþiei.

Totuºi, regimul georgian poate fi penetrat, deºi cu greu,de iniþiative ale societãþii civile. În 2004, la propunereaInstitutului Libertatea, parlamentul a modificat legea presei,dezincriminând calomnia ºi stabilind prevederi cu privire laaccesul la informaþia publicã. Peste patru ani, guvernul geor-gian a cedat în faþa presiunilor opiniei publice, a opoziþiei ºia acceptat reorganizarea mass-mediei subvenþionate dinfonduri publice (Freedom House Georgia, 2005).

Reprezentanþii ONG-urilor au acces liber în mass-media,participã adesea la dezbaterile televizate. Niciunul dintreactiviºtii societãþii civile intervievaþi pentru acest raport nua cerut sã-i fie declinatã identitatea ºi nu s-a temut sã criticeregimul politic.

Democraþia care limiteazã presiunile Rusiei

Georgia este un stat mic, poziþionat într-o regiune cumulte conflicte (Caucazul de Nord, Abhazia, Osetia de Sudºi Nagorno-Karabah), situaþie care creeazã necesitatea unuialiat puternic. Paleta de opþiuni e limitatã la douã variante:Rusia ºi Occidentul. Relaþiile privilegiate cu Rusia, deºi arfi favorizat întãrirea controlului ºi consolidarea puteriiMNU ºi a lui Mihail Saakaºvili, au fost excluse din progra-mul electoral al acestora încã din 2003: atât partidul, câtºi candidatul la preºedinþie au afiºat ca obiective majore aleviitoarei guvernãri integrarea în UE ºi aderarea la NATO.Câºtigarea tuturor alegerilor ulterioare cu aceeaºi platformãprooccidentalã ºi larga susþinere popularã pentru alianþa cuVestul au fãcut ca menþinerea la putere a regimului sã fiedependentã de relaþiile cu SUA ºi UE. Puterea de la Tbilisia iniþiat cu sprijin financiar occidental reformarea institu-þiilor interne: a mãritt de câteva ori salariile funcþionarilorpublici (aflate în perioada ªevardnadze sub limita supravie-þuirii), a modificat structura aparatului birocratic, a asigurat

sub forma unor demonstraþii masive timp de 2 luni, au fostîntâmpinate paºnic de regim. Poliþia a folosit forþa, în mai2011, împotriva opozanþilor grupaþi în jurul lui Nino Burja-nadze, incidente soldate cu moartea a 4 persoane ºi rãnireaaltor câtorva zeci. Unul dintre reprezentanþii opoziþiei a fostîncarcerat.

Georgia este singurul stat din Caucazul de Sud în caresocietatea civilã a reuºit sã transmitã prin proteste paºnicemesajul populaþiei cãtre guvernarea ªevardnadze ºi sã înde-plineascã principalele obiective ale manifestaþiilor: anulareaalegerilor fraudate ºi organizarea unui nou scrutin, demisiapreºedintelui. Dupã 2004, societatea civilã a reuºit doarparþial sã schimbe relaþiile cu regimul politic. Guvernul de laTbilisi are o dublã abordare a relaþiei cu mediul ONG: pro-movarea unei politici de deschidere faþã de societatea civilãla nivel formal ºi evitarea dialogului atunci când sunt aduseîn dezbatere chestiuni de politicã internã.

Legislaþia în vigoare în Georgia nu împiedicã apariþiaONG-urilor ºi regimul de la Tbilisi nu a încercat sã oferesubvenþii din partea statului pentru a influenþa în favoareasa activitãþile mediul non-guvernamental. ONG-urile celemai active primesc finanþare din Occident. Au existat, însã,situaþii în care diferite organizaþii non-guvernamentale auexprimat opþiuni partizane (cel mai bun exemplu este cel alInstitutului Libertatea, susþinãtor al revoluþiei trandafirilor,al cãrui director s-a implicat în politicã în cadrul MNU,dupã 2004).

Rolul clasic al societãþii civile de a transmite mesajelecetãþenilor cãtre guvern este limitat, deoarece executivul nue dispus sã participe la dezbaterile organizate de ONG-urisau sã permitã influenþa societãþii civile asupra deciziei înpoliticile publice. Spre deosebire de perioada ªevardnadze,guvernul manifestã aparent deschidere faþã de proiectelesocietãþii civile în special în cazul ONG-urilor ce deruleazãacþiuni în parteneriat cu diverse instituþii ale UE, pentru aevita astfel eventualele critici venite de la Bruxelles. Dar

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cu rãdãcini în Nagorno-Karabah16 (Petrosyan, 2010, 8) ºi altransferului de putere dintre preºedintele Kociarian ºi pre-mierul Serge Sargsian17.

Dupã preluarea puterii de cãtre Sargsian, autoritãþilearmene au construit un regim politic hibrid în care practiciledemocratice se îmbinã cu mãsurile autoritare. Dupã venireala putere a lui Sargsian (ca premier în 2008), autoritãþile dela Erevan au îmbunãtãþit modul de organizare a alegerilor.Renunþarea parþialã la practicile autoritare de organizare ascrutinului este explicatã prin inexistenþa unei opoziþiiputernice ºi prin încercarea de a oferi o imagine mai demo-craticã regimului18.

Alegerile care reconfirmã acelaºi câºtigãtor

Scrutinul legislativ din 2007 „s-a desfãºurat în acord cunormele OSCE ºi alte standarde internaþionale cu privire laorganizarea de alegeri democratice“ (OSCE Armenia, 2007, 5).

training-uri pentru a îmbunãtãþi performanþele angajaþilor ºia eliminat corpuþia.

Occidentul ºi-a condiþionat, însã, sprijinul pentru adop-tarea reformelor democratice, fapt ce a determinat guver-narea de la Tbilisi sã-ºi tempereze tendinþele autoritare ºi sãoscileze între mãsuri democratice, cum ar fi organizareaalegerilor dupã normele OSCE, ºi reprimarea prin forþã aprotestelor opoziþiei sau brutalizarea jurnaliºtilor. Regimulde la Tbilisi pãstreazã memoria recentã a eºecului guvernãriiªevardnadze, care a pierdut sprijinul Occidentului pentru cãnu a adoptat reforme, a deteriorat situaþia economicã ºi afost înlãturat prin proteste. Presiunea strãzii este exercitatãºi asupra regimului Saakaºvili, care a reuºit sã facã faþã maimultor proteste care aveau ca obiectiv schimbarea puterii.

Relaþiile cu Rusia, dupã fricþiunile comerciale (mãrireapreþului la gaze de cãtre Moscova ºi sistarea importurilor deapã mineralã din Georgia) s-au deteriorat total dupã rãzboiuldin august 2008. Rusia este marele inamic al regimului geor-gian care, potrivit discursului oficial, a încercat de mai multeori, dupã 2008, sã organizeze înlãturarea de la putere a luiSaakaºvili.

Presiunile Occidentului pentru democratizarea regimuluide la Tbilisi au o dublã coordonatã: internã (menþinerea laputere prin promovarea unei agende provestice ºi contra-cararea încercãrilor Moscovei de a-l înlocui) ºi externã (nece-sitatea unui partener puternic care sã-i asigure securitatea).

ArmeniaRegimul politic din Armenia15 este rezultatul perpe-

tuãrii, începând din 1998, a puterii unui singur grup politic

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16 Conflictul are la origine decizia lui Stalin din 1923 de a includeOblastul Nagorno-Karabah, regiune cu o populaþie majoritar armeanã,în RSS Azerbaidjan. În 1988, armenii din Nagorno-Karabah ºiErevan au cerut, prin ample demonstaþii, ca regiunea sã fie inclusã înRSS Armenia, situaþie care a dus la declanºarea conflictului. În 1991,Nagorno-Karabah s-a declarat independentã de Azerbaidjan. Acordulde încetare a focului a fost semnat în 1994. De atunci, reprezentând14% din teritoriul Azerbaidjanului, Nagorno-Karabah se aflã de factosub controlul Erevanului ºi de iure sub administraþia de la Baku.

17 Originar din Stepanakert, Nagorno-Karabah, Serge Sargsianare o îndelungatã carierã în PC al RSS Armeanã ºi activitate în struc-turile militare armene ca ºef al Comitetului Forþelor de Autoapãrarea Nagorno-Karabah (1989-1993) ºi ministru al Apãrãrii (1993-1995,2000-2007). Dupã 1995, a ocupat posturile de ministru al Secu-ritãþii, ministru de Interne, diverse funcþii în cadrul administraþieiprezidenþiale de la Erevan. În 2007, a devenit premier al Armeniei.A fost considerat omul de încredere al fostului preºedinte armean,Robert Kociarian.

18 Alegerile parlamentare din Armenia, desfãºurate în 2003, aufost fraudate, situaþie care a atras numeroase critici din partea Occi-dentului ºi a observatorilor internaþionali.

15 Armenia ºi-a declarat independenþa faþã de URSS în august1990. Levon Ter-Petrosian a devenit, în 1991, primul preºedinte alArmeniei postcomuniste. Pânã în 1998, Petrosian s-a aflat în frunteaunui regim autoritar criticat frecvent de Occident pentru reprimareapresei, încãlcarea drepturilor ºi libertãþilor cetãþeneºti ºi fraudareaalegerilor parlamentare din 1995 ºi a celor prezidenþiale din 1998.

În 2009, locuitorii Erevanului au fost chemaþi pentruprima datã la urne pentru a-i alege pe membrii ConsiliuluiMunicipal. Scrutinul, apreciat ca întrunind în general nor-mele Consiliului Europei, a fost marcat de aceleaºi practicinedemocratice: cumpãrarea voturilor, tipãrirea mai multorbuletine de vot, intimidarea alegãtorilor. Dupã numãrareavoturilor, Partidul Republican a obþinut majoritatea în Con-siliul Municipal (35 din cele 65 de locuri) ºi l-a reconfirmatîn funcþie pe fostul primar.21

Mediul politic de la Erevan are un grad redus de polari-zare, care se reflectã doar în conþinutul naþionalist al agen-dei politice cu privire la viitorul enclavei Nagorno-Karabah.Câteva partide reclamã includerea regiunii în statul armeansau independenþa acesteia, iar altele organizarea unui refe-rendum în care locuitorii din Nagorno-Karabah sã se pro-nunþe cu privire la viitorul provinciei. În politica internã,atât puterea, cât ºi opoziþia afirmã ca obiectiv prioritardemocratizarea ºi reformele, fãrã ca acestea sã aibã ca scopfinal integrarea în UE: „Noi nu excludem cooperarea cu UE,dar ºtim cã o eventualã integrare este un obiectiv mult preaîndepãrtat“22.

Dupã alegerile parlamentare din 2007, Partidul Repu-blican a creat o coaliþie de guvernare cu Armenia Prosperã,Federaþia Revoluþionarã Armeanã (FRA) ºi Ornitas Yerkir,coaliþie dominatã de republicani. Armenia prosperã estecontrolatã de fostul preºedinte Kociarian, Ornitas are doardoi membri în guvern (apropiaþi de Sargsian), despre carese spune cã informal fac parte din Partidul Republican(Petrosyan, 2010, 10).

Opoziþia parlamentarã din Armenia include FRA ºi Moº-tenirea (consideratã opoziþia realã). În 2009, FRA a pãrãsit

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Partidul Republican aflat la putere a câºtigat scrutinul cu 41de mandate proporþionale ºi 22 majoritare19. Celelalte par-tide care au trecut pragul electoral20 au fost Armenia Prosperã(18 mandate proporþionale ºi 7 majoritare), Federaþia Revo-luþionarã din Armenia – Daºnacii-FRA (16 mandate pro-porþionale), Ornitas Yerkir-Supremaþia Legii (8 proporþionaleºi 2 majoritare), Moºtenirea (7 proporþionale), PartidulAlianþa (1 mandat majoritar), Iniþiativa civicã (non-parti-zanã, 9 mandate majoritare) (OSCE:2007 anexa). Niciunuldintre competitori nu a depus candidaturi în toate circum-scripþiile ºi 2/3 dintre partidele ºi alianþele angajate în cursaelectoralã au depus doar liste pentru scrutinul proporþional(în 7 circumscripþii s-au înscris candidaþi unici). Foartemulþi candidaþi (ai puterii ºi ai opoziþiei) s-au retras dincursa electoralã dupã înscrierea listelor sau depunerea can-didaturilor pentru mandatele majoritare. Cu câteva ocazii,Partidul Republican s-a folosit de resursele administrativeale statului pentru a obþine susþinerea electoratului (OSCEArmenia, 2007, 1) ºi ºi-a creat un spaþiu de campanie favo-rabil lui însuºi ºi aliaþilor informali (Armenia Prosperã ºiparþial pentru FRA).

Alegerile prezidenþiale din februarie 2008 „au întrunit,în general, normele OSCE ºi standardele internaþionale“cu privire la organizarea de alegeri libere. Rezultatele scru-tinului l-au indicat câºtigãtor pe Serge Sargsian cu 52,8%din sufragii din primul tur. Pe locul doi s-a aflat Levon Ter-Petrosian cu 21,5% voturi. În ansamblu, procesul elec-toral s-a desfãºurat cu favorizarea candidatului PartiduluiRepublican: preºedintele în exerciþiu ºi oficialii guvernuluiau fãcut campanie în favoarea acestuia, numãrarea a 16%din voturi s-a desfãºurat în condiþii „proaste“ sau „foarteproaste“ (OSCE Armenia, 2008, 4).

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21 Pânã în 2009, primarul Erevanului era numit de preºedintelestatului. Dupã amendarea Constituþiei, în 2005, primarul Erevanuluieste ales indirect de majoritatea membrilor Consiliului Municipal.

22 Interviu cu un membru al Adunãrii Naþionale a Armeniei, Ere-van, iunie 2011.

19 Potrivit Constituþiei din 1995, amendatã în 2005, ParlamentulArmeniei este o instituþie unicameralã cu 131 de parlamentari (90de mandate delegate prin scrutin proporþional pe liste, ºi 41 prin votmajoritar în circumscripþii uninominale).

20 În Armenia, pragul electoral este de 5%.

În prezent, Partidul Republican are un control electoralde 50%, iar îmbunãtãþirea condiþiilor de organizare aalegerilor nu i-a afectat controlul asupra puterii. „Partidul deputere“ de la Erevan beneficiazã de avantajul unei opoziþiislabe mãcinatã de dispute ºi de „parteneriate informale“ cuo altã parte a opoziþiei.

Un regim legitimat de conflictul dinNagorno-Karabah

Actuala elitã de la Erevan este rezultatul coaliþiei, createîn anii 1990, între naþionaliºti ºi postcomuniºti (Gallina,2010, 24). Gruparea politicã aflatã la putere în Armeniaa apãrut prin fuziunea dintre elita militarã care a luptat înNagorno-Karabah în anii 1990 ºi corpul politic stabilit laErevan dupã independenþã (ibidem, 25). Puterea de laErevan nu a cunoscut nicio schimbare în cei douãzeci de anide la proclamarea independenþei: alegerile au fost câºtigatede preºedintele în exerciþiu sau de premierul desemnatinformal ca succesor al acestuia. Regula succesiunii pre-mierului la funcþia de preºedinte este confirmatã inclusiv desingurul moment în care transferul de putere nu s-a fãcutprin alegeri, înlocuirea lui Levon Ter-Petrosian, printr-o lovi-turã soft de palat în 1998, cu Robert Kociarian. Puterea dela Erevan a beneficiat de victoria împotriva Azerbaidjanuluipentru a întãri controlul autoritar prin construirea unuiputernic aparat de coerciþie (în armatã ºi poliþie), folosit cusucces pentru a reprima amplele proteste ale opoziþiei (Way,2009, 111).

Potrivit Constituþiei din 2005 (amendatã în 2004),Armenia are un regim semiprezidenþial, dar informal putereae concentratã în mâinile preºedintelui. Situaþia este explica-bilã prin moºtenirea sovieticã care a cultivat imaginea unuilider puternic ºi prin practica politicã postcomunistã a unuigrup de lideri care au trebuit sã facã faþã unor ameninþãri desecuritate constante ºi sã obþinã stabilitatea politicã. Elitapoliticã aflatã la putere este unificatã în jurul preºedintelui,

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coaliþia de guvernare23, dar a continuat sã susþinã informalputerea contra unui „pact de neagresiune“ informal (autori-tãþile nu au luat mãsuri represive împotriva membrilor aces-teia).

Moºtenirea (Heritage) este considerat singurul partid deopoziþie din parlamentul armean ºi unica voce criticã laadresa guvernului atât cu privire la politica externã (criticãinvestiþiile Rusiei în economia armeanã pentru cã sunt „oformã de corupþie“, prezenþa bazei militare ruseºti pe terito-riul armean), cât ºi la cea internã (modul în care autoritãþileau gestionat evenimentele din 2008 ºi urmãrile acestora,corupþia). Membrii partidului au fost þinta criticii guvernu-lui ºi a violenþei forþelor de ordine.

Opoziþia extraparlamentarã din Armenia — ConsiliulNaþional Armean — este o miºcare hibridã, compusã din18 partide politice (cu ideologii diverse) ºi organizaþii co-munitare (Petrosyan, 2010, 11) creatã în jurul lui LevonTer-Petrosian. CNA criticã frecvent guvernul pentru încãl-carea drepturilor omului, corupþie ºi nerespectarea ordiniiconstituþionale. Cele douã tabere ale opoziþiei din Armenianu au reuºit sã creeze o forþã unicã pentru a participa lavreuna dintre cursele electorale. Totuºi, Heritage a protestatîn 2011 alãturi de CNA, fãrã a adera la toate obiectiveleacestora.

Opoziþia politicã armeanã, deºi a participat cu ºansereale de a concura puterea, la toate scrutinele organizatedupã adoptarea Constituþiei din 1995, nu a avut suficientãinfluenþã electoralã ºi nu s-a consolidat prin atragerea demembri. Dupã protestele din 2008, opoziþia tradiþionalã dela Erevan s-a discreditat în faþa populaþiei, pentru cã a con-testat în mod nejustificat un scrutin apreciat ca fiind înacord cu normele democratice occidentale.

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23 FRA a pãrãsit alianþa de guvernare de la Erevan ca de protestfaþã de semnarea, în octombrie 2009, a protocoalelor de la Zürichpentru normalizarea relaþiilor dintre Armenia ºi Turcia.

implementare a acestora e caracteristic spaþiului post-sovietic.Regimul politic armean a înregistrat pânã în prezent progreseimportante în adoptarea sau modificarea de legi cu privire lagarantarea drepturilor ºi libertãþilor.

Constituþia armeanã, modificatã ºi democratizatã în2005, creeazã la nivel legal premisele pluralismului ºi pen-tru exercitarea supremaþiei legii. În 2008, au fost adoptatealte mãsuri legislative cu scopul de a asigura transparenþaºi independenþa sistemului juridic. Dar sistemul juridicarmean a rãmas sub influenþa regimului politic, dovadã fiindmãsurile luate împotriva protestatarilor în martie 2008 (ares-tãri suspecte, bãtãi, probe îndoielnice, tergiversarea proce-selor — Freedom House, 2009, 68). În 2010, în Armeniaerau încarceraþi 14 deþinuþi politici.

În 2007, codul electoral armean a fost amendat, iarmodificãrile au adus, potrivit observatorilor internaþionali,îmbunãtãþiri substanþiale faþã de situaþia de la alegerile din2003. Puterea de la Erevan a organizat potrivit regulilorproprii discuþiile cu opoziþia ºi societatea civilã pe margineaamendãrii legislaþiei electorale. Deºi a anunþat cã e deschisdezbaterilor, regimul de la Erevan a iniþiat modificãrile în anelectoral ºi cu doar câteva luni înainte de desfãºurareascrutinului.

Puterea de la Erevan a oscilat între încãlcarea ºi respec-tarea dreptului la libera întrunire. Legislaþia armeanã oferãopoziþiei politice dreptul de a contesta puterea prin mani-festaþii de stradã. Regimul nu a ezitat sã foloseascã mãsuriviolente împotriva opoziþiei politice. Dupã alegerile preziden-þiale din 2008, opoziþia, coalizatã în jurul lui Ter-Petrosian,a protestat acuzând Partidul Republican cã ar fi fraudatalegerile în favoarea lui Sargsian. Forþele de ordine au repri-mat protestele prin violenþe soldate cu moartea, rãnirea sauarestarea unor manifestanþi, iar instanþele de judecatã autergiversat panã în prezent verdictele. Preºedintele a decre-tat starea de urgenþã pentru 20 de zile ºi a restricþionatmanifestaþiile (situaþie care persistã ºi în prezent). Regimula adoptat, de asemenea, mãsuri punitive (bãtãi, arestãri sau

situaþie determinatã de necesitatea de a avea un lider puter-nic care sã negocieze soluþionarea conflictului ºi de folosireaenclavei Nagorno-Karabah ca pretext pentru consolidareaputerii ºi mijloc de legitimare (Gallina, 2010, 30).

Reþelele de putere ale regimului din Armenia suntmoºtenite din perioada URSS sau construite în postcomu-nism. Tranziþia armeanã nu a însemnat schimbarea totalãa instituþiilor moºtenite din perioada sovieticã, ci pãstrareastructurii de stat aprope intactã ºi loialã pentru a controlaformal instituþiile ºi reþelele informale (Stefes, 2009, 448).Baza regimului sunt oficialii corupþi (actualul prim-ministrua fost implicat în mai multe scandaluri financiare sau înprejudicierea statului prin menþinerea unei rate de schimbsuspecte pentru drama armeanã) sau chiar relaþiile derudenie (se pare cã oficialul care se bucurã de cea mai mareîncredere la Erevan este fratele preºedintelui, AlexanderSarsgian). Majoritatea oficialilor au ºi un trecut criminal.Prezenþa constantã la putere dupã 1991 a fost un atu pen-tru liderii de la Erevan care au reuºit sã creeze, în toatãaceastã perioadã, douã tipuri de loialitãþi: în rândul func-þionarilor administrativi ai statului ºi printre oligarhii careau beneficiat de privatizãri. Puterea politicã din Armenia aconstruit un mecanism de control al corupþiei în care guver-nul supravegheazã reþelele unei corupþii centralizate (ibidem,447) care are pârghii de monitorizare ºi la nivel local.

Consolidarea puterii de la Erevan este explicabilã ºi prinmodul în care opoziþia a înþeles sã participe la viaþa politicã:prin stabilirea unor relaþii informale cu puterea sau refuzulde a participa la dezbateri (boicotarea parlamentului înperioada 2003-2008) sau protestele de stradã.

Drepturi ºi libertãþi, doar dupã dorinþa discreþionarãa regimului politic

Retorica ºi legislaþia promovate de regimul politic de laErevan în privinþa respectãrii drepturilor ºi libertãþilor omu-lui sunt specifice democraþiilor occidentale, dar modul de

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Mass-media de la putere ºi presa de opoziþie

Regimul de la Erevan exercitã un control parþial asupramass-media prin mijloacele de finanþare, presiuni adminis-trative (controleazã licenþele) ºi cenzurarea conþinutuluieditorial.

Legislaþia armeanã creeazã la nivel formal condiþiile exis-tenþei unei mass-media independente. În Armenia existãpresã finanþatã din fonduri publice ºi mass-media privatã.Principala sursã de informare pentru armeni e televiziunea(doar postul public H1 transmite pe întreg teritoriul armean),iar presa tipãritã nu are un tiraj mai mare de 6.000 de exem-plare (pentru o publicaþie) ºi nu se bucurã de o largã circu-laþie — numai aproximativ 8% dintre armeni citesc ziarele(OSCE Armenia, 2007, 14).

Presa subvenþionatã din fonduri publice este în proporþiede 100% aservitã regimului politic. Asupra mass-media pri-vate, regimul de la Erevan exercitã douã forme de control:investiþii ale unor finanþatori apropiaþi puterii ºi controlulasupra organismului care oferã licenþele de transmisie tele-vizate. Principalele surse de finanþare pentru mass-mediasunt vânzãrile de tiraj ºi publicitatea care aduc veniturifoarte reduse, la care se adaugã banii oferiþi de diverºi actoripolitici sau investitori privaþi: „30% din finanþarea acestuicotidian sunt bani negri“ (interviu cu directorul unui coti-dian generalist de la Erevan). Din cauza finanþãrii precaresalariile jurnaliºtilor din mass-media privatã armeanã suntla limita supravieþuirii: „un tânãr debutant are un salariu deaproximativ 250$, iar un director de publicaþie caºtigãmaxim 1000$“25. Situaþia financiarã precarã a presei a fostfolositã de puterea politicã pentru a-ºi asigura loialitãþi înrândul jurnaliºtilor: „În presa de stat, jurnaliºtii pot câºtigaºi 10.000$, dar cea mai mare parte a veniturilor lor sunt dinsurse nedeclarate“26.Toate cele trei posturi private TV suntcontrolate de oligarhi asociaþi regimului, „iar în ultimii ani

încarcerarea cu amânarea procesului) împotriva membrilorfamiliilor opozanþilor (interviu cu membrul unui partid deopoziþie). În 2009, Parlamentul a creat o comisie de studierea evenimentelor din 2008 a cãrei activitate s-a finalizat cuun raport. Potrivit Adunãrii Parlamentare a ConsiliuluiEuropei, documentul emis parlamentului armean „disculpãautoritãþile ºi acuzã opoziþia din jurul lui Ter-Petrosian, si-tuaþie care submineazã credibilitatea raportului“ (2009, 3).Noi proteste ale opoziþiei din CNA au avut loc în martie2011, fãrã a fi reprimate în forþã de poliþie. În plus, putereaºi-a anunþat intenþia de a începe dialogul cu opoziþia, a eli-berat doi deþinuþi politici (încarceraþi dupã violenþele din2008) ºi a permis manifestaþiile în Piaþa Libertãþii (undeopoziþiei îi fusese interzis accesul din 2008).

Legislaþia armeanã ºi mediul politic de la Erevan au per-mis crearea ºi desfãºurarea de proiecte de cãtre organizaþiilenon-guvernamentale. Regimul manifestã totuºi o atitudineostilã faþã de ONG-uri, considerându-le potenþiali competi-tori politici (Freedom House, Nations in Transit, 2009, 67)ºi încearcã sã evite cooperarea cu acestea. Oficialii statuluinu au dat curs invitaþiilor la dezbaterile organizate deONG-uri ºi nu permit societãþii civile sã influenþeze luareadeciziilor cu privire la politicile publice. Pentru a-ºi amelio-ra imaginea, regimul a încercat totuºi sã iniþieze un dialogcu societatea civilã prin crearea unor comisii de discuþii:„ne-au chemat doar ca sã facem figuraþie, pentru cã luaudeciziile fãrã a ne consulta… Aºa cã ne-am retras.“24

Cele mai multe ONG-uri primesc finanþare din Occidentºi nu au afilieri partizane. Mediul societãþii civile armeneare, însã, ºi actori conectaþi partidelor politice care au fãcutcampanie electoralã pentru acestea sau candidaþii lor lapreºedinþie (OSCE Armenia, 2007, 11).

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24 Interviu cu directorul unui ONG de la Erevan, Erevan, iunie2011.

25 Interviu cu un director de cotidian, Erevan, iunie 2011.26 Interviu cu un director de cotidian, Erevan, iunie 2011.

din Occident produce astfel de materiale“, dar „nu inves-tigheazã marile cazuri de corupþie, se limiteazã la profe-sori/micii funcþionari care primesc mitã“29. În rest jurnaliºtiise autocenzureazã pentru a nu avea probleme cu finanþa-torii sau cu autoritãþile.

La nivel local, situaþia mass-media din Armenia este ºimai dificilã: „Trebuie sã facã faþã presiunilor guvernatorului,autoritãþilor regionale. Supravieþuieºte la fel ca într-un regimautoritar sau dictatorial.“30 Existã un singur post TV localindependent, cãruia i-a fost refuzatã obþinerea unei licenþepentru a transmite la nivel naþional ºi care a fost obligat sãstrângã cu ajutorul publicului o sumã uriaºã pentru a puteaplãti pretinse datorii cãtre stat.

Niciunul dintre jurnaliºtii intervievaþi la Erevan nu s-atemut sã critice regimul politic.

Sprijinul Rusiei este indispensabil, UE este preadeparte

Presiunile externe pentru democratizarea regimuluipolitic din Armenia depind de insecuritatea din Caucazul desud, dependenþa de actori externi ca Rusia ºi Occidentul,competiþia între statele regiunii, influenþa actorilor externiasupra societãþii armene.

Armenia este un stat mic, izolat geografic, aflat într-oregiune cu o securitate precarã. Erevanul are relaþii tensio-nate cu doi dintre vecinii sãi (Azerbaidjanul ºi Turcia31),situaþie care îl face complet dependent de garanþiile de secu-ritate oferite de Rusia. Pentru a menþine statu quo-ul creatdupã rãzboiul din Nagorno-Karabah, Erevanul are nevoie

au oferit licenþe de emisie doar posturilor despre care se ºtiaclar cã nu vor crea probleme la nivel politic“. În prezent pro-cesul de digitalizare e un alt instrument de presiune asuprateleviziunilor folosit de autoritãþi.

Presa tipãritã este „de opoziþie“, afiliatã puterii sau inde-pendentã (un singur ziar în spatele cãruia este speculatãinfluenþa guvernului).

Accesul la internet nu a fost restricþionat de autoritãþilede la Erevan, iar presa îºi extinde rapid activitatea în mediulonline. În mediul online din Armenia activeazã ºi autori debloguri, dar procesul de extindere a blogurilor critice laadresa regimului este atent monitorizat de autoritãþi27.

Opoziþia realã poate transmite mesaje populaþiei doarprin presa tipãritã ºi prin internet. RFA, partid de opoziþieapropiat guvernului, apare ºi la posturile TV controlate deregim.

Calitatea produselor de media din Armenia e influenþatãde pregãtirea slabã a jurnaliºtilor, presiunile autoritãþilor,finanþarea. În interviurile realizate pentru acest raport, jur-naliºtii cu experienþã de la Erevan au acuzat lipsa de profe-sionalism a tinerilor jurnaliºti.

Televiziunea armeanã este în totalitate monopolizatã deputerea politicã, iar informaþiile oferite de aceasta suntfavorabile regimului: „Timp de cinci zile am urmãrit doarinformaþiile transmise de televiziunile armene. Dupã ce amavut acces la alte surse de informare mi-am dat seama cã încele cinci zile trãisem într-o altã realitate, creatã artificial deregimul politic.“28

Presiunile autoritãþilor asupra conþinutului materialelorde presã sunt evidente mai ales în perioadele electorale:„Atunci apar ºi media-killers, dar aceºtia nu sunt la fel deagresivi ca cei din Rusia“. Articolele de investigaþie suntaproape absente în presa armeanã: „Apare câte un articol pelunã. ªi doar o singurã organizaþie — Hedk –— subvenþionatã

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27 Interviu cu un reprezentant al societãþii civile, Erevan, iunie 2011.28 Interviu cu un reprezentant al societãþii civile, Erevan, iunie 2011.

29 Interviu cu un jurnalist, Erevan, iunie 2011. 30 Interviu cu un jurnalist, Erevan, iunie 2011.31 În cei 20 de ani de la proclamarea independenþei, autoritãþile

armene nu au reuºit sã ajungã la o înþelegere cu Turcia cu privire lagenocidul turcilor împotriva populaþiei armene din 1915. În plus,Turcia este principalul aliat din regiune al Azerbaidjanului, susþinândintegritatea teritorialã a acestuia.

Azerbaidjan

Actualul regim politic de la Baku este rezultatul transfe-rului de putere între Heidar33 ºi Ilham34 Aliev ºi al întãririicontrolului autoritar de cãtre ultimul asupra tuturor pâr-ghiilor puterii.

Alegerile care au întotdeauna rezultatul cunoscut

Prima mãsurã prin care regimul controlat de Ilham Alieva întãrit controlul asupra puterii, a fost fraudarea ºi câºti-garea alegerilor.

În 2003, alegerile prezidenþiale din Azerbaidjan s-audesfãºurat dupã modelul introdus în perioada Heidar Aliev.Candidatul Partidului Noul Azerbaidjan — Yeni AzerbaycanPartiyasý (PNA) — a fost favorizat în campania electoralã demass-media, iar autoritãþile au fraudat alegerile în favoarealui Ilham Iliev sau au recurs la metode de intimidare aopoziþiei. Rezultatele scrutinului l-au indicat câºtigãtor cu

permanentã de sprijinul Moscovei, care dupã 1998/1999 adevenit principalul investitor în economia armeanã ºi alcãrei sprijin nu este condiþionat de democratizarea regimu-lui intern.

Statul armean este lipsit de resurse, situaþie care impuneatragerea de ajutoare/fonduri occidentale ºi care îl face vul-nerabil la presiunile ºi sancþiunile SUA ºi UE, care au criti-cat mãsurile autoritare luate la nivel intern ºi au ameninþatcu retragerea sprijinului financiar. Menþinerea relaþiilorcordiale cu Occidentul este esenþialã ºi pentru a evita trans-formarea Moscovei în aliat unic. În acest sens, regimul de laErevan nu a putut evita adoptarea ºi implementarea, celpuþin la nivel formal, a normelor democratice. Spre deose-bire de Georgia ºi Azerbaidjan, care pot întreþine o relaþie deinterdependenþã cu Occidentul, prima pentru tranzitul hidro-carburilor ºi a doua pentru resursele energetice, Armeniaeste doar dependentã de ajutorul vestic. În plus, dupã 2003,Georgia, în pofida sincopelor în procesul de democratizare,a devenit un model de succes pentru Caucazul de sud ºipartenerul privilegiat al Occidentului.

Regimul de la Erevan nu este presat la nivel intern desocietate pentru a întreþine relaþii privilegiate cu Occiden-tul: „Armenii nu sunt proruºi ºi anti-UE. Dar îºi dau seamaca aderarea la UE nu este un obietiv realist ºi privesc cuscepticism ideea de europenizare“32. În plus, în cei 20 de anide independenþã, puterea de la Erevan, indiferent de culoa-rea politicã, a promovat în mass-media ideea cã „Rusia estemarele nostru aliat“. Mediul non-guvernamental, deºi arefinanþare externã, este prea slab pentru a reuºi în imple-mentarea modelului democratic: organizaþii concentrate înErevan care nu pot desfãºura acþiuni în alte regiuni, activiºtiisunt mai mult o elitã care nu penetreazã ºi nu are aderenþãla populaþia obiºnuitã.

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32 Interviu cu un expert, Erevan, iunie 2011.

33 Heidar Aliev, fost lider al PC al RSS Azerbaidjan ºi ex-colabo-rator KGB, a fost ales preºedinte al Azerbaidjanului în 1993 ºi 1998.Cele douã mandate ale lui Heidar Aliev au coincis cu întãrirea con-trolului preºedintelui ºi a apropiaþilor sãi asupra regimului politic dela Baku. Regimul Aliev-senior a fost permanent criticat de Occidentpentru mãsurile autoritare promovate la nivel intern ºi fraudareaalegerilor. Guvernarea Aliev senior a coincis cu stabilizarea regimuluiintern ºi încheirea unui acord de pace cu Armenia, în 1994, în con-flictul din Nagorno-Karabah. Aliev-senior a reuºit sã lanseze, cuinvestiþii occidentale în industria petroliferã, economia azerã.

În 2003, Heidar Aliev, în vârstã de 80 de ani, candidatul PNAanunþat la alegerile prezidenþiale, a murit ºi a fost înlocuit de fiul sãuIlham Aliev în cursa pentru preºedinþia Azerbaidjanului.

34 Absolvent al Institutului de Relaþii Internaþionale din Mos-cova, Ilham Aliev a fost ºef al SOCAR la începutul anilor 1990 ºiapoi membru al Parlamentului azer (1995-2000). Între 1999 ºi 2003a ocupat poziþia secundã în ierarhia PNA (liderul partidului eraHeidar Aliev). În 2003 a devenit premier ºi apoi a fost ales preºedinteal Azerbaidjanulu (Jim Nichol, 2010, 8).

voturi obþinut de opoziþie la ultimele alegeri indicã consoli-darea puterii ºi tendinþa progresivã de a scoate opoziþia dinjocul politic. Rezultatul cunoscut al alegerilor ºi mãsurilerepresive ale autoritãþilor împotriva forþelor contestatare autransformat populaþia într-un corp a cãrui participare la vota scãzut cu fiecare scrutin organizat dupã 2003 (la alegerileparlamentare din 2003, 69% dintre azeri s-au prezentat lavot, la scrutinul din 2005–47%), situaþie favorabilã regimu-lui, care în condiþiile absenteismului trebuie sã controlezemai puþine sufragii.

Analiza partidelor de opoziþie din Azerbaidjan are caprim criteriu existenþa acestora ºi nu platformele electoralesau programele ideologice. Cele mai importante partide deopoziþie — Musavat, Partidul Independent din Azerbaidjan,Partidul Democrat ºi Frontul Popular — sunt aproape invi-zibile pe scena politicã de la Baku din cauza mãsurilor repre-sive ale puterii. Imaginea acestor partide este construitã înjurul liderilor. Discursul opoziþiei este unul comun, centratpe critica la adresa PNA.

Un al doilea criteriu, în funcþie de care poate fi analizatãopoziþia de la Baku, este relaþia acesteia cu PNA. Opoziþiapoliticã din Azerbaidjan este divizatã în douã tabere: opo-ziþia parlamentarã, apropiatã partidului aflat la guvernare ºiopoziþia extraparlamentarã (realã, criticã la adresa regimuluiAliev). La ultimele alegeri prezidenþiale opoziþia extraparla-mentarã nu a depus candidaturi, motivând cã nu doreºte sãparticipe la un scrutin fraudat de putere.35

Confruntarea putere-opoziþia realã a fost întodeauna vio-lentã ºi se reduce la reprimarea protestelor/manifestaþiilorcelei din urmã de cãtre forþele de ordine. Relaþia PNA cuopoziþia exclude negocierile, dialogul sau compromisul.Ultimele negocieri dintre putere ºi opoziþie au avut loc dupã

76,84% din sufragii pe Ilham Aliev, iar urmãtorul clasat, IsaGambar, a obþinut 13,94% din voturi. Alegerile prezidenþialedin 2008 au avut un rezultat previzibil, fiind organizatedoar pentru a nu atrage ºi mai multe critici din parteaOccidentului ºi a-l reconfirma în funcþie pe Ilham Aliev.Scrutinul nu a întrunit standardele pentru alegeri democra-tice ale OSCE, chiar dacã modul de organizare a procesuluielectoral a cunoscut îmbunãtãþiri faþã de alegerile parlamen-tare din 2005. În cursa electoralã s-au mai înscris, în afarãde preºedintele în exerciþiu, ºase candidaþi. a câºtigat IlhamAliev cu 88,73% din sufragii. Ceilalþi competitori nu aureuºit sã acumuleze mai mult de 2,86% din voturi.

În 2005 ºi 2010, regimul Aliev a organizat în mod simi-lar ºi alegerile legislative. La scrutinul din 2005, PNA aobþinut 61 mandate parlamentare din totalul de 125. În2010, PNA a obþinut din nou majoritatea mandatelor par-lamentare — 74 de locuri. În parlamentul azer au mai intrat39 candidaþi independenþi (care în realitate susþin PNA),9 locuri pentru partide minore (care sprijinã PNA), 1 loc(Partidul Speranþa, care reprezintã opoziþia realã) (OSCE:2010 32). La ultimul scrutin, puterea a reuºit sã înlãture dinparlament, pentru prima datã de la proclamarea indepen-denþei Azerbaidjanului, opoziþia tradiþionalã Blocul FrontulPopular-Musavat.

PNA — rege pe scena politicã de la Baku

În cei 8 ani de când se aflã la putere, regimul Ilham Alieva reuºit sã transforme opoziþia dintr-un competitor, care în2003 avea ºansa de a deposeda PNA de putere, într-o pre-zenþã formalã, aproape inexistentã pe scena politicã. PNAeste un partid care controleazã total puterea în Azerbaidjandupã ce a fraudat toate alegerile, a creat o opoziþie „artifi-cialã“ în parlament ºi a eliminat prin mijloace neconcu-renþiale opoziþia realã. Potrivit rezultatelor alegerilor, PNAºi Aliev au un control electoral de peste 70% (în realitatecontrolul este total). Reducerea însemnatã a numãrului de

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35 Partidul Musavat (Liberal), Partidul Liberal, Partidul FrontulPopular, Forumul Public pentru Binele Azerbaidjanului ºi PartidulCetãþean ºi Dezvoltare au creat o alianþã informalã – Frontul Comunal Forþelor Democratice ºi au cerut cetãþenilor sã nu participe laalegeri (OSCE Azerbaidjan: 2008, 5).

„Aici toþi miniºtrii au afaceri. Nu existã oficial care sã nu fiecorupt“ (interviu cu un oficial UE). Figura principalã înansamblul de putere de la Baku este preºedintele Aliev, care,dupã modelul tatãlui sãu „încearcã sã pãstreze puterea înfamilie ºi înþelege puterea statului ca o afacere de familie“(Guliev, 2005, 241). Probabil cã Azerbaidjanul are unii din-tre cei mai longevivi miniºtri din lume: „În acel tablou esteministrul nostru cu fostul nostru preºedinte, Heidar Aliev.În celãlalt tablou, domnul ministru este cu actualul preºe-dinte“ (discuþie cu un funcþionar de la Baku). Schimbãrilede miniºtri la Baku sunt evenimente cu totul neobiºnuitepe scena politicã: „Eu sunt ministru aici de peste zece ani,nu înþeleg de ce miniºtrii se schimbã atât de des în Georgia“(interviu cu un oficial de la Baku).

Chiar ºi funcþionarii publici de rând îi sunt loiali pre-ºedintelui: „În tabloul acela îl puteþi vedea pe Heidar Aliev,primul nostru preºedinte. ªtiþi, el a fãcut foarte multe pen-tru noi, este liderul naþional al Azerbaidjanului.“36

În perioadele electorale, regimul de la Baku face „cadourielectorale“ populaþiei. Un expert ne-a relatat povestea uneibãtrane cu 80 manaþi pensie, care a primit înainte de alegerio scrisoare de la preºedintele þãrii prin care era anunþatã cãnu mai trebuie sã plãteascã o datorie de 300 manaþi pentruelectricitate.

Prin partidul aflat la putere, Aliev ºi grupul din jurul sãuobligã la loialitate. PNA este o structurã birocraticã pirami-dalã care îmbinã interesele de afaceri cu apartenenþa politicã:„Calitatea de membru în PNA este o cerinþã obligatorie pen-tru posturile de rang înalt ale statului ºi pentru multe slujbeimportante din sectorul privat“37.

Existenþa financiarã a PNA depinde atât de spolierearesurselor statului, cât ºi de contribuþiile mediului de afaceri(Goul&Sickner, 2008, 754).

alegerile din 2005, când, prin medierea ambasadorului SUA,puterea a încercat sã negocieze cu opoziþia numãrul delocuri obþinute de ultima în legislativ.

Corupþia care funcþioneazã perfect

Întrebarea fundamentalã care se pune în legãturã cuvenirea la putere a lui Ilham Aliev: a fost într-adevãr oschimbare de putere? Puterea de la Baku pãstreazã structurade clan moºtenitã din perioada sovieticã ºi epoca lui HeidarAliev din regiunea Nachicevan. Elementul nou pentruperioada Ilham Aliev este confruntarea invizibilã la nivelformal între vechii oficiali, moºteniþi din perioada Heidar,noua elitã, apropiatã de fiu ºi cu idei occidentale (Ishiyama,2008, 46) ºi familia Aliev.

Resursele administrative ºi petrolifere ale statului, pre-cum ºi afacerile de succes sunt împãrþite între: Ramiz Meh-diev, ºeful admnistraþiei prezidenþiale ºi vechea gardã dinjurul acestuia, oligarhi ºi familia Aliev. Primul controleazãîmpreuna cu ministrul de interne ºi procuroul ºef numirileîn funcþiile publice ºi organizarea alegerilor.

În grupul oligarhilor se disting ministrul transportului ºicel al situaþiilor de urgenþã ºi preºedintele SOCAR care con-troleazã vãmile, schimburile comerciale, proiectele de infra-structurã ºi afaceri imobiliare (ICG, 2010, 8-10).

În familia Aliev existã douã tabere: una conservatoare, înfruntea cãreia se aflã Bailar Eibov (rudã prin alianþã cuIlham) ºi reformatorii — familia Paºaiev, din care provineMehriban Aliev, soþia preºedintelui azer. Eibov controleazãafacerile din vestul Azerbaidjanului, iar Paºaievii au activitãþiîn turism, asigurãri, bãnci (ICG, 2010, 10-11).

Regimul lui Ilham Aliev se bazeazã pe douã tipuri deloialitãþi: din sistemul public sau mediul privat ºi loialitateaocazionalã (obþinutã cu puþin timp înainte de alegeri) acetãþenilor.

Regimul politic azer este construit pe loialitãþi personalevechi, privatizãri frauduloase, afaceri cu petrol ºi corupþie:

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36 Discuþie cu un funcþionar ministerial, Baku, iunie 2011. 37 Interviu cu un oficial european, Baku, iunie 2011.

În realitate, mulþi candidaþi ai opoziþiei nu au avut resurse-le necesare pentru a-ºi face campanie la nivelul întregii þãri,iar în unele regiuni, doar PNA ºi-a promovat candidatul.

Drepturile pe care puterea de la Baku le oferã în mod realopoziþiei sunt (aproape) inexistente. Regimul Aliev nu per-mite existenþa niciunei surse de finanþare pentru opoziþiarealã: „Nu ºtiu din ce trãiesc liderii Musavat. Regimul îi îm-piedicã sã obþinã un serviciu… la fel ºi pe membrii familiilorlor. Partidul nu ar putea fi finanþat de niciun om de afaceripentru cã autoritãþile i-ar închide imediat activitatea.“38

Legislaþia din Azerbaidjan, modificatã în 2005 ºi 2008dupã standardele democraþiilor consolidate, permite organi-zarea de proteste împotriva acþiunilor puterii; autoritãþileazere au interpretat, însã, prevederile legii în interesul pute-rii ºi au refuzat aprobarea manifestaþiilor.

Puterea de la Baku a folosit ºi violenþa fizicã pentru a-ºiîndepãrta adversarii din opoziþie: mai mulþi lideri ai partide-lor de opoziþie au fost atacaþi pe stradã. Dupã fiecare scrutinlegislativ sau prezidenþial, opoziþia a protestat împotrivafraudãrii scrutinului, iar autoritãþile au reprimat manifesta-þiile prin violenþã. În martie 2011, autoritãþile au mobilizatchiar forþele armatei la Baku pentru a preveni organizareaunor manifestaþii ale opoziþiei care sãrbãtoreau o lunã de laînlãturea de la putere a lui Hosni Mubarak.

Puterea de la Baku foloseºte ºi o retoricã agresivã de pro-pagandã antiopoziþie: „Cetatea azerã asediatã de serviciisecrete din Armenia sau de Occident care încearcã sã orga-nizeze o revoluþie coloratã la Baku“, toþi „inamicii“ strãiniacþionând în complicitate cu reprezentanþi ai opoziþiei.Aceleaºi mesaje agresive au fost transmise în mass-media ºidespre ONG-urile care au criticat regimul politic.

Regimul politic azer a dezvoltat ºi pârghii de control alsocietãþii civile: fie prin înfiinþarea ºi finanþarea unorONG-uri fantomã (GONGO-uri) sau prin presiuni asupraorganizaþiilor independente. Regimul a creat chiar o instituþie

Drepturi ºi libertãþi cu existenþã precarã

Potrivit Constituþiei din 1995, Azerbaidjanul este un statdemocratic bazat pe supremaþia legii ºi principiul separaþieiputerilor. Constituþia azerã este doar un text care existã for-mal fãrã sã fi fost vreodatã aplicat în absenþa acordului de lanivel politic. Sistemul juridic din Azerbaidjan este în totali-tate subordonat deciziilor politice ºi aplicã adesea normelejuridice în interesul regimului. Dupã venirea la putere a luiIlham Aliev, parlamentul de la Baku a confecþionat unambalaj legislativ democratic pentru mãsurile autoritare.Pentru a da un aspect democratic procesului electoral,regimul politic din Azerbaidjan a modificat de mai multe oridupã 2003 legislaþia electoralã, fãrã a organiza însã dezba-teri democratice pe marginea modificãrilor ºi fãrã a respectaîn totalitate recomandãrile fãcute de Comisia de la Veneþia.Comisia electoralã centralã a fost întotdeauna controlatã dePNA, iar campania electoralã a avut ca protagonist princi-pal partidul aflat la putere sau candidatul acestuia. Cu toateacestea, OSCE a considerat cã noile norme pot asiguradesfãºurarea unui proces electoral democratic (2008, 1).Aproape la fiecare scrutin, autoritãþile azere, în frunte cupreºedintele Aliev, adoptã mãsuri de imagine înainte deorganizarea alegerilor: retrasarea cadrului legislativ pentrua permite formal organizarea unui scrutin corect sau deciziicu caracter popular. Prima mãsurã vizeazã îmbunãtãþireaimaginii regimului în faþa observatorilor electorali inter-naþionali, iar a doua în relaþiile cu alegãtorii. Ilham Alievnu ºi-a fãcut campanie electoralã în mod direct, susþinândcã vrea sã ofere ºanse reale opoziþiei (OSCE, 2008, 2). Pre-ºedintele a decretat mãsuri legislative sau a refuzat sã-ºi facão campanie electoralã pentru a crea impresia cã opoziþiaare avantaje electorale pe care nu reuºeºte sã le foloseascã.În 2005, preºedintele a semnat un decret care menþiona cãONG-urile ºi opoziþia îºi pot desfãºura liber activitatea încampania electoralã ºi cã funcþionarii statului care nu vorpermite organizarea de alegeri libere ºi democratice vorrãspunde în faþa legii (Freedom House Azerbaidjan, 2006).

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38 Interviu cu un expert, Baku, iunie 2011.

legislativ anticorupþie, regimul nu a pus în practicã prevede-rile acestuia: „Nu existã funcþionar care sã nu fie corupt aici.Ar fi imposibil sã supravieþuiascã, la cât de mici sunt sala-riile“41. Corupþia este instrumentul prin care regimul ºi-aasigurat loialitãþi în întrega structurã administrativã a sta-tului: „Toþi miniºtrii au afaceri în Azerbaidjan, sunt busi-nessmeni într-un regim sovietic adaptat la capitalism. Fãrãcorupþie regimul ar fi mort.“42 În Azerbaidjan, nu existãtransparenþã în nicio instituþie publicã. Puterea politicã nuare niciun interes sã lupte împotriva corupþiei, iar sistemuljuridic care îi este subordonat este ºi el corupt, nu a luatniciodatã horãrâri care sã protejeze drepturile ºi libertãþilecivile ºi a organizat ºi pronunþat hotãrâri judecãtoreºti înfavoarea regimului.

Mass-media nu poate fi decât la putere înAzerbaidjan

În perioada care a urmat dupã instalarea la putere a luiIlham Aliev, regimul de la Baku a preluat aproape exclusivcontrolul asupra presei.

Televiziunea este cea mai importantã sursã de informaredin Azerbaidjan, acoperind aproape întreg teritoriul statu-lui. Toate posturile TV din Azerbaidjan se aflã sub controlulregimului politic, care exercitã presiuni directe asupracanalului finanþat din fonduri publice (AzTV), sau indirecteasupra posturilor private care sunt susþinute de investitoriapropiaþi regimului politic.

Presa tipãritã din Azerbaidjan este parþial controlatã deregim. La Baku apar ºi câteva cotidiene de opoziþie, a cãrorcirculaþie nu acoperã întreg teritoriul azer.

Calitatea materialelor de presã din Azerbaidjan esteinfluenþatã de cenzura regimului, pregãtirea jurnaliºtilor ºide finanþarea disponibilã. Articole de investigaþie nu existã

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care se ocupã de finanþarea organizaþiilor neguvernamentale:Consiliul de stat pentru susþinerea organizaþiilor neguverna-mentale, ale cãrui fonduri au crescut în fiecare an dupãboom-ul petrolier (exemplul cel mai elocvent este FundaþiaHeidar Aliev, finanþatã în exclusivitate de la bugetul statului)ºi organizarea unor competiþii pentru granturi sau oferireape cãi neoficiale a finanþãrii: „M-au rugat sã-mi finanþezeprogramele. Dar, când am vãzut cã toate organizaþiile careprimesc bani de la stat fac doar ce spun autoritãþile, amrefuzat.“39

GONGO-urile pot fi, însã, finanþate ºi de organizaþiioccidentale care oferã granturi pentru dezvoltarea societãþiicivile din Azerbaidjan: „Nu considerãm cã, dacã un ONG aprimit bani din fondul creat de stat pentru societatea civilã,nu este eligibil pentru programele noastre“40.

Presiunea asupra societãþii civile a avut ºi forme legale(de tipul controalelor fiscale ale autoritãþilor) sau chiar vio-lenþe, ameninþãri ºi intimidãri. Pe parcursul interviurilorpentru acest raport, foarte mulþi activiºti ai societãþii civile s-au temut sã critice regimul politic, au rãspuns evaziv laîntrebãri ori au cerut sã nu le fie citate numele. Presiunileregimului asupra societãþii civile sunt mai mari în perioadeleelectorale (în 2008 niciun ONG nu a fost lãsat de autoritãþisã monitorizeze campania electoralã).

În Azerbaidjan elaborarea politicilor publice e un atributunic al puterii ºi orice proiect al societãþii civile este per-ceput ca fiind politic (Gahramanova, 2008, 787). Informal,reprezentanþii societãþiile civile din Azerbaidjan considerãcã rolul acesteia este de a implementa programe (indiferentde finalitatea lor), pentru a-ºi realiza sarcinile de serviciu,având certitudinea cã mediul ONG nu poate influenþa înniciun fel decizia politicã.

Corupþia este o altã formã de încãlcare a drepturiloromului de cãtre regimul de la Baku. Deºi a adoptat un pachet

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41 Interviu cu un oficial european, Baku, iunie 2001. 42 Interviu cu un oficial european, Baku, iunie 2001.

39 Interviu cu un expert, Baku, iunie 2011.40 Interviu cu un funcþionar ONG, Baku, iunie 2011.

Presa tipãritã, finanþatã de stat, s-a conformat doar preve-derilor legale minimale ºi a acordat dreptul la exprimareopoziþiei, în rest a furnizat doar informaþii despre candidaþiiputerii. Doar cotidianul de opoziþie Yeni Musavat a publicatinformaþii detaliate despre campania electoralã a opoziþiei.

Un petrostat atotputernic

Influenþa actorilor externi asupra procesului de democra-tizare din Azerbaidjan depinde de securitatea regiunii, depen-denþa regimului de relaþii cordiale cu Rusia ºi Occidentul,competiþia între statele din Caucazul de Sud ºi influenþapresiunii actorilor strãini asupra societãþii azere.

Rusia e principalul sprijin pe care se poate baza Armeniapentru a menþine controlul asupra enclavei Nagorno-Karabah,situaþie care face Azerbaidjanul vulnerabil în faþa presiunilorMoscovei pentru a obþine integritatea teritorialã. Darrelaþiile cordiale cu Moscova nu înseamnã presiune pentrudemocratizarea regimului politic intern, situaþie care setransformã într-un mare atu pentru mãsurile autoritare aleputerii de la Baku.

Azerbaidjanul este singurul stat cu resurse însemnate dehidrocarburi din Caucazul de Sud, situaþie care îi asigurão relaþie de interdependenþã în raport cu Occidentul: Bakuare nevoie de piaþa vesticã pentru a vinde gazul ºi petrolulºi statele UE vor sã evite dependenþa de Rusia ca singurfurnizor de energie. Prin urmare, chiar dacã la nivel formalcondamnã mãsurile autoritare ale regimului Aliev, Occi-dentul nu se poate lipsi de resursele acestuia ºi nu poatesista relaþiile comerciale ca mijloc de presiune pentru lipsaperformanþelor democratice. În plus, resursele energetice aufãcut ca Azerbaidjanul sã nu aibã mare nevoie de sprijinfinanciar occidental (de exemplu, Azerbaidjanul nu a accep-tat iniþial granturile oferite prin Politica Europeanã deVecinãtate sau prin Corporaþia Provocãrile Mileniului).

Azerbaidjanul e cel mai mare stat din Caucazul de Sudºi, spre deosebire de Georgia ºi Armenia, e bogat în resurse,

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în presa azerã ºi jurnaliºtii se autocenzureazã pentru a evitapresiuni ale finanþatorilor sau ale autoritãþilor.

Regimul de la Baku exercitã ºi o „presiune legalã asupramass-media strãine ºi a jurnaliºtilor. În 2008, autoritãþile aucenzurat mass-media prin adoptarea unei legi ce nu permitetransmisiunea pe frecvenþele naþionale a posturilor strãineRadio Europa Liberã, BBC ºi Vocea Americii pe teritoriulazer. Presiunea asupra jurnaliºtilor se exercitã prin inter-mediul legislaþiei care incrimineazã calomnia (pasibilã depedepse penale) / defãimarea ºi prin folosirea violenþei decãtre forþele de ordine. În 2010, patru jurnaliºti azeri seaflau în închisoare.43 Forþele de ordine au recurs la violenþeîmpotriva jurnaliºtilor în toatã perioada de dupã instalareala putere a lui llham Aliev.

În ultimii ani presiunile regimului asupra mass-mediaazere au crescut. Acestea se manifestã în general în cam-paniile electorale. În mass-media azerã, controlatã de regim,toate campaniile electorale s-au desfãºurat cu favorizareaPNA sau a lui llham Aliev, despre care sunt difuzate doarinformaþii cu caracter pozitiv ºi cãrora li se acordã cea maimare parte a timpului de transmisie. Pânã în 2008, tele-viziunea publicã din Azerbaidjan era obligatã sã asiguretututor candidaþilor un timp egal de antenã. Potrivit modi-ficãrilor aduse legii în 2008, TvAZ nu mai poate transmiteemisiuni cu caracter electoral. Toate televiziunile au prezen-tat doar informaþii pozitive despre PNA sau Ilham Aliev peparcursul tuturor campaniilor electorale de dupã 2003, iaropoziþia a apãrut doar sporadic în emisiunile informative.44

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43 Curtea Europeanã a Drepturilor Omului a cerut în 2010 autori-tãþilor azere sã-l elibereze pe jurnalistul Eiula Fatulaiev (FreedomHouse Azerbaijan: 2011, 85). Pânã în 2011, regimul azer nu a pus înaplicare cererea CEDO, chiar dacã judecãtorii au retras acuzaþiile laadresa acestuia.

44 În 2008, TvAZ a furnizat în programele de ºtiri sau cu caracterpolitic 92% informaþii pozitive despre putere (din care 72% au aco-perit doar activitãþile preºedintelui în exerciþiu — OSCE, 2008, 16).

democraþiei. În Armenia, regimul a oscilat între fundamen-tarea puterii prin legitimitatea datã de procesele electoraleorganizate dupã normele democratice ºi construirea unuicentru de putere bazat pe mãsuri autoritare. Pentru azeri,conservarea puterii în jurul Alievilor ºi loialitãþile politice aufost elementele-cheie ale unui regim care nu ºi-a pus proble-ma legitimitãþii.

În toate aceste state, democraþia electoralã a fost într-omãsurã mai mare sau mai micã un mijloc de consolidare aputerii (Shirinian, 2003). Toate cele trei regimuri din Cau-cazul de Sud folosesc aceleaºi instrumente pentru acapara-rea ºi consolidarea puterii ºi au avantajul unei opoziþii slabe.Într-un top al performanþelor democratice în Caucazul deSud, Georgia se aflã pe primul loc, iar Azerbaidjanul peultimul.

Pânã în prezent regimul de la Tbilisi este unul competi-tiv-autoritar aflat încã în perioada de tranziþie; el va ficondiþionat în viitor sã adopte ºi mai multe mãsuri dedemocratizare din cauza dependenþei de sprijinul Occiden-tului ºi a presiunii/influenþei pe care o exercitã Rusia prinstimularea miºcãrilor de contestare a regimului. PreºedinteleAliev este liderul unei structuri de putere centralizate în carepoliticul guverneazã asupra celorlalte puteri (legislativã ºijudiciarã), care existã doar pentru a crea false aparenþe demo-cratice. Puterea de la Baku a eºuat în organizarea alegerilor,crearea unei relaþii democratice cu mass-media ºi nu a garan-tat drepturile ºi libertãþile cetãþeneºti. În ultimii ani, IlhamAliev ºi aliaþii sãi au creat un regim competitiv autoritar,care în viitor se va transforma într-unul autoritar stabil sauun petro-autoritarism dupã modelul rusesc.

Puterea de la Erevan a realizat un melanj între practiciautoritare ºi mãsuri democratice. Fiindcã a eºuat în garan-tarea drepturilor ºi libertãþilor cetãþeneºti, regimul Sargsianeste în prezent unul competitiv-autoritar, iar pe viitor nuexistã ºanse de transformare a acestuia sau de înlocuire prinalegeri.

situaþie care îi asigurã din start supremaþia regionalã, ºi nueste interesat de o competiþie care sã aibã ca mizã transfor-marea într-un model de democraþie în zonã. Revoluþiatrandafirilor din Georgia a influenþat mãsurile autoritareluate de puterea de la Baku, care s-a temut de un scenariuasemãnãtor în Azerbaidjan.

Societatea azerã este neutrã în raport cu modelul politicoccidental din trei motive: azerii sunt conºtienþi cã UE ºieuropenizarea sunt un model mult prea îndepãrtat, Rusia nueste vãzutã ca inamic (deºi menþine ocupaþia armeanã înNagorno-Karabah), azerii au legãturi culturale cu societãþileorientale ºi cu Turcia. Societatea civilã azerã, formatã dingrupuri de elitiºti, este izolatã de populaþie, mesajele acesteiapenetreazã doar Baku ºi împrejurimile acestuia. Prin urmare,mesajele de democratizare, chiar dacã nu sunt reprimate deregim, nu au largã rãspândire printre azeri.

Concluzii

O privire generalã asupra regimurilor politice din Cauca-zul de Sud aratã evoluþii ºi trãsãturi comune: foste republicisovietice, tranziþii repetate care nu au avut ca finalitatedemocratizarea, conflicte teritoriale ºi/sau interetnice, relaþiicomplicate cu Rusia ºi Occidentul. În acelaºi timp, fiecareregim politic din Caucazul de Sud are propriile particulari-tãþi, care sunt influenþate de proiectele locale de construcþiea statului, de existenþa sau absenþa resurselor energetice, deproblemele teritoriale.

Elita politicã georgianã se aflã la 20 de ani de la procla-marea independenþei în faþa aceloraºi întrebãri: autoritarismsau democraþie? Pentru liderii de la Baku întrebarea funda-mentalã este: pânã unde pot fi extinse mãsurile autoritare înAzerbaidjan ºi cum putem asigura prezenþa cât mai îndelun-gatã la putere a actualilor lideri? Regimul de la Erevan cautãsã afle care sunt limitele mãsurilor democratice în Armeniaºi cum se poate pãstra autoritarismul salvând aparenþele

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Karakhanian, Aghavni, 2003. Political Culture & DemocracyBuilding:The Case of Armenia, în Political Culture Studies,Research & Assessment Branch, Swindon, 3-13.

Levistky Steven, Way Luncan, 2010. Competitive Authoritari-anism. Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War, CambridgeUniversity Press, Cambridge.

Mackinnon Mark, 2007. The New Cold War. Revolutions,Rigged Elections, and Pipeline Politics in the Former SovietUnion, Carroll&Graf Publishers, New York.

Nichol Jim, CRS Report Georgia [Republic] Most RecentDevelopments and US Interests, June 15 2011, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/97-727.pdf, accesat la 18 septembrie2011.

Nichol Jim, CRS Report Georgia’s January 2008 PresidentialElection: Outcome and Implications, January 25, 2008,http://www.opencrs.com/document/RS22794/ accesat la18 septembrie 2011.

Niklas Nilsson, Svante E. Cornell, 2008. Georgia’s May2008 Parliamentary Elections Setting Sail in a Storm, http://www.silkroadstudies.org/new/docs/Silkroadpapers/0805Georgia.pdf, accesat la 18 septembrie 2011.

Nodia Ghia ºi Pinto Scholtbach Álvaro, 2006. The PoliticalLandscape of Georgia, Delft, Eburon.

Nodia Ghia (ed.) 2010. Political Forum: 10 Questions onGeorgia’s Political Development, CIPDD, Tbilisi.

Nodia Ghia, Dynamics of State Building in Georgia, http://www.belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/2370/dynamics_of_statebuilding_in_georgia.html?bread-crumb=%2Fpublication%2Fby_type%2Fbook_chap-ter%3Fpage%3D38, accesat la 18 septembrie 2011.

Petrosyan David, 2010. “The Political System of Armenia:Form and Content”, în Caucasus Analytical Digest, (17),8-12.

Stefes, H. Christoph, “Governance, the State and SystemicCorruption: Armenia and Georgia in Comparison”, înCaucasian Review of International Affairs, 2(2), 73-83.

Timm Christian, 2010. Neopatrimonialism by Default. StatePolitics and Domination in Georgia after the Rose Revolution,

Bibliografie:

Aprasizde David, 2009. State-Building and Democratization inGeorgia: Have the Limits Been Reached?, în OSCE-Yearbook2008, IFSH, Hamburg, 63-71.

Bader Max, 2008. “Fluid Party Politics and the Challengefor Democracy Assistance in Georgia”, în Caucasian Reviewof International Affairs, 2(2), 1-10.

Bader Max, 2010. “Party politics in Georgia and Ukraineand the Failure of Western Assistance”, în Democratization,17(6), 1085-1107.

Chiaberashvili Zurab ºi Tevzadze Gigi, 2005. Power Elites inGeorgia: Old and New, în Fluri H. Cole, Philipp Eden,From Revolution to Reform. Georgia’s Struggle with DemocraticInstitution Building and Security Sector Reform, NationalDefense Academy, Viena, 187-207.

Dannreuther Roland (ed.), 2004. European Union Foreign andSecurity Policy. Towards a Neighbourhood Strategy, Routledge,Londra.

Fulvio Aitana, Rossi Rossa (ed.), 2004. European Neighbour-hood Policy: Political, Ecomonic and Social Issue, Jean MonnetProject, Catania.

Gould John A. & Carl Sickner, “Making Market Democra-cies? The Contingent Loyalties of Post-privatization Elitesin Azerbaijan, Georgia and Serbia”, în Review of Interna-tional Political Economy, 15(5), 740-769.

Franke Anja, Gawrich Andrea ºi Alakbarov Gurban,Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan as Post-Soviet Rentier States:Resource Incomes and Autocracy as a Double Curse, în Post-Soviet Regimes Europe-Asia Studies, 61(1), 109-140.

Ishanian Armine, 2008. Democracy Building and Civil Societyin Post-Soviet Armenia, Routledge, New York.

Ishiyama John, 2008. “Political Party Development andParty ‘Gravity’ in Semi-Authoritarian States. The Casesof Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan”, în TaiwanJournal of Democracy, 4 (1), 33-53.

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International Crisis Group (ICG), 2010. Azerbaijan Vulnera-ble Stability. Europe Report 107, 1-32 (http://www.crisis-group.org/~/media/Files/europe/caucasus/azerbai-jan/207%20Azerbaijan%20%20Vulnerable%20Stability.ashx, accesat la 18 septembrie 2011).

International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assis-tance (IDEA), Georgia Country Report based on Research andDialogue with Political Parties. 2006, Stockholm, http://www.idea.int/parties/upload/Georgia_report.pdf, accesatla 14 septembrie 2011.

OSCE, Republic of Armenia Parliamentary Elections 12 May2007, http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/armenia/26606,accesat la 12 august 2011.

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OSCE, Republic of Azerbaijan Presidential Elections 15 October2003, http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/azerbaijan/13467, accesat la 15 august 2011.

OSCE, Republic of Azerbaijan Parliamentary Elections 6 Nov-ember 2005, http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/azerbai-jan/17946, accesat la 15 august 2011.

OSCE, Republic of Azerbaijan Parliamentary Elections 7 Nov-ember 2010, accesat la 15 august 2011.

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OSCE, Georgia Municipal Elections 5 October 2006, http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/23510, accesat la 7 august2011.

OSCE a), Georgia Extraordinary Presidential Elections 5 January2008, http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/georgia/30959,accesat la 8 august 2011.

OSCE b), Georgia Parliamentary Elections 21 May 2008, http://www.civil.ge/files/files/32898_en.pdf, accesat la 7 august2011.

German Institute of Global and Area Studies (GIGA)http://www.gigahamburg.de/content/fsp1/pdf/neopat/paper_neopat_workshop_timm.pdf, accesat la 18 septembrie2011.

Svante E. Cornell, 2005. Small Nations and Great Powers.A Study of Ethnopolitical Conflict in the Caucasus, RoutledgeCurzon, New York.

Waal de Thomas, 2003. Black Garden Armenia and AzerbaijanTrough Peace and War, New York University Press, NewYork.

Waters Christopher (ed.), 2005. The State of Law in the SouthCaucasus, Palgrave Macmillan, New York.

Commission Staff Working Paper Country Report Georgia,http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/documents_en.htm, acce-sat la 5 august 2011.

The European Neighbourhood Fishes on Partners, http://www.ec.europa.eu/world/enp/documents_en.htm, accesat la2 august 2011

Freedom House Country Report Azerbaijan 2006, http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=47&nit=390&year=2006, accesat la 12 august 2011.

Freedom House Country Report Azerbaijan 2008, http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=47&nit=445&year=2008 accesat la 12 august 2011.

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Freedom House Country Report Georgia 2005, http://www.free-domhouse.org/template.cfm?page=47&nit=363&year=2005, accesat la 16 septembrie 2011.

Freedom House Country Report Georgia 2006, http://www.free-domhouse.org/template.cfm?page=22&year=2006&country=6967. accesat la 12 august 2011.

Freedom House Country Report Georgia 2008, http://www.free-domhouse.org/template.cfm?page=47&nit=452&year=2008, accesat la 16 septembrie 2011.

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Stanislav Secrieru

Geometrie variabilã în acþiune: politica externã ºi de securitate

în Caucazul de Sud

Introducere

Acest demers îºi propune sã supunã analizei detaliatepolitica externã ºi de securitate regionalã a statelor dinCaucazul de Sud la douã decenii de la disoluþia UniuniiSovietice. De la recâºtigarea independenþei au fost propusemai multe formule tri- sau multilaterale de integrare înCaucazul de Sud, care însã nu s-au materializat. Pe de altãparte, comunitatea academicã ºi politicienii au contestatînsãºi existenþa Caucazului de Sud ca regiune. Prin urmare,în prima parte a lucrãrii se va realiza radiografia dezbateriicurente asupra regionalitãþii în Caucazul de Sud. Aceasta vaîngloba impactul rãzboiului ruso-georgian din 2008 asuprapercepþiei existenþei sau inexistenþei Caucazului de Sud caregiune. Totodatã, aceastã secþiune va descrie mediul macro-regional în care evolueazã statele din Caucazul de Sud.Tonul ºi atmosfera politicã în Caucazul de Sud sunt date dedinamica raporturilor intraregionale. A doua parte se vafocaliza asupra relaþiilor bilaterale dintre cele trei state dinCaucazul de Sud. Se va pune accent pe raporturile comer-ciale, proiectele de infrastructurã, conflictele teritoriale încãnesoluþionate, percepþia publicã, situaþia minoritãþilornaþionale, cooperarea militarã, demarcarea frontierelor ºialte aspecte care fac parte din agenda bilateralã. PrãbuºireaUniunii Sovietice a lichidat unipolaritatea în regiune ºi amultiplicat numãrul actorilor capabili sã influenþeze în mod

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ºi academic sunt vehiculate o serie de formule optimiste deintegrare regionalã: „Statele Unite ale Caucazului“, „Cauca-zul Casa Comunã“, „Piaþa Comunã Caucazianã“. De aseme-nea, se propun scheme de cooperare 3+1, în care Rusia sauTurcia servesc drept locomotive ale integrãrii regionale(Ismailov ºi Papava, 2007, 13-14). Tot atunci, se fac primiipaºi pentru a înlocui vechea etichetã politico-geograficã —Transcaucazia. Un oficial îºi aduce aminte: „Ne-a luat patruani sã convingem UE sã schimbe limbajul în documenteleoficiale din Transcaucazia în Caucazul de Sud“1. Treptat,termenul de Caucazul de Sud se afirmã în vocabularuldiplomatic la nivel internaþional ºi este folosit pe larg deactorii cu interese în regiune, inclusiv Rusia. Declaraþiacomunã a preºedinþilor Federaþiei Ruse, Armeniei ºiAzerbaidjanului din 2008 face referire explicitã la Caucazulde Sud, ºi nu la Transcaucazia (Prezident Rossii, 2008).Schimbarea terminologicã este reflectatã la nivelul organizã-rii birocratice ºi în politicile promovate de actorii regionali.De exemplu, în 2003 UE a creat un post de Reprezentantspecial pentru Caucazul de Sud, pãstrat dupã reorganizãrilestructurale implementate în baza Tratatului de la Lisabona.În 2005 ºi 2006 blocarea de cãtre Cipru a negocierilor cuprivire la planul de acþiune UE-Azerbaidjdan a motivat UEsã decaleze negocierea planurilor similare cu Georgia ºiArmenia (Popescu, 2011, 102). În 2008, Turcia a reînviatideea Pactului de stabilitate în Caucazul de Sud lansatãîn anii ’90, de aceastã datã sub umbrela „Platformei destabilitate ºi cooperare în Caucaz“ în formatul 3+2 (Rusia,Turcia, Armenia, Azerbaidjan ºi Georgia).

1.2. Este Caucazul de Sud o regiune?

Utilizarea conceptului la nivel internaþional a evoluat înparalel cu afirmarea curentului puternic de negare a regio-nalitãþii Caucazului de Sud. Un expert explicã: „Geografic

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semnificativ evoluþiile în Caucazul de Sud. Luând în conside-rare pluralitatea actorilor cu pondere regionalã, o parte im-portantã a analizei va fi dedicatã relaþiilor dintre statele dinCaucazul de Sud ºi SUA, UE, Rusia, Turcia ºi Iran. Prezen-tul demers analitic va fi ghidat de percepþia intraregionalã.Astfel, în prezentarea dezbaterilor despre regionalitateaCaucazului de Sud, relaþiile intraregionale ºi raporturile cuactorii externi va prima optica celor trei republici, reconsti-tuitã preponderent prin intermediul interviurilor realizatecu oficiali ºi experþi din Armenia, Azerbaidjan ºi Georgia.

I. Problema regionalitãþii Caucazului de Sud

1.1. De la Transcaucazia la Caucazul de Sud

Transcaucazia, termen precursor al Caucazului de Sud,a fost introdus în limbajul diplomatic al Rusiei þariste laînceputul secolului al XIX-lea. Transcaucazia marca terito-riul controlat de Rusia la sud de Munþii Caucazului pânã lagraniþele cu Imperiul Persan ºi cel Otoman. În cadrul Rusieiþariste, Transcaucazia a fost divizatã în 5 gubernii: Tiflis,Baku, Erevan, Kutaisi ºi Elizavetpol (a se vedea harta 1).Revoluþia din 1917 din Rusia þaristã a declanºat procesecentrifuge la periferia imperiului. În 1918, Transcaucazia îºideclarã independenþa ºi pentru prima datã formeazã ostructurã politicã integratã — Republica DemocraticãFederalã Transcaucazianã. Însã, dupã o lunã de coexistenþã,Georgia, Armenia ºi Azerbaidjan îºi declarã independenþa.Cele trei state sunt încorporate militar în Uniunea Sovieticãîn 1922 sub forma Republicii Sovietice Federale Trans-caucaziene. Prin Constituþia URSS din 1936, FederaþiaTranscaucazianã este desfiinþatã ºi sunt create trei republiciunionale, care îºi pãstreazã acest statut pânã în 1991 (a sevedea harta 2).

Redobândirea independenþei de cãtre Armenia, Azer-baidjan ºi Georgia (vezi harta 3) declanºeazã dezbaterea cuprivire la denumirea ºi viitorul regiunii. În discursul politic

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1 Interviu cu un oficial, Tbilisi, iunie 2011.

noi suntem o regiune, dar asta nu e suficient […] în epocaglobalizãrii regiunile se construiesc.“2 Or, în termeni de co-operare economicã, politicã sau militarã trilateralã Caucazulde Sud este paralizat. Proiectele de infrastructurã care sãincludã toate cele trei state lipsesc, iar coordonarea pozi-þiilor pe plan extern în format trilateral este de neconceput.Nu existã nici umbrela integratã de securitate. Statele dinregiune apeleazã la diverºi actori regionali pentru a-ºi garan-ta securitatea militarã.3 Aºadar, „dacã comparãm Caucazulde Sud cu zona balticã, atunci Caucazul de Sud nu este oregiune“4, concluzioneazã un alt expert. Indubitabil, trans-formarea Caucazului de Sud într-o regiune funcþionalã dupãmodelul european rãmâne mai mult un deziderat decât orealitate. Tentativele UE de a iniþia cooperarea regionalã nuau produs efectele scontate. Lansat de UE în 2010, progra-mul „Management integrat al frontierei în Caucazul de Sud“se realizeazã bilateral între Georgia ºi Armenia, pe de o parte,

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2 Interviu cu un expert, Baku, iunie 2011.3 Interviu cu un expert, Tbilisi, iunie 2011.4 Interviu cu un expert, Tbilisi, mai 2011.

Harta 1 — Transcaucazia în componenþa Rusiei þariste(sursa: Andrew Andersen 2003/2007)

Harta 3 — Armenia, Azerbaidjan ºi Georgia în perioada postsovieticã(sursa: RFE/RL 2002)

Harta 2 — Caucazul de Sud în componenþa URSS(sursa: Wikipedia)

dezvoltat profilul de stat la Marea Neagrã. Dupã valuriconsecutive de extindere a NATO ºi UE Georgia a dublateforturile pentru a se desprinde de Caucazul de Sud perce-put ca o regiune cu un handicap de imagine imens (Nilsson,2009, 100), ºi a se alãtura proiectului occidental în con-strucþie — „zona lãrgitã a Mãrii Negre“ (Asmus ºi Jackson,2004). „Noi am încercat sã redefinim identitatea noastrã,punând accent pe plasamentul nostru de la Marea Neagrã“9,explicã un expert. Pentru autoritãþile de la Tbilisi, migrareaspre „zona lãrgitã a Mãrii Negre“ înseamnã pãrãsirea Cauca-zului ºi o etapã intermediarã în apropierea ºi conectareainstituþionalã la Occident. Însã rãzboiul ruso-georgian din2008 a nãruit aceste speranþe ºi a determinat schimbarea deopticã la Tbilisi. Georgia încearcã sã profite de pe urmaParteneriatul Estic pentru a se poziþiona ca un stat dinEuropa de Est. Important de observat este cã noul discursare atât o componentã regionalã, cât ºi una individualistã.„Caucazul de Sud face parte din Europa de Est [...], de ce seface distincþie în cadrul Parteneriatului Estic între Caucazulde Sud ºi celelalte state?“10, întreabã un oficial guvernamen-tal. „În termeni de performanþã [la integrare europeanã],Georgia este mult mai aproape de Ucraina ºi Moldova“11,adaugã reprezentantul guvernului, introducând în acelaºitimp în ecuaþie elemente de diferenþiere în raport cu cele-lalte republici din Caucazul de Sud. Se pare cã în urmã-toarea perioadã Georgia se va inspira pe larg din povestea de„evadare“ din Balcanii de Vest ºi integrarea (prognozatã)Croaþiei în UE.12

Concluzionând, tabãra pesimiºtilor anticipeazã cã blo-cajul la nivelul cooperãrii trilaterale ºi orientãrile externedivergente ale statelor vor stimula „dispersarea a ceea ce amai rãmas din regiune, astfel încât într-o perioadã de 15-20

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ºi între Georgia ºi Azerbaidjan, pe de altã parte. La scarãredusã, se implementeazã proiecte trilaterale în domeniulmediului înconjurãtor, finanþate de UE. Însã în cele maimulte cazuri soluþiile unilaterale sau bilaterale prevaleazã.Aºa cum a mãrturisit un oficial referindu-se la un dosar careimplicã cele trei state: „Noi nu avem timp sã aºteptãmGeorgia sau Armenia [...], noi vom soluþiona problema desine stãtãtor.“5 Deºi au loc contacte la nivelul societãþilorcivile, intensitatea acestora a scãzut dupã 2007.6 Printrepuþinele proiecte trilaterale în curs de realizare este progra-mul care faciliteazã comunicarea între tinerii din regiune ºiprin care aceºtia învaþã sã conceapã ºi sã dezvolte proiectelocale ºi transfrontaliere (Eurasia Partnership Foundation,2009a).

Contestarea regionalitãþii Caucazului de Sud ºi a oricãrorperspective de viitor regional se face ºi într-o altã dimen-siune. Observatorii din regiune au remarcat cã statelor dinCaucazul de Sud le lipseºte o identitate regionalã, sau în celmai bun caz, aceasta este subdezvoltatã. „Viziunea cu privirela Caucazul de Sud nu existã în societatea noastrã“7, ob-servã un expert din Armenia. „Ataºamentul faþã de regiuneîn Azerbaidjan este destul de redus [deoarece] identitateanoastrã include, pe lângã elementele caucaziene, pe celecaspice ºi orientale“8, remarcã un formator de opinie dinAzerbaidjan. Relativa izolare a Armeniei în regiune ºi asu-marea de cãtre Azerbaidjan a rolului de pod între Vest ºi Estdilueazã sensul apartenenþei acestor state la Caucazul deSud. De asemenea, obiectivele de politicã externã ºi impe-rativele dezvoltãrii interne mobilizeazã statele sã cautesoluþii extraregionale. Georgia este de departe cel mai activstat din regiune la capitolul tentativelor de „evadare“ dinregiune. Încã din a doua jumãtate a anilor ’90 Georgia a

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9 Interviu cu un expert, Tbilisi, iunie 2011.10 Interviu cu un oficial, Tbilisi, iunie 2011.11 Interviu cu un oficial, Tbilisi, iunie 2011.12 Interviu cu un expert, Tbilisi, iunie 2011.

5 Interviu cu un oficial, Baku, iunie 2011.6 Interviu cu experþi, Erevan, iunie 2011.7 Interviu cu un expert, Erevan, iunie 2011.8 Interviu cu un exepert, Baku, iunie 2011.

regionalism ºi, prin urmare, poate fi extrem de utilã în stu-diul regionalitãþii în Caucazul de Sud (Buzan ºi Weaver,2003, 419-423; Simao ºi Freire, 2008, 225-226). Prin „com-plex de securitate“ se înþelege existenþa „unui grup de stateale cãror percepþii ºi preocupãri majore cu privire la securi-tate sunt interconectate în aºa mãsurã, încât problemele lorde securitate naþionalã nu pot fi analizate sau soluþionateseparat una faþã de cealaltã“ (Buzan, Weaver ºi De Wilde,1998, 12). Trebuie precizat cã autorii acestei construcþiianalitice aderã la interpretarea extensivã a securitãþiinaþionale care include, dincolo de tradiþionalul sector poli-tico-militar, securitatea ecologicã, economicã ºi societalã(ibidem, 198-199).

Privit prin aceastã lentilã teoreticã, Caucazul de Sud esteun complex subregional de securitate. Acesta este definit deo relaþie de inamiciþie între Armenia ºi Azerbaidjan ºi o seriede raporturi sectoriale de prietenie pragmaticã ºi/sau com-petiþie situaþionalã între Georgia ºi Armenia ºi între Georgiaºi Azerbaidjan. De exemplu, securitatea Azerbaidjanului îndomeniul gestionãrii fluxurilor de apã ºi calitãþii acesteiadepind de cooperarea cu Georgia ºi Armenia — state riveranein amonte pentru râurile Kura ºi Aras, care curg spreAzerbaidjan. Securitatea energeticã a Georgiei nu poate fiasiguratã fãrã Azerbaidjan, iar un eventual rãzboi întreArmenia ºi Azerbaidjan va submina semnificativ securitateaeconomicã a Georgiei. La rândul sãu, siguranþa tranzituluiterestru prin Georgia este vitalã pentru economia Armenieiºi (într-o mãsurã mai micã) cea a Azerbaidjanului. Aceastãînºiruire poate continua. Factori obiectivi care leagã aceastãregiune cu „geometrii variabile“ (statele fac parte selectiv dinCSI, OTSC, OCEMN sau GUAM14; intensitatea relaþiilor cuUE ºi NATO de asemenea variazã) au impact asupra per-cepþiilor ºi calculelor strategice cu privire la managementul

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de ani termenul de Caucazul de Sud, o inerþie postsovieticã,nu va mai avea nici o valoare descriptivã.“13

1.3. Caucazul de Sud — un complex subregional de securitate

Deºi reflectã în mod obiectiv realitatea regionalã, contes-tatarii regionalitãþii Caucazului de Sud omit douã aspecte:pluralitatea regionalismelor ºi impactul rãzboiului ruso-geor-gian din 2008. Aºadar, negarea regionalitãþii Caucazului deSud porneºte de la accepþiunea restrânsã a conceptului deregiune, care face posibilã existenþa unei regiuni, la nivelteoretic ºi practic, doar sub forma „comunitãþii de securi-tate“ caracterizatã printr-un grad înalt de integrare ºi elimi-narea violenþei ca soluþie la problemele din interiorul comu-nitãþii (Deutsch, 2006, 41-42). Comunitatea transatlanticãeste un exemplu clasic în literatura de specialitate. Prinurmare comparaþia Caucazului de Sud cu Regiunea Balticã,ultima fiind parte componentã a comunitãþii transatlantice,nu este una întâmplãtoare. Însã „comunitatea de securitate“este un tip ideal ºi cu aplicaþie geograficã destul de limitatã.În relaþiile internaþionale, regionalismul se poate manifestaîn diverse forme. Printre formulele mai puþin benigne figu-reazã „regionalismul disfuncþional“ ºi „regionalismul geo-politic“. În cadrul acestora, statele au eºuat în a dezvolta ocooperare regionalã solidã, iar regiunea este în centrul uneirivalitãþi pentru „sfere de influenþã“ care implicã puteriregionale (Emerson, 2008, 2-4).

Dacã depãºim concepþia idealistã cu privire la regiune ºiacceptãm faptul cã integrarea nu este singurul criteriu pen-tru determinarea regionalitãþii ºi cã interdependenþa poatefi nu doar pozitivã, ci ºi una negativã, atunci Caucazul deSud este o regiune. Conceptul de „complex de securitate“,elaborat în literatura de specialitate consacratã securitãþiiinternaþionale, oferã o platformã analiticã comprehensivãcare încapsuleazã modele cooperative ºi disfuncþionale de

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14 CSI – Comunitatea Statelor Independente; OTCS – Organi-zaþia Tratatului de Securitate Colectivã; OCEMN – OrganizaþiaCooperãrii Economice a Mãrii Negre; GUAM – Georgia-Ucraina-Azer-baidjan-Moldova.13 Interviu cu un expert, Erevan, iunie 2011.

oficial de la Baku. „Existã o serie de similitudini, precumistoria dominaþiei imperiale, memoria rãzboiului, încercãrilede a se debarasa de eticheta regionalã, care fac Caucazul deSud comparabil cu Balcanii de Vest“18, observã un expert dela Tbilisi.

În pofida tentativelor de a „pãrãsi“ regiunea, statele aufost forþate sã „revinã“ în Caucazul de Sud dupã rãzboiulruso-georgian. „Pânã în 2008 regiunea era pe cale de dez-integrare, [însã] rãzboiul din Georgia a schimbat aceastãdinamicã, forþând statele sã îºi refocalizeze atenþia asupraregiunii“19, explicã un influent analist local. În consecinþã,rãzboiul a readus conºtiinþa ºi gândirea regionalã. „Georgiaa deteriorat atmosfera în regiune“20, declarã tranºant unexpert din regiune cu referire la conflictul armat ruso-geor-gian. „Rãzboiul din 2008 a schimbat în negativ percepþiadespre Caucazul de Sud în Europa ºi în lume“21, îl com-pleteazã alt observator. Confruntarea armatã din 2008 ascos în evidenþã ameninþãrile regionale la adresa securitãþiieuropene, deºi Caucazul de Sud prezintã multiple oportu-nitãþi pentru Europa. Acest deficit de imagine a afectattoate statele din regiune. În cercurile academice se încearcãdepãºirea handicapului de imagine prin schimbarea etiche-telor. De pildã, doi autori consacraþi într-un studiu detaliatdedicat regiunii argumenteazã cã cele trei state caucazienefac parte din Caucazul Central, ºi nu din Caucazul de Sud(Ismailov ºi Papava, 2008, 287-289). De observat cã logicade argumentare este aproape identicã cu cea a statelor dinEuropa de Est la mijlocul anilor ’90, care doreau sa fieîncadrate politic ºi economic în Europa Centralã.

De asemenea, în 2008, þãrile din Caucazul de Sud auredescoperit vulnerabilitatea ºi interconectarea regionalã.Statele au sporit monitorizarea activitãþii vecinilor ºi ºi-auajustat strategiile de securitate luând în calcul mediul

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securitãþii naþionale. Armenia ºi Azerbaidjan urmãresc foarteatent raporturile pe care fiecare stat le dezvoltã cu NATO.„Dacã astãzi se prezintã reprezentantul Armeniei ºi solicitãcooperarea într-un anumit sector, e foarte probabil ca mâinesã primim o solicitare similarã din partea Azerbaidjanului[...] ºi vice versa“15, mãrturiseºte un oficial. Confirmareacorelãrii la nivel regional a deciziilor de cooperare cu NATOo gãsim în motivarea deciziei Armeniei de a tripla contin-gentul forþelor de menþinere a pãcii în Afganistan în 2011.Potrivit ministrului Apãrãrii, „Armenia nu trebuie sã fieultima în Caucazul de Sud la acest [prezenþa militarã înAfganistan] capitol“ (Massis Post, 2011). Încercarea de areintegra militar Osetia de Sud în Georgia a fost perceputãnegativ în Armenia. Vãzut de la Erevan, un eventual succesal Georgiei ar încuraja Azerbaidjanul ºi ar spori ºansele uneisoluþii militare în Nagorno-Karabah.16 La fel, Georgia, gazdaunui numãr semnificativ de persoane strãmutate intern (PSI)urmãreºte cu atenþie negocierile între Azerbaidjan ºiArmenia, în special soluþia la care cele douã pãrþi vor ajungecu privire la PSI din Nagorno-Karabah. Acestea sunt doarcâteva preocupãri suprapuse ale statelor din zonã care de-monstreazã existenþa unui complex subregional de securitateîn Caucazul de Sud.

Aºadar, în ciuda accentelor divergente în politica externãºi de securitate a statelor din regiune, existã un grad sporitde interdependenþã. Dependenþa reciprocã în Caucazul deSud nu este mereu una pozitivã, dar acest fapt nu infirmãexistenþa regiunii, ci descrie natura legãturilor regionale.Probabil comparaþia cu Balcanii de Vest este mult mai indi-catã atunci când cãutãm exemple similare de regionalismpentru Caucazul de Sud. Aceastã opinie o împãrtãºesc uniipoliticieni ºi analiºti din zonã. „Caucazul de Sud reprezintãal doilea focar de probleme dupã Balcani“17, declarã un

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18 Interviu cu un expert, Tbilisi, mai 2011.19 Interviu cu un expert, Erevan, iunie 2011.20 Interviu cu un expert, Baku, iunie 2011.21 Interviu cu un expert, Tbilisi, iunie 2011.

15 Interviu cu un oficial NATO.16 Interviu cu un expert, Erevan, iunie 2011.17 Interviu cu un oficial, Baku, iunie 2011.

se dezvoltã. Dinamica intraregionalã în Caucazul de Sudnu face excepþie. În virtutea poziþionãrii geografice a Cau-cazului de Sud, impactul mediului regional asupra stateloreste probabil mai mare decât în cazul altor regiuni (a se vedeaharta 4). Fiind la intersecþia câtorva complexe regionale desecuritate, fiecare stat în parte, dar ºi Caucazul de Sud caregiune, resimt din plin ºocurile politice, crizele economicesau ascensiunea unor actori regionali în vecinãtatea ime-diatã. În literatura de specialitate, un complex sub-regionalde securitate care se aflã la intersecþia unor complexe regio-nale de securitate ºi procese de securitate paralele la nivelmacroregional este catalogat drept izolator (Buzan ºi Weaver,2003, 490). Aºadar, fiind un punct unde se întâlnesc logiciconcurente de securitate pe plan regional, preocupãrile desecuritate ale statelor din Caucazul de Sud nu pot fi înþeleseizolat de contextul eurasiatic.

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regional modificat. Integrarea acceleratã a Georgiei înNATO a eºuat, ceea ce a determinat Tbilisi sã promoveze opoliticã externã regionalã mai echilibratã. Sistarea tempo-rarã a tranzitului comercial prin Georgia în august 2008a grãbit negocierile Armeniei cu Turcia în vederea norma-lizãrii relaþiilor bilaterale. Rãzboiul din Georgia a diminuatinteresul Azerbaidjanului faþã de NATO ºi a introdus noielemente în politica energeticã. Totodatã, discursul politica fost adaptat la realitatea post-conflict. „Reîntoarcerea“Georgiei în regiune a fost anunþatã de preºedintele Georgiei:„Caucazul trebuie sã se uneascã“ (Grigoryan, 2009). Prinurmare, el a resuscitat ideea „Caucazul, Casã Comunã“. Înopinia sa, aceasta ar trebui sã ia forma unei uniuni trilate-rale care sã fie capabilã sã creioneze o strategie politicã ºieconomicã regionalã (Ghazinyan, 2011). Ideea a fost pre-luatã de societatea civilã. „Noi dorim realizarea conceptuluiCaucazul Casã Comunã sub auspiciile UE“22, declarã entu-ziast un reprezentant al mass-media. Au fost introdusenuanþe economice în discursul politic. Astfel, preºedinteleAzerbaidjanului a declarat cã „economia Azerbaidjanuluireprezintã 75% din economia Caucazului de Sud“ (News.Az,2010), iar preºedintele Georgiei a descris Tbilisi drept„capitala Caucazului“ (Civil.Ge, 2011a). Fãrã îndoialã,„Caucazul, Casã Comunã“ rãmâne în mare parte doar unexerciþiu retoric, iar datele cu privire la volumul economieiAzerbaidjanului fac parte din jocul de intimidare la distanþãîntre Armenia ºi Azerbaidjan. Însã aspectele regionale alediscursului ºi mai cu seamã ajustarea politicilor statelor dinregiune dupã 2008 demonstreazã cã afirmaþiile cu privire lairelevanþa conceptului de Caucazul de Sud sunt premature.

1.4. Caucazul de Sud în contextul eurasiatic

Raporturile interstatale nu se desfãºoarã într-un vacuumpolitic, militar ºi economic. Inerþia unor raporturi bilateraleeste mereu influenþatã de contextul regional în care acestea

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22 Interviu cu un reprezentant al mass-media, Baku, iunie 2011.Harta 4 — Caucazul de Sud în contextul eurasiatic

(sursa: Caspian Studies Program, Harvard University 2006)

Harta 5 — Caucazul de Sud ºi cel de Nord(sursa: Wikitravel)

Krasnodarskii krai este singura unitate administrativãîn componenþa districtului federal sud care se învecineazãcu Caucazul de Sud, mai exact cu regiunea separatistã dinGeorgia — Abhazia. Krasnodarskii krai gãzduieºte cel maiimportant port rusesc de la Marea Neagrã — Novorossiisk,care anterior înþelegerilor ruso-ucrainene de la Harkov din2010, era considerat o alternativã la baza flotei ruseºti de laSevastopol. Strategia insurgenþilor presupune extindereafrontului din Caucazul de Nord în regiunile populate deetnici ruºi. Astfel, Krasnodarskii krai, vecin direct cu republi-cile caucaziene, importã insecuritate din Caucazul de Nord.În ultimul deceniu, au avut loc o serie de atentate teroristeîn aceastã regiune. În acelaºi timp, desemnarea oraºului Socica gazdã a Jocurilor Olimpice de iarnã din 2014 sporeºtepericolul comiterii atentatelor teroriste de proporþii înKrasnodarskii krai. Explozia la calea feratã de lângã Soci în2010 confirmã cele mai pesimiste predicþii. Utilizarea infra-structurii ºi resurselor naturale ale Abhaziei în vedereapregãtirii pentru Jocurile Olimpice din 2014 alimenteazãtensiuni la nivel regional între Rusia ºi Georgia.

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1.4.1. Nord

La nord, Caucazul de Sud se învecineazã cu districtulfederal nord-caucazian ºi cel sudic al Federaþiei Ruse (a sevedea harta 5). Caucazul de Nord este una din cele maiimportante provocãri la adresa securitãþii naþionale a Rusiei.Republicile din Caucazul de Nord se confruntã cu violenþeaproape zilnice de intensitate micã ºi medie, rate mari deºomaj (în unele cazuri depãºesc 50%), corupþie sistemicã ºisãrãcie. Autoritãþile de la Moscova mizeazã pe stabilitateasituaþionalã asiguratã prin alocarea fondurilor federale ºimilitarizarea regiunii. De pildã, bugetele Republicii Cecenesau Inguºetiei sunt acoperite în proporþie de 91% din alo-caþii federale (Grove, 2011). Infuzia de bani asigurã loiali-tatea elitelor regionale. Însã modul netrasparent de distri-buire a acestora exacerbeazã fenomenul corupþiei. Rusia adislocat în regiune un contingent de circa 88.000 militaridin diverse structuri de forþã (Nichol, 2011, 13) pentru aface faþã insurgenþei. Prezenþa militarã terestrã este întãritãprin douã baze militare ale flotilei caspice în Kaspiisk ºiMahacikala. În 2011, Ministerul de Interne a trimis înDaghestan forþe adiþionale pentru a contracara campaniade primãvarã a rebelilor. Situaþia explozivã din Caucazul deNord ºi militarizarea regiunii afecteazã în mod direct secu-ritatea statelor din Caucazul de Sud. Calea feratã ºi con-ducta de gaze care leagã Daghestanul de Azerbaidjan a fostdeseori þinta atentatelor teroriste. De asemenea, au fostînregistrate cazuri de traversare a frontierei în direcþiaAzerbaidjanului de cãtre rebeli din Daghestan. Rusia acuzãsistematic Georgia de gãzduirea ºi protejarea rebelilor dinCaucazul de Nord în defileul Kodori. Trebuie menþionat cãKremlinul a continuat sã acuze Georgia ºi dupã preluareacontrolului asupra defileului Kodori de cãtre miliþiile abhazecu ajutorul trupelor regulate ruse. Nu în ultimul rând,Armata a 58-a, dislocatã în Caucazul de Nord, a constituitnucleul forþelor armate ruseºti care au participat în 2008 larãzboiul ruso-georgian.

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cel mai longeviv lider în spaþiul postsovietic. În aprilie 2011,Nazarbaev a fost reales pentru un nou mandat de cinci ani.În Turkmenistan, decesul subit al preºedintelui Niazov în2006 a fãcut posibilã, tranziþia de putere, dupã 15 ani de ladeclararea independenþei, care însã nu a schimbat naturaautoritarã a regimului. Kazahstan ºi Turkmenistan sunt„petro-statele“ cu cele mai mari rezerve de hidrocarburi înAsia Centralã. Rusia ºi China încearcã sã monopolizezeimportul de gaze naturale ºi petrol din regiunea caspicã:Rusia pentru a le distribui apoi în UE ºi statele post-sovie-tice din Europa de Est, China pentru a satisface consumulintern în continuã creºtere. Pe de altã parte, Iranul, prinpoziþia rigidã cu privire la statutul juridic al Mãrii Caspice,sperã sã blocheze proiectele transcaspice de interes majorpentru securitatea energeticã a UE. De asemenea, disputaazero-turkmenã cu privire la delimitarea sectoarelornaþionale în Marea Caspicã împiedicã realizarea conducteide gaze transcaspice. În ciuda tuturor acestor obstacole,Kazahstanul (din 2008) ºi Turkmenistanul (din 2010) auînceput sã livreze petrol în Europa prin oleoductul Baku-Tbilisi-Ceihan (BTC). Kazahstanul mai foloseºte rutaadiþionalã de export prin portul georgian Batumi. Legãturamaritimã între Azerbaidjan, Turkmenistan ºi Kazahstan esteasiguratã prin curse regulate cu feribotul: Baku-Turkmenbaºiºi Baku-Aktau. Arterele de transport care leagã Georgia ºiAzerbaidjan cu Kazahstanul ºi Turkmenistanul fac parte dinreþeaua de distribuþie nordicã care aprovizioneazã forþeleNATO ºi SUA în Afganistan. Cu toate acestea, Rusia ºiIranul deþin în continuare supremaþia militarã navalã laMarea Caspicã.

1.4.3. Vest

Marea Neagrã este unica legãturã directã a Caucazuluide Sud cu UE ºi NATO. Ultimul val de extindere a trans-format UE într-o putere la Marea Neagrã. În acelaºi timp,extinderea din 2004 a mãrit prezenþa NATO în regiune.

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Problemele de securitate în Caucazul de Nord trebuiepuse în contextul ambiþiilor regionale ale Rusiei. Kremlinul,în mod tradiþional, a considerat vitalã prezenþa militarã înCaucazul de Sud pentru menþinerea controlului asupraCaucazului de Nord. Aceastã gândire este determinatã deistoria cuceririi Caucazului. Din punct de vedere cronologic,Rusia þaristã mai întâi a ocupat Caucazul de Sud în urmaconfruntãrii directe cu alte puteri regionale. Abia dupã cea asigurat controlul asupra teritoriului de la sud de MunþiiCaucaz, Rusia a declanºat campania decisivã pentrucucerirea integralã a Caucazului de Nord (regiunile de est ºivest), care s-a încheiat în a doua jumãtate a secolului alXIX-lea (Trenin, 2009, 143). Legãtura între Caucazul de Sudºi de Nord în gândirea strategicã rusã s-a reflectat parþial înlogica acþiunilor din 2008. Pe lângã subminarea poziþiilorSUA în regiune ºi prevenirea extinderii NATO în Caucazulde Sud, intervenþia militarã a trimis un semnal ferm repub-licilor din Caucazul de Nord (ibidem, 149). Aºadar, vulnera-bilitatea obiectivã în Caucazul de Nord ºi ambiþia de a aveao „sferã de influenþã“ în spaþiul post-sovietic motiveazã aspi-raþia Rusiei de a fi principalul „gestionar al securitãþii“ înCaucaz (ibidem, 154).

1.4.2. Est

Caucazul de Sud este flancat la est de Marea Caspicã ºila vest de Marea Neagrã. Aceastã poziþie geograficã în com-binaþie cu vastele resurse energetice din regiunea Caspicãconferã Caucazului de Sud funcþia de important nod ener-getic în Eurasia. Marea Caspicã serveºte drept legãturã întreCaucazul de Sud ºi Asia Centralã, în special cu douã repu-blici post-sovietice, Kazahstan ºi Turkmenistan. Cele douãstate sunt guvernate de regimuri autoritare consolidate(Freedom House, 2011), care îºi asigurã supravieþuirea nu înultimul rând prin intermediul politicii externe multivecto-riale. Preºedintele Nazarbaev este de 19 ani la cârma þãrii(egalat doar de preºedintele Uzbekistanului, Karimov), fiind

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este printre puþinele state membre NATO care a achiziþio-nat armament de producþie ruseascã. Apropierea ruso-turcãnu este însã fãrã precedent în istoria recentã. În anii ’70,Turcia ºi URSS au avut o perioadã de încãlzire a relaþiilorpolitice ºi economice bilaterale, care s-a datorat, nu în ulti-mul rând, tensiunilor între cei doi aliaþi, SUA ºi Turcia(Altunisik ºi Tur, 2005, 108). Îmbunãtãþirea relaþiilorruso-turce în anii 2000 s-a produs pe fondul deteriorãriirelaþiilor turco-americane, marcate de campania militarã aSUA în Irak ºi planurile Washingtonului de internaþionalizarea Mãrii Negre. Acestã dinamicã a grãbit formarea în regiu-nea Mãrii Negre a „condominiului ruso-turc“ informal ori-entat spre menþinerea statu quo-ului regional (Socor, 2009;Triantaphyllou, 2009, 232). Drept urmare, Turcia s-a opusextinderii operaþiunii NATO “Active Endeavour” în MareaNeagrã ºi a aprobat o prezenþã militarã limitatã a NATO înMarea Neagrã pe durata conflictului ruso-georgian din 2008(Lesser, 2011, 2-3). Acestã alianþã tacticã însã nu este lip-sitã de interese divergente ºi competiþie în Caucazul de Sud,fapt demonstrat de reacþia Rusiei la tentativele de norma-lizare a relaþiilor turco-armene (Torbakov, 2010).

1.4.4. Sud

În sud, Caucazul se învecineazã cu douã puteri dinOrientul Mijlociu, Iran ºi Turcia, ultima fiind ºi o putereregionalã europeanã. Iranul este un vecin incomod (nu ºipentru Armenia), dar, în acelaºi timp, un partener necesarpentru statele din Caucazul de Sud. Programul nuclear ºiinstabilitatea politicã internã în Iran alimenteazã stareade incertitudine în regiune. Teheranul urmãreºte cel puþinpatru obiective în Caucazul de Sud: prevenirea perceputeiîncercuiri de cãtre Occident, garantarea neutralitãþii statelorîn caz de conflict armat cu SUA, spargerea izolãrii inter-naþionale ºi legitimarea regimului politic, sporirea influenþeiregionale prin proiectarea „puterii blânde“ ºi expansiuneaeconomicã. Coerenþa politicii regionale a Iranului e afectatã

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Noua stare de fapt pe de o parte, ºi interesele statelor nouvenite pe de altã parte, au declanºat procesul de formularea politicilor în regiunea Mãrii Negre. În consecinþã, UEa lansat douã iniþiative care acoperã aceastã arie: SinergiaMãrii Negre (2007) ºi Parteneriatul Estic (2009). În 2011,Parlamentul European a adoptat strategia UE pentruregiunea Mãrii Negre. Deºi au existat iniþiative de a elaborao strategie similarã a NATO ºi pânã atunci, acestea au fostbarate în ultimã instanþã de Turcia.23 România ºi Bulgariasunt democraþii semiconsolidate (Freedom House, 2011)cu interese economice în Caucazul de Sud. Imperativele desecuritate energeticã au determinat cele douã state sã se alã-ture proiectului gazoductului Nabucco ºi sã dezvolte relaþiieconomice ºi politice apropiate cu Azerbaidjan ºi Georgia.Primatul intereselor economice explicã pasivitatea Bulgarieiºi României în promovarea agendei democratice în Georgiaºi Azerbaidjan.

Pe lângã noii membri ai UE, din regiunea Mãrii Negre facparte douã state cu aspiraþii europene, Ucraina ºi Moldova.Cele douã þãri riverane sunt guvernate de regimuri politicehibride (Freedom House 2011) ºi au cele mai avansaterelaþii cu UE din grupul þãrilor Parteneriatului Estic. Înscopul accelerãrii integrãrii europene, între Ucraina,Moldova ºi Georgia are loc un schimb intens de experienþãla diferite nivele în privinþa implementãrii reformelor ºipurtãrii negocierilor cu UE. Din regiunea Mãrii Negre maifac parte doi actori care în mare mãsurã determinã dinami-ca de securitate în zonã — Turcia ºi Rusia. În ultimul dece-niu, relaþiile politice, militare ºi economice între Moscova ºiAnkara au cunoscut o traiectorie ascendentã. Schimburilecomerciale bilaterale au crescut substanþial, Rusia devenindal doilea partener comercial al Turciei dupã UE (EUCommission, 2011a). Cele douã state au eliminat vizelepentru cãlãtoriile de scurtã duratã ºi au creat Consiliul deCooperare Strategicã la Nivel Înalt. De asemenea, Turcia

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23 Interviu cu un oficial NATO.

Caucazul de Sud au urmãrit cu mare preocupare revirimen-tul democratic din þãrile arabe. Declanºarea campaniei decombatere a corupþiei în Azerbaidjan ºi dialogul între putereºi opoziþie în Armenia au coincis cu valul revoluþionar dinOrientul Mijlociu, confirmând expunerea Caucazului deSud la procesele de democratizare care au loc în vecinãtate.

II. Dinamica intraregionalã în Caucazul de Sud

Starea de conflict între Armenia ºi Azerbaidjan transfor-mã Georgia într-un stat pivot în Caucazul de Sud. Singurelerelaþii stabile în regiune, pe care le au cele douã pãrþi anga-jate în conflictul din Nagorno-Karabah sunt cu Georgia. Pede altã parte, poziþia cheie a Georgiei în regiune impuneautoritãþilor de la Tbilisi pãstrarea unui echilibru subtil înraporturile cu Armenia ºi Azerbaidjan.

2.1 Armenia-Azerbaidjan: pace improbabilã, rãzboi posibil

Între Armenia ºi Azerbaidjan nu existã relaþii diploma-tice, graniþa este închisã ºi nu existã comunicare directãterestrã sau pe calea aerului. Zborul între cele douã capitalese face cu escalã la Moscova, Kiev sau Istanbul. Cu toatecã unii oficiali afirmã cã între Armenia ºi Azerbaidjan areloc comerþul prin terþi25, cel mai probabil prin Georgia, esteextrem de dificil de verificat ºi de cuantificat volumul aces-tuia. Singurul loc confirmat din Georgia unde avea loc co-merþul între armeni ºi azeri a fost satul Sadahlo la graniþaîntre Armenia ºi Georgia, nu foarte departe de punctul undefrontiera celor trei state din Caucazul de Sud se intersec-teazã (Poghosyan, 2011). Însã piaþa din Sadahlo a fost în-chisã în 2005. Existã interacþiune limitatã între ONG-uriledin cele douã þãri, însã nivelul de cooperare a scãzut dupã2005.26 Întâlnirile au loc, de regulã, în Georgia sau înArmenia, deoarece este mai dificil de organizat activitãþi de

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de diviziunile în cadrul regimului de la Teheran ºi problemasuccesiunii generate de alegerile prezidenþiale din 2009 ºiprotestele de masã ce le-au urmat (Nader, Thaler ºiBohandy, 2011). De pildã, vizita preºedintelui Ahmadinejadîn Armenia în 2011 a fost anulatã nu doar din motiveexterne invocate oficial de Teheran, dar ºi de ordin intern.Interdicþia de a pãrãsi þara impusã în ajunul vizitei unor ofi-ciali de rang înalt din anturajul preºedintelui ºi intenþia luiAhmadinejad de a nu ceda în faþa presiunilor ayatollahuluiKhamenei se pare cã au contribuit la decizia de a reprogra-ma vizita la Erevan.24

Turcia a trecut prin transformãri interne majore în anii2000. Ratele de creºtere economicã ridicate ºi stagnareanegocierilor de aderare la UE au contribuit la auto-încre-dere, o politicã externã independentã ºi o strategie activãîn vecinãtatea imediatã a þãrii (Tocci, 2011). Politica turcãregionalã — „zero probleme“ cu vecinii — a consolidat pozi-þiile politice ºi economice ale Turciei în Orientul Mijlociu,Balcanii de Vest, Caucazul de Sud ºi regiunea caspicã(Akyol, 2011). Discursul premierului Recep Erdogan dupãcâºtigarea alegerilor în 2011, în timpul cãruia el s-a adresatpopulaþiei din Damasc, Sarajevo ºi Baku, confirmã conti-nuitatea politicii regionale ambiþioase a Turciei. Caucazul deSud este important în viziunea Turciei pentru transformareaþãrii într-un major nod energetic eurasiatic. Rãzboiul ruso-georgian, care a pus în pericol aceste planuri, a impulsionatimplicarea mai activã a Turciei în dosarele de securitateregionalã. Normalizarea relaþiilor cu Armenia era perceputãca un pas care ar putea redesena arhitectura regionalã ºimultiplica pârghiile de influenþã ale Turciei în Caucazul deSud. Deºi a înregistrat succese notabile, politica de vecinã-tate a Turciei se confruntã cu douã provocãri majore: pãs-trarea balanþei între competiþia ºi cooperarea cu Rusia ºi ges-tionarea consecinþelor politice ºi economice ale revoluþiilordin lumea arabã. Nu în ultimul rând, regimurile politice din

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25 Interviu cu un oficial, Baku, iunie 2011.26 Interviu cu un reprezentant mass-media, Baku, iunie 2011.24 Interviu cu un expert, Erevan, iunie 2011.

aproximativ 600.000 de PSI în Azerbaidjan. Potrivit organi-zaþiilor non-guvernamentale internaþionale, Azerbaidjanulse aflã în topul primelor 10 þãri din lume cu cea mai mareratã de PSI pe cap de locuitor (Internal DisplacementMonitoring Center, 2011).

Harta 6 — Nagorno-Karabah ºi alte ºapte regiuni ocupate ale Azerbaidjanului

(sursa: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Londra, 2011)

De iure, cele douã þãri sunt în stare de rãzboi. Opera-þiunile militare au fost sistate în 1994 în urma semnãriiarmistiþiului de la Biºkek. Azerbaidjanul s-a opus desfã-ºurãrii forþelor de menþinere a pãcii ruse pe linia frontului.Astfel, respectarea acordului de încetare a focului cade însarcina pãrþilor beligerante. Deºi din 1994 în zona de con-flict nu au avut loc confruntãri militare de proporþii, pãrþilesunt angajate sistematic în schimburi de focuri. Violenþa demicã intensitate numitã de unii experþi „rãzboiul lunetiºti-lor“30 s-a soldat cu 3000 de victime din 1994 pânã în 2009(International Crisis Group, 2009, 1). În ultimii trei ani,violarea armistiþiului a devenit o practicã mai frecventã,sporind probabilitatea reizbucnirii conflictului armat(International Crisis Group, 2011a). Aºa cum remarcã unexpert din regiune „scopul eforturilor diplomatice la nivel

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acest gen în Azerbaidjan.27 Participanþii armeni la Bakusau azeri la Erevan beneficiazã de protecþia personalã, iarpaºapoartele nu sunt ºtampilate la intrarea ºi ieºirea dinþarã, astfel încât nu existã dovada cã ei au vizitat vreodatãArmenia sau Azerbaidjanul.28 Tentativele de a reconectacele douã societãþi prin dialog cultural sunt blocate de celemai multe ori. În 2010, un ONG din Armenia a avut iniþia-tiva de a organiza sãptãmâna filmului azer în Armenia, însã,în ciuda mãsurilor oganizatorice preliminare, evenimentulnu a avut loc (Grigoryan, 2010). Câºtigarea finalei con-cursului Eurovision 2011 de cãtre Azerbaidjan a declanºat odezbatere publicã amplã în Armenia cu privire la eventualaparticipare sau neparticipare la ediþia Eurovison 2012.

Relaþiile conflictuale între Armenia ºi Azerbaidjan suntrezultatul rãzboiului purtat între cele douã state laînceputul anilor ’90 pentru Nagorno-Karabah, care pânã ladisoluþia Uniunii Sovietice a fost în componenþa Azerbai-djanului. În prezent Armenia controleazã Nagorno-Karabahºi alte ºapte regiuni (douã parþial) ale Azerbaidjanului înjurul enclavei (vezi harta 6).29 Prin urmare, Azerbaidjanulnu controleazã în jur de 14% din teritoriul sãu recunoscutinternaþional (Waal, 2003, 286). În Armenia, cele ºapteregiuni ale Azerbaidjanului sunt numite „teritorii eliberate“ºi servesc douã obiective strategice: asigurã legãtura întreNagorno-Karabah ºi Armenia ºi asigurã spaþiul necesarpentru apãrarea avansatã a Nagorno-Karabahului. Deasemenea, la Erevan, nu este exclusã posibilitatea folosiriiregiunilor (cu excepþia Lacinului ºi Kelbajarului, care separãArmenia de Nagorno-Karabah) drept monedã de schimb înnegocierile asupra viitorului statut al Nagorno-Karabahuluiºi a unor garanþii de securitate credibile. Pe lângã distrugereainfrastructurii ºi numeroase victime, rãzboiul a generat

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30 Interviu cu un expert, Erevan, iunie 2011.

27 Interviu cu un expert, Baku, iunie 2011.28 Interviu cu un expert, Erevan, iunie 2011.29 Cele ºapte regiuni sunt: Kelbajar, Lacin, Kubatli, Jebrail, Zan-

ghelan, Agdam ºi Fizuli.

sau în cadrul forurilor internaþionale. Graniþa actualã dintreAzerbaidjan ºi Armenia este printre cele mai militarizatedin lume. Armenia ºi Nagorno-Karabah au edificat trei liniide apãrare ºi se pare cã a patra este în faza de construcþie.32

Armenia sprijinã financiar ºi contribuie cu militari în termenla sistemul de apãrare a Nagorno-Karabahului. Potrivit esti-mãrilor, forþele armate ale Armeniei ºi Nagorno-Karabahuluitotalizeazã 70.000 de militari, în timp ce armata Azerbai-djanului numãrã circa 95.000 de militari (InternationalCrisis Group, 2011a, 1). Armatele celor douã state organi-zeazã cu regularitate demonstraþii de forþã prin intermediulexerciþiilor militare în apropierea liniei frontului. Armenia ºiAzerbaidjan sunt angajate în cursa înarmãrilor reflectatã încreºterea spectaculoasã a bugetelor de apãrare ºi achiziþii detehnicã militarã. În perioada 2000-2009, bugetul de apãrareal Armeniei a crescut de la 3,6% la 4,2% din PIB, iar alAzerbaidjanului de la 2,3% la 3,4 din PIB (SIPRI, 2011).În anii 2000-2010, Azerbaidjanul a alocat pentru apãrare$9,2 miliarde, iar Armenia $2,6 miliarde (News.Az 2011a).În 2010, guvernul de la Baku a stabilit bugetul de apãrare lanivelul de $2,1 miliarde, ceea ce depãºeºte bugetul naþionalconsolidat al Armeniei ($1,8 miliarde).

Pe lângã dorinþa de a demonstra schimbarea echilibruluide forþe, Baku þinteºte extenuarea economicã a Armenieiprin continuarea cursei înarmãrilor. Închiderea frontiereiazero-armene ºi turco-armene ºi excluderea Armeniei dinproiectele regionale de infrastructurã sunt ghidate de aceeaºilogicã. Una din recentele tentative de a pune presiune eco-nomicã pe Armenia a fost invocarea, dupã accidentul de laFukushima, a pericolului pe care îl reprezintã pentru întrea-ga regiune centrala nuclearã Metsamor, de construcþie so-vieticã, care produce aproximativ 40% din energia electricãla nivel naþional (News. Az, 2011b). Eventuala închidere acentralei de la Metsamor, fãrã a identifica surse alternative

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înalt în acest an [2011] a fost mai degrabã prevenirearãzboiului decât identificarea unei soluþii pentru conflict.“31

Nagorno-Karabah este principala problemã de politicãexternã ºi de securitate a Azerbaidjanului. Potrivit sonda-jelor de opinie, conflictul cu Armenia este cea mai impor-tantã preocupare pentru 51% din cetãþenii Azerbaidjanului(Puls-R/Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2010). În acelaºi timp,problema pãcii (implicit conflictul cu Azerbaidjanul) ocupãdoar locul trei cu 9%, dupã ºomaj (46%) ºi sãrãcie (10%),în topul preocupãrilor cetãþenilor Armeniei (CaucasusResearch Resource Centers, 2010). Aceastã diferenþã poatefi explicatã prin: Azerbaidjanul este perdantul rãzboiuluidin 1992-1994; petrodolarii distribuiþi diverselor categoriisociale în mod relativ atenueazã, în percepþia publicã, efectelecorupþiei ºi ºomajului, care urmeazã în lista preocupãrilor;guvernul de la Baku controleazã strâns spaþiul public ºi, prinurmare, instrumentalizeazã eficient conflictul cu Armeniapentru a preveni în dezbaterea publicã primordialitateaproblemelor de ordin intern asupra celor generate extern. Pede altã parte, sondajul din Armenia aratã cã armenii se simtmult mai confortabil cu actualul statu quo pe linia frontu-lui, dar în acelaºi timp resimt mai puternic efectele conflic-tului, care, parþial, este responsabil pentru situaþia econo-micã dificilã. Totodatã, rezultatele sondajului în Armeniaaratã cã sistemul politic este mai deschis în comparaþie cucel din Azerbaidjan, iar societatea depãºeºte lent logica„fortãreþei asediate“. În consecinþã, în prim plan ies proble-mele care afecteazã viaþa de zi cu zi a cetãþenilor ºi creºtecererea societalã pentru soluþionarea lor.

Pentru a apãra sau schimba statu quo-ul în problema Na-gorno-Karabahului, Armenia, pe de o parte, ºi Azerbaidjan,pe de altã parte, alocã resurse financiare ºi umane impor-tante în rãzboiul juridic, diplomatic, istoriografic, economicºi militar purtat pe linia frontului, în spaþiul informaþional

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32 Interviu cu un expert, Erevan, iunie 2011.31 Interviu cu un expert, Erevan, iunie 2011.

fie la dreptul de autodeterminare a populaþiei, care a fostvictima unei agresiuni a guvernului central, fie la agresiuneateritorialã a unui stat împotriva altui stat ºi campania deepurãri etnice. Pe lângã implicarea activã în campanii deinformare a corpului diplomatic, administraþiile preziden-þiale din Armenia ºi Azerbaidjan includ în componenþa lordepartamente specializate care monitorizeazã mesajele con-curente ºi gestioneazã eforturile de neutralizare a acestora înspaþiul informaþional.34 Diaspora este un emiþãtor impor-tant de mesaje în campaniile de lobby ale Armeniei ºiAzerbaidjanului. Diaspora armeanã din Franþa ºi SUA estecunoscutã pentru buna organizare ºi impactul pe care îl areasupra unor decizii de politicã externã. Într-un efort de re-cuperare, în ultimii ani, autoritãþile de la Baku au acordatmai multã atenþie organizãrii diasporei pentru promovareacauzei Azerbaidjanului la nivel internaþional (News.Az,2011c). Pe de altã parte, Baku a repurtat o serie de succesediplomatice tactice. În 2008 Adunarea Generalã al ONU aadoptat rezoluþia cu privire la „situaþia pe teritoriul ocupatal Azerbaidjanului“ în care se solicitã retragerea „imediatã,completã ºi necondiþionatã“ a Armeniei de pe teritoriulAzerbaidjanului (UN, 2008). În 2011, Adunarea Parlamen-tarã a Consiliului Europei a decis restabilirea subcomitetu-lui pentru Nagorno-Karabah, anterior suspendat.

Rivalitatea în forurile diplomatice se desfãºoarã în para-lel cu negocierile mediate de grupul de la Minsk creat subegida OSCE ºi care include Rusia, Franþa ºi SUA în calitatede copreºedinþi. Dupã conflictul ruso-georgian activitateagrupului, ºi în special a Rusiei, în cadrul acestuia a fostrevigoratã. Rusia a gãzduit între 2008 ºi 2011 nouã întâlniriîntre preºedinþii Armeniei ºi Azerbaidjanului, care s-au sol-dat cu semnarea unei serii de declaraþii comune ºi schimb deprizoneri sau corpurile militarilor uciºi în acþiune. Duma deStat a intermediat în 2010 la Moscova un dialog informal

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de energie sau construcþia unei noi centrale, va pune într-osituaþie dificilã întreaga economie a Armeniei. Baku sperã cãstrategia de hãrþuire permanentã în combinaþie cu creºtereaeconomicã proprie, alimentatã de exporturile de hidrocarburi,va forþa Armenia sã negocieze de pe o poziþie de inferiori-tate în ultimã instanþã. Azerbaidjanul nu exclude nici opþiu-nea militarã pentru a recupera Nagorno-Karabah.

La rândul sãu, deºi efortul financiar pentru apãrare estesubstanþial pentru economia Armeniei, pãstrarea balanþeimilitare este asiguratã, nu în ultimul rând, cu sprijinul dia-sporei ºi prin achiziþii de armament din Rusia la preþuri subnivelul pieþei mondiale. Armenia încearcã sã minimalizezeefectele izolãrii economice regionale prin dezvoltareaproiectelor energetice alternative ºi blocarea iniþiativelorpromovate de Azerbaidjan. De exemplu, Armenia s-a opusactiv alocãrii finanþãrii externe pentru proiectul de cale feratãBaku-Tbilisi-Kars. Dezizolarea vizeazã nu doar Armenia,dar ºi Nagorno-Karabahul. Astfel, diaspora a contribuit cu$3 milioane la reconstrucþia aeroportului din Stepanakert,a cãrui redeschidere a fost amânatã însã în 2011. Erevanul,ca mãsurã de retorsiune pentru închiderea frontierelor cuAzerbaidjan ºi Turcia, blocheazã legãtura directã a Azerbai-djanului cu enclava sa Nahicevan, care la sud se învecineazãcu Iranul ºi pe o fâºie foarte scurtã (11 km) cu Turcia.

Ambele state desfãºoarã o campanie internaþionalãactivã de informare pe problema Nagorno-Karabahului,care sã capteze suportul cât mai larg al comunitãþii inter-naþionale. Experþii nu exclud faptul cã decizia din 2011 aAzerbaidjanului de a se alãtura Miºcãrii de Nealiniere dincare fac parte 180 de þãri vizeazã parþial utilizarea acesteiplatforme pentru mobilizarea sprijinului pentru Baku înrândul statelor care se confruntã cu probleme teritorialesimilare.33 Pãrþile în conflict fac uz de o istoriografie careexclude sau minimalizeazã prezenþa reciprocã în Nagorno-Karabah pe parcursul istoriei. De asemenea, pãrþile apeleazã

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34 Interviu cu un expert, Baku, iunie 2011; interviu cu un expert,Erevan, iunie 2011.33 Interviu cu un expert, Baku, iunie 2011.

De asemenea, 70% din cei chestionaþi în Azerbaidjan con-siderã cã guvernul nu ar trebui sã accepte niciun compromispentru a soluþiona paºnic conflictul (Puls-R/Friedrich EbertStiftung 2010). Or fãrã compromis, care se reflectã în prin-cipiile de la Madrid, nu poate exista o soluþie nonviolentã aconflictului. Cu toate cã 78% din armeni considerã cã situa-þia din Nagorno-Karabah poate fi rezolvatã pe cale amiabilã(International Republican Institute, 2008a), se pare cã laErevan ºi Stepanakert existã preocupãri cu privire la imple-mentarea unei astfel de soluþii. „Noi dorim o datã previzibilãpentru organizarea referendumului prin care se va decidestatutul Nagorno-Karabahului“36, dezvãluie un oficial unadin preocupãri. Totodatã, se pune întrebarea cu privire lacredibilitatea forþelor de menþinere a pãcii ºi capacitatea lorde a îndeplini misiunea. „Cine ne asigurã cã unele eveni-mente din Balcani nu se vor repeta în Nagorno-Karabah?“37,întreabã un analist cu aluzie la masacrul de la Srebreniþa ºiinacþiunea forþelor internaþionale de menþinere a pãcii. Separe cã reticenþa faþã de desfãºurarea pacificatorilor are ºirãdãcini economice. Armata regiunii separatiste este princi-palul angajator pentru un segment important al populaþieimasculine din Nagorno-Karabah. Prin urmare, desfãºurareatrupelor de menþinere a pãcii va genera reducerea efectivu-lui forþelor armate ale regiunii separatiste, cu impact socialºi economic sever imediat.38

Aºadar, implementarea unui plan de pace în Nagorno-Ka-rabah poate fi comparatã cu „mersul pe un câmp minat“(Economist, 2011). Acesta poate fi traversat cu succes dacãnegocierile politice vor fi combinate cu mãsuri care vor pre-gãti societãþile pentru pacea sustenabilã. Dacã regimurilepolitice de la Baku ºi Erevan au voinþã ºi sunt capabile deaºa ceva, rãmâne o întrebare deschisã. Se pare cã tot maimulþi observatori din regiune considerã cã, fãrã o autenticã

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între membrii Milli Majlis-ului ºi Adunãrii Naþionale. Înciuda presiunii din partea SUA, Franþei ºi Rusiei în ajunulultimului summit de la Kazan în 2011, Baku ºi Erevan nuau reuºit sã ajungã la un acord cu privire la principiile desoluþionare a conflictului, propuse de co-preºedinþi în cadrulconferinþei ministeriale OSCE, în 2007, la Madrid. Dupãrunde succesive de negocieri, principiile de la Madrid înforma încã neacceptatã de pãrþi includ: retragerea Armenieidin regiunile din jurul Nagorno-Karabahului cu reglemen-tãri speciale pentru Lacin ºi Kelbajar; un statut provizoriupentru Nagorno-Karabah garantat internaþional; garantareasecuritãþii Nagorno-Karabahului ºi desfãºurarea forþelorinternaþionale de menþinere a pãcii; dreptul refugiaþilor ºiPSI de a se întoarce în zone anterior locuite; redeschidereacomunicaþiilor, reluarea comerþului ºi implementareamãsurilor de reabilitare post-conflict finanþate de donatoriexterni; determinarea statutului Nagorno-Karabahului înurma unui referendum. Se pare cã punctele care ridicã pro-bleme sunt graficul retragerii forþelor armene din regiunileocupate în jurul Karabahului, asigurarea coridorului decomunicare între Armenia ºi Karabah ºi natura statutuluiinterimar al Karabahului (RFE, 2010a).

Observatorii sunt sceptici cu privire la soluþionareaconflictului în perspectiva apropiatã. „Chiar dacã lideriiArmeniei ºi Azerbaidjanului vor conveni asupra principiilorde la Madrid ºi foii de parcurs, nu existã precondiþii la nivelsocial pentru implementarea acestora“35, remarcã un analist.Discursul politic agresiv promovat la Baku ºi Erevan reducespaþiul de manevrã pentru liderii politici ºi face acceptareaunui eventual consens la nivel înalt inacceptabil pentruambele societãþi. Potrivit sondajelor de opinie, 97% dinazeri considerã cã Armenia este cel mai important rival ºi91% din armeni percep Azerbaidjanul drept principalaameninþare politicã ºi economicã (Puls-R/Friedrich EbertStiftung, 2010; International Republican Institute, 2008a).

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36 Interviu cu un oficial, Erevan, iunie 2011.37 Interviu cu un expert, Erevan, iunie 2011.38 Interviu cu un expert, Erevan, iunie 2011.35 Interviu cu un expert, Erevan, iunie 2011.

Potrivit sondajelor de opinie, 75% din respondenþi înGeorgia ºi 62% din cei chestionaþi în Armenia considerã cãrelaþiile bilaterale sunt bune (International RepublicanInstitute, 2011; International Republican Institute, 2008a).La capitolul state prietene ºi inamici, pentru 8% din geor-gieni Armenia reprezintã cel mai important partener(International Republican Institute, 2011), ºi pentru 24%din armeni Georgia este principalul partener (InternationalRepublican Institute, 2008a). Aceastã diferenþã poate fiexplicatã prin importanþa strategicã pe care o are Georgiaîn calitate de þarã tranzit pentru fluxurile comerciale aleArmeniei. Volumul schimburilor comerciale bilaterale nueste semnificativ, statisticile pentru 2010 demonstreazã cãGeorgia este al 8-lea partener comercial al Armeniei (2,2%pondere în comerþ), în timp ce Armenia este al 12-leapartener comercial al Georgiei cu doar 1,5% pondere încomerþ (EU Commision, 2011b; EU Commission, 2011c).Cercetãrile sociologice aratã, pe deasupra, cã 31% dinrespondenþi în Armenia privesc Georgia drept principalaameninþare politicã ºi economicã (International RepublicanInstitute, 2008a). În Georgia, 3% din cetãþeni percepArmenia în mod similar (International Republican Institute,2011). Este posibil ca din 2008, când s-a fãcut ultima cer-cetare în Armenia, numãrul celor care trateazã Georgiadrept o ameninþare sã fi scãzut. Totodatã, percepþia publicãnegativã în Armenia reflectã foarte probabil îngrijorarea înprivinþa aspectelor asimetrice în relaþiile economice, preocu-parea pentru drepturile minoritãþii armene din Samþhe-Javaheti ºi participarea statului vecin la proiecte regionalecare exclud Armenia.

La nivelul opiniei publice din Georgia, Armenia estedeseori privitã drept aliat militar al Kremlinului în Caucazulde Sud. Datã fiind atitudinea georgienilor faþã de politicarusã în regiune, are loc un transfer negativ asupra imaginiiArmeniei, fapt reflectat în sondajele de opinie.

În pofida accentelor diferite în politica externã, la Tbilisiºi Erevan existã înþelegere cã fiecare îºi face propriul joc în

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democratizare, Armenia ºi Azerbaidjanul nu vor reuºi sãfacã progrese substanþiale în problema Nagorno-Karabahu-lui.39 Pânã atunci, cel mai plauzibil scenariu împãrtãºit înambele tabere este statu quo-ul care poate fi sintetizat în for-mula „pacea rapidã este imposibilã, rãzboiul rapid e proba-bil“40. Pe termen scurt, însã, reizbucnirea conflictului estedescurajatã, se pare, de un factor de naturã non-militarã.Gãzduirea finalei Eurovisionului în mai 2012 reprezintão ºansã rarã de a proiecta internaþional o imagine pozitivãdespre Azerbaidjan, pe care, fãrã îndoialã, autoritãþile de laBaku nu vor sã o iroseascã prin escaladarea conflictului.41

2.2. Georgia – Armenia: „resetarea“ pragmatismului

Relaþiile între Georgia ºi Armenia sunt caracterizate de ointerdependenþã preponderent pozitivã, în unele sectoareasimetricã, care este gestionatã într-un mod pragmatic deambele guverne. Dialogul politic armeano-georgian s-aintensificat calitativ ºi cantitativ dupã rãzboiul din Georgiadin 2008. Comentatorii observã cã „chimia personalã“ întrecei doi preºedinþi contribuie la valenþe pozitive în relaþiilebilaterale.42 Interacþiunea pe linia ministerelor de externeaduce un plus de valoare relaþiei la nivel înalt. În 2011, ºefiidiplomaþiei au convenit sã se întâlneascã de cel puþin patruori pe an pentru a avea un dialog continuu pe problemati-cile bilaterale ºi regionale. Erevan ºi Tbilisi recunosc exis-tenþa problemelor bilaterale, dar nici una dintre acestea nueste consideratã insurmontabilã (Civil.Ge 2011b). Deºirelaþiile politice s-au îmbunãtãþit considerabil în ultimii doiani, la nivelul opiniei publice persistã animozitãþi.43

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39 Interviu cu un reprezentant mass-media, Baku, iunie 2011.Interviu cu un expert, Erevan, iunie 2011.

40 Interviu cu un expert, Baku, iunie 2011. Interviu cu un oficial,Erevan, iunie 2011.

41 Interviu cu un expert, Baku, iunie 2011.42 Interviu cu un expert, Erevan, iunie 2011.43 Interviu cu experþi, Erevan, iunie 2011.

guvernamental. Aceste garanþii au fost date de ministrulgeorgian al Apãrãrii în cadrul vizitei la Erevan, care a prece-dat votul din parlamentul de la Tbilisi cu privire la acordulde tranzit militar cu Rusia. Tot atunci, partea georgianã aoferit posibilitatea pregãtirii militarilor armeni la bazamontanã de antrenament din Sacihere. Aºadar, manieraechilibratã de abordare a acestui dosar confirmã atitudineapragmaticã la Erevan ºi Tbilisi.

„Resetarea“ pragmaticã a relaþiilor bilaterale dupã 2008nu este, însã, întâmplãtoare. Georgia este un nod vital detransport pentru economia Armeniei. Potrivit estimãrilorguvernului de la Erevan, sistarea tranzitului prin Georgia pedurata rãzboiului din 2008 a produs o pagubã de circa $670milioane. Prin urmare Armenia era interesatã în restabilireacât mai rapidã a comunicaþiilor. Ameninþarea militarã de lanord motiveazã Tbilisi sã detensioneze relaþiile cu veciniiapropiaþi. Dupã conflictul cu Rusia, problema minoritãþiiarmene din Georgia a fost identificatã la Tbilisi ca un factorvulnerabil care poate fi speculat de Rusia. Astfel, guvernulgeorgian a dedicat mai multã atenþie relaþiilor cu Armenia,în paralel cu proiectele de dezvoltare în Samþhe-Javaheti.Suprapunerea celor douã obiective a dat un suflu nou rela-þiilor bilaterale.

Georgia asigurã în jur de 70-75% din tranzitul comercialal Armeniei. În prezent, existã legãturã feroviarã între Ere-van ºi portul Batumi, iar pãrþile coopereazã la construcþiaautostrãzii Gyumri-Ahaliþihe-Batumi care sã faciliteze trafi-cul rutier. Portul Poti joacã un rol important pentru securi-tatea alimentarã a Armeniei, deoarece asigurã în proporþiesemnificativã importurile de grâu ale þãrii. Portul Batumideserveºte traficul de pasageri: astfel, în 2009 au fostrelansate curse de feribot între Batumi ºi Soci. Aceastã rutãeste de interes pentru Armenia, deoarece Soci gãzduieºteo diasporã armeanã numeroasã stabilitã încã din secolul alXIX-lea, iar mulþi armeni aleg sã petreacã vacanþa la Soci.Cu ocazia pregãtirilor pentru Jocurile Olimpice de Iarnã din2014, Soci a devenit o destinaþie atractivã pentru armeni

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regiune, determinat de situaþia politicã ºi raþiuni de secu-ritate naþionalã.44 De pildã, Erevanul a perceput în modnegativ acþiunile militare ale Georgiei în Osetia de Sud din2008, care puteau stabili un precedent periculos pentruArmenia. Conducerea politicã de la Erevan s-a abþinut de laun discurs critic la adresa Georgiei, care ar fi sprijinit reto-rica agresivã a Rusiei. În schimb, Armenia a jucat un rolimportant în evacuarea personalului diplomatic ºi cetã-þenilor strãini din Georgia în timpul conflictului,45 lucruapreciat de autoritãþile georgiene. În perioada postconflict,Armenia a rezistat presiunilor de la Moscova pentru arecunoaºte independenþa Abhaziei ºi Osetiei de Sud46,iar preºedintele Armeniei a fãcut o vizitã oficialã la Tbilisiîn septembrie 2008. În 2009 preºedintele Georgiei a fostdecorat cu cea mai înaltã distincþie de stat a Armeniei —„Ordinul de Onoare“, fapt care a stârnit critici din parteaMoscovei. Pe de altã parte, Georgia nu agreeazã prezenþamilitarã rusã în Armenia, însã autoritãþile de la Tbilisi rea-lizeazã cã nu pot schimba situaþia radical ºi cã în mediul desecuritate actual este important sã pãstreze o relaþie amia-bilã cu Armenia.47 Cu toate cã a denunþat în 2011 acordulde tranzit militar cu Rusia folosit pentru alimentarea bazeiruseºti din Gyumri, Georgia aprobã în continuare tranzitulcargourilor militare destinate forþelor armate armene prinspaþiului sãu aerian.48 Partea georgianã a asigurat Erevanulcã denunþarea acordului cu Rusia, care nu funcþiona din2008, este una tehnicã (prevenirea prelungirii automatea acordului pe cinci ani) ºi nu va afecta cooperarea cuMinisterul Apãrãrii din Armenia. „Noi am dorit sã primimasigurãri cã securitatea noastrã nu va fi afectatã de aceastãdecizie […], noi le-am primit“49, explicã un reprezentant

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44 Interviu cu un expert, Tbilisi, mai 2011. Interviu cu un expert,Erevan, iunie 2011.

45 Interviu cu un oficial, Erevan, iunie 2011.46 Interviu cu un expert, Erevan, iunie 2011.47 Interviu cu un expert, Tbilisi, iunie 2011.48 Interviu cu un oficial, Erevan, iunie 2011.49 Interviu cu un oficial, Erevan, iunie 2011.

la depozitele de gaze subterane pentru a acoperi consumulintern. În 2010, parlamentul georgian a eliminat conductade gaze ce face legãturã cu Armenia de pe lista obiectivelorcare nu pot fi privatizate. Acest lucru a trezit neliniºte laErevan: în cel mai pesimist scenariu, Azerbaidjanul puteasã preia controlul asupra magistralei care garanteazã secu-ritatea energeticã a Armeniei. Autoritãþile de la Tbilisi auasigurat Armenia cã statul georgian nu va renunþa la pache-tul majoritar în întreprinderea care gestioneazã conducta(Civil.Ge, 2011c).

În ultimii doi ani, Georgia a devenit o destinaþie atrac-tivã pentru investitorii din Armenia. De exemplu, în 2011,compania de dulciuri din Armenia „Grand Candy“ a decissã se extindã pe piaþa georgianã, iar grupul „Jermuk“ a pre-luat producþia Pepsi din Georgia. Potrivit datelor pentru2010, 103 companii din Armenia au fost înregistrate înGeorgia. Experþii estimeazã cã în total în Georgia opereazãîn jur de 4 mii de afaceri mici ºi mijlocii cu capital armean.Prezenþa mai activã pe piaþa georgianã a investitorilor dinArmenia a condus la înfiinþarea Uniunii AntreprenorilorArmeni (Vardanyan, 2011). O serie de factori determinãaceastã tendinþã: pe de o parte, sunt corupþia, multipleleobstacole de ordin birocratic pentru oamenii de afaceri ºipiaþa micã a Armeniei; pe de altã parte, sunt condiþiile maifavorabile pentru deschiderea ºi organizarea afacerii, scu-tirea de taxe pentru afacerile nou înfiinþate, nivelul decorupþie redus ºi infrastructura din Georgia.50 Clasamentul“Doing Business” al Bãncii Mondiale confirmã diferenþadintre Armenia ºi Georgia la capitolul mediu de afaceri,þãrile ocupând în 2011 locurile 48 ºi, respectiv 12 (WorldBank, 2011). Totodatã, Georgia ºi în special litoralul sãu(Batumi ºi Kobuleti) sunt o destinaþie turisticã preferatãpentru tot mai mulþi turiºti din Armenia. În 2009, numãrulcetãþenilor armeni care au vizitat Georgia a depãºit 300.000(Chkhikvadze, 2010), iar acest numãr a atins aproape

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în cãutarea oportunitãþilor de angajare sezonierã. Traficulaerian de pasageri între Erevan ºi Tbilisi în ultimii doi ani afost suspendat din raþiuni economice pe timp de iarnã ºireluat în primavarã sau varã.

În 2010, Georgia ºi Rusia au cãzut de acord sã redeschidãsingurul punct vamal între cele douã þãri — Verhni Lars-Kazbeghi, în urma negocierilor mediate de Elveþia. Astfel,dupã trei ani de pauzã, Armenia beneficiazã din nou de le-gãturã terestrã cu Rusia prin Georgia. Aproximativ 70-80%din exporturile din Armenia spre Rusia tranziteazã Georgia.În loc sã utilizeze rute maritime ocolitoare Batumi-Varna/Burgas-Novorossiisk, exportatorii din Armenia au acumacces la „Drumul Militar Georgian“ care face legãturã întreTbilisi ºi capitala Osetiei de Nord, Vladikavkaz. Tranzitulterestru spre Rusia prin Verhni Lars-Kazbeghi reduce cos-turile de transport cu 20-25% (Zhahanina, 2010). Volumulmare al tranzitului comercial aduce profituri importantestatului georgian. În 2008-2009, graniþa armeano-georgianãa fost traversatã de 4.594 de trenuri marfare ºi 273.478 devehicule (OSCE Yerevan Office, 2010, 5). Însã guvernul dela Erevan considerã cã Georgia profitã de pe urma inter-dependenþei asimetrice, promovând o politicã de taxare atranzitului care sporeºte semnificativ costurile pentruagenþii economici din Armenia (Civil.Ge, 2009a).

Armenia este conectatã la Georgia prin infrastructuraenergeticã ºi de telecomunicaþii. Conexiunea la internet ºitelefonie internaþionalã în Armenia este asiguratã prin cablulde fibrã opticã care traverseazã Georgia. Într-un incidentdin 2011, cãutãtorii de fier vechi au tãiat cablul de internetîn apropiere de Tbilisi, lãsând o bunã parte din abonaþii dinArmenia fãrã internet timp de câteva ore (Bedwell, 2011).Sistemele electrice între Armenia ºi Georgia sunt interconec-tate prin intermediul a trei linii de transmisie. Gazoductulprin care Gazpromul livreazã gaze naturale Armeniei trecede asemenea prin Georgia. În 2010, în urma alunecãrilor deteren, Georgia a suspendat tranzitul de gaze pentru mãsuride mentenanþã necesare reluãrii livrãrilor. Armenia a recurs

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50 Interviu cu experti, Erevan, iunie 2011.

În perioada sovieticã, regiunea a gãzduit baza militarã dinAhalkalaki care fãcea parte din districtul militar transcau-cazian. Din acest motiv, regiunea avea un regim semi-închisºi era relativ izolatã de restul Georgiei.51 Dupã disoluþiaUniunii Sovietice, Rusia a preluat controlul asupra bazeimilitare, care a devenit principalul angajator ºi sursã devenit pentru populaþia localã (Overland, 2009). În 2007,baza din Ahalkalaki a fost evacuatã, ridicând semne deîntrebare cu privire la perspectivele economice ale regiunii.La Tbilisi, a existat teama cã Rusia va încerca sã destabi-lizeze regiunea, provocând tensiuni interetnice în Samþhe-Javaheti. Îngrijorãrile nu au fost lipsite de temei. Aºa cumconfirmã partea armeanã, Rusia a avut câteva tentative de amobiliza minoritatea armeanã împotriva guvernului de laTbilisi înainte ºi dupã rãzboiul din 2008, fie prin anunþarearepatrierii iminente a turcilor meshetini în Samþhe-Javaheti(în jur de 100.000 au fost deportaþi din regiune în AsiaCentralã în 1944), fie reluând discursul despre discrimi-narea armenilor în Georgia.52

Pe lângã introducerea mãsurilor adiþionale de securitate53,guvernul de la Tbilisi a implementat o strategie complexãpentru integrarea regiunii ºi populaþiei în circuitul economicºi educaþional al Georgiei. În 2008 ºi 2010 au fost executateproiecte de renovare sau construcþie de autostradã care aulegat regiunea cu vestul Georgiei ºi Tbilisi. Odatã cu finali-zarea proiectului de cale feratã Baku-Tbilisi-Kars, distanþaîntre Samþhe-Javaheti ºi Tbilisi va fi parcursã în aproximativdouã ore. Executivul de la Tbilisi a realizat investiþii masiveîn infrastructura localã: ºcoli, spitale, sisteme de distribuþiea apei ºi energiei electrice (International Crisis Group,2011b, 6). O altã componentã a strategiei a vizat educaþia.Necunoaºterea limbii georgiene reduce semnificativ ºanseletinerilor din regiune de a face studii sau de a beneficia de

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200.000 de turiºti doar în perioada ianuarie-aprilie 2011(News.Am, 2011a).

Cooperarea bilateralã însã nu s-a focalizat exclusiv asupradomeniului economic ºi extinderii comunicaþiilor de trans-port. Agenda bilateralã conþine unele dosare care, dacã suntneglijate, pot complica semnificativ relaþiile între Georgia ºiArmenia. În dorinþa de a elimina de pe agendã subiectelelitigioase, guvernul de la Tbilisi a abordat problemele mino-ritãþii armene: înregistrarea bisericii armeneºti (BisericaApostolicã Armeanã) ºi demarcarea ºi gestionarea frontierei.Însã nu toate iniþiativele guvernului s-au bucurat de sprijinulpopulaþiei. La rândul lor, autoritãþile de la Erevan au rãspunsde o manierã cooperantã la aceste eforturi. În spaþiul public,executivul sau conducerea bisericii armeneºti au fost criticatepentru luãri de poziþii uneori prea flexibile.

Frontiera armeano-georgianã nu este delimitatã ºi demar-catã integral pânã în prezent. În lipsa demarcãrii clare, înlocalitãþile de frontierã uneori este dificil de stabilit pânãunde se extinde dreptul de proprietate asupra unui lot depãmânt. Prin urmare, au loc incidente legate de accesul þãra-nilor la terenurile agricole. Pãrþile au depus eforturi pentrua grãbi procedura de delimitare ºi demarcare a frontierei.În 2010, Comisia interguvernamentalã de profil a convenitasupra delimitãrii ºi demarcãrii a 160 km (71%) din cei 225(OSCE Yerevan Office, 2010, 13, 15). Totodatã, Armenia ºiGeorgia au ajuns la un acord politic cu privire la gestionareacomunã a trei din cele ºase puncte de trecere a frontierei(RFE, 2011a). Implementarea acestei iniþiative este menitãsã faciliteze fluxurile de pasageri ºi cele comerciale între celedouã þãri.

În Georgia, existã comunitãþi armeneºti în Tbilisi (circa83.000 de persoane în 2002), Batumi (aproximativ 800în 2002) ºi regiunea separatistã Abhazia (în jur de 45.000în 2005). Însã cea mai numeroasã prezenþã se înregistreazãîn Samþhe-Javaheti (aproape 125.000 în 2002), regiuneadin sudul Georgiei care se învecineazã cu Armenia ºi Turcia.

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51 Interviu cu un reprezentant mass-media, Tbilisi, iunie 2011.52 Interviu cu un expert, Erevan, iunie 2011.53 Interviu cu un expert, Tbilisi, mai 2011.

scoate de pe ordinea zilei chestiunea înregistrãrii bisericiiarmeneºti în Georgia. Însã soluþionarea problemelor de pro-prietate asupra lãcaºelor de cult va necesita mai mult timpºi rãbdare din partea ambelor pãrþi. Protestele de stradã dela Tbilisi, declanºate în urma amendãrii legislaþiei cu privirela minoritãþile religioase, aratã cât de sensibil este acestsubiect ºi cât de atenþi trebuie sã fie în continuare lideriipolitici pentru a pãstra o dinamicã pozitivã în raporturilebilaterale din ultimii ani.

2.3. Azerbaidjan – Georgia: tot mai aproape

Între Azerbaidjan ºi Georgia s-a dezvoltat în timp orelaþie politicã ºi economicã foarte strânsã care se bazeazã,nu în ultimul rând, pe o experienþã istoricã pozitivã în scurtaperioadã de independenþã de dupã Primul Rãzboi Mondial.În perioada post-sovieticã relaþiile personale apropiate întrepreºedinþii ªevardnadze ºi Aliev au solidificat raporturileîntre Azerbaidjan ºi Georgia. De la începutul anilor ’90, celedouã þãri se confruntã cu conflicte teritoriale, iar restabili-rea integritãþii teritoriale devine principalul laitmotiv caresudeazã relaþia din punct de vedere politic. În 2008,Georgia s-a numãrat printre cele 39 de state care au votat înfavoarea rezoluþiei Adunãrii Generale a ONU cu privire la„situaþia pe teritoriul ocupat al Azerbaidjanului“. În august2008, dupã izbucnirea conflictului militar în Osetia de Sud,Ministerul Afacerilor Externe din Azerbaidjan a calificatacþiunile Georgiei în vederea restabilirii integritãþii terito-riale ca fiind în conformitate cu dreptul internaþional(Today.Az, 2008). Pentru autoritãþile de la Baku, rãzboiulavea implicaþii directe asupra situaþiei din Nagorno-Karabah.Fãrã îndoialã, recuperarea Osetiei de Sud de cãtre Georgiaîn 2008 ar fi pus presiune pe regimul de la Baku. „DacãGeorgia a reuºit, noi de ce sã nu încercãm?“ — ar fi fostmesajul popular care ar fi împins guvernul dincolo de reto-rica belicoasã al cãrei prizonier a devenit. Însã înfrângereaGeorgiei a redus, în unele cercuri, entuziasmul pentru osoluþie militarã, care în contextul postconflict are mai puþine

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oportunitãþi de angajare. Cu ajutorul donatorilor externi,au fost organizate cursuri gratuite de studiere a limbii. Deasemenea, a fost facilitat accesul armenilor din Samþhe-Java-heti la studii superioare în instituþiile de învãþãmânt dinGeorgia.54 Reprezentanþii societãþii civile din Armenia careau vizitat regiunea în 2010-2011 au constatat cã populaþiaeste mult mai optimistã în privinþa situaþiei economice ºisociale, decât cu câþiva ani în urmã. Cererea pentru studierealimbii georgiene a crescut. În loc sã meargã la Erevan, tot maimulþi armeni din regiune opteazã pentru universitãþile dinTbilisi.55 Autoritãþile de la Erevan au adaptat discursul faþãde minoritatea armeanã din Georgia la schimbãrile din regiu-ne. Preºedintele Armeniei a apreciat eforturile executivuluigeorgian pentru a îmbunãtãþi situaþia socio-economicã înSamþhe-Javaheti ºi a anunþat disponibilitatea de a asistaacest proces (Civil.Ge, 2009b).

Un alt factor iritant în relaþiile bilaterale o reprezintãproblema înregistrãrii bisericii armeneºti în Georgia ºicererile reciproce de restituire a lãcaºelor de cult. Aºadar,partea armeanã pretinde o serie de biserici în Tbilisi ºi înSamþhe-Javaheti. În acelaºi timp, partea georgianã reclamãdreptul de proprietate asupra unor biserici medievale dinnordul Armeniei de la graniþa cu Georgia (Civil.Ge, 2011d).Pânã de curând, potrivit legislaþiei georgiene, minoritãþilereligioase nu puteau fi înregistrate în calitate de persoanejuridice de drept public. Astfel, statul proteja biserica orto-doxã din Georgia, refuzând calitatea similarã altor culte dinþarã, inclusiv bisericii armeneºti. Însã, în 2011, Catolicosultuturor armenilor a efectuat o vizitã istoricã în Georgia,prima vizitã a unei înalte feþe bisericeºti armene în þaravecinã din 1894. În cadrul acesteia, au fost ridicate celedouã probleme. La foarte scurt timp, parlamentul Georgieia modificat legea în sensul admiterii înregistrãrii altor culteca persoane juridice de drept public. Modificarea legislativã

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54 Interviu cu un oficial, Tbilisi, mai 2011.55 Interviu cu experþi, Erevan, iunie 2011.

bilaterale (EU Commission, 2011d). La nivelul opinieipublice, 22% din respondenþii din Georgia au calificat Azer-baidjanul ca fiind cel mai important partener al Georgiei(International Republican Institute, 2011). În Azerbaidjan,11,3% considerã Georgia un stat prieten (Puls-R/FriedrichEbert Stiftung, 2010). Aceastã diferenþã reflectã importanþasporitã a Azerbaidjanului, în percepþia publicã, pentrusecuritatea energeticã a Georgiei. Trebuie menþionat însã, cãîn cazul Azerbaidjanului numãrul simpatizanþilor Georgieiaproape s-a dublat din 2006 (Puls-R/Friedrich EbertStiftung, 2010). Aceastã dinamicã poate fi explicatã princreºterea simpatiei la nivel popular pentru cauza reintegrãriiGeorgiei dupã rãzboiul din 2008 ºi rolul Georgiei în tran-zitul petrolului ºi gazelor.

Azerbaidjanul a intervenit decisiv pentru a garanta nece-sarul de gaze pentru Georgia de douã ori în ultimii cinci ani.Prima datã, în 2006, atunci când Gazpromul a întreruptlivrãrile spre Georgia, mãrind drastic preþul la gaze. A douaoarã, în 2008, imediat dupã rãzboi, când Baku ºi Tbilisi auconvenit asupra contractului de furnizare a gazelor pe cinciani, în 2009 gazele fiind livrate la un preþ preferenþial(Alieva, 2009, 2). Ulterior, pãrþile au ajuns la un acord dea prelungi contractul pânã în 2020 fãrã a modifica preþulde bazã la gaze naturale (AZE.Az, 2010). Nivelul înalt deîncredere între Baku ºi Tbilisi a facilitat intrarea Azerbai-djanului în sectorul energetic din Georgia. Compania de statSOCAR controleazã terminalul petrolier de la Kulevi carea devenit operabil din 2008. Totodatã, SOCAR a intrat pepiaþa distribuþiei de gaze din Georgia, având o cotã de piaþãde aproape 75%. Compania preconizeazã construcþia a1500 km de conducte care vor adãuga la reþeaua de gazedeja existentã alþi 150.000 de consumatori (ABC.Az, 2011).Georgia este o piesã importantã în proiectul AGRI (Azer-baidjan-Georgia-România Interconnector) la care participãSOCAR. Acesta prevede transportul gazelor din Azerbai-djan spre terminalul Kulevi, de unde vor fi transportate încontinuare în portul Constanþa în formã lichefiatã (LNG).

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ºanse de succes.56 Situaþia economicã dificilã din Georgia,dupã rãzboiul din 2008, a motivat guvenul de la Baku sãofere sprijin statului în a cãrui existenþã ºi supravieþuire estedirect interesat.

Azerbaidjanul ºi Georgia sunt interdependente în sec-torul energetic. Georgia depinde de livrãrile de gaze dinAzerbaidjan aproape în totalitate. În schimb, principalelerute de export de gaze ºi petrol dinspre Azerbaidjan sprepiaþa europeanã traverseazã Georgia. Un eventual rãzboiîntre Armenia ºi Azerbaidjan poate afecta livrãrile spreGeorgia prin conducta de gaze Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum, caretrece la o distanþã nu foarte mare de zona de conflict.Experþii avertizeazã cã, în cazul reizbucnirii conflictului dinNagorno-Karabah, reþelele energetice vor fi þinta predilectãa forþelor armene (International Crisis Group, 2011a, 14).În aceste circumstanþe, Georgia va fi nevoitã sã apeleze laGazprom pentru a-ºi acoperi consumul de gaze. Similar,conflictul pe teritoriul Georgiei poate duce la distrugereareþelelor energetice de transport afectând exporturile dehidrocarburi ale Azerbaidjanului. În astfel de condiþii, Rusiadevine un partener nu foarte dorit, dar necesar pentru Azer-baidjan. În august 2008, Azerbaidjanul a reorientat o partedin exporturile de petrol care tranziteazã Georgia (Baku-Tbilisi-Ceihan ºi Baku-Supsa) spre conducta Baku-Novo-rossisk.

Relaþia între Baku ºi Tbilisi este cimentatã de schimburieconomice ºi dialog politic intensiv. La nivel înalt sau minis-terial au loc multiple întâlniri ºi consultãri. Potrivit statisti-cilor, în 2010 Azerbaidjanul a fost al 4-lea partener comer-cial al Georgiei cu o pondere de 7,8% (EU Commission,2011c). De asemenea, în 2010, Azerbaidjan s-a numãratprintre principalii investitori strãini în Georgia, plasându-sepe locul cinci cu $58 milioane (Civil.Ge, 2011e). PondereaGeorgiei este semnificativ mai redusã în comerþul Azerbai-djanului (1,5%), indicând o asimetrie economicã în relaþiile

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56 Interviu cu un expert, Baku, iunie 2011.

dosarelor iritante, dar reitereazã determinarea de a le solu-þiona într-un mod amiabil. Dupã douãzeci de ani de la re-dobândirea independenþei, cei doi vecini încã nu au fina-lizat delimitarea ºi demarcarea frontierei. În 1996, a fostînfiinþatã comisia interguvernamentalã pentru delimitareaºi demarcarea frontierei. În 2010, Baku ºi Tbilisi au con-venit asupra delimitãrii a 300 km (66%) din cei 480 km defrontierã (Trend, 2011a). Procesul avanseazã lent, nu înultimul rând din cauza disputei în jurul mãnãstirii DavidGareja, care se aflã parþial în regiunea georgianã Kakheti ºiparþial în regiunea Agstafa din Azerbaidjan. ComplexulDavid Gareja gãzduieºte peste 20 de biserici ºi numeroasepeºteri pe o distanþã de 25 km. Mãnãstirea are o valoareistoricã, culturalã ºi spiritualã pentru Georgia, care ar dorisã facã un schimb de terenuri pentru a controla integral teri-toriul mãnãstirii. Printre posibilele variante de compensares-a vehiculat cedarea satului Erismedi, o localitate de fron-tierã disputatã între cele douã þãri. Pentru partea azerã însãbiserica Bertubani care face parte din mãnãstire este con-sideratã importantã din punct de vedere strategic, din cauzaaltitudinii la care se aflã. Prin urmare, Baku respinge oricecompensaþie teritorialã în schimbul renunþãrii la partea sadin complexul David Gareja. În cadrul negocierilor, Azer-baidjanul a lansat idea transformãrii mãnãstirii într-o „zonãturisticã deschisã“. Biserica ortodoxã georgianã s-a opuscategoric acestei propuneri. În 2007, preºedinþii celor douãþãri au discutat posibilitatea cedãrii mãnãstirii în favoareaGeorgiei, în condiþiile în care Azerbaidjan menþine controlulasupra punctelor strategice la altitudini. Însã, dincolo dediscuþii, pãrþile nu au avansat în procesul de identificare aunei soluþii pânã în prezent (Petriashvili ºi Ismayilov, 2006;Kazimov, 2011).

Minoritatea azerã locuieºte compact în regiunile KvemoKartli, Kaheti ºi Mþheta-Mtianeti de-a lungul graniþei cuAzerbaidjan ºi Armenia. Populaþia azerã a Georgiei, potrivitultimului recensãmânt, atinge aproximativ 285.000 delocuitori. Situaþia minoritãþii azere din Georgia s-a bucurat

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Însã relaþia de încredere între Baku ºi Tbilisi are limite. Deºis-a vehiculat ideea cã Azerbaidjanul a oferit Georgiei $500milioane pentru a achiziþiona conducta prin care se furni-zeazã gaze spre Armenia (Asbarez Post, 2010), autoritãþilede la Tbilisi au exclus posibilitatea cedãrii pachetuluimajoritar. Preluarea acestei conducte de cãtre Azerbaidjanar spori potenþialul de conflict între Baku ºi Erevan, lucru pecare Georgia vrea sã-l evite din raþiuni de securitate energe-ticã naþionalã ºi regionalã.

Din perspectiva Azerbaidjanului, participarea þãrii vecineeste crucialã pentru realizarea legãturii feroviare cu Turcia.Iniþial se preconiza cã proiectul Baku-Tbilisi-Kars va bene-ficia de finanþare internaþionalã, cu ajutorul cãreia Georgiava putea desfãºura lucrãrile de reabilitare ºi construcþie pesectorul Marabda-Ahalkalaki-Karþahi. Însã donatorii externiau refuzat sã ofere împrumuturi pentru proiect, pe motiv cãacesta nu contribuie la integrarea regionalã. Datã fiindimportanþa proiectului, Azerbaidjan a aprobat douã împru-muturi în condiþii avantajoase pentru Georgia (pe 25 anicu 1% dobândã pe an) din care sã fie finanþate lucrãrile.În 2007, Baku a oferit $200 milioane, iar în 2011 alte $575milioane. Condiþiile de creditare prevãd rambursarea împru-muturilor din veniturile realizate de Georgia de pe urmaexploatãrii acestui segment de cale feratã, care ar devenioperaþional începând cu 2013 (Civil.Ge, 2011f). Prin pris-ma sectorului turistic georgian, Azerbaidjanul este vãzut caun rezervor important de turiºti. Conexiunea directã Baku-Tbilisi pe calea aerului este suplimentatã de numeroasecurse de autocar. În ultimii zece ani, numãrul vizitatorilordin Azerbaidjan a crescut considerabil, ajungând în 2009 laaproape 400.000 (Chkhikvadze, 2010). Numãrul turiºtilorse anticipeazã sã crescã: doar în perioada ianuarie-aprilie2011 Georgia a fost vizitatã de 244.000 de cetãþeni azeri(ArmeniaNews, 2011).

Cu toate cã se dezvoltã rapid, relaþiile dintre Baku ºiTbilisi nu sunt lipsite de probleme care afecteazã atmosferabilateralã sau pot tensiona relaþiile. Pãrþile recunosc existenþa

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parte la reabilitarea porþiunii de drum Telet-Samþhe-Java-heti. Fondul „Heydar Aliev“ a finanþat reabilitarea sau con-strucþia de ºcoli în Kvemo Kartli în 2009-2010 (MESGeorgia, 2010). Cu toate cã problema minoritãþii azere nua fost politizatã de Baku, aceasta are potenþial destabiliza-tor la nivel social. În 2006, douã ziare ale Asociaþiei Naþio-nale a Azerilor din Georgia cu sediul la Baku, care militeazãpentru recunoaºterea limbii azere drept „a doua limbã destat“, au fost suspendate (RFE, 2009). În 2005, comunitateaazerã a protestat împotriva închiderii pieþii din Sadahlo,solicitând autoritãþilor centrale sã revinã asupra deciziei.Nu în ultimul rând, sustenabilitatea coabitãrii preponderentpaºnice a comunitãþii armene ºi azere în Kvemo Kartli poatefi testatã de reizbucnirea conflictului din Nagorno-Karabah.

Pe lângã chestiunile cu privire la minoritãþile naþionaleºi demarcarea frontierei, factorul armean poate genera ten-siuni în relaþiile bilaterale. Georgia este pusã tot mai multîn situaþia dificilã de a pãstra echilibrul între sprijin politicpentru integritatea teritorialã a Azerbaidjanului ºi asigurareatranzitului comercial pentru Armenia. Privind prin prismaintegritãþii teritoriale ºi cooperãrii în sectorul energetic,Baku doreºte ca balanþa sã încline în favoarea sa. Deºi laînceputul anilor ’90 a încercat sã convingã fãrã succesGeorgia sã se alãture blocadei economice a Armeniei, Bakua tolerat, în general, schimburile comerciale între Armeniaºi Georgia. Evacuarea bazei militare din Ahalkalaki în 2007,însã, a trezit îngrijorare la Baku, deoarece o parte a arsena-lului urma sã fie transferat în Armenia, în dotarea forþelorruseºti de la baza din Gyumri. Deºi acordul ruso-georgianstipula obligaþia Rusiei de a nu transfera armament forþelorarmene, nu existau mijloace credibile de a verifica respec-tarea de cãtre Moscova a obligaþiilor asumate (Socor, 2007).Desigur, Azerbaidjanul ar prefera ca echipamentul militarsã fie transferat integral în Rusia. În 2011, ambasadorulAzerbaidjanului în Georgia a prezentat, în termeni delocdiplomatici, presupusul pericol al cooperarii economice ar-meano-georgiene ºi al comunitãþii armene pentru integritatea

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de mai puþinã atenþie internaþionalã, deoarece nu era con-sideratã o problemã cu potenþial social ºi politic exploziv(Cornell et al., 2005, 24). Însã minoritatea se confruntã cunumeroase probleme de infrastructurã, necunoaºterea limbiide stat ºi accesul limitat la funcþii publice locale sau edu-caþie superioarã, frontiera nedemarcatã armeano-georgianãºi abuzurile sporadice din partea grãnicerilor armeni, precumºi subdezvoltare economicã. Deºi unele probleme de infra-structurã au fost abordate de guvernul de la Tbilisi în ultimiiani, sistemul de asigurare a apei potabile, reparaþia drumu-rilor rurale ºi sectorul agricol au fost neglijate. De asemenea,problema cunoaºterii limbii georgiene rãmâne acutã, nu suntsuficienþi instructori bilingvi ºi interesul pentru învãþarealimbii rãmâne scãzut. Majoritatea tinerilor din regiune pre-ferã sã-ºi continue studiile în Azerbaidjan (CIPDD, GYLA ºiSafeworld, 2011). Închiderea în 2005 a pieþei din Sadahlo,sat populat de azeri, a lãsat 5.000 de oameni fãrã un venitstabil. Condiþiile economice dificile din Kvemo Kartli îiforþeazã pe etnicii azeri sã migreze în þãrile din vecinãtate încãutarea oportunitãþilor de angajare.

În 2010, Rusia a acuzat Georgia de violarea drepturilorminoritãþilor etnice ºi a chemat Tbilisi sã normalizeze rela-þiile cu minoritãþile de pe teritoriul sãu, inclusiv cu azerii(Socor, 2010). Azerbaidjanul a rãmas impasibil la tentativade manipulare a Rusiei. De altfel, Baku a evitat sã politizezeproblemele minoritãþii azere din Georgia. Azerbaidjanul s-acomportat în spiritul neimplicãrii în ceea ce considerã afa-cerile interne ale Georgiei. În virtutea intereselor economiceºi politice, fragmentarea Georgiei este împotriva intereselorAzerbaidjanului. Prin urmare, autoritãþile de la Baku auîncurajat loialitatea minoritãþii azere faþã de statul georgian.Însã guvernul de la Baku recunoaºte tacit multilplele pro-bleme de ordin economic ºi social ale minoritãþii azere. Înconsecinþã, Azerbaidjanul, prin intermediul fundaþiilor saucompaniilor, s-a implicat în proiecte de infrastructurã ºiprograme sociale în regiunile populate de azeri (Today.Az,2011). De exemplu, companiile Akord ºi Azerinshaat au luat

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armenilor. Pentru a realiza aceste obiective, politica externãa Armeniei se conduce dupã principiul „complementaritãþii“.Aceasta presupune ca Armenia sã dezvolte relaþii apropiatecu principalii actori regionali astfel încât sinergia acestora sãcontribuie sectorial la promovarea ºi realizarea obiectivelorde politicã externã. În domeniul economic, „complementa-ritatea“ este expresia dependenþei economice a Armeniei dedonatorii externi. La nivelul securitãþii militare, „comple-mentaritatea“ este rãspunsul la dependenþa de Rusia.

3.1.1. Rusia

Din gama parteneriatelor ºi alianþelor dezvoltate deArmenia, cea cu Rusia este de importanþã vitalã. Rusia esteunul din copreºedinþii activi ai Grupului de la Minsk ºi esteun actor indispensabil în procesul de negociere în dosarulNagorno-Karabahului. În plus, alianþa este condiþionatã dedependenþa economicã, energeticã ºi militarã a Armeniei deRusia. Alianþa cu Rusia se bucurã de sprijinul a 95% dincetãþenii Armeniei (International Republican Institute2008a).

În plan militar, Armenia face parte din OTSC, fapt care,teoretic, garanteazã securitatea þãrii prin clauza care pre-supune intervenþia organizaþiei în cazul unei agresiuniîmpotriva unui membru. Pentru Erevan „OTSC este Rusia,iar în caz de agresiune se aºteaptã la asistenþa militarã aRusiei, ºi nu a Belarusului sau a republicilor din Asia Cen-tralã“.57 Pe durata preºedenþiei OTSC, Armenia a sprijinitactiv crearea forþelor de reacþie rapidã în ideea asigurãriiunei intervenþii neîntârziate a organizaþiei în caz de necesi-tate58. În 2010, unul dintre exerciþiile forþelor de reacþierapidã a avut loc în Rostov, în sudul Rusiei. Pe lângã clauzade securitate, OTSC oferã posibilitatea procurãrii arma-mentului rusesc la preþuri interne sau, în cazuri speciale,

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teritorialã a Georgiei. Diplomatul a chemat Georgia ºi Azer-baidjanul sã-ºi uneascã eforturile pentru a se opune politiciiArmeniei în regiune (Apa News, 2011). În timp ce apelulnu va schimba optica guvernului georgian faþã de Armenia,discursul rezoneazã cu unele segmente sociale marginale înGeorgia aºa cum aratã rezultatele sondajelor de opiniepublicã. Este puþin probabil ca la Baku sã existe iluzia cãexecutivul de la Tbilisi îºi va schimba radical politica faþã deArmenia. În acelaºi timp, acest discurs probabil semnaleazão stare de iritare la Baku cu privire la efectele „resetului“pragmatic ale relaþiilor armeano-georgiene. În condiþiile date,Georgia va avea nevoie de multã îndemânare diplomaticãpentru a naviga între aspiraþiile adeseori contradictorii alevecinilor sãi din Caucazul de Sud.

III. Caucazul de Sud: raporturile cu puterileregionale

Procesele regionale nu sunt doar produsul raporturilorîntre cele trei republici din Caucazul de Sud. Regiunea esteun teren pe care actori cu importanþã regionalã precumSUA, UE, Rusia, Turcia ºi Iran concureazã economic, poli-tic, militar ºi cultural. În acelaºi timp, republicile caucazieneîncearcã sã extragã maximum din aceastã competiþie pentrua-ºi promova propriile agende de securitate naþionalã peplan regional.

3.1. Armenia: complementaritatea variabilã

Politica externã a Armeniei urmãreºte o serie de obiectivemajore: garantarea apãrãrii în cazul unui atac convenþionaldin partea Azerbaidjanului, pãstrarea statu quo-ului sausoluþionarea conflictului din Nagorno-Karabah respectânddreptul la autodeterminare a popoarelor, spargerea blocadeiimpuse de Azerbaidjan ºi Turcia, atragerea unor investiþiistrãine ºi asistenþei financiare internaþionale pentru dezvol-tarea economicã, recunoaºterea internaþionalã a genocidului

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57 Interviu cu un expert, Erevan, iunie 2011.58 Interviu cu un oficial, Erevan, iunie 2011.

2011). Un rãzboi între cele douã state lasã Armenia cu osingurã frontierã deschisã ºi rutã de tranzit comercial —Iran. Dincolo de aceste aspecte, Armenia este interesatã deaccesul la piaþa rusã, de importurile de gaze, suportul finan-ciar ºi investiþiile ruse. Rusia este al doilea partener comer-cial al Armeniei, cu o pondere de aproape 21% în comerþ(EU Commission, 2011b). Rusia rãmâne în continuare des-tinaþia preferatã pentru muncitorii sezonieri din Armenia, alcãror numãr se ridicã la proximativ 2 milioane. Muncitoriiarmeni din strãinãtate au transferat acasã $1,3 miliardeîn 2010, ceea ce reprezintã 13% din PIB-ul þãrii (Danielyan,2011). Experþii estimeazã cã 75% din remitenþe au ca þarãde origine Rusia.63 Armenia depinde în proporþie de 80%de livrãrile de gaze din Rusia ºi aproximativ 80% din reþeauade distribuþie a gazelor este controlatã de Gazprom. Deasemenea, monopolul rus a preluat controlul asupra porþiu-nii armene a gazoductului Tabriz-Ersah care leagã Armeniacu Iranul. În schimb, Armenia plãteºte cel mai mic preþ înCSI pentru gazele naturale din Rusia, $210 pe o mie m/c(Armtown.Com, 2011a). Totodatã, Rusia este gata sã par-ticipe la construcþia noilor unitãþi de la centrala nuclearãMetsamor, care sã înlocuiascã reactoarele care trebuie sã fiescoase din uz pânã în 2017.

Pentru dezvoltarea economicã în condiþii de semi-izolareregionalã, Armenia cautã investiþii pe termen lung ºi sprijinfinanicar. În anii 2000, Armenia a acceptat intrarea masivãa capitalului rus în sectoare de importanþã strategicã: tele-comunicaþii, cãi ferate, sectorul financiar-bancar, industriagrea. Rusia a preluat cãile ferate armene pe o duratã de 30de ani, obligându-se sã investeascã în modernizarea lor$570 milioane. Un model de succes la Erevan este conside-ratã investiþia de $70 milioane realizatã de Rusal în re-tehnologizarea uzinei locale de aluminiu. Prin urmare, Rusiaa rãmas principalul investitor al Armeniei în 2010 cu $270milioane (Mediamax, 2011). Criza economicã a afectat

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transferuri gratuite de echipamente. „NATO nu oferã aºaceva“59, contrapune un expert local avantajele de participarela o altã alianþã militarã. Garantarea securitãþii militare,însã, nu se reduce la înþelegeri multilaterale în cadrul OTSC.Armenia gãzduieºte douã baze militare ruseºti, la Gyumriºi Erevan, care numãrã aproximativ 4.000 de militari. Deasemenea, pe teritoriul Armeniei activeazã grãniceri ruºicare asigurã protecþia frontierei de stat cu Turcia ºi Iran. În2010, Armenia a extins prezenþa militarilor ruºi pânã în2044. Potrivit autoritãþilor de la Erevan, în urma acordului,aria de activitate a forþelor ruse în Armenia nu mai e limi-tatã la frontiera externã a ex-Uniunii Sovietice (Danielyan2010). „Rusia s-a angajat sã protejeze interesele regionaleale Armeniei“60, explicã semnificaþia acordului un oficial.Rusia a promis livrarea de armament ºi deschiderea unorsocietãþi mixte din industria de apãrare a Armeniei.

Deºi se bucurã de o dublã asigurare din partea Rusiei,în Armenia existã dubii cu privire la momentul intervenþieiMoscovei în eventualitatea eruperii conflictului. „Clauzade apãrare nu a fost testatã niciodatã […], Rusia nu îºi vapermite sã nu intervinã, cãci îºi va pierde credibilitatea, [dar]când o va face: dupã sau înaintea unei decizii a Consiliuluide Securitate a ONU, dupã ce vom pierde o parte din teri-toriul Nagorno-Karabahului sau imediat dupã izbucnireaconflictului?“61, se întreabã un expert. Partea rusã a comu-nicat cã va interveni la timpul potrivit. Aceastã ambiguitateinduce suspiciune ºi determinã Armenia sã se asigure cã, celpuþin în prima fazã a conflictului, va fi capabilã sã poartesingurã ostilitãþile.62

În plan economic, Armenia este prizoniera relaþiilorconflictuale dintre Georgia ºi Rusia, iar rãzboiul din 2008a demonstrat acest lucru cât se poate de bine (Markedonov,

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63 Interviu cu un expert, Erevan, iunie 2011.

59 Interviu cu un expert, Erevan, iunie 2011.60 Interviu cu un oficial, Erevan, iunie 2011.61 Interviu cu un expert, Erevan, iunie 2011.62 Interviu cu un expert, Erevan, iunie 2011.

Sodk ºi Megradzor este semnificativã din acest punct devedere (RFE, 2010b). Activitatea centrelor ruse de recrutarede pe teritoriul Armeniei care le oferã cetãþenilor armenicetãþenie rusã cu condiþia stabilirii domiciliului în regiunilepreponderent non-europene ale Rusiei a stârnit un val deproteste printre reprezentanþii societãþii civile, în mass-mediaºi spaþiul virtual. O iniþiativã care a provocat iritare a fostpropunerea de a introduce limba rusã ca „mijloc de comuni-care interetnicã“ în Armenia, unde aproape 98% din locui-tori sunt armeni. De asemenea, propunerea legislativã carea declanºat o dezbatere publicã aprinsã cu privire la ºcolilecu predare în limbã strãinã a fost vãzutã de mulþi ca un actnormativ care va autoriza activitatea ºcolilor cu predare înlimbã rusã. ªtirile despre uciderea muncitorilor armeni înRusia din motive xenofobe nu au adãugat popularitateRusiei în Armenia.69

3.1.2. Iran

Efectele adverse ale alianþei cu Rusia împing Armenia sãcontrabalanseze dependenþa de Moscova. Iranul este veci-nul imediat al Armeniei spre care priveºte Erevanul în efor-turile sale de a diversifica opþiunile economice ºi a garantapoziþia favorabilã în conflictul din Nagorno-Karabah. Iranulasigurã între 25-30% din tranzitul comercial al Armeniei ºieste o sursã importantã de bunuri de larg consum. Astfel,Iranul este al patrulea partener comercial al Armeniei, cu opondere de 5,6% (EU Commission 2011b). Însã, la fel ca ºiruta prin Georgia, tranzitul prin Iran nu este sigur din cauzarelaþiilor tensionate între Teheran ºi Washington ºi Teheranºi Ierusalim.

În ciuda diferenþelor religioase, Armenia se simte confor-tabil cu Iranul ºi nu îl percepe drept o ameninþare la adresasecuritãþii sale.70 În ultimele sondaje de opinie, 37% din ceichestionaþi considerã Iranul principalul partener al Armeniei

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puternic Armenia. În 2010, guvernul rus a anunþat cã vaacorda Armeniei un împrumut de $500 milioane pentrustabilizarea macroeconomicã. În 2011, Moscova ºi Erevanulau ajuns la un acord de principiu cu privire la acordareaunui credit în valoare de $400 milioane din fondul anticrizãal Comunitãþii Economice Eurasiatice (EurAsEc), organi-zaþie în care Armenia este doar observator (Hayrumyan,2011). Se preconizeazã cã banii vor fi investiþi în moder-nizarea uzinei chimice Nairit, care a suferit de pe urmacrizei economice globale.

Dependenþa de Rusia restrânge autonomia autoritãþilorde Erevan în plan extern ºi are un impact semnificativ peplan intern. Rusia a pus presiune pe Armenia sã nu ia partela exerciþiul NATO din Georgia în 200964 ºi la sesiuneaAdunãrii Parlamentare NATO de la Tbilisi în 201165. Separe cã lista instituþiilor guvernamentale la care sunt ataºaþiconsilieri UE în Armenia a fost influenþatã de Moscova(Popescu, 2009). La insistenþa, nu în ultimul rând a Rusiei,diametrul gazoductului între Armenia ºi Iran a fost redus.66

Erevanul „nu a fost pregãtit“ în vara 2011 pentru semnareaunor acorduri în domeniul energetic cu Iranul din cauza opo-ziþiei Moscovei.67 Alianþa cu Rusia are efecte adverse pentruArmenia, ceea ce creeazã tensiuni în relaþiile bilaterale.„Relaþiile sunt departe de a fi calde“68, confirmã un diplomat.Reprezentanþii comunitãþii de afaceri reclamã cã investitoriiruºi exportã modelul corupt de a face afaceri, care amplificãfenomenul corupþiei în Armenia. Deseori investitorii ruºinu îºi onoreazã obligaþiile rezultate din planul de investiþii,iar întreprinderile nu funcþioneazã la capacitatea maximãsau activitatea acestora este sistatã (Hayrumyan, 2010).Evaluarea curþii de conturi cu privire la activitatea com-paniei ruse GPM Gold care controleazã minele de aur din

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69 Interviu cu experþi, Erevan 2011.70 Interviu cu un oficial, Erevan, iunie 2011.

64 Interviu cu un oficial NATO.65 Interviu cu un expert, Erevan, iunie 2011.66 Interviu cu un expert, Erevan, iunie 2011.67 Interviu cu un expert, Erevan, iunie 2011.68 Interviu cu un diplomat.

poziþia Iranului în problema Nagorno-Karabahului. Iranulnu încurajeazã schimbarea statu quo-ului, fiind preocupat deimplicaþiile asupra securitãþii sale în cazul retragerii chiar ºilimitate a Armeniei ºi desfãºurãrii forþelor internaþionale demenþinere a pãcii, care ar putea include SUA ºi þãrile mem-bre UE, foarte aproape de frontiera sa.73 Discuþiile tele-fonice ale preºedintelui iranian cu omologul din Azerbaidjanºi Armenia în ajunul summit-ului de la Kazan confirmãpreocuparea Teheranului cu privire la efectele regionale aletratativelor purtate între Baku, Erevan ºi Moscova.

Cooperarea în domeniul energetic cu Iranul este impor-tantã pentru Armenia din trei motive: alimentarea cu gazeîn cazul sistãrii livrãrilor dinspre Georgia, care va acoperinecesarul pe o perioadã limitatã; diminuarea gradualã adependenþei de Rusia; ºi aprovizionarea forþelor armate cucombustibil în cazul reluãrii ostilitãþilor în Nagorno-Karabah.Armenia ºi Iran sunt conectate prin douã linii de transmisieelectricã. O parte din gazele iraniene importate este folositãpentru a genera ºi exporta energie electricã din Armenia înIran. În primãvara lui 2011, ºedinþa interguvernamentalãla Teheran a pregãtit o serie de acorduri în domeniul infra-structurii ºi energiei: construcþia unei linii electrice de trans-misie ºi a hidrocentralei de pe râul Aras (PanArmenian.Net,2011). De asemenea, a fost reluatã ideea construcþiei unuioleoduct între cele douã þãri. Însã vizita preºedinteluiiranian în Armenia, în vara 2011, în cadrul cãreia trebuiasã fie definitivate ºi semnate acordurile nu a avut loc. Tehe-ranul a decalat vizita invocând probleme la Erevan. Pe lângãdeja amintita influenþã a Moscovei ºi calculele de ordinintern ale preºedintelui iranian, care au contribuit laamânarea vizitei, se pare cã nici Washingtonul nu agreeazãunele proiecte care permit Teheranului sã spargã izolareainternaþionalã.74

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ºi doar 5% îl privesc prin prisma inamiciþiei (InternationalRepublican Institute, 2008a). Starea de siguranþã derivã, nuîn ultimul rând, din tratamentul favorabil al minoritãþiiarmene în Iran, care numãrã între 40 ºi 80.000 de oameni.Armenii din Iran sunt printre cele mai puternice minoritãþireligioase, fapt confirmat prin alocarea a douã locuri înparlamentul de la Teheran. Atitudinea pozitivã a armenilorse bazeazã ºi pe interacþiunea intensivã pe linie turisticã.Armenia este o destinaþie popularã în Iran. Mii de turiºtiiranieni viziteazã Armenia pentru sãrbãtoarea Novruz Bai-ram ºi vacanþa de varã. În 2011, 28.000 de iranieni au venitîn Armenia cu ocazia Novruz Bairam (News.Am, 2011b).„Pentru iranieni, Armenia este Europa, unde ei se pot relaxaaºa cum regulile din Iran nu le permit“71, explicã un analistinteresul iranienilor pentru Armenia. Între cele douã þãri,existã curse de avion regulate. Pânã în prezent, Armenia ºiIran nu sunt conectate prin cale feratã. În perioada sovie-ticã, legãtura era realizatã prin Azerbaidjan. În 2009, Erevanºi Teheran au cãzut de acord sã construiascã o cale feratãdirectã între cele douã þãri, care sã se extindã pânã la GolfulPersic. Valoarea proiectului se ridicã la $1,8 miliarde. În2010, Armenia a dus o campanie activã pentru identificareafinanþatorilor externi pentru acest proiect (RFE, 2010c).

Compatibilitatea între cele douã þãri este sudatã desentimentul de izolare regionalã (Coene, 2010, 180), pecare Armenia ºi Iranul încearcã sã o depãºeascã inclusiv cuajutor reciproc. Dupã suspendarea tranzitului militar prinGeorgia, Iran a oferit spaþiu aerian pentru cargoul militardestinat bazei militare din Gyumri cel puþin o datã. Dete-riorarea relaþiilor ruso-iraniene dupã aprobarea de cãtreConsiliul de Securitate al ONU a sancþiunilor împotrivaIranului a pus Armenia într-o situaþie dificilã. Experþii nuexclud faptul cã partea armeanã încearcã sã intermediezeaprobarea tranzitului spre Gyumri de cãtre Teheran pentruurmãtoarea încãrcãturã.72 Erevanul apreciazã, de asemenea,

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73 Interviu cu un oficial, Erevan, iunie 2011; interviu cu un expert,Erevan, iunie 2011.

74 Interviu cu un diplomat.71 Interviu cu un expert, Erevan, iunie 2011.72 Interviu cu experþi, Erevan, iunie 2011.

armean. Pe lângã activitatea de lobby depusã la Washington,comunitatea armeanã contribuie direct la dezvoltarea eco-nomicã prin finanþarea unor proiecte de infrastructurã înArmenia. Însã interesele diasporei ºi ale autoritãþilor de laErevan nu se suprapun mereu. În 2008 ºi 2009, conducereade la Erevan a fost mult mai favorabilã presiunilor pe care lepuneau SUA asupra Turciei în vederea normalizãrii relaþiilorcu Armenia. Temerea diasporei armene din SUA a fost cãErevanul va reduce intensitatea campaniei pentru recunoaº-terea genocidului armenilor odatã cu restabilirea relaþiilor cuAnkara. De asemenea, unii reprezentanþi ai diasporei careau dorit sã investeascã în Armenia au reclamat nivelul înaltal corupþiei ºi blocajele la nivel administrativ care împiedicãdezvoltarea afacerilor.75

În contextul redefinirii prioritãþilor de securitate ale SUAdupã atentatele teroriste de la 11 septembrie 2001 ºi des-fãºurãrii celor douã campanii militare majore din Afganistanºi Irak, Armenia ºi-a reactivat cooperarea în sectorul militarcu SUA. O linie similarã a fost promovatã de Erevan faþã deNATO. Autoritãþile de la Erevan au perceput aceste evoluþiidrept ocazii favorabile de a diversifica opþiunile lor desecuritate, de a beneficia de asistenþa tehnicã ºi a acumulaexperienþã. Armenia a reuºit sã instituie un dialog strategicregulat cu SUA ºi a semnat Planul de Acþiuni Individuale aleParteneriatului cu NATO. Cu sprijinul SUA a fost deschis înArmenia centrul specializat în pregãtirea specialiºtilor îndezamorsarea minelor. În 2010 Armenia a gãzduit pentruprima datã pe teritoriul sãu un exerciþiu NATO. În perspec-tivã sunt preconizate primele exerciþii militare armeano-ame-ricane. Armenia a trimis 46 de militari în Irak ºi 45 de mi-litari în Afganistan. În 2011, Armenia ºi-a mãrit substanþialprezenþa în Afganistan, deplasând în teatrul de operaþiuniun contingent de 81 de militari. Toate acestea, în ansamblu,nu þintesc decuplarea Armeniei de alianþa cu Federaþia Rusã.

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3.1.3. SUA

Deºi la o distanþã geograficã apreciabilã de Caucazul deSud, SUA sunt o piesã grea în angrenajul politico-diploma-tic ºi economic al Armeniei. SUA sunt unul dintre co-preºe-dinþii Grupului de la Minsk, gãzduiesc o diasporã armeanãnumeroasã ºi influentã ºi sunt un donator extern importantpentru dezvoltarea economicã a Armeniei. SUA au fost alºaptelea partener comercial al Armeniei în 2010 cu o pon-dere de 4,1% (EU Commission, 2011b). Mai mult de 8%din totalul remitenþelor în Armenia îºi au originea în SUA(New Europe, 2011). Începând cu 2006, Armenia a bene-ficiat de fonduri nerambursabile în valoare de $235,6 mi-lioane prin intermediul Corporaþiei Provocãrile Mileniului,însã violenþele postelectorale de la Erevan din 2008 au de-terminat SUA sã suspende finanþarea proiectelor în cadrulacestui program. Chiar ºi în aceste condiþii Armenia rãmâneîn lista statelor cu cel mai mare ajutor din partea SUA pecap de locuitor. Asistenþa SUA acordatã Armeniei în perioa-da 1992-2005 depãºeºte $1 miliard (Nichol, 2011, 27). În2011, Congresul SUA a aprobat pentru Armenia asistenþãeconomicã în valoare de $44 milioane, asistenþã militarã învaloare $3,5 milioane ºi $450.000 pentru pregãtire militarã.De asemenea, SUA alocã anual sume pentru finanþarea pro-iectelor de reconstrucþie ºi dezvoltare în Nagorno-Karabah.Anul 2011 nu este o excepþie, SUA alocând $8 milioane pen-tru programe de asistenþã în aceastã regiune (RFE, 2010d).În 1998-2008, SUA au acordat ajutor umanitar Nagorno-Karabahului în valoare de $32 milioane (Nichol, 2011, 27).

Diaspora armeanã din SUA este esenþialã pentru Erevanîn eforturile de a obþine asistenþã financiarã în cadrul dez-baterilor bugetare din legislativul american, de a bloca saua reduce asistenþa similarã pentru Azerbaidjan, de a preveniabrogarea secþiunii 907 din Freedom Support Act aplicatãAzerbaidjanului, de a bloca unele numiri diplomatice ne-convenabile (de pildã, procedura de confirmare a actualuluiambasador în Azerbaidjan), de recunoaºtere a genocidului

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75 Interviu cu un expert, Erevan, iunie 2011.

pentru îmbunãtãþirea securitãþii nucleare din Armenia.UE a propus sã acopere parþial costurile închiderii centraleinucleare Metsamor. În plus, UE este al doilea investitor înArmenia dupã Rusia. Statele membre UE, Franþa ºi Olanda,sunt pe locul doi ºi trei în topul investitorilor în Armeniaîn 2010, cu $146,7 ºi respectiv $64,3 milioane (Mediamax,2011). În plan economic, UE este principalul partenercomercial al Armeniei, cu o pondere de 32,1% în 2010 (EUCommission, 2011b). Acest lucru s-a datorat, nu în ultimulrând, extinderii din 2009 a Sistemului Generalizat de Prefe-rinþe Plus (SGP+) asupra Armeniei, care a facilitat accesulproduselor autohtone pe piaþa europeanã. În 2008, UE acomandat un studiu de fezabilitate cu privire la crearea uneiZone de Comerþ Liber, Aprofundat ºi Cuprinzãtor (ZCLAC)cu Armenia.

La Erevan, aproape toate forþele politice sprijinã apro-pierea de UE. „Existã un interes real pentru UE la Erevan“78,confirmã un diplomat. Interesul este întãrit prin documen-tele oficiale. Strategia naþionalã de securitate adoptatã în2007 menþioneazã integrarea europeanã printre obiectiveleArmeniei (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2007). Însã integrareaîn UE este conceputã la Erevan altfel decât la Kiev, Chiºinãusau Tbilisi. Întrebat despre integrarea europeanã, un oficiala explicat: „Noi nu vom bate la uºa UE precum o fac vecinii.Nu ne vom precipita. Integrarea europeanã este un proces deduratã în cadrul cãruia, pe mãsurã ce soluþionãm problemelenoastre interne, vom atinge nivelul apropiat de dezvoltaredin statele membre UE. Abia atunci vom calcula dacã meritãsã devenim membri cu drepturi depline sau nu.“79 Pe deo parte, aceastã poziþionare faþã de integrare demonstreazão gândire realistã cu privire la perspectivele Armeniei de adeveni membru UE în viitorul previzibil. Se pare cã Erevanuleste relativ mulþumit cu ceea ce a fost propus de UE vecinilordin Est ºi încearcã sã extragã maximum din oferta actualã.

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În condiþiile actualului statu quo în regiune, acest lucru ar fiimposibil. În schimb, dorind sã-ºi mãreascã spaþiul de mane-vrã pe plan extern, „autoritãþile de la Erevan trimit Rusieisemnalul cã Armenia are ºi alte opþiuni pentru a-ºi asigurasecuritatea militarã“76. Întrebarea rãmâne cât de credibilesunt aceste semnale pentru Rusia, care dispune de o gamãdiversificatã de instrumente pentru a preveni schimbarearadicalã a cursului de politicã externã a Armeniei.

3.1.4. UE

Cãutând sã amplifice efectul diversificãrii, în ultimii aniArmenia ºi-a îndreptat atenþia spre UE. Relaþiile economiceArmeniei cu UE s-au intensificat rapid începând cu 2005-2006. Includerea Armeniei în politica de vecinãtate a UE ºisemnarea planului de acþiune UE-Armenia au impulsionatacest proces. În consecinþã, Erevanul percepe UE drept oresursã tot mai importantã pentru stabilitatea macro-finan-ciarã ºi dezvoltarea economicã a Armeniei. Mãrturiseºte unobservator: „Când vorbim despre UE, prima întrebare estedacã ºi câþi bani ne vor da?“77. Ultimul barometru de opiniepublicã aratã cã 29% din respondenþi considerã UE cel maiimportant partener al Armeniei (International RepublicanInstitute, 2008a).

Armenia beneficiazã de asistenþã financiarã semnifica-tivã din partea UE. În perioada 2007-2010, UE a alocat€98,4 milioane, iar pentru perioada 2011-2013 sunt buge-tate €157,3 milioane ºi alte €40 milioane care pot fi atrasede Armenia din alte programe finanþate de UE (Navasar-dian, 2011, 65). În 2011 UE ºi Armenia au semnat unmemorandum cu privire la acordarea sprijinului macro-financiar Armeniei pentru a depãºi efectele crizei economiceglobale în valoare de €100 milioane, din care €65 milioanesub formã de împrumut ºi €35 milioane în calitate de grant(Eteris, 2011). De asemenea, UE finanþeazã programe

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78 Interviu cu un diplomat.79 Interviu cu un oficial, Erevan, iunie 2011.

76 Interviu cu un expert, Erevan, iunie 2011.77 Interviu cu un expert, Erevan, iunie 2011.

diplomaþiei armene în interacþiunea cu instituþiile UE suntpãstrarea statu quo-ului în formatul de negocieri ºi blocareaunor documente sau a unor iniþiative care dezavantajeazãArmenia în raport cu Azerbaidjanul. De regulã, UE încearcãsã pãstreze neutralitatea în raporturile cu cele douã þãri. Înconsecinþã, documentele UE deseori includ formulãri caresatisfac ºi, în acelaºi timp, provoacã nemulþumiri la Erevansau Baku. De exemplu, Armenia a avut o reacþie criticã laadresa rezoluþiei care cheamã UE sã dezvolte o strategie faþãde Caucazul de Sud, care a fost adoptatã de ParlamentulEuropean în 2010. Documentul cere în mod explicit retra-gerea forþelor militare armene de pe teritoriul ocupat alAzerbaidjanului (EU Parliament, 2010), reiterând practicmesajul rezoluþiei Adunãrii Generale ale ONU din 2008. Înacelaºi timp, pasajul în care UE este chematã sã ofere ajutorumanitar populaþiei din Nagorno-Karabah este în armoniecu eforturile Armeniei de dezizolare a Nagorno-Karabahului.

3.1.5. Turcia

Primul lucru pe care îl fac mulþi din locuitorii Erevanuluidimineaþa este sã priveascã spre Turcia, admirând mag-nificul Ararat, muntele cu încãrcãturã istoricã ºi simbolicãpentru armeni. Deºi privirile sunt aþintite spre Turcia, sunto serie de lucruri care îi separã pe armeni de vecinul imediatdin vest. La începutul anilor ’90, Erevanul ºi Ankara s-auaflat pe diferite pãrþi ale baricadei în conflictul din Nagor-no-Karabah. Rãzboiul ºi închiderea graniþei cu Turcia ºiAzerbaidjan care i-a urmat au resuscitat sentimentul deameninþare turcã înrãdãcinat în memoria istoricã colectivãa armenilor. Campania pentru recunoaºterea genociduluiarmean ºi referirea în Constituþia Armeniei la provinciile deest ale Turciei drept Armenia de Vest au adâncit ºi mai multfractura dintre Erevan ºi Ankara.

Începând cu 2008, la nivel politic, Armenia a cãutatactiv sã depãºeascã animozitãþile. Rãzboiul ruso-georgian agrãbit acest proces, care ar fi fost imposibil dacã ambelepãrþi nu fãceau mici paºi spre normalizarea relaþiilor. Ankara

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Pe de altã parte, aceastã abordare aratã cã Erevanul esteinteresat de cooperarea tehnicã (introducerea standardelortehnice) ºi în acelaºi timp vrea sã previnã intruziunea exce-sivã a UE în afacerile politice interne, pãstrând o anumitãdistanþã. Aºa cum a observat un analist local „conducereapoliticã se fereºte sã-ºi asume prea multe obligaþii în relaþiacu UE; statutul de membru al Consiliului Europei ºi pro-blematica drepturilor omului genereazã deja prea multe bãtãide cap pentru guvernanþi“80.

Agenda de cooperare a Armeniei cu UE nu se reduce doarla aspecte economice. Drept confirmare, în 2010 Armenia s-a alãturat celor 28 din cele 44 declaraþii ale UE în dome-niul politicii externe ºi de securitate la care a fost invitatã sãse alinieze (EU Commission, 2011e). Cooperarea Armenieicu UE în domeniul politicii externe ºi de securitate areconexiune directã cu disputa cu Azerbaidjanul ºi relaþia difi-cilã cu Turcia. „Pentru noi UE este o uniune a statelor creº-tine“81, declarã un oficial. Fãrã a nominaliza Azerbaidjan ºiTurcia, Armenia se pare cã dã de înþeles cã cele douã statenu au ce cãuta în UE. Alternativ, acestea trebuie sã-ºirezolve chestiunile contradictorii cu Armenia ca sã poatãavansa pe calea integrãrii în UE. Confirmând aceastã pozi-þie, autoritãþile de la Erevan „au exprimat dezamãgire înlegãturã cu faptul cã soluþionarea problemelor istorice ºideschiderea frontierei turco-armene nu au fost incluse deUE ca precondiþii pentru declanºarea negocierilor de aderarea Turciei“ (Navasardian, 2011, 64). Deºi UE nu participã înformatul de negocieri în chestiunea Nagorno-Karabahului,Franþa, stat membru al UE, este copreºedintele Grupuluide la Minsk. Anterior au existat propuneri ca Franþa sã fieînlocuitã în Grupul de la Minsk de cãtre un diplomat UE.Armenia bucurându-se de o legãturã privilegiatã cu Franþa,þara-gazdã a unei diaspore armene influente, a blocataceastã iniþiativã (Popescu, 2011, 105). Aºadar, obiectivele

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80 Interviu cu un expert, Erevan, iunie 2011.81 Interviu cu un official, Erevan, iunie 2011.

între ei discutã în contradictoriu ce trebuie de fãcut pentruîmpãcare [între armeni ºi turci]“ (Markedonov, 2011).

Din raþiuni evidente procesul întâmpinã opoziþie la nivelpolitic ºi social. Un oficial de la Erevan conchide într-o notãpesimistã: „Politica zero probleme cu vecinii înseamnã pentruTurcia inexistenþa vecinilor“83. ªi la nivel social existã rezis-tenþã la acest proces. Dar cifrele nu sunt atât de descuraja-toare pe cât ar trebui sã fie reieºind din percepþia majoritarnegativã pe care turcii ºi armenii o au unii faþã de alþii. ÎnTurcia, potrivit unui sondaj de opinie, 50% din cei chestio-naþi se opun redeschiderii frontierei, 27% rãspund afirmativ,iar 22% rãmân indeciºi. Într-un sondaj de opinie realizat înArmenia, 31% din cei chestionaþi s-au exprimat pentrumultiplicarea contactelor cu Turcia, un procent aproapesimilar de respondenþi se opun, iar 40% s-au declarat inde-ciºi (Armtown.Com, 2011b). În Armenia prevaleazã factoriicomerciali în problema redeschiderii frontierei. Mulþi percepacest proces ca pe o imensã oportunitate de a explora piaþadin regiunea de est a Turciei. Acestã gândire se regãseºte însondaje. Potrivit unui barometru de opinie publicã, 41% dinrespondenþi considerã cã redeschiderea frontierei cu Turciava avea un impact economic pozitiv imediat asupra þãrii,iar 36% s-au declarat neutri sau nu sunt siguri de efectelepozitive (RFE, 2011b).

În ciuda graniþei închise ºi a lipsei relaþiilor diplomatice,între cele douã þãri existã schimburi comerciale, umanitareºi ocazional politice, care împing zi de zi Erevanul ºi Ankaraspre normalizarea relaþiilor. Turcia a fost al ºaselea partenercomercial al Armeniei în 2010, cu o pondere de 4,4% (EUCommission, 2011b). Oamenii de afaceri estimeazã cãschimburile comerciale bilaterale s-ar putea dubla dacã frontiera va fi redeschisã (Markedonov, 2011). Între Erevanºi Istanbul existã comunicare pe calea aerului. În Turcialucreazã sezonier între 40 ºi 70 de mii de armeni. Armeniinu se feresc sã meargã în vacanþã în Turcia; în jur de 50 demii de armeni au vizitat Antalia în 2009 (Ziflioglu, 2010).

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a dat primele semne de apropiere în 2005-2007 prin restau-rarea unor biserici armeneºti pânã atunci neglijate. Printreacestea s-a numãrat biserica Akdamar aflatã pe una dintreinsulele de pe lacul Van. Oficialii din Armenia au participatla ceremonia de deschidere a bisericii, iar ulterior autori-tãþile turce au permis oficierea unei slujbe pe an la bisericaAkdamar. Erevanul a sesizat deschiderea unei oportunitãþiºi l-a invitat pe preºedintele Turciei în Armenia cu ocaziameciului oficial de fotbal între cele douã echipe naþionale.În septembrie 2008, preºedintele turc a fãcut o vizitãistoricã la Erevan, fiind primul lider al Turciei care a vizitatArmenia. La aproape un an de la acest eveniment, Armeniaºi Turcia au semnat protocoale care prevãd stabilirea rela-þiilor diplomatice ºi redeschiderea frontierei turco-armene.Însã procesul de normalizare a relaþiilor s-a împotmolit încursul anului 2010, când ambele pãrþi au renunþat sã mairatifice protocoalele, acuzându-se reciproc pentru eºec.Trebuie menþionat cã nici Armenia, nici Turcia nu ºi-auretras semnãturile de pe protocoale. Astfel pãrþile nu au puscapãt procesului, ci doar au îngheþat procedura de ratificare.

Deºi au eºuat în primã fazã în 2010, Armenia ºi Turciaau trecut de o etapã psihologicã importantã. „Problema nuse mai pune dacã, ci când vor fi normalizate relaþiile?“82,remarcã un expert local influent. Sub egida politicii „zeroprobleme“ cu vecinii, Turcia a continuat procesul de restau-rare a bisericilor armeneºti ºi a eliminat Armenia din listastatelor care reprezintã o ameninþare la adresa securitãþiisale în 2010. Procesul nu este liniar însã. Armenia continuãcampania internaþionalã pentru recunoaºterea genociduluiarmenilor. Ca rãspuns, primul-ministru turc ameninþã cuexpulzarea muncitorilor armeni din þarã ºi cere demolareamonumentului de reconciliere turco-armeanã din Kars.Însã majoritatea analiºtilor considerã cã procesul nu poate fioprit. Aºa cum observã un bun cunoscãtor al regiunii:„Astãzi nu turcii cu armenii, dar armenii între ei ºi turcii

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83 Interviu cu un oficial, Erevan, iunie 2011.82 Interviu cu un expert, Erevan, iunie 2011.

Prin urmare, Azerbaidjanul promoveazã o politicã externãmultivectorialã, care se bucurã de sprijinul a 41% din cetã-þeni (Puls-R/Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2010). Accentele înpolitica externã se schimbã situaþional pentru a scãpa desub presiunea unei puteri regionale sau pentru a extrage dela actorii regionali anumite concesii. Cu toate cã asigurã ungrad de independenþã strategicã, acest curs este susceptibilla crize ciclice în relaþiile cu partenerii Azerbaidjanului.

3.2.1. Turcia

Probabil cele mai apropiate relaþii regionale au fost dez-voltate cu Ankara. Azerbaidjanul ºi Turcia sunt conectateprintr-o reþea multilateralã de contacte umanitare, econo-mice, sociale, politice ºi militare care sudeazã aceastã relaþie.La nivel politic au loc multiple întâlniri ºi consultãri inter-guvernamentale. Baku se simte confortabil în raporturilecu Ankara, deoarece partea turcã evitã sã critice evoluþiilepolitice interne din Azerbaidjan (Musabekov, 2011). În sec-torul energetic, douã magistrale strategice azere de export agazelor ºi petrolului îºi au ca punct final oraºe din Turcia —Erzurum ºi, respectiv, Ceihan. Calea feratã care va conectaAzerbaidjanul cu Turcia via Georgia este în construcþie.Turcia este al doilea partener comercial al Azerbaidjanului,cu o pondere de 8,2% în 2010 (EU Commission, 2011d).Totodatã, Turcia este al cincilea investitor în Azerbaidjan,cu 3,9% din totalul investiþiilor în 2010 (News.Az, 2011e).În ultimii ani, Azerbaidjanul a demonstrat interes pentrupiaþa energeticã din Turcia, realizând o serie de investiþii deproporþii. De exemplu, SOCAR a achiziþionat un pachet de51% în compania turcã petrochimicã Petkim, intenþionândsã investeascã în jur de $100 milioane în dezvoltareaproiectelor energetice (News.Az, 2011f). Volumul cumulatal investiþiilor azere în Turcia este de $4 miliarde, Bakuplanificând alte investiþii în valoare de $6 miliarde (Kardas,2011). Pentru mulþi azeri, Turcia este o destinaþie de studiisau de lucru atractivã. Din 1992 pânã în 2010, mai mult de

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Nici turiºtii turci nu ocolesc Armenia. Au loc ºi evenimenteculturale bilaterale, în 2011 oraºul armean Vanadzor gãz-duind sãptãmâna filmului turcesc pentru a doua oarã. Existãnumeroase contacte la nivelul societãþii civile ºi comunitãþiide experþi care oferã posibilitatea purtãrii unui dialog infor-mal între formatorii de opinie ºi oficiali din cele douã þãri.La Erevan, unii experþi afirmã cã discuþiile bilaterale în pri-vinþa normalizãrii relaþiilor nu au fost sistate, dar au fostmutate pe alt palier. Se pare cã în cadrul acestora pãrþile audiscutat posibilitatea implementãrii limitate a protocoalelorfãrã ratificarea acestora (de exemplu, deschiderea graniþeipentru doar câteva zile pe sãptãmânã pentru camioane).84

Mesajul primului-ministru al Turciei dupã câºtigarea alege-rilor parlamenare din 2011 cu privire la continuarea dia-logului cu Erevanul (News.Az, 2011d) confirmã cã procesulnu se va opri în ciuda multiplelor obstacole. Aceste evoluþii,dacã au succes în timp, vor avea un impact major asupraarhitecturii economice ºi de securitate în Caucazul de Sud.Însã pentru Turcia misiunea promite a fi extrem de dificilã,nu în ultimul rând din cauza opoziþiei Azerbaidjanului faþãde normalizarea necondiþionatã a relaþiilor ºi legãturilorstrânse între Ankara ºi Baku.

3.2. Azerbaidjan: independenþã strategicã prin multivectorism

Principalul obiectiv al politicii externe a Azerbaidjanuluieste restabilirea integritãþii teritoriale. Strategia externã aAzerbaidjanului urmãreºte, de asemenea, accesul la tehno-logii ºi creºterea potenþialului de export al hidrocarburilor,inclusiv prin multiplicarea rutelor de livrare a gazelor ºipetrol pe pieþele internaþionale. La rândul sãu, factorul ener-getic este instrumentalizat intern ºi extern pentru reinte-grarea þãrii. Independenþa financiarã asiguratã de veniturilesubstanþiale generate de sectorul energetic oferã Azerbaidja-nului o autonomie largã în raporturile cu puterile regionale.

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tratatul OTSC.85 În caz de rãzboi, Azerbaidjanul se aºteaptãla sprijin politic ºi ajutor militar indirect din partea Turciei.86

Turcia joacã un rol crucial în strategia Azerbaidjanului dedezizolare ºi asigurare a securitãþii Nahicevanului. În 2010a început construcþia gazoductului din Turcia înspre Nahi-cevan, iar Azerbaidjanul ºi Turcia au semnat un contract delivrare a gazelor spre enclava azerã, fãrã ca partea turcã sãperceapã taxã de tranzit. Totodatã, au fost lansate zboruridirecte între Istanbul ºi Nahicevan. Baku ºi Ankara anali-zeazã posibilitatea conectãrii Nahicevanului la calea feratãBaku-Tbilisi-Kars. Nu în ultimul rând, prezenþa militarã aAzerbaidjanului în Nahicevan a fost întãritã cu asistenþasubstanþialã a Turciei (Abbasov, 2010). Date fiind relaþiiletensionate între Azerbaidjan ºi Iran, Turcia cautã sã mediezeîntre cele douã state în spiritul noii politici de vecinãtate. În2011, Turcia a organizat întâlnirea trilateralã a miniºtrilorde Externe, pentru a da un impuls pozitiv dialogului întreBaku ºi Teheran.

Însã parteneriatul strategic turco-azer nu este lipsit deprobleme. Tentativa Turciei de a normaliza necondiþionatrelaþiile cu Armenia a fost perceputã extrem de negativ laBaku. Privitã din Azerbaidjan, eventuala deschidere a fron-tierei turco-armene reduce semnificativ ºansele de a deter-mina Erevanul sã cadã la un acord cu Baku. Pe lângã schim-barea de discurs la adresa Turciei, Baku a schimbat accenteleîn politica sa energeticã. Aceasta a inclus revizuirea preþuluigazelor livrate Turciei ºi implicarea în proiectul AGRI careexclude nu doar Rusia, ci ºi Turcia. Semnalul dat de Azerbai-djan Turciei a fost „fãrã noi, nu puteþi fi hub energetic“.87

Proiectul Nabucco a alimentat divergenþele între Baku ºiAnkara. Azerbaidjanul a respins oferta Turciei de a contractaîntregul volum de gaze pentru ca ulterior sã-l exporte pepiaþa europeanã. Deºi cetãþenii Azerbaidjanului beneficiazã

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5.000 de studenþi din Azerbaidjan au studiat în universitãþidin Turcia prin intermediul burselor oferite de guvernul turc.În plus, unii tineri au ales sã plece în Turcia la studii pe contpropriu. Tot mai mulþi pãrinþi îºi trimit copiii la grãdiniþe,ºcoli primare ºi licee turce în Baku (Trend, 2011b). Reþeauainstituþiilor de educaþie turceºti în Azerbaidjan este depãºitãdoar de instituþiile similare cu predare în limbã rusã (Musa-bekov, 2011). Într-un sondaj de opinie, Turcia este pe locultrei (7,4%) în preferinþele azerilor care ar alege sã plece dinþarã la muncã (Puls-R/Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2010). Toateacestea se reflectã în atitudinea favorabilã faþã de Turcia lanivelul societãþii. Astfel, 86,4% din respondenþi în 2010au apreciat cã Turcia este un stat-prieten al Azerbaidjanului(Puls-R/Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2010).

Atitudinea favorabilã faþã de Turcia se explicã inclusivprin asistenþa pe care a acordat-o Turcia Azerbaidjanului întimpul ºi dupã suspendarea acþiunilor militare în Nagorno-Karabah. O serie de organizaþii nonguvernamentale dinTurcia au oferit ajutor umanitar PSI din Nagorno-Karabah,acesta atingând pânã în prezent $6 milioane (News.Az,2011). Dupã sistarea ostilitãþilor, cooperarea în domeniulmilitar s-a intensificat, ajutorul total acordat pânã în 2010depãºind $200 milioane potrivit Ministerului turc alApãrãrii (Artsakank News, 2011). Turcia a pregãtit ofiþeriºi soldaþi azeri în instituþiile sale de învãtãmânt ºi în facili-tãþile de antrenament militare. Pãrþile coopereazã într-oserie de proiecte comune în domeniul industriei de apãrare.Pe lângã importul de armament din Turcia, Baku ºi Ankaraau înfiinþat societãþi mixte în scopul producþiei de muniþieºi echipamente militare destinate forþelor armate azere(News.Az, 2011g). În 2010, Ankara ºi Baku au solidificatrelaþia prin semnarea acordului privind parteneriatul strate-gic ºi asistenþa mutualã. Pãrþile ºi-au asumat obligaþia de aoferi ajutor reciproc în caz de pericol la adresa securitãþiinaþionale. Documentul, însã, nu oferã Azerbaidjanului ace-leaºi garanþii de securitate de care se bucurã Armenia prin

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Compatibilitatea modelelor politice (democraþia suvera-nã) ºi economice (petro-state), precum ºi multiplele legãturipersonale cu Rusia ale preºedintelui (care ºi-a fãcut studiilela Moscova) au facilitat acest proces. Interesele economiceºi fluxurile migraþionale au contribuit la apropierea dintreMoscova ºi Baku. Rusia este al treilea partener comercialal Azerbaidjanului, cu o pondere de 7,4% în 2010 (EU Com-mission, 2011d). Rusia, de asemenea, este a doua în listadestinaþiilor preferate de azerii care ar fi dispuºi sã plecedin þarã la muncã (Puls-R/Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2010).Potrivit estimãrilor, în Rusia se aflã între 1,3 ºi 1,8 milioaneazeri care anual trimit în þarã $1,8 – $2,4 miliarde (Valiyev,2011). Limitarea accesului migranþilor azeri în Rusia ar aveaun impact social negativ imens, care ar pune într-o situaþiedificilã guvernul de la Baku.

Creºterea importanþei vectorului rusesc a contribuit laeliminarea unor probleme de pe agenda bilateralã. În 2010,Azerbaidjanul ºi Rusia au semnat tratatul cu privire la fron-tiera terestrã de stat completând acordul semnat în 2002cu privire la delimitarea frontierei între cele douã state înMarea Caspicã. Cu aceastã ocazie, Rusia a anunþat cã pro-blema a douã sate din nordul Azerbaidjanului — Urianobaºi Hrahoba —, care se considerau temporar teritoriul Rusiei(Republica Daghestan) a fost soluþionatã definitiv, cele douãlocalitãþi revenind sub jurisdicþia autoritãþilor de la Baku(News.Az, 2011h). Tranºarea problemei celor douã localitãþiera importantã pentru guvernul azer preocupat de reven-dicãrile ocazionale ale minoritãþii lezghine din nordul þãrii,care adeseori a folosit Moscova ca platformã pentru a lansamesaje politice. Azerbaidjanul gãzduieºte o staþie radar înGabala, pe care Rusia o închiriazã pentru $7 milioane anual.Aproximativ 1.000 de militari ruºi deservesc staþia. Acordulexpirã în anul 2012, dar pãrþile au purtat deja o rundã denegocieri preliminare pe marginea prelungirii acordului.Rusia s-a oferit sã investeascã în modernizarea radarului.Este foarte probabil ca Azerbaidjanul sã extindã termenul

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din 2008 de regimul liberalizat de cãlãtorie în Turcia, autori-tãþile de la Baku nu aplicã un tratament similar cetãþenilorturci. Ankara face presiuni ca Baku sã liberalizeze regimulde cãlãtorie pentru cetãþenii sãi. Azerbaidjanul rezistã invo-când motive de securitate (traficul de droguri ºi migraþia).Iranul, la rândul sãu, pune presiune pe Baku sã eliminevizele pentru cetãþenii sãi. Experþii aduc de asemenea în dis-cuþie motive de ordin intern. „Regimul este preocupat decreºterea influenþei politice ºi economice a Turciei în Azer-baidjan“88, detaliazã un analist preocupãrile pe care oficialiile trec sub tãcere. Cu toate cã în 2010 Turcia a reuºit sãrepare relaþiile cu Azerbaidjan, gustul amar al tentativei dea normaliza necondiþionat relaþia cu Armenia a rãmas. LaBaku se aºteaptã ca Turcia sã continue dialogul cu Armeniadupã alegeri.89 În aceste circumstanþe, este foarte posibil caAzerbaidjanul sã foloseascã aici cooperarea sectorialã cuRusia, pentru a deturna acest proces.

3.2.2. Rusia

În timpul rãzboiului ruso-georgian din 2008, conducereaAzerbaidjanului a avut o reacþie moderatã. Baku a evitat sãcritice în mod deschis Rusia. Conformitatea acþiunilor Geor-giei cu dreptul internaþional a fost anunþatã de purtãtorulde cuvânt al Ministerului de Externe, ºi nu de un oficial derang înalt. Protestele din faþa ambasadei ruse la Baku au fostde scurtã duratã, fiind dispersate de forþele de ordine. Înacelaºi timp, conflictul armat din 2008 ºi negocierile întreTurcia ºi Armenia au creat premisele pentru apropierea întreMoscova ºi Baku. Rolul pe care îl joacã Rusia în Grupul dela Minsk ºi reactivarea dupã 2008 a negocierilor de cãtreMoscova au determinat Azerbaidjanul, care se opune actua-lului statu quo în Nagorno-Karabah, sã admitã punctualinteresele Rusiei, fãrã însã a trece limita pe care o impuneo politicã externã multivectorialã.

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88 Interviu cu un un expert, Baku, iunie 2011.89 Interviu cu un expert, Baku, iunie 2011.

Ebert Stiftung, 2010), însã societatea azerã este polarizatãîn privinþa Rusiei. În acelaºi sondaj, aproape 17% dintre ceichestionaþi au identificat Rusia drept stat duºman (Puls-R/Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2010). Fãrã îndoialã, pe lângã spri-jinul acordat Armeniei în Nagorno-Karabah, imaginea Rusieia avut de suferit dupã rãzboiul din Georgia, simpatia popu-laþiei fiind preponderent de partea georgienilor.92 Un indica-tor util în acest sens poate fi nivelul de sprijin pentru proce-sele integraþioniste în cadrul CSI, al cãror motor este Rusia.Din 2006 pânã în 2010, sprijinul în Azerbaidjan pentruintegrarea în cadrul CSI a scãzut de la aproximativ 24% la15% (ibidem).

Cursul pragmatic al Azerbaidjanului faþã de Rusia a fosttestat de o serie de situaþii conflictuale. În 2009 informaþiacirculatã în mass-media despre transferul de armament învaloare de $800 milioane din Rusia cãtre Armenia a provo-cat indignare în Azerbaidjan. Guvernul de la Baku a fostdezamãgit, deoarece Kremlinul, dupã apropierea din 2008,a promis sã ofere extrasprijin Azerbaidjanului (Ismailzade,2009). Ori, în timp ce intermedia negocieri între Erevan ºiBaku, Kremlinul contribuia la echilibrarea balanþei militareîntre pãrþi contrar obiectivelor Azerbaidjanului. Prelungireaprezenþei militare ruse în Armenia în 2010 de asemenea nua fost recepþionatã cu entuziasm la Baku. Comentând poli-tica militarã rusã în Caucazul de Sud, un oficial azer de rangînalt a observat cã „a venit timpul de a înlocui tancurile deluptã cu tancuri petroliere, [altfel spus] de a substitui pre-zenþa militarã cu cea economicã“ (Aztag, 2011). Pe parcur-sul anului 2008 au avut loc o serie de atacuri violentexenofobe împotriva cetãþenilor azeri în regiunea Moscovei.Mass-media localã a informat pe larg despre aceste crime,stârnind o reacþie publicã negativã în Azerbaidjan. Subpresiunea opiniei publice, guvernul de la Baku a ridicat pro-blema securitãþii cetãþenilor azeri aflaþi în Rusia în cadruldiscuþiilor bilaterale cu colegii de la Moscova. Pe poziþii

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de ºedere a militarilor ruºi cu încã cinci sau zece ani.90 Nueste exclus ca un eventual acord sã fie plata politicã pentruarmamentul rusesc modern livrat Azerbaidjanului în 2010.Unii experþi considerã cã aderarea Azerbaidjanului la Miºca-rea de Nealiniere are legãturã directã cu dinamica regionalãpost-2008. Se pare cã prin aceastã miºcare Baku a dorit sãcomunice în principal Moscovei cã nu cautã aderarea laalianþe militare, nici la NATO, dar nici la OTSC.91

Acomodarea intereselor Rusiei a avut loc de asemenea îndomeniul energetic, economic ºi umanitar. O serie de com-panii au fost admise pe piaþa din Azerbaidjan. Banca VTB aintrat pe piaþa financiarã în 2008. Alte douã companii ruse,Rostelekom ºi Sistema, ºi-au declarat interesul sã participela procesul de privatizare a Azertelekom ºi Baki TelefonRabitasi. Aproximativ 500 de companii ruse activeazã înAzerbaidjan (Oxford Analytica, 2011). Rusia ºi Azerbaidjanau încheiat acordul cu privire la construcþia unei noi linii detransmisie electricã, Iaºma-Derbent, care va spori capaci-tatea de export a energiei electrice din Rusia. În 2008, Rusiaa evitat sã bombardeze terminalul Kulevi, proprietateaSOCAR-ului, ºi conducta Baku-Supsa. În 2010, Azerbai-djanul a început exporturile de gaze spre Rusia. În 2011,volumul exporturilor a fost majorat pânã la 2 miliarde m/c.În 2008, în Azerbaidjan, gazda celei mai numeroase diasporeruseºti în Caucazul de Sud (160-170.000), a fost deschisãfiliala Universitãþii de Stat de la Moscova. Aceastã instituþies-a adãugat listei care include peste 200 de ºcoli ºi facultãþidin Azerbaidjan cu predare în limba rusã (Musabekov,2011). Azerbaidjanul e vizitat anual de 700.000 de cetãþeniruºi (Oxford Analytica). Toate acestea pãstreazã în percepþiaunei pãrþi a populaþiei o imagine pozitivã despre Rusia. Unbarometru de opinie publicã din 2010 aratã cã aproximativ23% dintre azeri considerã Rusia un stat-prieten. Rusia estedepãºitã la acest capitol doar de Turcia (Puls-R/Friedrich

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Azerbaidjanul reprezintã un nod important, care asigurãfuncþionarea facilã a reþelei nordice de distribuþie spre Af-ganistan. Începând cu 2002, preºedintele SUA a suspendatanual aplicarea secþiunii 907 din Freedom Support Act,care bloca asistenþa financiarã acordatã Azerbaidjanului.În 2010, SUA au acordat Azerbaidjanului asistenþã finan-ciarã în valoare de $22 milioane. În 2003, DepartamentulApãrãrii american a început derularea programului de pre-gãtire ºi dotare cu echipament a gãrzii navale azere în MareaCaspicã. Anual forþele armate ale SUA ºi Azerbaidjanului auorganizat exerciþii militare comune.

Însã în 2008 acest parteneriat a scos în evidenþã primelefisuri, care s-au adâncit în 2009 ºi 2010. În ciuda eforturilordin partea ambelor pãrþi de a menþine aparenþa normalitãþiila suprafaþã, relaþiile nu mai sunt la fel de apropiate cumau fost în primii ani 2000, în opinia unui oficial azer dinadministraþia prezidenþialã (News.Az, 2011i). Acest lucruse reflectã în sondajele de opinie, în care numai 6,5% dinrespondenþi au declarat cã SUA sunt un stat prieten, cu 2%mai puþin comparativ cu Iranul (Puls-R/Friedrich EbertStiftung, 2010). Din perspectiva azerã, o serie de factori aucontribuit la rãcirea relaþiilor azero-americane. În general,la nivelul elitei politice este împãrtãºit pe larg sentimentulcã Azerbaidjanul a oferit mai mult decât a primit în schimb.În percepþia conducerii de la Baku, relaþia cu SUA nu estebazatã pe valori, ci pe interese. Azerbaidjanul a sperat cãcooperarea în domeniul securitãþii ºi al sectorului energeticva genera un sprijin masiv din partea SUA pentru soluþiona-rea conflictului din Nagorno-Karabah. Astfel, interpretândparteneriatul ca pe o relaþie pur contractualã, Baku simte cãnu a beneficiat suficient de pe urma sprijinului din parteaWashingtonului.93 O serie de acþiuni de politicã externã aleSUA au provocat iritare la Baku: în primul rând, rolul activjucat de SUA în semnarea protocoalelor de normalizare arelaþiilor dintre Armenia ºi Turcia; în al doilea rând,

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diametral opuse s-au plasat pãrþile în dezbaterea cu privirela construcþia conductei transcaspice. Dacã ambasadorul rusla Baku a invocat daune ce pot fi cauzate mediului încon-jurãtor prin executarea acestui proiect ºi necesitatea acordu-lui Rusiei ºi Iranului ca aceastã iniþiativa sã progreseze,reprezentantul SOCAR a replicat cã negocierile cu privire laconducta transcaspicã vor avea loc fãrã Rusia (Fitzpatrick,2011).

3.2.3. SUA

Sprijinul politic ºi economic al SUA a fost decisiv pentrufinalizarea la mijlocul deceniului 2001-2010 a rutelor ener-getice care ocolesc Rusia ºi oferã autonomia internaþionalãde care se bucurã Azerbaidjanul acum. Rolul SUA este încontinuare crucial pentru deblocarea dosarelor bilateraleturkmeno-azere, care ar pune bazele transformãrii Azerbai-djanului în þarã de tranzit a gazelor naturale dinspre MareaCaspicã. Totodatã, între Azerbaidjan ºi SUA s-au dezvoltatîn timp relaþii economice strânse. SUA sunt al doilea inves-titor (9% din totalul investiþiilor) ºi al patrulea partenercomercial al Azerbaidjanului în 2010, cu o pondere de 7%(News.Az, 2011e; EU Commission, 2011d). Unele dintrecele mai mari companii petroliere din SUA (Exxon Mobil,Conoco Philips sau Chevron) sunt implicate în proiecte ener-getice de proporþii în Azerbaidjan. Adeseori, Azerbaidjanula apelat la lobby-ul companiilor petroliere americane pentrua promova agenda sa naþionalã la Washington.

Cooperarea bilateralã în domeniul securitãþii a sporitconsiderabil dupã atentatele de la 11 septembrie 2001.Azerbaidjanul a deschis spaþiul sãu aerian pentru forþelearmate ale SUA ºi a pus la dispoziþie infrastructura terestrã pentru realimentarea avioanelor cu destinaþia Afganistan.Baku a desfãºurat un contingent de pacificatori în Afga-nistan, care numãrã 80 de militari. Azerbaidjanul a oferitsuport SUA în cadrul operaþiunii militare din Irak, contri-buind la forþa de stabilizare cu 150 de militari. De asemenea,

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93 Interviu cu un expert, Baku, iunie 2011.

cã Azerbaidjanul este singurul stat din Parteneriatul Esticcare se bucurã de o balanþã comercialã pozitivã solidã cu UE.Principalul export al Azerbaidjanului sunt hidrocarburile.Statele membre UE se numãrã printre cei mai mari investi-tori în Azerbaidjan, cu Marea Britanie situându-se detaºatpe primul loc în 2010 (52% din totalul investiþiilor reali-zate), urmatã de Republica Cehã ºi Franþa (News.Az, 2011e).Pentru perioada 2007-2010 UE a alocat €92 milioane, iarpentru perspectiva financiarã 2011-2013 au fost repartizate€122,5 milioane (EEAS 2011). UE ºi integrarea europeanãsunt relativ populare la nivelul societãþii. Ultimul barometrude opinie aratã cã 32,2% se pronunþã pentru integrareaeuropeanã, în creºtere de la 27,7% în 2006. Totodatã,statele membre UE combinat reprezintã prima opþiune înpreferinþele azerilor (11%) care ar fi dispuºi sã plece lamuncã în altã þarã (Puls-R/Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2010).

În ciuda dinamicii comerciale pozitive, preponderent însectorul energetic, relaþiile politice ale Azerbaidjanului cuUE nu au un succes similar. Azerbaidjanul este un actorfinanciar independent. Experþii au estimat cã în 2009veniturile zilnice ale Azerbaidjanului din vânzãrile de petrolau oscilat între $40 ºi $60 milioane (Bayramov, 2009, 7).Azerbaidjanul însuºi dezvoltã un profil de stat donator,oferind în 2011 $1 milion Japoniei lovite de un cutremurdevastator.97 În aceste condiþii, „un milion în plus sau unmilion în minus din partea UE nu mai conteazã“98, remar-cã un analist local. „Noi nu avem aceeaºi motivaþie de a nereforma precum Georgia sau Moldova“99, explicã alt expert.Siguranþa oferitã de veniturile uriaºe i-a transformat pe liderii azeri în interlocuitori extrem de dificili pentru UE.100

Reducerea asimetriei în relaþiile bilaterale este confirmatãla Baku. „Cooperarea noastrã a trecut prin transformãrimajore, de la accentul iniþial pus pe ajutor spre cooperarea

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menþinerea secþiunii 907 din Freedom Support Act;94 ºi înal treilea rând, promovarea agendei democratice în Azerbai-djan95. Administraþia prezidenþialã a devenit extrasensibilãla presiunile de democratizare din partea SUA dupã valul derevolte populare din lumea arabã.96 Votul SUA împotrivarezoluþiei Adunãrii Generale a ONU în 2008 cu privire la„situaþia pe teritoriul ocupat al Azerbaidjanului“, postulvacant de ambasador al SUA la Baku timp de un an ºi ne-invitarea preºedintelui Azerbaidjanului la summit-ul privindSecuritatea Nuclearã de la Washington, în 2010, la care auparticipat ºefi de stat din Armenia ºi Georgia, sunt câtevaepisoade în plus care au contribuit la distanþarea Azerbai-djanului de SUA.

În consecinþã, Baku a suspendat exerciþiile militarecomune cu SUA în 2009, 2010 ºi 2011 ºi a virat situaþio-nal în plan extern spre Rusia. Administraþia prezidenþialã l-a detaºat pe ministrul Apãrãrii al SUA la Baku pentru arelansa relaþia bilateralã. A urmat vizita Secretarului de Statla Baku în 2010 ºi a ministrului de Externe azer la Washing-ton în 2011. Cu toate cã dialogul la nivel guvernamentals-a intensificat în 2010 ºi 2011, poziþia pãrþilor în ceea cepriveºte dosarele care îi divizeazã a rãmas aproape neschim-batã. Un nou apel lansat la Istanbul în 2011 de Secretarulde Stat al SUA, de a fi redeschisã graniþa turco-armeanã,a provocat o reacþie previzibilã la Baku (News.Az, 2011),care menþine pãrþile într-un cerc vicios.

3.2.4. UE

Începând cu a doua jumãtate a deceniului 2001-2010,comerþul Azerbaidjanului cu UE cunoaºte o traiectorieascendentã. Astfel, în 2010, UE este de departe principalulpartener comercial al Azerbaidjanului cu o pondere de46,9% în 2010 (EU Commission, 2011d). Trebuie observat

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97 Interviu cu un oficial, Baku, iunie 2011.98 Interviu cu un expert, Baku, iunie 2011.99 Interviu cu un expert, Baku, iunie 2011.100 Interviu cu un diplomat.

94 Interviu cu un oficial, Baku, iunie 2011.95 Interviu cu un expert, Baku, iunie 2011.96 Interviu cu un reprezentant al mass media, Baku, iunie 2011.

a Comerþului (OMC). În 2006, UE a semnat cu Azerbaidjanun memorandum cu privire la parteneriatul în sectorul ener-getic, iar în 2011 preºedintele Comisiei Europene ºi preºe-dintele Azerbaidjanului au semnat o declaraþie comunã cuprivire la coridorul sudic al gazului, a cãrui parte componentãîl reprezintã proiectul Nabucco. Accesul pe pieþele europenetrebuie sã sporeascã veniturile ºi importanþa Azerbai-djanului pentru securitatea energeticã a UE (Aliyev, 2010).Totodatã, Azerbaidjanul aspirã sã converteascã interacþiuneacu UE în domeniul energiei în sprijin pentru reintegrareaþãrii. Acest efort este suplimentat prin aderarea ocazionalãla declaraþiile UE în domeniul politicii externe ºi de secu-ritate la care a fost invitat sã se alinieze ºi Azerbaidjanul.În 2010, guvernul de la Baku s-a alãturat la 18 din 44 dedeclaraþii (EU Commission, 2011f). Azerbaidjanul nu per-cepe UE ca putere majorã în regiune, deoarece îi lipseºtecomponenta militarã. Rãzboiul ruso-georgian a fost exem-plificativ pentru Baku.103 Prin urmare, conducerea politicãnu aºteaptã ca UE sã joace un rol important în negocierilepe marginea conflictului din Nagorno-Karabah pe termenmediu ºi scurt. În acelaºi timp, diplomaþia azerã cultivãrelaþii apropiate cu statele membre UE, printre care actualisau potenþiali importatori de gaze din Azerbaidjan, pentrua-ºi susþine în interiorul UE poziþia în conflictul dinNagorno-Karabah.

3.2.5. Iran

Iranul, pe teritoriul cãruia trãiesc circa 16 milioane deetnici azeri, rãmâne un vecin incomod pentru Azerbaidjan.Deºi între cele douã þãri existã puternice legãturi istorice,culturale ºi religioase, la nivelul percepþiei publice dinAzerbaidjan existã neîncredere ºi suspiciune faþã de Iran.Într-un sondaj de opinie publicã, 10% din respondenþii dinAzerbaidjan considerã Iranul un stat inamic, ºi doar 8,8%au apreciat cã Iranul este un stat prieten (Puls-R/Friedrich

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mutual avantajoasã“, remarcã ministrul azer de Externe(News.Az, 2011j). Prin urmare, Azerbaidjanul promoveazãactiv egalitatea în relaþiile sale cu UE. Eschivarea de lacondiþionalitatea UE face parte din acest efort. De pildã,Azerbaidjanul respinge ceea ce considerã o abordare unidi-mensionalã a problematicii drepturilor omului promovatãde UE. Drepturile omului, dincolo de libertãþile politice ºicivile, includ aspecte economice ºi sociale, domenii în careBaku anunþã progrese.101 În acelaºi timp, Baku dezvoltãparteneriate bilaterale privilegiate cu statele membre UEpentru a dilua critica instituþiilor comunitare la adresa sa.Atunci când aceasta nu poate fi evitatã, precum în cazulreprimãrii protestelor opoziþiei în primãvara anului 2011,autoritãþile îºi exprimã nemulþumirea faþã de poziþia luatãde UE (Azernews, 2011). Alternativ, Baku invocã abordareaselectivã a UE faþã de respectarea drepturilor omului, refe-rindu-se mai ales la dezinteresul instituþiilor europene pen-tru drepturile PSI din Nagorno-Karabah (News.Az, 2011k).Azerbaidjanul demonstreazã un comportament obstrucþio-nist în domeniile de interes pentru cetãþenii sãi, cum ar firegimul facilitat de vize cu UE. Autoritãþile afirmã cãproblema este în curtea UE, Comisia neavând mandatul dea începe negocierile.102 Experþii însã deplâng lipsa voinþeipolitice la Baku. Executivul se opune semnãrii acordurilorde readmisie necesare încheierii unui acord de facilitare avizelor cu UE (Trend, 2011c). În schimb, în 2010, Azerbai-djanul a înãsprit regimul de vize pentru cetãþenii strãini,inclusiv UE.

În esenþã, aceste exemple reflectã poziþia guvernului dela Baku cu privire la formula de integrare europeanã preferatã,care se reduce la cooperarea economicã. Se pare cã, la capi-tolul cooperare economicã cu UE, Azerbaidjanul pune accentpe sectorul energetic, din moment ce perspectiva ZCLACrãmâne irealizabilã fãrã aderarea la Organizaþia Mondialã

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103 Interviu cu un expert, Baku, iunie 2011.101 Interviu cu un oficial, Baku, iunie 2011.102 Interviu cu un oficial, Baku, iunie 2011.

împãrþirea pe linia medianã în sectoare naþionale, Teheranulinsistã ca Marea Caspicã sã fie divizatã în pãrþi egale întrestatele riverane. Prin urmare, în zona disputatã de cele douãstate, Azerbaidjanul nu poate efectua lucrãri de prospecþiuneºi exploatare. Într-un incident din 2001, garda iranianã aforþat un vas de cercetare al BP sã se retragã din zona dispu-tatã. În 2005, au existat informaþii cu privire la violarea spa-þiului aerian de cãtre forþele iraniene. Un alt incident gravpe frontiera terestrã a avut loc în iulie 2011. Un schimb defocuri între grãnicerii iranieni ºi cei azeri, în care un militarazer a fost ucis, redã cât se poate de bine atmosfera încãr-catã în relaþiile bilaterale (News.Az, 2011l).

Autoritãþile de la Baku sunt preocupate de activitateadesfãºuratã de Iran pe teritoriul Azerbaidjanului. În 2007,la Baku, 15 cetãþeni azeri au fost reþinuþi ºi gãsiþi vinovaþide o instanþã judecãtoreascã azerã de trãdare în favoareaIranului. La Baku, tentativele Iranului de a exporta o ver-siune mai conservatoare a Islamului decât cea practicatã înAzerbaidjan trezesc neliniºte.104 În 2011, a fost arestat lide-rul Partidului Islamic din Azerbaidjan, pentru implicarea saîn organizarea protestelor în faþa Ministerului Educaþieiîmpotriva interzicerii purtãrii hijab-ului în ºcolile din Azer-baidjan (Abbasov, 2011). Partidul considerat pro-iranian ºisuspectat cã este finanþat de Teheran a fost scos în afara legiiîn Azerbaidjan. Arestarea liderului acestuia a fost precedatãde declaraþiile critice ale clericilor ºi politicienilor din Irancu privire la decizia guvernului azer de a interzice purtareahijab-ului în ºcoli. Oficiali de rang înalt de la Teheran auavertizat autoritãþile de la Baku cu privire la iminenþa uneirevolte populare dacã dreptul la libertate religioasã va fiîngrãdit în Azerbaidjan. Conducerea Azerbaidjanului esteîngrijoratã de tentativele de a proiecta „puterea blândã“ aIranului în Azerbaidjan, ameninþând astfel bazele actualuluiregim politic. Începând din februarie 2010, Iranul a liberali-zat unilateral regimul de vize pentru azeri, cu excepþia unei

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Ebert Stiftung, 2010). Schimburile comerciale bilateralesunt de o intensitate scãzutã. Iranul este al 17-lea partenercomercial al Azerbaidjanului, cu o pondere de 0,7 în 2010(EU Commission, 2011d). La nivel politic are loc un dialoginsuficient instituþionalizat, care alterneazã între elementede conflict ºi cooperare. Vizita preºedintelui parlamentuluiiranian la Baku în iunie 2011 are puþine ºanse de a schim-ba radical natura raporturilor între cele douã state. Printrepuþinele proiecte bilaterale de cooperare existente în prezentse numãrã schimburile sezoniere de energie electricã.Potrivit acordurilor bilaterale, Azerbaidjanul exportã energieelectricã vara, iar Iranul exportã o cantitate similarã toamnaºi iarna. De asemenea, Iranul ºi Azerbaidjanul realizeazãexporturi reciproce de gaze. Astfel, Iranul joacã un rol im-portant în asigurarea securitãþii energetice a Nahicevanului.Iranul livreazã anual enclavei izolate de Armenia volumulde gaze necesar. În schimb, Azerbaidjanul exportã gaze înregiunile de nord ale Iranului. În 2009 ºi 2011 Azerbai-djanul a mãrit livrãrile de gaze spre Iran (Nichol, 2011, 16).Aparent, prin aceastã majorare, Baku doreºte sã neutralizezepotenþialul efect negativ al relaþiilor politice disfuncþionaleasupra Nahicevanului.

Relaþiile bilaterale sunt împovãrate de un numãr de do-sare bilaterale problematice, care afecteazã substanþial inter-acþiunea între vecini. Iranul ocupã ceea ce Azerbaidjanulconsiderã o poziþie proarmeanã. Proiectele în domeniulenergetic sunt percepute negativ deoarece slãbesc presiuneaexercitatã de Azerbaidjan ºi Turcia asupra Armeniei prinînchiderea graniþelor ºi excluderea Armeniei din proiecteleregionale de infrastructurã. Baku a semnalat dezaprobareacooperãrii armeano-iraniene în dialogul direct cu Teheranul(News.Am 2011c). Aparent Iranul a intensificat cooperareacu Armenia, atunci când Azerbaidjanul s-a apropiat preamult, pentru Teheran, de Occident. De asemenea, chestiu-nea frontierei e un alt dosar iritant în raporturile bilaterale.Azerbaidjanul ºi Iranul nu au ajuns la un consens cu privirela delimitarea graniþei în Marea Caspicã. Dezavantajat de

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104 Interviu cu un expert, Baku, iunie 2011.

cursului de politicã externã a fost adaptat la noua realitatemacroregionalã.

3.3.1. SUA

Deºi relaþiile bilaterale au fost depersonalizate în man-datul preºedintelui Obama, SUA joacã în continuare un rolimportant în strategia de politicã externã a Georgiei. Tânãraelitã politicã de la Tbilisi, educatã în Occident, se inspirã pelarg în acþiunile ºi politicile publice din modelul american.Cooperarea intensificatã cu SUA se bucurã de sprijinul popu-lar. În sondajele de opinie din 2011, 58% din cetãþeni con-siderã SUA cel mai important partener politic ºi economical Georgiei, în scãdere uºoarã (de la 63%) în 2008 (Inter-national Republican Institute, 2008b, 2011). Protesteleorganizate de unii reprezentanþi ai opoziþiei în faþa amba-sadei de la Tbilisi în 2011 nu s-au bucurat de o prezenþãmasivã ºi au fost denunþate de cealaltã parte a opoziþieigeorgiene.

Conducerea Georgiei a folosit relaþia cu SUA dupã rãzbo-iul din 2008 pentru a neutraliza strategia de marginalizarea regimului politic de la Tbilisi promovatã de Rusia pe planinternaþional. Astfel, în 2009 Georgia a semnat un docu-ment cu privire la parteneriatul strategic cu SUA. Cu toatecã documentul nu oferã garanþii de securitate similare celordin tratatul de securitate nipono-american, acesta a recon-firmat sprijinul politic al SUA. Acest sprijin politic s-areflectat ulterior în rezoluþia Senatului cu privire la violareaintegritãþii teritoriale ºi suveranitãþii Georgiei de cãtre Rusia(US Senate, 2011). În 2009 ºi 2010, vicepreºedintele Sta-telor Unite ºi respectiv Secretarul de Stat au vizitat Tbilisi.În 2010 a fost reluat dialogul direct între cei doi ºefi de stat.Pe lângã dezizolarea pe plan extern, Tbilisi a apelat la in-fluenþa SUA pentru a descuraja recunoaºterea Abhaziei ºi aOsetiei de Sud de cãtre comunitatea internaþionalã.106 Posi-bilele efecte economice sau politice negative asupra relaþiilor

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singure categorii, jurnaliºtii. De atunci, Teheranul insistã caBaku sã adopte mãsuri similare faþã de cetãþenii iranieni.Teheranul finanþeazã postul iranian TV Sahar, care emite înazerã ºi acoperã partea de sud a Azerbaidjanului, în caretrãieºte compact minoritatea talîºã, cultural ºi lingvisticapropiatã de Iran. Activitatea postului este echivalatã laBaku cu subminarea monopolului guvernului în spaþiulinformaþional. Pe lângã acuzaþii la adresa autoritãþilor cen-trale pentru cooperarea cu SUA ºi Israelul, postul invitã curegularitate reprezentanþi ai societãþii civile pentru a discu-ta despre derapajele democratice din Azerbaidjan.105 Astfelde dezbateri au devenit mai frecvente odatã cu declanºareavalului revoluþionar în Orientul Mijlociu. Toate acestea auîntãrit la Baku percepþia de ameninþare din partea Iranului,motivând o distanþare pronunþatã a Azerbaidjanului devecinul din sud. În acelaºi timp, amplificarea conflictului lavârful conducerii în Iran este vãzutã ca un potenþial factordestabilizator în regiune, ceea ce întreþine starea de anxietatela Baku.

3.3. Georgia: spre Occident

Cu toate cã rãmâne un obiectiv imposibil de realizat într-un viitor previzibil, reintegrarea þãrii rãmâne preocu-parea majorã a autoritãþilor de la Tbilisi. Pe termen scurtºi mediu însã, Georgia îºi propune sã atingã pe plan externurmãtoarele: descurajarea recunoaºterii independenþei Ab-haziei ºi Osetiei de Sud de cãtre comunitatea internaþionalã,asigurarea securitãþii de-a lungul frontierei administrative denord, atragerea investiþiilor strãine ºi asistenþei financiaredin partea donatorilor externi necesare dezvoltãrii interneintensive, dezvoltarea relaþiilor cât de posibil apropiate cuNATO ºi UE, care ar facilita într-un context favorabil inte-grarea deplinã în aceste instituþii. Aºadar, politica externãa Georgiei este puternic orientatã spre Occident. Dupãrãzboiul din 2008, caracterul pronunþat prooccidental al

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105 Interviu cu un expert, Baku, iunie 2011. 106 Interviu cu un expert, Tbilisi, mai 2011.

modernizare la trei vase de patrulare ale gãrzii de coastãgeorgiene ºi construcþia unui atelier pentru reparaþii navale(GHN News Agency, 2011).

Deºi guvernul SUA s-a ferit sã livreze armament, politicade resetare a relaþiilor cu Rusia a produs efecte pozitiveasupra securitãþii naþionale a Georgiei. Detensionarearelaþiilor ruso-americane garanteazã într-o oarecare mãsurãsecuritatea militarã a Georgiei, în sensul diminuãrii ºanselorunui atac convenþional masiv din partea Rusiei.107 SUAau descurajat activ Rusia sã iniþieze acþiuni agresive deschiseîmpotriva Georgiei. Discuþiile de la Moscova, din 2009,între preºedinþii Rusiei ºi SUA în condiþiile escaladãrii uºoarea situaþiei în zonele de conflict sunt exemplificative.108 Geor-gia percepe resetul ruso-american ca o evoluþie conjucturalã,iar conflictul cu Rusia o constantã a politicii externe pentruun viitor previzibil. „Cât de mult va dura resetul ruso-ame-rican?“, întreabã un analist de la Tbilisi, evaluând alterna-tivele de a garanta securitatea militarã a Georgiei. „Rãzboiulrece nu s-a încheiat pentru Georgia“109, îl completeazã unoficial. Aºadar, preocuparea majorã la Tbilisi o reprezintãasigurarea securitãþii naþionale în contextul epuizãrii resetu-lui ruso-american ºi perseverenþei Kremlinului de a modificaorientarea politicii externe a Georgiei, inclusiv prin schim-barea regimului politic.110

SUA sunt un partener economic ºi donator extern esen-þial pentru Georgia. SUA sunt al cincilea partener comercialal Georgiei cu o pondere de 7,2% în 2010 (EU Commission,2011c). Totodatã, SUA sunt principalul investitor în Georgiacu $135,8 milioane în 2010. Investiþiile strãine în Georgiaau scãzut dramatic de la $2 miliarde în 2007 la $814 mi-lioane în 2010 (Civil.Ge 2011e). În acelaºi timp, creºtereaeconomicã a Georgiei din ultimii ani s-a bazat pe atragereamasivã a investitorilor strãini. Plasând Georgia în context

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bilaterale cu Washingtonul în cazul recunoaºterii celor douãregiuni separatiste au fost un motiv puternic pentru multestate din emisfera vesticã de a refuza oferta Moscovei.

Resimþind acut deficitul de securitate, Georgia a depuseforturi pentru a adânci cooperarea în domeniul militar cuSUA ºi NATO. În 2008, a fost creatã Comisia NATO-Geor-gia pentru a intensifica consultãrile politice ºi cooperareapracticã. Începând cu 2009, Georgia implementeazã progra-mul anual naþional care þinteºte reforme în sectorul de secu-ritate. Modelul programelor anuale este, de regulã, aplicatstatelor care au primit Planul de acþiune în vederea obþineriicalitãþii de membru al NATO (MAP), Georgia reprezentândastfel o excepþie. Georgia este parte a reþelei de distibuþienord spre Afganistan, a cãrei importanþã a crescut în contex-tul vulnerabilitãþii tot mai mari a tranzitului prin Pakistanºi al creºterii numãrului trupelor americane în Afganistan.Portul Poti serveºte ca punct de legãturã cu Azerbaidjanul,de unde cargourile continuã tranzitul peste Marea Caspicã.Guvernul de la Tbilisi a mãrit substanþial prezenþa militarãîn Afganistan. Cu 937 de militari desfãºuraþi în 2010,Georgia se numãrã printre cei mai mari contribuitori dintrestatele care nu fac parte din NATO la misiunile de stabili-zare în Afganistan. Autoritãþile de la Tbilisi pregãtesc întã-rirea contingentului din Afganistan cu alþi 600 de militari(Civil.Ge, 2011g). În schimb, Tbilisi a încercat sã obþinãcontracte de achiziþii de armament ºi echipamente, care sãrestabileascã capacitatea de apãrare serios afectatã derãzboiul din 2008. Administraþia americanã a evitat sã deacurs acestor solicitãri ºi a oferit în schimb mai multe pro-grame de pregãtire militarã ºi exerciþii comune (Charap ºiWelt, 2011, 56-57). Guvernul american a fãcut donaþiiocazionale de naturã militarã sau a investit în modernizareaechipamentelor aflate în dotarea forþelor armate georgiene.În 2011, au fost donate 40 de autovehicule uºor blindateHumvee contingentului militar georgian care se deplasaîn teatrul de operaþiuni din Afganistan (Civil.Ge, 2011h).De asemenea, guvernul american a finanþat lucrãrile de

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107 Interviu cu un expert, Tbilisi, iunie 2011.108 Interviu cu un expert, Tbilisi, iunie 2011.109 Interviu cu un oficial, Tbilisi, mai 2011.110 Interciu cu un expert, Tbilisi, iunie 2011.

a deschis negocierile cu privire la Acordul de Asociere, a sem-nat acordul de facilitare a vizelor ºi a aderat la piaþa euro-peanã comunã de aviaþie. Ajustarea prioritãþilor de politicãexternã se bucurã de sprijinul larg al opiniei publice. Potrivitsondajelor, 79% dintre georgieni se declarã pentru aderareaGeorgiei la UE (Eurasia Partnership Foundation, 2009b).Apropierea de UE este ghidatã de imperative de securitatenaþionalã ºi modernizare politicã ºi economicã ale Georgiei.

În calitate de parte care a mediat sistarea ostilitãþilor în2008, UE e garantul implementãrii planului Sarkozy-Med-vedev. Prin urmare, Tbilisi doreºte ca UE sã preseze multmai intens Rusia pentru ca aceasta sã respecte toate pre-vederile planului de pace din 2008. De multe ori, oficialiigeorgieni sunt critici la adresa UE din cauza a ceea ce eiconsiderã timiditate în relaþiile cu Rusia.113 În acelaºi timp,autoritãþile sunt conºtiente de faptul cã UE neutralizeazãîntr-o anumitã mãsurã ameninþarea militarã a Rusiei114,iar Georgia trebuie sã evite sã fie perceputã de UE drepto povarã în relaþiile sale cu Rusia. În 2008, UE a desfãºurato misiune civilã de monitorizare (EUMM), compusã din340 de observatori, care reduce semnificativ ºansele eruperiiunui nou conflict. Georgia gãseºte prezenþa observatorilorUE esenþialã pentru monitorizarea imparþialã a situaþiei pefrontiera adminstrativã cu Abhazia ºi Osetia de Sud ºi con-tracararea acuzaþiilor lipsite de probe ale Rusiei cu privirela fortificarea prezenþei militare georgiene în vecinãtateazonelor de conflict. Autoritãþile de la Tbilisi au semnat în2009 un memorandum cu EUMM, valabil pe trei luni, cuopþiunea prelungirii tacite dacã una din pãrþi nu îºi exprimãdezacordul, care impune restricþii cu privire la miºcarea tru-pelor în vecinãtatea Abhaziei ºi Osetiei de Sud. Georgia, deasemenea, s-a obligat sã informeze EUMM despre redislo-carea trupelor pe teritoriul sãu. UE este parte a procesuluide la Geneva care reuneºte Georgia, Rusia, SUA, OSCE,

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regional, un expert local explicã: „Noi nu avem o diasporãputernicã, noi nu dispunem de petrol ºi gaze naturale, prinurmare trebuie sã atragem investiþii“111. Aºadar, investiþiileamericane sunt importante pentru reluarea ºi menþinerearitmului pozitiv de creºtere economicã a Georgiei. Totodatã,SUA sunt un donator major în Georgia. În perioada 2006-2011, guvernul SUA a finanþat prin intermediul CorporaþieiProvocãrile Mileniului numeroase proiecte de infrastructurãºi dezvoltare în Georgia, cifrate la aproape $400 milioane.Programul a avut un impact decisiv pentru integrarea ºimodernizarea infrastructurii din regiunile populate de mino-ritatea armeanã ºi azerã din Georgia. În prezent se discutãposibilitatea finanþãrii unui nou program pentru Georgia încadrul aceleiaºi iniþiative. Dupã rãzboiul ruso-georgian,SUA au contribuit cu $1 miliard la eforturile de recon-strucþie a Georgiei, sprijinul PSI ºi dezvoltarea economicã.Contribuþia financiarã a SUA la efortul donatorilor externia fost crucialã pentru depãºirea cu succes de cãtre Georgiaa dublului ºoc cauzat de rãzboi ºi criza financiarã globalã.

3.3.2. UE

UE, forþatã de evenimentele din Georgia din 2008, ºi-aasumat un rol semnificativ în asigurarea securitãþii ºi sta-bilitãþii macroeconomice a þãrii. Rãzboiul ruso-georgian ainversat prioritãþile conducerii politice georgiene. Aderareaacceleratã la NATO fiind imposibilã, Tbilisi a pus mai multaccent pe integrarea europeanã ºi cooperarea în domeniulsecuritãþii cu UE. În 2010 Georgia s-a alãturat la 28 dintrecele 44 de declaraþii UE în domeniul politicii externe ºi desecuritate la care a fost invitatã sã se alinieze (EU Commis-sion, 2011g). În cadrul platformei multilaterale a Partene-riatului Estic „democraþie, guvernare ºi stabilitate“, Georgiaa exprimat interesul pentru cooperarea în domeniul politiciicomune de securitate ºi apãrare a UE.112 În 2010, Georgia

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113 Interviu cu un oficial, Tbilisi, mai 2011.114 Interviu cu un expert, Tbilisi, iunie 2011.

111 Interviu cu un expert, Tbilisi, iunie 2011.112 Interviu cu un oficial, Tbilisi, iunie 2011.

Georgiei în 2010, cu $73,4 ºi, respectiv, $59 milioane(Civil.Ge, 2011e). UE este o piaþã atractivã pentru forþa demuncã din Georgia. Potrivit barometrului de opinie publicã,30% dintre georgieni ar alege UE ca destinaþie de muncã înafara þãrii (Eurasia Partnership Foundation, 2009b). Statelemembre UE combinate sunt pe locul doi ca sursã de remi-tenþe în Georgia în prima jumãtate a anului 2011. Grecia,Italia, Spania ºi Germania s-au plasat pe urmãtoarele patrulocuri dupã Rusia (Civil.Ge, 2011i). În perioada postconflict(2008-2011), UE a alocat Georgiei €483,5 milioane, alte€131,27 milioane au fost acordate de state membre UE(Fean, 2009, 9). Pentru perspectiva bugetarã 2011-2013,UE are prevãzute, pentru asistenþa financiarã a Georgiei,€180,3 milioane. Georgia mai poate atrage fonduri supli-mentare din programe regionale ºi transfrontaliere (EU Com-mission, 2011g).

O fazã crucialã pentru integrarea europeanã a Georgiei oreprezintã instituirea ZCLAC. UE a decis în 2008 creareaZCLAC cu Georgia ºi a expediat la adresa guvernului de laTbilisi o serie de precondiþii pentru începerea negocierilor.Dezbaterea în legãturã cu avantajele ºi dezavantajele, cos-turile ºi beneficiile ZCLAC cu UE este extrem de intensã încercurile guvernamentale ºi academice. Avocaþii ideii afirmãcã ZCLAC este singura cale de apropiere realã de UE, pre-luare a standardelor europene ºi atragere a investitorilorstrãini pe termen lung. „Chiar dacã procesul de implemen-tare e foarte costisitor, trebuie sã-l plãtim“116, argumenteazãun experimentat observator local. Oponenþii, care majoritarreprezintã aripa ultraliberalã a elitei opineazã cã ZCLAC,prin introducerea instituþiilor ºi reglementãrilor stufoase îndiferite domenii economice, va stimula fenomenul corupþieiºi va îndepãrta investitorii de care Georgia are nevoie acum.În plus se argumenteazã cã introducerea rapidã a standarde-lor europene va elimina de pe piaþã producãtorii autohtoni,care nu vor fi capabili sã suporte costurile trecerii la standarde

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ONU, Abhazia ºi Osetia de Sud. Consultãrile au loc încadrul a douã grupe de lucru: securitate ºi refugiaþi. În 2009pãrþile au convenit asupra stabilirii „firului roºu“ ºi creãriimecanismului de prevenire ºi gestionare a incidentelor,ceea ce presupune întâlniri sãptãmânale între observatori ºiofiþeri responsabili de securitate în zona de conflict.

UE a fost ºi rãmâne ferm decisã în favoarea integritãþiiteritoriale a Georgiei. Acest fapt a fost confirmat prin des-curajarea altor state de a recunoaºte cele douã entitãþi sepa-ratiste. Avertizarea subtilã adresatã autoritãþilor de la Minskîn 2009 cu privire la efectele negative ale recunoaºterii Ab-haziei ºi Osetiei asupra cooperãrii cu UE este reprezentativ.În acelaºi timp, politica unor state membre UE de comer-cializare a armamentului a stârrnit îngrijorare la Tbilisi cuprivire la securitatea militarã naþionalã ºi regionalã. În 2011Franþa a semnat contractul de vânzare cãtre Rusia a douãpurtãtoare de elicoptere Mistral. Georgia este îngrijoratã cãaceastã achiziþie va întãri prezenþa militarã rusã la MareaNeagrã. În august 2008, Rusia a apelat la nave de rãzboi alo-cate operaþiunii maritime de menþinere a securitãþii regio-nale Black Sea Harmony la care participã þãrile riverane.115

Dat fiind cã invadarea Georgiei în 2008 a avut loc parþialpe cale maritimã, iar Rusia se pare cã s-a confruntat cu de-ficitul navelor operaþionale, Tbilisi nu exclude posibilitateaca achiziþiile sã urmãreascã sporirea capacitãþii de proiecþiea forþei militare într-un conflict la Marea Neagrã. Aºa cuma explicat un ofiþer rus de rang înalt, referindu-se la ostilitã-þile din august 2008 „ceea ce ne-a luat sã facem în 26 de ore,aceastã navã [Mistral] face în 40 de minute“ (Kommersant,2009).

În plan economic, UE ºi statele membre sunt activ impli-cate în modernizarea multidimensionalã a Georgiei. UE esteprimul partener comercial al Georgiei, cu o pondere de31,7% în 2010 (EU Commission, 2011c). Olanda ºi MareaBritanie s-au plasat pe locul trei ºi patru printre investitorii

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116 Interviu cu un expert, Tbilisi, mai 2011.115 Interviu cu un fost oficial de rang înalt, Bucureºti, aprilie 2011.

În 2005 ºi 2008, compania turcã TAV a obþinut dreptul degestionare a aeroportului din Batumi timp de 20 de ani ºia celui din Tbilisi pe o perioadã de 15 ani. Între Turcia ºiGeorgia existã curse regulate aeriene ºi de autocar ºi sepreconizeazã finalizarea conexiunii pe calea feratã. Turcia ºiGeorgia sunt conectate prin reþelele de transport ale gazelor,petrolului ºi electricitãþii, fapt care contribuie la interdepen-denþa economicã. În 2011, Georgia a semnat un acord cuTurcia pentru construcþia a trei hidrocentrale în Samþhe-Javaheti ºi a unei linii de transmisie electricã Batumi-Arakli(News.Az, 2011m). Georgia a debutat în calitate de expor-tator de energie electricã pe piaþa europeanã, livrãrile fiindrealizate prin Turcia. Astfel, foarte rapid, Turcia s-a transfor-mat într-o punte a Georgiei spre Europa.

Între cele douã þãri are loc o interacþiune intensã la nivelumanitar. Experþii estimeazã cã aproximativ 100.000 degeorgieni lucreazã în Turcia.121 În 2009, în jur de 350.000de turci au vizitat Georgia (Chkhikvadze, 2010). Numãrulturiºtilor creºte de la an an. Doar în primele patru luni din2011 aproape 268.000 de turci au fãcut deplasãri în Georgia(News.Am, 2011a). Dinamizarea raporturilor bilaterale atransformat Turcia într-unul dintre principalii partenerieconomici ai Georgiei. Volumul comercial între Turcia ºiGeorgia a crescut cu 230% în ultimii cinci ani (Fisher Onar,2009). Prin urmare, Turcia este al doilea partener comercialal Georgiei, cu o pondere de 15,6% în 2010 (EU Com-mission, 2011c). În 2010, Turcia a fost al doilea investitorstrãin în Georgia, cu $91,8 milioane (Civil.Ge, 2011e).Totodatã, Turcia s-a clasat în prima jumãtate a anului 2011pe locul 6 printre þãrile de origine a remitenþelor în Georgia(Civil.Ge, 2011i). Pânã la declanºarea rãzboiului în 2008,Tbilisi ºi Ankara au extins cooperarea în domeniul militarîn baza acordului semnat în 1997. Ambiþia Georgiei de adeveni stat membru NATO a apropiat forþele armate turceºi georgiene. Turcia a oferit asistenþã tehnicã ºi a pregãtit

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europene.117 Aceastã dezbatere aprinsã a influenþat modulîn care Georgia a implementat reformele necesare deschi-derii negocierilor, fapt reflectat în ultimul raport de evaluareal Georgiei realizat de UE (EU Commission, 2011g). În con-secinþã, opinia este divizatã la Tbilisi. În timp ce oficialiiinsistã asupra faptului cã Georgia s-a conformat cerinþeloriniþiale ale UE ºi este gata sã înceapã negocierile118, experþiispun cã multe din mãsurile luate au fost întârziate ºi adop-tate selectiv119. Se pare cã, cel puþin pe termen scurt,Georgia doreºte începerea negocierilor cu privire la ZCLACpentru a le trimite un semnal pozitiv investitorilor strãini120

ºi a inversa tendinþa descendentã din ultimii ani. La rândulsãu, UE este preocupatã de faptul cã momentul începeriinegocierilor va fi instrumentalizat de Tbilisi pentru a atrageinvestiþii strãine, iar interesul pentru încheierea acorduluipropriu-zis va scãdea (Waal, 2011, 37).

3.3.3. Turcia

În ultimii cinci ani relaþiile Georgiei cu Turcia au cunos-cut o dezvoltare calitativã ºi cantitativã rapidã. Au loc viziteregulate la nivel de stat ºi consultãri guvernamentale bilate-rale. Relaþia dintre preºedintele Georgiei ºi primul-ministrual Turciei este sudatã printr-o serie de proiecte comuneimplementate pe parcursul mandatelor succesive. Turciaeste singurul vecin cu care Georgia are frontiera delimitatãºi demarcatã. În scopul facilitãrii comerþului ºi a vizitelorturistice, pãrþile au semnat acordul cu privire la comerþulliber, au liberalizat regimul de vize (se circulã pe baza cãrþiide identitate) ºi au deschis un modern punct comun defrontierã în Sarpi (Adjaria), prin care se desfãºoarã 90%din traficul rutier bilateral. Pãrþile vor demara în curândlucrãrile la un alt punct de frontierã comun — Cildir-Aktas.

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121 Interviu cu un expert, Tbilisi, mai 2011.

117 Interviu cu un expert, Tbilisi, iunie 2011.118 Interviu cu un oficial, Tbilisi, iunie 2011.119 Interviu cu un expert, Tbilisi, iunie 2011.120 Interviu cu un oficial, Tbilisi, iunie 2011.

Abhazia la 24 de ani de închisoare pentru contrabandã ºiactivitate economicã neautorizatã. La presiunile guvernuluiturc, sentinþa a fost comutatã, iar cetãþeanul turc a fost eli-berat. Prin urmare, guvernul turc nu a dat nici un semn cãar fi dispus sã renunþe la strategia de angajare a Abhaziei123,iar Georgia a realizat cã nu se poate opune efectiv procesu-lui. În 2011, Ankara ºi Tbilisi au purtat negocieri intense cuprivire la modalitãþile de interacþiune cu Abhazia, care sã nustârneascã animozitatea executivului georgian.124

Apropierea Georgiei de Turcia pe multiple planuri a co-incis cu distanþarea Turciei de UE. Cu toate cã relaþiile cuAnkara sunt considerate importante pentru realizarea obiec-tivelor de politicã externã, percepþia despre rolul ºi interese-le Turciei în regiune s-a modificat la Tbilisi. „Turcia nu maieste o putere regionalã care proiecteazã interesele Occiden-tului în Caucazul de Sud“125, împãrtãºeºte un oficial per-spectiva georgianã. „Turcia rãmâne un partener importantal Georgiei, dar motivele Ankarei nu sunt întotdeauna clarepentru Tbilisi“126, îl completeazã un expert local. Înstrãi-narea Turciei de Europa este privitã la Tbilisi prin prismapropriilor eforturi de apropiere de UE ºi impactul pe careaceastã tendinþã îl poate avea asupra Georgiei. Aºa cumremarcã un observator, „ameninþarea constantã de la nord ºiTurcia tot mai distantã de UE compun un mediu regional nutocmai favorabil integrãrii europene a Georgiei“127.

3.3.4. Iran

Pânã în 2006, Georgia nu a demonstrat un interes spe-cial pentru raporturile bilaterale aprofundate cu Iranul.Contactele ocazionale la nivel politic ºi schimburile comer-ciale nesemnificative pentru balanþa bilateralã caracterizau

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militari georgieni în vederea ajustãrii forþelor armate aleGeorgiei la standardele NATO ºi asigurãrii interoperabili-tãþii acestora în misiunile internaþionale. În 2006, asistenþamilitarã a Turciei pentru Georgia s-a cifrat la $1,8 milioane(Torbakov, 2008, 9). Deºi la o scarã mai redusã, cooperareamilitarã între cele douã þãri a continuat ºi dupã 2008.Factorul rusesc a contat în calculele politice de la Ankara.

Chestiunea care, însã, afecteazã relaþiile bilaterale o repre-zintã rolul Turciei în Abhazia. Turcia gãzduieºte o diasporãabhazã numeroasã, care încurajeazã guvernul spre dezvolta-rea relaþiilor mai apropiate cu Abhazia. Pe lângã lobby-uldiasporei, guvernul de la Ankara însuºi doreºte sã sporeascãinteracþiunea cu Abhazia. Raþionamentul este urmãtorul:dacã nu contrabalansãm economic ºi politic Moscova,Abhazia va fi absorbitã integral în timp de Rusia.122 Deºioficial legãtura maritimã între Abhazia ºi Turcia este închisã,între cele douã pãrþi au loc schimburi comerciale. Suhumideclarã cã Turcia este al doilea partener comercial al Abha-ziei dupã Rusia (Vindimian, 2010, 5). În 2009, un diplomatturc s-a deplasat la Suhumi pentru consultãri cu autoritãþileseparatiste, iar liderul Abhaziei a efectuat în 2011 o vizitãde patru zile în Turcia în cadrul cãreia s-a întâlnit cureprezentanþii diasporei ºi oameni de afaceri. Tbilisi acceptãparþial argumentele Turciei, însã nu vrea ca prevenireaabsorbþiei Abhaziei de cãtre Rusia sã fie realizatã cu preþula ceea ce Tbilisi percepe ca un proces gradual de legitimareinternaþionalã a regimului de la Suhumi, care ar putea ducela recunoaºterea independenþei Abhaziei. În consecinþã,Georgia a reþinut, între 1999 ºi 2006, peste 60 de nave carecirculau pe ruta Turcia-Abhazia ºi a blocat în 2009deschiderea reprezentanþei Benetton din Turcia la Suhumi(Vindimian, 2010, 5; Civil.Ge, 2009c). În 2009, într-un cazcare a tensionat relaþiile bilaterale, o instanþã judecãtoreascãde la Tbilisi a condamnat comandantul turc al unei navereþinute în apele teritoriale ale Georgiei care se îndrepta spre

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123 Interviu cu un expert, Berlin, noiembrie 2009.124 Interviu cu un oficial, Tbilisi, mai 2011.125 Interviu cu un oficial, Tbilisi, mai 2011.126 Interviu cu un expert, Tbilisi, mai 2011.127 Interviu cu un expert, iulie 2010.122 Interviu cu un expert, Berlin, noiembrie 2009.

Georgia a profitat de momentul prielnic relansând relaþiilecu Teheranul atunci când relaþiile ruso-iraniene s-au rãcit(Oxford Analytica, 2010), iar Iranul se simþea tot mai izolatpe plan internaþional. Ulterior, o delegaþie condusã de undiplomat iranian s-a deplasat la Tbilisi. În cadrul vizitei,Iranul a propus o serie de iniþiative de cooperare în dome-niul producerii ºi exportului de energie electricã (Lomsadze,2010). În 2010, Iranul a deschis un consulat la Batumi,iar în 2011 pãrþile au convenit asupra liberalizãrii regimuluide vize ºi lansãrii curselor directe Teheran-Tbilisi ºi Teheran-Batumi. Astfel, Georgia a instrumentalizat cooperarea cuIranul pentru a stimula industria turisticã autohtonã. Deºicomerþul bilateral s-a revitalizat uºor, Iranul continuã sã fieun partener comercial insignifiant pentru Georgia. Pondereaschimburilor comerciale cu Iranul în comerþul Georgiei afost doar de 0,6% în 2010 (EU Commission, 2011c).

Iranul s-a dovedit mult mai entuziast ºi mai proactivdecât Georgia, în timp ce executivul georgian a acþionat mairezervat coordonându-ºi acþiunile cu SUA.129 Aºadar, ceea ceTbilisi a conceput drept o cooperare pragmaticã, care sã nupunã în pericol relaþia cu Occidentul, Iranul a interpretatdrept o ºansã de a-ºi proiecta influenþa în regiune ºi a atrageGeorgia într-o relaþie mult mai intensificatã. Prin urmare, întimp ce Teheranul cãuta modalitãþi de a profita la maximumde aceastã deschidere, Georgia încerca sã pãstreze o anumitãdistanþã.130

3.3.5. Rusia

Spre deosebire de alþi actori regionali, Rusia e perceputãla Tbilisi în calitate de obstacol major în calea realizãriiobiectivelor strategice naþionale. În sondajele de opinie,83% dintre georgieni identificã Rusia drept ameninþareanumãrul unu la adresa securitãþii Georgiei (InternationalRepublican Institute, 2011). Existã o serie de factori care

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relaþiile între Tbilisi ºi Teheran. Politic ºi economic, Georgiaprivea intens dincolo de Marea Neagrã. Faptul cã þãrile nuau o frontierã comunã a contribuit la detaºarea lor. Însã, în2006, în contextul deteriorãrii rapide a relaþiilor ruso-geor-giene, Georgia a apelat în regim de urgenþã la importurile degaze din Iran. La finele anului 2006, guvernul de la Tbilisipreconiza cã va reduce cu 80% importurile de gaze dinRusia. Incertitudinea cu privire la data la care Azerbaidjanulva putea începe din punct de vedere tehnic livrarea gazelorde pe zãcãmântul Shah Deniz a determinat Georgia sãprospecteze din nou posibilitatea importurilor de cantitãþimici de gaze din Iran. Dar cursul de politicã externã a Geor-giei nu lasã foarte mult spaþiu pentru dezvoltarea relaþiilorde vecinãtate apropiate cu Iranul. Georgia a descoperitfoarte rapid limita cooperãrii în domeniul energetic cuIranul, deoarece guvernul SUA s-a exprimat împotriva inter-acþiunii pe termen lung în sectorul energetic între Georgia ºiIran (Civil.Ge, 2006).

În 2008, rãzboiul cu Rusia a impulsionat indirect relaþiileîntre Teheran ºi Tbilisi. Ameninþarea militarã constantã dinpartea Rusiei, depersonalizarea relaþiilor cu SUA ºi crizaeconomicã au contribuit la echilibrarea politicii externegeorgiene. Guvernul a imprimat politicii externe o dimen-siune regionalã inclusivã. Tbilisi a realizat cã în mediul desecuritate postconflict este vital ca Georgia sã dezvolte oagendã pozitivã cu absolut toate puterile regionale. Aºadar,fãrã a-ºi schimba radical orientarea strategicã, Georgia nuexclude din start nicio alternativã de cooperare.128 Tehera-nul a sesizat oportunitatea ºi a reacþionat rapid la demer-surile Georgiei. Ministrul de externe al Georgiei a vizitat în2010 Teheranul ºi a promis cã Georgia nu va întreprindenicio acþiune împotriva Iranului indiferent de apartenenþasa la alianþe (Civil.Ge, 2010). Astfel, în limbaj diplomatic,Tbilisi a trimis mesajul cã nu va pune la dispoziþie terito-riul sãu în cazul unei operaþiuni militare împotriva Iranului.

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129 Interviu cu un expert, Tbilisi, mai 2011.130 Interviu cu un expert, Tbilisi, mai 2011.128 Interviu cu un expert, Tbilisi, iunie 2011.

intermediul companiei Itera, care are încheiate contracte dedistribuþie cu 103 întreprinderi locale (Postnikov, 2008, 54).Însã principalul beneficiar al acestor livrãri, probabil la unpreþ preferenþial, este uzina chimicã Azot din Rustavi, careeste controlatã de Itera.132 Georgia are un acord cu Rusia cuprivire la livrãrile reciproce de energie electricã, care a rãmasfuncþional ºi dupã conflictul din 2008. În Rusia muncescaproximativ 700.000 de georgieni. Remitenþele din Rusiaconstituie în jur de 63% din totalul transferurilor bãneºtiefectuate de georgienii aflaþi în strãinãtate (ibidem, 56).

Deºi 72% din georgieni considerã cã agresiunea Rusieiîmpotriva Georgiei continuã, în jur de 90% de respondenþisprijinã dialogul politic ºi interacþiunea în domeniul eco-nomic cu Rusia (International Republican Institute, 2011).Aºadar, luând în considerare legãturile economice ºi opiniapublicã, provocarea majorã pentru guvernul de la Tbilisi

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explicã aceastã atitudine. Rusia controleazã militar în jur de20% din teritoriul Georgiei, inclusiv regiunea Ahalgori, aflatãsub jurisdicþia autoritãþilor de la Tbilisi pânã în august 2008(a se vedea harta 7). Forþele armate ruse sunt la distanþa de50 km de Tbilisi. În eventualitatea unui conflict, Rusia vaputea uºor bloca infrastructura de transport care face legã-tura între estul ºi vestul Georgiei ºi va putea avansa rapidspre capitala þãrii. Rusia a dislocat în cele douã regiuniseparatiste 3.800 de militari ºi 1.000 de grãniceri din cadrulServiciului Federal de Securitate. Pe lângã investiþii masiveîn infrastructura militarã, Moscova a declanºat procesul dedemarcare a frontierei administrative între Georgia, pe de oparte, ºi Abhazia ºi Osetia de Sud pe de altã parte. Moscovasubvenþioneazã bugetele republicilor separatiste în proporþiede 70-90%. Companiile de stat preiau controlul asuprainfrastructurii strategice, precum cãile ferate sau aeroportulBabuºera din Abhazia. Kremlinul a depus eforturi diploma-tice ºi financiare pentru a extinde lista statelor sau micro-statelor care au recunoscut independenþa Abhaziei ºi Osetieide Sud. Astfel, Rusia îºi propune sã decupleze definitiv celedouã regiuni de Georgia, pentru a minimaliza ºansele uneireintegrãri chiar ºi în viitorul îndepãrtat. În acelaºi timp,diplomaþia rusã depune eforturi pentru a izola Georgia peplan extern ºi a preveni livrãrile de echipament ºi tehnicãmilitarã, inclusiv de naturã defensivã, forþelor armategeorgiene. Rusia se opune deschis aderãrii Georgiei nu doarla NATO, ci ºi la UE.131

În ciuda lipsei relaþiilor diplomatice, între cele douã þãrise menþin multiple legãturi economice. Rusia a fost al ºapte-lea partener comercial al Georgiei în 2010, cu o pondere de4,4% (EU Commission, 2011c). Companiile ruseºti (Vîm-pelkom, Inter RAO, Itera, VTB) sunt prezente în sectorultelecomunicaþiilor, energetic ºi financiar-bancar al Georgiei.Georgia importã în continuare aprope 8-10% din necesarulsãu de gaze din Rusia. Gazele naturale sunt importate prin

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132 Interviu cu un expert, Tbilisi, mai 2011.131 Interviu cu un diplomat, Tbilisi, mai 2011.

Harta 7 — Georgia ºi cele douã regiuni separatiste(sursa: Wikipedia)

este publicul din Caucazul de Nord. Pagina de internet apostului are în jur de 7-8.000 de vizitatori unici din Rusia(Elder, 2011). Parlamentul Georgiei a recunoscut în 2011„genocidul cerkeºilor“ comis de Rusia þaristã în secolul alXIX-lea. Evenimentele tragice care au marcat campania decucerire a Caucazului au avut loc în 1864 în KrasnaiaPoliana, una dintre localitãþile care va gãzdui Jocurile Olim-pice de iarnã de la Soci în 2014. Autoritãþile georgiene pla-nificã în 2012 deschiderea unui memorial dedicat victimelor„genocidului cerkeºilor“, amplasat aproape de Abhazia. Nuîn ultimul rând, discursul politic georgian recurge la com-paraþii cu Rusia pentru a delegitima ºi decredibiliza regimulpolitic de la Moscova. Reforma poliþiei, combaterea corup-þiei, îmbunãtãþirea mediului investiþional ºi transformareaoraºului Batumi sunt deseori contrapuse abuzurilor poliþiei,corupþiei sistemice, hãrþuirii investitorilor strãini ºi orga-nizãrii deficitare în pregãtirea oraºului Soci pentru JocurileOlimpice.

Deºi nu sunt gândite exclusiv pentru a irita Rusia, acestset de acþiuni politice indubitabil îºi propune sã vulnerabi-lizeze Rusia. „Rusia este satisfãcutã de statu quo, Georgia vreaca Rusia sã plãteascã preþul pentru actualul echilibru“135,explicã logica din spatele unor mãsuri un analist local. „Pânãacum Rusia nu a plãtit un preþ pe mãsurã, de aceea Georgiaîncearcã sã incomodeze Rusia în regiunea unde ea se simtevulnerabilã“136, detaliazã expertul motivaþia politicilorgeorgiene în Caucazul de Nord. În acelaºi timp, guvernul dela Tbilisi este ghidat ºi de imperative de securitate. Caucazulde Nord, cu care Georgia se învecineazã, va rãmâne o regiuneturbulentã pe termen lung. Tbilisi încearcã sã proiectezeforþa de atracþie pentru a asigura o atitudine favorabilã faþãde Georgia în republicile nord-caucaziene.137 Efectul cumu-lat al acþiunilor de incomodare a Rusiei ºi de detensionare

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o reprezintã identificarea unei modalitãþi funcþionale deco-existenþã cu Rusia. În ultimii doi ani, autoritãþile de laTbilisi au avut o serie de iniþiative prin care au încercatsã detensioneze relaþiile cu Rusia.133 În 2010, Georgia ºi-aasumat în mod unilateral obligaþia de a nu utiliza forþapentru a realiza reintegrarea þãrii. Cu toate cã serveºteinteresele economice ale Armeniei, redeschiderea punctuluivamal Verhni Lars-Kazbeghi în 2010 a fãcut, de asemenea,parte din eforturile de deescaladare a conflictului ruso-geor-gian. În octombrie 2008, Georgia a simplificat unilateralregimul de vize cu Rusia. Cetãþenii ruºi obþin viza la intrareaîn Georgia fãrã a mai trece printr-o procedurã stufoasã deaplicaþie. Începând cu 2011, viza se poate obþine inclusiv lapunctul de trecere Verhni Lars-Kazbeghi. În 2010 ºi 2011,pãrþile au reluat zborurile pe rutele Moscova-Tbilisi, Mos-cova-Batumi ºi, respectiv, Moscova-Kutaisi. Georgia consi-derã necesarã continuarea discuþiilor de la Geneva, în ciudarolului deseori neconstructiv al Rusiei. Aºa cum explicã unoficial, „uneori e nevoie sã porþi un proces de dragul proce-sului“134. În 2011, la cererea Moscovei au fost reluate nego-cierile ruso-georgiene pe marginea problemelor care menþinveto-ul Georgiei cu privire la aderarea Rusiei la OMC.Totodatã, au existat contacte ºi pe linia bisericeascã. Capiicelor douã biserici s-au întâlnit la Kiev în vara lui 2011.

În paralel cu o serie de mãsuri pozitive, Georgia a con-tinuat sã atingã puncte nevralgice pentru Rusia. În 2010,Georgia a liberalizat unilateral regimul de vize pentru cetã-þeni ruºi cu viza de reºedinþã în ºapte republici naþionale dinCaucazul de Nord. Potrivit autoritãþilor, zilnic 600 de rezi-denþi din Caucazul de Nord traverseazã frontiera ruso-geor-gianã (Ekho Moskvy, 2011). În 2011, Georgia a lansat deasemenea un post TV — PIK — accesibil prin satelit, careemite în rusã ºi acoperã evenimentele din Caucazul de Sudºi Caucazul de Nord. Grupul-þintã primar al acestui post

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135 Interviu cu un expert, Tbilisi, iunie 2011.136 Interviu cu un expert, Tbilisi, iunie 2011.137 Interviu cu un expert, Tbilisi, mai 2011.

133 Interviu cu un expert, Tbilisi, mai 2011.134 Interviu cu un oficial, Tbilisi, mai 2011.

învecineazã cu (sub)regiuni turbulente (Caucazul de Nord,Orientul Mijlociu) care exportã instabilitate ºi conservã ele-mente de imprevizibilitate. Cumulate, aceste variabile con-tribuie la multiple scenarii pe care le-ar putea urma regiuneaîn viitor. Normalizarea relaþiilor turco-armene în combinaþiecu eventualele progrese în soluþionarea conflictului dinNagorno-Karabah ar putea vindeca statele din Caucazul deSud de logica jocului cu suma nulã ºi ar crea premise pentrucooperare regionalã trilateralã. Însã nu poate fi exclus faptulcã inerþia regionalã caracterizatã prin dezvoltarea cu maimulte viteze ºi evoluþiile pluridirecþionale regionale vor fi sin-gurele certitudini pentru Caucazul de Sud în acest deceniu.

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Concluzii

La 20 de ani de la disoluþia Uniunii Sovietice, Caucazulde Sud este un imens ºantier în lucru, a cãrui arhitecturãpoliticã, economicã ºi de securitate finalã este încã insesi-zabilã. Aºa cum aratã analiza, o serie de factori contribuiela incertitudinea cu privire la viitorul regiunii. În primul rând,douã din cele trei republici nu îºi controleazã integral teri-toriul suveran, iar modificarea violentã sau paºnicã a fron-tierelor nu poate fi exclusã. În al doilea rând, un segmentsocial important, refugiaþi ºi PSI, trãiesc de aproape douãdecenii în aºteptare. Reîntoarcerea, la fel ca ºi neîntoarcereala casele lor, va influenþa evoluþiile în jurul conflictelor ºipoliticile statelor gazdã. În al treilea rând, Caucazul de Sudeste o regiune cu multe graniþe închise ºi comunicare trans-frontalierã fragmentatã. Prin urmare, deschiderea graniþelorva avea un impact multidimensional benefic asupra regiunii.În acelaºi timp, menþinerea frontierelor închise va contribuila dezvoltarea proiectelor care mereu exclud pe cineva înregiune, alimentând animozitãþile ºi segmentarea regionalã.În al patrulea rând, statele resimt puternic deficitul de secu-ritate la nivel regional care motiveazã nu numai militari-zarea excesivã, dar ºi externalizarea securitãþii. Agendeleconcurente ale actorilor cu pondere regionalã fac deseoriimposibilã conceperea ºi implementarea soluþiilor regionaleinclusive. Manipularea marilor puteri pentru realizarea obiec-tivelor naþionale conflictuale contribuie din plin la situaþiade insecuritate generalã din zonã. În al cincilea rând, diver-sitatea orientãrilor externe ºi proiectelor naþionale internecontribuie la geometria variabilã la nivel regional. Statele facparte sau aspirã spre organizaþii sau alianþe militare alterna-tive, precum OTSC, NATO, CSI, GUAM, UE, OCEMNsau Miºcarea de Nealiniere. În final, Caucazul de Sud se

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Angela Grãmadã

Caucazul de Sud între economie politicã ºi politicã energeticã

I. Contextul macroeconomic de dezvoltare a regiunii

Tonul politicilor externe ºi cele ale strategiilor de securi-tate sunt date în primul rând de succesul politicilor economi-ce promovate de un actor statal sau non-statal. Majoritateasubiecþilor de drept internaþional public sunt puºi în situaþiade a recunoaºte importanþa factorilor economici, atuncicând elaboreazã noi scheme de guvernare sau de ascensiuneeconomicã. Fãrã o bazã economicã bine argumentatã ºisusþinutã prin programe eficiente, niciun stat nu va reuºi sãse menþinã în topul actorilor care administreazã procesele ºifenomenele care au loc pe scena internaþionalã. Adjudeca-rea prin investiþii financiare sau presiune politicã a unorregiuni precum Caucazul de Sud — important datoritãresurselor de petrol, gaze naturale, a conexiunilor de diferitenaturi pe care le poate oferi diferitor pãrþi ale lumii — esteuna dintre metodele cele mai eficiente, utilizate de cãtremarile puteri pentru a atinge obiective ºi interese naþionale.Regiunea menþionatã abundã în bogate resurse naturale,fãrã a le limita nomenclatorul doar la hidrocarburi, pentrucã aici se mai gãsesc resurse de plutoniu, aur ºi nu numai.

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I. Promovarea reformelor economice — între necesitateºi incapacitate

Transformarea calitativã a realitãþilor sociale ale unui statpoate fi atinsã prin implementarea unor reforme economiceprofunde. Acestea din urmã au drept finalitate realizareaunor schimbãri structurale, ce permit ulterior ameliorareanivelului indicatorilor economici ºi a indicilor sociali. Lipsaunor experienþe anterioare în gestionarea afacerilor interneale statului, precum ºi dependenþa excesivã de un partenersau de anumite procese, care au loc la nivel regional, au con-dus la apariþia unor discrepanþe între nivelurile de dezvoltareeconomicã ale statelor care formeazã regiunea Caucazuluide Sud. Cauzele sunt multiple ºi pot avea caracter politicsau economic, dar soluþia cea mai bunã este urmãrireaobiectivelor ºi intereselor naþionale ca sursã unicã de argu-mentare a mãsurilor ºi acþiunilor care trebuie sã fie imple-mentate pentru dezvoltarea armonioasã a societãþii unuistat. Cele trei state care formeazã Caucazul de Sud au re-simþit de-a lungul independenþei lor tentaþia de a face apella modele evoluate de dezvoltare economicã. Estonia,Singapore, Emiratele Arabe Unite — acestea sunt doar câte-va exemple de state ale cãror rezultate economice au influ-enþat într-o mare mãsurã atitudinea autoritãþilor caucazienefaþã de metoda de acþiune care trebuia adoptatã în interiorsau spre ce formã de integrare regionalã sã se orienteze înexterior. Conexiunea accentuatã la procesele economice ºipolitice promovate de Federaþia Rusã ºi menþinerea unortrãsãturi caracteristice regimurilor autoritare au contribuitla crearea unui mediu politic ostil procesului pentru imple-mentare a strategiilor ºi acþiunilor capabile sã apropieCaucazul de piaþa economicã mondialã. Dacã Georgia ºiArmenia sunt membre ale OMC, din anul 2000 ºi respectivdin 2003 (World Trade Organization, 2008), acceptândnormele ºi principiile acestei forme de integrare internaþio-nalã, atunci Azerbaidjanul pare sã-ºi fi creat propriul modelpentru a fi inclus în circuitul mondial, care este susþinut depetrolul ºi gazele naturale de care dispune, precum ºi de

Potenþialul de transport al acestor resurse cât ºi al altorminereuri dinspre Est spre Vest ºi dinspre Nord spre Sud atransformat zona ºi a atras spre ea diverse interese naþionaleºi obiective economice. Astfel, profitul pe care îl poate oferiprezenþa factorului politic în regiune poate avea mai multecaracteristici, însã latura economicã a acesteia e de departecea mai importantã. Regiunea este legatã de Federaþia Rusã,dar depinde de sprijinul tehnico-financiar al Uniunii Euro-pene ºi al Statelor Unite ale Americii.

Potenþialul economic ºi energetic al zonei este propicepentru crearea mai multor conexiuni cu lumea externã.Studiile ºi cercetãrile la faþa locului scot la ivealã inaccesibi-litatea regiunii pentru potenþialii investitori strãini. Pe lângão forþã de muncã ieftinã ºi bine pregãtitã, care constituieun avantaj, aceºtia sunt puºi în situaþia de a face faþã mono-polurilor sau oligopolurilor, corupþiei la nivel înalt, siste-mului instituþional depãºit, lacunelor legistative, situaþiilorpolitice incerte ºi refuzului de a acþiona în conformitate cunoile tendinþe de modernizare ºi progres tehnologic, atâtîn viaþa politicã, precum ºi în cea economicã, astfel încât sãpoatã asigura valoare adãugatã superioarã produselor deorigine sud-caucazianã. Cel mai important punct de luat înconsiderare, pe care acest studiu doreºte sã îl sublinieze, estefaptul cã regiunea Caucazului de Sud trebuie sã fie studiatãca un sistem integrat. Diferenþa între componentele acestuiao face disponibilitatea de a lua parte la diferite procese deintegrare în circuitul economic mondial, precum ºi capaci-tatea de a negocia cel mai bun preþ pentru resursele de caredispune fiecare, desigur þinând cont de tipologia ºi calitateaacestora. Resursele energetice ºi infrastructura pentru trans-portul acestora, disponibile în regiune, ar trebui sã fie argu-mentul forte pentru adoptarea unor strategii de stimulare ainteresului în implementarea reformelor ºi modernizareaeconomiei. Un parcurs ferm spre dezvoltare poate duce întimp la mãrirea capabilitãþilor de negociere a autoritãþilorîn procesul de soluþionare a conflictelor ºi diminuarea influ-enþei politice a Federaþiei Ruse.

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de vânzãrile de resurse energetice. Conform aprecierilorFondului Monetar Internaþional, Republica Azerbaidjanpoate fi catalogatã drept stat dependent de remitenþele dincontractele energetice (Ahmedov et al., 2009, 6). Pentrua putea delimita asemãnãrile ºi deosebirile în procesul detransformare a economiilor statelor din Caucazul de Sud,este necesar sã fie scos în evidenþã specificul fiecãrei þãriîn parte. Într-adevãr, faptul cã toate cele trei componente aleregiunii sunt state ex-sovietice ar putea sã reprezinte bazastudiului, însã a face abstracþie de anumite tendinþe naþio-nale, existente anterior, dar ºi în perioada când acestea aufãcut parte din Uniunea Sovieticã, ar fi incorect. Majorita-tea problemelor cu care se confruntã autoritãþile ºi cetãþeniidin Georgia, Armenia ºi Azerbaidjan se pot regãsi în tot spa-þiul ex-sovietic, dar nivelul interesului marilor puteri diferãde la o regiune la alta. Iatã de ce scoaterea la ivealã a trãsã-turilor ce fac diferenþa în caracteristicile de dezvoltare eco-nomicã ale celor trei state sud-caucaziene este o primãcondiþie pentru elaborarea unor recomandãri pentru guver-nanþii care au sarcina de a atrage investiþii strãine în zonãprin reducerea nivelului instabilitãþii politice, prin liberali-zarea preþurilor, prin combaterea corupþiei ºi a monopo-lurilor, astfel încât ºi ceilalþi indicatori economici utilizaþi înstudierea nivelului de dezvoltare economicã a unui stat sãatingã nivelul dorit. Tranziþia la economia de piaþã nu tre-buie sã se transforme într-un principiu declarativ pe termenlung. Ea trebuie atinsã prin adoptarea unor mãsuri bazatepe pragmatism, cu efect pe termen lung, astfel încât stabili-tatea ºi creºterea economicã sã susþinã securitatea naþionalãa fiecãrui stat sud-caucazian. În plus, este bine cunoscutfaptul cã soluþionarea problemelor cu caracter economic,implementarea reformelor ºi decizia fermã de a depãºi oanumitã etapã de dezvoltare, adicã de a duce la bun sfârºitceea ce numim astãzi „perioada de tranziþie la economiade piaþã“, poate conduce la deschiderea partenerilor spresoluþionarea unor probleme mai vechi, regionale, cu caracterpolitic.

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preþul mondial al acestor resurse. Atât la Tbilisi, cât ºi laBaku au existat la un moment dat preferinþe pentru imple-mentarea modelului de susþinere a economiei utilizat deautoritãþile statului Singapore.1 Renunþarea la acest modelare la bazã mai multe explicaþii: el este greu de adaptat înCaucazul de Sud din cauza condiþiilor cu care se confruntaucele trei state noi, independente imediat dupã prãbuºireaUniunii Sovietice, nu a existat voinþã politicã pentru asu-marea implementãrii elementelor acestuia sau guvernãrileau evoluat, pur ºi simplu, spre alte modele regionale, multmai apropiate ca filosofie. Pentru Georgia, de exemplu,drept modele de dezvoltare economicã au servit pe rând:Turcia, Estonia ºi chiar Emiratele Arabe Unite; pentru Azer-baidjan — Singapore ºi Emiratele Arabe Unite; Armenia afost tentatã sã preia o parte din experienþa statelor baltice.Prin logica de acþiune, concepte ºi tendinþe Georgiei ºiArmeniei le sunt mult mai apropiate modelele europene dedezvoltare economicã, pe când Azerbaidjanul dã dovadã deafinitate orientalã ºi asiaticã. Adesea apare tentaþia ca aceststat sã fie inclus în rândul statelor din Asia Centralã. Inde-pendenþa politicã regionalã poate sã fie de scurtã duratã,dacã un stat se bazeazã exclusiv pe resursele sale naturale.Existenþa ºi comercializarea acestora nu este o condiþieobligatorie pentru creºterea nivelului bunãstãrii sociale —unul din principalii indicatori macroeconomici, care permito apreciere mult mai largã a nivelului dezvoltãrii economicea unui stat. Administrarea afacerilor unui stat care dispunede hidrocarburi poate deveni în timp o problemã destul deînsemnatã, care îºi poate gãsi soluþionarea doar prin acte detransparenþã a actului de guvernare, precum ºi a cheltuiriiveniturilor provenite din contractele petroliere. Economiastatelor petroliere depinde cel mai mult de nivelul preþurilorla hidrocarburi pe pieþele mondiale. În asemenea condiþii,scãderea preþului la petrol ar putea avea consecinþe mai miciasupra Armeniei ºi Georgiei, care sunt mai puþin dependente

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1 Interviu cu un expert, Tbilisi, 31 mai, 2011.

urmatã de Azerbaidjan ºi Georgia. Criza a schimbat ierarhia.Migraþia forþei de muncã are loc în special spre FederaþiaRusã, care a iniþiat un program de susþinere a proprieidemografii, aflatã în cãdere liberã. Acest program prevedeîncurajarea migraþiei cetãþenilor armeni în regiunile non-europene ale Rusiei, unde aceºtia primesc terenuri ºi o sumãde bani. Tot Rusia rãmâne ºi statul de unde provin cele maimulte remitenþe, chiar dacã ºi aici are loc scãderea indicato-rilor macroeconomici, iar ramurile economice în care suntimplicaþi cel mai mult angajaþi care provin din statele CSIînregistreazã recesiune. Lipsa investiþiilor strãine înArmenia sau migrarea afacerilor mici cãtre statul vecin —Georgia, are la bazã raþionamente politice, mai degrabãdecât de ordin economic. Deºi reformele economice promo-vate de autoritãþile de la Erevan nu au înregistrat rezultatenotorii, lipsa interesului extern de a investi în economiaArmeniei a fost pusã de cele mai multe ori pe seama conflic-tului din Nagorno-Karabah — factor de instabilitate regio-nalã. În realitate, recunosc oficialii armeni, conflictul a fostºi este paravanul perfect pentru argumentarea inacþiunilorcu caracter economic ºi a implementãrii reformelor, dar maiales pentru a ascunde actele de corupþie la nivel înalt. Inves-titorii strãini ar putea condiþiona adoptarea unor mãsuriprincipiale de luptã împotriva corupþiei. Acest cerc viciospoate fi întrerupt doar prin implicarea fermã a factoruluipolitic. Mediul de afaceri se dizolvã în instituþiile statului.Majoritatea afacerilor sunt susþinute de cãtre persoanecare ocupã funcþii-cheie în sistemul instituþional de stat.3Federaþia Rusã a fost întotdeauna unul dintre principaliiparteneri economici al Armeniei. Relaþiile economice bilate-rale au avut o dinamicã pozitivã pânã în anul 2009, atuncicând au fost resimþite primele efecte negative ale crizei eco-nomice mondiale. Dacã în anul 2008 schimbul de mãrfuriîntre Rusia ºi Armenia atingea cifra de 900 milioane dedolari SUA, în anul urmãtor aceasta a înregistrat o scãdere

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Armenia, numitã adesea „paradoxul diasporei“2, a re-simþit cel mai mult, dintre cele trei þãri care formeazã Cau-cazul de Sud, efectele crizei economice mondiale. În anul2009 Produsul Intern Brut al Armeniei a înregistrat oscãdere de 14,4% (Civilitas Foundation, 2010), exprimatã înunitãþi monetare. Aceastã cifrã indicã o scãdere a PIB-ului dela 12 miliarde dolari SUA în 2008 la 8,7 miliarde dolari SUAîn 2009. Unele ramuri ale economiei naþionale au înregistrato încetinire a ritmului de dezvoltare, altele au înregistratregrese. Printre cele mai afectate domenii se numãrã con-strucþiile, agricultura, precum ºi industria metalurgicã, dincauza scãderii preþurilor la metale pe pieþele internaþionale.În perioada Uniunii Sovietice, Armenia era recunoscutã pen-tru dezvoltarea metalurgiei ºi a infrastructurii de prelucrare,care avea indicatori mari din cauza forþei de muncã binepregãtitã, resurse proprii ºi o piaþã de desfacere asiguratã încadrul URSS.

Dacã vom lua în calcul faptul cã multe trãsãturi aleeconomiilor acestor state au rãmas neschimbate încã dinperioada Uniunii Sovietice, infrastructura s-a învechit, iarErevanul a fost în cea mai mare parte a independenþei salesub influenþa politicã a Federaþiei Ruse, cumulatã cu izo-larea economicã ºi energeticã în plan regional, este evidentcã recesiunea economicã globalã a influenþat cel mai multacest stat. Abia în 2010, economia armeanã a înregistratprimele redresãri, Produsul Intern Brut majorându-se înaceastã perioadã cu aproximativ 7,6% faþã de anul 2009.Situaþia economicã necesitã, însã, în continuare investiþiiconsiderabile ºi aplicarea unor mãsuri eficiente de reformarea tuturor ramurilor industriei ºi agriculturii. Tot ca efect alperpetuãrii crizei economice mondiale, are loc scãdereanivelului remunerãrii salariale ºi a creºterii nivelului ºomaju-lui pânã la 6,9%, ceea ce contribuie ºi mai mult la migraþiaforþei de muncã în afara statului. Pânã în anul 2008,Armenia avea cel mai mare salariu mediu pe economie, fiind

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2 Interviu cu un analist politic, Erevan, iunie 2011. 3 Interviu cu un expert, Erevan, iunie 2011.

Autoritãþile de la Erevan înþeleg necesitatea diversificãriiproduselor care sunt destinate exportului. În condiþiile uneieconomii izolate pe plan regional, statele arabe sunt prin-cipala piaþã de desfacere pentru agenþii economici dinArmenia. Pentru Armenia statul vecin — Iranul — ar puteadeveni în timp deschizãtorul de drumuri pentru intereseleeconomice cãtre pieþele regionale ºi mondiale. În prezentsunt dezvoltate câteva proiecte energetice comune cu Tehera-nul. Acestea þin de livrarea de hidroenergie cãtre þara vecinã.Armenia recunoaºte cã nu este de acord cu modalitatea depromovare a obiectivelor de politicã externã a autoritãþiloriraniene, însã cele douã state partenere sunt obligate decircumstanþele regionale sã coopereze: Iranul este pentruArmenia cheia de acces spre pieþele economice regionale, iarArmenia este pentru Iran cheia de acces spre lumea ne-musulmanã, deoarece este printre puþinele state creºtine cucare a reuºit sã stabileascã ºi sã menþinã relaþii bilaterale.5

În anul 2006, Armenia a fost invitatã sã ia parte la cori-dorul de transport „Nord-Sud“, pentru a-ºi diversifica rutelede transport pentru mãrfurile sale. În perspectivã, produse-le de origine armeanã aveau sã obþinã o nouã posibilitate detrasport prin intermediul conexiunii feroviare, iar mai apoicu ajutorul bacului pânã în portul georgian Poti. Situaþiarutelor de transport pentru bunurile ºi serviciile din ºi înspreAmenia are urmãtoarea structurã:

– Georgia — 75% din mãrfuri;– Iran — 25% din mãrfuri;– Turcia — embargo;– Azerbaidjan — conflict.

Armenia depinde excesiv de tranzitul de mãrfuri prinGeorgia, ceea ce îngreuneazã dezvoltarea unor proiecte co-merciale cu alte state, nu doar din regiune. Deºi existã anu-mite demersuri pentru eliminarea taxelor de import-export

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de 19,3%. Abia în anul 2010 au putut fi înregistrate primelesemne pozitive ale schimburilor comerciale bilaterale.4 Încalitate de partener strategic al Armeniei, Federaþia Rusãrãmâne în etapa actualã principalul investitor în economiaarmeanã. Investitorii ruºi au reuºit sã se impunã în maimulte sectoare ale economiei: sistemul energetic, sistemulbancar, industria extractivã, tehnologiile informaþionale.Prezenþa investitorilor ruºi în Armenia poate fi tratatã dindouã perspective. Prima þine de dependenþa economicã aArmeniei faþã de Federaþia Rusã, care controleazã în între-gime sistemul energetic, deoarece deþine majoritatea active-lor în toate proiectele energetice importante ale þãrii prinGazprom ºi Inter RAO UES (compania de producere ºidistribuþie a energiei electrice), a achiziþionat toate activeleoperatorului naþional „Armentel“, precum ºi ale SA „BancVTB“, SA „Banca de Economii a Armeniei“. Cea de-a douaperspectivã de analizã a relaþiei economice ruso-armene þinede modalitatea în care e prezentatã aceasta de cãtre oficialiiarmeni. Conform acestora, prezenþa companiilor ruseºtidemonstreazã atractivitatea economiei Armeniei pentruinvestitorii strãini, ignorând aspectul dependenþei econo-miei faþã de Federaþia Rusã. Pe parcursul anului 2009,Federaþia Rusã a promis mai multor state ex-sovietice cã leva acorda credite preferenþiale sau nerambursabile pentrua sprijini eforturile guvernãrilor acestora de a depãºi efectelecrizelor economice. Armenia a fost printre puþinele bene-ficiare ale acestui tip de susþinere din partea Rusiei. Astfel,la începutul lunii iunie 2009, Ministerul Finanþelor al Fede-raþiei Ruse a transferat în conturile Guvernului Armenieiprima tranºã din creditul total de 500 milioane dolari SUA.Una dintre ramurile economice ale Armeniei unde existãpotenþial de dezvoltare important este aceea a comercia-lizãrii apei potabile în statele arabe, dar ºi a hidroenergiei.

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4 Interacþiunea ruso-armeanã ºi problemele regionale. Materiale aleconferinþei internaþionale din 5 iunie 2010, Erevan, ed. NAAPET, 2011, pag. 11. 5 Interviu cu un oficial, Erevan, iunie 2011.

investiþii în domeniul construcþiilor, România — produsepetroliere (motorinã) ºi chimice, Germania — investiþii îndezvoltarea unor proiecte pentru construcþia de minihidro-centrale, Franþa — telecomunicaþii (Orange).

Armenia este prin vocaþie un stat european. Legãturilesale istorice ºi comerciale cu Europa au influenþat includereavectorului de integrare europeanã în principalele strategii ºipolitici ale statului. Armenia este unul dintre cele ºase stateex-sovietice incluse în Parteneriatul Estic din cadrul PoliticiiEuropene de Vecinãtate. Planul de Acþiuni Comune Arme-nia– Uniunea Europeanã a fost semnat pe 14 noiembrie 2006la Bruxelles. Acest document prevede integrarea Armeniei însistemul politic ºi economic european (Inside Europe, Arme-nians in Europe, 2006).

Prin conþinutul acestui document Armenia se obligã sãimplementeze cerinþele impuse de instituþiile UniuniiEuropene, care trebuie sã contribuie la accelerarea procesu-lui de implementare a reformelor economice, precum ºi laapropierea diferitelor sectoare industriale ºi ale agriculturiide standardele europene. În plus, UE cere autoritãþilor de laErevan sã elaboreze cât mai urgent o strategie de securitateenergeticã, astfel încât obiectivele strategice care se bazeazãpe energie nuclearã sã fie scoase din circuitul economic ºi sãfie înlocuite cu alt tip de resurse energetice.

Dezvoltarea schimburilor comerciale cu Uniunea Euro-peanã este confirmatã ºi prin cifre. Astfel, în primul semes-tru al anului 2010 comerþul exterior al Armeniei cu statelemembre ale UE a crescut în medie cu 29,1%, depãºind întermeni monetari cifra de 1 miliard de dolari americani.Creºterea acestui indicator economic a avut loc în pofidadeprecierii monedei euro ºi la diminuarea valorii în cifre.Deºi a rãmas în urma Georgiei în ceea ce priveºte imple-mentarea principalelor cerinþe asumate prin diferite acte ºideclaraþii oficiale în domeniul integrãrii europene, Armeniaîºi continuã demersul spre apropierea de valorile ºi standar-dele europene. Revigorarea economicã uºoarã din ultimiidoi ani sunt semne ale perceperii rolului luãrii unor decizii

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care existã între cele douã state, procesul pare sã întâmpinedestule greutãþi. Spre exemplu, dezinteresul investitorilorromâni este condiþionat anume de accesul pieþei armene ladiferite rute de transport regional ºi interregional. Armeniaeste conectatã la coridoarele de transport Nord-Sud, prinGeorgia, iar România este interesatã mai mult de coridorulEst-Vest de transport al mãrfurilor. Deºi sunt prezente pepiaþa georgianã, produsele româneºti sunt supuse dubleiimpozitãri pânã în momentul accesãrii pieþei armene. Acestaspect, respectiv dubla impozitare, duce la creºterea preþu-rilor pentru diferite produse, pentru cã ea se reflectã în cos-tul bunului sau al serviciului. Lipsa unui sistem diversificatde conexiuni la principalele rute de transport al mãrfurilor,precum ºi cele de transport al produselor energetice, scadedin atractivitatea investiþionalã a Armeniei. Din aceste con-siderente, investitorii strãini vor ocoli ºi în continuare opor-tunitãþile existente pe piaþa acestui stat caucazian ºi vormigra spre Georgia sau Azerbaidjan. Riscurile pe care ar tre-bui sã ºi le asume investitorii sunt prea mari. Susþinutã deKremlin, dar ºi de câteva instituþii financiare internaþionale,printre care Fondul Monetar Internaþional, dupã încetareaconflictului militar cu Azerbaidjanul, Armenia a reuºit sãreintre în circuitul comercial regional. Federaþia Rusã nuputea sã determine autoritãþile de la Erevan sã stabileascãconexiuni ºi punþi economice spre sud. O asemenea atitu-dine ar fi devenit prea costisitoare, mai ales în condiþiile încare existã deja foarte multe conflicte la nivel regional pecare le susþine neoficial sau deschis, sub pretextul protejãriidrepturilor propriilor cetãþeni. Dacã estul ºi vestul erau zoneinterzise pentru bunurile ºi serviciile de origine armeanã,nu rãmânea decât efectuarea unor demersuri pentru apro-fundarea relaþiilor cu Iranul ºi Georgia, pentru cã Turcia ºiAzerbaidjanul erau inaccesibile ca pieþe de desfacere.Federaþia Rusã rãmâne ºi în continuare principalul partenereconomic al Armeniei. Aceastã relaþie bilateralã este una cal-culatã, bazatã pe pragmatism. Printre statele europene careau reuºit sã-ºi facã loc pe piaþa armeanã se numãrã Italia —

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de vizitã a Republicii Azerbaidjan, decisã acum mai mult caniciodatã, sã-ºi negocieze locul în cadrul sistemului de relaþiieconomice internaþionale. În prezent, politica promovatã deBaku este de a-ºi negocia poziþia în regiune, contracteleeconomice, precum ºi stabilitatea exclusiv prin instrumenteenergetice, ceea ce la un moment dat ar putea epuiza re-zervele interne. Concentrarea pe negocierea unor obiectiveactuale, pe consumul veniturilor provenite din industriapetrolierã, ignorând de cele mai multe ori investiþia în viitorºi în alte ramuri economice este dovada unei strategii dedezvoltare economicã greºitã. Diversitatea redusã a ramuri-lor economice, lipsa unor condiþii ce ar încuraja investiþiilestrãine ºi interne, încurajarea unor forme de concurenþãinadecvate pentru economia de piaþã, precum sunt mono-polurile ºi oligopolurile, corupþia la nivel înalt, prejudiciereadreptului asupra proprietãþii private ºi implicarea excesivãa statului în stabilirea preþurilor — sunt semne ale unei de-ficienþe majore în administrarea proceselor ºi fenomeneloreconomice ale unui stat. Autoritãþile se implicã în activitã-þile agenþilor economici, abuzând de instrumentul stabiliriipreþurilor la bunuri ºi servicii, ca o mãsurã foarte eficientãpentru preîntâmpinarea diferitor acþiuni sociale împotrivaguvernanþilor. La acest capitol, însã, nici Georgia ºi niciArmenia nu par sã fi înregistrat mai multe succese. Preþurilesunt controlate sau impuse de cãtre autoritãþi. Liberalizareapreþurilor ca trãsãturã a economiei de piaþã nu funcþio-neazã. Dupã douãzeci de ani de la proclamarea indepen-denþei Azerbaidjanului, încã mai putem sã vorbim aici deexistenþa unei economii de tip închis, unde accesul partene-rilor strãini este restricþionat, de cele mai multe ori dincauza intereselor private ale diferiþilor lideri politici aflaþi laguvernare. Azerbaidjanul este un stat specializat în extracþiaºi comercializarea pe pieþele internaþionale a produselor

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ferme de apropiere de forme de integrare economicã regio-nalã ºi internaþionalã. Doar prin promovarea unor acþiuniferme în direcþia schimbãrilor sistemice, adicã a întreguluicircuit economic, efectuarea de reforme adânci ºi dure,mobilizarea spre negocierea propriei independenþe politice,energetice ºi economice regionale, pot fi obþinute rezultateeconomice credibile.

Azerbaidjanul, numit adesea „paradoxul petrolului“ sau„paradoxul economiei de tip închis“,6 este singurul stat dinlume care a continuat sã înregistreze în perioada crizei eco-nomice globale o creºtere economicã însemnatã. Conformestimãrilor experþilor, economia azerã constituie peste 70%din toatã economia Caucazului de Sud, iar volumul total alhidrocarburilor extrase în anul 2009 a depãºit cifra de 50milioane de tone, cel al gazelor naturale a atins nivelul de23,6 miliarde metri cubi (Nagdalyan, Eduard, 2011: 128).Atât în trecut, cât ºi în prezent Azerbaidjanul este asociat cupetrolul ºi gazele naturale.7 Aceste resurse constituie cartea

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6 Interviu cu un analist politic, Erevan, iunie 2011.7 Transformarea Azerbaidjanului într-un stat cu rol energetic

important a început acum 400 de ani, când pe peninsula Absheronau fost extrase primele hidrocarburi. În anul 1813, Imperiul Þarista reuºit sã intre în posesia acestor zãcãminte ºi sã le administreze operioadã destul de lungã. În 1859, ruºii au construit în Baku primauzinã pentru prelucrarea petrolului. Pânã în 1872, Imperiul Rusa deþinut exclusivitate asupra extragerii de resurse energetice dinAzerbaidjan. Abia dupã 1872, când ruºii au anulat sistemul de rãs-cumpãrare fiscalã introdus tot de ei, în aceastã ramurã ºi au declaratliberã extragerea de zãcãminte petroliere, investitorii strãini dinMarea Britanie, Franþa, Germania ºi Olanda au primit undã verdepentru a pãtrunde pe piaþa ºi în industria petrolierã a Azerbaidjanu-lui. La începutul secolului XX, mileniul trecut, jumãtate din resurse-le petroliere extrase ale lumii aveau origine azerã. Câteva companiiinternaþionale, printre care ºi membrii clanului financiar Rothschild,au reuºit sã pãtrundã în regiune ºi astfel sã controleze nu doar can-titãþile de hidrocarburi extrase, dar ºi preþul mondial al petrolului.Monopolul asupra industriei de extracþie petrolierã le permitea sãobþinã venituri maxime cu investiþii minime. În rezultat, necesitatea

dotãrii tehnologice a acestei industrii a scãzut considerabil pe parcurs.Regresul tehnologic a fost iminent. În perioada URSS, aproximativ70% din necesitãþile industriei sovietice erau acoperite de resurselepetroliere de origine azerã.

fenomenului în Azerbaidjan pentru ambele situaþii. Altecifre, care vin sã confirme dependenþa exageratã a econo-miei azere de domeniul energetic sau orientarea ei cãtre dez-voltarea unei singure ramuri economice reies din Proiectulde Lege al Bugetului de Stat al Republicii Azerbaidjan(Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Azerbaijan, 2011).Pe 22 octombrie 2010, preºedintele azer Ilham Aliev a apro-bat Legea cu privire la bugetul de stat pentru anul 2011.Conform prevederilor acesteia, veniturile vor fi de 12,061miliarde AZN9, iar cheltuielile vor atinge cifra de 12,748miliarde AZN. Deficitul bugetar a fost aprobat la suma de687 milioane AZN. Cea mai mare parte a veniturilor înBugetul de Stat vor proveni din transferurile din FondulPetrolier de Stat ºi ar atinge cifra de 6,48 miliarde AZN,adicã peste 50% din totalul veniturilor bugetare; celelaltesurse de venit în bugetul statului sunt: taxa pe valoare adãu-gatã — 2,121 miliarde AZN, impozitul pe venit — 1,21 mi-liarde AZN. La capitolul cheltuieli, cele mai mari resursebugetare vor fi alocate programului investiþiilor de stat —3,38 miliarde AZN, cheltuieli pentru educaþie — 1,338 mi-liarde AZN, armatã — 1,325 miliarde AZN. În luna iuniecurent, au intrat în vigoare modificãrile aduse Legii pentruBugetul Statului din Republica Azerbaidjan (ABC.az,2011a). În conformitate cu noile prevederi, veniturile înbugetul statului vor atinge cifra de 15,554 miliarde AZN, iarcheltuielile vor ajunge la 15,941 miliarde. AZN. Trebuie sãmenþionãm aici cã Bugetul de Stat al Republicii Azerbaidjaneste un sistem bugetar supracentralizat, organizat pe douãniveluri: bugetul central ºi bugetul local. Bugetul central artrebui sã atingã pânã la finele anului 2011 cifra de 15,107miliarde AZN, iar resursele acumulate în bugetele locale(84 unitãþi administrativ-teritoriale, raioane) doar 0,447 mi-liarde AZN. La capitolul cheltuieli, raportul dintre bugetulcentral ºi bugetul local ar trebui sã fie 14,633 miliarde AZN,

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petroliere, preocupat prea puþin sã creeze condiþii optime dedezvoltare ºi pentru alte ramuri ale economiei. O balanþãcomercialã pozitivã nu semnificã neapãrat ºi existenþa unortransformãri calitative în domeniul economico-financiar.Schimbãrile au doar un caracter cantitativ la nivel desusþinere financiarã a activitãþilor ºi iniþiativelor actualeiguvernãri. Dacã vom þine cont de procesele ºi fenomenteleenumerate mai sus, prin care trece economia azerã, atunciar trebui sã recunoaºtem cã rezultatele înregistrate în acestdomeniu ºi capacitatea de a menþine indicatorii macro-economici pe un trend pozitiv par sã exprime existenþa unuiparadox economic. Potrivit rezultatelor prezentate de orga-nizaþiile internaþionale în rapoartele lor anuale, Azerbai-djanul a fost singurul stat din lume care a atins în condiþiide crizã economicã mondialã un ritm de creºtere economicãde aproximativ 9%. Criza a fost resimþitã mai puþin, fiindcãau fost utilizate resurse financiare din Fondul Petrolier deStat pentru a micºora intensitatea consecinþelor negativeasupra cetãþenilor. Membrii Grupului Naþional pentru Bu-getul de Stat (National Budget Group, 2007)8 atenþioneazãcã, în conformitate cu o clasificare efectuatã de cãtre Comi-tetul pentru Transparenþã al Fondului Monetar Interna-þional (International Monetary Fund, 2007), dacã o þarãare un Produs Intern Brut (PIB) format din peste 25% dinindustria extractivã de petrol sau cota parte a exporturilortotale ale þãrii depãºeºte cifra de 50% din PIB, aceasta intrãîn categoria statelor dependente de petrol. Nivelul indicato-rilor macroeconomici pentru anul 2010 confirmã prezenþa

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8 Grupul Naþional pentru Bugetul de Stat este o coaliþie formatãîn anul 2006 din nouã organizaþii non-guvernamentale, susþinutãfinanciar de Fundaþia SOROS, Baku. Misiunea coaliþiei este de acreºte tansparenþa utilizãrii finanþelor publice în interesul cetãþenilor.Scopurile activitãþii coaliþiei sunt: îmbunãtãþirea legislaþiei bugetare,asigurarea transparenþei ºi eficienþei efectuãrii de cheltuieli bugetare,participarea la dezbaterile publice cu privire la administrarea ºi repar-tizarea veniturilor ºi cheltuielilor bugetare, monitorizarea procesuluide implementare a politicii bugetare.

9 AZN – manatul azer, moneda naþionalã a Republicii Azerbai-djan.

acestora ºi, probabil, posibila ostilitate a Armeniei, care adevenit membru al organizaþiei pe 5 februarie 2003.10 Co-merþul Azerbaidjanului încã mai este orientat spre FederaþiaRusã ºi cãtre iniþiativele regionale economice, create specialde cãtre Moscova pentru a-ºi menþine influenþa în spaþiulex-sovietic. Majoritatea importurilor au origine rusã. Fede-raþia Rusã se pare cã încã rãmâne a fi unul dintre cei maiimportanþi parteneri economici pentru Baku. Dincolo deconexiunile de ordin familial ale actualului preºedinte azercu Rusia ºi oamenii de afaceri ruºi, cifrele vorbesc de la sinedespre potenþialul de influenþã al Kremlinului asupra singu-rului stat din Caucazul de Sud care îºi poate asigura parþialindependenþa politicã: Rusia este al treilea partener impor-tant al Azerbaidjanului în ceea ce priveºte originea mãrfu-rilor importate de cãtre azeri ºi al optulea dupã volumul demãrfuri exportate.11 Rusia nu mai reprezintã, ca în trecut,principalul partener comercial al Azerbaidjanului, dar con-tinuã sã deþinã controlul asupra unor pârghii economiceimportante. Liderii Federaþiei Ruse insistã sã rãmânã printreliderii energetici mondiali, care stabilesc regulile de joc pepieþele internaþionale. Rusia achiziþioneazã gaz de prove-nienþã azerã la preþuri mai mari decât cele pe care le arestabilite cu alþi parteneri.12 În plus, spun experþii, faptul cãAzerbaidjanul a renunþat la aderarea la NATO în doctrina samilitarã ºi a intrat în Organizaþia statelor nealiniate (carenu vor intra în vreun bloc militar) ne demonstreazã faptulcã preºedintele azer Ilham Aliev încearcã sã echilibrezebalanþa intereselor politico-economice dintre Rusia ºiOccident. Existenþa monopolurilor în economie are efectenegative asupra consumatorilor finali — cetãþenii azeri. Dincauza condiþiilor dificile de a pãtrunde pe pieþile azere ºi acheltuielilor financiare foarte mari pe care le efectueazã în

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respectiv 1,308 miliarde AZN. Dupã rectificãrile bugetare,programul investiþiilor de stat a fost suplimentat pânã lacifra de 5,864 miliarde AZN (ABC.az, 2011b). În anul2010, structura exporturilor prezentatã de cãtre ComitetulStatistic de Stat aratã cã în Republica Azerbaidjan expor-turile sunt mai mari decât importurile. Volumul comerþuluiextern a atins cifra de 27,924 miliarde dolari SUA, ceea ceeste cu 31,1% mai mult decat în anul 2009. Exportul depetrol brut atinge cifra de 86,53%, iar cea a produselorpetroliere prelucrate cota de 5,07% (Foreign Trade. EconomicRewiev of Azerbaijan, 2011, 13). Tot din structura expor-turilor pentru anul 2010 aflãm cã cea mai mare parte aexporturilor azere au avut ca destinaþie statele membreale Uniunii Europene, la import au predominat þãrile dinComunitatea Statelor Independente. Rata creºterii expor-turilor a fost mai mare decât cea a importurilor. Spre deose-bire de Georgia ºi Armenia, Azerbaidjanul nu este membrual Organizaþiei Mondiale a Comerþului. Una dintre princi-palele cauze ale amânãrii obþinerii calitãþii de membru cudrepturi permanente þine de existenþa aceloraºi monopoluriºi oligopoluri, controlate de stat. Pentru autoritãþile de laTbilisi calitatea de membru al acestei organizaþii inter-naþionale reprezintã un instrument important în negocierilepolitice cu Rusia, care de aproximativ optsprezece ani poartãtratative cu celelalte state membre pentru a fi acceptatã încalitate de membru cu drepturi depline. Georgia este doarunul dintre impedimentele cu care se confruntã Kremlinul,care trebuie sã aibã acordul tuturor membrilor OMC.Celãlalt impediment þine de filosofia de acþiune a liderilorde la Moscova ºi a atitudinii faþã de cerinþele ºi regulile cuprivire la funcþionarea pieþelor mondiale ºi pe care aceastarefuzã sã le respecte. La Baku, este popularã ideea de adeveni stat membru OMC numai dupã ce Federaþia Rusãva fi acceptatã în aceastã formã de organizare economicãinternaþionalã. Cauza este aceeaºi ca ºi în cazul Moscovei:dependenþa excesivã a stabilitãþii economice de vânzãrilede produse petroliere ºi implicarea în procesul de stabilire a

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10 Interviu cu un expert în transparenþa fondurilor provenite dinvânzãrile de petrol, Baku, iunie, 2011.

11 Interviu cu oficiali, Baku, iunie 201112 Interviu cu un expert în securitate energeticã, Bucureºti, august

2011.

document micºoreazã posibilitatea de apariþie a unor ne-mulþumiri potenþiale din partea agenþilor economici, actulasigurând stabilitate fiscalã, considerã Ministrul Finanþeloral Georgiei, Dmitri Gvindadze. Ca ºi Republica Azerbaidjan,Georgia nu controleazã o parte a teritoriului sãu. Dupã con-flictul ruso-georgian din luna august 2008, Abhazia ºi Osetiade Sud ºi-au autodeclarat independenþa faþã de Tbilisi, iarFederaþia Rusã ºi încã patru þãri, printre care ºi Venezuela,le-au recunoscut. Astãzi, Abhazia ºi Osetia de Sud sunt sus-þinute financiar din bugetul Rusiei, care le trateazã practic casubiecte ale federaþiei.13 Aceastã situaþie produce tensiuneîntre Georgia ºi Rusia, oferind teren pentru dispute politice,care adesea sunt utilizate drept pretext pentru evitareareformelor economice reale. Dupã anul 2003 — când a avutloc revoluþia trandafirilor — noua guvernare a fost pusã însituaþia de a prelua afacerile statului într-o stare deplorabilã.Reformele economice nu s-au bucurat de o abordare corec-tã, capabilã sã promoveze tranziþia realã la economia depiaþã. Modelul de acþiune era construit dupã acelaºi tipar,care a cuprins întregul spaþiu ex-sovietic: privatizarea ilegalãa obiectivelor strategice, încurajarea corupþiei, preocupareaslabã pentru atragerea investiþiilor externe. Datoria externãa Georgiei depãºise suma de 1,5 miliarde dolari SUA, iarmai mult de 50% din populaþia þãrii trãia sub pragul sãrãciei(Guseynov, 2008, 295). Aceastã stare de lucruri a fost de-pãºitã în primul rând datoritã susþinerii financiare externeºi interesului marilor puteri, Statele Unite ale Americii ºiUniunea Europeanã, pentru menþinerea stabilitãþii politiceºi economice în regiune. Georgia este element definitoriual punþii de legãturã care conecteazã pieþele europene laresursele energetice din Marea Caspicã. În plus, este parte acoridoarelor de transport al mãrfurilor Est-Vest, iar datoritãfaptului cã Armeniei i s-a refuzat participarea în cadrul maimultor proiecte care vizau Caucazul de Sud în calitate deregiune, Tbilisi a preluat o parte din rolul acesteia, reuºind

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acest scop, investitorii care reuºesc sã-ºi facã loc pe anumiteniºe stabilesc la rândul lor preþuri superioare celor promo-vate pe pieþele regionale sau mondiale. Azerbaidjanul are unpotenþial turistic enorm, neexploatat, dar încã nu a reuºit sãdevinã cunoscut ca destinaþie turisticã la nivel regional saumondial. Turismul ar putea sã devinã în timp una dintreramurile capabile sã asigure complementaritate proiectelorenergetice. Investiþiile în domeniul turistic pot fi o sursãstabilã de fluxuri financiare în bugetul de stat. Domeniulserviciilor, unde este inclus ºi turismul în calitate de com-ponentã de bazã, necesitã sprijin din partea autoritãþilor,mai ales în ceea ce priveºte facilitatea intrãrii pe piaþã aafacerilor mici ºi mijlocii în aceastã ramurã, precum ºi mo-dificarea legislaþiei în domeniu. Dezvoltarea serviciilor esteobligatorie. Turismul poate deveni în timp o alternativã pen-tru resursele de petrol. Fãrã dezvoltarea acestuia, economiaazerã ar putea muri în timp, mai ales dacã estimãrile spe-cialiºtilor în domeniul energetic se vor confirma, iar nivelulmaxim al extracþiilor de petrol ºi gaze va fi atins în 2020.Caracterul epuizabil al resurselor energetice nu trebuie sã fieignorat, în pofida faptului cã se insistã din ce în ce mai multpe implementarea celor mai noi tehnologii în extracþia depetrol, care permite forãri la adâncimi între 7.000 ºi 10.000metri. Turismul rural, agricol constituie una dintre posibilitã-þile de atragere a capitalului intern spre economia naþionalã,creând condiþiile necesare pentru a produce valoare adãugatã.

Georgia — modelul de dezvoltare economicã adoptat decãtre autoritãþile georgiene se bazeazã pe principiile ºi ideileneoliberale. Implementarea acestora presupune adoptareaunor mãsuri printre care se numãrã încurajarea concurenþeiloiale, a liberalizãrii pieþei, dar ºi reducerea implicãrii auto-ritãþilor statului în economie prin funcþia sa de corectare aexternalitãþilor decât în situaþii excepþionale. Tot în Georgiaa fost adoptat ºi aºa-numitul Act al Libertãþii Economice,prin care se micºoreazã probabilitatea ca autoritãþile statuluisã mãreascã taxele (Georgia Times, 2011) Conþinutul acestui

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13 Interviu cu un oficial georgian, Tbilisi, mai 2011.

conflictului ruso-georgian din august 2008 activitatea portu-lui Batumi din Georgia a fost suspendatã temporar. În urmaacestui conflict, statul vecin, Armenia, a suferit pierderi depeste 600 milioane dolari SUA — o sumã enormã pentrueconomia þãrii.15 Dacã Georgia a primit suport politic ºieconomic extrem de important din partea mai multor parte-neri occidentali, astfel fiind posibilã ºi ieºirea din recesiuneaeconomicã, Armenia, din cauza relaþiei sale cu FederaþiaRusã, nu a primit sprijinul necesar pentru a-ºi acoperi saupentru a recupera o parte din pierderile suportate. EduardNagdalyan confirmã teoria conform cãreia salvarea econo-micã a Georgiei a fost posibilã tocmai datoritã rãzboiuluiruso-georgian din luna august 2008. Armenia ºi Azerbaidja-nul nu s-au bucurat de asemenea resurse (Nagdalyan, 2011,127): „Pe de o parte dinamica Georgiei a avut de suferit înurma rãzboiului, dar, oricât ar pãrea de paradoxal, potrivitpãrerilor împãrtãºite de mai mulþi experþi georgieni,rãzboiul a fost cel care a salvat economia Georgiei în timpulcrizei. Aici este avut în vedere sprijinul financiar în valoarede 4,5 miliarde dolari SUA oferit de donatorii internaþionaliGeorgiei pentru depãºirea rezultatelor conflictului cu Rusia.Din aceastã sumã, 2 miliarde dolari SUA sunt parte a gran-tului oferit de cãtre Statele Unite.“ Lipsa propriilor resursenaturale, precum ºi relaþia tensionatã cu Rusia, din cauzarecunoaºterii de cãtre aceasta a independenþei Abhaziei ºiOsetiei de Sud, au orientat economia georgianã cãtre struc-turi occidentale. Pentru reintegrarea teritoriilor sale, însã,Georgia trebuie sã devinã un model de dezvoltare economi-cã realã, sã promoveze ºi sã implementeze ºi în continuarereformele economice. Transformarea trebuie sã se producãla nivel de sistem ºi nu doar separat pe anumite domenii, iarfaptul cã este susþinutã cel mai mult de comunitatea inter-naþionalã în demersul sãu de a se integra în circuitul eco-nomic mondial, nu doar de jure, ci ºi de facto, constituie unavantaj în negocierea intereselor naþionale.

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astfel sã multiplice avantajele economice ale orientãrii salepolitice cãtre Uniunea Europeanã ºi cãtre Statele Unite aleAmericii. Deºi nu dispune de resurse energetice, precumAzerbaidjanul, acest stat caucazian este atractiv prin simplulmotiv cã a reuºit sã adere la forme de integrare economicãregionale ºi internaþionale. Este stat membru al OrganizaþieiMondiale a Comerþului, conformându-se normelor, compor-tamentului ºi standardelor promovate de OMC. Renunþareala calitatea de membru al Comunitãþii Statelor Indepen-dente dupã rãzboiul din august 2008 i-a permis sã rãmânãparte a tratatelor pe care le semnase anterior. Astfel, conþi-nutul acestor documente permite ºi în continuare Georgieisã participe la o serie de schimburi economice din cadrulCSI, având posibilitatea sã-ºi promoveze bunurile pe pieþelestatelor ex-sovietice. Relaþiile dintre Georgia ºi UniuneaEuropeanã au fost oficializate în anul 1996, când a fostsemnat Acordul de Parteneriat ºi Cooperare, care prevedeaasistenþã tehnicã pentru Tbilisi ºi dezvoltarea unor raporturibiletarale în mai multe domenii, inclusiv economic. Docu-mentul a intrat în vigoare în anul 1999. Ulterior, Georgia adecis sã stabileascã drept prioritate a politicii sale integrareaîn Uniunea Europeanã. Acþiunile urmãtoare ale guvernãriide la Tbilisi au fost îndreptate spre semnarea Planului deAcþiuni Comune Georgia — UE (European Commission,2006), semnat pe 6 octombrie 2006. Ca ºi celelalte douãstate caucaziene, Georgia este parte a Parteneriatului Estic,al Politicii Europene de Vecinãtate. Georgia pare sã-ºischimbe atitudinea ºi faþã de Iran, fiind tot mai preocupatãsã se transforme într-o piaþã atractivã pentru investitoriiiranieni, dar, spre deosebire de Armenia, autoritãþile de laTbilisi au o reþea de parteneriate bilaterale mult mai diver-sificatã, ceea ce mãreºte cu mult libertatea de acþiune înbazinul Mãrii Negre.14 Pentru Georgia, parteneri importanþisunt Turcia ºi Ucraina. Parteneriatele cu aceste þãri permitaccesul produselor georgiene pe piaþa europeanã. Ulterior

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14 Interviu cu un expert în integrare europeanã, Tbilisi, mai, 2011. 15 Interviu cu un oficial, Erevan, iunie, 2011.

luarea deciziei de a exporta surplusul de capital în afarã.Dacã un investitor nu va avea deplina siguranþã cu privire lasecuritatea investiþiilor sale financiare, el va pãrãsi piaþaunde îºi desfãºoarã activitatea economicã sau nici nu o vamai accesa. Multe ramuri industriale au nevoie de acesteinjecþii financiare din afarã, deoarece ele sunt însoþite decele mai multe ori ºi de introducerea în procesul de produc-þie sau de prestare a serviciilor de implementarea celor mainoi rezultate ale progresului tehnologic. Amânarea pe ter-men nelimitat a asigurãrii protecþiei drepturilor fundamen-tale ºi, în special, a celor ce garanteazã proprietatea privatãpoate conduce la amânarea modernizãrii economiei ºi, prinricoºeu, ºi a celorlalte instituþii statale. Tranziþia la econo-mia de piaþã necesitã susþinere pentru iniþiative private dinpartea autoritãþilor, implicã supravegherea principalelor pro-cese ºi oferirea unor garanþii de securitate pentru reprezen-tanþii mediului de afaceri care decid sã se implice, investindîn sectorul privat. Iatã doar douã dintre multiplele exemple:în Azerbaidjan — casele luate pentru a construi un palat deiarnã în zona centralã — Baku16 sau în Armenia — simplaexistenþã a organizaþiei non-guvernamentale Victims of StateInterests în Erevan, care are drept scop protejarea intereselorºi a drepturilor persoanelor care au devenit victime aleintereselor de stat.17 O altã condiþie pentru a readuce stabi-litate în sistemul economiilor naþionale ale statelor sud-cau-caziene este adoptarea sau modificarea codurilor anti-monopol. Foarte mulþi agenþi economici se confruntã cuaceastã problemã: nu pot pãtrunde pe pieþe din cauza lipseicondiþiilor pentru o concurenþã loialã. În Azerbaidjan,proiectul de modificare a codului antimonopol este finanþatde Fundaþia SIDA ºi Fundaþia Eurasia. Proiectul de lege esteîn curs de adoptare. Se preconizeazã cã legea va fi ratificatãîn parlamentul azer pânã la sfârºitul lunii octombrie 2011.Problemele din domeniul legislativ îngreuneazã ºi progresul

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2. Importanþa dezvoltãrii mediului de afaceri ºi factoriicare influenþeazã evoluþia lui

Din punct de vedere economic, Caucazul de Sud poate fistudiat ca un sistem unitar regional, dar ºi separat, conformelementelor care îl formeazã. Pentru a avea imaginea deansamblu asupra regiunii, însã, a fost necesarã efectuareaunei analize retrospective pentru economia naþionalã a fie-cãrui stat sud-caucazian, pentru a depista particularitãþileºi necesitãþile interne. Nu fiecare stat va avea aceleaºi nevoieconomice. Din acest punct de vedere, Azerbaidjanul areindependenþã totalã, sau va tinde cãtre sisteme de integrareregionalã diferite, din varii motive: afinitãþi cultural-istorice,valori ºi principii împãrtãºite, independenþã sau dependenþãpoliticã. Cert este un lucru: regiunea cere o abordare com-plexã, chiar dacã existã tendinþe ale specializãrii acesteia peanumite tipuri de ramuri economice: industrie metalurgicã,industrie energeticã, industrie petrochimicã (Kavkazia.net,2011). Doar aºa se pot crea strategii fezabile pentru promo-varea unor proiecte investiþionale în regiune. Orice guver-nare democraticã trebuie sã aibã drept scop asigurarea pros-peritãþii ºi bunãstãrii cetãþenilor sãi, astfel încât aceºtia sãnu-ºi simtã ameninþate sau lezate în vreun fel interesele.Asigurarea protejãrii ºi promovãrii drepturilor ºi libertãþiloromului, garantate inclusiv prin adeziunea la diferite normeºi principii internaþionale, în urma semnãrii ºi ratificãriidocumentelor care le includ, este primul pas spre asigurareaunui dialog reuºit între stat ºi cetãþean. Respectarea drep-tului la proprietate privatã este parte a demersului spretransformarea economiilor statelor ex-sovietice ºi tranziþiala economia de piaþã. Din pãcate, în toate cele trei statesud-caucaziene existã dificultãþi în asigurarea acestui drept.Dreptul la proprietate privatã este efemer: prin Constituþieacesta este garantat, dar de facto nu se respectã. Autoritãþilecelor trei state par dezinteresate de acest aspect al activitãþiilor ºi de foarte multe ori asistãm la încãlcarea flagrantã adrepturilor elementare, ceea ce în final conduce la anulareainteresului de a investi în economia unui stat strãin sau la

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16 Interviu cu un expert în drepturile omului, Baku, iunie 2011.17 Interviu cu un expert în drepturile omului, Erevan, iunie 2011.

Deºi investitorii strãini se confruntã cu numeroase pro-bleme atunci când iau decizia de a intra pe pieþele statelordin Caucazul de Sud, totuºi aceºtia au o prezenþã importan-tã. Dacã se poate face abstracþie de nivelul înalt al corupþiei,de lacunele legislative existente, care reglementeazã dome-niul financiar sau cel cu privire la investiþiile strãine, esteimportant sã notãm cã principalul pericol pentru mãrireavolumului iniþiativelor private ar trebui sã îl constituie con-flictele îngheþate existente în regiune. În cei douãzeci de anide independenþã, fiecare stat sud-caucazian s-a confruntatcu conflicte militare deschise. Cu toate acestea, cifra investi-þiilor strãine în regiune confirmã faptul cã niciuna dintrepãrþile implicate în diferendele din regiune nu se pronunþãpentru rezolvarea acestora pe cale armatã, chiar dacã elecontinuã sã existe în timp, într-o formã latentã. Dacã peri-colul declanºãrii unor astfel de acþiuni militare ar existacu adevãrat, atunci majoritatea investitorilor strãini s-arretrage, pentru a-ºi proteja investiþiile. Fenomenul retrageriiinvestitorilor strãini are o intensitate destul de ridicatã,dar nu este argumentat de raþionamentele politice, ci maidegrabã de o politicã internã promovatã greºit, care poate firedusã la cauzele menþionate anterior: corupþie, concurenþãneloialã ºi o legislaþie care nu corespunde realitãþilor ºicerinþelor actuale ale pieþei mondiale. Încurajarea ieºiriicapitalului financiar în afara þãrii de origine poate fi unsemn al îmbunãtãþirii stãrii principalilor indici economici aiunui stat. Una dintre cele mai mari companii din Caucaz,care a reuºit sã aibã o prezenþã internaþionalã impresionan-tã prin mãrimea proiectelor pe care le desfãºoarã în afaraþãrii de origine — SOCAR19, Compania Petrolierã de Stat

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în economie. Societatea azerã e destul de conservatoare ºiacceptã cu greu noile iniþiative sau propuneri de modificarea legislaþiei, chiar dacã acest lucru este cerut de instituþiileºi organizaþiile internaþionale unde Azerbaidjanul are cali-tatea de stat membru. Dacã un proiect de lege contravineintereselor unui anumit grup de interese, atunci adoptareaºi ratificarea acestuia va întâmpina suficiente greutãþi saunu va trece de Milli Majlis.18

Mãsurile luate de autoritãþile de la Baku nu pot fi tratatedecât ca fiind populiste. Scãderea preþurilor la produselealimentare de primã necesitate nu anuleazã necesitateamodificãrii strategiei naþionale de dezvoltare a economiei.În plus, asistãm la implicarea statului în stabilirea preþurilorpe pieþe, ceea ce este inadmisibil într-un stat cu economie depiaþã. În toate cele trei state sud-caucaziene deciziile econo-mice sunt influenþate de monopoluri ºi oligolopuri. Totuºi,existã o diferenþã majorã în structura acestora: dacã înGeorgia ºi Armenia oligarhi sunt atât la guvernare, cât ºi înopoziþie, în Azerbaidjan opoziþia nu are în spate mono-poliºti sau oligarhi care sã le susþinã iniþiativele. Un lucru ecert: deciziile politice ºi economice sunt dictate de interese-le unor grupuri private. Deºi la nivel guvernamental esterecunoscutã importanþa unei strategii de luptã împotrivamonopolurilor ºi oligopolurilor, cele trei state nu dispun deprograme eficiente de luptã împotriva acestora.

Fenomenul monopolurilor ºi oligopolurilor poate fi era-dicat cu ajutorul a douã tipuri de factori:

– Interni — perceperea necesitãþii creãrii unui mediuconcurenþial sãnãtos, ceea ce presupune modificarea legis-laþiei în conformitate cu cerinþele impuse de piaþa mondialãºi organizaþiile internaþionale cu profil economic;

– Externi — „revoluþiille arabe“, care se pot extinde ºi înstatele sud-caucaziene, dacã nu vor fi luate decizii ferme deefectuare a unor reforme sistemice.

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18 Denumirea în limba azerã a Adunãrii Parlamentare a RepubliciiAzerbaidjan.

19 Compania petrolierã de stat din Azerbaidjan (SOCAR) este unadintre cele mai mari companii petroliere din lume, care acþioneazã înbaza unei politici de stat indivizibile cu scopul de a îmbunãtãþi struc-tura de administrare a industriei petroliere azere, precum ºi pentru aoferi posibilitatea de dezvoltare pentru complexul energetic petrolieral Azerbaidjanului. SOCAR a fost înfiinþatã în anul 1992 în urmafu-ziunii a douã companii petroliere de stat: Azerneft ºi Azneftkimiya.

cele trei state sud-caucaziene au semnat Planuri de AcþiuniComune cu Uniunea Europeanã ºi sunt incluse în PoliticaEuropeanã de Vecinãtate (PEV), prin intermediul Partene-riatului Estic, apãrut în cadrul PEV la iniþiativa Poloniei ºiSuediei în anul 2008 ºi implementat începând cu primãvaraanului 2009. Principalul beneficiu al unui asemenea tip decooperare intraregionalã ar fi asigurarea securitãþii econo-mice. Pentru a pune bazele unei forme de integrare regionalã,statele Caucazului de Sud trebuie sã continue reformeleîncepute acum mai bine de un deceniu, fiindcã foarte multefenomene economice negative, proprii spaþiului ex-sovietic,sunt capabile sã încetineascã ºi mai mult procesele de tre-cere la economia de piaþã, respectiv sã diminueze interesulpentru investiþii.

II. Economia politicilor energetice în Caucazulde Sud

Majoritatea disfuncþiilor în domeniul economic ºi în celal securitãþii energetice în statele din Caucazul de Sud auconexiune cu procesul de destrãmare a Uniunii Sovietice.Recunoaºterea internaþionalã a independenþei politice nua condiþionat în manierã obligatorie ºi obþinerea indepen-denþei economice sau energetice faþã de noua moºtenitoarede jure a Uniunii Sovietice, adicã faþã de Federaþia Rusã,care ºi-a menþinut influenþa în Caucazul de Sud prin diferiteproiecte ºi iniþiative regionale cu caracter economic. În plus,infrastructura energeticã învechitã ºi lipsa mijloacelor finan-ciare pentru efectuarea unor modernizãri imediate a anulataproape în întregime posibilitatea de a dezvolta acest sector.Dacã mai adãugãm ºi privatizarea incorectã a reþelelor dedistribuire a produselor energetice finale sau rãmânereaacestora în proprietatea statului, prea puþin preocupat dereforme în domeniu, atunci vom asista la creionarea unuitablou dezolant al unuia dintre cele mai importante sectoareale economiei, a cãrui disfuncþie poate contribui, în final,la apariþia unor tulburãri sociale, aºa cum s-a întâmplat la

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din Azerbaidjan — a iniþiat numeroase proiecte energeticeîn afara Azerbaidjanului.

Lupta împotriva corupþiei este un alt element indis-pensabil transformãrii calitative a mediului de afaceri aloricãrui stat. În Azerbaidjan, combaterea acestui flagel s-aintensificat dupã declanºarea revoluþiilor arabe. Autoritãþilede la Baku au venit cu iniþiativa de a crea un ComitetAnticorupþie, care a atins rezultate mai mult la nivel local.Lupta împotriva corupþiei la nivel înalt ºi nivel mic inclusivrãmâne o problemã. Cu o situaþie similarã se confruntã ºiGeorgia, diferenþa o face contracararea acestui fenomen lanivel mic. Georgia a avansat foarte mult în lupta împotrivaactelor de corupþie, fiind unul dintre liderii regionali în com-baterea acestui fenomen negativ, care influenþeazã foartemult deciziile oamenilor de afaceri atunci când aceºtia anal-izeazã nivelul de siguranþã al unor potenþiale investiþii. Înplus, fenomenul corupþiei este unul dintre factorii care vorfrîna foarte mult procesul de liberalizare a regimului de vizecu Uniunea Europeanã.20 Cu toate acestea, în cele trei statesud-caucaziene, fenomenul este un element cotidian. Eradi-carea lui se face mai mult prin declaraþii oficiale decât prinaplicarea unor acþiuni concrete.

Cei douãzeci de ani de independenþã nu au creat condi-þiile necesare pentru construirea unui spaþiu economiccomun în regiunea Caucazului de Sud. Aceastã trãsãturãa zonei are la bazã existenþa mai multor divergenþe politiceîntre actorii statali care o formeazã, precum ºi intereseleparticulare, modalitatea de abordare a problemelor cu carese confruntã sau relaþia cu marile puteri ale lumii cu interesegeostrategice în regiune. Crearea unui asemenea spaþiu eco-nomic comun, dupã modelul european, de exemplu, ar con-duce inevitabil la creºterea atractivitãþii Caucazului de Sudpentru potenþiali investitori occidentali ºi asiatici. Deasemenea, ar crea precondiþii pentru accederea în formatede integrare economicã: europene sau internaþionale. Toate

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20 Interviu cu un expert, Tbilisi, mai 2011.

între Azerbaidjan ºi Armenia sau între Federaþia Rusã ºiGeorgia, ele au atras atenþia opiniei publice internaþionaleasupra proceselor ºi fenomenelor care s-au derulat înregiune. Petrolul ºi gazele naturale sunt cele douã elementecare transformã Caucazul de Sud, fãcându-l atractiv pentruinvestiþii politice ºi financiare; incapacitatea autoritãþilor dea gestiona diferendele guvernare/opoziþie, precum ºi lacunelelegislative în domeniul investiþional, cumulate cu prezenþamonopolurilor ºi a corupþiei, diminueazã posibilitãþile deimplementare a celor mai noi rezultate tehnologice ºi astfelmodernizarea economiei rãmâne ceva incert. Caucazul deSud dispune de multiple posibilitãþi de dezvoltare ºi nimeninu poate contesta aceastã trãsãturã a zonei. Pe aici trecprincipalele rute de transport Est-Vest ºi Nord-Sud pentrumãrfuri ºi bunuri de consum, se fac conexiuni între Europaºi Asia, se creeazã oportunitãþi pentru a ameliora cãile deacces spre resursele energetice din bazinul Mãrii Caspice,atât de necesare pentru industriile statelor dezvoltate.Promovarea unor politici energetice independente, care audrept scop promovarea interesului naþional, ºi nu a celui alelitelor aflate la conducere, este o condiþie esenþialã pentrumodernizarea economicã.

1. Resurse energetice, economie ºi politici energetice

Dupã colapsul Uniunii Sovietice ºi rãzboiul armeano-azer,care i-a urmat imediat, pe parcursul cãruia Federaþia Rusãa susþinut cauza Armeniei, cea din urmã s-a confruntat cumari probleme de ordin economic, dar mai ales cu o crizãenergeticã acutã. Azerbaidjanul a sistat livrãrile de gazenaturale cãtre Armenia, ceea ce a întrerupt alimentarea co-respunzãtoare a gazoductului construit pe teritoriul Georgieiºi a oprit activitatea trenurilor pe ruta de cale feratã caretrecea prin Abhazia ºi unea Rusia cu Georgia ºi Armenia.Deºi pe parcursul celor douãzeci de ani de independenþã,autoritãþile de la Erevan s-au bucurat de susþinere din parteaKremlinului, bunele raporturi diplomatice între cei doi actorinu au reuºit sã compenseze efectele negative ale izolãrii

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începutul ultimului deceniu al secolului trecut în timpulcrizei economice din anul 1998. Politicile ºi strategiile ener-getice ale celor trei state au trecut prin procese de transfor-mare dificile, conducând de multe ori la declanºarea unorcrize acute, ale cãror consecinþe au fost resimþite cel maimult de cãtre cetãþeni. Infrastructura industrialã ºi energe-ticã slabã, moºtenitã de la URSS, sistemul instituþionalimperfect, o elitã politicã nepregãtitã pentru noile provocãriºi nevoi sociale, precum ºi necesitatea acceptãrii ºi asumãriinoilor statute de state independente au dus la accentuareacrizelor economice în tot spaþiul ex-sovietic. Implementareaeficientã a unor strategii de securitate energeticã presupuneutilizarea unui complex de mecanisme ºi instrumente, atâtîn dimensiunea externã, cât ºi în cea internã, pentru reali-zarea cu succes a obiectivelor strategice din domeniul ener-getic (Infosfera, Bucureºti, 2011). Dar ele nu au fost capabilesã facã faþã tuturor provocãrilor. Toate acestea, cumulate ºicu distribuþia neuniformã a resurselor naturale, au stat labaza diferenþierii ritmului de transformare sistemicã calita-tivã a acestor state, precum ºi la apariþia unei ierarhizãri înceea ce priveºte importanþa alegerii vectorilor de orientarepoliticã: unele au reuºit sã se conecteze la forme de coope-rare europene, altele încã oscileazã între Est ºi Vest ºi întreforme de integrare economicã regionalã. Un sistem economicdevine stabil în momentul în care toate componentele aces-tuia sunt asigurate cu resurse pentru o bunã funcþionare.Politica energeticã este componenta de bazã a oricãreieconomii dezvoltate. Fãrã promovarea unor iniþiative bineargumentate în acest domeniu, nicio formaþiune politicã nuva reuºi sã implementeze punctele incluse în programele deguvernare ºi, în consecinþã, va alimenta ºi mai mult nemul-þumirea electoratului. Cum menþionam anterior, Caucazulde Sud dispune de numeroase resurse energetice de maimulte tipuri, însã distribuþia inegalã a acestora a fost fac-torul determinant al stabilirii conþinutului raporturilor mul-tilaterale ºi bilaterale între componentele regiunii. Cumulatecu diferendele de ordin politic, adicã cu conflictele existente

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din Japonia, în urma cãruia a avut mult de suferit centralanuclearã de la Fukushima. Pãrerile sunt împãrþite în funcþiede interesele ºi resursele pe care le deþin statele prezente înregiune — Franþa, Marea Britanie, Rusia, Ucraina ºiRomânia nu vor renunþa la energia nuclearã ºi vor consoli-da aceastã ramurã.22 Pe de altã parte, este corectã ºi opiniaconform cãreia majoritatea proiectelor energetice, mai alescele prin care alimentarea conductelor de gaze naturale ºipetrol se face din Azerbaidjan, ocolesc Armenia. Nu estecea mai bunã soluþie a politicii energetice azere, pentru cãmãreºte considerabil cheltuielile pentru dezvoltarea pro-iectelor petroliere regionale. Aceastã atitudine, deºi nu esteargumentatã din punct de vedere economic, are susþinerepoliticã, inclusiv internaþionalã, din cauza conflictului dinNagorno-Karabah. Soluþia nu rãmâne decât orientareaspre lumea arabã, adicã spre acelaºi Iran cu care Armeniaintenþiona sã semneze câteva tratate în domeniul energetic,care distoneazã cu interesele de politicã externã ale Federa-þiei Ruse în regiune. Proiectul conductei de tranzit pentrugaze naturale Iran-Armenia era o alternativã realã pentruprodusele energetice de origine rusã. Reprezentanþii de laKremlin au luat decizia de a susþine financiar consumurilede gaze naturale ale cetãþenilor armeni, transferând în con-turile guvernului Armeniei compensaþii parþiale pentru noiletarife care urmau sã se majoreze în perioada 2009-2011,dar ºi sã finanþeze o parte din lucrãrile la conducta Iran-Armenia, fãcând investiþii de aproximativ 550 milioane.dolari SUA. Este un rãspuns energetic care are drept scopfinal susþinerea propriilor obiective politice. Cele douã statepartenere, implicate în dezvoltarea proiectului, au conti-nuat lucrãrile. Datele oficiale despre proiect susþin cã peaici ar putea fi livrate cãtre Armenia 2,3 miliarde metri cubide gaze naturale, ceea ce ar putea asigura în întregime nece-sitãþile interne ale agenþilor economici armeni.23 Curios la

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politico-economice a acestui stat sud-caucazian. Spre deo-sebire de Azerbaidjan, Armenia nu dispune de resurse depetrol ºi gaze naturale, necesarul de hidrocarburi internatât pentru consumatorii finali, cât ºi pentru agenþii eco-nomici este asigurat cu resurse din Federaþia Rusã. În anul1997 a fost creatã o companie cu capital mixt ruso-armean,numitã SA „ArmRosGazprom“, ce avea drept scop oficialrefacerea infrastructurii energetice a Armeniei, precum ºireluarea livrãrilor de gaze naturale prin singura conductãde gaze naturale funcþionalã, care unea Georgia cu sistemulenergetic rusesc spre nord ºi cel armean spre sud. Astfel,Rusia a reuºit sã restabileascã sistemul energetic al Ereva-nului. Din pãcate pentru economia armeanã, Rusia a reuºitulterior sã achiziþioneze pânã la 80% din acþiunile Com-paniei „ArmRosGazprom“, care, din cauza tipologiei deconstituire — societate pe acþiuni de tip închis — nu aputut avea ºi alþi cumpãrãtori. Chiar dacã relaþia bilateralãRusia-Armenia continua sã parã una privilegiatã, necesitateaadoptãrii unor mãsuri suplimentare de asigurare a proprieisecuritãþi energetice era iminentã. Existã mai multe posibi-litãþi de a diversifica numãrul de furnizori de produse ener-getice, dar toate ar trebui sã aibã drept scop final obþinereaindependenþei faþã de Rusia: „Considerãm cã este necesarãobþinerea unei alternative energetice la cea ruseascã, deaceea este util sã ne apropiem de România ºi Bulgaria“21.ªi reprezentanþii mediului academic par sã confirme ideeaconform cãreia Federaþia Rusã este deranjatã de iniþiativeleenergetice ale autoritãþilor armene. Potrivit opiniei publicede la Erevan, securitatea energeticã a statului nu trebuie sãse bazeze doar pe petrol ºi gaze. Strategia energeticã trebuiesã fie diversificatã ºi sã susþinã ºi în continuare iniþiativeleprivate care doresc multiplicarea potenþialului energetic dinsurse alternative: solarã, eolianã ºi hidroenergie. De aseme-nea, autoritãþile de la Erevan vor susþine ºi în continuaredezvoltarea energiei nucleare. Dezbaterea la nivel inter-naþional a luat amploare dupã cutremurul din martie 2011

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21 Interviu cu un oficial, iunie 2011, Erevan.

22 Interviu cu un expert în securitate energeticã, Bucureºti, 2011.23 Interacþiunea ruso-armeanã ºi problemele regionale. Materiale ale con-

ferinþei internaþionale din 5 iunie 2010, Erevan, NAAPET, 2011, 19.

intenþiile de a începe lucrãrile la un nou proiect energetic:construcþia unei noi centrale nucleare. Primii paºi în aceastãdirecþie au fost fãcuþi în anul 2009, când parlamentariiarmeni au votat legea cu privire la creare unei companiiruso-armene „Metsamorenergoatom“, care va construi nouacentralã. Costurile proiectului ating cifra de 5 miliardedolari SUA, cu o perioadã de uzurã de 60 de ani. Aceastãcentralã atomo-electricã se preconizeazã a fi datã în exploa-tare în anul 2016. Ea va asigura o parte din nesesarul intern,însã acesta este insuficient pentru toatã economia armeanã.Iatã de ce autoritãþile de la Erevan au decis sã sprijine acestproiect de construcþie a centralei atomo-electrice cu capitalrusesc, deºi iniþial se preconiza ca investiþia de capital sãaibã origine germano-americanã. Pentru a obþine sprijinulamerican ºi german pentru aceastã iniþiativã era necesarãincluderea Georgiei în proiect, ceea ce ar fi condus ºi laîmbunãtãþirea vizibilitãþii politice a Armeniei în regiune.Colaborarea în domeniul energiei nucleare reprezintã onouã etapã a colaborãrii ruso-armene. În acest scop a fostînfiinþatã în anul 2008 o altã companie mixtã, care are dreptdomeniu de activitate efectuarea unor cercetãri geologice,precum ºi extracþia de uraniu ºi alte minerale de pe teritoriulArmeniei. Aceastã companie poartã denumirea de „Com-pania ruso-armeanã pentru extracþii miniere“, iar în prezentse lucreazã la conectarea juridicã a Erevanului la lucrãrileproiectului Centrului internaþional de îmbogãþire a uraniu-lui de la Angarsk.25

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acest proiect este faptul cã, în prezent, tot necesarul de gazenaturale al Armeniei este asigurat de Rusia prin gazoductulcare trece pe teritoriul Georgiei. Dupã reluarea relaþiiloreconomice bilaterale între Moscova ºi Tbilisi, Erevanul areuºit sã-ºi stabilizeze sistemul energetic. Cu toate acestea,livrãrile prin gazoductul armeano-iranian continuã. Resur-sele energetice ajung pe teritoriul Armeniei, unde sunttransformate în energie electricã în centralele de profilarmene, iar apoi sunt exportate înapoi spre Iran.24 Armeniaîºi doreºte sã dezvolte politici energetice viabile. Condiþiileinterne ºi natura relaþiilor cu statele vecine cer luarea unormãsuri concrete, lucru menþionat ºi mai sus. Dupã dezas-trul de la Fukushima, subiectul utilizãrii energiei nuclearea fost supus dezbaterii publice tot mai intens. Mai multestate, în frunte cu Germania, ºi-au arãtat disponibilitateapentru renunþarea la acest tip de surse energetice pe termenmediu, dar nu ºi Armenia, pe teritoriul cãreia se gãseºteuna dintre cele mai periculoase centrale nucleare: cea de laMetsamor. Centrala are peste 30 de ani ºi este localizatãîntr-o zonã seismicã sensibilã (World Nuclear Association,2010), la doar 30 de kilometri de capitala Erevan. În 2007,autoritãþile armene au adoptat o nouã strategie energeticã,însã conþinutul ei confirmã faptul cã statul nu va renunþala acest tip de energie, în pofida faptului cã Uniunea Euro-peanã îi sugereazã Armeniei sã renunþe treptat la energianuclearã. (European Commission a, 2006, 8). Aceeaºirecomandare va fi reluatã ºi prin conþinutul rapoartelorde evaluare a Planului de Acþiuni Comune Armenia-UE(A1plus.am, 2011). Datã fiind situaþia energeticã aArmeniei, adicã existenþa unui numãr minim de partenerienergetici, Erevanul nu aratã deschidere spre renunþareala dezvoltarea unor asemenea centrale, mai ales cã dispunede cantitãþi suficiente de uraniu, care se gãsesc pe teritoriulþãrii. În anul 2006, guvernul armean ºi-a fãcut publice

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24 Interacþiunea ruso-armeanã ºi problemele regionale. Materiale ale con-ferinþei internaþionale din 5 iunie 2010, Erevan, NAAPET, 2011, 19.

25 Centrul internaþional de îmbogãþire a uraniului din Angarsk –prima reuniune a Comisiei pentru înfiinþarea Centrului internaþionalde îmbogãþire a uraniului a avut loc în anul 2006, fiind organizatã decãtre compania ruseascã Rosatom. În cadrul primei reuniuni au fostdiscutate conceptul, forma juridicã, precum ºi viitoarele colaborãri aleCentrului cu Agenþia Internaþionalã pentru Energie Atomicã (AIEA).Acest centru face parte dintr-o reþea de centre internaþionale pentrustudierea procesului de îmbogãþire a uraniului. Centrul din Angarsktrebuia iniþial sã trateze doar uraniu produs în Rusia ºi Kazahstan. Eleste situat în apropierea lacului Baikal, în Siberia.

mici ºi mijlocii, care nu angajeazã financiar excesiv de multcompania. Aceasta poate explica de ce pânã acum SOCARa achiziþonat doar câteva benzinãrii în zona Moldovei dinRomânia. SOCAR negociazã, de asemenea, intrarea pe piaþadin Bulgaria, Serbia, Ucraina, precum ºi Republica Moldova.În Bulgaria, reprezentanþii companiei de stat azere SOCARnegociazã preluarea activelor singurei rafinãrii de petrolNeftochim, controlatã de compania rusã Lukoil. Procesulde negociere al achiziþiei activelor companiei Neftochim aînceput pe fondul disputei dintre autoritãþile vamale bulgarecu reprezentanþii companiei Lukoil, când ruºilor le-a fostretrasã temporar licenþa fiindcã nu au reuºit sã contorizezeprocesul de producþie în termenul negociat cu autoritãþilebulgare. În final, divergenþele au condus la sistarea tuturoractivitãþilor de prelucrare a þiþeiului la rafinãria din Burgaspentru o perioadã de o lunã ºi jumãtate (Vedomosti, 2011).

Interesul pentru piaþa Republicii Moldova nu este nou ºinici întâmplãtor. La finele anului 2003 compania Azpetrolintra pe piaþa Moldovei, intenþionând sã preia construcþiaterminalului de la Giurgiuleºti, iar mai apoi sã construiascão reþea de staþii de alimentare în toatã þara. Pentru Azpetrolcucerirea pieþei Republicii Moldova însemna o oportunitateextraordinarã pentru a pãtrunde pe pieþele europene. Darcompania ºi-a încetat în cel mai scurt timp activitãþile.Cauzele acestui fenomen þin de evenimente interne care auavut loc în viaþa politicã din Azerbaidjan. Compania Azpetrolse afla sub conducerea Ministerului Dezvoltãrii Economieia Republicii Azerbaidjan. În luna octombrie 2005 ministrulDezvoltãrii Economice în exerciþiu de la Baku, FarhadAliyev (Aze.az, 2007a) era arestat, fiind acuzat de organi-zarea unei lovituri de stat ºi depãºirea atribuþiilor de servi-ciu. Ulterior a fost arestat ºi fratele acestuia, Rafik Aliyev,ex-preºedintele companiei Azpetrol, fiind acuzat de spãlarede bani. Recent, acesta a fost pus în libertate.

În prezent compania Azpetrol are o prezenþã redusãchiar ºi pe piaþa internã, limitându-se doar la administrareaa 66 staþii de alimentare cu petrol ºi cinci care funcþioneazã

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Pe parcursul celor douãzeci de ani de independenþã,politica energeticã a Azerbaidjanului a fost permanent învizorul autoritãþilor. Ea s-a aflat în slujba promovãrii intere-selor de politicã externã ºi a fost un instrument eficient înmenþinerea unor relaþii stabile cu majoritatea partenerilor.De fapt, politica energeticã a administraþiei de la Baku tindesã diversifice reþeaua de clienþi pentru resursele energeticede care dispune. Este o atitudine corectã ºi responsabilã,spun specialiºtii în transparenþa utilizãrii veniturilor prove-nite din comercializarea petrolului, tot ei adãugând cã politi-ca energeticã agresivã promovatã astãzi de Azerbaidjan estecea mai bunã strategie de stat, care se implementeazã cuajutorul Companiei petroliere de stat din Azerbaidjan —SOCAR. Rezultatele nu au doar caracter economic, ci maiales geopolitic, ele devenind deja vizibile la nivel regional.Agresivitatea energeticã este cea mai importantã compo-nentã a politicii externe azere.26 Ea le oferã independenþãautoritãþilor în procesul de luare a deciziilor politice nu doarîn spaþiul Caucazului de Sud, transformând Azerbaidjanulîntr-un stat care dispune de resursele necesare pentru sus-þinerea unui anumit tip de negociere. Pentru România,compania azerã SOCAR este foarte importantã pentruinvestiþiile în proiecte energetice bilaterale. În viitorulapropiat, SOCAR intenþioneazã sã construiascã peste 300de staþii de alimentare pe teritoriul României. Conform de-claraþiilor reprezentanþilor companiei SOCAR în România,pãtrunderea companiei azere pe piaþa româneascã va con-tribui la scãderea preþurilor carburanþilor. Existã disponibi-litate politicã, existã potenþial economic pentru a dezvoltaaceste proiecte, dar conducerea companiei azere SOCAReste foarte precautã în ceea ce priveºte investiþiile externe.Unul dintre argumentele pentru adoptarea unei asemeneaatitudini sunt negocierile dintre ruºi ºi azeri pe proiecteenergetice, al cãror conþinut nu este fãcut public, iar strate-gia adoptatã are urmãtorul algoritm: investiþii în proiecte

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26 Interviu cu un expert economic, Baku, iunie 2011.

se confruntã astãzi Azerbaidjanul se referã la transparenþadistribuirii veniturilor care provin din sectorul energetic.Accesul la informaþia publicã despre modul în care sunt chel-tuite finanþele publice acumulate în urma comercializãrii deproduse energetice este limitat, iar administrarea acestoranu este eficientã. Astfel, transparenþa actului decizional,care ar trebui sã fie proprie unui sistem democratic, este unprincipiu declarativ, greu de implementat. Interesele privatedominã asupra intereselor naþionale. Economia Azerbaidja-nului este în întregime dependentã de sectorul energetic,chiar dacã autoritãþile de la Baku insistã asupra faptului cãºi celelalte sectoare ale economiei se bucurã de atenþie dinpartea guvernãrii. Întrebarea care apare aici este urmãtoarea:ce se va întâmpla cu o economie dependentã de petrol ºigaze peste douãzeci de ani? Specialiºtii în transparenþaveniturilor din sectorul energetic insistã asupra faptului cãdoar 15% din bugetul de stat al Azerbaidjanului este formatdin taxe ºi impozite, iar restul de 85% este format din plãþiprovenite din contractele energetice ale statului. Printrespecialiºtii în economie este tot mai des vehiculatã ideeacã petrolul azer se transformã într-un „blestem al Azerbai-djanului“. Explicaþia este logicã ºi destul de accesibilã: re-sursele petroliere, precum ºi gazele naturale sunt epuizabile,deci limitate în timp, dar autoritãþile nu percep acest lucruatunci când direcþioneazã economia statului spre o singurãramurã industrialã. Fondul Petrolier de Stat al RepubliciiAzerbaidjanului (State Oil Fund of the Republic of Azer-baijan, 2011)29 a fost creat în 1999. Prognozele susþineau

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pe bazã de gaze naturale (Azpetrol, 2011). SOCAR era unuldintre potenþialii cumpãrãtori, care ducea tratative pentrua prelua activele companiei Azpetrol.27 Pentru a diminuaefectele negative ale crizei economice mondiale, companiaSOCAR a fost cea care a finanþat sectorul non-petrolier dinAzerbaidjan. Astfel, în anul 2010 peste 60% din investiþiiledin Republica Azerbaidjan au avut origine internã. Cu toateacestea, ramurile industriei azere care nu au conexiune direc-tã cu sectorul energetic continuã sã sufere de o finanþareinsuficientã.

Probleme apar atunci când se face distribuirea incorectãa acestor venituri, iar alte ramuri economice primesc resursefinanciare insuficiente pentru a putea implementa rezul-tatele modernizãrii economice în industria uºoarã sau agri-culturã, spre exemplu. Desigur, actuala politicã energeticãa Azerbaidjanului permite autoritãþilor sã jongleze printreobiectivele geostrategice ale marilor actori în regiune, sus-þinând inclusiv propriile demersuri de transformare a aces-tui stat sud-caucazian în veriga principalã a regiunii, caretrebuie sã fie consultat atunci când se iau decizii cu privirela vectorii de politicã externã a actorilor din Caucazul de Sud.Disponibilitatea celorlalþi lideri de a consulta autoritãþilede la Baku cu privire la evoluþia regiunii este, dupã cum ammenþionat anterior, unul dintre rezultatele promovãrii uneipolitici energetice corecte. Nimeni nu poate nega cã în acestdomeniu conducerea azerã a fãcut progrese considerabile,asigurându-ºi astfel un dialog stabil inclusiv cu Moscova.Interesele cu caracter economic sunt cel puþin la fel deimportante ca ºi cele politice. Este dificil pentru guvernareade la Baku sã echilibreze interesele energetice, economice,precum ºi pe cele politice ale marilor puteri în regiuneaCaucazului de Sud, ºi cu toate acestea se dezvoltã tendinþepozitive în aceastã direcþie.28 Una dintre problemele cu care

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27 Interviu cu un expert economic ºi un expert în transparenþa fondurilor provenite din vânzãrile de produse petroliere, Baku, iunie2011.

28 Interviu cu un analist politic, iunie 2011, Baku.

29 Fondul Petrolier de Stat al Republicii Azerbaidjan (SOFAZ) afost creat prin Decretul Preºedintelui Republicii Azerbaidjan „Desprecrearea Fondului Petrolier de Stat al Republicii Azerbaidjan“, emis pe29 decembrie 1999. SOFAZ a fost creat pentru a contribui la asigu-rarea egalitãþii între generaþii în ceea ce priveºte beneficiile care potapãrea în urma exploatãrii resurselor de petrol ale þãrii. Demersulpentru bunãstarea economicã de astãzi trebuie sã conducã la asigu-rarea stabilitãþii economice pentru generaþiile viitoare — aceasta estefilosofia Fondului Petrolier de Stat al Republicii Azerbaidjan.

actuale, cãrora, de cele mai multe ori, le lipsesc studiile defezabilitate bine argumentate, chiar dacã acestea sunt elabo-rate de parteneri externi. De exemplu, studiul de fezabilitatepentru conducta de alimentare a oraºului Baku cu apã pota-bilã a fost efectuat cu ajutorul companiei CES ConsultingEngineers, Germania ºi a costat peste 2,1 milioane AZN.Dar nu toate proiectele susþinute financiar prin SOFAZ suntgândite pe termen lung. Banii sunt investiþi, ei formeazã uncircuit economic care însã produce rentabilitate de moment,pe termen scurt ºi de care nu se vor putea bucura generaþiileviitoare. Concluzia primarã este cã guvernul azer nu gân-deºte în termeni de sustenabilitate economicã. Diversificareasurselor energetice este una dintre posibilitãþi, dar diversifi-carea producerii de bunuri ºi servicii ºi susþinerea celor exis-tente deja, care nu au nicio conexiune cu domeniul energetic,e singura ºansã pentru asigurarea securitãþii economico-socialeºi, nu în ultimul rând, a stabilitãþii politice. Concentrareaagenþilor economici în oraºe, în special în capitala Baku,diminueazã posibilitatea efectuãrii unor investiþii majore înprovincie. Despre acest lucru vorbesc ºi taxele colectate înbugetul statului: 93% din taxele ºi impozitele colectate aufost vãrsate în bugetul statului de la agenþi economici cuadresã juridicã în capitala Azerbaidjanului — oraºul Baku.Ponderea provinciei este de doar 7%.

Georgia nu e un stat independent din punct de vedereenergetic. De cele mai multe ori, ea este somatã de cãtresocietatea civilã sã facã anumite concesii politice tocmaipentru a-ºi asigura stabilitatea energeticã. Dependenþa deresursele energetice ruseºti s-a resimþit de-a lungul celordouãzeci de ani de independenþã, însã acest lucru nu a pre-judiciat interesul pentru promovarea unei politici energeticede stat bazate pe divesrificarea surselor de aprovizionare cunecesarul de hidrocarburi sau gaze naturale din alte surse.De cele mai multe ori, opinia publicã internaþionalã estetentatã sã asocieze acest stat caucazian cu proteste, încãl-carea drepturilor omului ºi conflictul ruso-georgian din lunaaugust 2008, dupã consumarea cãruia autoritãþile de la Tbilisi

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cã în anul 2011 în Fondul Petrolier de Stat vor fi acumulatepeste 30 miliarde dolari SUA, cu 10 miliarde dolari SUAmai mult decât în anul 2009 (ABC.az, 2011c). Cifra prog-nozatã a fost depãºitã în luna iulie curent. Astfel, conformdatelor prezentate de reprezentanþii SOFAZ pe 28 iunie2011, activele Fondului Petrolier de Stat au atins cifra de30,2 miliarde dolari SUA (ABC.az, 2011d). Mãrirea active-lor Fondului a fost posibilã, adaugã reprezentanþii SOFAZ,datoritã implementrãrii cu succes a strategiei petroliere na-þionale, elaboratã de liderul Heydar Alyev (ABC.az, 2011d).În anul 2050, suma care se va acumula în acest fond alviitorului se preconizeazã cã va atinge cifra de 50 miliardedolari SUA. Fondul Petrolier de Stat în care se acumuleazãfondurile din contractele de vânzare a produselor petroliereeste administrat ineficient, sunt de pãrere experþii în trans-parenþa fondurilor de stat, deoarece banii sunt destinaþiunor proiecte mult prea ambiþioase, pe care autoritãþile nule vor putea implementa. Printre proiectele finanþate deSOFAZ se numãrã o serie de iniþiative destinate reformãriisistemului educaþional al þãrii ºi în special pentru atragereatinerilor care au studiat în strãinãtate, susþinere financiarãpentru proiectul de construire a unei noi rute de cale feratãBaku-Tbilisi-Kars, proiectul de construire a unei conductede transport a apei potabile din regiunea Oguz-Obala, careva alimenta capitala Baku ºi care este foarte dificil de imple-mentat din cauza unei infrastructuri foarte slab dezvoltate,precum ºi o serie de iniþiative destinate sã amelioreze situaþiarefugiaþilor din regiunea Nagorno-Karabah. Din anul 2001pânã în prezent, SOFAZ a alocat peste 765 milioane AZNpentru îmbunãtãþirea condiþiilor de trai ale refugiaþilorstabiliþi în diferite regiuni ale Azerbaidjanului, dar în specialîn oraºul Baku. Utilitatea Fondului Petrolier de Stat al Repu-blicii Azerbaidjan e pusã sub semnul întrebãrii în condiþiileîn care doar 5% din totalul de resurse financiare care ajungacolo sunt destinate pentru proiecte pe termen lung, adicãinvestiþii în viitor, în urmãtoarele generaþii, susþin experþiieconomici. Celelalte 95% sunt distribuite pentru proiecte

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tranzit din orice proiect energetic deoarece, având dreptobiectiv de bazã obþinerea independenþei energetice faþã deRusia, autoritãþile sunt tentate sã neglijeze capitolul carecuprinde securitatea mediului, adicã ecologia. Dezvoltareaproiectului AGRI ar putea întâmpina ostilitate din parteasocietãþii civile tocmai din aceste considerente. Importantde notat aic este cã oficialii georgieni se pronunþã în conti-nuare ºi pentru dezvoltarea unor iniþiative care promoveazãutilizarea energiei regenerabile, adicã 90% din consumul deenergie sã fie asigurat de hidroenergie, în condiþiile în careUniunea Europeanã nu impune un consum total mai marede 20% de energie regenerabilã necesar sectorului econo-mic.31 Începând cu anul 2006 Georgia devine exportator deenergie electricã, iar principalii consumatori sunt FederaþiaRusã, Armenia, Azerbaidjan, Turcia. ªi dupã august 2008,Rusia rãmâne principalul consumator de energie electricãprodusã de Georgia, care va continua sã-ºi dezvolte cen-tralele hidroelectrice. Dacã la Tbilisi se vehiculeazã ideeacã ar exista posibilitatea ca domeniul hidroelectroenergeticsã constituie elementul de bazã al restabilirii dialogului întreAbhazia ºi Georgia, la Suhumi opiniile sunt împãrþite. Con-textul politic nu permite acest lucru. Directorul centraleihidroelectrice de pe râul Inguri, Rezo Zantaria, declara înnoiembrie 2008 cã aceastã centralã intrã sub jurisdicþiaautoritãþilor abhaze, pe care Tbilisi nu le-a recunoscut dupãproclamarea independenþei ºi recunoaºterea acesteia de cãtreautoritãþile ruse. Din aceste considerente, autoritãþile geor-giene nu au dreptul sã demareze procedura de privatizare acentralei hidroelectrice, cu participarea unor investitori dinAzerbaidjan. „Geografic, Centrala hidroelectricã de la Ingurise aflã la hotarul dintre Abhazia ºi Georgia, acest lucru estebine cunoscut pãrþii azere“ (Kavkaz Uzel, 2008), a adãugatRezo Zantaria. Încã mai persistã teama, din partea autori-tãþilor georgiene, cã, dupã rãzboiul din august 2008, Rusiava reuºi sã-ºi însuºeascã obiectivul energetic, dar autoritãþile

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au decis sã iasã din Comunitatea Statelor Independente,rãmânând afiliate la aceastã formã de cooperare regionalãdoar prin intermediul tratatelor deja semnate. Strategia ener-geticã a Georgiei se bazeazã pe o filosofie de acþiune simplã:diversificarea surselor de aprovizionare a necesarului de pro-duse energetice atât pentru sectorul economic, cât ºi pentruconsumatorii finali, cu o uºoarã orientare cãtre integrareapropriului sistem energetic în proiectele susþinute deUniunea Europeanã. Spre deosebire de Republica Moldovaºi Ucraina, Georgia încã nu a semnat Tratatul ComunitarEnergetic (Energy Community Treaty), dar a fost acceptatã încalitate de observator al Comunitãþii Energetice Europenepe 18 decembrie 2007 (Energy Community, 2007). Întâr-zierea participãrii Georgiei la diferitele iniþiative europenecu caracter energetic, explicã experþii georgieni, are ºi oconotaþie geograficã, nu doar politicã. Republica Moldova ºiUcraina au frontiere comune cu Uniunea Europeanã ºi estemai uºor pentru acestea sã acceseze diferitele programe des-tinate statelor incluse în Politica Europeanã de Vecinãtate ºinu numai.30 Conexiunea la proiectele energetice ale UniuniiEuropene pentru Georgia va deveni posibilã prin interme-diul Turciei. Dar, pentru a obþine independenþã energeticãfaþã de Federaþia Rusã, autoritãþile de la Tbilisi trebuie sãarmonizeze legislaþia ce reglementeazã domeniul energeticîn conformitate cu standardele ºi normele Uniunii Europene.Deºi UE pare sã nu fie tentatã sã promoveze solidaritateregionalã în domeniul energetic, mai ales dupã crizele eco-nomice repetate, care au avut loc mai mulþi ani consecutivdin cauza înrãutãþirii raporturilor politice dintre Ucraina ºiFederaþia Rusã, beneficiile pe care le-ar obþine Georgia princonectarea la iniþiative energetice europene ar putea aveaun caracter pe termen lung, pentru cã ele vor supune trans-formãrii inclusiv parametrii tehnici ai sistemului energeticgeorgian. Experþii georgieni în domeniul eficienþei energe-tice trebuie sã fie atenþi la capitolul care cuprinde rutele de

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30 Interviu cu un expert în domeniul energetic, Tbilisi, mai 2011. 31 Interviu cu un expert în domeniul energetic, Tbilisi, mai 2011.

ameninþã cu acþiuni de protest care vor avea drept finalitateschimbarea actualei guvernãri. Acþiunea nu a avut finalita-tea presupusã de liderii opoziþiei. Adesea actuala guvernaredin Georgia este acuzatã de limitarea formelor de protestale opoziþiei, însã protestele care au avut la bazã o motivaþieenergeticã nu s-au bucurat de aceeaºi atitudine ca cele dinluna mai 2011, spre exemplu. În Caucazul de Sud, promo-varea unor politici energetice ºi a unor strategii de dez-voltare eficientã a sectorului energetic, care stã la baza uneibune funcþionãri a întregului sistem economic, este o nece-sitate vitalã. Dar, fãrã a-i asigura resursele necesare pentrudezvoltarea infrastructurii în domeniul supus dezbaterii,orice politicã publicã devine inutilã. Condiþia de bazã pentrua înregistra un progres este crearea unor condiþii adecvatepentru apariþia voinþei politice, iar aceasta se educã pe par-curs, transformând erorile în succese.

2. Proiecte energetice ºi coridoare de transport în Caucazulde Sud

Caucazul de Sud a reuºit sã atragã atenþia marilor puteriprin intermediul mai multor elemente, capabile sã contribuiela atingerea unor obiective ºi interese naþionale, cuprinse înstrategii de politicã externã sau strategii de securitate ener-geticã ce se pot regãsi în aceste regiuni care îºi aratã deschisinteresul pentru a efectua investiþii în zonã. O altã calitatea Caucazului de Sud este apropierea sa de Asia Centralã,cu care la un moment dat se uneºte nu doar geografic, ci maiales energetic, ceea ce îl face ºi mai atractiv din punct devedere geostrategic. Dacã Georgia ºi Armenia, dupã cumam menþionat anterior, au o afinitate pentru procese deintegrare politice ºi economice occidentale, în Azerbaidjannu existã o predispoziþie generalã pentru limitarea propriilorposibilitãþi de a pãtrunde în circuitul mondial. Capacitãþileenergetice de care dispune îi permit sã oscileze între regiuni.Adesea Azerbaidjanul este studiat ca parte a Asiei Centrale,chiar dacã în ultima perioadã s-a renunþat la aceastã asociere.

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celor douã state aflate în conflict au reuºit sã ajungã la oînþelegere de a administra în mod egal hidrocentrala de laInguri.32 Conform înþelegerilor dintre cele douã pãrþi, 60%din totalul de energie produsã aici pleacã spre Georgia, iarcelelalte 40% acoperã o parte a necesitãþilor consumatorilordin Abhazia. Lucrãrile de reconstrucþie la aceastã hidrocen-tralã au fost efectuate de cãtre compania germanã Siemens,ele durând câþiva ani. Deºi presa georgianã ºi internaþionalãvehiculeazã anumite subiecte tabu, care nu pot fi supusedezbaterii publice la Tbilisi, cele mai accesibile platformede discuþie pentru societatea civilã de aici sunt cele dedicatesectorului energetic ºi mediului. Politica energeticã a statu-lui a servit în Georgia drept pretext pentru adâncirea diver-genþelor dintre guvernare ºi opoziþie. Astfel, Partidul Laburistdin Georgia a organizat pe 13 ianuarie 2011 o acþiune deprotest în faþa sediului central al Companiei de Distribuþiea Energiei Electrice Telasi din Tbilisi, cerând autoritãþilor sãanuleze chitanþa unicã pentru serviciile comunale. Potrivitacestei chitanþe, cetãþenii Georgiei vor fi obligaþi sã facãplata pentru apã, energie electricã, gaze naturale ºi alte ser-vicii în conformitate cu dispoziþiile unui nou sistem unifi-cat. În caz de neplatã, Telasi are dreptul sã-i debranºeze peconsumatori de la reþea. Liderul Partidului Laburist dinGeorgia, ªalva Natelaºvili, a declarat în cadrul unui briefingde presã cã regimul Saakaºvili pregãteºte prin actul de luarea unei asemenea decizii o nouã bombã în relaþiile dintreRusia ºi Georgia. El a amintit cã proprietarul reþelei geor-giene de distribuþie a energiei electrice e Compania ruseascãINTER RAO UES, care nu are niciun drept de a-i pedepsipe consumatorii georgieni pentru datorii strãine. Conformlui Natelaºvili, partidul pe care îl reprezintã a luat toatemãsurile necesare pentru ca aceastã acþiune sã nu aibã loc.Printre acestea se numãrã ºi sesizarea Curþii Constituþionaleca sã-ºi dea avizul cu privire la legalitatea adoptãrii deciziei,a negociat cu Telasi ºi compania rusã. Laburiºtii georgieni

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32 Interviu cu un expert în domeniul energetic, Tbilisi, mai 2011.

ºi economic, promovând în primul rând ideea de schimbareinstituþionalã, prin aplicarea principiilor democratice, orien-tând în mod natural subiecþii regiunii cãtre Vest. China esteobligatã, practic, sã-ºi mobilizeze eforturile pentru redirec-þionarea intereselor economice a tuturor actorilor în regiunecãtre Est, astfel încât sã poatã prelua o parte din potenþialulacestei prezenþe. O analizã minuþioasã cu privire la poten-þialul energetic al Caucazului de Sud este dificil de efectuatdacã vor fi ignorate principalele coridoare de transport careunesc Asia de Europa ºi Nordul de Sud. Produsele energeticecer în mod obligatoriu ºi dezvoltarea unor rute de transport,a unor depozite de stocare, dar ºi a unor unitãþi de prelu-crare a lor. Dezvoltarea sectorului petrolier se face în paralelcu susþinerea investiþiilor în sectoare complementare, astfelîncât fezabilitatea proiectelor în curs de derulare, precumºi a celor în curs de pregãtire sã nu întâmpine dificultãþide implementare în fazele lor finale. Cantitatea de petrol ºigaze naturale care trebuie sã alimenteze principalele proiecteenergetice din Caucazul de Sud permite efectuarea uneiierarhizãri a acestora, însã autoritãþile diferitor state dinregiune încearcã sã dea asigurãri cã nu vor prioritiza unproiect în defavoarea altuia. Rolul Caucazului de Sud îneconomia mondialã ar putea fi rezumat la urmãtoarele: zonãde acces la petrolul din Marea Caspicã prin cele mai scurtecoridoare de transport.

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Poþi sã reconstruieºti o regiune dupã interesele pe care le aiacolo, iar din acest punct de vedere se poate face afirmaþiacã Baku ar fi parte a Asiei Centrale.33 Petrolul, gazele natu-rale, uraniul, iar mai recent ºi plutoniul care se gãsesc aicile transformã importanþa în cadrul sistemului mondial derelaþii internaþionale. Lupta nu se dã atât pentru schimbareacalitativã a sistemelor politice existente în regiune, câtpentru stabilirea unui grad de subordonare politicã, pentrua obþine un control suficient asupra acestor resurse, astfelîncât administrarea lor sã producã beneficii economice. Dinpãcate acest lucru va fi recunoscut mai puþin de cãtre actoriistatali ºi non-statali care au interese de politicã externã, desecuritate ºi energetice. Implicarea ºi prezenþa în regiune aFederaþiei Ruse, a Statelor Unite ale Americii ºi a UniuniiEuropene nu au diminuat interesul altor mari puteri pentruregiunea Caucazului de Sud. Pe lângã actorii enumeraþi maisus, trebuie sã menþionãm ca fiind foarte importantã ºiChina — marea câºtigãtoare a crizei economice mondiale —mai ales din cauza resurselor de hidrocarburi. Ce încearcã sãfacã autoritãþile de la Beijing poate prejudicia mai mult saumai puþin atingerea obiectivelor strategice de cãtre Rusia,UE sau SUA; totul va depinde de capacitatea de a ajunge laun consens în ceea ce priveºte modalitatea de construire arutelor de transport, precum ºi a împãrþirii contractelorpetroliere. Industria Chinei necesitã cantitãþi foarte mari deresurse petroliere pentru a-i putea fi susþinut ritmul de dez-voltare actualã. Aceasta este una dintre explicaþiile pentrucare Azerbaidjanul continuã sã fie atras mai mult spre zonaasiaticã, iar proiectele energetice la care acesta este partesunt redirecþionate — cel puþin unele dintre ele — spre Est.Filosofia de acþiune a acestor mari puteri diferã foarte mult.Dacã Rusia se bazeazã pe influenþa sa politicã asupra regiu-nii ºi pe susþinerea pe care o oferã anumitor actori prin pre-lungirea artificialã a crizelor ºi conflictelor, Uniunea Euro-peanã încearcã sã devinã atractivã prin modelul democratic

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33 Interviu cu un analist politic, Baku, iunie 2011.

Harta 1 — Traseul proiectului energetic NabuccoSursa: Nabucco Pipeline,

http://www.nabucco-pipeline.com/portal/page/portal/en/pipeline/route

infrastructurii necesare pentru stocarea cantitãþilor de gazenaturale pentru care a fost proiectat Nabucco. Autoritãþileazere, însã, au o motivaþie politicã pentru a susþine ºi încu-raja partenerii strãini interesaþi sã investeascã în continuareîn acest proiect. Jocul pe mai multe proiecte energetice oferãposibilitate actualilor guvernanþi de a se menþine la condu-cerea statului, astfel cã susþinerea pentru Nabucco va fi încontinuare una fermã. SOCAR vine cu garanþii cã va fi capa-bilã sã asigure cantitãþile necesare de gaze naturale pentruNabucco, mai ales dupã 2020, când vor fi finalizate majo-ritatea lucrãrilor de îmbunãtãþire a infrastructurii de trans-port, care în acest moment se confruntã cu multe probleme.Potenþialul Nabucco va creºte abia dupã anul 2015, odatãcu creºterea producþiei de gaze naturale. În prezent, produc-þia de gaze naturale se aflã în umbra producþiei de petrol.35

Dacã vorbim despre Nabucco, atunci se cer a fi luate în con-siderare mai multe variabile politice care pot prejudicia dez-voltarea proiectului. Independenþa energeticã faþã de Rusiaeste doar una dintre cele la care putem sã facem referinþã înacest moment, dar trebuie acordatã maximã atenþie ºi unuialt aspect la fel de important: cea mai mare parte a iniþiati-velor energetice, pe care Uniunea Europeanã este interesatãsã le dezvolte în baza resurselor de hidrocarburi existente înMarea Caspicã vor trece prin Turcia. Acest stat va deveniimportant nu doar din punct de vedere regional, ci va devenimonopolist energetic pe axa sudicã, ceea ce se poate trans-forma pe viitor într-o ameninþare pentru siguranþa energeticãa Uniunii Europene, care insistã tot mai mult pe liberalizareapieþei energetice, asumându-ºi un risc major.36 Autoritãþileturce nu vor risca în acest moment relaþia economicã pe careo au cu Uniunea Europeanã, pentru cã nu existã garanþiipolitice în ceea ce priveºte evoluþia relaþiei bilaterale cuFederaþia Rusã. Iatã de ce Turcia se va limita pe termen scurtdoar la tratarea Rusiei ca piaþã de desfacere pentru bunurile

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Nabucco34 — acest proiect energetic a fost gândit ca oextensie a conductei Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum (vezi harta 1),pentru a asigura securitatea energeticã a statelor europene.Deciziile cu privire la dezvoltarea proiectului au fost adop-tate în perioada crizei economice mondiale, însã statele careau lansat iniþiativa nu l-au abandonat, tocmai din cauza sta-bilitãþii energetice pe care o poate oferi (ACGRC, 2011, 35).

Azerbaidjanul e dispus sã ofere gaze naturale proiectuluiNabucco, dar nu va putea asigura tot necesarul pentru bunadesfãºurare a acestui proiect. Aceasta este una dintre cauzelepentru care Turkmenistanul a fost invitat sã participe la dez-voltarea Nabucco, în direcþia conectãrii Mãrii Caspice la ini-þiativã. Condiþia de bazã impusã de autoritãþile de la Bakueste ca statele care au nevoie de acest proiect sã ia o deciziefermã în ceea ce priveºte efectuarea de investiþii financiareîn construcþia conductei. Autoritãþile azere militeazã pentruimplementarea a cât mai multor proiecte energetice. Acestlucru atestã cã politica energeticã a Republicii Azerbaidjaneste concentratã pe diversificarea la maximum a rutelor detransport pentru hidrocarburile sale cãtre pieþele internaþio-nale. Nabucco este un proiect pretenþios ºi existã numeroasedificultãþi pentru ca acesta sã devinã cu adevãrat fezabil petermen scurt. Infrastructura de transport de gaze naturalea Azerbaidjanului e foarte slab dezvoltatã. În acest momentar trebui sã se punã un accent mai mare pe dezvoltarea

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34 Nabucco — este o conductã lansatã în anul 2006, având iniþialo capacitate de transport al gazelor naturale de 7,2 miliarde metricubi pe an, cu o posibilitate de creºtere de pânã la 20 miliarde metricubi, ea fiind gânditã ca o extensie a unei alte conducte în care Azer-baidjanul era implicat, Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum. Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurumare un traseu aproape identic cu cel al Oleoductului Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan. Conducta va avea o lungime de peste 3.300 km ºi o capaci-tate de transport de circa 31 miliarde metri cubi de gaze naturale pean. Durata de viaþã a proiectului este de 50 de ani (Nabucco pipeline,Overwiev). Celelalte surse de aprovizionare a conductei îºi au origi-nea în Orientul Mijlociu ºi Egipt. Este unul dintre cele mai ambiþioaseproiecte. Costul estimativ al lucrãrii va atinge cifra de 7,9 miliardeeuro (Nabucco pipeline, Facts and Figures), fiind o cifrã provizorie.

35 Interviu cu un expert economic, Baku, iunie, 2011.36 Interviu cu un expert în domeniul energetic, Tbilisi, mai 2011.

România, Ungaria ºi alte state europene interesate de diver-sificarea surselor de aprovizionare cu resurse energetice, fiindparte a coridorului sudic de transport al gazelor naturale.Compania care se va preocupa de implementarea proiectu-lui poartã numele AGRI LNG Project Company. Ea a fostformatã de participanþi din patru state: Romgaz (România),Georgian Oil and Gas Company (Georgia), State Oil Companyof Azerbaijan Republic (Azerbaidjan) ºi MVM (Ungaria).Fiecare dintre cele patru state deþine o cotã-parte egalãcu 25% din capitalul social al AGRI LNG Project Company.

Statele implicate în dezvoltarea proiectului AGRI auprobleme de ordin politic cu Federaþia Rusã, ceea ce poate fiinterpretat ca o prejudiciere a intereselor acesteia energetice,economice ºi politice în direcþia sudicã. AGRI este un pro-iect mult mai apreciat decât Nabucco, iar interesul parte-nerilor implicaþi în dezvoltarea sa pare sã argumenteze acor-darea anumitor prioritãþi, fiind una dintre cele mai ieftineiniþiative de acest gen ºi, în ciuda faptului, cã niciunul dintre

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ºi serviciile sale. Interesant e cã autoritãþile azere nu dorescsã vinã cu resurse financiare nici pentru Nabucco, nici pen-tru AGRI (a se vedea mai jos), care întâmpinã mai multeprobleme de ordin tehnologic, dar ºi financiar. De aseme-nea, agenda de politicã externã a Armeniei conþine prevederidespre o posibilã aliniere a acestui stat caucazian la proiect.Autoritãþile de la Erevan sunt somate de propriile intereseenergetice sã adere în viitor la aceastã iniþiativã regionalã.În cazul Armeniei acest lucru poate deveni posibil prinintermediul Planului de Acþiuni Comune Armenia-UniuneaEuropeanã (European Commission, 2006b), care prevedecooperare în sectorul energetic între cei doi parteneri. Con-form conþinutului acestui document, Uniunea Europeanãva susþine proiectele armene pentru dezvoltarea unei strate-gii energetice pe termen lung, dar condiþia de bazã este caArmenia sã renunþe la iniþiativele sale de construcþie a uneinoi centrale energetice nucleare. La rândul sãu, Erevanultinde sã decline cerinþele UE din cauza lipsei unei alterna-tive, pe care comunitatea europeanã întârzie sã o propunã.În aceste condiþii, Nabucco ar putea fi o asemenea alterna-tivã, dar ea depinde în foarte mare mãsurã de relaþia cuAzerbaidjanul, care pânã acum s-a opus implicãrii statuluicu care se aflã în conflict teritorial în mai multe iniþiativeenergetice regionale, insistând de fiecare datã asupra ocoliriiacestuia.

Azerbaidjan-Georgia-România-Interconector (AGRI,vezi harta 2)37 — este un proiect ambiþios, care s-a bucuratde o atenþie sporitã din partea partenerilor implicaþi în dez-voltarea lui. Acest proiect energetic are drept scop trans-portarea de gaze naturale de la zãcãmântul Shah Deniz spre

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37 Azerbaidjan-Georgia-România-Interconector (AGRI) – Memo-randumul de înþelegere pentru începerea lucrãrilor la proiectul AGRIa fost semnat la Bucureºti, pe 13 aprilie 2010, iar Declaraþia privindproiectul AGRI a fost semnatã la Baku, pe 14 septembrie 2010.Studiul de fezabilitate intermediar pentru acest proiect este elaboratde cãtre experþi din Statele Unite ale Americii.

Harta 2 — Interconectorul Azerbaidjan – Georgia – România (AGRI, STRATFOR) Sursa: Plano 10 (cu verde AGRI),

http://www.plano10.com/2011/04/proiectul-agri-o-bila-alba-pentru.html

Autoritãþile de la Baku nu acordã prioritate unui anumitproiect energetic regional. Nabucco sau AGRI — ambelesunt la fel de importante, iar Azerbaidjanul ar dori ca aces-te douã proiecte sã devinã complementare. Primul proiectare o susþinere mare din partea Uniunii Europene ºi va legaEuropa de zãcãmintele de petrol din Marea Caspicã ºi dinOrientul Mijlociu. Atât Nabucco, cât ºi AGRI se bucurã deaceeaºi atenþie din partea autoritãþilor, doar cã primul estemai dificil de implementat, pentru cã au fost invitate sãparticipe la dezvoltarea proiectului state precum Iranul ºiTurkmenistanul, care sunt tratate ca actori statali capabilisã producã instabilitate regionalã, dar ºi pentru cã tarifele pentru hidrocarburile care vor fi tranzitate prin Nabuccosunt mai mari. În plus, în anul 2010, Uniunea Europeanãa renunþat la implicarea Teheranului în proiect, ca sancþiunepentru continuarea programului nuclear al Iranului. În con-secinþã, autoritãþile iraniene au arãtat disponibilitate pentrudezvoltarea unui alt proiect, care ar putea rivaliza cu Na-bucco ºi care ar putea aproviziona Europa cu gaze naturalepe sub Marea Mediteranã.

Disponibilitate pentru a investi în proiectul AGRI auarãtat mai mulþi agenþi economici. Printre aceºtia se numãrãinvestitori din Japonia, Germania, Coreea de Sud, Franþa,care ºi-au oferit sprijinul pentru realizarea unor studii defezabilitate a proiectului. Conform unui comunicat de presãemis pe 14 februarie 2011 de cãtre Ministerul Economiei,Comerþului ºi Mediului de Afaceri al României (MinisterulEconomiei, Comerþului ºi Mediului de Afaceri al României,2011) studiul de fezabilitate al Proiectului AGRI, trebuiesã fie încheiat pânã cel mai târziu la data de 1 aprilie 2012,cu scopul de a accelera finalizarea proiectului

Spre deosebire de statele care ºi-au propus serviciile pen-tru efectuarea studiilor de fezabilitate, Japonia are un avansminim, propunând sã finanþeze o parte din costurile proiec-tului ºi sã furnizeze tehnologie de transport pentru a primila schimb gaze naturale din Azerbaidjan. De asemenea,Federaþia Rusã, Bulgaria ºi Ucraina nu-ºi ascund interesul dea adera la acest proiect — dovadã cã interesele economice

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cele patru state implicate în derularea acestuia nu deþine înacest moment posibilitãþi tehnice ºi financiare de implemen-tare. În aceeaºi mãsurã, nici Azerbaidjanul, cum aminteammai sus, nu pare sã agreeze finanþarea proiectului din resurseproprii. Terminalul de lichefiere al gazelor naturale trebuiesã fie construit pe teritoriul Georgiei, care nu dispune detehnologia necesarã pentru demararea lucrãrilor. În plus,experþii în securitatea energeticã susþin cã existã ºi problemede securizare a transporturilor pe Marea Neagrã, deoarecenu existã nave (tancuri) speciale pentru transportul gazuluilichefiat pe Marea Neagrã, ele fiind construite pentru a par-curge distanþe mult mai mari ºi având o capacitate de trans-port foarte mare.38 Aceiaºi experþi în securitate energeticãsunt de pãrere cã AGRI este mai degrabã un joc politic alAzerbaidjanului pentru a-ºi promova interesele ºi pentru ase poziþiona în calitate de negociator în dialogul energetic alUniunii Europene ºi Federaþiei Ruse, astfel încât sã obþinãbeneficii politice. Nici resursele de gaze disponibile ºi ne-contractate nu sunt certe. Faptul cã niciun alt stat membrual Uniunii Europene, în afarã de România ºi Ungaria, nu auaderat la proiect spune multe. 39 Finanþarea privatã pentruAGRI e cea mai plauzibilã variantã. Primele estimãri alecosturilor proiectului indicã o cifrã cuprinsã între 2 ºi 5 mi-liarde euro, pentru o capacitate de transport de 8 miliardede metri cubi de gaze pe an, cu potenþial de creºtere ulte-rior.40 Existã trei variante pentru capacitatea de transportarea gazelor naturale din Azerbaidjan spre Europa prin inter-mediul proiectului AGRI: 2 miliarde metri cubi, 4,5 miliardemetri cubi ºi 8 miliarde metri cubi. Dacã prioritatea va fidatã celei de-a treia variante, atunci România ar putea nego-cia o cotã parte din totalul de gaze tranzitate egalã cu 2 mi-liarde metri cubi.

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38 Interviu cu un expert în securitate energeticã, Bucureºti, august2011.

39 Interviu cu un expert în securitate energeticã, Bucureºti, august2011.

40 Interviu cu oficiali, Baku, iunie 2011.

este un proiect internaþional, apãrut la iniþiativa Turciei,Georgiei ºi Azerbaidjanului în 1994 cu scopul de a consoli-da independenþa economicã a þãrilor din regiune (HaciyevIqbal, 2010, 227-242). Proiectul este alimentat cu petrolextras din zona sectorului azer al Mãrii Caspice ºi pãtrundeprin intermediul acestuia pe pieþele internaþioale, fiind con-ceput astfel încât sã poatã prelua ºi o parte din producþiapetrolierã kazahã (ibidem, 227-242). Lungimea oleoductuluieste de 1.767 km, dintre care 443 pe teritoriul Azerbaidja-nului, 248 pe teritoriul Georgiei ºi 1.076 pe cel al Turciei.Conducta a fost proiectatã cu o duratã de viaþã de 40 de ani.Capacitatea maximã de transport pe an este de 50 milioanetone pe an. Participarea Azerbaidjanului la proiect a fostasiguratã de una din filialele SOCAR ºi anume AzBTC Co.Ponderea investiþiilor acesteia în cadrul BTC Co. este de25% din totalul de 3 miliarde euro necesari pentru reali-zarea întregului proiect. (vezi ceilalþi investitori în figura 1).

Importanþa acestuia este complexã. În afarã de faptul cãasigurã o parte din necesitãþile interne ale industriilor statelor

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prevaleazã adesea în faþa obiectivelor politice. Nici Turcianu pare sã fie prea încântatã de entuziasmul manifestat deanumiþi jucãtori regionali pentru dezvoltarea AGRI, pentrucã diminueazã rolul sãu cheie în cadrul coridorului sudicde transport al resurselor energetice înspre Europa. PoziþiaUniunii Europene faþã de acest proiect nu este una ostilã.Dimpotrivã, Bruxelles-ul încurajeazã demararea lucrãrilorpentru AGRI, deoarece acesta ar contribui în mod esenþialla diversificarea rutelor de tranzit ºi pentru alte state membreale UE. În plus, AGRI pare sã fie un proiect care dispuneîn primul rând de o argumentare economicã foarte bunã.41

De asemenea, disponibilitate pentru a adera la proiect aumanifestat ºi autoritãþile sârbe care, dupã cum se ºtie, senumãrã printre partenerii stabili ai Federaþiei Ruse în Bal-canii de Vest. Pentru partea georgianã, care este unul dintrecei patru deþinãtori ai capitalului social din cadrul AGRILNG Project Company, acest proiect pare sã aibã unele difi-cultãþi de ordin ecologic. Conducta de tranzitare a gazelornaturale va trece prin zone sensibile ºi anume locul de undeîºi au originea renumitele ape Borjomi — un importantprodus georgian, recunoscut atât în þarã, cât ºi peste hotarepentru proprietãþile sale curative. În cazul unui dezastruecologic, care nu este exclus, dar care este prea puþin luat înconsideraþie în proiectarea conductei, vor avea de suferit înprimul rând fabricile de apã mineralã Borjomi destinatãexporturilor, iar mai apoi ºi economia georgianã.42

Oleoductul Heydar Aliyev: Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan(State Oil Fund of the Republic of Azerbaijan b, 2011)43 —

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41 Interviu cu un expert în domeniul energetic,Tbilisi, mai 2011.42 Interviu cu un expert în domeniul ecologic, Tbilisi, mai 2011.43 Oleoductul Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) – contractul petrolier al

secolului XX pentru statele care i-au pus bazele – a fost semnat pe20 septembrie 1994. În anul 1999 a fost semnat la Istanbul Acordulde transportare a petrolului neprelucrat prin oleoductul BTC de cãtrepreºedinþii Azerbaidjanului, Georgiei ºi Turciei. Oficial, oleoductul afost dat în exploatare pe 13 iulie 2006. Lucrãrile la oleoduct au fostefectuate de cãtre BTC Co., fondatã la Londra în luna august 2002.

Figura 1 — Cotele-pãrþi ale investiþiilor în dezvoltareaoleoductului Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan

Sursa: State Oil Fund of Azerbaijan, http://www.oilfund.az/en/content/10/95

al Republicii Azerbaidjan a obþinut reprezentarea oficialãa intereselor guvernului azer, printr-o participare de 80% încadrul AzBTC. Astfel, veniturile ce rezultã în urma implicã-rii ºi susþinerii oferite de Ministerul Dezvoltãrii Economicevor fi acumulate în conturile Fondului Petrolier de Stat alRepublicii Azerbaidjan. SOFAZ a finanþat construcþia pãrþiide pe teritoriul azer a oleoductului Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan, înconformitate cu prevederile Decretului Prezidenþial nr. 739din 30 iulie 2002, semnat de preºedintele în exerciþiu deatunci, Heidar Aliev. În luna februarie 2007 au fost alocate298 milioane AZN pentru finanþarea cotei pãrþi a Azerbai-djanului în cadrul BTC. Secþiunea azerã a conductei Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) destinatã exportului de petrol a fostinauguratã pe 25 mai 2005 de cãtre preºedinþii Azerbai-djanului, Georgiei ºi Turciei în cadrul unei ceremonii ofi-ciale, care a avut loc la Terminalul Sangachal de lângã Baku.BTC este unul dintre cele mai scumpe proiecte energeticedezvoltate pânã în anul 2005, la care au luat parte 11 statepartenere. El modificã situaþia geopoliticã din Caucaz, creândtensiuni între Federaþia Rusã ºi Statele Unite ale Americii.

Platforma Shah Deniz44 — consorþiul Shah Deniz,constituit de cãtre mai multe companii cu profil energetic,printre care British Petroleum, Stateoil, SOCAR, Lukoil,NICO, Total ºi TPAO, aºteaptã propuneri pânã la data de1 octombrie 2011 pentru construirea unor rute de transportadiacente, în afara celor care vor alimenta proiectul AGRI,

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participante la dezvoltarea proiectului, are ºi însemnãtatepoliticã. Miza geopoliticã a proiectului presupune reducereadependenþei energetice faþã de Federaþia Rusã. Cea de-adoua funcþie a acestui oleoduct este de a oferi Statelor Uniteale Americii, precum ºi altor state occidentale posibilitateade a nu mai fi dependente în prea mare mãsurã de petroluldin zona Golfului Persic, ocolind teritoriul Rusiei ºi ruteleaglomerate din strâmtorile Bosfor ºi Dardanele.

Deºi conexiunea economicã a Azerbaidjanului la Fede-raþia Rusã este încã destul de însemnatã, strategia de dez-voltare energeticã este orientatã, dupã cum am menþionatanterior, spre promovarea unor proiecte de dezvoltare alter-native la colaborarea prea strânsã cu Rusia. Aceastã atitu-dine le oferã autoritãþilor de la Baku o perspectivã supli-mentarã în negocierea intereselor ºi obiectivelor politicenaþionale, dar pune în valoare foarte mult aspectul economical relaþiei bilaterale Baku-Moscova. Strategia de diversifi-care a ofertanþilor de produse petroliere, precum ºi a rutelorde transport pentru hidrocarburile de altã provenienþã decâtruseascã va modifica rolul Federaþiei Ruse pe scena mon-dialã, obligând-o sã fie mai deschisã, mai orientatã spreadoptarea unui alt tip de negocieri. Totodatã, conducerearusã va deveni mai receptivã la mecanismele ºi normeleinternaþionale promovate de instituþiile de profil cu carepoartã negocieri pentru a obþine statutul de membru cudrepturi depline. Scopul acestui demers — cel de deschiderea Rusiei cãtre pieþele mondiale în condiþiile unei concurenþeloiale — este de a asigura stabilitate energeticã pe teritoriulEuropei.

BTC Co. este un consorþiu de companii petroliere ºifinanciare, care au un aport total în cadrul proiectului de3 miliarde euro, dintre care 30% din investiþii au fost efec-tuate de cãtre filiala SOCAR — AzBTC — înfiinþatã specialpentru dezvoltarea pãrþii azere a oleoductului. Celelalte70% constituie contribuþiile celorlalþi parteneri, membri aiconsorþiului: instituþii financiare internaþionale, agenþii decreditare, bãnci comerciale. Ministerul Dezvoltãrii Economice

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44 Proiectul Shah Deniz – prima fazã a proiectului a fost finaliza-tã în anul 2003. Aceasta a presupus instalarea unor noi platforme deexploatare a zãcãmintelor de gaze naturale ºi a douã conducte sub-acvatice, capabile sã asigure transportul acestora la þãrm, în apropierede Sangachal. Exportul gazelor naturale extrase la Shah Deniz aînceput în 2004. Primul contract de export al gazelor naturale a fostsemnat de autoritãþile azere în anul 2001. El presupunea furnizareaacestui tip de resurse Turciei. Livrãrile au început în 2006. Volumulgazelor exportate anual, consemnate prin acest contract, a atins cifrade 222 miliarde metri cubi de gaz la finele anului 2009.

naturale din câmpul Shah Deniz spre consumatorii euro-peni prin Turcia. Declaraþiile oficialilor azeri confirmã acestlucru (News.az b, 2011), ei menþionând cã, la etapa în carese aflã, deja a fost convenit volumul resurselor de gaze natu-rale care vor fi livrate cãtre Europa.

Interconexiunea Turcia-Grecia-Italia (ITGI, 2011) esteun proiect care are drept scop crearea unei punþi de legãturãîntre Europa ºi resursele de gaze naturale din Marea Caspicã.Importurile spre statele membre ale Uniunii Europene sevor efectua prin Turcia, ceea ce duce la creºterea rolului aces-tui stat în cadrul coridorului energetic de sud. Ca ºi celelaltecoridoare energetice, are rolul de a diversifica sursele deaprovizionare cu gaze naturale ale agenþilor economici de pecontinentul european. Cumulat cu celelalte proiecte, ITGIva contribui la transformarea Republicii Azerbaidjan în unuldintre cei mai mari furnizori de gaze naturale pentruEuropa. ITGI intenþioneazã sã conecteze sistemele energe-tice ale Greciei ºi Bulgariei la cel italian prin intermediul off-shore-ului ce se ocupã de administrarea conductei Poseidon.45

Conducta Transadriaticã (TAP) e un alt proiect ener-getic care face parte din sistemul conductelor care trec princoridorul sudic, menit sã contribuie la asigurarea securitãþiienergetice a statelor europene în condiþiile unei dependenþemãrite faþã de importurile de gaze naturale din FederaþiaRusã. Principalii acþionari ai companiei de tip joint ventureai Conductei Transadriatice, care vor administra conductace va uni Europa de Marea Caspicã prin Marea Adriaticã,sunt EGL din Elveþia, Statoil din Norvegia ºi E.ON Ruhrgasdin Germania. Capacitatea de transport a produselor ener-getice prin conducta TAP este de 10 miliarde metri cubi pean, cu posibilitatea de mãrire a acesteia pânã la 20 miliardemetri cubi (Trans-Adriatic Pipeline, 2011). Compania TAP

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pentru tranzitarea de gaze naturale extrase din câmpul ShahDeniz. Pânã în prezent au fost lansate trei propuneri, caresunt studiate de autoritãþile de la Baku. Toate sunt orientatespre Europa:

– ITGI — interconectorul Turcia-Grecia-Italia– TAP — Conducta Transadriaticã;– Nabucco.Primele extracþii de gaze din câmpul Shah Deniz pentru

cel mai ambiþios proiect energetic european, Nabucco, aufost preconizate pentru anul 2017 (News.az a, 2011), datãconfirmatã de oficialitãþile azere, care adaugã cã, din punctde vedere al viabilitãþii de transportare economicã ºi logis-ticã, Nabucco va contribui cel mai mult la dezvoltarea cori-dorului energetic sudic. Deºi SOCAR deþine doar 10% dincota parte a consorþiului Shah Deniz, care a fost creat pen-tru a exploata acest zãcãmânt, reprezentanþii companiei destat azere vin sã confirme faptul cã pânã în 2017 capaci-tatea de extracþie va atinge cifra de 25 miliarde metri cubipe an. Nabucco a fost proiectat pentru a transporta 31 mi-liarde metri cubi de gaze naturale pe an, cu un potenþial deextindere de pânã la 35 miliarde metri cubi pe an. Oficialiiazeri au garantat o producþie de 10 miliarde metri cubi pean pentru Nabucco. În ceea ce priveºte AGRI, dupã cum ammenþionat anterior, cantitatea de resurse care va alimentaconducta încã nu a fost decisã. Pânã în 2006, Azerbaidja-nul, deºi deþinea cantitãþi importante de gaze naturale, afost un stat importator de acest tip de resurse (EIA, 2011).Consumul intern depãºea cantitãþile extrase. Principalulfurnizor era compania rusã Gazprom. (Haciyev, Iqbal,2010, 242) Exploatarea rezervelor de la Shah Deniz le-apermis autoritãþilor azere sã reducã în timp dependenþa faþãde gazele naturale de provenienþã rusã. Cele mai mari impe-dimente în dezvoltarea rapidã a proiectului sunt, pe rând,lipsa infrastructurii de depozitare, apoi a celei de prelucrarea resurselor extrase la Shah Deniz. Acest aspect, însã, nu aîmpiedicat conducerea azerã sã poarte negocieri cu cea turcãpentru semnarea unor acorduri de tranzitare pentru gazele

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45 Compania care se ocupã de dezvoltarea conductei Poseidon senumeºte IGI Poseidon SA.

douã þãri ºi-au manifestat oficial interesul pentru proiectulViking, aderând la lucrãrile acestuia. Lungimea iniþialã arutei a fost de 1.753 km. Ulterior la acest proiect a fost invi-tat sã participe ºi Azerbaidjanul (Web-portal of UkrainianGovernment, 2011). Primul-ministru ucrainean MykolaAzarov a declarat, în cadrul unei conferinþe de presã, cãAzerbaidjanul va participa la proiect pentru extinderea ruteispre Kazahstan, Turkmenistan ºi alte þãri din Asia Centralã.Astfel proiectul ar putea obþine ºi o altã semnificaþie: unireaMãrii Caspice cu Marea Balticã, prin punctul Odessa.Pentru transportul de mãrfuri Europa-Asia acest proiect estefoarte important, pentru cã va face conexiune cu un alt cori-dor de transport, TRACECA — Coridorul de TransportEuropa-Caucaz-Asia (Kusch, Prause & Hunke, 2011, 25).Pe alocuri, transportul feroviar ar putea fi dublat de cel cuferibotul, ceea ce ar facilita ºi mai mult conexiunile locale.

Existã douã posibilitãþi de extindere a coridorului detransport Est-Vest spre Asia Centralã:

1. Regiunea de Sud a Mãrii Baltice-Lituania-Belarus-Federaþia Rusã-Kazahstan-China;

2. Regiunea de Sud a Mãrii Baltice-Lituania-Belarus-Ucraina-Georgia-Azerbaidjan-Kazahstan-China, adicã folo-sirea potenþialã a unor elemente componente ale TRACECA.Costurile transportãrii pe cale feroviarã a mãrfurilor suntmai mici decât cele cu alte mijloace. Problema o poate con-stitui ecartamentul diferit, care va trebui adaptat la stan-dardele internaþionale. Proiectul Viking este destinat creãriiunui sistem de transport containerizat al mãrfurilor MareaNeagrã-Marea Balticã ºi este parte a unui proiect inter-modal de transport internaþional, lansat încã în anul 2003.Capacitatea redusã a mai multor coridoare de transport con-stituie o ameninþare pentru o eventualã creºtere economicã,dar ºi pentru integrarea europeanã. În viitorul apropiat vacreºte volumul mãrfurilor produse, ceea ce va conduce ºi lanecesitatea de a dezvolta proiectele de transport deja existentesau de a iniþia altele noi. Proiectul Viking este gândit sã facãfaþã unei asemenea creºteri cantitative.

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va contribui la dezvoltarea infrastructurii de stocare a gaze-lor naturale pe teritoriul Albaniei, care a fost invitatã alãturide Grecia sã participe la dezvoltarea proiectului. Depozitelede stocare pentru gazele naturale au rolul de a asigura nece-sarul de produse energetice pentru statele europene în cazulunor potenþiale crize energetice. În iulie 2011, reprezentanþiiTAP au semnat cu guvernul Albaniei un Memorandum decooperare (Penn Energy, 2011), în urma cãruia intenþio-neazã sã studieze posibilitãþile de conectare a gazoductuluiIonian Adriatic Pipeline la Trans-Adriatic Pipeline, astfelîncât sistemul de conducte care formeazã coridorul de sudsã fie cât mai interconectat, pentru a facilita funcþionareaacestuia. Livrãrile de gaze naturale cãtre TAP vor începe dinzãcãmântul Shah Deniz II în 2017. În prezent, experþiistudiazã impactul construirii conductei asupra mediului.

Proiectul Viking este o cale de transport pentru mãrfuri,care opereazã pe ruta Odessa-Klaipeda (Railway Pro, 2011)ºi utilizeazã secþiunea de linie Jonava-Siauliai (parte a linieiRail Baltica). Acest proiect a apãrut în anul 2003 la iniþiati-va a trei state: Lituania, Belarus ºi Ucraina. Este o iniþiativãimportantã din punct de vedere economic, pentru cã oferão perspectivã de unificare a rutelor de transport dintreEuropa de Nord ºi Europa Centralã cu statele membre aleComunitãþii Statelor Independente ºi alte state asiatice,printre care ºi China. Fezabilitatea proiectului este sporitãde efectele crizei economice mondiale, care a impus adop-tarea unor mãsuri de contracarare a consecinþelor acesteiade cãtre statele participante la fluxurile internaþionale demãrfuri pe coridorul de transport Est-Vest. Transportul fero-viar al mãrfurilor scade preþul de achiziþie al acestora, fiindunul dintre cele mai ieftine mijloace de transport internaþio-nal. Dacã e completat ºi de alte mijloace de transport de-alungul unei rute, atunci eficienþa utilizãrii acestuia creºte.Georgia ºi Republica Moldova au primit invitaþia de a aderala acest proiect. Ele pot contribui la dezvoltarea transportu-lui de marfã din bazinul Mãrii Negre. În mai 2011, aceste

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TRACECA46 este un proiect lansat în anul 1993, careasigurã accesul mãrfurilor europene ºi asiatice pe piaþa inter-naþionalã la transportul rutier, feroviar ºi cel de navigaþiecomercialã. El a stat la baza creãrii unei rute alternative detransport din Europa spre Asia Centralã, din Bazinul MãriiNegre, trecând prin Caucaz spre Mongolia ºi China. Aceastãrutã alternativã a fost creatã pentru a micºora cheltuielile detransport pentru schimbul de mãrfuri europene ºi asiatice,dar ºi pentru a oferi o rutã ocolitoare pentru aceleaºi pro-duse europene ºi asiatice la ruta transiberianã. În acelaºitimp, TRACECA are ºi o misiune cu caracter politic, pentrucã va conduce la apariþia unor pârghii eficiente prin inter-mediul cãrora ar putea fi asiguratã parþial independenþacomercialã a statelor din Caucazul de Sud ºi Asia Centralãfaþã de rutele de transport create la iniþiativa FederaþieiRuse. Putem sã vorbim aici despre încercarea de a minimizarolul proiectelor economice propuse de Moscova, minimiza-rea influenþei ºi rolului Comunitãþii Statelor Independenteavând de aceastã datã origine europeanã. Aºadar, TRACECAeste una dintre punþile create de cãtre Bruxelles cãtre Asia,care prejudiciazã parþial interesele geostrategice aleKremlinului în regiune. Aderarea la aceastã rutã alternativãde transport presupunea ºi adoptarea unor mãsuri legislativeºi de armonizare a politicilor de transport. Cei care se arã-tau dispuºi sã adere la TRACECA, dar ºi la Proiectul Vikingtrebuia sã treacã printr-un proces de armonizare ºi adaptarea propriilor politici publice ºi a cadrului legislativ, în acestcaz cele în domeniul transportului, la cele europene.

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Harta 3 — Coridorul de transport Est-VestSursa: Thomas Kusch, Gunnar Prause, Kristina Hunke,

The East-West Transport Corridor and the Shuttle Train “VIKING”, Hochschule Wismar, Fakultät für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, 2011,http://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/48566/1/66468520X.pdf

Harta 4 — Extensia rutei de transport VikingSursa: Thomas Kusch, Gunnar Prause, Kristina Hunke,

The East-West Transport Corridor and the Shuttle Train “VIKING”,Hochschule Wismar, Fakultät für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, 2011,http://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/48566/1/66468520X.pdf

46 Documentul prin care au fost puse bazele Proiectului TRACECAa fost semnat pe 3 mai 1993 la Bruxelles, de miniºtrii Transporturilorºi Comerþului din opt state din Asia Centralã, respecti Caucazul deSud: Kazahstan, Kîrgîzstan, Tadjikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan,Armenia, Azerbaidjan ºi Georgia. Proiectul a fost finanþat de UniuneaEuropeanã cu scopul de a dezvolta coridorul de transport pe direcþiaVest-Est din Europa cu traversarea Mãrii Negre prin Caucaz ºi MãriiCaspice cu ieºire la Asia Centralã. Din 1996, la TRACECA au aderat:Ucraina, Mongolia, Republica Moldova, Bulgaria, România ºi Turcia.

bunã pe termen scurt. Regiunea poate deveni vulnerabilãîn faþa noilor provocãri, dacã liderii celor trei state care oformeazã vor nega importanþa ei ca un întreg. Caucazul deSud nu e doar o punte de acces la hidrocarburile din MareaCaspicã pentru marile economii ale lumii, ci ºi o zonã detransfer a unor pericole ºi ameninþãri la adresa securitãþiiregionale. A recunoaºte importanþa conexiunilor economiceºi a schimburilor intraregionale este una dintre multiplelesoluþii pe care le au la dispoziþie cele trei state, iar utilizarealor este o necesitate vitalã pentru accelerarea dezvoltãriicalitative a societãþilor celor trei state caucaziene.

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Concluzii

Dezvoltarea potenþialului economic al Caucazului deSud este condiþionatã în cea mai mare mãsurã de interesulpe care îl manifestã marile puteri pentru regiune, în calitateasa de furnizor de resurse energetice, precum ºi de spaþiul pecare îl oferã acesta pentru transportul de mãrfuri ºi serviciidinspre Est spre Vest ºi dinspre Nord spre Sud. Acest terito-riu a devenit o punte de intersecþie a intereselor ºi obiecti-velor politice, economice ºi geostrategice pe care le dezvoltãdiferiþi actori statali ºi non-statali. În acest context, cândrolul regiunii creºte din ce în ce mai mult, ea fiind capabilãsã producã stabilitate ºi instabilitate deopotrivã, vor apãreamereu iniþiative ºi proiecte regionale, ce vor cuprinde împre-unã sau separat cele trei state sud-caucaziene, dar ele nu voravea drept scop întãrirea unitãþii regionale, ci le vor atrageseparat spre diferite forme de cooperare regionalã, ceea ce vaconduce ºi mai mult la slãbirea conexiunilor între subiecteleregiunii. Armenia, Azerbaidjan ºi Georgia trebuie sã continueprocesul de reformare a sistemului economic, prin asumareaunor acþiuni cu caracter dur, la care populaþia va fi tentatãsã se opunã. Este deopotrivã un exerciþiu politic ºi demo-cratic, dar consecinþele benefice asupra economiei ar puteafi valorificate de cãtre generaþiile viitoare. De asemenea, ceitrei actori statali din Caucazul de Sud trebuie sã gãseascãsoluþiile necesare pentru a depãºi conflictele ºi divergenþelecu caracter politic care existã fie ºi în stare latentã între ele.Dacã soluþia nu poate fi gãsitã în zona factorilor politici,atunci ar trebuie sã fie ales un model economic de succes,care sã stea la baza creãrii unui sistem regional stabil. Trans-formarea factorului economic în soluþie pentru rezolvareaproblemelor politice nu este întotdeauna posibilã. Procesulpoate fi argumentat din perspectiva intereselor naþionale pecare le poate acoperi. Deciziile politice trebuie sã fie mode-late pragmatic, astfel încât sã asigure obþinerea a cât maimultor beneficii economice. „Spargerea“ Caucazului de Sud,în dependenþã de obiectivele separate ale unor mari con-sumatori de resurse energetice ºi politice, este o strategie

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Ileana Racheru, Stanislav Secrieru, Angela Grãmadã

South Caucasus20 Years After

Political Regimes, Security, and Energy

English version by Mihnea Gafiþa

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Ileana Racheru is a graduate of the Master of InternationalRelations of the University of Bucharest Department ofPolitical Sciences. She is currently a PhD candidate of theUniversity of Bucharest Doctoral School of Political Sciences.She is also the author of a dissertation entitled “Foreign PolicyDebates in the Relations of the EU and Russia with Georgiaand the Ukraine” and of several academic articles concerningthe relationships between Romania and the South-Caucasianstates. She has published many articles on the political andsecurity-related evolutions in the ex-Soviet countries in suchperiodicals as 22 and Foreign Policy Romania, for which she hasinterviewed regional diplomats, experts, decision-makers, andpolitical leaders.

Stanislav Secrieru is a scholar of the New Europe Collegewithin the “Black Sea Link Fellowship” program and an asso-ciate-researcher with the Bucharest Center for East-Europeanand Asian Studies. He is a PhD in Political Sciences (SNSPA).He has conducted researches at the NATO Defense College(Rome) and the Institute for European Politics (Berlin). Hehas been involved in research projects at the European Councilon Foreign Relations (London), the DemosEuropa (Warsaw),the Europeum (Prague), the Heinrich Böll Foundation (Berlin),and the Finnish Institute for International Affairs (Helsinki).His major fields of interest are: the Russian domestic and for-eign policies, the EU-Russia relationships, and the Europeanneighborhood policy.

Angela Grãmadã is a PhD candidate in Political Sciences ofthe National School of Political and Administrative Studies inBucharest and a bachelor in International Economic Relationsof the “Perspectiva” Institute of International Relations inChiºinãu (2004). She is a researcher with the BucharestCenter for East-European and Asian Studies. Her major fieldsof interest are: the evolution of the relationships between theRussian Federation, the US, and the EU within the ex-Sovietspace; the democratization processes in the Republic of Mol-dova, the Ukraine, and Georgia; the European neighborhoodpolicy; and the geopolitical redefinition of the ex-Soviet space.

Contents

Acknowledgements ……………………………………………………………… 261Introduction …………………………………………………………………………… 263

The Political Regimes in South Caucasus. The DemocracyThat Hides Competitive Authoritarianisms (Ileana Racheru)

What Is Competitive Authoritarianism? …………………………… 272

Georgia …………………………………………………………………………………… 273

Democratic Elections, the Great Success of theRose Revolution ……………………………………………………… 273

The UNM, All-Powerful in Georgian Politics ……… 277

The Georgian Political Scene between Revolutionand Reform ……………………………………………………………… 277

New Elites, New Cliental Networks in Power …… 280

The Mass-Media and Its Impossible Co-existencewith the Political Regime ……………………………………… 281

Civil Society, the Only Voice That Criticizesthe Regime ……………………………………………………………… 285

The Democracy That Limits the Russian Pressure 288

Armenia ………………………………………………………………………………… 291

The Elections That Reconfirm the Same Winner … 291

A Regime Legitimized by the Nagorno-KarabakhConflict …………………………………………………………………… 294

Rights and Liberties Only According to theDiscretionary Will of the Political Regime …………… 296

The Mass-Media of Power and the Press of theOpposition ……………………………………………………………… 298

Russia’s Support Is Indispensable, the EU Is too Far 301

Azerbaijan ……………………………………………………………………………… 303

Elections with an Outcome Always Knownin Advance ………………………………………………………………… 303

258 259

The NAP, a King on the Baku Political Scene ……… 304

The Perfectly Functioning Corruption ………………… 306

Rights and Liberties with an Insecure Existence …… 308

The Mass-Media Can Only Be in Powerin Azerbaijan …………………………………………………………… 312

A Powerful Petrostate ……………………………………………… 313

Conclusions …………………………………………………………………………… 315Bibliography ………………………………………………………………………… 316

Variable Geometry in Action: Foreign and SecurityPolicies in South Caucasus (Stanislav Secrieru)

Introduction …………………………………………………………………………… 323

I. The Question of the “Regionness” of South Caucasus … 324I.1. From Transcaucasia to South Caucasus ………………… 324I.2. Is South Caucasus a region? ………………………………… 327I.3. South Caucasus — a sub-regional security complex … 330I.4. South Caucasus in its Eurasian context ………………… 335

I.4.1. North / 336I.4.2. East / 338I.4.3. West / 340I.4.4. South / 344

II. The Intra-Regional Dynamics in South Caucasus ……… 343

II.1. Armenia and Azerbaijan: an improbable peace,a possible war ……………………………………………………………… 344

II.2. Georgia and Armenia: "Resetting" pragmatism …… 353

II.3. Azerbaijan and Georgia: Getting closer ……………… 362

III. South Caucasus: Relationships with the RegionalPowers …………………………………………………………………………………… 369

III.1. Armenia: Variable complementarity …………………… 370III.1.1. Russia / 370III.1.2. Iran / 374III.1.3. The US / 377

III.1.4. The EU / 379III.1.5. Turkey / 383

III.2. Azerbaijan: Strategic independence throughmulti-vectorism …………………………………………………………… 386

III.2.1. Turkey / 387III.2.2. Russia / 390III.2.3. The US / 394III.2.4. The EU / 396III.2.5. Iran / 399

III.3. Georgia due West ……………………………………………… 402III.3.1. The US / 403III.3.2. The EU / 406III.3.3. Turkey / 410III.3.4. Iran / 414III.3.5. Russia / 415

Conclusions …………………………………………………………………………… 420Bibliography ………………………………………………………………………… 421

South Caucasus between Political Economyand Energy-Based Politics (Angela Grãmadã)

I. The Macro-Economic Context of Regional Development 439

1. The implementation of economic reforms betweennecessity and incapacity ……………………………………………… 440

2. The importance of developing the business environmentand the factors that influence its evolution …………………… 459

II. The Economy of Energy-Related Policies inSouth Caucasus …………………………………………………………………… 464

1. Energy resources, economy, and energy policies ………… 467

2. Energy-related projects and transport corridorsin South Caucasus ……………………………………………………… 480

Conclusions …………………………………………………………………………… 499Bibliography ………………………………………………………………………… 500

Acknowledgements

The present study has about two hundred pages andcomprises a much lesser number of words than the thanks— Mulþumim! / Ñïàñèáî! / Thank you! — the authors have toaddress to those who have made our journey and documen-tation in South Caucasus financially possible.

Through the interviews1 we have taken in the threeSouth-Caucasian capitals, we have had the opportunity tocontact the Georgian, Azerbaijani, and Armenian intellec-tual elites, some of the best-known experts in the region whohave shared with us major and fresh information about thestate-level actors in the area. We have talked to outstandingjournalists from the most important media, who haveallowed us to know the world of the South-Caucasian pressand to grasp the specificities of the relationships betweenthe mass-media and the political regimes. We have met with,and talked to, representatives of the civil society in the threestates, who have offered us an overview of the NGOs tryingto build up democracy in relatively hostile political regimes.

We have contacted members of the parliaments, minis-ters, and other high-ranking officials who have shown us

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1For reasons that have to do with their own security or at the spe-cific request of some of the interviewed, the authors of the studyhave chosen not to mention their names.

This book is published within the framework of the“European Values Across the Black Sea” program of theSoros Foundation Romania. The priority of this program isto improve the dialogue and cooperation among civil societyorganizations on the Eastern and Western shores of theBlack Sea, thus increasing mutual societal knowledge, aswell as common awareness of, and adherence to, the widerEuropean space understood as a common sphere of socialand political principles and values.

The goal of the program is to foster mutual knowledgeand a rapprochement of civil societies by establishing solidcontacts and exchanges of intellectual resources betweenSoros Foundation Romania and other Romanian organi-zations, on the one hand, and organizations in Armenia,Azerbaijan and Georgia, on the other hand.

Sergiu PanainteProgram Coordinator

Introduction

In the public discourse in Romania, there are plenty ofreferences to the South Caucasus, but the discussions arealways being reduced to a couple of persistent themes:Georgia, the August 2008 war, and the vital sources of ener-gy that ensure Europe’s energetic security. The authors rein-vent the discourse on the Caucasus for the Romanian pub-lic; they offer a radiograph of the area from a political, aneconomic, and a security-related point of view. Meant forthe institutions that articulate Romania’s foreign policywith regard to this part of the world and for the experts inthe civil society, this study completed by the SorosFoundation Romania is also an instrument and a compellingreading for the journalists and students who wish to graspthe complexity of an essential region when it comes to thesecurity of Europe. The analytic undertaking is based on theimplementation of the most recent interpreting perspectivesin the literature specialized on the political and economicevolutions in South Caucasus. The most significant aspectof the work, however, is that the authors have gone “on theground”, so to speak; they have drawn their subject-matterfrom the area itself, in that they had access, through theinterviews that were taken in Yerevan, Baku, or Tbilisi, toexperts from the NGOs in those cities, to opinion makers,and technocrats in the governmental bureaucracies (at thehighest levels, at times).

how the policies are being conceived, how the leading elitesof South Caucasus think.

We have talked to European officials in the region, whohave shown us how negotiations are being carried out in theSouth-Caucasian states, and have been offered informationconcealed from the public about the political regimes inArmenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan.

We have found out from simple talks and strolls throughYerevan, Baku, and Tbilisi how the Armenians, the Azerbai-janis, and the Georgians think, how they live, and whattheir customs are.

Mulþumim! / Ñïàñèáî! / Thank you! once again to all thosewho have agreed to be interviewed for this study, for givingus a little of their time and for their patience in answeringour questions.

Mulþumim!, Soros Foundation Romania, for this uniqueinitiative and for choosing us to write this first Romanianstudy about the political and economic evolutions in SouthCaucasus, based on direct documentation in Tbilisi, Baku,and Yerevan.

Ñïàñèáî! / Thank you!, Open Society Georgia, Open Socie-ty Azerbaijan, Open Society Yerevan, for the interviewingagendas, for the transportation, for the accomodation.

Ileana RacheruStanislav SecrieruAngela Grãmadã

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political challenge is perceived by Aliyev as an existentialthreat against his political dynasty.

The second part, authored by Stanislav Secrieru,describes the complexity of the regional relationships asdetermined by security policies and sensitive issues. Fromthe point of view of international relationships, SouthCaucasus represents a “sub-regional security complex” thathas coalesced around a zero-sum rapport (Armenia andAzerbaijan), plus a wide variety of relationships of pragmat-ic cooperation or circumstantial competition in differentrespects between Georgia and Armenia and betweenGeorgia and Azerbaijan. The nature of the interactionbetween the states of this sub-regional complex builds up agenuine puzzle of interdependence: Georgia is vital for thefunctioning of Armenia (70 to 75% of Armenia’s tradecrosses the Georgian territory and the port of Poti is anessential link in guaranteeing the country’s food security;moreover, Armenia’s access to the Internet depends on thewiring that crosses the same Georgian territory). At thesame time, Georgia depends in the highest degree on the gassupply from Azerbaijan and the Azeri gas for the Europeanmarket is being supplied through the infrastructure thatcrosses Georgia. Interacting with the powers around SouthCaucasus also has a major impact inside the local securitycomplex. Most of the times, the states in the region instinc-tively take the management of security outside their ownspace, by courting one of the great powers able to offer themsecurity guarantees: while to Georgia it is its nearness to theEuropean security structures that counts (especially NATOand the USA as an “offshore balancer”), Armenia seeks itssecurity guarantees in Russia, under the umbrella of the col-lective defense organization CSTO. Even Azerbaijan, whichis much more self-sufficient, seeks support in the field ofsecurity, through its treaty with Turkey and its bilateral mil-itary relationship with the US. The study shows that afterthe August 2008 war, however, Georgia’s space of maneuverat a macro-regional level tends to narrow down. This is a

The first part of the study, authored by Ileana Racheru,focuses on the political radiograph of the area. If we aretalking about the typology of their political regimes, thestates in South Caucasus practice competitive authoritari-anism as a dominant form of government. It is in the DNAof the local regimes to colonize and mobilize the state tobenefit the power, tilting the structural balance against theopposition and restraining its possibilities of participationin the elections. Society seems ontologically shackled in anunequal relationship, one of subordination to the state andto the regime in power. In Georgia, although an independ-ent press formally exists, the power has rapidly found themeans to influence its contents by creating an extended net-work of investors closely related to the regime who manageto control it, with the effect that the press has become a her-ald of those in power. In Armenia, the political forces thatcould create an alternative to the state are too weak to coag-ulate a democratic critical mass. Civic activism manages tounite a rather isolated elite, that does not reach or attractthe populace. The image of the regime led by presidentAliyev, empirically checked out in the Baku ministries,seems to step right out of the WikiLeaks telegrams: it is aregime built on personal allegiances that have withstood thetest of time. In Azerbaijan, the central figure in the architec-ture of power is president Ilham Aliyev who, following hisfather Heydar Aliyev’s model, “tries to keep power in thefamily and understands the power of the state as a familybusiness”. Aware of the limits of his power, Aliyev is a skil-ful tactician, but also a very clever acrobat, walking a tightrope between mutually exclusive alliances. He makes a clear-cut distinction between what is personal and what is actual-ly a business. President Aliyev encourages a balanced for-eign policy, combining the openness towards NATO and theEuropean Union with measures seeking to win over his greatneighbor powers — Russia and Iran. Domestically, however,he proves to be an impulsive personality, with a blind confi-dence in ruling by force and coercion. In consequence, any

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and Armenia), while Azerbaijan tends to show Orientalaffinities. Politically, Georgia is interested in the domesticimplementation of institutional reforms at European stan-dards, Armenia by re-establishing its relationships withTurkey, while Azerbaijan seems preoccupied by a foreignpolicy strictly based on energy, often in contradiction withits neighbors’ interests. Essentially, the study advocates thesearch of a successful economic pattern that could be laid atthe foundation of a stable regional system and concentrateon inter-regional cooperation. But are the South-Caucasianstates able to make the concessions they should in order tocreate their own, Caucasian pattern of integration?

The present study, 20 Years After: Political Regimes, Security,and Energy Policies in South Caucasus, has been completed aspart of the program “Promoting European values in theBlack Sea basin” of Soros Foundation Romania. This pro-gram seeks to increase knowledge regarding South Caucasusamong the political, administrative, academic, and journal-istic elites in Romania, on the one hand, trying to bring thistopic onto the agendas of the public institutions interested— the Presidency and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs —and, on the other hand, to turn it into a matter of publicinterest. Given its position at the Eastern border of theEuropean Union, Romania could and should become aconnecting factor between the Caucasus and the rest of theUnion. From this point of view, the study is also meant forthe deciding factors in Europe, that can support and encour-age Romania to become a coordinator of the Union’s policiesin the region.

Octavian ManeaForeign policy editor

Foreign Policy Romania and Revista 22

reality created by the contradictory policies of certainEuropean states that have supported the sale of Mistral hel-iports to Russia, but also by the increasing alienation ofTurkey from the European Union. In Tbilisi, Ankara’sregional intentions are all the more confusing, as Turkey isno longer perceived as a power projecting the interests ofthe West.

The last part, authored by Angela Grãmadã, offers a pic-ture of the economy of South Caucasus. The study pointsout the very important role that the oligarchic and monop-olist power structures play in the politics and the economyof the region. It would be a South-Caucasian constant thatthe economic and political decisions are being decisivelyinfluenced by the interests of certain private groups coalesc-ing in monopolies and oligopolies. Although structurallythey make up a common reality, there are, of course, manyspecific national nuances: while in Georgia and Armenia theoligarchy is present both in power and in the opposition, inAzerbaijan the opposition does not have its initiatives sup-ported by oligarchs. Ultimately, all these biological parame-ters of the South-Caucasian economic and political environ-ment tend to discourage the foreign investors to enter amarket where unfair competition is a natural datum. In theabsence of antimonopoly legislations that should bringabout stability and predictability, the rules of the game keepdepending on the goodwill of the various cliental structures.

Of course, when talking in Bucharest about SouthCaucasus, we instantly think “energy”. It is the relativeadvantage of Azerbaijan (as a state with oil and gasresources) and of Georgia (as a state with a transit poten-tial). From this point of view, the economic potential of theregion depends on its capacity to connect to the great ener-gy-consuming markets: the EU, Russia, and China. But, eco-nomically as well as politically, it remains divided, fragment-ed, poles apart from functioning as a unitary whole. Someof these states are economically attracted by the Europeanpatterns of development and cooperation (mostly Georgia

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Ileana Racheru

The Political Regimes in South Caucasus.The Democracy That Hides

Competitive Authoritarianisms

This chapter tackles the evolution of the politicalregimes in Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan following theadvent to power of the current presidents of the respectivecountries. It covers the administrations of MikhailSaakashvili, Ilham Aliyev, and Serzh Sargsyan. The analysisassumes that the three regimes are forms of competitiveauthoritarianism and studies the way in which the authori-ties have managed to create and/or to perpetuate the mech-anisms which consolidate their power. It first explains anddescribes what competitive authoritarianism is. The analy-sis then focuses on every state in turn and follows the evo-lution of the political regime regarding the organization ofelections, the relationship between power, on the one hand,and opposition, media, and civil society, on the other hand.Finally, the study discusses the influence of external pressureupon the internal political decision-making. The analysis isbased on primary sources (interviews taken by the author inSouth Caucasus and data published by OSCE and FreedomHouse) and on expert theoretical studies or observations ofthe political regimes in the three states. The behavior of theregime in its relationship with the opposition, the press, andthe civil society is being surveyed in key political moments:elections, protests, and the passing of legislation consideredto be of major importance for democratization. Consequently,

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actions. Levitsky and Way (2010, p. 10) have establishedthree conditions for the occurring of an unfair competition:the state institutions are constantly being used for purposesfavorable to those in power, the power is always beingprivileged in the opposition’s detriment, and the possibilitiesof the opposition to take part in the elections are seriouslybeing restrained.

Georgia: Democratic Elections,

the Great Success of the Rose Revolution

The current political regime in Tbilisi resulted broadlyfrom the Rose Revolution of 2003, when the long-lastingpeaceful protests of the Georgian political opposition andWest-supported civil society overthrew the authoritarianregime of Eduard Shevardnadze1. After having fraudulentlywon the parliamentary elections of November 2003, Eduard

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1 A former leader of the Communist Party of the Soviet SocialistRepublic of Georgia (1972-1985) and Foreign Minister of the SovietUnion (1985-1991), Eduard Shevardnadze (b. 1928) led Georgiafirst as head of Parliament (1992-1995), then as President electedby direct vote (1995-2003). While in power, Shevardnadze con-cluded the two Russia-mediated peace treaties that put an end tothe violent confrontations in South Ossetia (1992) and Abkhazia(1994). In 1995, he also concluded an Agreement with Moscow, fora 25-year functioning of four Russian military bases on Georgianterritory. Shevardnadze’s rule saw the earliest attempts at creating aGeorgian state based on a national identity and avoided the violentmanifestations characteristic of that of his predecessor, Zviad Gam-sakhurdia (1939-1993). In 1994, due to his positive image in theWest, where he was still seen as having been instrumental in thereunification of Germany, Eduard Shevardnadze managed to launcha Western-supported program of economic reforms. However, whenhe was overthrown from power, in 2003, said economic reforms hadfailed and Georgia had come to be regarded as one of the countriesin the world with the highest level of corruption. The Shevardnadzeregime is considered by experts to have been an authoritarian one.

this chapter aims at finding out how strong the governmentor the party in power is and the means it employs in orderto exercise its authoritarian control over the political regime.

What Is Competitive Authoritarianism?

Competitive authoritarianism is a hybrid regime resultingfrom the combination of democratic practices with authori-tarianism (Levitsky & Way [2010], p. 5). In a competitiveauthoritarian regime, the political power fails to observe atleast one of the conditions of democracy: free elections, theguaranteeing of civil rights, the existence of a space of polit-ical game where both power and opposition can expressthemselves (Levitsky [2010], p. 7).

Competitive authoritarianism has been defined by differ-entiating it from democracy and authoritarianism.

Authoritarianism is a political regime that does not allowthe opposition to express any form of contestation (Levits-ky [2010], p. 7). Competitive authoritarianism is a politicalregime that allows the constitutional existence of contestationby the opposition. In a competitive authoritarian regime,elections are not always free or they take place in an envi-ronment that does not guarantee equal opportunities for theopposition, although the latter can legally participate in theelection campaign. The power can manipulate the lists ofvoters, it can tamper with the results of the voting, or it canrestrict the access of the opposition to the media or thefinancial resources (ibidem, p. 8).

The competitive authoritarian regimes formally guaran-tee the civil liberties, but they are frequently violated: theopposition and the free mass-media are the targets of theabusing law-and-order forces, of the police, of the judicialsystem. Protests, even when they observe the regulations,are often repressed forcibly. Restraining the civil libertiescan also take the shape of “legal repression”, through moresubtle methods like the implementation of certain stipu-lations of the law, in order to give legal form to repressive

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The November 2003 parliamentary elections weredeclared null and void and new elections were organized inMarch 2004, a decision that was deemed suspicious by theinternational observers, since it was applied exclusively tothe parliamentary seats that had been delegated throughproportional representation.4 16 parties and alliances ran inthe new elections, but they began campaigning rather lateand did not come up with any offers or ideological programs,limiting themselves to attacks against their opponents. Thevoting competition strengthened the position of the alliancebetween the UNM and the United Democrats, that won67% of the ballot (135 seats), and brought the right-wingopposition (The New Right and Industry to Save Georgia)7.6% of it (15 seats).5 The OSCE noticed that the votingconditions had improved if compared to the previous cam-paigns, but it also mentioned the “continuing lack of a clearseparation between State administration and political partystructures, and the ongoing potential for misuse of Stateadministrative resources” (OSCE, 2004, p. 3).

The following elections that took place in Georgia, the2006 local elections, were considered a key-moment for theevolution of the new political regime in Tbilisi. Althoughevaluated by international observers as being, generally, inaccordance with the norms of democracy, the use of stateresources (hires in public positions, a temporary increase ofpensions, a granting of social vouchers) by the parties inpower in order to win votes was still practiced. Five parties,an alliance, and several independent candidates ran in thiselections, which were won by the UNM. In 27.5% of themajoritarian races and in 8.7% of the proportional races,

Shevardnadze gave up before the Western pressure and thestreet unrest and announced his resignation. The GeorgianCitizens’ Union — the party in power at the time — disin-tegrated.

The new, hybrid configuration of power was the resultof the concentration of all forces of opposition around acommon goal: overthrowing Shevardnadze and winning thepolitical battle. Today’s power in Tbilisi, that took over afterthe presidential elections of January 2004, is made up ofcontesters from inside the Shevardnadze regime — NinoBurjanadze (b. 1964), Mikhail Saakashvili2 (b. 1967), andZurab Zhvania (1963-2005), turned into critics whofavored the introduction of democratic norms internallyand a West-oriented foreign policy. Following the January2004 vote, Saakashvili, who was the unique candidate ofthe United National Movement (UNM) and of the UnitedDemocrats, was elected president by 96.2% of the votes andhis allies Burjanadze and Zhvania became Chairman andSpokesman of Parliament and State Minister, respectively.3The January 2004 elections were the first described byinternational observers described as being close to the dem-ocratic standards and marked the beginning of the secondGeorgian transition, after the 1991 proclamation of inde-pendence.

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4 The Constitution that was effective in Georgia in 2004 stipu-lated that the parliament was made up of 235 seats; for 150 of these,the vote was proportionate, according to lists, while for the remaining85 it was a simple-majority vote - one mandate, one district.

5 In the Georgian parliament, ten seats are reserved for the repre-sentatives of the population displaced from the provinces Abkhaziaand South Ossetia.

2 With his master’s degree at Columbia University and his Ph.D.at the George Washington University, Mikhail Saakashvili was amember of Parliament (1995-1999) and a Minister of Justice(2000-2001) during the rule of Eduard Shevardnadze. In 2001,he resigned from the Ministry of Justice and accused his owngovernment of corruption. That same year, he founded the UnitedNational Movement as an opposition entity with which he won thepresidential elections of 2004 and 2008 (CRS Report, 2011, p. 1).

3 According to the 1995 Constitution, the president of Georgiaheld the most important position in the country. The presidentialsystem instituted by the fundamental law did not make provisionsfor the existence of the position of prime-minister, but of a StateMinister who supervised the body of ministers accountable onlybefore the president.

In the local elections of March 30th, 2010, the party inpower used the administrative resources in its campaign onceagain and its members that occupied public offices wentcampaigning. The UNM won the elections by 73.9% of theballot nationwide and by 55.2% (for the mayors) from thefirst round and 52.5% (for the Municipal Council) in theTbilisi city hall, thought to be the jackpot of local elections.

The UNM, All-Powerful in Georgian Politics

The presidential party in Georgia is now in power (MaxBader, 2008, p. 5); together with several opposition parties,it is building the image of a presidential political systemwith practices both democratic, and authoritarian.

After four years of government, the UNM has managedto preserve the parliamentary majority, even though it has aweaker position now than after the 2004 elections; but theopposition did not gather half of the votes that the presi-dential party won, so it is no formidable adversary. Theresults of the last two elections (the parliamentary ones in2008 and the local ones in 2010) showed that the UNMhas managed to preserve the majority even after presidentSaakashvili lost almost half of the ballot in the 2008 presi-dential elections. Through the local elections, the UNM hasstrengthened its power network also locally, which is goingto give it a significant advantage in the following elections.The UNM has now a well-consolidated power network allover Georgia, the party’s control varying between 50 and70% of the electorate.

The Georgian Political Scene betweenRevolution and Reform

The political scene in Tbilisi preserves the atmosphere ofextreme confrontation of the 1990s, since neither thepower, nor the opposition is experienced in negotiations andcompromise and neither has any ideological programs. The

only one candidate or party list runs — in all but one case,that of the governing UNM (OSCE, 2006, p. 2).

In 2008, the Georgians were called again to vote for theanticipated presidential elections and for parliamentaryones. The elections were qualified as “the first really com-petitive post-independence presidential race”. MikhailSaakashvili used the state’s administrative resources in hiscampaign and the vote counting and registration procedureswere inadequate (OSCE, 2008a, p. 2). Saakashvili’s mainadversary was Levan Gachechiladze, supported by nineopposition parties grouped together in the UNM. Saakashviliwon over 53% of the ballot from the first round, Gachechi-ladze gathered 25.69% and the rest of the votes went to fiveother competitors (each got under 1%). The first two candi-dates had similar objectives of foreign policy on their agen-das (Georgia’s joining NATO) and different views as to theconfiguration of the domestic political regime (a semi-pres-idential system, eliminating corruption and poverty, and theintegration of Abkhazia and South Ossetia for Saakashvili;parliamentary monarchy and encouraging the business envi-ronment for Gachechiladze).

The 2008 parliamentary elections “clearly offered theGeorgian people the opportunity to choose its representa-tives from a wide variety of options”, but, as in the previouselections, the UNM made use of the state’s administrativeresources to win votes (OSCE, 2008b, p. 1). The presidentialparty won 59.18% of the ballot (119 seats), the nine-partyopposition alliance obtained 17.73% of the votes (17 seats),the Christian-Democrats 8.66% (6 seats), the Labor Party7.44% (6 seats), and the Georgian Republican Party 3.78%(2 seats).6

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6 The Georgian Constitution was amended on March 28th, 2008,so the number of members of parliament was reduced from 253 to150 (75 chosen proportionately, in a single national constituency,and 75 chosen through a majority vote in unequal constituenciesoverlapping with the administrative districts).

program “Georgia without poverty”. The opposition threat-ened to withdraw from all debates referring to governmentreforms and organized more protests. Moreover, it accusedthe power of perpetrating fraud in the elections, althoughthe international observers noticed the UNM’s progress inorganizing them.

The political agendas of both camps claim that their pri-ority objective is to achieve democratization combined withWesternization and Europeanization, with various achieve-ment strategies. For the opposition, revolution is the means;for the power, the often radical reforms that attempt atapplying Western norms without taking into account thelocal specificities. Anti-communism in the form of a radicallustration is also present on the power’s agenda.

The party in power in Georgia has created a space for thepolitical game in which the opposition may take part in theelections with real chances to win, but it has not given upaltogether the disloyal administrative practices that put it inan advantageous position. The increasing power of theUNM is also due to the opposition’s incapacity of bringingforth important adversaries who might challenge the power(in the 2004 parliamentary elections, most candidatesrefused the media’s offers and did not have any TV cam-paigns). The UNM is the strongest party in Georgia, but itmight be challenged by a powerful opposition, since itleaves its adversaries a great many possibilities to expressthemselves and allows for a political climate that does notrule out competition. Although the UNM holds the major-ity in parliament, the opposition could penetrate the system(in 2005, for instance, all the opposition parties formed analliance in order to propose that the mayor of Tbilisi beelected by direct voting and they rejected the initiatives thatheld that he or she be chosen by the Municipal Council).The confrontation between the Georgian parties takes placein an organized fashion, through elections or parliamentarydebates, in the street (peaceful or violent manifestations), orthrough fights in parliament. Violent confrontations do not

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UNM has no ideology and claims it represents the entireGeorgian society (IDEA, 2006, p. 7), while the other par-ties, although claiming to belong to either left, or right orproclaim their centrism, do so only to avoid the criticism of“lacking any ideology”. The behavior and discourse of theparties in Tbilisi mostly distinguish between the moderatereformers in power and the radical revolutionaries in theopposition. Most opposition parties in Tbilisi7 place them-selves to the right of the ideological spectrum leftist valuesbeing rejected as directly or indirectly associated with com-munism.

The political scene in Tbilisi has a low degree of polar-ization (Nodia, 2006, p. 19), that does not manifest itselfideologically, but through the refuse to take part in debates,the acceptance of the Russian support (Nino Burjanadze’sparty), and the way in which everyone relates to the RoseRevolution8 (ibidem, p. 119). The creation of coalitions andalliances and their dissolution is a phenomenon frequentlyoccurring on the political scene in Tbilisi, at any moment ofthe electoral cycle or just conjecturally, in parliament, inorder to sustain certain initiatives or projects.

The UNM came to power with a revolutionary programthat subsequently, with Western help , it managed to turninto a reform program. It has tried to come up with a positiveanswer to a question that is fundamental to the Georgians:Was the 2003 revolution the last one in Georgia? The oppo-sition has not given up the revolutionary objectives it pro-claimed through street protests, although, in time, the num-ber of those who joined the manifestations decreased verymuch. A new revolution and the president’s resignation werethe main objectives of the opposition, against which thegovernment came up with reforms and with the electoral

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7 There is only one center-left political structure in Georgia, theLabor Party.

8 The Republican Party and the Conservative Party were involvedin the Rose Revolution. The New Conservative party, the Indus-trialists, and the Labor Party did not support the 2003 events.

all ministers resemble their president — they have studiedin the West and support the reformation of the state afterWestern patterns. The power of the UNM may be account-ed for, aside from its success in the elections (that can alsobe explained, at least partially, by the people’s wish to attaina certain political stability), through the high-level clientalnetworks whose loyalty is based on corruption: “The publicinstitutions have been ridden of corruption at the lowerlevels. This is the greatest achievement of the Saakashviliadministration. But nobody has touched the corrupt ele-ments at the high levels.”9 In the upper positions, corrup-tion “has just changed form. The stakes are now to controlbusiness and the market.”10 The regime relies on the loyal-ty of the business environment and of the administrativeemployees, not on the ministers’ (the replacement of minis-ters is a constant practice in Tbilisi). But, as a result of thereforms it has initiated, the Saakashvili administration hasnot managed to obtain popular support as well, because thepositive changes, although visible in the streets of Tbilisi orBatumi, have not yet reached the lower strata of the impov-erished population.

The Mass-Media and Its Impossible Co-existencewith the Political Regime

The relationship between the mass-media and the powerin Tbilisi is typical for the authoritarian regimes in that ademocratic legislation overlaps with undemocratic practices.In the almost eight years since it came to power, the UNMhas managed to assume control of almost all mass-media.Although it has created the legal conditions for the existenceof an independent press, the Saakashvili regime has alsoidentified, in a very short time, the means by which it mayinfluence the content of the news: to bring the state-financed

mean just measures taken by law enforcement against theopposition. The Georgian parties preserve a tradition priorto the Rose Revolution, that of violent confrontations amongthemselves: each party has a SonderKommando, a group ofthugs that help it face the potential provocations of theiradversaries (Nodia, 2006, p. 117).

New Elites, New Cliental Networks in Power

The image and practices of the political elites in Tbilisicombine the Soviet heritage with adaptation to the transi-tion and to the ever-present objective of democratization.The Soviet heritage is reflected in the existence of a strongleader and the elimination of all heads of state that do notshow this attribute. Mikhail Saakashvili is the strong leaderin Tbilisi, a position he has built for himself through thesuccessful Rose Revolution, the winning of the elections by97% and 53%, respectively, and through reforms. Adaptationto transition has meant the creation of a legislative frame-work that observes the norms of democracy, while favoringthe power.

The legislative reformation of government (by modifyingthe constitution and building up a strong presidential sys-tem) has been another way of consolidating the Saakashviliregime’s power in Georgia. Thus, the president may dismissthe cabinet and the parliament (if the latter does not givea vote of confidence to three successive cabinets). Althoughthe system has formally been reformed by the introductionof the office of prime-minister (who functions as a screeninasmuch as he/she apparently shares the executive powerwith the president), as well as his/her confirmation by par-liament, the president’s power has actually strengthened,because he is the one around whom the entire politicalregime is built.

The new elite created by Mikhail Saakashvili is different,first and foremost, from the Soviet one around EduardShevardnadze or from the nationalist radicals of the 1990s:

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9 Interview with an expert, Tbilisi, May 2011.10 Interview with an expert, Tbilisi, May 2011.

The private mass-media are incapable of financially sus-taining themselves, because of the extremely meager publicitymarket, which makes them vulnerable before the editorialpressure often politically inspired, that the financers exert.The private investors in the Georgian mass-media remainunknown, they are obscure companies located in “fiscal par-adises” and it is speculated that they are only screens meantto conceal the presence of political actors connected to thecircles of either power, or opposition. The private TV sta-tions fight serious financial deficits and “nobody knowswhere they are getting their money from”11. It seems thatafter 2004, the three main private TV stations (Rustavi-2,Imedi-TV, TV Mze) were purchased by individuals withgovernment ties or by parliament members, after their own-ers were submitted to legal pressure.

The financial problems of the mass-media make themdependent not only on the private investors, but also onhow the debts towards the state are being paid. The regimeresorted to “legal” forms of pressure (fiscal police controls)or informal messages (criticisms of the journalists by theofficials and restricting their access to events organized bypublic institutions — a practice of the Ministry of StateSecurity). In 2004, the government rescheduled paymentsdue by Rustavi-2 and the TV station was later purchased byan investor close to the government circles, which seems tohave diluted its critical stance with reference to the author-ities (Freedom House Georgia, 2005).

The financial situation of the Georgian press has animpact on the editorial content of the information madepublic. The private mass-media often practice self-censor-ship in order to avoid pressure from the financer. There havebeen several scandals in the Georgian press, in which jour-nalists accused their investors of interference causing docu-mentaries about corruption in the police ranks or showswhose hosts criticized the government to be pulled off the air.

press under its own influence and to create a network of pri-vate investors close to the regime (even of parliament mem-bers) who are capable of controlling the private media andturn them from an independent press that often criticizedthe regime into a mouthpiece of those in power.

The legislation regulating the Georgian audio-visualenvironment has been evaluated by Freedom House as onethat meets all democratic requirements. After 2004, theparliament in Tbilisi completed the legislative provisionsregarding the mass-media. The new legal framework alsocame up with significant amendments to the 1991 law:it guarantees the freedom of expression, it clarifies the legalconstraints that the media people may be subjected to, andit des-incriminates slander (Freedom House Georgia, 2006).

Television represents the Georgians’ main source of infor-mation, while the printed mass-media have a reduced circu-lation and usually cover the educated milieus, being distrib-uted mainly in Tbilisi and other larger cities. There is a TVstation in Georgia, that is being financed from public funds(TV1), three private TV channels (Kanal 1, Rustavi 2, andImedi), and several newspapers partially state-financed. TheSaakashvili regime took the publicly-financed press fromunder the influence of Shevardnadze and brought it underits own after 2004. The same happened with the mass-mediain Ajaria, that was put under the control and censorship ofthe Batumi authorities, heavily influenced by the power inTbilisi. After the advent to power of the UNM and ofMikhail Saakashvili, the public TV station became the mainmedia vehicle the regime resorted to in all electoral cam-paigns. Although formally — through the legislation guaran-teeing the right to free expression and the means by whichits leadership is being appointed that observe all democraticnorms — this station has at its disposal all the necessaryelements for disseminating non-partisan information, it hasnot abandoned the self-censorship practices associated withthe press from an authoritarian regime.

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11 Interview with a journalist, Tbilisi, May 2011.

“There are now in Georgia one press for the power and onefor the opposition”13. At present, the most important TVstation of the opposition is Maestro TV, which supports theradical opposition represented by Nino Burjanadze.

Civil Society, the Only Voice That Criticizes theRegime

The Tbilisi regime has hesitated between the democraticand the authoritarian practices in its relationship with theopposition and the civil society. Its control over the exercis-ing of civil rights and liberties is a limited one and mostlyimpacts the debates on the legislation regarding the reforma-tion of the state and the right to protest against or contestthe power.

The second transition in Georgia implied the reorganiza-tion of the legislative framework in which the elections tookplace and the legal reconfiguration of the political regime.As soon as it came to power, the UNM announced that itwas going to have consultations regarding the project for aUnified Electoral Code and the amendments to be broughtto the Constitution. The power in Tbilisi tried and succeededto monopolize the public debate by two means: the parlia-mentary majority vote and some façade debates with theopposition and the civil society (to show, at least formally,that it observed the rules of political dialogue required bythe West). Moreover, the power took advantage of theextreme polarization of the political milieu and of the radi-cal manner in which the opposition approached those con-sultations, by withdrawing from the discussions and puttingup street protests.

International observers have frequently criticized themanner in which consultations with the civil society and theopposition parties were organized in view of the modifica-tion of the electoral legislation and the amendment of the

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13 Interview with a journalist, Tbilisi, May 2011.

They also accused their own employers of pressure: “It isimpossible to write and publish an article about a corruptpolitical figure either in power, or in the opposition, unlessyour own boss agrees”12.

The regime’s pressure on the mass-media has been mani-fest especially in the tensed moments of the struggle forpower (elections, opposition protests, the 2008 war) andhas gone all the way to physical violence or the suspensionof TV broadcasting. At the 2004 parliamentary elections, allthe sixteen parties and alliances that competed for the voteswere present in the media, but the general tendency of boththe private TV stations and of the public one, was to favorthe party in power, the UNM. TV1, which is publiclyfinanced, broadcast 80% positive news about the UNM anddid not host any electoral debates (OSCE, 2004, pp. 2, 15).Rustavi-2, a private-owned station, covered the campaign ina similar fashion. The following elections showed that thepractices of the 2004 voting were still in use.

The forces of order have physically aggressed the journal-ists, especially those who broadcast information about the2005 and 2007 protests. President Saakashvili proclaimed astate of emergency in November 2007 and forbade all TVbroadcasting, except from the public station. At that samemoment, the Imedi and Kavkasia TV stations were suspend-ed, allegedly for having stirred up the protesters (FreedomHouse Georgia, 2008). During the 2008 Russo-Georgianwar, all TV stations in Georgia broadcast only informationthat was favorable to the Tbilisi authorities and, as a conse-quence of the November 2007 incidents, all talk-shows andanalyses vanished from all programs.

The Tbilisi regime has managed to rid the Georgian mar-ket of the independent mass-media, but it has not sup-pressed pluralism, since the investors are not only politiciansand people having close connections with the power circles,but also members or supporters of the political opposition:

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12 Interview with a journalist, Tbilisi, May 2011.

police used force in May 2011 against one part of the oppo-sition led by Nino Burjanadze, which resulted in four deathsand tens of people being injured. One of the oppositionleaders was put under arrest.

Georgia is the only South-Caucasian state in which thecivil society has managed to send the message of the popu-lation through peaceful protests to the Shevardnadzeadministration and to achieve the main objectives of themanifestations: the annulment of the fraudulent elections,the organizing of new ones, and the president’s resignation.After 2004, the civil society has only partially managed toalter its relationships with the political milieu. The govern-ment in Tbilisi has a dual approach in its relationships withthe NGOs: it presents itself with a formal policy of opennessto the civil society, yet avoids the dialogue when matters ofdomestic policy are brought into debate.

The legislation in effect in Georgia does not obstruct thecreation of NGOs and the Tbilisi regime has not tried tooffer those already existing any state financing in order toinfluence the activities of the non-governmental environmentto its advantage. The most active NGOs are being financedfrom the West. There have been, however, situations in whichvarious NGOs expressed very biased options (a good exam-ple is the Liberty Institute, a supporter of the Rose Revolu-tion, whose director took up politics, after 2004, under theumbrella of the UNM).

The classic role of civil society of communicating thecitizens’ messages to the government is limited in Georgia,since the administration is unwilling to take part in debatesorganized by NGOs or to allow the civil society any influenceon the decision-making process in the case of public policies.Unlike under Shevardnadze, the government is now appar-ently open to the civil society projects, especially in the caseof the NGOs working in partnership with various EU insti-tutions, so as to avoid any possible criticism coming fromBrussels. But members of the government turned downseveral invitations by the NGOs to take part in the debatesregarding the modification of the constitution.

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constitution: they were held over a very limited time-span14

and favored the parties in power. In 2004, following a gov-ernment initiative, the parliament modified the electoral law,while violating the deliberation procedures. The debatesregarding the modification of the parliamentary structure(reduction of the number of seats) began in 2008, only twomonths before the elections, and the OSCE (2008, p. 1)considered that the initiative was violating the equality ofthe vote. Moreover, the changes were in favor of the UNMthat had obtained most of the simple-majority mandates inthe previous elections. The UNM version of the electorallaw also contains a controversial stipulation that allowsthe candidates already holding public offices to take part inthe campaign.

The regime in Tbilisi has also promoted a dual approachin its relations with the political opposition: peaceful ones,according to the norms of Western democracy, but also vio-lent reactions or scandals and intimidations.

The Tbilisi government has offered the opposition thepossibility to take part in the elections with real chances ofgaining votes (no candidate or party was abusively deniedparticipation in the elections organized so far). The opposi-tion has been able to exercise freely its legal right of organ-izing anti-Saakashvili protests, yet several manifestations ofthe contesters were suppressed violently. In November 2007,the government forcibly suppressed the protests of theopposition parties grouped together in a National Council,which demanded that the parliamentary elections be organ-ized earlier and called for the president’s resignation. Thefollowing protests of the opposition, which took the form ofmassive demonstrations lasting almost two months were,however, received peacefully by the regime in power. The

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14 On August 26th, 2006, president Saakashvili issued a decreethat announced that local elections were to be held on October 6th,the same year. The time allotted to the debates on the modificationof the local elections legislations was just two weeks.

(in Eduard Shevardnadze’s administration, these were underthe subsistence limit), modified the structure of the bureau-cratic apparatus, put up training sessions for the improvementof the employees’ performance, and eliminated corruption.

The West demanded, however, that democratic reformsbe implemented in exchange for its support, so the govern-ment in Tbilisi had to temper its authoritarian tendenciesand began hesitating between the organization of electionsaccording to the OSCE norms and the suppression by forceof the opposition’s protests or the brutalizing of mediamembers. The regime there has not yet forgotten the recentfailure of the Shevardnadze administration, which wasdeprived of help from the West because it refused to imple-ment any reforms, it let the economic situation deteriorateand was overthrown through public protests. The street putspressure on the Saakashvili regime as well, although thisregime has withstood a number of manifestations meant tobring about a change of power.

After some commercial frictions (an increase of the priceof gas by Moscow and the discontinuation of mineral waterimports from Georgia), the relations between Georgia andRussia have utterly deteriorated in the wake of the August2008 war. Russia has become the great enemy of the Georgianregime and has tried several times to have Saakashviliremoved from power, if the official version is to be takenseriously.

The Western pressure for the democratization of theregime in Tbilisi has double coordinates: an internal one (tokeep it in power by encouraging a pro-Western agenda andby counteracting Moscow’s attempts at replacing it) and anexternal one (the necessity of having a powerful partnerthere and guaranteeing its security).

However, the Georgian regime is not altogether immuneto all initiatives of the civil society. In 2004, following thesuggestion of the Liberty Institute, the parliament modifiedthe law of the press, by des-incriminating slander and pro-viding for access to public information. Four years later, theGeorgian government gave up to the pressure exerted by thepublic opinion and the opposition and accepted reorganizingthe publicly funded mass-media (Freedom House Georgia,2005).

The representatives of the NGOs have free access to themedia and they often take part in TV-broadcast debates.None of the civil society activists that were interviewed forthis paper demanded that his of her identity be concealedand did not fear to criticize the political circles.

The Democracy That Limits the RussianPressure

Georgia is a small state in a region of many conflicts(North Caucasus, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno-Kara-bakh), a situation that creates the necessity of having astrong ally. There are only two options for it: Russia and theWest. The privileged relationships with Russia have beenruled out of the political program of both the UNM, andMikhail Saakashvili since 2003, although they might havehelped them both to assume a firmer control and consoli-date their positions. However, the party and its presidentialcandidate alike proclaimed EU integration and joiningNATO as being the major objectives of their future adminis-tration. Winning all the subsequent elections with the samepro-Western program and the people’s wide support for analliance with the West has caused the survival in power ofthe regime to depend on its relationships with the US andthe EU. The power in Tbilisi has initiated the reform of thecountry’s institutions with the financial support of the West:it has substantially augmented the public servants’ wages

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offering a more democratic image to the world, due to thelack of a real opposition that could have threatened it.18

The Elections That Reconfirm the Same Winner

The 2007 parliamentary elections “were conductedlargely in accordance with OSCE commitments and otherinternational standards for democratic elections” (OSCEArmenia, 2007, p. 1). The Republican Party, which was inpower, won 41 proportional mandates and 22 simple-major-ity ones.19 The other parties that made the 5% electionthreshold were Prosperous Armenia (18 proportional and7 simple-majority mandates), the Dashnaktsutyun — theArmenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF; 16 proportionalmandates), Orinac Yerkir — the Country of Laws (8 propor-tional and 2 simple-majority mandates), the HeritageMovement (7 proportional mandates), the Alliance Party(1 simple-majority mandate), the non-party Civic Initiative(9 simple-majority mandates) (OSCE Armenia, 2007, Annex).None of the competitors had candidates in all electoral dis-tricts and two thirds of the parties and alliances running inthe elections only had lists for the proportional voting (inseven districts only single candidates were registered). Manycandidates (of both power, and opposition) withdrew fromthe race after the lists were registered or the candidacies forthe single-majority mandates were validates). On severaloccasions, the Republican Party used the state administrativeresources to gain the support of the voters (OSCE Armenia,2007, p. 1) and to create a campaign environment favorable

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18 The parliamentary elections held in Armenia in 2003 werestolen, which brought about a lot of criticism from the West and theinternational observers.

19 According to the 1995 Constitution, that was amended in2005, the Parliament of Armenia is a one-chamber institution with131 deputies (90 mandates delegated through a proportional voteon lists and 41 mandates through a simple majority in single-winnerconstituencies).

Armenia

The current political regime in Armenia15 has resultedfrom the remaining in power, since 1998, of a single politicalgroup rooted in Nagorno-Karabakh16 (Ter-Petrosyan, 2010,p. 8) and from the transfer of power from President RobertKocharyan to prime-minister Serzh Sargsyan17. After thetaking over of power by Sargsyan, the Armenian authoritiesbuilt up a hybrid political regime in which democratic prac-tices co-exist with authoritarian measures. After Serzh Sarg-syan’s appointment as prime-minister in 2008, the Yerevanauthorities improved the electoral system. The regime couldafford renouncing some of the authoritarian practices and

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15 Armenia declared its independence from the USSR in August1990. Levon Ter-Petrosyan (b. 1945) became the first president ofpost-communist Armenia in 1991. Until 1998, Ter-Petrosyan headedan authoritarian regime frequently criticized in the West for suppres-sing the press, violating the citizens’ rights and liberties, and havingfraudulently won the 1995 parliamentary elections and the 1998presidential ones.

16 In 1923, Stalin decided to include the Oblast Nagorno-Kara-bakh, with a mostly Armenian population, in the Azerbaijan SovietSocialist Republic. In 1988, the Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakhand Yerevan demanded, in vast street demonstrations, that theregion be included in the Armenian SSR, which led to the outbreakof the conflict. In 1991, Nagorno-Karabakh declared its independ-ence from Azerbaijan. The cease-fire agreement was signed in 1994.This roughly 14% of the territory of Azerbaijan has been de factounder the control of Yerevan and de iure under the Baku administra-tion ever since.

17 Born in Stepanakert, Nagorno-Karabakh, Sargsyan had a longcareer in the Communist Party of the Armenian SSR, then servedin the Armenian military structures as head of the Nagorno-Kara-bakh Self-Defense Committee (1989-1993) and Minister of Defense(1993-1995 and 2000-2007). After 1995, he was Minister of StateSecurity, Minister of Internal Affairs, and held other various posi-tions in the Yerevan presidential administration. In 2007, he wasappointed prime-minister of Armenia, being seen as the right handof the Armenian President Robert Kocharyan.

not reject cooperation with the EU, but we are aware thata possible integration is a much too distant objective”21.

After the 2007 parliamentary elections, the RepublicanParty formed a majority together with Prosperous Armenia,the ARF, and the Orinac Yerkir, a coalition dominated by theRepublicans. Prosperous Armenia is being controlled by for-mer president Kocharyan, while Orinac Yerkir has only twomembers in the governing team, who are said to be close toSargsyan and, unofficially, members of the Republican Party(Petrosyan, 2010, p. 10).

The Armenian parliamentary opposition includes theARF and the Heritage (considered to be the only genuineopposition). In 2009, the ARF left the governing coalition22,but went on sustaining the power informally, in exchangefor an equally informal “non-aggression pact” (the authori-ties took no measures against its members).

Heritage is seen as the only opposition party in theArmenian parliament and the only one that criticizes boththe government’s foreign policy (for the Russian investmentsin the Armenian economy, as being “a form of corruption”,and for the presence of a Russian military base on theArmenian territory), and for its domestic one (for corruptionand for the way the authorities handled the 2008 events).Heritage members, on the other hand, have constantly beentargets of government criticism and of law enforcementbrutality.

The Armenian opposition outside the parliament, theso-called Armenian National Council, is a hybrid movementmade up of eighteen political parties of different ideologiesand civic organizations grouped around Levon Ter-Petrosyan(Petrosyan, 2010, p. 11). The ANC frequently criticizes

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21 Interview with a member of the Armenian National Assembly,June 2011.

22 As a protest against the signing, in October 2009, of the Zurichprotocols of the normalization of the relationship between Armeniaand Turkey.

to itself and its informal allies (Prosperous Armenia and,partially, the ARF).

The February 2008 presidential elections “mostly metOSCE commitments and international standards” regardingthe organization of a free voting. The results indicated thatSerzh Sargsyan won in the first run by 52.8% of the ballot.Levon Ter-Petrosyan came out second, with 21.5% of thevotes. All in all, the voting process developed in such a wayas to favor the candidate of the Republican Party: the actingpresident and the Government officials campaigned for himand the counting of votes in some 16% of the polling sta-tions observed was assessed as “bad” or “very bad” (OSCEArmenia, 2008, p. 2).

In 2009, for the first time, the inhabitants of Yerevanwere called upon to elect the members of their MunicipalCouncil. This voting, that was assessed as generally meetingthe norms of the European Council, was, however, markedby the same non-democratic practices: votes were bought,ballot papers were printed in excess, and voters were intimi-dated. After counting, the Republican Party gained themajority in the Municipal Council (35 of the total 65 seats)and reconfirmed the former mayor.20

The political scene in Yerevan shows a low degree ofpolarization, only reflected in the nationalist content of thepolitical agenda regarding the future of Nagorno-Karabakh.Several parties claim that the region should either be includ-ed in the Armenian state, or remain independent, whileothers advocate the organization of a referendum in whichthe inhabitants of Nagorno-Karabakh themselves shouldstate their opinion as to the future of the area. Domestically,both power, and opposition claim that democratization andreforms are their main priorities, but the final purpose ofthose are not the integration in the European Union: “We do

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20 Until 2009, the mayor of Yerevan was appointed by the presi-dent. Since the 2005 revision of the Constitution, the mayor ofYerevan is being chosen indirectly by the majority of the MunicipalCouncil members.

to succeed him. The rule that the prime-minister takes overthe president’s position was confirmed even the single timewhen the transfer of power was not made as a result of elec-tions — in 1998, when Levon Ter-Petrosyan was replaced byRobert Kocharyan following a soft coup. The power inYerevan took advantage of the victory against Azerbaijanand strengthened its authoritarian control by building up apowerful coercive force in the Army and the Police, whichwas afterwards efficiently used to suppress the opposition’svast protests (Way, 2009, p. 111).

According to the 2005 constitution (it was amended in2004), Armenia has a semi-presidential regime, but unoffi-cially the power is concentrated in the president’s hands.This situation is accountable for by the Soviet heritage thatcultivated the image of a powerful leader and by the post-communist political practice of a group of leaders who hadto face a series of constant threats in order to gain politicalstability. The political elite in power is grouped around thepresident, due to the necessity of having a strong leader ableto negotiate the outcome of the conflict and to use the pre-text of Nagorno-Karabakh for consolidating his own powerand obtaining legitimacy (Gallina, 2010, p. 30).

The power networks of the Armenian regime are inheritedfrom the Soviet period or constructed in the post-commu-nist one. The Armenian transition has not meant the totalchange of the institutions inherited from the Soviet period,but the preservation of the state structure almost intact andloyal, so the institutions and the informal networks may becontrolled in a formal way (Stefes, 2009, p. 448). The regimeis based on corrupt officials (the current prime-minister hasbeen involved in several financial scandals or in defraudingthe state by maintaining a suspect exchange rate for theArmenian dram) or even on family relationships (it seemsthat the most trustworthy official in Yerevan is the presi-dent’s brother, Alexander Sargsyan). Most officials also havea felonious past. Their uninterrupted presence in power after1991 has been an advantage for the Yerevan leaders who

the government for violation of human rights, corruption,and the infringement of the constitutional order. The twocamps of the Armenian opposition have not managed tocoalesce into a unique force able to take part in elections.In 2011, Heritage protested alongside the ANC, withoutsupporting all of the latter’s objectives, however.

Although it has taken part in all the elections that havebeen organized since the 1995 adoption of the Constitutionand has had real chances to challenge the power, theArmenian political opposition has never had enough influ-ence on the voters and has not strengthened itself byattracting new supporters. After the 2008 protests, the tra-ditional opposition in Yerevan compromised itself beforethe population by unduly contesting the results of a votingthat had been assessed as being one in accordance with theWestern democratic standards.

At present, the Republican Party holds a majority of over50% of the electorate and the improvement of the condi-tions in which elections are being organized has not affectedits control over the political power. The “party in power” inYerevan enjoys the advantages of an opposition that is weakand divided by internal disputes and of “informal partner-ships” with part of the opposition.

A Regime Legitimized by the Nagorno-KarabakhConflict

The current elite in Yerevan is the result of the coalitionbetween nationalists and post-communists, set up in the1990s (Gallina, 2010, p. 24). The political force holdingpower in Armenia was created when the military elite thathad fought in Nagorno-Karabakh in the 1990s blended withthe political body that had settled in Yerevan after the gain-ing of independence (ibidem, p. 25). The power in Yerevanhas met no change in the twenty years since the proclama-tion of independence: elections have been won by the actingpresident or by the prime-minister unofficially designated

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brought substantial improvements in comparison with thesituation of the 2003 elections. The power in Yerevanimposed its own rules when setting up talks with the oppo-sition and the civil society with regard to the electoral legis-lation. Although it claimed to be open to debate, the Yerevanregime initiated the modification of the law during the elec-tion year, just a few months before the voting itself.

The power in Yerevan also hesitated between violatingand observing the right of free assembling. The Armenianlegislation grants the political opposition the right to contestthe power through street manifestations. However, the regimehappened to apply a violent treatment to its opposition.After the 2008 presidential elections, the opposition thatgathered around Ter-Petrosyan protested by accusing theRepublican Party of having fraudulently skewed the electionresults in favor of Sargsyan. The police suppressed theprotests by resorting to violence, which resulted in the killing,injuring, or detaining of several protesters; the courts of lawhave not yet come with any verdict. The president decreeda 20-day state of emergency and imposed limits for themanifestations, a situation that has been prolonged to thisday. The regime also took punitive measures (beatings,arrests, imprisonments with postponed trials) against theprotesters’ family members.23 In 2009, the parliament setup a commission for the studying of the 2008 events, whichcompleted its activity by drawing up a report. Accordingto the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe,the document presented before the Armenian parliament“exculpated the authorities and blamed the oppositiongathered around Ter-Petrosyan, a situation that underminesthe credibility of the report” (2009, p. 3). Further protestsof the opposition took place in March 2011, but they werenot forcibly suppressed by the police. Moreover, the powerdeclared itself ready to begin a dialogue with the opposition,freed two political detainees (imprisoned after the 2008

have managed to build up, during these two decades, twotypes of loyalties: within the state’s administration andamong the oligarchs who have benefited from privatizations.The political power in Armenia has conceived a mechanismfor the control of corruption, in which the governmentmonitors the central networks of corruption (ibidem, p. 447)which, in their turn, monitor the local ones.

The consolidation of the power in Yerevan can be alsoaccounted for by the way in which the opposition has cho-sen to take part in the political life: by establishing informalrelationships with the power, by its refuse to engage indebates (see the parliament boycotting from 2003 to 2008),or by street protests.

Rights and Liberties Only According to theDiscretionary Will of the Political Regime

The rhetoric and legislation encouraged by the politicalregime in Yerevan in order to observe human rights andliberties are characteristic of the Western democracies, buttheir implementation is typical for the post-Soviet space.The Armenian political regime has made significant progressso far in the adoption or modification of laws that refer tothe guaranteeing of rights and liberties.

The Armenian constitution, modified and improved in2005, creates the legal premises of pluralism and of thesupremacy of law. In 2008, other legislative measures weretaken in order to ensure the judicial system’s transparencyand independence. But the Armenian judicial system hasnot ridden itself of the influence of the political regime, asproven by the measures taken against the March 2008 pro-testers (suspect arrests, beatings, collection of doubtful evi-dence, protracted court actions — Freedom House, 2009,p. 68). In 2010, fourteen political detainees were imprisonedin Armenia.

In 2007, the Armenian electoral code was amended and,according to the international observers, the modifications

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23 Interview with a member of an opposition party.

The publicly financed press is 100 percent in the serviceof the political regime. The Yerevan regime exercises twoforms of control of the privately financed media: invest-ments by financers who are close to the circles of power andcontrol over the organism that issues licenses for televisionbroadcasting. The main financing sources for the mass-mediaare the sales and the publicity, which bring only a veryreduced income, plus the money offered by various politicalactors or private investors: “30% of the financing of thisdaily is black money”, says the manager of a Yerevan dailynewspaper of general interest. Because of the precariousfinancing, the wages of the journalists from the Armenianprivate media are barely enough to survive: “A young begin-ner earns about $250 and a manager $1,000 at the most”25.This precarious financial situation of the press has beenused by the political power to make sure the journalists wereloyal to it: “In the state-owned press, journalists can earneven $10,000, but most of their income is from undisclosedsources”26. All three private TV stations are being controlledby oligarchs associated to the regime; “These past years,they have given broadcasting licenses only to the stationsthat were most assuredly not going to create any politicalproblems”. At present, the process of digitalization is anoth-er instrument used by the authorities to put pressure on theTV stations.

The printed press is “of the opposition”, affiliated to thepower, or independent (one single newspaper about whichthere are speculations that it is in fact influenced by thegovernment).

Access to the Internet has not been restricted by theauthorities in Yerevan and the press is rapidly extending itsactivities online. In the Armenian online environment, there

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25 Interview with the manager of a daily newspaper, Yerevan,June 2011.

26 Interview with the manager of a daily newspaper, Yerevan,June 2011.

violent events) and allowed for the manifestations in LibertySquare (where the opposition was denied access in 2008).

The Armenian legislation and the political circles in Yere-van allowed for the conceiving and developing of projects bythe NGOs. The regime, however, shows certain hostility tothe NGOs, in which it sees potential political rivals (Free-dom House, Nations in Transit, 2009, p. 67), and tries toavoid cooperating with them. The state officials have turneddown the NGOs’ invitations to debates and do not let thecivil society influence the taking of decisions with regard topublic policies. To improve its image, the regime has tried,nevertheless, to initiate a dialogue with the civil society bycreating thematic commissions: “They have called us just toplay extras, because decisions are taken without anyoneconsulting us… So, we have retreated.”24

Most NGOs are financed from the West and do not havebiased affiliations. There are, however, on the Armeniancivil society scene, actors connected to the political parties,who have been campaigning for these or for their presiden-tial candidates (OSCE Armenia, 2007, p. 11).

The Mass-Media of Power and the Press of theOpposition

The Yerevan regime partially controls the mass-media byfinancing means, administrative pressure (it conditions theissuing of licenses), and the censoring of the editorial content.

The Armenian legislation formally provides conditions forthe existence of independent mass-media. There is a pressfinanced from public funds and there are private media. TheArmenians’ main source of information is television (onlythe public station H1 broadcasts all over Armenia) and theprinted press has issues of no more than 6,000 copies forany publication and has no significant circulation: only about8% of the Armenians read the papers (OSCE Armenia, 2007,p. 14).

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24 Interview with the director of anNGO, Yerevan, June 2011.

At local level, the situation of the Armenian mass-mediais even more difficult: “They have to deal with the pressureput on them by the governor and by the regional authorities.They survive as if it were an authoritarian or a dictatorialregime.”30 There is only one independent local TV station,that was denied a license for broadcasting nationwide andhad to collect a huge sum with the help of the public, so itmay pay some alleged duties to the state.

None of the journalists interviewed in Yerevan was afraidto criticize the political regime.

Russia’s Support Is Indispensable,the EU Is too Far.

The foreign pressure for the democratization of the polit-ical regime in Armenia depends on the feeling of insecurityin South Caucasus, on the dependence on foreign actors likeRussia and the West, on the competition between the statesin the region, and on the influence of the foreign factorsupon the Armenian society.

Armenia is a small, geographically isolated state, in aregion with a frail security. Yerevan has tense relationshipswith two of its neighbors, Azerbaijan and Turkey31, a situa-tion that makes it completely dependent on the securityguarantees offered by Russia. In order to maintain the statusquo that resulted after the Nagorno-Karabakh war, Yerevanis in permanent need of Moscow’s support, all the more soas Russia has become, since 1998-1999, the main investorin the Armenian economy and does not condition its helpon the democratization of the country’s regime.

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30 Interview with a journalist, Yerevan, June 2011.31 In the twenty years since the proclamation of indepedence,

the Armenian authorities have not managed to reach an agreementwith Turkey regarding the 1915 Turkish genocide against theArmenian population in the Ottoman Empire. Moreover, Turkey isAzerbaijan’s main ally in the region and a supporter of its territorialintegrity.

are also bloggers who are active, but the spreading blogs thatare critical about the regime is attentively being monitoredby the authorities.27

The actual opposition may communicate with the popu-lation only through the written press and the Internet. TheArmenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF), an oppositionparty close to the government, also appears at the TV stationscontrolled by the regime.

The quality of the Armenian media products is deter-mined by the journalists’ poor training, the authorities’pressure, and by financing. In the interviews taken for thispaper, experienced journalists in Yerevan complained aboutthe lack of professionalism of their younger colleagues.

The Armenian television is completely monopolized bythe political circles in power, so the information it providesis favorable to the regime: “For five days, all I saw was theinformation broadcast by the Armenian TV stations. AfterI had access to other sources of information, I realized thatduring those five days I had been living in a different reality,one created artificially by the political regime there.”28

The pressure the authorities exert on the content of thepress releases is obvious especially during elections: “Thenthere are also media-killers, but they are not as aggressive asthose in Russia”. The investigation articles are almost absent:“Maybe you get an article a month. And even then, a singleorganization, Hedk, that is financed from the West, pro-duces such material”, but “they do not investigate the greatinstances of corruption, they keep to teachers or low-levelcivil servants who take bribes”29. For the rest, the journalistspractice self-censorship, so they won’t get in trouble withthe financers or the authorities.

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27 Interview with a representative of the civil society, Yerevan,June 2011.

28 Interview with a representative of the civil society, Yerevan,June 2011.

29 Interview with a journalist, Yerevan, June 2011.

Azerbaijan

The current political regime in Baku is the result of theshift of power between Heydar33 and Ilham34 Aliyev and ofthe strengthening of the latter’s authoritarian control at alllevers of power

Elections with an Outcome Always Knownin Advance

The first thing Ilham Aliyev’s regime did to strengthenits control over power in Azerbaijan was to fraudulently winthe elections.

In 2003, the presidential elections in Azerbaijan wereheld after the pattern introduced under Heydar Aliyev. Thecandidate of the New Azerbaijani Party (NAP) was favoredby the mass-media during the campaign and the authorities

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33 Heydar Aliyev, former leader of the Communist Party of theAzerbaijani Soviet Socialist Republic and ex-KGB collaborator, waselected president of Azerbaijan in 1993 and 1998. Aliyev’s twosuccessive terms of office coincided with the strengthening of thepresident’s and his closest advisors’ control over the political regimein Baku. The Heydar Aliyev administration was constantly criti-cized by the West for its authoritarian methods and for stealing theelections. It also brought about the stabilization of the domestic af-fairs and the conclusion of a peace agreement with Armenia in 1994,following the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Heydar Aliyev managedto give a fresh start to the Azerbaijani economy, by attractingWestern investments in the country’s oil industry. In 2003, HeydarAliyev, aged 80, died while running for a new presidential electionas the sole candidate of the New Azerbaijani Party. He was replacedby his son Ilham in the presidential race, that the latter won.

34 A graduate of the Moscow State Institute of InternationalRelations, Ilham Aliyev was a head of SOCAR in the early 1990s,then a member of the Azerbaijani parliament (1995-2000). From1999 to 2003, he was second in command of his father’s NewAzerbaijani Party. In 2003, he was appointed prime-minister, thenelected president of Azerbaijan (Jim Nichol, 2010, p. 8).

Armenia is a state devoid of resources — a situationwhich makes the attraction of Western aid and financingcompulsory — and, hence, vulnerable to the pressure andcriticism of the US and the EU, that have disapproved ofthe authoritarian measures adopted internally and havethreatened to discontinue their financial support. Maintainingcordial relationships with the West is also essential in orderto avoid having Moscow as Armenia’s unique ally. In thissense, the regime in Yerevan could not help introduce andimplement, at least formally, the democratic norms. UnlikeGeorgia and Azerbaijan, that are able to maintain relation-ships of interdependence with the West, the former for itstransiting of oil and gas, the latter for its energy resources,Armenia depends entirely on the Western help. Moreover,since 2003, in spite of all its hesitations in the process ofdemocratization, Georgia has become a successful model forSouth Caucasus and a privileged partner of the West amongits republics.

The regime in Yerevan is not pressured internally todevelop privileged relationships with the West: “Armeniansare not pro-Russian and anti-EU, but they are aware of thefact that joining the EU is not a realistic objective for them,so they are skeptical about the idea of Europeanization”32.Moreover, during the two decades of independence, thepower in Yerevan, irrespective of its political orientation, hasactively circulated in the mass-media the idea that “Russiais our great ally”. The non-governmental milieu, althoughfinanced from abroad, is too weak to succeed in implement-ing the democratic pattern: the organizations concentratedin Yerevan cannot activate in other regions, while theiractivists are more of an elite that does not penetrate and hasno impact on the average Armenians.

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32 Interview with an expert, Yerevan, June 2011.

over the power in Azerbaijan, after it has stolen every elec-tion, has created an “artificial” opposition in parliament,and has all but eliminated the real opposition throughunfair means. According to the voting results, the NAP andIlham Aliyev have control over 70% of the electoral body(in fact, they have control over the whole of it). The signif-icant reduction in the number of votes the opposition wonin the most recent elections shows that the Aliyev regimehas an all-reaching power and the progressive tendency toeliminate the opposition from the political game altogether.The results of the elections that are known beforehand andthe repressive measures that the authorities resort to againsttheir contesters have made the population more and moreindifferent to the elections: its participation has diminishedwith every voting organized after 2003: while 69% of theAzerbaijanis took part in the parliamentary elections of2003, only 47% of them voted in the 2005 ones (a situationin favor of the regime, since fewer votes have to be tamperedwith).

The analysis of the Azerbaijani opposition parties has todo, in the first place, with their proper existence, not withtheir electoral or ideological programs. The most importantopposition parties — Musavat, the Independent Party inAzerbaijan, the Democratic Party, and the Popular Front —are almost invisible on the Baku political scene because ofthe power’s repressive measures. The image of such partiesis built around their leaders. The opposition’s discourse is acommon one, focused on everyone’s criticism of the NAP.

The second aspect one could analyze regarding theopposition in Baku is its relationship with the NAP. TheAzerbaijani political opposition is divided into two camps:the parliamentary opposition, which is close to the party inpower, and the real, extra-parliamentary opposition, whichis critical about the Ilham Aliyev regime. At the last presi-dential elections, this latter opposition did not come upwith its own candidate, claiming that it did not want to be

committed an electoral fraud to Ilham Aliyev’s advantageor else resorted to methods of intimidation against theopposition. The counting of the votes showed that IlhamAliyev had won 76.84% of the ballot, while the second com-petitor, Isa Gambar, had got only 13.94% of the votes. Theresults of the 2008 presidential elections were predictable,since they were organized just to reconfirm Ilham Aliyev’sposition and to avoid too much criticism from the West.The voting was not in accordance with the OSCE standardsfor democratic elections, even if the organization of theelectoral process itself had been somewhat improved if com-pared to the 2005 parliamentary elections. Besides the sit-ting president, six other candidates ran for the office. IlhamAliyev won again by 88.73% of the ballot. The other com-petitors put together did not manage to accumulate morethan 2.86% of the votes.

In 2005 and 2010, the Aliyev regime organized parlia-mentary elections in a similar way. At the 2005 voting, theNAP won 61 parliamentary seats of the total 125. In 2010,it won the majority in parliament — 74 seats. 39 independ-ent candidates (who vote, in fact, for the NAP) also becamemembers of the Azerbaijani parliament, while 9 seats werereserved for minor parties (supporting the NAP, too) andone seat for the Party of Hope, representing the actual op-position (OSCE, 2010, p. 32). At the most recent elections,for the first time since the independence of Azerbaijan wasproclaimed, the power managed to keep out of parliamentthe traditional opposition represented by the Popular FrontParty — Musavat.

The NAP, a King on the Baku Political Scene

In its eight years of power, the Ilham Aliyev regime hasmanaged to turn the opposition from a real competitor, thatin 2003 was a step away from depriving the NAP of power,into a formal, almost non-existent actor on the politicalscene. The NAP is currently a party with an overall control

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The most famous among the oligarchs are the Ministerof Transportation, the one of Emergency Situations, and thepresident of SOCAR who have control over the customs,the trade exchanges, the infrastructure projects, and the realestate business (ICG, 2010, pp. 8-10).

There are two camps in the Aliyev extended family: aconservative one grouped around Bailar Eibov (an in-law ofIlham Aliyev’s) and a reform-oriented one, the Pashayevs,from which Mehriban Aliyev, the wife of the Azerbaijanipresident, comes. Eibov controls the businesses in WesternAzerbaijan, while the Pashayevs activate in tourism, banking,insurances etc. (ICG, 2010, pp. 10-11).

Ilham Aliyev’s regime is based on two types of loyalties:from the public system or the private sector and the occa-sional loyalty of the citizens, usually obtained just beforethe elections. The Azerbaijani political regime rests on oldpersonal loyalties, fraudulent privatizations, oil trafficking,and corruption: “All the ministers here have their business-es. There is no uncorrupt official”, says an EU official. Themain figure in the grand power design in Baku is presidentAliyev who follows his father’s example and “tries to keeppower in the family and sees the power of the state as afamily business” (Guliev, 2005, p. 241). Azerbaijan hasprobably some of the longest-lasting ministers in the world:“In that picture over there, you can see our minister withthe former president, Heydar Aliyev. And there, you havethe same minister with the new president”, said a Baku offi-cial during an interview. A change of minister in Baku isquite an unusual event on the political scene: “I’ve been aminister here for over ten years, I don’t see why ministerschange so often in Georgia”, said another Baku official.

Even the low-level public servants are loyal to the presi-dent: “In that picture over there, you can see Heydar Aliyev,our first president. He did a lot for us, you know, he is thenational leader of Azerbaijan.”36

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part of a voting process the power was anyway going tosteal.35

The confrontation between the power and its real oppo-sition has always been a violent one and manifested itself inthe form of the latter’s protests and manifestations beingforcefully suppressed by the forces of order. The NAP’s rela-tionship with the opposition rules out the negotiations, thedialogue, or the compromise. The last negotiations betweenpower and opposition took place after the 2005 elections,when the US ambassador in Baku tried to mediate the num-ber of seats each side had won in the legislative voting.

The Perfectly Functioning Corruption

The basic question about Ilham Aliyev’s coming topower is this: Was it really a change of power? The power inBaku preserves the clan structure it inherited from the Sovietperiod and from Heydar Aliyev’s Nakhichevan administra-tion of the 1990s. The new element in Ilham Aliyev’sadministration is the invisible confrontation between theolder officials left over from Heydar Aliyev’s regime, thenew elite, which is close to Aliyev the son, and which flirtswith Western ideas (Ishiyama, 2008, p. 46), and the Aliyevfamily itself.

The state’s administrative and oil resources, as well asthe lucrative businesses are divided between Ramiz Mehdiev,chief of the presidential administration and the old guardaround him, the oligarchs, and the Aliyev family. Mehdiev,together with the Minister of the Interior and the ChiefProsecutor, has control over the appointments in publicoffices and the organization of elections.

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35 The Musavat (Liberal) Party, the Liberal Party, the PopularFront, the Public Forum “For Azerbaijan” and the Citizens Develop-ment Corps created an informal alliance called the Common Frontof the Democratic Forces that called upon the citizens not to takepart in the elections (OSCE Azerbaijan, 2008, p. 5). 36 Interview with a ministerial official, Baku, June 2011.

development of the voting process. At almost every voting,the Azerbaijani authorities, including president Ilham Aliyev,take measures meant to improve their image just before theelections: they either adapt the legislative framework so asto formally allow for a correct voting, or come up withpopulist decisions. The former method is meant to improvethe regime’s image before the international observers of theelections, while the latter addresses its image before thevoters. Ilham Aliyev did not properly go on campaign, argu-ing that he wanted to offer the opposition some real chances(ibidem, p. 2). The president decreed some legislative meas-ures or gave up campaigning in order to leave the impressionthat the opposition had some electoral advantages but itwas unable to make use of them. In 2005, Aliyev ruled thatthe NGOs and the opposition could activate freely duringthe campaign and that the state officials who obstructed theorganization of free and democratic elections would answerto the law (Freedom House Azerbaijan, 2008). In fact,many opposition candidates did not possess the necessaryresources to campaign all over the country, so there wereregions in which only the NAP could promote its candidate.

The rights actually granted by the power in Baku to theopposition are (quasi) non-existent. The Ilham Aliyev regimedoes not allow for the existence of any source of financingfor the real opposition: “I don’t know what the Musavatleaders live of. The regime prevents them from gettingjobs… and their family members, too. The party could notbe financed by any businessman, because the authoritieswould shut down his business in no time.”38

The legislation in Azerbaijan, which was modified in2005 and 2008 according to the standards of establisheddemocracies, allows for the organization of protests againstthe power’s actions, but the Azerbaijani authorities haveinterpreted the legal stipulations in the interest of the powerand refused to approve of the manifestations.

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When elections take place, the Baku regime makes “elec-toral gifts” to the population. An expert told us the story ofan elderly woman with an 80-manat pension who receiveda letter from the president himself, just before the elections,whereby she was informed that her 300-manat debt for elec-tricity was forgiven.

Through the party in power, Ilham Aliyev and his teammake loyalty an obligation. The NAP is a pyramidal bureau-cratic structure that combines business interests with polit-ical affiliation: “Being an NAP member is a requirement inorder to be appointed in a high-ranking state official position,as well as in many important jobs from the private sector”37.

The NAP’s financial existence depends on both stateresources and the contributions of the business environment(Goul & Sickner, 2008, p. 754).

Rights and Liberties with an Insecure Existence

According to the 1995 constitution, the Republic of Azer-baijan is a democratic state based on the supremacy of lawand the principle of the separation of powers. Yet the Azer-baijani constitution is just a text with a formal existence,that has never actually been applied in practice, becausethere is no agreement at the political level. The judicial sys-tem in Azerbaijan is totally subordinated to political deci-sions and often interprets the judicial norms in the regime’sinterest. After Ilham Aliyev’s coming to power in 2003,Azerbaijan has modified the electoral legislation severaltimes, without calling for a democratic debate on the modi-fications and without observing all the recommendations ofthe Venice Commission. The central electoral commissionhas always been under NAP control and the election cam-paigns have always been focused on the party in power orits candidate as the main actors. However, the OSCE (2008,p. 1) thinks that the new norms may guarantee a democratic

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37 Interview with a European official, Baku, June 2011. 38 Interview with an expert, Baku, June 2011.

has got money from the special civil society state-createdfund is not eligible for our own programs”40.

The pressure exerted on the civil society can take legalforms (i.e., the authorities’ fiscal controls), but can also beof a violent, threatening, or intimidating nature. While theinterviews for this paper were taken, many activists of thecivil society were afraid to criticize the political regime,answered the questions evasively or demanded that theirnames remain secret. There is more pressure on the civilsociety during the elections (in 2008, no NGO was allowedby the authorities to monitor the electoral campaign).

In Azerbaijan, to elaborate public policies is a uniqueattribute of the power, so any civil society project is per-ceived as being a political one (Gahramanova, 2008, p. 787).Privatly, the members of the Azerbaijani civil society believethat all they can do is to go through the motions of imple-menting various programs (irrespective of their purpose),since they are convinced that no NGO can influence thepolitical decision in any way.

Corruption is yet another form of the Baku regime’s vio-lation of human rights. Although it has introduced an anti-corruption legislative package, the regime has not put it intopractice: “There is no clerk here that is not corrupt. Nobodycould survive with a salary that small.”41 Corruption is theinstrument by which the regime has secured the loyalty ofthe entire state administration: “All the ministers have theirown businesses in Azerbaijan, they are businessmen in aSoviet regime adapted to capitalism. Without corruption,the whole system would be dead.”42 There is no transparen-cy in any Azerbaijani public institution. The political powerhas no interest in fighting corruption and the judicial sys-tem subordinated to it is also corrupt: it has never takendecisions that protect civil rights and liberties, and has pro-duced legal sentences always in favor of the regime.

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40 Interview with an NGO employee, Baku, June 2011.41 Interview with a European official, Baku, June 2011.42 Interview with a European official, Baku, June 2011.

The power in Baku also used physical violence to intim-idate its adversaries in the opposition: several leaders of theopposition parties were attacked in the streets. After eachparliamentary or presidential voting, the opposition protest-ed that the elections had been stolen and the authoritiessuppressed the manifestations violently. In March 2011,they even mobilized the army in Baku to prevent the cele-bration by the opposition of one month since Hosni Mubarakwas overthrown from power.

The power in Baku also uses an aggressively rhetoricalanti-opposition propaganda: “The Azerbaijani fortressbesieged by the Armenian or Western secret services tryingto put up some colored revolution in Baku…”, all foreign“enemies” being accomplices of the members of the opposi-tion. The same aggressive messages pervade the mass-mediawith reference to the NGOs which have ever criticized thepolitical power.

The Azerbaijani political regime has also developedmeans by which to control the civil society: by setting upand financing so-called GONGOs (Government-OrganizedNon-Governmental Organizations) or by putting pressureon the independent organizations. It has even created aninstitution responsible for the financing of NGOs: the StateCouncil for the supporting of non-governmental organiza-tions, with funds that have grown year after year since theoil boom (the most eloquent example being the HeydarAliyev Foundation, financed from the state budget alone);there are also contests for grants or financing may be offeredunofficially: “They asked me to let them finance my pro-grams. But I saw that every organization that got moneyfrom the state did only what the authorities told them todo, so I turned down the offer.”39

But GONGOs may be financed also by Western organi-zations that offer grants for the development of the civilsociety in Azerbaijan: “We do not think that an NGO that

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39 Interview with an expert, Baku, June 2011.

Over the last few years, there has been a growing pressureof the Azerbaijani regime on the mass-media. This mostlyoccurs during the voting campaigns. In the Azerbaijani mediacontrolled by the regime, all campaigns to date have favoredthe NAP or Ilham Aliyev, by transmitting only positiveinformation about them and allowing them most of thebroadcasting time. Until 2008, the public television in Azer-baijan was under the obligation to give all candidates equaltime. After the modifications to the law made in 2008,TvAZ cannot broadcast any more programs related to theelections. Ever since 2003, all TV stations have given onlypositive information regarding the NAP or Ilham Aliyevduring all the election campaigns, while the opposition wasonly mentioned occasionally in the news programs.44 Thestate-financed printed press minimally met the legal provi-sions for equal time and granted the opposition the right toexpress itself, but otherwise offered information only aboutthe candidates of the parties in power. Yeni Musavat, thedaily newspaper of the opposition, was the only one topublish detailed information on the opposition’s campaign.

A Powerful Petrostate

The foreign actors’ influence on the process of democra-tization in Azerbaijan depends on the level of security in theregion, on the regime’s cordial relationships with both Russia,and the West, on the competition between the South-Cau-casian states, and on the pressure of the very foreign actorson the Azerbaijani society.

Russia is Armenia’s main support in maintaining controlon Nagorno-Karabakh, which makes Azerbaijan vulnerablebefore Moscow’s pressure to obtain territorial integrity. Yet,

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44 In 2008, TvAZ broadcast news or political programs in which92% of the material was positive information on the power (ofwhich 72% covered only the activities of the president in office —OSCE, 2008, p. 16).

The Mass-Media Can Only Be in Powerin Azerbaijan

After Ilham Aliyev’s coming to power, the Baku regimetook over the control of the press almost entirely.

Television is the most important source of information inAzerbaijan, covering almost its entire territory. All Azer-baijani TV stations are controlled by the political regimethat puts pressure directly on the publicly-financed channel(AzTV) or indirectly on the private stations financially sup-ported by investors close to it.

The printed Azerbaijani press is partially controlled bythe regime. There are a number of opposition daily newspa-pers published in Baku, but their circulation does not coverthe entire territory of the country.

The quality of the media products in Azerbaijan is influ-enced by the regime’s censorship, the journalists’ training,and the available financing. There are no investigationarticles in the Azerbaijani press and the journalists practiceself-censorship in order to avoid pressure from the financersor the authorities.

The Baku regime also puts “legal pressure” on the foreignmass-media and the journalists. In 2008, it censored RadioFree Europe, the BBC and the Voice of America by passinga law that forbade the foreign stations to broadcast on thesame frequencies as the national Azerbaijani ones. Pressureis being exerted on journalists through legislation thatincriminates slander (penal punishments are stipulated forit) or defamation and through the use of violence by theforces of order. Four Azerbaijani journalists were in jail in2010.43 Police resorted to violence against the media peopleduring the whole period after Ilham Aliyev’s taking office.

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43 The European Court of Human Rights asked the Azerbaijaniauthorities in 2010 to free journalist Eiula Fatulaiev (Freedom HouseAzerbaijan, 2011, p. 85). In 2011, the regime in Baku had not yetcomplied with the ECtHR request, even though the judges hadgiven up the charges against him.

Conclusions

A general analysis of the political regimes in South Cau-casus shows common features and evolutions: they were allSoviet republics, they all had repeated transitions which didnot lead to democratic societies, territorial and/or inter-eth-nic conflicts, and complicated relationships with Russia andthe West. At the same time, each political regime in SouthCaucasus has its own particularities, that are influenced bythe local projects of state construction, by the existence orabsence of energy resources, and by territorial problems.

The Georgian political elite are now, twenty years afterthe proclamation of independence, before the same questions:Authoritarianism or democracy? For the regime in Baku, thebasic question is: How far can it go with authoritarian meas-ures in Azerbaijan and how can the current leaders remainin power as long as possible? The Yerevan leadership tries tofind out: What are the limits of the democratic measures inArmenia and how can authoritarianism be preserved, whilekeeping up the appearance of democracy?

In Armenia, the regime has oscillated between basing itspower on the legitimacy of voting processes organizedaccording to democratic norms or setting up a power centerbased on authoritarian measures. For the Azerbaijanis, thepreservation of power by the Aliyevs and political loyaltytowards them have been the key levers of a regime that hasnever been preoccupied by legitimacy.

In all three states, the election-based democracy has moreor less been a means of consolidating the power (Shirinian,2003). All three regimes in South Caucasus use the sameinstruments to seize or strengthen their power and arefavored by the weakness of their respective oppositions. Ina top of the democratic achievements in South Caucasus,Georgia ranks first and Azerbaijan last.

So far, the Tbilisi regime has been a competitive-author-itarian one still in process of transition, that will be madeto accept more and more democratization measures in the

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having cordial relations with Moscow, does not mean pressurefor the democratization of the domestic political regime,which turns into a great advantage for the power in Bakuand its authoritarian attitude.

Azerbaijan is the only South-Caucasian state with signif-icant oil and gas resources, which guarantees its relationshipof interdependence with the West: Baku needs the Westernmarket to sell its oil and gas and the EU states want to avoiddepending on Russia alone as a supplier of energy. Conse-quently, even if it formally condemns the authoritarianmeasures of the Aliyev regime, the West cannot do withoutthe Azerbaijani resources and cannot suspend commercialrelations as a means of pressure for the lack of democratictransformations. Moreover, due to its energy resources,Azerbaijan is in no great need of Western financial support(for instance, it initially rejected the grants offered to itthrough the European Neighborhood Policy or the Millen-nium Challenge Corporation).

Azerbaijan is the largest South-Caucasian state and, unlikeArmenia and Georgia, a rich one, too, which guarantees itsregional supremacy from the start, so it is not interested ina competition meant to turn it into a model democracy ofSouth Caucasus. The Rose Revolution in Georgia, however,had an impact on the authoritarian measures of the Bakupower that feared a similar scenario occurring in Azerbaijan.

The Azerbaijani society is neutral with regard to theWestern political model for three reasons: the Azerbaijanisare aware that the EU and Europeanization are patterns toofar away for them to even consider, they do not see Russiaas an enemy (although the Russians support the Armenianoccupation in Nagorno-Karabakh), and they have culturalties with the other societies in the East and with Turkey. TheAzerbaijani civil society consists of small groups of elitistsisolated from the population, its messages going no furtherthan Baku and its surroundings. It follows that the democra-tization initiatives, even if they are not suppressed by theregime, have only a small echo among the Azerbaijanis.

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Democratic Institution Building and Security Sector Reform,National Defense Academy, Vienna, pp. 187-207.

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Dannreuther, Roland (ed.), 2004. European Union Foreign andSecurity Policy. Towards a Neighbourhood Strategy, Routledge,London.

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future due to its dependence on the Western support and tothe pressure and influence Russia exerts on it by stimulatingthe contesting movements.

President Ilham Aliyev leads a centralized administrationin which the political power clearly dominates the other two(legislative and judicial) existing only to create the falseimpression of democracy. The power in Baku has failed toorganize free elections, to create democratic relationshipswith the mass-media and to guarantee the citizens’ rightsand liberties. Over the past few years, Ilham Aliyev and hisallies have put up a competitive-authoritarian regime that isbound to turn into either a stable authoritarian one, or ina petro-authoritarian one, after the Russian pattern, in thefuture.

The Armenian regime has managed to achieve a mixtureof authoritarian and democratic practices. For having failedin guaranteeing the Armenian citizens’ rights and liberties,the Sargsyan regime is currently a competitive-authoritarianone and there are few chances to see it transformed orreplaced through elections in the near future.

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Freedom House Country Report Azerbaijan 2011 (available at:http://www.freedomhouse.org/images/File/nit/2011/NIT-2011-Azerbaijan.pdf, accessed on 18 September 2011).

Freedom House Country Report Georgia 2005 (available at:http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=47&nit=363&year=2005, accessed on 16 September 2011).

Freedom House Country Report Georgia 2006 (available at:http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=22&year=2006&country=6967, accessed on 12 August 2011).

Freedom House Country Report Georgia 2008 (available at:http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=47&nit=452&year=2008, accessed on 16 September 2011).

International Crisis Group (ICG), 2010. Azerbaijan VulnerableStability, Europe Report 107, pp. 1-32 (available at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/europe/caucasus/azer-baijan/207%20Azerbaijan%20%20Vulnerable%20Stability.ashx, accessed on 18 September 2011).

International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assis-tance (IDEA), Georgia Country Report based on Research andDialogue with Political Parties, 2006. Stockholm (availableat: http://www.idea.int/parties/upload/Georgia_report.pdf, accessed on 14 September 2011).

OSCE, Republic of Armenia Parliamentary Elections, 12 May2007 (available at: http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/armenia/26606, accessed on 12 August 2011).

OSCE, Republic of Armenia Presidential Elections, 19 February2008 (available at: http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/armenia/32115, accessed on 12 August 2011).

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Nichol, Jim, CRS Report Georgia’s January 2008 PresidentialElection: Outcome and Implications, January 25th, 2008(available at: http://opencrs.com/document/RS22794/,accessed on 18 September 2011).

Niklas, Nilsson and Cornell, Svante E., 2008. Georgia’s May2008 Parliamentary Elections Setting Sail in a Storm (avail-able at: http://www.silkroadstudies.org/new/docs/Silkroadpapers/0805Georgia.pdf, accessed on 18 September 2011).

Nodia, Ghia and Pinto Scholtbach, Álvaro, 2006. The Polit-ical Landscape of Georgia, Delft, Eburon.

Nodia, Ghia (ed.) 2010. Political Forum: 10 Questions onGeorgia’s Political Development, CIPDD, Tbilisi.

Nodia, Ghia, Dynamics of State Building in Georgia (availableat: http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publiction/2370/dynamics_of_statebuilding_in_georgia.html?bread-crumb=%2Fpublication%2Fby_type%2Fbook_chap-ter%3Fpage%3D38, accessed on 18 September 2011).

Petrosyan, David, 2010. “The Political System of Armenia:Form and Content”, in Caucasus Analytical Digest (17),pp. 8-12.

Stefes, H. Christopf. “Governance, the State, and SystemicCorruption: Armenia and Georgia in Comparison”, inCaucasian Review of International Affairs, 2(2), pp. 73-83.

Timm, Christian, 2010. Neopatrimonialism by Default. StatePolitics and Domination in Georgia after the Rose Revolution,German Institute of Global and Area Studies (GIGA —available at: http://www.gigahamburg.de/content/fsp1/pdf/neopat/paper_neopat_workshop_timm.pdf, accessedon 18 September 2011).

Waal, Thomas de, 2003. Black Garden. Armenia and AzerbaijanThrough Peace and War, New York University Press, NewYork.

Waters, Christopher (ed.), 2005. The State of Law in the SouthCaucasus, Palgrave Macmillan, New York.

Commission Staff Working Paper Country Report Georgia (avail-able at: http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/documents_en.htm,accessed on 5 August 2011).

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Stanislav Secrieru

Variable Geometry in Action: Foreign and Security Policies

in South Caucasus

OSCE, Republic of Azerbaijan Presidential Elections, 15 October2003 (available at: http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/azerbaijan/13467, accessed on 15 August 2011).

OSCE, Republic of Azerbaijan Parliamentary Elections, 6 Nov-ember 2005 (available at: http://www.osce.org/odihr/elec-tions/azerbaijan/17946, accessed on 15 August 2011).

OSCE, Republic of Azerbaijan Parliamentary Elections, 7 Nov-ember 2010 (available at: http://www.osce.org/odihr/elec-tions/azerbaijan/75073, accesed on 15 August 2011).

OSCE, Georgia Partial Repeat Parliamentary Elections, 28 March2004 (available at: http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/georgia/34196, accessed on 15 September 2011).

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OSCE, a) Georgia Extraordinary Presidential Elections, 5 January2008 (available at: http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/georgia/30959, accesed on 8 August 2011).

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Introduction

This chapter attempts at making a detailed analysis ofthe foreign and regional security policies of the South-Cau-casian states two decades after the dissolution of the SovietUnion. Since their regaining of independence, several tri- ormultilateral integration formulas in South Caucasus havebeen proposed, but these have failed to materialize. At thesame time, the academic community and the political circleschallenged the very existence of South Caucasus as a region.Consequently, the first part of this chapter reviews thecurrent debate on the “regionness” of South Caucasus. Itencompasses the impact of the 2008 Russo-Georgian waron the perception of the “regionness” of South Caucasus.Moreover, this section describes the macro-regional envi-ronment in which the South-Caucasian states evolve. Thetrends and political atmosphere in South Caucasus resultfrom the dynamics of the intra-regional relationships. Thesecond part focuses on the bilateral relationships betweenthe three South-Caucasian states, emphasizing their com-mercial relationships, infrastructure projects, unsolved terri-torial conflicts, public perception, the status of nationalminorities, military cooperation, demarcation of borders,and other aspects of the bilateral agendas. The fall of theSoviet Union has liquidated unipolarity in the region andhas multiplied the number of actors capable to influence

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to the Transcaucasian Federation and created threerepublics of the union that kept their status until 1991 (seeMap 2).

The regaining of their independence by Armenia,Azerbaijan, and Georgia (see Map 3) triggered the debateon the proper name to use and the future of the region.The political and academic discourses make use of severaloptimistic labels that allude to regional integration: “TheUnited States of Caucasus”, “The Caucasian CommonHouse”, and “The Caucasian Common Market”. Also, thereare proposals for cooperation projects of the type “3 + 1”,in which Russia or Turkey serve as engines of regional inte-gration (Ismailov & Papava, 2007, pp. 13-14). At the sametime, the first attempts are made to replace the old politicaland geographic label of Transcaucasia. An official remem-bers: “It took us four years to persuade the EU to replaceTranscaucasia, in its official documents, with South Cau-casus”1. Gradually, the term South Caucasus came to promi-nence in the international diplomatic vocabulary and is nowlargely being used by the actors interested in the region,including Russia. The 2008 joint statement of the presi-dents of the Russian Federation, Armenia, and Azerbaijanrefers explicitly to South Caucasus, and not Transcaucasia(Prezident Rossii, 2008). The terminological change is mir-rored at the level of bureaucratic organization and in thepolicies led by the regional actors. For instance, in 2003, theEU created a position of special Representative for SouthCaucasus, that was maintained after the structural reorgani-zation triggered by the Lisbon Treaty. In 2005 and 2006,the obstruction by Cyprus of the negotiations for an EU –Azerbaijan action plan determined the European Union topostpone negotiation of similar plans with Georgia andArmenia (Popescu, 2011, p. 102). In 2008, Turkey revivedthe idea of a stability pact in South Caucasus initiallylaunched in the 1990s, this time under the umbrella of a

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developments in the South-Caucasus in a significant way.Given the multitude of influential actors in the region, amajor part of the analysis will be devoted to the relation-ships between the South-Caucasian states and the US, theEU, Russia, Turkey, and Iran. All in all, this analyticalundertaking will be guided by an intra-regional perception.Thus, in presenting the debates on the “regionness” ofSouth Caucasus, on the intra-regional relationships, and theinteraction with external actors, the views of the threerepublics, which are mainly compiled from interviews withofficials and experts in Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia,will prevail.

I. The Question of the “Regionness” of SouthCaucasus

I.1. From Transcaucasia to South Caucasus

Transcaucasia, a term used before South Caucasus, wasintroduced into the diplomatic vocabulary of Tsarist Russiain the early 19th century. It referred to the territory underRussian control south of the Caucasian Mountains, all theway to the borders of the Persian and the Ottoman Empires.In Tsarist Russia, Transcaucasia was divided into fiveguberniyas: Tiflis, Baku, Yerevan, Kutaisi, and Elizavetpol(see Map 1). The 1917 Revolution triggered centrifugalmovements on the periphery of the Tsarist Empire. In 1918,Transcaucasia declared its independence and for the firsttime formed an integrated political structure — theTranscaucasian Federal Democratic Republic. However,after a month of co-existence, Georgia, Armenia, and Azer-baijan declared their independence. The three states wereincluded by military force in the Soviet Union in 1922,under the banner of the Transcaucasian Federal SovietRepublic. The 1936 Constitution of the USSR put an end

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1 Interview with an official, Tbilisi, June 2011.

I.2. Is South Caucasus a region?

The international use of the concept evolved alongsidea strong trend which denies the “regionness” of SouthCaucasus. An expert explains: “We are a region, geographi-cally speaking, but this is not enough […] In the era of glob-alization, regions are being built.”2 And yet, in terms of atrilateral economic, political, or military cooperation, SouthCaucasus is actually paralyzed. There are no infrastructureprojects that include all the three states and coordinatingtheir foreign policy positions in a trilateral format is uncon-ceivable. Nor is there an integrated security umbrella: thestates in the region turn to the various regional actors toguarantee their military security.3 So, “if we compare SouthCaucasus to the Baltic area, then South Caucasus is not aregion”4, concludes another expert. Undoubtedly, turningSouth Caucasus into a functional region, following a Europeanpattern, is more of a wish than a reality. The EU attempts

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2 Interview with an expert, Baku, June 2011.3 Interview with an expert, Tbilisi, June 2011.4 Interview with an expert, Tbilisi, May 2011.

“Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform”, of the type“3 + 2” (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia + Russia and Turkey).

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Map 1 — Transcaucasia within Tsarist Russia (Source: Andrew Andersen, 2003/2007)

Map 3 — Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia in the post-Soviet era(Source: RFE/RL, 2002)

Map 2 — South Caucasus within the USSR (Source: Wikipedia)

Georgia is by far the most active state in the region when itcomes to attempts to “escape” the region. Ever since the lat-ter half of the 1990s, Georgia has developed a Black Seastate profile. After the consecutive expansions of NATO andof the EU, Georgia doubled its efforts to detach itself fromSouth Caucasus, which was perceived as a region with ahuge image burden (Nilsson, 2009, p. 100) and to join thedeveloping Western project in making: “the wider Black Searegion” (Asmus and Jackson, 2004): “We have tried to rede-fine our identity, by emphasizing our geographical positionin the Black Sea”9, an expert said. For the authorities inTbilisi, migrating towards “the wider Black Sea region”means leaving the Caucasus and gradually getting closer andconnecting to the institutions of the West. But the 2008Russo-Georgian war dashed these hopes and determined achange of perspective in Tbilisi. Georgia seeks to takeadvantage of the Eastern Partnership so as to assume theposition of an Eastern European state. It is important tonotice that the new discourse has both a regional compo-nent, and an individualist one: “South Caucasus is part ofEastern Europe […] why is there this distinction, within theEastern Partnership, between South Caucasus and the otherstates?”10, a government official asks; “Speaking of reforms[for the European integration], Georgia is much closer tothe Ukraine and Moldova”11, a government representativeadds, while adding to the equation elements that differentiateGeorgia from the other South-Caucasian republics. It seemsthat in the years to come, Georgia will find a rich source ofinspiration in Croatia’s “escape” from the Western Balkansand its (predictable) integration in the EU.12

In conclusion, it is anticipated in the pessimists’ campthat the blockages at the level of trilateral cooperation and

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9 Interview with an expert, Tbilisi, June 2011.10 Interview with an expert, Tbilisi, June 2011.11 Interview with an official, Tbilisi, June 2011.12 Interview with an official, Tbilisi, June 2011.

at launching regional cooperation have not produced theexpected results. Initiated by the EU in 2010, the “SouthCaucasus Integrated Border Management” program is beingimplemented bilaterally between Georgia and Armenia, onthe one hand, and between Georgia and Azerbaijan, on theother hand. Trilateral environmental programs financed bythe EU are being implemented on a rather small scale, but,in most cases, unilateral or bilateral solutions prevail: “Wehave no time to wait for Georgia or Armenia […] We willsolve this matter by ourselves”5, an official confessed, refer-ring to an issue involving all three states. Although there arecontacts at the level of the civil societies, even those havedropped in intensity after 2007.6 One of the few ongoingtrilateral projects is the program that facilitates communica-tion between the young people in the region and teachesthem to conceive and develop local and trans-boundaryprojects (Eurasia Partnership Foundation, 2009a).

The contestation of the “regionness” of South Caucasusand of any prospect of regional cohesion is also being arguedfrom an alternative perspective. Observers have noticed thatthe South-Caucasian states’ regional identity is either mis-sing or, at best, under-developed: “There is no vision regard-ing South Caucasus in our society”7, an Armenian expertsaid; “The attachment to the idea of a region is rather weakin Azerbaijan [because] our identity includes not onlyCaucasian elements, but also Caspian and Oriental ones”8,an Azerbaijani opinion maker stated. Armenia’s relative iso-lation in the area and the fact that Azerbaijan assumes therole of a bridge between East and West dilute these states’sense of belonging to South Caucasus. Moreover, foreignpolicy objectives and imperatives of domestic developmentpush the states towards seeking extra-regional solutions.

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5 Interview with an official, Baku, June 2011.6 Interview with experts, Yerevan, June 2011.7 Interview with an expert, Yerevan, June 2011.8 Interview with an expert, Baku, June 2011.

literature devoted to international security studies, offersa comprehensive analytical platform that captures coopera-tive as well as dysfunctional patterns of regionalism and can,hence, prove extremely useful in the study of the “region-ness” of South Caucasus (Buzan & Weaver, 2003, pp. 419-423; Simao & Freire, 2008, pp. 225-226). The concept of“security complex” refers to “a set of states whose majorsecurity perceptions and concerns are so interlinked, thattheir national security problems cannot reasonably be ana-lyzed or resolved apart from one another” (Buzan, Weaver& De Wilde, 1998, p. 12). It must be pointed out that theauthors of this analytical approach share the extensive inter-pretation of national security which includes, apart from thetraditional political and military dimension, the ecological,economic, and societal security (ibidem, pp. 198-199).

Seen through such a theoretical lens, South Caucasus isa sub-regional security complex, which is defined by enmitybetween Armenia and Azerbaijan and by a variety of secto-rial relationships of pragmatic friendship and/or situationalcompetition between Georgia and Armenia and betweenGeorgia and Azerbaijan. For instance, Azerbaijan’s security,when it comes to the management of the courses of waterand its quality, depends on the cooperation with Georgiaand Armenia, which are situated upstream on the riversKura and Aras flowing towards Azerbaijan. Georgia’s energysecurity cannot be ensured without Azerbaijan, and a pos-sible war between Armenia and Azerbaijan is bound to sig-nificantly undermine Georgia’s economic security. In turn,the security of the terrestrial transit through Georgia is vitalfor Armenia’s economy and (to a lesser extent) for that ofAzerbaijan. The list could go on. Objective factors bindingthis region of “variable geometries” (the three states are part,in various combinations, of the CIS, CSTO, BSEC, GUAM14;

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the diverging external orientations of the three states willstimulate “the dispersal of what is left from the region, sothat, in fifteen to twenty years’ time, the phrase South Cau-casus, a post-Soviet inertia, will be stripped of any descrip-tive value”13.

I.3. South Caucasus — a sub-regional security complex

Although they reflect objectively the regional reality,the deniers of the South Caucasus “regionness” overlooktwo aspects: the plurality of regionalism typologies and theimpact of the 2008 Russo-Georgian war. Hence, the rejec-tion of the South Caucasus “regionness” is built on the nar-row meaning of the concept of region, that theoretically andpractically imagines region only in the form of a “securitycommunity” defined by a high degree of integration and bythe elimination of violence as a solution to problems insidethe community (Deutsch, 2006, pp. 41-42). A classicexample in the IR literature is the trans-Atlantic communi-ty. Therefore, the parallel between South Caucasus and theBaltic region as part of the trans-Atlantic community is notan accidental one. The “security community”, however, isan ideal type, reproduced in a rather limited geographicalarea. In international relationships, regionalism may mani-fest itself in various forms. “Dysfunctional regionalism” and“geo-political regionalism” are among the less benign formu-las of regionalism. These apply to cases in which the stateshave failed to develop a sound regional cooperation and theregion is the object of a rivalry for “spheres of influence”involving regional powers (Emerson, 2008, pp. 2-4).

If we put aside the idealist notion of region and admitthat integration is not the only criterion of determining“regionness” and that interdependence may be not onlypositive, but negative as well, then South Caucasus is aregion. The concept of “security complex”, developed in the

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13 Interview with an expert, Yerevan, June 2011.

14 Community of Independent States; Collective Security TreatyOrganization; (Organization of the) Black Sea Economic Coopera-tion; Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldova.

much more appropriate when we seek examples of region-alism similar to those in South Caucasus. It is an opinionshared by some politicians and analysts in the area: “SouthCaucasus represents the next source of problems after theBalkans”17, a Baku official stated; “There are a series of sim-ilarities — the history of imperial domination, the memoryof the war, the attempts at getting rid of the regional label —that make South Caucasus comparable to the WesternBalkans”18, a Tbilisi expert pointed out.

In spite of their attempts at “escaping” the region, thethree states were forced to “return” to South Caucasus afterthe Russo-Georgian war: “Before August 2008, the regionwas about to disintegrate [but] the war in Georgia alteredthese dynamics and forced the states to refocus their atten-tion on the region”19, an influential local analyst explains.Consequently, the war brought back the regional conscious-ness and thinking: “Georgia has deteriorated the atmospherein the region”20, a local expert incisively declared, referringto the Russo-Georgian military conflict; “The 2008 waraltered the perception about South Caucasus in Europe andin the world in a negative way”21, another observer added.The 2008 military conflict brought to light the regionalthreats affecting European security, although South Cau-casus offers to Europe a multitude of opportunities. Thealtered image has impacted all the states in the region. Theacademic circles are attempting to overcome the imagedeficit by changing labels. For instance, two authors of adetailed study dedicated to the region argue that the threeCaucasian states belong to Central, not to South Caucasus(Ismailov & Papava, 2008, pp. 287-289). The logic of theirargument is almost identical to that of the East-European

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17 Interview with an official, Baku, June 2011.18 Interview with an expert, Tbilisi, May 2011.19 Interview with an expert, Yerevan, June 2011.20 Interview with an expert, Baku, June 2011.21 Interview with an expert, Tbilisi, June 2011.

the intensity of their relationships with the EU and NATOalso varies) have an impact on the strategic perceptions andcalculations regarding the management of the national secu-rity of each state. Armenia and Azerbaijan follow very close-ly the relationships that each of them develops with NATO:“If the representative of Armenia comes today and requestscooperation in this or that sector, it is most likely thattomorrow we will receive a similar request from Azerbaijan[…] and vice versa”15, an official admits. Confirmation of thecorrelation at regional level of each country’s decision tocooperate with NATO is to be found in the motivation forArmenia’s decision to triple its peace-keeping forces inAfghanistan in 2011. According to the Minister of Defense,“Armenia must not be last in South Caucasus in this respect[the military presence in Afghanistan]” (Massis Post 2011).The attempt at military reintegration of South Ossetia inGeorgia was negatively perceived in Armenia. As Yerevansees things, any success on the part of Georgia wouldencourage Azerbaijan and increase the chances of a militarysolution in Nagorno-Karabakh.16 Similarly, in Georgia, wherea significant number of internally displaced persons (IDPs)live, the negotiations between Azerbaijan and Armenia areclosely followed, especially the solution the two countrieswill reach regarding the IDPs from Nagorno-Karabakh.These are some of the overlapping concerns of the states inthe region, confirming the existence of a sub-regional secu-rity complex in South Caucasus.

Therefore, in spite of the divergent foreign and securitypolicies orientations of the states in the region, there is arather high degree of interdependence. The South-Caucasianstates’ mutual dependencies are not always of a positivenature, but this does not negate the existence of the region,it merely describes the nature of the regional interconnec-tions. The comparison with the Western Balkans is probably

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15 Interview with a NATO official.16 Interview with an expert, Yerevan, June 2011.

of the discourse and, especially, the adjustments brought tothe policies of the three states after 2008 prove that it is pre-mature to speak of the notion of South Caucasus as beingirrelevant.

I.4. South Caucasus in its Eurasian context

The relationships between states do not evolve in apolitical, military, or economic void. The inertia of bilateralrelationships is always influenced by the regional context inwhich they develop. The intra-regional dynamics of SouthCaucasus makes no exception. By virtue of the geographicpositioning of the region, the impact of the regional envi-ronment on the three states is probably stronger than incase of other regions (see Map 4). Since they are placed atthe intersection of several regional security complexes, everySouth-Caucasian state by itself, but also South Caucasus as

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states in the mid-1990s, that wished to be included politi-cally and economically in Central Europe.

Moreover, in 2008, the South-Caucasian states redis-covered the regional vulnerability and interconnectedness.They increased the monitoring of their neighbors’ activitiesand adjusted their security strategies by taking into accountthe modified regional environment. Georgia’s acceleratedNATO integration failed, which determined the authoritiesin Tbilisi to practice a more balanced regional foreign poli-cy. The temporary suspension of the commercial transitthrough Georgia, in August 2008, sped up Armenia’s nego-tiations with Turkey for the normalization of the bilateralrelationship. The war in Georgia diminished Azerbaijan’sinterest for NATO and introduced new elements into theenergy policy. The political discourse was also adapted tothe post-war reality. Georgia’s “homecoming” back to theregion was announced by the Georgian president: “TheCaucasus must unite” (Grigoryan, 2009). Hence, he resus-citated the idea of “The Caucasian Common House”. In hisopinion, that should take the shape of a trilateral union ableto sketch a regional political and economic strategy (Gha-zinyan, 2011). The idea was taken up by the civil society:“We wish for the materialization of the concept of a‘Caucasian Common House’ under the auspices of theEuropean Union”22, a member of the mass-media enthusias-tically states. Economic undertones were introduced intothe political discourse. For instance, the president ofAzerbaijan said that “the economy of Azerbaijan represents75% of the economy of South Caucasus” (News.Az, 2010),while the president of Georgia described Tbilisi as “thecapital of the Caucasus” (Civil.Ge, 2011a). Undoubtedly,the “Caucasian Common House” remains mostly a rhetori-cal exercise and the data referring to the volume of Azer-baijan’s economy belongs to the intimidation game going onbetween Armenia and Azerbaijan. But the regional aspects

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22 Interview with a mass-media person, Baku, June 2011.Map 4 — South Caucasus in its Euro-Asian context

(Source: Caspian Study Program, Harvard University, 2006)

stability in the area through allocation of federal funds andmilitarization of the region. For instance, the budgets ofrepublics such as Chechnya and Ingushetia are being coveredat a rate of 91% from federal allocations (Grove, 2011). Theinfusion of money secures the regional elites’ loyalty, but thenon-transparent way in which the funds are distributedexacerbates corruption. To contain the insurgency, Russiahas deployed a contingent of approximately 88,000 troopsin the region, from various branches of the armed forces(Nichol, 2011, p. 13). The military presence on land isbeing reinforced by two military bases of the Caspian fleet,in Kaspiysk and Makhacikala. In 2011, the Ministry of theInterior dispatched additional forces to Dagestan, to coun-teract the rebels’ spring campaign. The explosive situationin North Caucasus and the militarization of the regiondirectly impact the security of the South-Caucasian states.The railroad and the gas pipeline that connect Dagestan toAzerbaijan have often been the targets of terrorist acts.Moreover, rebels from Dagestan have often crossed theborder into Azerbaijan. Russia regularly blames Georgia forharboring and protecting North-Caucasian rebels in theKodori Gorge. It is worthwhile to mention that the Kremlinhas kept accusing Georgia even after the Abkhazian militiagained control over the Kodori Gorge, with large support ofRussian troops. Last, but not least, the 58th Army deployedin North Caucasus was at the backbone of the Russian forcesthat took part in the Russo-Georgian war of 2008.

Krasnodarsky Kray is the only administrative unit of theSouthern Federal District that neighbors South Caucasusor, more precisely, the Georgian separatist region, Abkhazia.It hosts the most important Russian port at the Black Sea,Novorossiysk, which was considered, prior to the 2010Russo-Ukrainian agreements in Kharkov, to be an alterna-tive to the Russian fleet basis in Sevastopol. The insurgents’strategy is to extend the North-Caucasian front towards theareas populated by Russian ethnics. Hence, KrasnodarskyKray, as an immediate neighbor of the Caucasian republics,

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a region feels the impact of the political upheavals, the eco-nomic crises, and the ascent of other regional actors in theirimmediate vicinity. The literature defines a sub-regionalsecurity complex situated at the intersection of other region-al security complexes and parallel security processes at amacro-regional level as being insulators (Buzan & Weaver,2003, p. 490). Therefore, since they are at a meeting-pointof concurrent regional security logics, the security concernsof the South-Caucasian states cannot be understood sepa-rately from the Eurasian context.

I.4.1. North

To the North, South Caucasus neighbors the North-Cau-casian Federal District and the Southern Federal Districts ofthe Russian Federation (see Map 5). North-Caucasus is oneof the most important challenges to Russia’s national secu-rity. The republics of North Caucasus are confronted withalmost daily acts of low or medium intensity violence,large-scale unemployment (over 50% in some cases), sys-temic corruption, and poverty. Moscow ensures situational

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Map 5 — South Caucasus and North Caucasus (Source: Wikitravel)

position, combined with the vast energy resources in theCaspian region, South Caucasus plays the role of an impor-tant energy hub in Eurasia. The Caspian Sea links SouthCaucasus to Central Asia, especially to the post-Sovietrepublics Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. The two states arebeing governed by consolidated authoritarian regimes(Freedom House, 2011), that ensure their survival alsothrough a multi-vectorial foreign policy. President NursultanNazarbayev has been in office for 19 years (matched onlyby president Karimov of Uzbekistan), the longest in poweramong the leaders in the post-Soviet space. In April 2011,Nazarbayev was reelected for another five-year term. InTurkmenistan, president Niazov’s sudden death in 2006made possible a power transition after fifteen years sincethe declaration of independence, but the authoritariannature of the regime remained unchanged. Kazakhstan andTurkmenistan are petrostates; they possess the largestreserves of oil and/or gas in Central Asia. Russia and Chinaseek to monopolize the imports of natural gas and crude oilfrom the Caspian region: Russia in order to re-sell theseresources to the EU and to the other post-Soviet states inEastern Europe, China in order to meet the demands of itsever-growing domestic consumption. On the other hand, byadopting a rigid position on the judicial status of theCaspian Sea, Iran aims to hamper the trans-Caspian projectsimportant for the EU’s energy security. Also, the disputebetween Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan regarding the delim-itation of the national sectors in the Caspian Sea hindersthe trans-Caspian gas pipeline project. In spite of suchobstacles, Kazakhstan (since 2008) and Turkmenistan(since 2010) have started supplying Europe with oil throughthe Baku – Tbilisi – Ceyhan pipeline (BTC). Kazakhstanalso uses additional export route through the Georgian portof Batumi. The maritime connection between Azerbaijan,Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan is provided by the regularferry-boat connections from Baku to Turkmenbashi andto Aktau, respectively. The transport routes linking Georgia

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imports insecurity from North Caucasus. During the lastdecade, there have been several terrorist acts in the region.Moreover, the designation of the city of Sochi as host of the2014 Winter Olympic Games increases the danger forlarge-scale terrorist attacks in Krasnodarsky Kray. The 2010railroad explosion outside Sochi confirms the worst predic-tions. The use of the Abkhazian infrastructure and naturalresources to prepare the 2014 Winter Olympiad fuels theregional tensions between Russia and Georgia.

The security problems in North Caucasus should be seenin the context of Russia’s regional ambitions. The Kremlintraditionally considered its military presence in South Cau-casus to be vital for keeping control over North Caucasus.This outlook is based on the history of the conquest of theCaucasus. Chronologically speaking, Tsarist Russia firstoccupied South Caucasus, following a direct confrontationwith other regional powers. Only after consolidating controlover the territory South of the Caucasian Mountains didRussia launch its decisive campaign for the all-out conquer-ing of North Caucasus as well (the East and West regions),that was accomplished in the latter half of the 19th century(Trenin, 2009, p. 143). The connection between South andNorth Caucasus in the Russian strategic thinking was par-tially reflected by the logic of the 2008 actions. Besidesundermining the US positions in the region and preventingthe extension of NATO in South Caucasus, the militaryintervention sent a powerful signal to the North-Caucasianrepublics (ibidem, p. 149). Therefore, the objective vulnera-bility in North Caucasus and the ambition to establish a“sphere of influence” in the post-Soviet space motivateRussia’s ambition to be the major “security manager” in theCaucasus (ibidem, p. 154).

I.4.2. East

South Caucasus is bordered by the Caspian Sea to the Eastand by the Black Sea to the West. Due to this geographic

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states, with the EU. In order to accelerate their Europeanintegration, tke Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia shareexperience at various levels regarding the implementation ofreforms and the negotiations with the EU. Another twoactors in the Black Sea region determine to a great extentthe security dynamics in the area: Turkey and Russia.During the last decade, the political, military, and economicrelations between Moscow and Ankara have had an ascend-ing trajectory. The bilateral trade exchanges have substan-tially grown, with Russia becoming Turkey’s second tradepartner after the EU (EU Commission, 2011a). The twostates have lifted the visas for short-term trips and have cre-ated a High-Level Strategic Cooperation Council. Moreover,Turkey is among the few NATO member-states to have pur-chased Russian weapons. The Russo-Turkish rapprochementis not, however, without precedent in recent history. In the1970s, Turkey and Russia went through a period of warmpolitical and economic bilateral relations ultimately due tothe tensions between the Turkey and its ally, the UnitedStates (Altunisik & Tur, 2005, p. 108). The improvement ofthe Russo-Turkish relations in the early 2000s occurredalongside the deterioration of the Turkish-American ones,that was caused by the US military campaign in Iraq andWashington’s plans to internationalize the Black Sea. Thisdynamics accelerated the formation of the Russo-Turkish“condominium” in the Black Sea region, meant to maintainthe regional status quo (Socor, 2009; Triantaphyllou, 1009,p. 232). Consequently, Turkey opposed the extension of theNATO “Active Endeavor” operation in the Black Sea andapproved a limited NATO military presence in the BlackSea during the 2008 Russo-Georgian conflict (Lesser, 2011,pp. 2-3). This tactical alliance, however, is not withoutdivergent or competitive interests in South Caucasus, whichhas been proven plainly by Russia’s reaction to the attemptsat normalization of the Turkish-Armenian relations (Torba-kov, 2010).

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and Azerbaijan to Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan are part ofthe northern distribution network whereby the NATO andUS forces in Afghanistan are being supplied. Nevertheless,Russia and Iran still hold the naval military supremacy atthe Caspian Sea.

I.4.3. West

The Black Sea is the only direct link between SouthCaucasus and the EU and NATO. Its latest enlargement hasturned the EU into a Black Sea power. At the same time, the2004 enlargement has extended NATO’s presence in theregion. The new regional configuration, on the one hand,and the interests of the new member states, on the otherhand, have triggered a process of reformulation of policiestowards the Black Sea region. Consequently, the EUlaunched two initiatives covering this area: the Black SeaSinergy (2007) and the Eastern Partnership (2009). In2011, the European Parliament adopted the EU strategy forthe Black Sea region. Although there had been initiatives fora similar strategy of NATO before, those were ultimatelyblocked by Turkey.23 Romania and Bulgaria are semi-consol-idated democracies (Freedom House, 2011) with economicinterests in South Caucasus. The imperatives of energysecurity have encouraged the two states to join the Nabuccogas pipeline project and to develop close economic andpolitical relationships with Azerbaijan and Georgia. The pri-macy of economic interests explains Bulgaria’s and Romania’sweak support for democracy promotion in Georgia andAzerbaijan.

Besides the new EU members, two states with Europeanaspirations are part of the Black Sea region: the Ukraine andMoldova. These Black Sea countries are being governed byhybrid political regimes (Freedom House, 2011) and havethe most advanced relations, among the Eastern Partnership

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23 Interview with a NATO official.

Middle East, the Western Balkans, South Caucasus, and theCaspian region (Akyol, 2011). Prime-Minister Erdogan’sspeech after winning the 2011 elections, in which headdressed the inhabitants of Damascus, Sarajevo, and Baku,confirmed the continuity of Turkey’s ambitious regionalpolicy. South Caucasus is important in Turkey’s strategy toturn itself into a major Eurasian energy node. The warbetween Russia and Georgia, while jeopardizing such plans,gave an impulse to Turkey’s more active involvement in theregional security matters. The normalization of the relationswith Armenia was seen as a step towards the redesigning ofthe regional architecture and the boosting of Turkey’s leversin South Caucasus. Although is has been successful to acertain extent, Turkey’s neighborhood policy is facing twomajor challenges: keeping the balance between competitionand cooperation with Russia and managing the political andeconomic consequences of the revolutions in the Arab world.Last, but not least, the political regimes in South Caucasushave followed with deep concern the democratic revival inthe Arab countries. The launch of the anti-corruption cam-paign in Azerbaijan and the dialogue between power andopposition in Armenia coincided with the revolutionarysweep in the Middle East, thus confirming the exposure ofSouth Caucasus to the democratization processes underwayin the vicinity.

II. The Intra-Regional Dynamics in SouthCaucasus

The conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan makesGeorgia a pivotal state in South Caucasus. The only stablerelations the two camps in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflicthave in the region are those with Georgia. On the otherhand, Georgia’s key-position in the region forces the author-ities in Tbilisi to keep a subtle balance in their relations withboth Armenia, and Azerbaijan.

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I.4.4. South

In the South, the Caucasus neighbors two Middle-Easternpowers, Iran and Turkey, the latter a regional Europeanpower as well. Iran is a difficult neighbor (though not toArmenia), but a necessary partner, at the same time, for theSouth-Caucasian states. Iran’s nuclear program and domes-tic political instability fuel uncertainty in the region. Tehranpursues at least four objectives in South Caucasus: to pre-vent what it perceives as encirclement by the West; toensure the neutrality of the three South-Caucasian states incase of an armed conflict with the US; to break out of inter-national isolation and to legitimate its political regime; toincrease its regional and economic influence by projecting“soft power” and through economic expansion. The coher-ence of Iran’s regional policy is undermined by the splitswithin the Tehran regime and by the problem of successionfollowing the disputed presidential elections of 2009 andthe mass protests they triggered (Nader, Thaler & Bohandy,2011). For instance, president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’svisit to Armenia was canceled in 2011 not only for theexternal reasons Tehran officially invoked, but also for somedomestic ones. The interdiction to leave the country, thatwas imposed on the eve of the visit to some high-rankingofficials from the president’s entourage, and Ahmadinejad’sintention to resist Ayatollah Khamenei’s pressure seem tohave contributed decisively to the postponement of his visitto Yerevan.24

Turkey has undergone major internal transformations inthe early 2000s. The high rates of economic growth and thestagnation of accession talks with the EU have contributedto self-confidence, an independent foreign policy, and anactive strategy in the country’s vicinity (Tocci, 2011).Turkey’s regional policy of “zero problems” with neighborshas strengthened its political and economic positions in the

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24 Interview with an expert, Yerevan, June 2011.

public debate in Armenia on whether the country shouldparticipate in the 2012 edition or boycott it.

The state of conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan isthe result of the war waged between the two states in theearly 1990s for Nagorno-Karabakh, an enclave that used tobelong to Azerbaijan prior to the Soviet Union dissolution.Currently, Armenia controls Nagorno-Karabakh and otherseven regions (two of them partially) around it (see Map 6).29

Therefore, Azerbaijan has no control over roughly 14% ofits internationally recognized territory (Waal, 2003, p. 286).In Armenia, the seven Azerbaijani regions are called “liber-ated territories” and serve two strategic objectives: to securea land connection between Nagorno-Karabakh and Armeniaand provide the necessary space for an advanced defense ofthe enclave. Moreover, one does not rule out, in Yerevan,that those regions might be used (except Lacin and Kelbajar,which separate Armenia from Nagorno-Karabakh) as a bar-gaining chip in the future negotiations for the status ofNagorno-Karabakh and for reliable security guarantees.Aside from the destruction of infrastructure and the numer-ous victims, the war produced around 600,000 internally

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29 The seven regions are: Kelbajar, Lacin, Kubatli, Jebrail, Agdam,Zanghelan, and Fizuli.

II.1. Armenia and Azerbaijan: an improbable peace,a possible war

Between Armenia and Azerbaijan there are no diplomaticrelations, the border is closed, and there is no direct com-munication by land or by air. Flights between the two capi-tals have stopovers in Moscow, Kiev, or Istanbul. Although,according to certain officials, there is a trade going onbetween Armenia and Azerbaijan through third parties25,most likely through Georgia, the extent of such a trade isvery difficult to measure. The only confirmed place inGeorgia where some trade between the Armenians and theAzerbaijani was going on was the village Sadakhlo, at theborder between Armenia and Georgia, not very far fromthe point of intersection of the borders between the threeSouth-Caucasian states (Poghosyan, 2011). However, theSadakhlo market was closed down in 2005. There exists alimited interaction between the NGOs in the two countries,but even the level of cooperation between those hasdropped after 2005.26 The encounters usually take placein Georgia or in Armenia, because it is rather difficult toorganize this type of activities in Azerbaijan.27 The Armenianparticipants in Baku or the Azerbaijani ones in Yerevan areprovided with personal protection and their passports arenot being stamped when they go in and out of the respec-tive countries, so there is no actual proof that they have evervisited Armenia or Azerbaijan.28 The attempts at reconnect-ing the two societies through a cultural dialogue are oftenblocked. In 2010, an Armenian NGO planned a week of theAzerbaijani film in Armenia, but, in spite of all preliminaryorganizational measures, the event no longer took place(Gregoryan, 2010). The Azerbaijani singers’ winning of the2011 finals of the Eurovision Song Contest triggered a vast

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25 Interview with an official, Baku, June 2011.26 Interview with a mass-media person, Baku, June 2011.27 Interview with an expert, Baku, June 2011.28 Interview with an expert, Yerevan, June 2011.

Map 6 — Nagorno-Karabakh and other seven occupied Azerbaijaniregions (Source: The International Institute for Strategic Studies,

London 2011)

government keeps a tight control over the public space,so it is able to instrumentalize efficiently the conflict withArmenia to prevent in the public debates the primacy of thedomestic problems over those generated externally. On theother hand, the opinion poll undertaken on the Armenianside shows that the Armenians feel much more comfortablewith the present-day status quo on the front line, but feelstronger the effects of the conflict, since it is partiallyresponsible for their difficult economic situation. At thesame time, the results of the Armenian survey show that thepolitical system in that country is more open than the onein Azerbaijan and the population gradually leaves behindthe logic of the “besieged fortress”. Consequently, the prob-lems affecting the citizens’ daily life come first and there isan ever-growing social demand that they be solved.

To defend or to change the status quo in Nagorno-Kara-bakh, Armenia, on the one hand, and Azerbaijan, on theother hand, invest significant financial and human resourcesinto the judicial, diplomatic, historiographic, economic, andmilitary conflict waged along the front line, in the infor-mational space, or within the international organizations.The current border between Azerbaijan and Armenia is oneof the most militarized ones in the world. Armenia andNagorno-Karabakh have already erected three lines ofdefense and the fourth appears to be under construction.32

Armenia supports Nagorno-Karabakh financially and con-tributes with troops to its defense system. According to esti-mates, the armed forces of Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakhadd up to 70,000 troops, while the Azerbaijani army countsabout 95,000 troops (International Crisis Group, 2011a,p. 1). The armies of the two states regularly display militarymight by organizing military exercises in the proximity ofthe front line. Both Armenia, and Azerbaijan are engagedin an arms race, as reflected by the spectacular increaseof defense budgets and acquisitions of military equipment.

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displaced persons (IDPs) in Azerbaijan. According to theinternational NGOs, Azerbaijan is in the top ten amongcountries with the highest per capita IDP population in theworld (Internal Displacement Monitoring Center, 2011).

De iure, the two countries are in a state of war. The mili-tary operations were suspended in 1994, following the con-clusion of an armistice in Bishkek. Azerbaijan opposed thedeployment of Russian peace-keeping forces along the frontline. Thus, it is the sole responsibility of the belligerents toobserve the cease-fire agreement. Although there have beenno considerable military confrontations in the conflict zonesince 1994, the two sides regularly engage in skirmishes.This low-intensity violence, that some experts call “thesnipers’ war”30, produced 3,000 casualties between 1994and 2009 (International Crisis Group, 2009, p. 1). Over thelast three years, the violation of the armistice has becomea more frequent practice, which increases the likelihood ofa new outbreak of the armed conflict (idem, 2011a). “Thepurpose of the high-level diplomatic efforts this year [2011]has been the prevention of war, rather than finding a solu-tion to the conflict”31, an expert in the region stated.

Nagorno-Karabakh is Azerbaijan’s main foreign policyand security problem. According to the surveys, the conflictwith Armenia is the utmost concern of 51% of the Azer-baijani citizens (Puls-R/Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2010). Atthe same time, the problem of peace (including the conflictwith Azerbaijan) comes only third, with 9%, after unemploy-ment (46%) and poverty (10%) in the top concerns of theArmenian citizens (Caucasus Research Resource Centers,2010). This difference could be due to the following:Azerbaijan lost the 1992-1994 war; its petrodollars, that aredistributed among various social categories, tend to miti-gate, in the public perception, the effects of corruption andunemployment coming next on the list of concerns; the Baku

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30 Interview with an expert, Yerevan, June 2011.31 Interview with an expert, Yerevan, June 2011. 32 Interview with an expert, Yerevan, June 2011.

strategy aims not only Armenia, but Nagorno-Karabakh aswell. Thus, the Diaspora has contributed $3 million for thereconstruction of the Stepanakert airport, but its reopeningwas postponed in 2011. At the same time, in retaliation forthe closing of its borders with Azerbaijan and Turkey,Armenia is blocking Azerbaijan’s access to the Nakhichevanenclave, whose southern neighbors are Iran and, for a veryshort length (11 km), Turkey.

Both states promote an active worldwide informationcampaign on Nagorno-Karabakh, in order to gain as muchsupport from the international community as possible.Experts do not rule out the possibility that Azerbaijan’s2011 decision to join the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM),with a membership of 180 countries, is partly aimedtowards using that platform in order to gain support for theBaku cause among states that are confronted with similarterritorial problems.33 The two conflicting parts make use ofa historiography that either denies or minimizes their mutu-al presence in Nagorno-Karabakh in the course of history.Furthermore, they invoke either the right to self-determina-tion of a population that has been the victim of an aggressionby the central administration, or the territorial aggression ofone state against the other and ethnic cleansing campaigns.Besides their active implication in information campaignsaimed at the diplomatic corps, the presidential administra-tions in both Armenia, and Azerbaijan include specializeddepartments that monitor the rivals’ messages and coordinatethe efforts to neutralize them in the informational sphere.34

The Diaspora is an important conveyor of messages in bothArmenia’s, and Azerbaijan’s lobbying campaigns. TheArmenian Diasporas in France and in the US are well-knownfor their thorough organization and their impact on certainforeign policy decisions. In a catch-up effort, the authorities

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33 Interview with an expert, Baku, June 2011.34 Interview with an expert, Baku, June 2011; interview with an

expert, Yerevan, June 2011.

Between 2000 and 2009, Armenia’s defense budget rosefrom 3.6% to 4.2% of the GDP and Azerbaijan’s from 2.3%to 3.4% of the GDP (SIPRI, 2011). From 2000 to 2010,Azerbaijan allocated $9.2 billion for its defense and Armenia$2.6 billion (News.Az, 2011a). In 2010, the Baku governmentadopted a $2.1 billion defense budget, more than Armenia’snational consolidated budget ($1.8 billion).

Besides its wish to demonstrate a change in the militarybalance, Baku’s aim is to exhaust Armenia economically,through a sustained arms race. The shutting down of theAzerbaijani-Armenian border and of the Turkish-Armenianone and the exclusion of Armenia from the regional infra-structure projects are guided by the same agenda. One ofthe recent attempts at exerting economic pressure onArmenia was to invoke, after the Fukushima nuclear inci-dent, the threat for the entire region represented by theSoviet-era nuclear plant in Metsamor, that produces rough-ly 40% of the country’s electric power (News.Az, 2011b).Shutting down the Metsamor plant without a prior identi-fication of alternative energy sources or the building of anew plant, would put in jeopardy Armenia’s entire economy.Baku hopes that its strategy of continuous harassment,combined with Azerbaijan’s own steady economic growthbased on oil and gas exports, will ultimately force Armeniainto negotiating from a position of weakness. Azerbaijandoes not rule out completely a military solution for recover-ing control over Nagorno-Karabakh.

Although the defense budget is a heavy burden forArmenia’s economy, keeping up the military balance is amajor objective achieved in great part with the help of theArmenian Diaspora and through purchasing military equip-ment from Russia at prices below those on the world mar-ket. Armenia tries to minimize the effects of its regional eco-nomic isolation by developing alternative energy projectsand obstructing the initiatives supported by Azerbaijan. Forinstance, Armenia has actively opposed any external financingfor the Baku – Tbilisi – Kars railroad project. The de-isolation

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peace-keeping forces; the right of the refugees and IDPs toreturn to their homes of origin; reopening of the routes ofcommunication, restoring of trade, and implementation ofpost-conflict rehabilitation measures financed by foreigndonors; determination of the status of Nagorno-Karabakhthrough referendum. It seems that the disputed points arethe schedule of the Armenian forces’ withdrawal from theoccupied regions around Nagorno-Karabakh, the mainte-nance of a communication corridor between Armenia andKarabakh and the nature of the provisional status of theenclave (RFE, 2010a).

Observers are skeptical about a solution to the conflictany time soon: “Even if the leaders of Armenia and Azer-baijan agree on the Madrid principles and the road map,there are no social conditions in place conducive towardsimplementation of the accord”35, an analyst commented.The aggressive political discourses promoted by Baku andYerevan narrow the political leaders’ space for maneuverand make very unlikely the acceptance by either society ofany future high-level deals. According to the opinion polls,97% of the Azerbaijani think that Armenia is their most sig-nificant rival and 91% of the Armenians perceive Azerbaijanas the main political and economic threat (Puls-R/FriedrichEbert Stiftung, 2010; International Republican Institute,2008a). Additionally, 70% of those poled in Azerbaijanoppose any compromise on the part of their government inorder to achieve a peaceful solution to the conflict. How-ever, there can be no non-violent solution to the conflictwithout a compromise as reflected in the Madrid principles.Although 78% of the Armenians believe the situation inNagorno-Karabakh can be solved peacefully (InternationalRepublican Institute, 2008a), it seems that there are con-cerns in Yerevan and Stepanakert regarding the implemen-tation of such a solution: “What we want is a certain datefor organizing the referendum that will decide the future

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35 Interview with an expert, Yerevan, June 2011.

in Baku have recently paid more attention to organizingtheir own Diaspora in order to promote the Azerbaijanicause in the world (News.Az, 2011c). On the other hand,Baku has registered a series of diplomatic tactical victories.In 2008, the United Nations’ General Assembly passed aresolution regarding the “situation in the occupied territo-ries of Azerbaijan”, in which the “immediate, complete, andunconditional” withdrawal of the Armenian forces from allthe occupied territories of the Republic of Azerbaijan wasdemanded (UN, 2008). In 2011, the ParliamentaryAssembly of the Council of Europe decided to reinstate thepreviously suspended sub-committee on Nagorno-Karabakh.

The rivalry in the international organizations takes placealongside with the negotiations mediated by the MinskGroup, which has been created under the umbrella of theOSCE and is co-presided by Russia, France, and the US.After the Russo-Georgian conflict, the group’s activity, andespecially Russia’s inside the group, was re-energized. From2008 to 2011, Russia hosted nine meetings between thepresidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan, which resulted in anumber of joint statements and several exchanges of prison-ers and bodies of soldiers killed in action. The Russian StateDuma mediated in Moscow, in 2010, an informal dialoguebetween representatives of the Azerbaijani Milli Majlis andof the Armenian National Assembly. In spite of the pressureexerted by the US, France, and Russia on the eve of thelatest 2011 summit in Kazan, Baku and Yerevan failed toreach an agreement regarding the principles of the conflictresolution that had been proposed by the Minsk Group co-chairing countries at the OSCE ministerial conference heldin Madrid in 2007. After successive rounds of negotiations,the Madrid principles, though not yet accepted by the con-flicting parts, include: Armenia’s withdrawal from the regionssurrounding Nagorno-Karabakh, with special stipulationsfor Lacin and Kelbajar; a provisional, internationally guar-anteed status for Nagorno-Karabakh; security guaranteesfor Nagorno-Karabakh and the deployment of international

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with the military: the organization of the 2012 EurovisionSong Contest finals offers Azerbaijan a rare chance to proj-ect internationally a positive image, a chance the Bakuauthorities certainly do not want to waste by escalating theconflict.41

II.2. Georgia and Armenia: “Resetting” pragmatism

The relationship between Georgia and Armenia is char-acterized by a preeminently positive interdependence,asymmetrical in certain sectors, which is managed pragmat-ically by both governments. The political dialogue betweenArmenians and Georgians has intensified both quantitative-ly, and qualitatively after the 2008 war in Georgia. Observersremark that the “personal chemistry” between the two pres-idents contributes positively to the bilateral relations.42 Theinteraction between Foreign Affairs ministries solidifies therelationship on the high level. In 2011, the two heads ofdiplomacy agreed to meet at least four times a year in orderto have a continuous dialogue on all bilateral and regionalproblems. Both Yerevan, and Tbilisi admit that there areunsolved bilateral problems, but none of those is consideredunsolvable (Civil.Ge, 2011b). Although the political rela-tionship has improved considerably in the past two years,there still are animosities reflected in the public opinion.43

According to surveys, 75% of the respondents in Georgiaand 62% of the ones in Armenia believe the bilateral rela-tionship is good (International Republican Institute, 2011;idem, 2008a). Speaking of friend and foe states, for 8% ofthe Georgians Armenia is the most important partner(International Republican Institute, 2011), while for 24%of the Armenians Georgia is the main partner (InternationalRepublican Institute, 2008a). This difference could beexplained by Georgia’s strategic importance as a transit state

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41 Interview with an expert, Baku, June 2011.42 Interview with an expert, Yerevan, June 2011.43 Interview with experts, Yerevan, June 2011.

status of Nagorno-Karabakh”36, an official unveils his pre-occupation. Another question is the peace-keeping forces’credibility and their capacity to carry out the mission:“Who can guarantee that certain events in the Balkans willnot occur in Nagorno-Karabakh as well?”37, an analyst asks,alluding to the Srebrenica massacre and to the inaction ofthe international peace-keepers’ forces. It seems that thereservations regarding the pacifiers’ deployment is also eco-nomically motivated. The separatist region’s army is the mainemployer of a significant number of Nagorno-Karabakhmen; so, the deployment of peace-keeping troops wouldmost likely generate a reduction of the armed forces of theseparatist region, with an immediate and severe social andeconomic impact.38

The implementation of a peace plan in Nagorno-Karabakhmay therefore be compared to “the crossing of a mine field”(Economist, 2011). The field could be crossed successfullyif the political negotiations will be combined with measuresmeant to prepare the two societies for a long-lasting peace.Whether the political regimes in Baku and Yerevan have thewill and capacity to do it, is still an open question. It seemsthat more and more observers in the region believe that,without a genuine democratization of both countries, Arme-nia and Azerbaijan will not achieve any substantial progressregarding the Nagorno-Karabakh settlement.39 Until then,the most likely scenario shared in both camps is the contin-uation of the status quo, described as: “Rapid peace is impos-sible, rapid war is probable”40. On a short term, however,the outbreak of violence around Nagorno-Karabakh seemsto be discouraged by a development that has nothing to do

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36 Interview with an official, Yerevan, June 2011.37 Interview with an expert, Yerevan, June 2011.38 Interview with an expert, Yerevan, June 2011.39 Interview with a mass-media person, Baku, June 2011; inter-

view with an expert, Yerevan, June 2011.40 Interview with an expert, Baku, June 2011; interview with an

official, Yerevan, June 2011.

during the conflict45, that was appreciated by the Georgianauthorities. After the conflict, Armenia resisted Moscow’spressure to recognize the independence of Abkhazia andSouth Ossetia46 and the president of Armenia paid an offi-cial visit to Tbilisi in September 2008. In 2009, the presi-dent of Georgia was decorated with the highest Armenianstate distinction — the Order of Honor —, which was metwith criticism in Moscow. On the other hand, Georgiadislikes the Russian military presence in Armenia, yet theTbilisi authorities are aware that they cannot change thingsradically and that it is important that, in the current securi-ty environment, they maintain a friendly relationship withArmenia.47 Although it cancelled in 2011 the agreement onmilitary transit with Russia meant to support the Russianbase in Gyumri, Georgia still consents to military cargotransit for the Armenian armed forces through its air space.48

Georgia assured Yerevan that the termination of the agree-ment with Russia, inoperable since 2008, is a strictly tech-nical one (meant to prevent its automatic five-year exten-sion) and will not affect its cooperation with the ArmenianMinistry of Defense: “We wanted to receive guarantees thatour security will not be affected by this decision […] Thosewe have received”49, a government representative explains.Such guarantees were offered by the Georgian Minister ofDefense during his visit in Yerevan that preceded the vote inthe Tbilisi parliament regarding the termination of theagreement for military transit with Russia. On the sameoccasion, the Georgians offered the possibility of trainingArmenian troops at mountain training base in Sachere. Thebalanced approach to these issues confirms the pragmaticattitude in both Yerevan, and Tbilisi.

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45 Interview with an official, Yerevan, June 2011.46 Interview with an expert, Yerevan, June 2011.47 Interview with an expert, Tbilisi, June 2011.48 Interview with an official, Yerevan, June 2011.49 Interview with an official, Yerevan, June 2011.

for the Armenian trade. The volume of bilateral trade is notsignificant, the 2010 statistic results showing that Georgiais Armenia’s eighth commercial partner (2.2% of the tradevolume), while Armenia is Georgia’s 12th commercial part-ner, with a mere 1.5% of the trade volume (EU Commission,2011b; EU Commission, 2011c). The opinion poll shows,in addition, that 31% of the Armenian respondents believeGeorgia represents the main political and economic threat(International Republican Institute, 2008a). In Georgia, 3%of the citizens perceive Armenia similarly (InternationalRepublican Institute, 2011). It may very well be that, since2008, when the last survey was conducted in Armenia, thenumber of those who consider Georgia to be a threat hasdiminished. At the same time, the negative public perceptionin Armenia might reflect the people’s concern regarding theasymmetries in the economic relations, the preoccupation forthe rights of the Armenian minority in Samtskhe-Javakhetiand the participation in the regional projects that excludeArmenia. In Georgian public opinion, Armenia is often seenas a military ally of the Kremlin in South Caucasus. Giventhe Georgians’ attitude towards the Russian policy in theregion, a negative transfer occurs upon the image of Armenia,which is reflected in the surveys.

In spite of different foreign policy priorities, Tbilisi andYerevan are increasingly aware that each one plays its owngame in the region based on the political situation andnational security rationales.44 For instance, Yerevan perceivedin a negative way Georgia’s 2008 military actions in SouthOssetia, which could have set a dangerous precedent forArmenia. The political leadership in Yerevan refrained froma critical discourse aimed at Georgia, which might have sup-ported Russia’s aggressive rhetoric. On the other hand,Armenia played an important role in the evacuation of thediplomatic personnel and the foreign citizens from Georgia

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44 Interview with an expert, Tbilisi, May 2011; interview with anexpert, Yerevan, June 2011.

Verhni Lars and Kazbeghi, following negotiations mediatedby Switzerland. Thus, after a three-year’s interruption,Armenia benefits again from a land connection with Russiathrough Georgia. About 70 or 80% of the Armenian exportsto Russia transit through Georgia. Instead of using long andindirect maritime routes like Batumi – Varna/Burgas – Novo-rossiysk, the Armenian exporters have now access to the“Georgian Military Highway” connecting Tbilisi and Vladi-kavkaz, the capital of North Ossetia. The land transit toRussia through Verhni Lars – Kazbeghi reduces transporta-tion costs by 20-25% (Zhahanina, 2010). The significantvolume of commercial transit generates substantial profitsfor the Georgian state. In 2008-2009, the border betweenArmenia and Georgia was crossed by 4,594 freight trainsand 273,478 vehicles (OSCE Yerevan Office, 2010, p. 5). Atthe same time, the government in Yerevan believes Georgiaprofits from the asymmetrical interdependence by applyinga policy of transit taxation that significantly increases costsfor Armenia’s economic agents (Civil.Ge, 2009a).

Armenia is linked to Georgia through its energy andtelecommunications infrastructure. The Internet and inter-national telephone connections in Armenia are being pro-vided through the optic fiber cable crossing Georgia. Therewas an incident in 2011, in which scrap iron collectors cutthe Internet cable just outside Tbilisi and left a great num-ber of Armenian users without an Internet connection forseveral hours (Bedwell, 2011). The electric systems that linkArmenia and Georgia are interconnected through threetransmission lines. The gas pipeline used by Gazprom tosupply natural gas to Armenia also crosses Georgia. In 2010,following landslides, Georgia suspended the transit of gas inorder to make the necessary pipeline repairs. Armenia hadto tap its underground gas deposits to cover the domesticconsumption. In 2010, the Georgian parliament removedthe gas pipeline supplying Armenia from the list of strategicenterprises that can not be privatized. This caused concernin Yerevan: the worst scenario was that Azerbaijan could

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The pragmatic “reset” of the bilateral relationships after2008 is not unexpected, however. Georgia is a vital transitcorridor for the Armenian economy. According to theYerevan governmental estimates, the suspension of transitthrough Georgia during the 2008 war produced losses ofapproximately $670 million. Consequently, Armenia wasinterested in the restoring of communications as soon aspossible. The military threat coming from the North moti-vates the Tbilisi authorities to ease up the tensions withimmediate neighbors. In the aftermath of the conflict withRussia, the problem of the Armenian minority in Georgiawas identified by Tbilisi as a vulnerable point that Russiacould exploit. Hence, the Georgian government paid moreattention to the relationship with Armenia and to the infra-structural projects in Samtskhe-Javakheti. The two objec-tives’ overlap provided impulse to the bilateral relations.

Georgia facilitates about 70-75% of Armenia’s commer-cial transit. Currently, there is a railroad connection betweenYerevan and the port of Batumi and the two countries coop-erate in the construction of the Gyumri – Akhaltsikhe –Batumi highway, which will facilitate the road traffic. Theport of Poti plays an important role for Armenia’s food secu-rity, because it is a significant gate of the country’s grainimports. The port of Batumi serves the passenger traffic: in2009, the ferry transports between Batumi and Sochi wereresumed. This route is important for Armenia, since there isa significant Armenian Diaspora settled in Sochi ever sincethe 19th century; moreover, many Armenians choose tospend their holidays in Sochi. Given the preparations forthe 2014 Winter Olympic Games, Sochi has become anattractive destination for the Armenians seeking opportuni-ties for temporary work. Over the past two years, air trafficfor passengers between Yerevan and Tbilisi has been sus-pended in winter time, for economic reasons, but resumedin spring or summer.

In 2010, Georgia and Russia agreed to reopen the onlyborder crossing between the two countries, the one between

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routes. There are issues on the bilateral agenda that, if over-looked, could generate significant complications in the rela-tions between Georgia and Armenia. Aiming to eliminatefrom the agenda the contentious items, the Tbilisi govern-ment has addressed the questions of the Armenian minority,the registration of the Armenian Church (as the ArmenianApostolic Church), and the demarcation and managementof the border. Not all the government’s initiatives, however,won the popular support. In their turn, the Yerevan author-ities reacted constructively to such overtures. The centraladministration or the leaders of the Armenian Church werecriticized publicly for sometimes too flexible positions.

To this day, the border between Armenia and Georgia hasnot been entirely delimited and demarcated. For lack of aclear demarcation, it is often difficult in the borderline com-munities to settle the ownership of land. This provokes inci-dents related to the peasants’ access to the farming land.The two sides joined efforts meant to accelerate the delin-eation and demarcation of the border. In 2010, the inter-governmental commission appointed to that end agreed onthe delineation and demarcation of 160 kilometers (71%)of the total of 225 km (OSCE Yerevan Office, 2010, pp. 13,15). Moreover, Armenia and Georgia have reached a politi-cal agreement as to the joint management of three of the sixborder checkpoints (RFE, 2011a). The implementation ofthis initiative is meant to facilitate the passenger and com-mercial traffic between the two countries.

In Georgia, there are Armenian communities in Tbilisi(about 83,000 people in 2002), in Batumi (about 8,000people in 2002), and in the separatist region of Abkhazia(about 45,000 people in 2005). But the most numerousArmenian presence (almost 125,000 people) was registeredin 2002 in Samtskhe-Javakheti, the southern region ofGeorgia neighboring Armenia and Turkey. In Soviet times,this was the place of the military base in Akhalkalaki, whichbelonged to the Transcaucasian military district. For thisreason, the whole region was under a quasi-closed regime

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assume control of the pipeline that guarantees Armenia’smain source of energy security. However, the authorities inTbilisi assured Armenia that the Georgian state would notgive up the controlling stake in the pipeline-managing com-pany (Civil.Ge, 2011c).

In the last two years, Georgia has become an attractiveterrain for the Armenian investors. For instance, in 2011,the Armenian candy maker “Grand Candy” decided toexpand on the Georgian market, while the “Jermuk” grouptook over the Georgian production of Pepsi-Cola. Accordingto the statistic data for 2010, 103 Armenian companieswere registered in Georgia. Experts estimate that there areabout 4,000 small and medium-size Armenian businessesoperating in Georgia. The increased presence of Armenianinvestors on the Georgian market has led to the establish-ment of a Union of Armenian Entrepreneurs (Vardanyan,2011). Several factors are behind this trend: on the onehand, there is the corruption and the multitude of bureau-cratic obstacles hindering small businesses, and the limitedmarket in Armenia; on the other hand, there are the friend-lier conditions for opening and managing a business, the taxexemptions for newly launched businesses, less corruption,and the better infrastructure in Georgia.50 The World Bank’s“Doing Business” classification confirms the differencebetween Armenia and Georgia regarding business environ-ments: the two countries were placed in positions 48 and12, respectively, in 2011 (World Bank, 2011). Additionally,Georgia and its seaside (Batumi and Kobuleti) are amongfavorite tourist destinations for an ever-growing number ofArmenian tourists: in 2009, the number of Armenian citi-zens visiting Georgia went over 300,000 (Chkhikvadze,2010) and topped 200,000 between January and April2011 alone (News.Am, 2011a).

The bilateral cooperation, however, has not focused onlyon the economic issued and the expansion of transportation

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50 Interview with experts, Yerevan, June 2011.

donors, free language courses have been introduced. Also,the Armenians in Samtskhe-Javakheti have been grantedfacilitated access to high education in the Georgian univer-sities.54 Representatives of the Armenian civil society whovisited the region in 2010-2011 found that the populationwas much more optimistic about their economic and socialsituation, than several years ago. The demand for studyingthe Georgian language has grown. Instead of going toYerevan, more and more Armenians in the region choose tostudy at the Tbilisi universities.55 The authorities in Yerevanhave adapted their discourse on the Armenian minority inGeorgia to the local changes. The Armenian president appre-ciated the efforts of the Georgian administration to improvethe socio-economic situation in Samtskhe-Javakheti andannounced his willingness to assist in the process (Civil.Ge,2009b).

Another irritating factor in the bilateral relationship isthe problem of registering the Armenian Church in Georgiaand the mutual demands of restitution of churches. TheArmenian side claims a number of churches in Tbilisi andSamtskhe-Javakheti. At the same time, the Georgian sideclaims the right of property over several medieval churchesin Northern Armenia, close to the border (Civil.Ge, 2011d).Until recently, according to the Georgian legislation, reli-gious minorities could not be registered as non-profit legalpersons. Hence, the state protected the Georgian OrthodoxChurch and denied similar rights to other cults in the coun-try, including the Armenian Church. In 2011, however, theCatholicos of All Armenians paid a historic visit to Georgia,the first of a high-level Armenian cleric to the neighboringcountry since 1894. The two problems were discussed dur-ing the visit. Soon after, the Georgian parliament modifiedthe law in the sense that other cults could be registered asnon-profit legal entities. The legal modification took off the

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54 Interview with an official, Tbilisi, May 2011.55 Interview with experts, Yerevan, June 2011.

and relatively isolated from the rest of Georgia.51 After thedissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia took control of themilitary base, which became the main employer and incomesource for the local population (Overland, 2009). In 2007,the Akhalkalaki base was evacuated, which raised questionsas to the economic future of the whole region. There werefears in Tbilisi that Russia would try to destabilize the area,by generating inter-ethnic tensions in Samtskhe-Javakheti.Such concerns were not entirely groundless. The Armenianside confirms that Russia did attempt to mobilize theArmenian minority against the Tbilisi authorities beforeand after the 2008 war, either by announcing the imminentrepatriation of the Meshetian Turks in Samtskhe-Javakheti(about 100,000 of them have been deported to Central Asiain 1944), or by re-ignating the discourse on discriminationagainst Armenians in Georgia.52

Apart from introducing additional security53 measures,the Tbilisi government implemented a complex strategy forthe integration of the region and its population in theGeorgian economic and educational circuit. In 2008 and2010, projects of highway renovation or construction werecarried out, in order to link the region to Western Georgiaand Tbilisi. Once the Baku – Tbilisi – Kars railroad projectis completed, the distance between Samtskhe-Javakheti andTbilisi will be covered in approximately two hours. TheGeorgian administration has made substantial investmentsin the local infrastructure: schools, hospitals, water and elec-tric power distribution systems (International Crisis Group,2011b, p. 6).

Another aspect of the strategy was education. Lack ofproficiency in the Georgian language significantly diminishesthe chances of young people in the region to study and takeadvantage of hiring opportunities. With the help of foreign

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51 Interview with a mass-media person, Tbilisi, June, 2011.52 Interview with an expert, Yerevan, June 2011.53 Interview with an official, Tbilisi, May 2011.

defeat lessened the enthusiasm for a military solution thatis much less likely to succeed in the post-conflict context.56

The difficult economic situation in Georgia after the 2008war impelled the Baku government to provide support tothe state in whose existence and survival it is directly inter-ested.

Azerbaijan and Georgia are interdependent as far as theenergy sector is concerned. Georgia depends on the Azer-baijani gas supplies almost entirely. In exchange, the mainoil and gas export routes linking Azerbaijan to the Europeanmarket cross Georgia. If a war broke out between Armeniaand Azerbaijan, it could impact the supplies of Georgiathrough the gas pipeline Baku – Tbilisi – Erzurum, which israther close to the conflict zone. Experts warn that, in caseof the reopening of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, theenergy-transporting facilities would be the favorite targetsof the Armenian forces (International Crisis Group, 2011a,p. 14). Georgia would then be forced to resort to Gazpromsatisfy the demand for gas. Similarly, a war waged onGeorgian territory would lead to the destruction of theenergy transportation network impacting the Azerbaijaniexports of oil and gas. In such conditions, Russia becomesan undesirable, but necessary partner for Azerbaijan. InAugust 2008, Azerbaijan redirected part of its oil exportsthat transit Georgia (Baku – Tbilisi – Ceyhan and Baku –Supsa) towards the Baku – Novorossiysk pipeline.

The relationship between Baku and Tbilisi is cementedby economic exchanges and an intensive political dialogue.There are many direct meetings and consultations at high orministerial level. According to statistics, Azerbaijan wasGeorgia’s fourth trade partner in 2010, with 7.8% of thetotal exchanges (EU Commission, 2011c). In 2010 as well,Azerbaijan was among the main foreign investors in Georgia,ranging fifth, with $58 million (Civil.Ge, 2011e). Georgia’splace in the Azerbaijani trade is considerably lower (1.5%),

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56 Interview with an expert, Baku, June 2011.

agenda the question of the Armenian Church registration inGeorgia. The second problem however, that of the right ofproperty over places of worship, will require much moretime and patience from both sides. The street protests thattook place in Tbilisi after the legal changes regarding reli-gious minorities show how delicate the topic is and howcautious the political leaders need to be from now on inorder to maintain the positive dynamics of the bilateral rela-tions established in recent years.

II.3. Azerbaijan and Georgia: Getting closer

A very close political and economic relationship hasdeveloped in time between Azerbaijan and Georgia, basedprimarily on a positive experience during their brief inde-pendence following World War I. In the post-Soviet era, theclose relations between presidents Heydar Aliyev andEduard Shevardnadze have consolidated the relationshipbetween Azerbaijan and Georgia. Since the early 1990s, thetwo countries have been faced with territorial conflicts,so the restoring of their territorial integrity has become thedominant theme that reinforces the relationship from apolitical point of view. In 2008, Georgia was among the39 states that voted in favor of the UN General Assembly’sresolution about the “situation in the occupied territories ofAzerbaijan”. In August 2008, after the outbreak of the mil-itary hostilities in South Ossetia, the Azerbaijani Ministryof Foreign Affairs qualified the Georgian actions meant toreestablish the territorial integrity as being in accordancewith international law (Today.Az, 2008). For the authoritiesin Baku, the war had direct implications on the situation inNagorno-Karabakh. Undoubtedly, the recovery of SouthOssetia by Georgia in 2008 would have put pressure on theBaku regime. “If Georgia has succeeded, why shouldn’t wetry as well?” — would have been the popular message push-ing the government beyond the bellicose rhetoric it hasbecome a prisoner of. In certain circles, however, Georgia’s

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form (LNG). There are limits, however, to the trust betweenBaku and Tbilisi. Although it has been said that Azerbaijanoffered Georgia $500 million for purchasing the pipelinethrough which gas is being supplied to Armenia (AsbarezPost, 2010), the authorities in Tbilisi ruled out the possibil-ity of giving up the controlling shares package. Azerbaijan’stakeover of this pipeline would potentially fuel the conflictbetween Baku and Yerevan, an evolution that Georgia is keento avoid for reasons of national and regional energy security.

From the Azerbaijani point of view, the neighbor coun-try’s participation is crucial for the completion of the rail-road connection with Turkey. It was initially planned thatthe Baku – Tbilisi – Kars project would be internationallyfinanced, such that Georgia would be able to launch worksof repair and construction on the Marabda – Akhalhalaki –Kartsakhi. The international donors, however, refused tosupport the project financially, claiming that it would notserve the purpose of regional integration. Given the impor-tance of the project, Azerbaijan offered Georgia two prefer-ential loans (for 25 years, at 1% yearly interest) for thefinancing of the works: Baku provided $200 million in 2007and another $575 million in 2011. Loan payments are to bemade from the profit made by Georgia from the exploitationof that segment of railroad, which will become operationalstarting in 2013 (Civil.Ge, 2011f). For Georgian tourism,Azerbaijan is an important reservoir of customers. In addi-tion to the direct Baku – Tbilisi connection by air, there arealso numerous coach routs. Over the last ten years, the num-ber of Azerbaijani visitors has considerably grown, reachingalmost 400,000 in 2009 (Chkhikvadze, 2010). The numberof tourists is expected to grow: from January to April 2011alone, Georgia was visited by 244,000 citizens of Azerbaijan(ArmeniaNews, 2011).

Although rapidly improving, the relations between Bakuand Tbilisi are not free of difficulties that impact negativelyon the atmosphere or could produce in the bilateral relations.The two sides admit that there are still contentious issues,

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which points to an economic asymmetry in the bilateralrelations (EU Commission, 2011d). As far as public opiniongoes, 22% of the respondents in Georgia estimated thatAzerbaijan is their country’s most important partner(International Republican Institute, 2011). 11.3% of theAzerbaijani believe that Georgia is a friendly state (Puls-R/Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2010). This difference mirrorsAzerbaijan’s increased significance, in the public eye, forGeorgia’s energy security. It should be pointed out, howev-er, that the number of Azerbaijani supporters of Georgia hasalmost doubled since 2006 (ibidem). This dynamics can beaccounted for by the increase in popular support for thecause of Georgia’s reintegration after the 2008 war and byits role in the oil and gas transportation.

Azerbaijan has twice taken decisive action over the lastfive years to guarantee the security of gas supply for Georgia.The first time was in 2006, when Gazprom cut gas deliveryto Georgia, simultaneously pushing high the gas price. Thesecond time was in 2008, right after the war, when Bakuand Tbilisi reached an agreement regarding the five-yearcontract for gas delivery, in 2009 the gas being supplied ata preferential price (Alieva, 2009, p. 2). Later on, the twosides agreed to extend the contract until 2020, withoutmodifying the basic price of natural gas (AZE.Az, 2010).The high level of mutual trust between Baku and Tbilisifacilitated Azerbaijan’s access to Georgia’s energy sector.The SOCAR state company has control over the oil termi-nal at Kulevi, which became operable in 2008. Moreover,SOCAR entered the Georgian gas distribution market, witha market quota of almost 75%. The company intends tobuild an additional 1,500 kilometers of pipelines that willsupply gas to another 150,000 users (ABC.Az, 2011).Georgia is an important component in the Azerbaijan –Georgia – Romania Interconnector (AGRI) project in whichSOCAR is a partner. This project envisions the transport ofgas from Azerbaijan to the Kulevi terminal, from whichpoint it is further sent to the port of Constanþa in a liquefied

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285,000 people, according to the latest census. The situa-tion of the Azerbaijani minority in Georgia has been underlesser international scrutiny, not being considered sociallyand politically explosive (Cornell et al., 2005, p. 24). Thisminority, however, faces numerous problems having to dowith the infrastructure, lack of proficiency in the Georgianlanguage, limited access to local public positions or to high-er education, undemarcated border between Armenia andGeorgia and occasional abuses by the Armenian border guards,as well as the economic under-development. Although cer-tain infrastructure problems have been addressed by theauthorities in Tbilisi in recent years, those of the drinkingwater supply, the repair of rural roads, and the agriculturalsector have been neglected. Moreover, lack of proficiency inGeorgian remains an issue for the Azerbaijani minority,since bilingual instructors are scarce and there is a low inter-est for learning the language. Most young people in the regionprefer to continue their studies in Azerbaijan (CIPDD,GYLA, and Safeworld, 2011). The closing down, in 2005,of the market in Sadakhlo, a village with Azerbaijani popu-lation, left 5,000 people without a regular profit. The hardeconomic conditions in Kvemo Kartli push the Azerbaijaniethnics to migrate to neighboring countries in search ofwork opportunities.

In 2010, Russia accused Georgia of violating the rights ofthe ethnic minorities and demanded that Tbilisi normalizeits relationships with the minorities living in that country,including the Azerbaijanis (Socor, 2010). Azerbaijan, how-ever, ignored Russia’s attempt at manipulation. Thus, Bakuavoided making a political issue out of the problems of theAzerbaijani minority in Georgia and behaved in such a wayas not to get involved in what it considers to be Georgia’sinternal affairs. Given the economic and political condi-tions, any fragmentation of Georgia is against the interestsof Azerbaijan. Consequently, the authorities in Baku haveencouraged the Azerbaijani minority to be loyal to theGeorgian state. But the government in Baku tacitly admits

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but insist on their determination to solve them amiably.Twenty years after the regaining of their independence, thetwo neighboring countries have not yet accomplished thedelineation and demarcation of the common border. In 1996,an inter-governmental commission for the delineation anddemarcation of the border was instituted. In 2010, Bakuand Tbilisi agreed on the delineation of 300 km (66% outof the 480 km) of the border (Trend, 2011a). The processadvances slowly, among other things, because of the disputearound the David Gareja monastery, which is situated halfin the Georgian region of Kakheti and half in the Azerbai-jani region of Agstafa. The David Gareja complex consists ofmore than twenty churches and a number of caves, over adistance of 25 kilometers. The monastery has an importanthistorical, cultural, and spiritual value for Georgia, whichwould like a land exchange so as to gain full control over themonastery. Among the possible means of compensationunder consideration is the village of Erismedi, a borderlocality also in dispute between the two countries. For theAzerbaijani side, however, the position of the Bertubanichurch, which is part of the monastery, is considered to bestrategically important, due to its altitude. Consequently,the authorities in Baku reject any territorial compensationin exchange for the Azerbaijani half of the David Garejacomplex. In the course of negotiations, Azerbaijan suggest-ed turning the monastery into an “open tourist zone”. TheGeorgian Orthodox Church explicitly opposed such a pro-posal. In 2007, the presidents of the two countries discussedthe possibility of leaving the entire monastery to Georgia,while Azerbaijan keeps control over the high-altitude strate-gic positions. But, other than talking it over, the two sideshave not taken any step further in the process of identifyinga solution (Petriashvili & Ismayilov, 2006; Kazimov, 2011).

The Azerbaijani minority lives in compact numbers in theregions of Kvemo Kartli, Kaheti, and Mtskheta-Mtianetialong the border between Azerbaijan and Armenia. TheAzerbaijani population of Georgia counts approximately

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forces at the Gyumri base. Although the Russo-Georgianagreement stipulated that Russia would not transfer weapon-ry to the Armenian forces, there were no trustworthy meansto verify that Moscow abided by the obligations it hadundertaken (Socor, 2007). No doubt, Azerbaijan wouldrather have the whole military equipment transferred backto Russia. In 2011, the Azerbaijani ambassador to Georgiaspoke about the presumed danger of the economic coopera-tion between Armenia and Georgia and of the Armeniancommunity for the territorial integrity of Georgia. Theambassador called upon Georgia and Azerbaijan to joinefforts in opposing the Armenian policy in the region (ApaNews, 2011). While the appeal is not bound to change theposition of the Georgian government regarding Armenia,the discourse echoes the stances of some marginal social seg-ments in Georgia, as the public opinion surveys show. It isunlikely that anyone in Baku believes the Tbilisi governmentwill radically change its policy towards Armenia. Yet thisdiscourse probably signals an irritation in Baku with the effectof the pragmatic “resetting” in the relationship betweenArmenia and Georgia. Given these circumstances, Georgianeeds great diplomatic skill to navigate among the oftenconflicting aspirations of its neighbors in South Caucasus.

III. South Caucasus: Relationships with theRegional Powers

The regional processes do not result only from the rela-tionships between the three South-Caucasian republics. It isan area where significant regional actors such as the US, theEU, Russia, Turkey, and Iran engage in an economic, politi-cal, military, and cultural competition. At the same time, theCaucasian republics do their best to take advantage as muchas possible of this competition, in order to promote theirown national security agendas at the regional level.

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that there are many economic and social problems of theAzerbaijani minority in Georgia, so it participates, throughcompanies or foundations, in infrastructure projects andsocial programs implemented in the areas inhabited by theAzerbaijani ethnics (Today.Az, 2011). For instance, theAkord and Azerinshaat companies helped in the repairs tothe Telet – Samtskhe – Javaheti road. The “Heydar Aliyev”fund financed the repair or building of schools in KvemoKartli in 2009-2010 (MES Georgia, 2010). Although theproblem of the Azerbaijani minority has not been exploitedpolitically in Baku, it has a destabilizing potential on a sociallevel. In 2006, two papers of the Baku-located NationalAssociation of the Azerbaijani in Georgia, which fights forthe recognition of the Azerbaijani language as “the secondofficial language”, were suspended from publication (RFE,2009). In 2005, the Azerbaijani community protestedagainst the closing of the Sadakhlo market and demandedthat the central authorities reconsider the decision. Finally,the sustainability of the preeminently peaceful cohabitationof the Armenian and Azerbaijani communities in KvemoKartli could be put to a serious test by any future outburstof the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh.

Apart from the problems regarding the national minori-ties and the border demarcation, the Armenian factor maygenerate tensions in the bilateral relationships. Georgia facesthe increasingly difficult task of maintaining the balancebetween its political support for the territorial integrity ofAzerbaijan and facilitation of Armenia’s commercial transit.Given the joint cause for territorial integrity and coopera-tion in the energy field, Baku would like the balance tiltedin its favor. Although, in the early 1990s, tried unsuccess-fully to persuade Georgia to join the economic blockadeagainst Armenia, the authorities in Baku have generally tol-erated the trade exchanges between Armenia and Georgia.The 2007 evacuation of the military base in Akhalkalakigave rise to worries in Baku, since a part of the arsenal wasto be transferred to Armenia, in order to supply the Russian

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CSTO, Armenia actively supported the creation of a RapidReaction Force, so as to guarantee the organization’s swiftintervention in case of need.58 One of the exercises of theRapid Reaction Force took place in Rostov, Southern Russia,in 2010. Aside from its security guarantee, the CSTO offersthe possibility of purchasing Russian equipment at domes-tic-market prices or, in some cases, of having the equip-ments transferred free of charge. “NATO does not offer any-thing similar”59, a local expert points out the advantages ofbeing part of a different military alliance. Guaranteeing themilitary security is not limited, however, to the multilateralalliances within the CSTO. Armenia hosts two Russianmilitary bases at Gyumri and Yerevan, totaling about 4,000troops. There are also Russian border guards in Armenia,who protect the border with Turkey and Iran. In 2010,Armenia extended the presence of the Russian troops on itsterritory through 2044. According to the Yerevan authori-ties, following the agreement, the Russian forces in Armeniawill extend their activities beyond the mere protection of theformer Soviet Union’s border (Danielyan, 2010): “Russiahas undertaken to protect Armenia’s regional interests”60,an official explains the meaning of the agreement. Russiahas promised to supply weapons and to cooperate with theArmenian companies in the defense industry.

Although their country enjoys a double assurance fromRussia, Armenians have doubts as to the timing of Moscow’sintervention in the eventuality of the outbreak of hostilities:“The defense clause has never been put to the test […].Russia cannot afford not to intervene, because it would loseits credibility, [but] when is it going to intervene: beforeor after a UN Security Council decision, after we have lostpart of the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh or immediatelyafter the outbreak of the conflict?”61, an expert wonders.

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58 Interview with an official, Yerevan, June 2011.59 Interview with an expert, Yerevan, June 2011.60 Interview with an official, Yerevan, June 2011.61 Interview with an expert, Yerevan, June 2011.

III.1. Armenia: Variable complementarity

Armenia’s foreign policy pursues several major objec-tives: guarantee defense in case of an Azerbaijani conven-tional military attack; keeping the status quo or solving theNagorno-Karabakh conflict by observing the nations’ rightto self-determination; breaking the blockade imposed byAzerbaijan and Turkey; attracting foreign investments andinternational financial aid for economic development, and,last but not least, international recognition of the Armeniangenocide. To carry out these objectives, Armenia’s foreignpolicy follows the principle of “complementarity”, whichrequires that Armenia develop close relationships with themain regional actors, such that their synergy contributes tothe sectoral promotion of its foreign policy objectives. Eco-nomically, complementarity expresses Armenia’s economicdependence on foreign donors. Regarding military security,complementarity is the answer to its dependence on Russia.

III.1.1. Russia

Among the partnerships and alliances developed byArmenia, that with Russia is vitally important. Russia is oneof the active co-presidents of the Minsk Group and an indis-pensable actor in the negotiation process concerningNagorno-Karabakh. Moreover, the alliance is conditionedby Armenia’s economic, military, and energy dependence onRussia. The alliance with Russia is supported by 95% of theArmenian citizens (International Republican Institute, 2008a).

Militarily, Armenia is part of the Collective SecurityTreaty Organization (CSTO), which theoretically guaranteesthe country’s security, since the organization is supposed tointervene if a member-country is subject to aggression. ToYerevan, “CSTO is Russia. In case of aggression, it is Russia’smilitary assistance that we expect, not that of Belarus or ofthe Central Asian republics.”57 During its presidency of the

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57 Interview with an expert, Yerevan, June 2011.

the Armenian railroads for thirty years, with a commitmentto invest $570 million in their modernization. In Yerevan,Rusal’s $70 million investment in the technological upgradeof the local aluminum plant is considered to be a model ofsuccess. Consequently, Russia has remained Armenia’s maininvestor in 2010, at the level of $270 million (Mediamax,2011). The economic crisis has hit Armenia hard. In 2010,the Russian government announced that it would grantArmenia a $500 million loan for macro-economic stabiliza-tion. In 2011, Moscow and Yerevan reached an agreementfor a $400 million loan from the anti-crisis fund of theEurasian Economic Community (EurAsEc), an organizationin which Armenia is an observer (Hayrumyan, 2011). It isintended that the money will be invested in the moderniza-tion of the Nairit chemical plant, which has struggled toovercome the effects of the global economic turmoil.

The dependence on Russia diminishes the autonomy ofthe Yerevan authorities externally and has a significant impactdomestically. Russia has put pressure on Armenia to cancelits participation in the 2009 NATO exercise in Georgia64

and in the 2011 session of the NATO Parliamentary As-sembly in Tbilisi65. It seems also that the list of governmentinstitutions in Armenia, to which EU advisors have beenassigned, was overseen by Moscow (Popescu, 2009). It wasat Moscow’s request, as well, that the diameter of the gaspipeline between Armenia and Iran was reduced.66 Yerevanwas “unprepared” in the summer of 2011 to sign severalagreements on energy with Iran, because Moscow opposedit.67 The alliance with Russia has also side effects for Armenia,which creates tensions in the bilateral relations. “The rela-tions are far from being warm”68, a diplomat confirms. Therepresentatives of the business community complain that

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64 Interview with a NATO official.65 Interview with an expert, Yerevan, June 2011.66 Interview with an expert, Yerevan, June 2011.67 Interview with an expert, Yerevan, June 2011.68 Interview with a diplomat.

The Russian side pointed out that it would intervene at theright moment. This ambiguity generates suspicion and deter-mines Armenia to make sure that, at least in the first stagesof a possible conflict it will be able to fight on its own.62

Economically, Armenia is a prisoner of the conflictualrelations between Georgia and Russia and the 2008 warbetween the two countries proved it perfectly well (Marke-donov, 2011). Such a war leaves Armenia with only oneopen frontier and one commercial transit route — throughIran. Beyond these aspects, Armenia is interested in havingaccess to the Russian market, gas import, financial support,and investments. Russia is Armenia’s second largest tradepartner, with roughly 21% of the exchanges (EU Commis-sion, 2011b). It remains the favorite destination for theapproximately two million Armenian seasonal workers.Armenians working abroad sent home $1.3 billion in 2010,wich makes 13% of the country’s GDP (Danielyan, 2011).Experts estimate that 75% of the remittances originate inRussia.63 Armenia heavily relies (80% of the gas consump-tion) on the Russian gas deliveries. Gazprom owns 80% ofArmenia’s gas distribution network. Moreover, the Russianstate monopoly has taken control of the Armenian segmentof the gas pipeline Tabriz – Ersakh, which connects Armeniawith Iran. In exchange, Armenia pays the lowest price in theCIS for the Russian natural gas it imports, namely $210 fora thousand cubic meters (Armtown.Com, 2011a). Russia isalso ready to take part in the construction of the new reac-tors at the Metsamor nuclear power plant, which are meantto replace the old ones scheduled to be shut down by 2017.

Aiming for economic development in conditions ofregional semi-isolation, Armenia is looking for long-terminvestments and financial support. Since the early 2000s, ithas accepted a massive penetration of Russian capital in sec-tors of strategic importance: telecommunications, railroads,finances and banking, heavy industry. Russia has taken over

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62 Interview with an expert, Yerevan, June 2011.63 Interview with an expert, Yerevan, June 2011.

through Iran is not safe either, because of the tensioned rela-tionships between Tehran, on the one hand, and Washingtonand Jerusalem, on the other hand.

In spite of religious differences, Armenia cooperates wellwith Iran and does not perceive it as a threat for its nation-al security.70 In the most recent surveys, 37% of the peoplequestioned see Iran as Armenia’s main partner and only 5%perceive it as an enemy (International Republican Institute,2008a). This feeling of safety derives, among other things,from the favorable treatment of the Armenian minority inIran, that counts between 40,000 and 80,000 people. TheArmenians in Iran are one of the most powerful religiousminorities, which is confirmed by two seats allocated tothem in the Iranian parliament. The Armenians’ positiveattitude is also based on the intensive tourist exchanges:Armenia is a popular destination for Iranians. Thousands ofIranian tourists visit Armenia for the Novruz Bairam holi-day and during the summer vacations. In 2011, 28,000Iranians came to Armenia for the religious festival of NovruzBairam (News.Am, 2011b): “For the Iranians, Armenia isEurope; they can celebrate here in ways the rules in Iran donot permit”71, an analyst explains the Iranians’ interest forArmenia. There are regular flights between the two coun-tries. As yet, however, they are not connected by railroad. InSoviet times, the connection was made through Azerbaijan.In 2009, Yerevan and Tehran agreed to build a railroad thatwould connect them directly and go all the way to thePersian Gulf. The costs of the project are estimated at $1.8billion. In 2010, Armenia launched an active campaign ofidentifying foreign investors for this project (RFE, 2010c).

The compatibility between the two countries is beingstrengthened by the feeling of regional isolation (Coene,2010, p. 180) that Armenia and Iran are trying to overcome,also through mutual help. After the suspension of military

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70 Interview with an official, Yerevan, June 2011.71 Interview with an expert, Yerevan, June 2011.

the Russian businessmen export corruption, which adds tothe already high level of corruption in Armenia. They oftendo not stick to the obligations stipulated in the investmentplans, so the companies do not function at full capacity, ortheir activity is suspended (Hayrumyan, 2010). The Courtof Accounts evaluation regarding the activity of the Russiancompany GPM Gold, which controls the gold mines in Sodkand Megradzor is illustrative in this respect (RFE, 2010b).The activity of the Russian recruiting centers in Armenia,that offer Russian citizenship, provided the beneficiariessettle permanently in the non-European sections of Russia,has generated numerous protests among the representativesof the civil society, in the mass- and social media. Anotherinitiative that caused irritation was the suggestion to intro-duce Russian as “a language of inter-ethnic communication”in Armenia, where almost 98% of the population is Armenian.Also, the bill on schools with teaching in a foreign language,that generated a heated public debate, was seen by many asa means to authorize schools where teaching is done inRussian. Also, the news about Armenian workers killed inRussia on xenophobic grounds did by no means improve theimage of Russia in Armenia.69

III.1.2. Iran

The adverse effects of its alliance with Russia pushArmenia towards finding a counter-balance to its depend-ence on Moscow. Iran is Armenia’s closest neighbor thatYerevan looks to in its efforts to diversify the economicoptions and to guarantee a favorable position in the Nagor-no-Karabakh conflict. Iran provides 25 to 30% of Armenia’scommercial transit and is a major source of consumer goods.

Thus, Iran is Armenia’s fourth trade partner, accountingfor 5.6% of the total commercial exchanges (EU Commission,2011b). However, like the transit through Georgia, the one

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69 Interview with experts, Yerevan, 2011.

(PanArmenian.Net, 2011). Also, the idea of the constructionof an oil pipeline between the two countries was revived.However, the visit of the Iranian president to Armenia, dur-ing which these agreements were to be finalized and signed,did not take place in the summer of 2011. Tehran postponedit invoking problems in Yerevan. Besides Moscow’s alreadymentioned influence and the domestic calculations of theIranian president that contributed to the delaying of thevisit, it seems that Washington does not sympathize eitherwith certain projects that would allow Tehran to break itsinternational isolation.74

III.1.3. The US

Although placed far enough from South Caucasus, theUS is a heavy piece in the political, diplomatic, and eco-nomic strategy of Armenia. The US is home of a large andinfluential Armenian Diaspora, it is one of the chairs of theMinsk Group, and it is an important foreign donor for theeconomic development for Armenia. In 2010, the US wasthe seventh trade partner of Armenia, accounting for 4.1%of the total commercial exchanges (EU Commission, 2011b).Over 8% of the remittances coming to Armenia originate inthe US. Since 2006, Armenia received a total of $235.6 mil-lion in assistance funds through the Millennium ChallengeCorporation, but the 2008 post-election violence in Yerevandetermined the US to suspend financing for the coveredprojects. Even in those circumstances, Armenia is still one ofthe states receiving the highest financial US aid per capita.The American assistance granted to Armenia between 1992and 2005 exceeds $1 billion (Nichol, 2011, p. 27). In 2011,the US Congress voted for Armenia: $44 million in economicassistance, $3.5 million in military assistance, and $450,000in military training. The US also allocates annually moneyfor the financing of the reconstruction and development

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74 Interview with a diplomat.

transit through Georgia, Iran offered, at least once, free pas-sage through its air space for the military cargo that wasmeant to reach the base at Gyumri. The deterioration of theRusso-Iranian relations after the approval by the UNSecurity Council of the sanctions against Iran put Armeniain a difficult position. Experts do not exclude the possibili-ty that the Armenian side tries to mediate the approval byTehran of the next cargo for the Gyumri base.72 Yerevan alsoappreciates Iran’s position regarding Nagorno-Karabakh.Iran does not favor the change of the status quo, being con-cerned about the implications on its security in case Armeniawithdraws even partially and international peace-keepingforces, which might include soldiers from the US or fromEU-member states, are deployed in the proximity of its bor-ders.73 The telephone talks between the president of Iranand his counterparts from Azerbaijan and Armenia on theeve of the Kazan summit confirm Tehran’s concerns regard-ing the regional effects of the negotiations carried outbetween Baku, Yerevan, and Moscow.

The cooperation with Iran in the field of energy is impor-tant to Armenia for three reasons: the supply of gas thatwould cover demand for a short period in case the deliver-ies from Georgia are cut off; the gradual reduction of thecountry’s dependence on Russia; and providing fuel for thearmed forces in case hostilities are resumed in Nagorno-Kara-bakh. Armenia and Iran are connected through two electricpower transmission lines. Part of the imported Iranian gas isbeing used to generate and transport electric power fromArmenia to Iran. In the spring of 2011, during the inter-gov-ernmental meeting in Tehran, a series of agreements in thefields of infrastructure and energy were prepared: the con-struction of an electric power transmission line and the con-struction of the hydroelectric power station on the river Aras

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72 Interview with experts, Yerevan, June 2011.73 Interview with an official, Yerevan, June 2011; interview with

an expert, Yerevan, June 2011.

assistance, and gaining experience. Armenia managed toestablish a regular strategic dialogue with the US and signedthe Individual Partnership Action Plan with NATO. WithAmerican assistance, the Center for Humanitarian Deminingfor the training of experts in land mine disarming wasopened in Armenia. In 2010, for the first time, Armeniahosted a NATO exercise on its territory. The first US-Arme-nian military exercises are also planned in the near future.Armenia sent 46 troops in Iraq and 45 in Afghanistan.In 2011, it increased its military presence in Afghanistansubstantially, by sending a contingent of 81 troops to thetheater of operations. All these do not aim to breakArmenia’s alliance with Russia. Given the current status quoin the region, a break is inconceivable. However, wishing toexpand the maneuvering space in their foreign policy, “theauthorities in Yerevan are signaling to Russia that Armeniahas other options as well, by which to guarantee its militarysecurity”76. Yet the question remains: how serious are suchsignals for Russia, which has at its disposal a variety of meansto obstruct a radical change in the course of Armenia’s foreignpolicy?

III.1.4. The EU

In an attempt to galvanize its diversification strategy,Armenia has lately turned its attention towards the EU.The economic relations between Armenia and the EU haverapidly grown since 2005-2006. Armenia’s inclusion in theEuropean Neighborhood Policy and the signing of theEU-Armenia action plan have accelerated this process.Consequently, Yerevan sees the EU as increasingly impor-tant for macro-financial stability and the economic develop-ment of Armenia. As an observer acknowledges: “When wespeak of the EU, the first question that comes to mind is ifand how much money they’ll give us”77. The latest public

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76 Interview with an expert, Yerevan, June 2011.77 Interview with an expert, Yerevan, June 2011.

projects in Nagorno-Karabakh. 2011 was no exception: theUS provided $8 million in assistance programs for the region(RFE, 2010d). Between 1998 and 2008, the US grantedNagorno-Karabakh humanitarian aid worth a total of $32million (Nichol, 2011, p. 27).

The Armenian Diaspora in the US is instrumental toYerevan’s efforts to obtain financial assistance during thebudget debates in the American legislative, to block orreduce a similar assistance for Azerbaijan, to prevent therepel of section 907 of the Freedom Support Act applied tothe latter, to block certain inconvenient diplomatic assign-ments (e.g., the confirmation procedure of the current USambassador in Azerbaijan), to obtain the recognition of theArmenian Genocide. Besides lobbying in Washington, theArmenian community contributes directly to the economicdevelopment by financing infrastructure projects inArmenia. However, the interests of the Diaspora and thoseof the authorities in Yerevan do not always overlap. In 2008and 2009, the leadership in Yerevan was much more favor-able to the pressure exerted by the US upon Turkey for thenormalization of relations with Armenia. The ArmenianDiaspora in the US suspected that Yerevan might slow downits campaign for the recognition of the Armenian Genocideonce it has reestablished relations with Ankara. Moreover,representatives of the Diaspora who wished to invest inArmenia complained about the high level of corruption andthe administrative obstacles that hinder the development ofbusinesses.75

In the context of changing US security priorities after theterrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001 and the two majormilitary campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq, Armenia reac-tivated its military cooperation with the US. A similar atti-tude was adopted by Yerevan towards NATO. The Armenianauthorities perceived these developments as an opportunityfor diversifying their security options, receiving technical

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75 Interview with an expert, Yerevan, June 2011.

European integration, however, is seen differently in Yerevanthan in Kiev, Chiºinãu, or Tbilisi. Asked about the country’sEuropean integration, an official explained: “We do notknock at the EU’s door, as our neighbors do. We do not rushinto it. European integration is a lengthy process duringwhich, as we solve our domestic problems, we will graduallyreach a level of development close to that of the EU-mem-ber states. Only then will we determine whether it is worthbecoming a full member or not.”79 On the one hand, such apositioning with regard to integration confirms a realisticassessment of Armenia’s chances to become an EU memberin the foreseeable future. It seems that Yerevan is relativelysatisfied with the EU’s offer to Eastern neighbors and triesto extract as much as possible from what is on the table. Onthe other hand, such an approach shows that Yerevan isinterested in technical cooperation (the introduction oftechnical standards and regulations), but also in preventingan excessive EU intrusion in its domestic affairs by keepinga certain distance. As a local analyst remarked, “the politi-cal leadership avoids assuming too many obligations in itsrelationship with the EU; the membership in the Council ofEurope and the problems related to human rights alreadygive our leaders enough headaches”80.

Armenia’s cooperation with the EU is not confined, how-ever, to economic aspects only. As a confirmation, in 2010Armenia aligned with 28 out of the 44 EU foreign and secu-rity policy statements, opened for third countries support(EU Commission, 2011e). Armenia’s cooperation with theEU in the field of foreign and security policies is directlyconnected to its dispute with Azerbaijan and difficult rela-tions with Turkey. “For us, the EU is a union of Christianstates”81, an official declared. Without mentioning Turkeyand Azerbaijan, Armenia seems to suggest that those two

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79 Interview with an official, Yerevan, June 2011.80 Interview with an expert, Yerevan, June 2011.81 Interview with an official, Yerevan, June 2011.

opinion barometer shows that 29% of the respondents viewthe EU as Armenia’s number one partner (InternationalRepublican Institute, 2008a).

Armenia receives significant financial assistance from theEU. Between 2007 and 2010, the EU allocated 98.4 millioneuros; for the years 2011-2013, a budget of 157.3 millioneuros is approved, plus another 40 million euros that can bedrawn by Armenia from other EU-financed programs (Nava-sardian, 2011, p. 65). In 2011, the EU and Armenia signeda memorandum for the granting of a macro-financial aid of100 million euros aimed to overcome the effects of theglobal economic crisis — 65 million as a loan and 35 millionas a grant (Eteris, 2011). The EU also finances programs forthe improvement of the nuclear security in Armenia: it hasoffered to partially cover the costs of closing down thenuclear power plant in Metsamor. Moreover, the EU is thesecond largest investor in Armenia after Russia. EU-memberstates, France and the Netherlands, are second and third topinvestors in Armenia in 2010, with $146.7 million and$64.3 million, respectively (Mediamax, 2011). Economical-ly, the EU is Armenia’s main trade partner accounting for32.1% of the total commercial exchanges in 2010 (EUCommission, 2011b). This was due, in part, to the 2009extension of the Generalized System of Preferences Plus(GSP+) to Armenia, which facilitated the access of thecountry’s products on the European market. In 2008, theEU commissioned a feasibility study concerning the creationof a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA)with Armenia.

In Yerevan, almost all political forces support closerrelations with the EU: “There is a genuine interest for theEU in Yerevan”78, a diplomat confirms. This interest is con-firmed by official documents. The national security strategyadopted in 2007 mentions the European integration amongArmenia’s objectives (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2007).

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78 Interview with a diplomat.

III.1.5. Turkey

The first thing many ordinary people in Yerevan do whenthey get up in the morning is to look towards Turkey andadmire the magnificent Ararat, the mountain that bearsdeep historical and symbolical significance to all Armenians.Although their eyes are drawn to Turkey, there are manythings that separate Armenians from their closest Westernneighbor. In the early 1990s, Yerevan and Ankara foundthemselves on the opposite sides of the barricade in theNagorno-Karabakh conflict. The war and the subsequentclosing of the borders with Turkey and Azerbaijan revivedthe fear of the Turkish threat deeply rooted in the collectivememory of the Armenians. The campaign for the recognitionof the Armenian Genocide and references in the ArmenianConstitution to the Eastern provinces of Turkey as WesternArmenia have farther broadened the split between Yerevanand Ankara.

Starting in 2008, Armenia has actively sought to overcomethe political animosities. The Russo-Georgian war accelerat-ed this process that would have been impossible if bothstates had not made small steps towards the normalizationof their relations. Ankara gave the first signs of rapproche-ment in 2005-2007 by restoring several Armenian churchespreviously in poor condition. Among those, was the Akdamarchurch, situated on one of the Lake Van islands. Armenianofficials took part in the opening ceremony and the Turkishauthorities subsequently allowed only one liturgy per year.Yerevan seized the opportunity and invited the Turkishpresident to Armenia for the official soccer game betweenthe two national teams. In September 2008, the presidentof Turkey paid a historic visit to Yerevan, being the firstTurkish head of state to have ever visited Armenia. Almosta year later, Armenia and Turkey signed protocols on estab-lishing diplomatic relations and reopening the border betweenthe two countries. However, the process of normalizationgot stuck in 2010, when both parts gave up ratifying the

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states have no place in the EU. Alternatively, both have tosolve their conflicts with Armenia first, in order to take fur-ther steps towards integration in the EU. Confirming thisposition, Yerevan “expressed a certain disappointment withthe the fact that overcoming certain historic problems andthe opening of the Turkish-Armenian border were not laiddown by the EU as preconditions for accession talks withTurkey” (Navasardian, 2011, p. 64). Although the EU doesnot formally take part in the negotiations regarding Nagor-no-Karabakh, France, an EU-member state, co-presides theMinsk Group. There have been suggestions that France bereplaced in the Minsk Group by an EU diplomat. Armenia,having a privileged relationship with France, which is hometo an influential Armenian Diaspora, opposed this proposal(Popescu, 2011, p. 105). To conclude, the Armenian diplo-macy objectives in its interaction with the EU institutionsare to preserve the status quo in the negotiations and to blockcertain documents or initiatives that would put Armenia inan unfavorable position with regard to Azerbaijan. Usually,the EU tries to keep its neutrality with regard to both coun-tries, so the EU documents often contain statements thatsatisfy Yerevan and irritate Baku or the other way around.For instance, Armenia had a critical reaction to the resolutioncalling upon the EU to develop a strategy regarding SouthCaucasus, which was passed by the European Parliament in2010. The document demands explicitly that the Armenianmilitary forces be withdrawn from the occupied territoriesof Azerbaijan (EU Parliament, 2010), actually reiteratingthe message of the 2008 resolution of the UN GeneralAssembly. At the same time, the passage in which the EU iscalled upon to offer humanitarian aid to the population ofNagorno-Karabakh is in accordance with Armenia’s effortsto de-isolate the region.

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22% remain undecided. In another opinion survey, this timein Armenia, 31% of the people questioned were in favor ofincreased contacts with Turkey, almost as many were againstit, while 40% were undecided (Armtown.Com, 2011b). InArmenia, the trade arguments prevail when it comes to thereopening of the border. Many see it as a huge opportunityto explore the market in Eastern Turkey. This line of reason-ing is mirrored in the surveys. According to a public opinionbarometer, 41% of the respondents believe the reopening ofthe country’s border with Turkey will have an immediatepositive economic impact on Armenia, while 36% state theyare neutral or unsure of the positive effects (RFE, 2011b).

In spite of the closed border and the lack of diplomaticrelations, there are commercial, humanitarian, and occasion-ally political exchanges that push Yerevan and Ankara dayby day towards the normalization of their relationship.Turkey was Armenia’s sixth trade partner in 2010, account-ing for 4.4% of the total commercial exchanges (EU Com-mission, 2011b). Businessmen estimate that the bilateraltrade exchanges might double if the border is reopened(Markedonov, 2011). There is air communication betweenYerevan and Istanbul. Between 40,000 and 70,000 Armenianswork in Turkey. Armenians have no problems with going onvacation to Turkey: about 50,000 of them visited Antalya in2009 (Ziflioglu, 2010). Neither do Turkish tourists avoidArmenia. There are also bilateral cultural events: in 2011,a Turkish film week was organized for the second time inthe Armenian city of Vanadzor. There are also many con-tacts between civil society and the experts’ community thatprovides the chance to have an informal dialogue betweenofficials and opinion makers from the two countries. InYerevan, some experts affirmed that the bilateral talks aboutthe normalization of relations have not been suspended;they have just been moved to a different level. It seems thatduring such talks the two sides discussed the possibility ofpartially implementing the protocols, without their being

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protocols and blamed the failure on each other. It should benoticed that neither Armenia, nor Turkey withdrew signa-tures on the protocols. Therefore they did not put an end tothe process but only froze the ratification procedure.

Although they failed in the first attempt in 2010, Arme-nia and Turkey overcame an important psychological stage.“The problem is no longer if, but when the relationships aregoing to be normalized”82, an influent local expert remarked.In the spirit of its policy of “zero problems” with the neigh-bors, Turkey went on with the restoration of the Armenianchurches and, in 2010, removed Armenia from the list ofcountries that pose a national security threat. The process isnot a linear one, however. Armenia goes on with its interna-tional campaign for recognition of the Armenian Genocide.In response, the Turkish prime-minister threatens to expelthe Armenian workers from the country and demands thatthe monument of the Turkish-Armenian reconciliation inKars be pulled down. But most analysts believe the processcannot be stopped. A keen observer of the region remarks:“Today, it is not the Turks and the Armenians, but theArmenians among themselves and the Turks among them-selves who argue as to what is to be done for the reconcilia-tion [between Turks and Armenians]” (Markedonov, 2011).

For obvious reasons, the process meets with oppositionat both political and social levels. An official in Yerevan con-cludes rather pessimistically: “The policy of ‘zero problems’with the neighbors means for Turkey ‘zero neighbors’”83.Socially as well, there is resistance to the normalizationprocess. But the figures are not as discouraging as they shouldbe, given the mostly negative mutual perception both Turksand Armenians have. In Turkey, according to an opinionsurvey, 50% of the people questioned are against thereopening of the border, 27% give affirmative answers, while

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82 Interview with an expert, Yerevan, June 2011.83 Interview with an official, Yerevan, June 2011.

III.2.1. Turkey

Probably the closest regional relations Azerbaijan has aredeveloped with Turkey. Azerbaijan and Turkey are connect-ed through a multilateral web of humanitarian, economic,social, and political contacts that strengthen the relation-ship. On a political level, there are many inter-governmentalmeetings and consultations between the two sides. Bakufeels comfortable in its relationships with Ankara, becausethe Turkish side avoids any criticism regarding the domesticpolitical developments in Azerbaijan (Musabekov, 2011).In the energy sector, two Azerbaijani oil and gas exportpipelines have two Turkish cities — Erzurum and Ceyhan,respectively — as their final destinations. The railroad thatwill connect Azerbaijan and Turkey via Georgia is underconstruction. Turkey is Azerbaijan’s second biggest tradepartner, with 8.2% of the total trade volume in 2010 (EUCommission, 2011d). Moreover, Turkey is the fifth greatestinvestor in Azerbaijan, at 3.9% of the total investments in2010 (News.Az, 2011e). Over the last few years, Azerbaijanhas shown interest in the Turkish energy market and hasmade several significant investments. For instance, SOCARhas purchased 51% of the Turkish petrochemical plantPetkim shares and intends to invest about $100 million inthe development of energy projects (News.Az, 2011f). Thetotal volume of Azerbaijani investments in Turkey reaches$4 billion and Baku plans further investments of about $6billion (Kardas, 2011). To many Azerbaijanis who want tostudy or work, Turkey is an attractive destination. From1992 to 2010, more than 5,000 Azerbaijani citizens studiedin Turkish universities thanks to the scholarships providedby the Turkish government. Some also chose to study inTurkey at their own expense. More and more parents sendtheir children to Turkish kindergartens and primary andhigh schools in Baku (Trend, 2011b). The network ofTurkish educational units in Azerbaijan is only surpassed bythe similar institutions where teaching is done in Russian(Musabekov, 2011). In an opinion survey, Turkey ranks third

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ratified (e.g., opening the border for trucks alone, several daysa week).84 The message of the Turkish premier, after winningthe 2011 parliamentary elections, about the continuation ofthe dialogue with Yerevan (News.Ad, 2011d) confirmedthat, in spite of the many obstacles, the process will notstop. These developments, if ultimately successful, will havea major impact on the economic and security architecture ofSouth Caucasus. For Turkey, however, the mission seemsextremely difficult, not least because of Azerbaijan’s opposi-tion to the unconditional normalization of relations betweenTurkey and Armenia and of the close connections existingbetween Ankara and Baku.

III.2. Azerbaijan: Strategic independence throughmulti-vectorism

The prime objective of Azerbaijan’s foreign policy is toreestablish its territorial integrity. The country’s externalstrategy also seeks access to technologies and aims to boostoil and gas exports, by multiplying the delivery routestowards the international market. The energy factor is thusinstrumentalized domestically and externally to achieve thecountry’s reintegration. The financial independence guaran-teed by the substantial income that the energy sector gener-ates offers Azerbaijan a wide autonomy in its relationshipswith the regional powers. Consequently, Azerbaijan pursuesa multi-vectorial foreign policy that 41% of its citizens sup-port (Puls-R/Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2010). The foreignpolicy orientations often oscillate in order to loosen thepressure of a regional power or to extract concessions fromthe regional actors. Although it guarantees a certain degreeof strategic independence, such a course is susceptible tocyclical crises in Azerbaijan’s relations with its partners.

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84 Interview with an expert, Yerevan, June 2011.

without the Turkish side collecting any transit fees. Directflights from Istanbul to Nakhichevan have been opened.Baku and Ankara discuss the possibility of connecting Nakhi-chevan to the Baku – Tbilisi – Kars railroad. Moreover,Azerbaijan’s military presence in Nakhichevan has beenstrengthened with Turkey’s substantial assistance (Abbasov,2010). Given the tensioned relationships between Azerbai-jan and Iran, Turkey tries to mediate between the two statesin the spirit of its new policy towards its neighbors. In 2011,it housed the trilateral meeting of the foreign ministers inorder to revamp the dialogue between Baku and Tehran.

Yet the strategic Turkish-Azerbaijani partnership is notwithout difficulties. Turkey’s attempt at normalizing rela-tions with Armenia was perceived in a very negative way inBaku. Seen from Azerbaijan, the eventual re-opening of theTurkish-Armenian border undermines drastically the chancesto force Yerevan to an agreement with Baku. Besides chang-ing its discourse on Turkey, Azerbaijan has slightly changeddirection in its energy policy as well. This meant the revisit-ed gas prices for Turkey and involvement in the AGRIproject that excludes not only Russia, but Turkey as well.Azerbaijan’s message to Turkey was, essentially: “Without us,you can not be an energy hub”87. The Nabucco project onlyfueled the differences between Baku and Ankara. Azerbaijanrejected Turkey’s offer to buy an entire volume of gas withthe aim to re-sell it on the European market. Although theAzerbaijani citizens enjoy, since 2008, a visa-free regimewith Turkey, a similar treatment is not being applied to theTurkish citizens visiting Azerbaijan. Ankara exerts pressureso that Azerbaijan liberalize its visa regime with Turkey.Azerbaijan, however, invokes security concerns (drug traf-ficking, migration etc.) and a similar pressure coming fromIran to lift visas for Iranian citizens. Experts invoke domes-tic motives as well: “The regime is concerned by Turkey’s

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(7.4%) in the top preferences of the Azerbaijanis who wouldgo to work abroad (Puls-R/Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2010).All this is reflected in the society’s favorable attitude towardsTurkey. Thus, 86.4% of the 2010 respondents declared thatTurkey is a friendly state for Azerbaijan (ibidem).

The favorable attitude towards Turkey can be accountedfor also by the assistance this country offered Azerbaijanduring and in the aftermath of the war in Nagorno-Karabakhand after its adjournment. Several NGOs in Turkey providedhumanitarian aid to the IDPs from Nagorno-Karabakh, theamount up to now reaching $6 million (News.Az, 2011).After the war, the military cooperation intensified, with atotal help granted until 2010 of over $200 million, accord-ing to the Turkish Ministry of Defense (Artsakank News,2011). Turkey trained Azerbaijani officers and soldiers in itseducational institutions and military training facilities. Thetwo sides cooperate in several common projects in thedefense industry. Besides importing weaponry from Turkey,Baku and Ankara have set up joint ventures for the produc-tion of ammunition and military equipment for the Azer-baijani armed forces (News.Az, 2011g). In 2010, Ankaraand Baku strengthen their relationship by concluding anagreement on Strategic Partnership and Mutual Support.They committed to offer each other support in case theirnational security is threatened. The document, however,does not offer Azerbaijan the same kind of security guaran-tees that Armenia enjoys through CSTO.85 In case of war,Azerbaijan expects to receive indirect political support andmilitary assistance from Turkey.86

Turkey plays a crucial role in Azerbaijan’s strategy ofde-isolation and guaranteeing security for Nakhichevan.The construction of a gas pipeline from Turkey to Nakhi-chevan began in 2010; plus, Azerbaijan and Turkey signeda contract for the gas supplies to the Azerbaijani enclave

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85 Interview with an expert, Baku, June 2011.86 Interview with an expert, Baku, June 2011. 87 Interview with an expert, Baku, June 2011.

the rapprochement between Moscow and Baku. Russia isAzerbaijan’s third trade partner, accounting for 7.4% of thetotal commercial exchanges in 2010 (EU Commission,2011d). It is also second on the list of preferred workingdestinations for the Azerbaijanis willing to work abroad(Puls-R/Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2010). According to esti-mates, there are between 1.3 and 1.8 million Azerbaijanis inRussia, who send home annually from $1.8 to $2.4 billion(Valiyev, 2011). A limitation on the access of Azerbaijanimigrants to the Russian labor market would have a hugenegative social impact, putting the Baku government intoa difficult situation.

The growing importance of the Russian vector in Azerbai-jan’s foreign policy contributed to the removing of certainproblems from the bilateral agenda. In 2010, Azerbaijanand Russia signed a terrestrial border delimitation agree-ment, in addition to the 2002 one on the delimitation ofthe border between the two states in the Caspian Sea. Onthat occasion, Russia announced that the issue of two villagesin Northern Azerbaijan — Uryanoba and Khrakhoba —,considered to be temporary Russian territory (Republic ofDagestan), had been solved: the two communities hadreturned under the jurisdiction of the Baku authorities(News.Az, 2011h). Solving the problem of the two villageswas important for the Baku government, since it is concernedby the occasional revendications of the Lezgin minority inNorthern Azerbaijan, which often uses Moscow as a platformto launch political messages. Azerbaijan hosts a radar stationin Gabala and leases it to Russia in exchange for $7 millionannually. About 1,000 Russian troops serve at the station.The agreement expires in 2012, but the two sides havealready begun a preliminary round of negotiations to extendit. Russia has offered to invest in the modernization of theradar. It is very likely that Azerbaijan will extend the termof leasing by another five or ten years.90 It may very well be

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growing political and economic influence in Azerbaijan”88,an analyst unveils the concerns otherwise concealed by theofficials. Although Turkey managed to repair its relationshipwith Azerbaijan in 2010, the bitter taste left by the former’sattempt at unconditionally normalizing relations withArmenia remained. It is expected in Baku that Turkey willgo on with its dialogue with Armenia after the elections.89

In such circumstances, it may very well be that Azerbaijanwill make use of sectorial cooperation with Russia to divertthis process.

III.2.2. Russia

During the 2008 Russo-Georgian war, the Azerbaijanileadership reacted with moderation. Baku refrained fromcriticizing Russia openly. That Georgia’s actions were inconformity with the international law was announced bythe spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Baku,not by some high-ranking official. The protests in front ofthe Russian embassy in Baku were brief, because of the law-and-order forces’ intervention. At the same time, the 2008military conflict and the negotiations between Turkey andArmenia created the necessary conditions for a rapproche-ment between Moscow and Baku. Russia’s role in the MinskGroup and the reactivation of the negotiations by Moscowdetermined Azerbaijan, which is opposed to the current sta-tus quo in Nagorno-Karabakh, to accomodate Russia’sinterests, without, however, crossing the line imposed by amulti-vectorial foreign policy.

The compatibility between the political models (sovereigndemocracies) and the specific of the economies (petro-states),as well as the Azerbaijani president’s multiple personal tieswith Russia (he studied in Moscow) facilitated this process.The economic interests and migratory flows contributed to

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88 Interview with an expert, Baku, June 2011.89 Interview with an expert, Baku, June 2011. 90 Interview with an expert, Baku, June 2011.

(Puls-R/Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2010). But the Azerbaijanisociety is polarized when it comes to Russia. In the sameopinion poll, almost 17% of the respondents identified Russiaas an enemy state (ibidem). Undoubtedly — and given theRussian support for Armenia in the Nagorno-Karabakh con-flict —, Russia’s image in Azerbaijan has further deteriorat-ed after the Georgian war, the population, being preponder-ently sympathetic with the Georgians.92 A useful indicatoris the level of popular support for the Russian-sponsoredintegration processes inside CIS. From 2006 to 2010, theAzerbaijanis’ support for integration in the CIS droppedfrom about 24% to 15% (Puls-R/Friedrich Ebert Stiftung,2010).

Azerbaijan’s pragmatic attitude towards Russia was putto the test in several conflicting situations. In 2009, theinformation in the media about the $800 million worth ofmilitary equipment transferred from Russia to Armeniacaused indignation in Azerbaijan. The Baku governmentwas disappointed, since the Kremlin, as a result of the 2008rapprochement, had promised to provide extra-support toAzerbaijan (Ismailzade, 2009). Yet, while mediating the talksbetween Yerevan and Baku, the Kremlin was busy to preservethe military balance, against the interests of Azerbaijan.The extension, in 2010, of the Russian military presence inArmenia was also received without enthusiasm in Baku.Commenting on the Russian military policy in South Cau-casus, an Azerbaijani high-ranking official pointed out that“the time has come to replace the battle tanks with oil tanks,in other words to substitute the military presence with theeconomic one” (Aztag, 2011). During 2008, there were sev-eral xenophobic violent attacks against Azerbaijani citizensin the suburbs of Moscow. The local media widely reportedon these crimes, causing public outcry in Azerbaijan. Underthe public opinion pressure, the Baku officials brought upthe question of the security of the Azerbaijani citizens in

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that this prolongation of the agreement will be the politicalpayback for the modern Russian weaponry supplied toAzerbaijan in 2010. Some experts think that Azerbaijan’sjoining the Non-Aligned Movement is in direct connectionwith the regional post-2008 dynamics. It seems that Bakuwanted to signal in this way, especially to Moscow, that itdoes not seek membership of military alliances, neither ofNATO, nor of the CSTO.91

Accommodation of the Russian interests also occurredin the energy, economic, and humanitarian fields. A numberof companies were admitted to the Azerbaijani market. TheVTB Bank entered the financial market in 2008. Anothertwo Russian companies, Rostelekom and Sistema, have stat-ed their interest to take part in the privatization process ofAzertelekom and Baki Telefon Rabitasi. Approximately 500Russian companies have businesses in Azerbaijan (OxfordAnalytica, 2011). Russia and Azerbaijan have signed anagreement regarding the construction of a new electricpower transmission line from Iashma to Derbent, that willboost Russia’s electricity exports capacity. In 2008, Russiaavoided to bomb the Kulevi terminal, which is the propertyof SOCAR, and the Baku – Supsa pipeline. In 2010, Azer-baijan began exporting gas to Russia. In 2011, the exportvolume was increased to 2 billion cubic meters. In 2008,in Azerbaijan, where the largest Russian Diaspora in SouthCaucasus lives (160,000-170,000 people), a branch of theMoscow State University was opened. This institution joinsthe list of the already existing over 200 schools and collegesin Azerbaijan, where teaching is done in Russian (Musabekov,2011). Annually, Azerbaijan is visited by 700,000 Russiancitizens (Oxford Analytica, 2011). All together, these factorspreserve a positive image of Russia among several segmentsof the Azerbaijani society. A 2010 public opinion barometerindicated that 23% of the Azerbaijanis think of Russia as afriendly state. It is surpassed, in this sense, only by Turkey

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91 Interview with an expert, Baku, June 2011. 92 Interview with an expert, Baku, June 2011.

towards Afghanistan from the North. Every year startingwith 2002, the President of the United States has suspend-ed the application of section 907 of the Freedom SupportAct, which blocks the financial assistance to Azerbaijan.In 2010, the US granted Azerbaijan financial assistance of$22 million. In 2003, the US Defense Department began todevelop a training and equipment program of the Azerbaijaninaval guard in the Caspian Sea. Each year, the US andAzerbaijani armed forces organize joint military exercises.

In 2008, however, the first cracks in this partnershipbecame visible, and kept growing in 2009 and 2010. Inspite of efforts on both sides to maintain a façade of nor-mality, the relationship is no longer as close as it used to bein the early 2000s, as an Azerbaijani official from the presi-dential administration stated (News.Az, 2011i). This reflectsin opinion surveys, in which only 6.5% of the respondentsdeclared that the US was a friendly state, 2% fewer than inthe case of Iran (Puls-R/Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2010).From the Azerbaijani point of view, several factors con-tributed to the chilling down of the Azerbaijani-Americanrelations. Among the political elite, there is a general feelingthat Azerbaijan has contributed more than it has received inexchange. In the Baku leadership’s perception, the relation-ship with the US is based not on values, but on interests.Azerbaijan hoped that its cooperation in the field of securityand in the energy sector would generate a massive supportfrom the US for solving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.Thus, interpreting the partnership as a purely contractualrelation, Baku feels that it has not profited enough fromWashington’s support.93 A series of US foreign policy actionscaused irritation in Baku: first, the US active role behind thenormalization of the relations between Armenia and Turkey;second, the preservation of section 907 of the FreedomSupport Act94; and third, the promotion of a democratic

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Russia during the bilateral talks with their counterparts inMoscow. The two sides found themselves on radically differ-ent positions also on the issue of the trans-Caspian pipeline:the Russian ambassador in Baku suggested that such a proj-ect could cause damages to the environment and that Russiaand Iran had to give consent for the project to be imple-mented. In turn, the SOCAR representative replied thattalks of the trans-Caspian pipeline will take place withoutRussia (Fitzpatrick, 2011).

III.2.3. The US

The US political and economic support was decisive forthe construction, in the first decade of this century, of theenergy routes that bypass Russia, providing Azerbaijan withthe wide international autonomy it currently enjoys. TheUS role continues to be crucial for lifting the bilateral block-ages between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan, which couldturn Azerbaijan into a transit country of the Caspian gas.Moreover, close economic relations have developed in timebetween Azerbaijan and the US. The US is Azerbaijan’s sec-ond biggest investor (9% of the total investments) andfourth trade partner in 2010, accounting for 7% of the totalcommercial exchanges (News.Az, 2011e; EU Commission,2011d). Some of the largest US oil companies (Exxon Mobil,Conoco Philips, or Chevron) are involved in large-scaleenergy projects in Azerbaijan. Baku has often resorted to theUS oil companies’ lobby to support its national agenda inWashington.

The bilateral cooperation in the field of security increasedconsiderably after September 11th, 2001. Azerbaijan openedits air space and made its terrestrial infrastructure availablefor refueling the US planes heading towards Afghanistan.Baku deployed a contingent of 80 peace-keepers in Afghan-istan and offered the US support in its military operation inIraq, contributing 150 troops to the stabilization force.Azerbaijan offers also an important way of transportation

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93 Interview with an expert, Baku, June 2011.94 Interview with an official, Baku, June 2011.

only Eastern Partnership state that enjoys a solid positivetrade balance with the EU. Its main export products are oiland gas. The EU-member states count among the largestinvestors in Azerbaijan: Great Britain comes first, with 52%of the total investments in 2010, and is followed by theCzech Republic and France (News.Az, 2011e). From 2007to 2010, the EU invested 92 million euros in Azerbaijan; forthe years 2011-2013, the budget goes up to 122.5 millioneuros (EEAS, 2011). The EU and European integration arerelatively popular topics in the Azerbaijani society. The lat-est public opinion barometer indicates that 32.2% of thepopulation is in favor of European integration, a rise from a27.7% in 2006. Moreover, the combined EU-member statescombined represent the first and foremost choice (11%) ofthe Azerbaijanis willing to work abroad (Puls-R/FriedrichEbert Stiftung, 2010).

In spite of the positive commercial dynamics, mostly inthe energy sector, the political relationships between Azer-baijan and the European Union trail behind. Azerbaijan isan independent financial actor. Experts estimate thatAzerbaijan’s daily income from the oil trade varied in 2009between $40 and $60 million (Bayramov, 2009, p. 7).Azerbaijan also develops a donor state profile: in 2011,it offered $1 million in aid to Japan after the devastatingearthquake.97 Under these circumstances, “one million moreor less from the EU does not make a difference”98, a localanalyst comments. “We do not have the same motivationfor reforms as Georgia or Moldova does”99, another explains.The self-confidence fueled by the oil-driven economy turnedthe Azerbaijani leaders into extremely difficult dialoguepartners.100 The diminishing asymmetry in the bilateralrelationships is confirmed in Baku: “Our cooperation has

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agenda in Azerbaijan95. The Azerbaijani presidency becamevery sensitive to the US pressure for democratization afterthe wave of popular revolts in the Arab world.96 The USvote against the 2008 resolution of the United Nations’General Assembly regarding the “situation in the occupiedterritories of Azerbaijan”, the fact that there was no USambassador appointed in Baku for more than a year, andthat the president of Azerbaijan was not invited at the 2010Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, attended insteadby the Armenian and Georgian heads of state, were a fewmore episodes that further contributed to the alienation ofAzerbaijan from the US.

Consequently, Baku suspended its common militaryexercises with the US in 2009, 2010, and 2011 and veeredtowards Russia in its foreign policy. The US Administrationsent the Secretary of Defense to Baku to shore up the divi-sion. This episode was followed by the 2010 visit of theSecretary of State in Baku and by that of the AzerbaijaniMinister of Foreign Affairs in Washington in 2011. Althoughthe dialogue intensified at governmental level in 2010 and2011, the positions of the two sides remained almostunchanged regarding the issues dividing them. A new appealfor the reopening of the Turkish-Armenian border, whichthe US Secretary of State launched in Istanbul in 2011,caused a predictable reaction in Baku (News.Az, 2011) andmaintained the vicious circle the two sides are caught in.

III.2.4. The EU

At the middle of the first decade of this century,Azerbaijan’s trade with the EU began growing, so that in2010 the EU was by far its largest trade partner, accountingfor 46.9% of the total commercial exchanges (EU Commis-sion, 2011d). It must be pointed out that Azerbaijan is the

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95 Interview with an expert, Baku, June 2011.96 Interview with a mass-media person, Baku, June 2011.

97 Interview with an official, Baku, June 2011.98 Interview with an expert, Baku, June 2011.99 Interview with an expert, Baku, June 2011.

100 Interview with a diplomat.

energy sector; the prospects of a DCFTA are bleak, sinceAzerbaijan is not a member of the World Trade Organization(WTO). In 2006, the EU and Azerbaijan signed a memo-randum on partnership in the field of energy; in 2011, thepresident of the European Commission and the president ofAzerbaijan signed a joint statement on the southern gas cor-ridor, of which project Nabucco is a part. Access to theEuropean markets is supposed to increase the profits andimportance of Azerbaijan for the EU’s energy security(Aliyev, 2010). Moreover, Azerbaijan aspires to convert itsinteraction with the EU in the field of energy into supportfor the country’s reintegration. This effort is backed by theoccasional support given to the EU’s foreign policy andsecurity statements that Azerbaijan is invited to join. In2010, the Baku government aligned with 18 of the 44 state-ments (EU Commission, 2011f). Azerbaijan does not seethe EU as a major power in the region, since it lacks hardpower. The Russo-Georgian war was a good example in thissense for Baku.103 Consequently, the political leadershipdoes not expect the EU to play, in short and medium term,an important role in the negotiations on the Nagorno-Kara-bakh conflict. At the same time, the Azerbaijani diplomacycultivates close ties with the EU-member states, actual orprospective importers of gas from Azerbaijan, to defendinside the EU its stance on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

III.2.5. Iran

The Islamic Republic of Iran, where about 16 millionAzerbaijani ethnics live, remains an inconvenient neighborfor Azerbaijan. Although strong historical, cultural, and reli-gious aspects link together the two countries, there is dis-trust regarding Iran in the public opinion. Surveys showthat 10% of the Azerbaijani respondents think that Iranis an enemy state, while 8.8% view it as a friendly one(Puls-R/Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2010). The bilateral trade

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undergone a serious transformation from the initial emphasison aid [from the EU] to mutually beneficial cooperation”,the Azerbaijani Minister of Foreign Affairs underscored(News.Az, 2011j). Consequently, Azerbaijan seeks equalityin its relations with the EU. Eschewing the EU’s condition-ality is part of this effort. For instance, Azerbaijan rejectswhat it considers to be the EU’s one-dimensional approachto human rights. Besides political and civil liberties, humanrights also cover economic and social rights concerningwhich Baku states it has made significant progress.101 At thesame time, Baku develops privileged bilateral partnershipswith the EU-member states, in order to mitigate theEuropean institutions’ criticism. When criticism cannot bemuted, as it happened in the spring of 2011, when protestsof the opposition were suppressed, the Azerbaijani authori-ties express their discontent with the EU’s position (Azernews,2011). At the same time, Baku criticizes the EU’s selectiveapproach towards human rights, for instance with referenceto the European institutions’ lack of interest for the rightsof the IDPs from Nagorno-Karabakh (News.Az, 2011k).Azerbaijan behaves in an obstructionist way in questions ofinterest for its citizens, for instance regarding the visa facil-itation agreement with the EU. The authorities state thatthe problem is now with the EU, since the Commission hasno mandate to begin negotiations.102 Experts, however,blame the lack of political will in Baku. The Azerbaijanigovernment is reluctant to conclude the readmission agree-ments that are necessary for a visa facilitation deal with theEU (Trend, 2011c). In turn, Azerbaijan has toughened visarequirementss for all foreign citizens, including EU ones.

Generally speaking, these examples reflect the positionof the Baku government on the preferred model of Europeanintegration, i.e. economic cooperation. It seems that eco-nomic cooperation with the EU is focused mainly on the

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101 Interview with an official, Baku, June 2011.102 Interview with an official, Baku, June 2011. 103 Interview with an expert, Baku, June 2011.

sectors between the Caspian states. Consequently, in thedispute area between the two states, Azerbaijan cannot con-duct drilling and exploitation activities. In a 2001 incident,the Iranian coast guard forced a BP research vessel to with-draw from the disputed area. In 2005, there were reportsabout the violation of the Azerbaijani air space by theIranian forces. Another serious incident on the land bordertook place in 2011: there was a fire exchange among theIranian border guards and the Azerbaijani ones, in thecourse of which an Azerbaijani soldier was killed. This per-fectly mirrors the tense atmosphere in the bilateral relation-ship (News.Az, 2011l).

The authorities in Baku are concerned by Iran’s activitieson the Azerbaijani territory. In 2007, fifteen Azerbaijanicitizens were put under arrest in Baku, and then found, byan Azerbaijani tribunal, guilty of treason for the benefit ofIran. Also in Baku, Iran’s attempts to export a more conser-vative version of Islam than the one practiced in Azerbaijanbreed suspicion.104 In 2011, the leader of the AzerbaijaniIslamic Party was also arrested for involvement in theprotests held in front of the Ministry of Education againstthe prohibition of wearing hijabs in the Azerbaijani schools(Abbasov, 2011). The party, which is considered pro-Iranianand suspected of receiving financial support from Tehran,was outlawed in Azerbaijan. The arrest of its leader was pre-ceded by critical statements of the clerics and politicians inIran regarding the decision of the Azerbaijani governmentto ban wearing hijabs in schools. High-ranking officials inTehran warned the authorities in Baku about the immi-nence of a popular revolt if the right to religious freedom isrestricted in Azerbaijan. The Azerbaijani leadership is con-cerned by the attempts at projecting Iran’s “soft power” inAzerbaijan, which threatens the very bases of the currentpolitical regime. Since February 2010, Iran has liberalizedunilaterally the visa regime with Azerbaijanis, with the

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exchanges are rather modest: Iran is Azerbaijan’s 17th tradepartner, with only 0.7% of the total commercial exchangesin 2010 (EU Commission, 2011d). Politically, there is aninsufficiently institutionalized dialogue which alternatesbetween conflict and cooperation. The June 2011 visit inBaku of the president of the Iranian parliament can hardlychange in a significant way the nature of the relationsbetween the two states. Among the few existing bilateralcooperation projects, there are the seasonal exchanges ofelectric power. According to the agreements, Azerbaijanexports electricity in summer, while Iran exports a similarquantity in autumn and winter. There are also gas exports inboth directions: thus, Iran plays an important role in Nakhi-chevan’s energy security, by supplying the annual volume ofgas necessary to the Armenia-isolated enclave. In exchange,Azerbaijan exports gas to Iran’s northern regions. Between2009 and 2011, Azerbaijan increased the gas deliveries toIran (Nichol, 2011, p. 16). Through such an increase, Bakuapparently wishes to protect Nakhichevan from the side ef-fects of the dysfunctional political relationship with Tehran.

The bilateral relationship is burdened by several prob-lematic dossiers that substantially affect the interactionbetween the two neighbors. Iran holds what Azerbaijan con-siders to be a pro-Armenian position. Projects in the field ofenergy are perceived in a negative way because they weakenthe pressure exerted by Azerbaijan and Turkey on Armeniavia closed borders and exclusion from regional infrastructureprojects. Baku has let Tehran know that it disapproves of thecooperation between Armenia and Iran (News.Am, 2011c).Apparently, Iran intensified its cooperation with Armeniawhen Azerbaijan got too close, in Tehran’s opinion, to theWest. The problem of the border is yet another irritatingsubject in the bilateral relationship. Azerbaijan and Iranhave not reached a consensus on the delineation of theirborder in the Caspian Sea. Since it feels disadvantaged bythe national sectors division along the median line, Tehraninsists that the Caspian Sea should be divided into equal

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104 Interview with an expert, Baku, June 2011.

pro-Western course of the Georgian foreign policy has beenadapted to the new macro-regional reality.

III.3.1. The US

Although the bilateral relationship has been de-person-alized during President Obama’s Administration, the USplays an important role in Georgia’s foreign policy strategy.The young political elite in Tbilisi, educated in the West,is largely inspired, in its public policies, from the Americanmodel. The intensified cooperation with the US enjoysoverwhelming popular support. In the 2011 public opinionsurveys, 58% of the citizens think that the US is Georgia’smost important political and economic partner, with a slightdrop from the 63% in 2008 (International RepublicanInstitute, 2008b, 2011). The protests organized in 2011 infront of the American embassy in Tbilisi by some activistsdid not attract a significant support and were denounced bythe rest of the Georgian opposition.

The Georgian leaders used their relation with the US,after the 2008 war, to neutralize the international isolationstrategy, that Russia promoted worldwide vis-à-vis Tbilisi.Thus, in 2009, Georgia signed the Charter on StrategicPartnership with the US. Although it did not provide simi-lar security guarantees as the one concluded between Japanand the US, this document reconfirmed the American polit-ical support. This was mirrored later in the US Senate reso-lution regarding the violation of Georgia’s territorial integrityand sovereignty by Russia (US Senate, 2011). The Vice-President of the United States and the US Secretary of Statevisited Tbilisi in 2009 and 2010, respectively. In 2010, thedialogue between the two heads of state was resumed. Inaddition to de-isolation efforts, Tbilisi resorted to US influ-ence to discourage the recognition of Abkhazia and SouthOssetia by the international community.106 The potentiallynegative economic or political consequences on the bilateral

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exception of a single category, the journalists. Since then,Tehran demands reciprocity for the Iranian citizens. Tehranfinances the Iranian TV station Sahar, which broadcasts inAzerbaijani and covers the southern parts of Azerbaijan,where a compact Talysh minority, culturally and linguistical-ly close to Iran, lives. The activity of the TV station is con-sidered in Baku as aimed to undermine the government’smonopoly in the informational space. Besides accusationsbrought to the central Azerbaijani authorities for their coop-eration with the US and Israel, the TV station regularlyinvites representatives of the civil society to discuss thedemocratic backslide in Azerbaijan.105 Such TV debateshave intensified ever since the outbreak of revolutionarymovements in the Middle East. All these have strengthenedin Baku the feeling that Iran represents a threat, which hascreated a widening gap between Azerbaijan and its southernneighbor. Moreover, the growing conflict within the Iraniantop leadership is perceived as a potentially destabilizing fac-tor in the region, which only amplifies the state of anxietyin Baku.

III.3. Georgia due West

Although it remains a goal that can hardly be reached inthe foreseeable future, the country’s reintegration is themajor preoccupation of the Tbilisi authorities. In the shortand mid run, however, Georgia aims to achieve the follow-ing objectives: to impede the international recognition ofthe independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, to ensuresecurity along its administrative northern border, to attractinvestments and financial assistance from foreign donors foran intensive domestic development, to set up the closestpossible relationships with NATO and the EU, which, in afavorable context, would facilitate full integration in theseorganizations. Hence, Georgia’s foreign policy is stronglyoriented towards the West. After the 2008 war, the openly

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105 Interview with an expert, Baku, June 2011. 106 Interview with an expert, Tbilisi, May 2011.

Although the US authorities have refrained from supply-ing weaponry, the policy of resetting the relations withRussia has been beneficial for Georgia’s national security.The de-tensioning of the Russo-American relations guaran-tees Georgia’s military security to a certain extent, in thesense that there are less chances of a Russian massive con-ventional attack against it.107 The US actively discouragedRussia from initiating open aggressive actions againstGeorgia. The 2009 Moscow talks between the presidents ofRussia and the US are illustrative in the context of the slightescalation of the situation in the conflict zones.108 Georgiaperceives the Russo-American resetting as a circumstantialevolution and the conflict with Russia as a constant factorin its foreign policy in a foreseeable future: “How long willthe Russo-American resetting last?”, a Georgian analyst inTbilisi wonders, while evaluating the alternatives beforeGeorgia for its military security. “The Cold War has notended for Georgia”109, an official adds. Hence, the majorconcern in Tbilisi is to guarantee the country’s nationalsecurity in case the Russo-American reset dies out and theKremlin persists in its endeavor to redirect the Georgianforeign policy, ultimately by the political regime change.110

The US is an essential economic partner and foreign donorfor Georgia. It is Georgia’s fifth trade partner, accountingfor 7.2% of the total commercial exchanges in 2010 (EUCommission, 2011c). Moreover, the US is the main foreigninvestor in Georgia with $135.8 million in 2010. Foreigninvestments in Georgia dropped dramatically from $2 bil-lion in 2007 to $814 million in 2010 (Civil.Ge, 2011e). Atthe same time, Georgia’s economic growth was based, overthe past few years, on the massive attraction of foreigninvestors. Presenting the country in the regional context, alocal expert explains: “We do not have a powerful Diaspora,

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relations with Washington in case of recognition of the twoseparatist regions were a strong reason for many states inthe Western hemisphere to turn down Moscow’s offer.

To address the acute security deficit, Georgia madeefforts to increase its military cooperation with the US andNATO. In 2008, a NATO-Georgia commission was created,in order to intensify the political consultations and practicalcooperation. From 2009 on, Georgia has begun implement-ing the national annual program targeting security sectorreforms. This pattern of annual programs is usually appliedto the states that have received their Membership ActionPlan (MAP) — therefore, Georgia represents an exception.Georgia is part of the northern distribution network leadingto Afghanistan, which has grown in importance due to theincreased vulnerability of transit through Pakistan and UStroops surge in Afghanistan. The port of Poti serves as apoint of liaison with Azerbaijan, wherefrom cargoes continuetheir transit across the Caspian Sea. The Tbilisi governmenthas considerably increased its military presence in Afghan-istan. Having 937 troops deployed in 2010, Georgia countsamong the largest contributors, among the non-NATOstates, to the stabilization missions in Afghanistan. Tbilisi isalso ready to reinforce its contingent in Afghanistan withanother 600 troops (Civil.Ge, 2011g). In exchange, Georgiasought to acquire weaponry and equipment that would re-establish its defense capabilities seriously affected by the2008 war. The US administration has declined suchrequests and offered, in exchange, more programs of mili-tary training and common exercises (Charap and Welt,2011, pp. 56-57). The US Government occasionally mademilitary donations or invested in the modernization of theequipment that the Georgian armed forces already pos-sessed. Forty light-armored Humvee vehicles were donatedin 2011 to the Georgian military contingent dispatched tothe theater of operations in Afghanistan (Civil.Ge, 2011h).Moreover, the US financed the modernization works forthree patrol ships of the Georgian coast guard and the con-struction of a ship maintenance facility.

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107 Interview with an expert, Tbilisi, June 2011.108 Interview with an expert, Tbilisi, June 2011.109 Interview with an official, Tbilisi, May 2011.110 Interview with an expert, Tbilisi, June 2011.

a visa facilitation agreement, and joined the European com-mon aviation area. The adjustments of the foreign policypriorities have met support in Georgian public opinion. Ac-cording to the surveys, 79% of the Georgians declare them-selves in favor of Georgia’s joining the EU (Eurasia Partner-ship Foundation, 2009b). The country’s closer relation withthe EU is motivated by national security imperatives andthe drive for political and economic modernization.

As a mediator for the cease-fire in 2008, the EU is guar-antor of the Sarkozy-Medvedev plan implementation. Con-sequently, Tbilisi wishes that the EU puts more pressure onRussia to determine it to observe all the provisions of the2008 peace deal. The Georgian officials are often critical ofthe EU, blaming it for being too soft in relation to Russia.113

At the same time, they are fully aware that the EU neutral-izes Russia’s military threat to a certain extent114, and thatGeorgia must avoid being perceived by the EU as a burdenin its relations with Russia. In 2008, the EU deployed acivilian monitoring mission (EUMM) of 340 observers,that significantly reduces the chances of another conflict.The presence of the EU observers is essential for the impar-tial monitoring of the situation on Georgia’s administrativeborder with Abkhazia and South Ossetia and to overrideRussia’s allegations regarding Georgia’s military buildup inthe vicinity of the conflict zones. The authorities in Tbilisisigned a three-month memorandum with the EUMM in2009, meant to be prolonged tacitly unless any of the sign-ing parts pulls out, which imposes restrictions as to themovement of troops in the vicinity of Abkhazia and SouthOssetia. Georgia has also taken upon itself to inform EUMMabout the redeployment of troops on its territory. The EUis part of the Geneva talks in which Georgia, Russia, the US,the OSCE, the UN, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia areinvolved. The consultations take place in two working groups:

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we do not have oil and natural gas, so we must attractinvestments”111. Hence, US investments are essential forthe resuming and maintaining of Georgia’s positive econom-ic growth. The US is also a major foreign donor in Georgia.From 2006 to 2011, through the Millennium ChallengeCorporation (MCC), the US Government financed numer-ous infrastructure and development projects in Georgia,worth almost $400 million. The program has had a decisiveimpact on the integration and modernization of the infra-structure in the regions inhabited by the Armenian andAzerbaijani minorities in Georgia. The possibility to extendthe program for another term is currently under discussion.After the Russo-Georgian war, the US contributed $1 billionto the efforts of reconstruction, supporting the IDPs andeconomic development in Georgia. The US financial contri-bution to the effort of the foreign donors was crucial forGeorgia’s successful overcoming of the double shock causedby the war and the global financial crisis.

III.3.2. The EU

Forced by the 2008 events in Georgia, the EU has assumeda significant role in guaranteeing the country’s security andmacro-economic stability. The Russo-Georgian war reversedthe priorities of the Georgian political leaders. Since theaccelerated accession to NATO is unfeasible, Tbilisi putmore emphasis on the European integration and coopera-tion with the EU in the field of security. In 2010, Georgiaaligned with 28 of the 44 EU foreign and security policystatements open for support (EU Commission, 2011g).Within the framework of the Eastern Partnership multi-lateral platform “democracy, good governance, and stability”,Georgia expressed interest for cooperation with the EU inthe field of the common security policy.112 In 2010, Georgiaopened the negotiations on Association Agreement, signed

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111 Interview with an expert, Tbilisi, June 2011.112 Interview with an official, Tbilisi, June 2011.

113 Interview with an official, Tbilisi, May 2011.114 Interview with an expert, Tbilisi, June 2011.

2011c). The Netherlands and Great Britain range secondand third among the top investors in Georgia in 2010, with$73.4 million and $59 million, respectively (Civil.Ge, 2011e).The EU is an attractive labor market for the Georgians.According to the public opinion barometer, 30% of theGeorgians would choose the EU as a destination for work-ing abroad (Eurasia Partnership Foundation, 2009b). TheEU member-states combined came second as a source ofremittances to Georgia in the first half of 2011: Greece,Italy, Spain, and Germany ranged second to fifth in this top,after Russia (Civil.Ge, 2011i). In the post-conflict years(2008-2011), the EU has allocated 483.5 million euros forGeorgia, while 131.27 million euros came form individualEU member-states (Fean, 2009, p. 9). In its 2011-2013 pro-jected budget, the EU has envisioned 180.3 million euros asfinancial assistance for Georgia, that may attract additionalfunding from the regional and trans-boundary programs(EU Commission, 2011g).

A crucial phase of Georgia’s European integration is thecreation of a DCFTA. The EU decided in 2008 to createa DCFTA in Georgia and sent to the Georgian governmenta set of preconditions for the beginning of negotiations.The debates as to the advantages and disadvantages, thecosts and benefits of an EU-Georgia DCFTA are extremelyintense in government and academic circles. The advocatesof the idea argue that a DCFTA is their country’s only wayof getting closer to the EU, of adopting the European stan-dards, and attracting long-term foreign investments. “Evenif the implementation process is very costly, we have to paythe price”116, says an experienced local observer. The oppo-nents, most of whom represent the ultra-liberal orientationof the Georgian elite, argue that a DCFTA, by introducingnew bureaucratic institutions and complicated regulationsin the various economic sectors, will encourage corruptionand to keep away the investors that Georgia needs right now.

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security and refugees. In 2009, the parties involved con-vened to establish a “hot line” and to create an incident pre-vention mechanism, that envisions weekly meetings betweenthe observers and the officers responsible with security inthe conflict zone.

The EU has been and remains decisive for the preservationof the territorial integrity of Georgia. This was confirmed byits discouraging of other states to recognize the two sepa-ratist entities. The subtle warning addressed to the Minskauthorities in 2009 regarding the negative effects of therecognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia on the coopera-tion between Belarus and the EU is a good example in thissense. At the same time, the policy of certain EU-memberstates on arms trade caused concerns in Tbilisi as to theimpact on national and regional military security. In 2011,France signed a contract for selling two Mistral helicoptercarriers to Russia. Georgia is concerned that such an acqui-sition is bound to reinforce the Russian military presence inthe Black Sea. In august 2008, Russia resorted to war shipsallocated to the “Black Sea Harmony” operation for main-taining regional security, that reunites the litoral states.115

Given that the 2008 invasion of Georgia was partiallylaunched from the sea and Russia seems to have been con-fronted with a deficit of operational ships, Tbilisi does notrule out the possibility that such acquisitions are meant toincrease the projection capacity of the Russian militaryforces in a potential Black Sea conflict. As a high-rankingRussian officer explained, referring to the August 2008 hos-tilities, “what it took us twenty-six hours to do, this [Mistral]ship does in forty minutes” (Kommersant, 2009).

Economically, the EU and its member-states are activelyinvolved in Georgia’s multi-dimensional modernization. TheEU is Georgia’s number one trade partner, with a 31.7% ofthe total volume of exchanges in 2010 (EU Commission,

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115 Interview with a former high-ranking official, Bucharest,April 2011. 116 Interview with an expert, Tbilisi, May 2011.

identity card), and have opened a modern joint bordercheckpoint in Sarpi (Adjaria), that manages 90% of thebilateral terrestrial traffic. They are soon to begin workingon yet another border checkpoint, Cildir – Aktas. In 2005and 2008, the Turkish company TAV obtained the contractfor the management of the Batumi airport over a period oftwenty years and of the Tbilisi one for a period of fifteenyears. There is regular air and bus transportation betweenTurkey and Georgia and the construction of a direct railroadconnection is under way. The two countries are intercon-nected through oil, gas, and electricity transport networks,that only solidifies their economic interdependence. In 2011,Georgia signed an agreement with Turkey for the construc-tion of three hydro-electric plants in Samtskhe-Javakhetiand of an electrical power transmission line from Batumi toArakli (News.Az, 2011m). Georgia has only begun elec-tricity exports to the European market and its deliveries aremade across Turkey. Hence, Turkey has rapidly turned intoa bridge connecting Georgia to Europe.

There is also an intensive human transit between the twocountries. Experts estimate that about 100,000 Georgianswork in Turkey.121 In 2009, about 350,000 Turks visitedGeorgia (Chkhikvadze, 2010). The number of tourists growsevery year. In the first four months of 2011 alone, almost268,000 Turks traveled to Georgia (News.Am, 2011a). Theintensification of the bilateral relations has transformedTurkey into one of Georgia’s main economic partners. TheTurkish-Georgian trade exchanges have increased by 230%over the last five years (Fisher Onar, 2009). Consequently,Turkey is Georgia’s second trade partner, with a 15.6% ofthe total volume of exchanges in 2010 (EU Commission,2011c). In 2010, Turkey was the second biggest foreigninvestor in Georgia, with $91.8 million (Civil.Ge, 2011e). Italso ranged sixth, in the first half of 2011, among the stateswherefrom remittances come to Georgia (Civil.Ge, 2011i).

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Moreover, they argue that the swift introduction ofEuropean standards would drive the Georgia producers offthe market, since they would be unable to meet the costs ofadopting those standards.117 These heated debates have hadan impact on the way Georgia has implemented the reformsneeded for the beginning of talks, which is reflected in thelatest EU evaluation report for Georgia (EU Commission,2011g). Thus, the opinions are divided in Tbilisi. Whileofficials insist that Georgia has met the EU’s initial require-ments and is ready to start negotiations118, experts say thatmany measures were taken too late and only selectively119.It seems that in the short term, at least, Georgia wishes tobegin the DCFTA-related negotiations in order to send apositive signal to the foreign investors120 and to reverse thelast years’ downward trend. In its turn, the EU is concernedthat, the moment negotiations are started, Tbilisi wouldtake advantage of it to attract foreign investments, so theinterest to conclude the agreement would drop (Waal, 2011,p. 37).

III.3.3. Turkey

Over the last five years, the relationship between Georgiaand Turkey has known a rapid quantitative and qualitativedevelopment. There are regular bilateral state visits andgovernment consultations. The relationship between theGeorgian president and the Turkish prime-minister isstrengthened by several joint projects implemented duringtheir successive mandates. Turkey is the only neighboringcountry with whom Georgia has a delineated and demar-cated border. To facilitate trade and tourist visits, the twocountries have concluded a free trade agreement, have liber-alized the visa regime (one may travel using just a regular

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117 Interview with an expert, Tbilisi, June 2011.118 Interview with an official, Tbilisi, June 2011.119 Interview with an expert, Tbilisi, June 2011.120 Interview with an official, Tbilisi, June 2011. 121 Interview with an expert, Tbilisi, May 2011.

Turkey to Abkhazia and obstructed in 2009 the opening ofthe Turkish Benetton branch in Sukhumi (ibidem; Civil.Ge,2009c). In 2009, in a case that produced tension in thebilateral relations, a Tbilisi tribunal sentenced the Turkishcommander of a ship that was heading towards Abkhaziaand was retained in the Georgian waters, to twenty-fouryears in prison for smuggling and unauthorized economicactivities. Following pressures from the Turkish government,the sentence was commuted and the Turkish citizen released.Hence, the Turkish authorities gave no sign of intention togive up on the engagement strategy with Abkhazia123, whileGeorgia realized that it cannot effectively oppose such aprocess. In 2011, Ankara and Tbilisi conducted intensenegotiations on the interaction with Abkhazia, that wouldnot raise concerns within the Georgian government.124

The multi-level rapprochement between Georgia andTurkey coincided with Turkey’s growing alienation from theEU. Although the relationship with Ankara is consideredimportant for the achievement of its foreign policy objectives,Tbilisi’s perception about Turkey’s role and interests in theregion has altered: “Turkey is no longer a regional powerthat projects the Western interests in South Caucasus”125,an official shares the Georgian perspective; “Turkey remainsan important partner for Georgia, but Ankara’s motives arenot always clear in Tbilisi”126, a local expert adds. Turkey’sestrangement from Europe is being seen in Tbilisi throughthe lens of its own efforts to come closer to the EU and ofthe impact such a trend may have on Georgia. As an observerremarks, “the constant threat from the North and Turkey’sestrangement from the EU make up a regional environmentnot exactly favorable to Georgia’s European integration”127.

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Until the outbreak of the 2008 war, Tbilisi and Ankara hadan extended military cooperation on the basis of an agree-ment signed in 1997. Georgia’s aspiration to become aNATO member-state has brought the Turkish and Georgianarmies very close together. Turkey has provided technicalassistance and trained Georgian troops in order to help itsneighbor country adjust to NATO standards and to ensuretheir inter-operability in the international missions. In 2006,Turkey’s military assistance for Georgia totaled $1.8 million(Torbakov, 2008, p. 9). The military cooperation betweenthe two countries went on after 2008 as well, though on alower scale, since the Russian factor weighed heavily enoughin Ankara’s political calculations.

However, the question affecting the bilateral relationshipis Turkey’s role in Abkhazia. There is a numerous AbkhazianDiaspora in Turkey, that pushes the government towardscloser relations with the separatist province. Besides theDiaspora’s lobby, the Ankara authorities themselves wish todeepen their interaction with Abkhazia, based on the fol-lowing reasoning: unless we counter-balance Moscow eco-nomically and politically, Abkhazia will eventually beabsorbed by Russia.122 Although the Turkish-Abkhazian seaconnection is closed, trade exchanges between the two sidestake place. Sukhumi states that Turkey is Abkhazia’s secondlargest trade partner after Russia (Vindimian, 2010, p. 5).In 2009, a Turkish diplomat went to Sukhumi for consulta-tions with the separatist authorities and the Abkhazianleader went on a four-day visit to Turkey in 2011, duringwhich he met with representatives of the Diaspora and busi-nessmen. Tbilisi partially accepts Ankara’s arguments, butdoes not wish that attempts to prevent the absorption ofAbkhazia by Russia turn into an international legitimationof the regime in Sukhumi, that could lead, eventually, to therecognition of Abkhazia’s independence. Consequently, from1999 to 2006, Georgia stopped over sixty ships going from

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122 Interview with an expert, Berlin, November 2009.

123 Interview with an expert, Berlin, November 2009.124 Interview with an official, Tbilisi, May 2011.125 Interview with an official, Tbilisi, May 2011.126 Interview with an expert, Tbilisi, May 2011.127 Interview with an expert, July 2010.

alliances it is a part of (Civil.Ge, 2010). Thus, in diplomaticjargon, Tbilisi sent a message that Georgia would not pro-vide its territory to launch military operations against Iran.Georgia took advantage of the favorable moment and re-launched its relations with Tehran at the very moment whenthe Russo-Iranian ones grew colder (Oxford Analytica, 2010)and Iran felt more and more isolated in the world. Sub-sequently, a delegation led by an Iranian diplomat visitedTbilisi and brought there a series of Iranian proposals forcooperation in the field of producing and exporting electric-ity (Lomsadze, 2010). In 2010, Iran opened a consulate inBatumi and in 2011 the two sides agreed on the liberaliza-tion of the visa regime and on the establishing of directflights from Tehran to Tbilisi and to Batumi. Thus, Georgiainstrumentalized its cooperation with Iran, so as to stimu-late its tourist industry. Although the bilateral trade wasslightly revitalized, Iran is still an insignificant trade partnerfor Georgia. Only 0.6% of the total trade volume was repre-sented by the country’s exchanges with Iran in 2010 (EUCommission, 2011c).

Iran proved to be much more enthusiastic and pro-activethan Georgia, while the Georgian authorities showed morereservation and coordinated their actions with the US.129

Hence, what Tbilisi conceived as pragmatic cooperationthat would not jeopardize its relationships with the West,Tehran interpreted as a chance to project its own influencein the region and draw Georgia into a much more intensebilateral cooperation. Therefore, while Tehran is looking forways of taking maximum advantage from new opportuni-ties, Tbilisi is trying to keep a certain distance.130

III.3.5. Russia

Unlike other regional actors, Russia is being perceivedin Tbilisi as a major obstacle for the achievement of the

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III.3.4. Iran

Before 2006, Georgia showed no particular interest fordeep bilateral relations with Iran. Infrequent political con-tacts and an insignificant volume of trade exchanges charac-terized the relations between Tbilisi and Tehran. Politicallyand economically, Georgia looked intensely beyond theBlack Sea. The fact that the two countries do not share acommon border contributed to their relative enstragement.In 2006, however, when the Russo-Georgian relations dete-riorated, Georgia turned, as an emergency solution, to thegas imports from Iran. At the end of 2006, the Tbilisi gov-ernment intended to cut gas imports from Russia by 80%.The uncertainty as to the date when Azerbaijan could tech-nically begin to supply Georgia with gas from the ShakhDeniz gas field forced Georgia to consider the possibility ofimporting small quantities of gas from Iran. But Georgia’sforeign policy course left little room for the development ofclose neighborly relations with Iran. Georgia discovered verysoon the limits of its cooperation in the field of energy withIran, since the US took position against a long-term energycooperation between the two countries (Civil.Ge, 2006).

In 2008, the war with Russia indirectly changed themomentum in the relations between Tbilisi and Tehran. TheRussian constant military threat, the de-personalization ofrelations with the US, and the economic crisis contributedto a more balanced Georgian foreign policy. The governmentadopted a more inclusive regional outlook in its foreign pol-icy. Tbilisi realized that, in the post-conflict security setting,it was vital that Georgia develop a positive agenda with allregional powers. Hence, without radically altering its strate-gic orientation, Georgia no longer rules out, in principle,any cooperation alternative.128 Tehran seized the opportuni-ty and reacted rapidly to Georgia’s overtures. The GeorgianForeign Minister visited Tehran in 2010 and promised thatGeorgia would not act against Tehran, irrespective of the

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128 Interview with an expert, Tbilisi, June 2011.129 Interview with an expert, Tbilisi, May 2011.130 Interview with an expert, Tbilisi, May 2011.

Russian companies (Vympelkom, Inter RAO, Itera, VTB)are present in Georgia’s telecommunications, energy, finances,and banking sectors. Georgia still imports almost 8 to 10%of gas from Russia. Natural gas is being imported throughthe company Itera, which has distribution contracts with103 local companies (Postnikov, 2008, p. 54). But the mainbeneficiary of these supplies, presumably at a preferentialprice, is the Itera-owned Azot chemical plant in Rustavi.132

There is an agreement with Russia regarding the mutualsupplies of electricity, which has remained in force after the2008 conflict. About 700,000 Georgians work in Russia.The money transferred back home represents about 63% ofthe overall remittances incoming to Georgia (ibidem, p. 56).

Although 72% of the Georgians believe that the Russianaggression against Georgia is going on, about 90% of therespondents support the political dialogue and economicinteraction with Russia (International Republican Institute,

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Georgian strategic national objectives. In the opinion sur-veys, 83% of the Georgians identify Russia as the mainthreat for Georgia’s security (International Republican Insti-tute, 2011). Several factors explain such an attitude. Russiahas military control over about 20% of the Georgian terri-tory, including the Akhalgori region, which was under thejurisdiction of the Tbilisi authorities until August 2008 (seeMap 7, opposite page). The Russian troops are stationed50 kilometers from Tbilisi. In case of a conflict, Russiawould find it easy to block the transport infrastructure thatconnects Eastern and Western Georgia and to rapidly reachthe country’s capital. Russia has deployed 3,800 troops and1,000 border guards from the Federal Security Service in thetwo Georgian separatist regions. Besides investing massive-ly in the military infrastructure, Moscow has also initiatedthe process of demarcation of the administrative borderbetween Georgia, on the one hand, and Abkhazia and SouthOssetia, on the other hand. It supports financially 70 to90% of the two separatist republics’ budgets. Russian statecompanies are gradually taking over control of the strategicinfrastructure, such as the railroads or the Babushera airportin Abkhazia. The Kremlin has made diplomatic and finan-cial efforts to expand the list of states or micro-states thathave recognized the independence of Abkhazia and SouthOssetia. Thus, Russia intends to permanently separate thetwo regions from Georgia, so as to minimize the chances oftheir reintegration, even in a distant future. The Russiandiplomacy makes considerable efforts to isolate Georgiaexternally and to prevent arms supplies, even defensive ones,to the Georgian armed forces. Russia is explicitly againstGeorgia’s joining not only NATO, but the EU as well.131

Despite the lack of diplomatic relations, multiple eco-nomic connections have survived between the two countries.Russia was Georgia’s seventh trade partner in 2010, witha 4.4% of the total trade volume (EU Commission, 2011c).

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Map 7 — Georgia and the two separatist regions (Source: Wikipedia)

131 Interview with a diplomat, Tbilisi, May 2011. 132 Interview with an expert, Tbilisi, May 2011.

launched the PIK TV station accessible by satellite, whichbroadcasts in Russian and covers the events in South andNorth Caucasus. The primary target-group of this TV sta-tion is the public in North Caucasus. The station’s webpagehas about 7 or 8 thousands single visitors from Russia(Elder, 2011). In 2011, the Georgian parliament recognizedthe 19th-century “Circassian genocide” committed byTsarist Russia. The tragic events that accompanied the cam-paign of conquering the Caucasus took place in 1864 inKrasnaya Polyana, one of the localities which will host the2014 Winter Olympic Games in Sochi. The Georgianauthorities plan to inaugurate a memorial dedicated to thevictims of the “Circassian genocide” in 2012, not far fromthe Abkhazian border. Last, but not least, the Georgianpolitical discourse appeals to comparisons with Russia inorder to undermine the legitimacy and credibility of theRussian political regime. Police reform, fight against corrup-tion, improvement of the business environment, and reno-vation of Batumi are often used to compare with develop-ments in Russia, such as the police abuses, the systemic cor-ruption, the foreign investors’ harassment, and the deficientpreparation of Sochi for the Olympic Games.

Although not meant exclusively to annoy Russia, suchpolitical actions undoubtedly aim at making it more vulner-able: “Russia is satisfied with the status quo, while Georgiawants Russia to pay the price for the current situation”135,a local analyst explains the logic behind certain measures;“Russia has not paid an adequate price so far, so Georgiatries to make it feel uncomfortable in the very region whereit feels vulnerable”136, the expert details the motivation ofGeorgia’s policies in North Caucasus. At the same time, theTbilisi government also has in mind security requirements.North Caucasus, that neighbors Georgia, will remain in thelong run a turbulent area. Tbilisi tries to project its “soft

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2011). Hence, considering the economic relations and thepublic opinion’s stance, the major challenge for the Tbilisigovernment is to identify a functional way of co-existingwith Russia. Over the past two years, the authorities inTbilisi have had several initiatives aimed to relieve the ten-sion in relations with Moscow.133 In 2010, Georgia unilat-erally committed itself not to use force in order to reinte-grate the country. Although it serves Armenia’s economicinterests, the reopening of the Verhni Lars – Kazbeghi cus-tom point in 2010 was also part of the Georgian effortsto de-escalate the conflict with Russia. In October 2008,Georgia unilaterally simplified its visa regime for Russiancitizens. They may obtain Georgian visas at the checkpoint,without having to go through a lengthy application proce-dure. Starting with 2011, visas may also be obtained at theentry point Verhni Lars – Kazbeghi. In 2010 and 2011, theMoscow – Tbilisi, Moscow – Batumi, and, respectively,Moscow – Kutaisi flights were resumed. Georgia finds it nec-essary to continue the Geneva talks, in spite of Russia’soften obstructive attitude. As an official explains, “It issometimes necessary to keep a process going for the sake ofthe process itself”134. In 2011, at Moscow’s request, theRusso-Georgian negotiations on removing Georgia’s veto onRussia’s membership in the WTO were resumed. Moreover,there have been high-level contacts between the two headsof church. The patriarchs met in Kiev in the summer of2011.

Alongside a number of positive measures, Georgia haskept pushing several initiatives that caused irritation inRussia. In 2010, Georgia unilaterally liberalized the visaregime for the Russian citizens residing in seven nationalrepublics in North Caucasus. According to the authorities,600 residents from the region cross the Russo-Georgianborder daily (Ekho Moskvy, 2011). In 2011, Georgia also

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133 Interview with an expert, Tbilisi, May 2011.134 Interview with an official, Tbilisi, May 2011.

135 Interview with an expert, Tbilisi, June 2011.136 Interview with an expert, Tbilisi, June 2011.

the various external orientations and domestic nationalprojects contribute to the variable geometry of the region.The states join or aspire to join alternative organizations ormilitary alliances like CSTO, NATO, CIS, GUAM, BSEC,the EU, or the Non-Aligned Movement. Finally, South Cau-casus neighbors turbulent (sub)regions like North Caucasusor the Middle East, wherefrom instability and elements ofunpredictability are being exported. Cumulated, all thesevariables contribute to a multitude of scenarios that theregion might develop along in the future. The normalizationof the Turkish-Armenian relationship combined with thepotential progress in the solving of the Nagorno-Karabakhconflict could vindicate the region from the logic of thezero-sum game and lay down preconditions for the trilater-al regional cooperation. But one cannot rule out, however,the fact that the regional inertia, which is characterized bymulti-speed developments and multi-directional evolutionscould be the only certainty for South Caucasus during thisdecade.

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Angela Grãmadã

South Caucasus between PoliticalEconomy and Energy-Based Politics

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I. The Macro-Economic Context of RegionalDevelopment

The orientation of foreign policies and security strategiesdepends, first and foremost, on the success of the economicpolicies a state or any other major actor practices. Mostsubjects of public international law have to admit theimportance of economic factors when they conceive of newschemes for government action or economic growth.Without a well-documented economic basis doubled by effi-cient programs, no state will ever manage to keep up withthe top actors that administrate the processes and phenom-ena going on at international level.

Making use of financial investments or political pressureto subordinate regions like South Caucasus — which isimportant for its oil and natural gas resources and its variousconnections to all parts of the world — is one of the mostefficient methods the great powers resort to in order toaccomplish their national objectives and goals. This regionis rich in natural resources of the most various kind, notonly oil and gas, but many more, like plutonium and gold.Its capacity of transporting such resources from East to Westand from North to South has transformed the area and hasattracted many national interests and economic objectives.Thus, the profit resulting from the presence of the political

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economic reforms. These are meant to achieve certain struc-tural changes that later allow for growth of the economicindicators and social progress. The lack of previous experi-ence in the management of the state’s domestic affairs, aswell as the excessive dependence on a partner or on certainregional processes have led to the appearance of discrepan-cies between the levels of economic development of thestates that make up the region of South Caucasus. There aremultiple political or economic causes for this, but the bestsolution is to follow the national objectives or interests as aunique source of inspiration for the measures and actionsthat must be implemented in order to have a harmoniousdevelopment of a society. The three states that make upSouth Caucasus have all felt, since they declared their inde-pendence, the temptation to resort to advanced models ofeconomic development. Estonia, Singapore, the United ArabEmirates are some examples of states whose economic resultshave greatly influenced the attitude of the South-Caucasianauthorities as to the method to be applied inside or the formof regional integration to be sought outside. Their intricateconnections to the economic processes and the policies pro-moted by the Russian Federation and the maintaining ofcertain features typical for the authoritarian regimes havecontributed to the creation of a political milieu that is hos-tile to the implementation of the strategies and actions thatare capable to bring South Caucasus closer to the world eco-nomic market. While Georgia and Armenia have been mem-bers of the World Trade Organization since 2000 and 2003,respectively (WTO, 2008) and accept the norms and prin-ciples of this form of international integration, Azerbaijanseems to have created its own pattern of penetrating theworld circuit, which is being supported by the oil and natu-ral gases it possesses and by the prices of these resources onthe world markets. In both Tbilisi, and Baku, the patternused by the authorities in Singapore to sustain the economyhad its supporters at one time or another.1 The renouncing

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factor in the area may present a lot of characteristics, but itseconomic side is by far the most important. The region isconnected to the Russian Federation, but also depends onthe technical and financial support of both the EuropeanUnion, and the United States of America.

The economic and energy potential of South Caucasus isfavorable for the creation of several connections with theoutside world. On-site studies reveal the region’s inacces-sibility by the potential foreign investors. There is, indeed,a cheap and well-trained labor force, which represents anadvantage, but then any investor has to deal with monopo-lies or oligopolies, with corruption at the highest level, withthe outdated institutional system, with legislative gaps, withuncertain political circumstances, and with the refusal to actaccording to the new trends of modernization and techno-logical advance both in the political, and in the economicspheres, so that the South-Caucasian products may guaran-tee a superior added value. The most important point to beconsidered, that this paper wishes to emphasize, is thatSouth Caucasus must be studied as a whole. What makesthe difference between its component states is the avail-ability to take part in various processes of integration in theworldwide economic circuit, plus the capacity of negotiatingthe best price for the resources each possesses, keeping inmind their typology and quality. The available energyresources and the infrastructure needed for their transporta-tion should be the number one argument for stimulating theinterest in the implementation of reforms and the modern-ization of the economies. A steady course towards develop-ment could lead in time to the increase of the authorities’capacity of negotiating in the process of conflict-solving andto the decrease of the Russian Federation’s political influence.

1. The implementation of economic reforms between necessity and incapacityThe improvement of a state’s social realities may be

accomplished through the implementation of deep-reaching

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1 Interview with an expert, Tbilisi, May 2011.

country in turn. Indeed, the fact that the three componentstates of the region are all ex-Soviet republics could be thestarting-point of the study, but it would be unfair to ignorecertain national tendencies, existing both previously, and atthe time they were part of the Soviet Union. Most problemsthat the authorities and citizens in Georgia, Armenia, andAzerbaijan have to face may be found in all the ex-Sovietstates, yet the great powers’ level of interest differs from oneregion to another. This is why outlining the features thatmake the difference when it comes to the specific economicdevelopment of the three South-Caucasian states is a pri-mary condition for contriving recommendations that thedecision-makers may use to attract foreign investments inthe area by reducing the level of political instability, byliberalizing the prices, by fighting corruption and themonopolies, so that the other economic indicators involvedin the studying of a state’s level of economic developmentreach the desired level. Transition to the market economyshould not turn into a long-term declarative principle. Itshould be reached by implementing measures based onpragmatism, effective on a longer term, so that stability andeconomic growth may sustain the national security of everySouth-Caucasian state. Moreover, it is well-known that thesolving of economic problems, the implementation of reforms,and the steady determination to go beyond a certain stageof development, i.e., successfully finalizing what is calledtoday the period of transition to market economy mayresult in the partners’ openness towards the solving of older,regional problems of a political nature.

Armenia, often called the “Diaspora paradox”2, has feltthe effects of the worldwide economic crisis more than theother two South-Caucasian states. In 2009, Armenia’sGross Domestic Product (GDP) experienced a 14.4% drop(Civilitas Foundation, 2010) expressed in monetary units,

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of this model had several explanations: it was difficult toadapt to South Caucasus because of the conditions thethree new independent states had to face immediately afterthe collapse of the Soviet Union, no one was politicallywilling to assume the implementation of that model, or thegovernments simply turned towards other regional models,much closer to them philosophically. Georgia, for instance,took its models of economic development, in turn, fromTurkey, Estonia, and even the United Arab Emirates, Azer-baijan from Singapore and the EAU, while Armenia wastempted to get inspiration, al least partially, from the Balticstates’ experience.

Through their logic in action, their concepts and tenden-cies, the European models of economic development aremuch more familiar to Georgia and Armenia, while Azer-baijan makes proof of its Oriental and Asian affinities. Thislast state is often included among the Central Asian nations.If a state relies exclusively on its natural resources, its region-al political independence may be short-lived. The existenceand trading of these is not a compulsory condition for thegrowth of social welfare, one of the main macro-economicindicators, that allows for a broader appreciation of a state’slevel of economic development. Managing the affairs of astate that possesses oil and gas may become quite a problemin time, one that can only be solved by the transparency ofgoverning itself and of how the income from the oil businessis being used. The economies of petro-states depend mostlyon the prices of crude and processed oil on the world mar-kets. In such conditions, a decrease of the price of oil wouldhave lesser consequences in Armenia and Georgia, which areless dependent on the selling of energy resources. Accordingto the International Monetary Fund estimates, the Republicof Azerbaijan may be classified as a state dependent on theincome from oil-selling contracts (Ahmedov et al., 2009, p. 6).

To determine the similarities and differences existing inthe process of transformation of the South-Caucasian states’economies, it is necessary to outline the specificities of each

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2 Interview with a political analyst, Yerevan, June 2011.

most employees come from the CIS states are in recession.The lack of foreign investments in Armenia and the migra-tion of small businesses to neighboring Georgia have politi-cal rather than economic reasons. Although the economicreforms introduced by the authorities in Yerevan have notled to notorious results, the lack of a foreign interest forinvesting in the Armenian economy has been justified, mostof the times, by the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, a factor ofregional instability. In fact, as the Armenian officials admit,the conflict was and is the perfect motivation for justifyinginaction regarding the implementation of economic reforms,but mainly to conceal acts of high-level corruption. Foreigninvestors might require that systemic measures of fightingcorruption be adopted. Such a vicious circle can only bebroken by the political factor’s firm involvement. The busi-ness milieu merges with the state’s institutions. Most busi-nesses belong to people holding key-offices in the state insti-tutional system.3 The Russian Federation has always beenone of Armenia’s main economic partners. The bilateraleconomic relationship had a positive trend until 2009, whenthe first negative effects of the worldwide economic crisismade themselves felt. If in 2008 the trade exchange betweenRussia and Armenia reached $900 million, the followingyear it dropped by 19.3%. Only in 2010 were the first posi-tive signs of recovery in the bilateral commercial exchangesregistered.4 As a strategic partner of Armenia, the RussianFederation also remains, at this stage, the main investor inthe Armenian economy. Russian investors have managed tocome into prominence in several sectors: the energy system,the banking system, the extractive industry, and the tech-nologies of information. The presence of Russian investorsin Armenia can be analyzed from two perspectives. The first

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i.e. from $12 billion in 2008 to $8.7 billion in 2009. Certainbranches of the national economy registered either a slow-ing down of the development rate, or even a regress.Constructions, agriculture, or the metallurgical industrywere among the worst affected, the last because of the dropin prices on the international metal markets. In the Sovietperiod, Armenia was well-known for the development of itsmetallurgical industry and processing infrastructure, withhigh indicators due to the well-trained labor force, the richresources and a secure market within the USSR.

Considering the fact that many features of these coun-tries’ economies have remained virtually unchanged sincethe Soviet period, that their infrastructure has become out-dated, and that Yerevan has been under the influence of theRussian Federation most of its independent life, cumulatedwith the regional economic and energy isolation, it is obviousthat the worldwide economic recession has had the deepestimpact on this particular state. No sooner than in 2010 didthe Armenian economy experience its first steps forward, theGDP going up by about 7.6% compared to 2009. However,the economic situation requires massive investments and theimplementation of efficient measures for the reformation ofall branches of industry and agriculture.

Also, as effects of the prolonged worldwide economiccrisis, wages went down, while unemployment went up to6.9%, which contributed even more to the migration of thelabor force outside the country. Until 2008, Armenia hadthe highest average salary in South Caucasus and outmatchedAzerbaijan and Georgia. The crisis modified this hierarchy.The labor force migrates mainly towards the Russian Feder-ation, which has initiated a program for sustaining its ownfree-falling demographic evolution. This program encouragesthe migration of Armenian citizens to the non-Europeanareas of Russia, where they receive land and money. Russiais also the state where most of the money transferred backhome comes from, even if the macro-economic indicators aredropping there as well and the economic domains in which

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3 Interview with an expert, Yerevan, June 2011.4 The Russo-Armenian Interaction and Regional Problems. Papers of the

International Conference of June 5th, 2010, Yerevan, NAAPET, 2011, p. 11.

key towards the regional economic markets, while Armeniais Iran’s access key towards the non-Muslim world, since it isone of the very few Christian states with which it has man-aged to establish and maintain a bilateral relationship.5

In 2006, Armenia was invited to join the North-Southtransportation corridor, in order to diversify the transitroutes for its goods. In perspective, the Armenian productswere to benefit from new transportation opportunitiesthrough railroad connections, then by ferry to the Georgianport of Poti. The situation of the transit routes for the goodsand services from and to Armenia is this:

– Georgia 75% of the goods– Iran 25% of the goods– Turkey embargo– Azerbaijan conflictArmenia is excessively dependent on the transiting of its

goods through Georgia, which impedes the development ofcommercial projects with other countries, and not only withthose in the region. Although there are proposals for can-celing custom fees between the two countries, the processseems to meet with a lot of difficulties. For instance, theRomanian investors’ disinterest is particularly conditionedby the Armenian market’s lack of access to various routes ofregional and inter-regional transit. Armenia is connected tothe North-South corridor through Georgia, but Romania isinterested rather in the East-West corridor. Although pres-ent on the Georgian market, Romanian products are beingsubmitted to double taxation until they reach the Armenianmarket. This aspect, of the double taxation, leads to theincrease of prices for various products, because it is reflectedin the costs of the respective goods or services. The lack ofa diversified system of connections to the main transporta-tion routes of the goods, as well as of those for the trans-portation of energy products lowers the attractiveness ofArmenia as far as investments are concerned. It is for these

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has to do with Armenia’s economic dependence on theRussian Federation; the Russians fully control the country’senergy system, because they are majority stockholders in allof the country’s major energy projects, through Gazpromand Inter RAO UES (the company that produces and dis-tributes electricity), they have purchased the entire activestock of the national phone operator Armentel, as well as ofBanc VTB and of the Armenian Savings Bank. The secondperspective from which the economic Russo-Armenian rela-tionship may be analyzed has to do with the way in whichit is being presented by the Armenian officials. They chooseto ignore the dependence of the Armenian economy on theRussian Federation and claim that the presence of Russiancompanies proves how attractive the Armenian economy isto foreign investors. During 2009, Russia promised severalex-Soviet states to grant them preferential or non-refundablecredits in order to help those governments overcome theeffects of the economic crises. Armenia was one of the fewbeneficiaries of such a financial support from Russia. So, inearly June 2009, the Russian Federation Ministry of Financestransferred to the Armenian government the first installmentof the total credit of $500 million.

One of the economic activities in Armenia where there isa major potential for development is the selling of drinkingwater to the Arab countries. So is hydro-energy. The author-ities in Yerevan grasp the necessity to diversify the productsmeant to be exported. In the circumstances of a regionallyisolated economy, the Arab states are the main market forthe sales of Armenian producers. For Armenia’s interests,neighboring Iran could become, in time, a road openertowards the regional and international markets. There arecurrently several ongoing common energy projects withTehran. These have to do with the supply of hydro-energyto the neighboring country. Armenia admits that it does notagree to the way the Iranian authorities further their foreignpolicy objectives, but the two partner states are forced by theregional circumstances to cooperate: Iran is Armenia’s access

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5 Interview with an official, Yerevan, June 2011.

Through its provisions, Armenia agrees to contribute to theacceleration of economic reforms implementation and tothe harmonization of its industrial sectors and agriculturewith the European standards. Moreover, the EU requires thatthe authorities in Yerevan come up with a strategy of ener-gy security as soon as possible, so the strategic objectivesbased on nuclear energy be taken out of the economic cir-cuit and replaced with other types of energy resources.

The development of commercial exchanges with the EUis confirmed by the figures, too. In the first semester of2010, Armenia’s foreign trade with the EU-member statesincreased by an average 29.1%, exceeding $1 billion. Thegrowth of this economic indicator took place in spite of thedepreciation of the euro. Although it was left behind byGeorgia with regard to the implementation of the mainrequirements agreed upon in various official acts and state-ments having to do with European integration, Armeniahas not given up its endeavor to draw nearer the Europeanvalues and standards. Its light economic recovery of the pasttwo years signals that Armenians have grasped the role oftaking certain firm decisions regarding the regional andinternational integration. Only by implementing somedecisive action towards systemic changes, i.e. of the entireeconomic circuit, by applying deep and severe reforms, bymobilizing everybody for the negotiation of their country’spolitical, economic, and energy regional independence,some credible results may be obtained.

Azerbaijan, often called the “oil paradox” or the “closedeconomy paradox”6 it the only state in the world that regis-tered a significant economic growth during the worldwidecrisis. According to the experts’ estimates, the Azerbaijaniindustry represents over 70% of the total South-Caucasianeconomy and the overall volume of oil extracted in 2009exceeded 50 million tons, while that of the natural gas went

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reasons that the foreign investors will go on passing up theopportunities existing otherwise on this Caucasian state’smarket and will migrate to Georgia or Azerbaijan. The risksthat foreign investors would have to take are too high.Supported by the Kremlin, but also by some internationalfinancial institutions — for instance, by the IMF — afterthe ceasing of its military conflict with Azerbaijan, Armeniahas managed to reenter the regional commercial circuit.The Russian Federation could not forbid the authorities inYerevan to establish economic connections and bridges tothe South. Such an attitude would have become too costly,all the more so as there are already a great many regionalconflicts that Russia encourages openly or unofficially,under the pretense of protecting its own citizens’ rights. IfEast and West had been off-limits areas for the goods andservices of Armenian origin, all that would have been left todo was to encourage relationships with Iran and Georgia,since Turkey and Azerbaijan were inaccessible markets. TheRussian Federation will remain Armenia’s main economicpartner in the near future. This bilateral relationship is acalculated one, based on pragmatism. Several Europeanstates that have managed to find their way to the Armenianmarket are Italy (investments in the field of constructions),Romania (oil and chemical products, e.g. diesel), Germany(investments in the development of projects for the con-struction of mini-hydro-power plants), and France (telecom-munications, e.g. Orange).

Armenia is by vocation a European state. Its historicaland commercial connections with Europe have determinedthe inclusion of the European integration vector amongthe South-Caucasian state’s main strategies and policies.Armenia counts among the six ex-Soviet states included inthe Eastern Partnership within the European NeighborhoodPolicy. The Joint Action Plan Armenia – EU was signed onNovember 14th, 2006, in Brussels. This document refers toArmenia’s integration in the European political and eco-nomic system (Inside Europe, Armenians in Europe, 2006).

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6 Interview with a political analyst, Yerevan, June 2011.

the encouraging of forms of competition that are inadequatefor the market economy, plus the monopolies and oligo-polies, high-level corruption, the violation of the right ofprivate property, and the excessive involvement of the statein establishing prices — all these signal major deficiencies inthe management of a state’s economic processes and evolu-tions. The authorities intervene in the companies’ activitiesand make an excessive use of price control for goods andservices, as a most efficient measure for preventing anysocial action against the government. In this respect, neitherGeorgia, nor Armenia seems to have made much progress.Prices and tariffs are being controlled or imposed by theauthorities. The liberalization of prices as a market econo-my feature does not work here. Twenty years after the inde-pendence of Azerbaijan was proclaimed, one can still speakof a closed economy, where the access of foreign partners isrestricted, most of the times because of the private interestsof various political leaders in close connection with the gov-ernment. Azerbaijan is a state specialized in the extractionand selling of oil products on the international markets,barely concerned to create efficient development conditionsfor other sectors of the economy. A positive trade balancedoes not necessarily mean the existence of quality economicand financial transformations. Changes occur only in quan-tity, inasmuch as the activities and initiatives of the currentgovernment receive their necessary financial support. If oneis to take into account the above-mentioned processes andphenomena that affect the Azerbaijani economy, then onehas to admit that the results obtained and the success inmaintaining the macro-economic indicators’ growth trendseem to signal an economic paradox. According to the resultspresented by the international organizations in their annualreports, Azerbaijan was the only state in the world to haveregistered a rate of economic growth of about 9% during theworldwide economic crisis. The crisis was felt less, becausethe financial resources from the State Oil Fund were used todiminish the impact of the negative consequences on the

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up to 23.6 billion cubic meters (Nagdalyan, 2009, p. 128).Azerbaijan was and still is associated with oil and naturalgas.7 These resources characterize the Republic of Azerbai-jan, which is now more than ever determined to negotiateits place within the system of international economic rela-tionships. At present, the official policy in Baku is to nego-tiate the country’s position in the region, its economic con-tracts and stability through energy-related instruments,which could lead, at some time in the future, to the exhaus-tion of the Azerbaijani domestic resources. Concentrationon the negotiation of current objectives, on spending theincome of the oil industry, more often than not ignoring anyinvestment in the future of this and other industries is theproof of a mistaken economic development strategy. Thereduced diversity of economic sectors, the lack of conditionsthat may attract both foreign, and domestic investments,

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7 The turning of Azerbaijan into a country with an importantrole in the field of energy started four hundred years ago, when oilwas first extracted from the Absheron peninsula. In 1813, theTsarist Empire took possession of those oil fields and managed themfor some time. In 1859, the Russians built the first oil processingplant in Baku. Until 1872, the Russian Empire was the exclussiveextractor of energy resources from Azerbaijan. It was only after thatyear, when the Russian annulled the system of fiscal buyback in thisdomain, that they had introduced themselves, and declared free theextraction of oil resources, that foreign investors from Great Britain,France, Germany, and the Netherlands were allowed to enter themarket and the oil industry of Azerbaijan. In the early 20th century,half of the oil resources extracted in the world were of Azerbaijaniorigin. Several international companies, including the Rothschildfinancial clan, managed to penetrate the region and, hence, get con-trol not only of the quantities of oil that were extracted, but also ofthe world price of crude oil. The monopoly on the oil extractionindustry allowed them to obtain maximum results with minimuminvestments. As a consequence, the necessity of keeping the industryup-to-date with the technological advances dropped significantly.The technological setback was imminent. In the Soviet years, about70% of the necessities of the Soviet industry were covered by oilresources of an Azerbaijani origin.

In June 2011, the modifications to the law of the StateBudget of the Republic of Azerbaijan (ABC.az, 2011a) cameinto effect. According to the new provisions, the state budg-et income was going to reach 15.554 billion AZN, and theexpenditure 15.941 billion AZN. It should be mentionedhere that the Azerbaijani state budget is an over-centralizedtwo-level budgetary system: the central budget and the localbudget. The central budget was expected to reach the sumtotal of 15.107 billion AZN by the end of 2011 and thecumulated resources of the local budgets (84 administra-tive-territorial units) only 0.447 billion AZN. As far asexpenditure is concerned, the central budget / local budgetproportion was supposed to be 14.633 billion AZN to 1.308billion AZN. After the budgetary adjustments, the budgetof the programs of state investments was supplemented to5.864 billion AZN (ABC.az, 2011b). In 2010, the evolutionof the exports, as presented by the State Committee forStatistics, showed that exports exceeded imports in Azerbai-jan. The volume of foreign trade has reached the sum totalof $27.294 billion, i.e. 31.1% more than in 2009. The exportsof crude oil represented 86.53%, while those of processedoil products only 5.07% (Foreign Trade, Economic Reviewof Azerbaijan, 2011, p. 13). Also from the evolution ofexports in 2010, one notices that most of the Azerbaijaniexports reached EU member-states, while most imports camefrom members of the Community of Independent States.The growth rate of exports was higher than that of imports.Unlike Georgia and Armenia, Azerbaijan is not a member ofthe World Trade Organization. One of the main reasons forwhich its joining the WTO with full rights has been post-poned has to do with the existence of the same state-con-trolled monopolies and oligopolies. For the authorities inTbilisi, the membership of this international organization isan important instrument in their political negotiations withMoscow, which has been talking for about eighteen yearswith the other member-states in order to be accepted as afull-rights member, too. Georgia is but one of the obstacles

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Azerbaijani population. Members of the National BudgetGroup8 (2007) warn that according to a classification madeby the Transparency Commission of the IMF (2007), if acountry has a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in which theoil extraction industry holds more than 25% or the sales ofoil products represents more than 50% of the country’sexports, then we are dealing with an oil-dependent country.The levels of the macro-economic indicators for 2010 con-firm the existence of both conditions in Azerbaijan. Otherfigures that confirm the exaggerated dependence of theAzerbaijani economy on the energy sector or its orientationtowards one single economic sector result from the projectof law for the State Budget of the Republic of Azerbaijan(Ministry of Finances, 2011). On October 22nd, 2010, theAzerbaijani president Ilham Aliyev promulgated the lawregarding the state budget for 2011, according to which thetotal income was meant to reach 12.061 billion AZN9, whilethe expenditure 12.478 billion AZN. The approved budget-ary deficit was 687 million AZN. Over 50% of the statebudget income — 6.48 billion AZN — was going to comefrom the State Oil Fund, other budgetary sources being: thevalue-added tax — 2.121 billion AZN and the income tax —1.21 billion AZN. As far as the expenditure was concerned,the largest budgetary resources were going to be allotted tothe state investment program — 3.38 billion AZN; to edu-cation — 1.338 billion AZN; the army — 1.325 billion AZN.

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8 The National Budget Group is a coalition created in 2006 bynine non-governmental organizations that are financially supportedby the Soros Foundation in Baku. The mission of this group is toincrease transparency regarding the use of public financing in theinterest of the citizens. Its goals are: to improve the budgetary leg-islation, to guarantee the transparency and efficiency of budgetaryexpenditure, to participate in public debates regarding the adminis-tration and distribution of the budgetary ins and outs, to monitorthe process of implementation of the budgetary policy.

9 AZN, or the Azerbaijani manat, the national currency of theRepublic of Azerbaijan.

taken out of its military doctrine the project of joiningNATO and has joined, instead, the Non-Aligned Movement(made up of states that are not going to join any militaryblock) shows that the Azerbaijani president Ilham Aliyevtries to find a proper balance between the political interestsof Russia and those of the West. The existence of monopo-lies has a negative impact on the final consumers, theAzerbaijani citizens. Because of the difficult conditions inwhich they may reach the Azerbaijani market and of thehigh expenses they incur in the process, the investors whomanage to find themselves a place in some local economicniche also establish prices higher than the ones practicedon the regional or world markets. Azerbaijan has a huge,yet unexploited tourist potential, but has not managed so farto become known as a tourist attraction either regionally,or worldwide. Tourism could become, in time, one of thesectors capable to offer complementariness to the energyprojects. Investments in tourism could be a stable source offinancial income for the national budget. The sector of serv-ices, of which tourism is a basic component, requires supportfrom the authorities, especially with regard to the facilitiesprovided to small and medium businesses for access to thismarket, plus the modification of the related legislation. Thedevelopment of services is mandatory. Tourism may become,in time, an alternative to the use of oil resources. Withoutits development, the Azerbaijani economy could suffocatein time, especially if the estimates of experts in the field ofenergy are confirmed and the climax of oil and gas extrac-tion is actually reached in 2020. The exhaustibility of theenergy resources should not be overlooked, even if there isan ever-growing pressure for the implementation of thenewest technologies of oil extraction, that allow for diggingsdown to 7,000 to 10,000 meters. Rural, agricultural tourismis but one of the possibilities of attracting the domesticcapital towards the country’s economy, by supplying it thenecessary conditions to produce added value.

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the Kremlin stumbles upon, since it must have the agreementof all WTO members. Another obstacle has to do with theMoscow leaders’ philosophy of action and with the require-ments and rules regarding the world markets, that they donot observe. In Baku, at least, there is this general idea thatAzerbaijan will become a member of the WTO only afterRussia has been accepted as a full member of this interna-tional economic structure. The reason is the same as in thecase of Moscow: the excessive dependence of economic sta-bility on the sales of oil products and the state’s involvementin price control, plus, presumably, the hostility of Armenia,that joined the organization on February 5th, 2003.10

The Azerbaijani trade is still oriented towards the RussianFederation and the regional economic initiatives, especiallycreated by Moscow to maintain its influence in the ex-Sovietcountries. Most Azerbaijani imports come from Russia. TheRussian Federation seems to hold the position as one ofAzerbaijan’s most important economic partners. Besides thefamily connections of the current Azerbaijani president withRussia and Russian businessmen, there are figures that speakfor themselves about the Kremlin’s potential influence onthe only South-Caucasian state able to partially guaranteefor its political independence: Russia is Azerbaijan’s thirdmajor partner as far as the imported goods are concernedand the eighth in the total volume of exported goods.11 It isno longer Azerbaijan’s main trade partner, as it used to be,but still has control over certain major economic sectors.The Russian Federation leaders insist on remaining amongthe world energy dealers who make the rules of the game onthe international markets. Russia purchases Azerbaijani gasat prices higher than the ones it uses with other trade part-ners.12 Moreover, experts say, the fact that Azerbaijan has

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10 Interview with an expert in the transparent use of the fundscoming from oil sales, Baku, June 2011.

11 Interview with officials, Baku, June 2011.12 Interview with an expert in energy security, Bucharest, August

2011.

great powers — the US and the EU primarily — in orderto maintain political and economic stability in the region.Georgia is a defining element of the bridge connecting theEuropean markets to the energy resources of the Caspian Seaarea. Moreover, it is part of the East-West transport corri-dors for goods and, since Armenia was denied participationin several projects related to South Caucasus as a region,Tbilisi took over part of Armenian’s role, thus managing tomultiply the economic advantages of its political orienta-tion towards the EU and the United States. Although itdoes not possess energy resources, like Azerbaijan does, thisCaucasian state is attractive simply because it has managedto join some forms of regional and international integration.Georgia is a member of the World Trade Organization andconforms to the norms, behavior, and standards the organi-zation upholds. The fact that it has renounced its member-ship in the CIS after the August 2008 war has allowedGeorgia to remain a signing part of the treaties it had adheredto before that. Thus, the documents in question allowGeorgia to keep participating in certain economic exchangeswithin the CIS and promoting its goods on the markets ofthe ex-Soviet states. The relationship between Georgia andthe EU was made official in 1996, when the Partnership andCooperation Agreement was signed; it stipulated that Tbilisiwould receive technical assistance and help to develop bilat-eral relations in several sectors, including the economic one.The document came into effect in 1999. Later, Georgiadecided to establish that integration in the EU was a prior-ity of its foreign policy. The following actions of the Tbilisigovernment were directed towards the signing of the JointAction Plan Georgia — EU (European Commission, 2006),which occurred on October 6th, 2006. As the other twoSouth-Caucasian states, Georgia is part of the EasternPartnership, within the European Neighborhood Policy. Thecountry seems to have changed its attitude towards Irantoo, since it is more and more intent on turning into anattractive market for the Iranian investors; however, unlike

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Georgia: The Georgian authorities’ pattern of economicdevelopment is based on neo-liberal principles and ideas.Their implementation presupposes the adoption of certainmeasures among which encouraging the loyal competition,liberalizing the market, but also limiting the involvement ofthe state in economy only to exceptional circumstances.The so-called Economic Freedom Act was also adopted inGeorgia, which lowers the likelihood of the state authorityincreasing taxes (Georgia Times, 2011). The contents of thatdocument, says the Georgian Minister of Finances DmitriGvindadze, make it less likely that the economic factorsbecome discontent, thus guaranteeing a fiscal stability. Likethe Republic of Azerbaijan, Georgia does not control itsentire territory. After the August 2008 Russo-Georgianconflict, Abkhazia and South Ossetia proclaimed their inde-pendence from Tbilisi and the Russian Federation plus fourother states, including Venezuela, have recognized them assuch. Today, Abkhazia and South Ossetia are being sup-ported financially from the Russian budget and treated as ifthey were actually parts of the Federation.13 This situationis likely to produce tension between Georgia and Russia andto offer a good subject of political disputes, which are ofteninvoked as pretexts for avoiding real economic reforms.After 2003, when the Rose Revolution took place, the newgovernment had to take over the government affairs, whichwere in a deplorable state. Economic reforms were not ade-quately applied, so as to encourage a real transition to amarket economy. The same pattern was followed as in theentire ex-Soviet space: an illegal privatization of the strategicobjectives, tolerance for corruption, a meager concern forattracting foreign investments. Georgia’s foreign debt hadexceeded $1.5 billion and over 50% of the country’s popu-lation were living under the limit of poverty (Guseynov,2008, p. 295). This state of affairs was overcome due to theexternal financial support and the interest shown by the

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13 Interview with a Georgian official, Tbilisi, May 2011.

Georgia has to become a model of actual economic develop-ment, to keep on encouraging and implementing economicreforms. Transformation has to be a systemic one; the factthat Georgia is being firmly sustained by the internationalcommunity in its endeavor to integrate in the worldwideeconomic circuit represents not only de iure, but also de factoan advantage in negotiating the country’s national interests.

2. The importance of developing the business environmentand the factors that influence its evolution

From an economic point of view, South Caucasus can bestudied as a regional unitary system, but also separately,each of its elements in turn. To have an overview of theregion, however, it was necessary to make a retrospectiveanalysis of the national economy of each South-Caucasianstate, in order to grasp its internal particularities and neces-sities. Each state does not have the same economic needs.From this point of view, Azerbaijan is totally independentor tends towards a different regional integration system,for various reasons: cultural and historical affinities, sharedvalues and principles, political dependence or independ-ence. One thing is for sure: this region requires a complexapproach, even if there are attempts at having specializedapproaches according to the economic sectors: metallurgicalindustry, energy industry, or petro-chemical industry (Kav-kazia.net, 2011). It is the only way to come up with feasiblestrategies for the promotion of certain investment projectsin the region. Any democratic government should establishas its purpose to guarantee the prosperity and well-being ofits citizens, so they do not feel threatened or having theirinterests affected in any way. Guaranteeing the protectionand promotion of human rights and liberties, includingthrough the adoption of various international norms andprinciples contained in the documents signed and ratified,is the first step towards a successful dialogue between stateand citizen.

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the Armenian ones, the authorities in Tbilisi have a muchmore diversified network of bilateral partnerships, whichgreatly expands their freedom of action in the Black Seaarea.14 Turkey and the Ukraine are important partners ofGeorgia’s. The partnerships with these two countries allowfor the access of Georgian products on the European market.After the August 2008 Russo-Georgian conflict, the activityof the Georgian port of Batumi was temporarily suspended.Following that conflict, neighboring Armenia suffered lossesof over $600 million, a huge sum for this South-Caucasiancountry’s economy.15 While Georgia received an extremelyimportant political and financial support from severalWestern partners, which made it possible for the country toovercome the economic recession, Armenia did not receiveany similar support, given its relationships with the RussianFederation, so it could not cover or recover at least some ofthe losses it had experienced. Eduard Nagdalyan (2011, p.127) confirms the theory that Georgia’s economic salvationbecame possible because of the Russo-Georgian war, whileArmenia and Azerbaijan did not enjoy the same externalsupport: “On the one hand, the dynamics of the Georgianeconomy was damaged by the war, but, however paradoxi-cal it may seem, in accordance with the opinions shared byseveral Georgian experts, it was the war itself that saved theGeorgian crisis-stricken economy. One has to consider the$4.5 billion worth of financial support offered to Georgia byinternational donors, so it may face the outcome of the warwith Russia. Of this money, $2 billion came from the USgrant.” The lack of natural resources of its own, as well asthe tensioned relationship with Russia because of the latter’srecognition of the independence of Abkhazia and SouthOssetia have oriented Georgia’s economy towards Westernstructures. For the reintegration of its territories, however,

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14 Interview with an expert in European integration, Tbilisi, May2011.

15 Interview with an official, Yerevan, June 2011.

A further condition for restoring the stability of theSouth-Caucasian states’ national economies is the adop-tion or modification of the anti-monopoly codes. A lotof businesses are confronted with the same problem: theycannot penetrate the markets because there are no adequateconditions for a loyal competition. In Azerbaijan, the projectof modification of the anti-monopoly code is being financedby the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA)Foundation and the Eurasia Foundation. The law project isunder discussion. It was estimated that the law would beratified by the Azerbaijani parliament by the end of October2011. The problems with legislation hinder the economicprogress, too. The Azerbaijani society is conservative enoughand finds it difficult to accept new initiatives or proposalsfor the modification of legislation, even if is required by theinternational institutions and organizations of whichAzerbaijan is a member. If a law project opposes the inter-ests of a certain business group, then its adoption and rati-fication is significantly hindered or else it is rejected by theMilli Majlis18.

The measures taken by the authorities in Baku can onlybe qualified as populist. The reducing of prices for the basicfood products can not compensate for the necessity ofmodifying the national strategy for economic development.Moreover, the state is omnipresent in the establishing ofmarket prices, which is inadmissible in a country with analleged market economy. In all three South-Caucasian states,economic decisions are being influenced by the monopoliesand oligopolies. However, there is a major structural differ-ence: while in Georgia and Armenia, the oligarchs are bothin power, and in the opposition, in Azerbaijan, the opposi-tion is not backed by any monopolists or oligarchs whomight support its initiatives. The only certain thing is thatpolitical and economic decisions are being dictated by theinterests of some private groups. Although the government

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Observing the right to private property is part of theendeavor towards the transformation of the ex-Soviet states’economies and transition to the market economy. Unfortu-nately, there are difficulties in all three South-Caucasianstates regarding the guaranteeing of this right. The right toprivate property is transitory: it is guaranteed in the consti-tutions, but in reality it is not fully protected. The authori-ties in the three states do not seem interested in this aspectof their activity, so that elementary rights are often beingflagrantly violated, which ultimately makes the investorslose their interest to invest in the economy of this state orpostpone the decision to export their capital surplus abroad.If an investor is not completely sure that his financialinvestments are secure, he leaves the market where he acti-vates or avoids it. Many industrial sectors need such foreignfinancial injections of capital that are accompanied, most ofthe time, by the implementation of the latest achievementsof technological progress in the production processes or inthe services offered on the market. The indefinite post-poning of the necessary steps in order to guarantee privateproperty protection may trigger a similar postponing of themodernization of the economy and, by way of consequence,of the other governmental institutions. Transition to themarket economy requires the authorities’ support for privateinitiatives, it implies monitoring the main processes andoffering security guarantees for the representatives of thebusiness environment who choose to involve themselves byinvesting in the private sector. Here are just two of manypossible examples: in Azerbaijan, the houses taken in orderto built a winter palace in the central area of Baku16 or, inArmenia, the mere existence in Yerevan of the NGO Victimsof State Interests, whose purpose it is to protect the interestsand rights of the people who have become victims of thestate17.

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16 Interview with a human rights expert, Baku, June 2011.17 Interview with a human rights expert, Yerevan, June 2011..

18 The Azerbaijani name of the Parliamentary Assembly of theRepublic of Azerbaijan.

Encouraging the capital to go outside its country oforigin may be a sign of improvement in a state’s main eco-nomic indicators. One of the largest companies in the Cau-casus that has managed to acquire an international presenceimpressive by the size of the projects it develops outside itscountry of origin is the Azerbaijani state oil companySOCAR19, whose management has initiated a lot of energyprojects outside Azerbaijan.

Fighting corruption is yet another element of the qual-itative transformation of any state’s business environment.In Azerbaijan, fighting against this scourge has intensifiedsince the outbreak of the Arab revolutions. The authoritiesin Baku came up with the idea of creating an Anti-CorruptionCommittee that has had results mostly locally. Fighting cor-ruption at high level or even at a medium level remains aproblem. Georgia is confronted with a similar phenomenon;the fight against corruption has yielded results only at lowadministrative levels Georgia has made significant progressin fighting corruption, being a regional leader by now inrepelling this negative phenomenon with a strong impact onthe investors’ decisions when they analyze the level of safetyof a potential investment. Moreover, the phenomenon ofcorruption is likely to hinder the process of liberalization ofthe EU visa regime for a long time.20 However, it is an every-day reality in the three South-Caucasian states. Its eradicationis attempted in official statements more than by applyingconcrete measures.

The two decades of independence have not created thenecessary conditions for building up a common economicspace in the South-Caucasian region. This characteristic of

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circles admit that it is important to have a strategy by whichto fight the monopolies and oligopolies, the three states donot have any efficient programs to this purpose.

The existence of monopolies and oligopolies may beeradicated with the help of two types of factors:

– Internal ones, by perceiving the need to create a healthycompetitive environment, which implies the modification ofthe legislation according to the requirements of the worldmarket and of the economically-oriented internationalorganizations;

– External ones, like the “Arab revolutions”, which mayreach the South-Caucasian states as well if firm decisions tointroduce some systemic reforms are not adopted.

Although foreign investors are confronted with numer-ous problems when they decide to penetrate the markets ofthe South-Caucasian states, their presence is important. Ifthe high level of corruption can be ignored and with theexisting legislative gaps that affect the financial sector andthe foreign investments, it is worthy mentioning here thatthe main threat for the growth in volume of the private ini-tiatives is due to the frozen conflicts in the region. Over thepast twenty years since their independence was proclaimed,all three South-Caucasian states were confronted with openmilitary conflicts. However, the amount of foreign invest-ments in the area confirms that none of the sides involvedin those regional conflicts advocates the idea of solving themthrough military force, even though the conflicts continueto exist in a latent form. If there were a real danger that suchmilitary actions break out again, then most of the foreigninvestors would withdraw to protect their investments. Thereis a high enough rate of withdrawal of the foreign investors,but this phenomenon is not actually based on political argu-ments, but rather on a domestic policy applied in a wrongway, which may be reduced to the causes mentioned earlier:corruption, disloyal competition and a legislation that doesnot correspond to the current realities and requirements ofthe worldwide market.

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19 SOCAR is one of the world’s largest oil companies, acting onthe basis of an indivisible state policy, in order to improve theadministrative structure of the Azerbaijani oil industry, as well as tooffer the possibility of developing the oil-based energy complex ofAzerbaijan. SOCAR was founded in 1992, following the fusion oftwo state-owned oil companies: Azerneft and Azneftkimiya.

20 Interview with an expert, Tbilisi, May 2011.

its influence in South Caucasus through various regionalprojects and initiatives of an economic nature. Moreover,the outdated energy infrastructure and the lack of financialmeans necessary to achieve immediate modernizations haveall but annihilated the possibility of developing this sector.Adding to this the incorrect privatization of the networks ofdistribution of the final energy products or their preserva-tion under state ownership, that is hardly concerned withachieving reforms in this respect, a desolating picture resultsof one of the most important areas of the economy, whosemalfunctioning may ultimately contribute to the aggrava-tion of social troubles, the way it happened during the eco-nomic crisis of the last decade of the previous century. Theenergy-related policies and strategies of the three states haveundergone difficult processes of transformation that morethan once led to the outbreak of acute crises, the conse-quences of which were mostly felt by the citizens. The weakindustrial and energy infrastructure inherited from the USSR,the imperfect institutional system, political elite unpreparedfor the new challenges and social needs, plus the necessityof accepting and assuming the new statuses of independentstates led to the deepening of the economic crises in theentire ex-Soviet space. The efficient implementation of cer-tain strategies of energy security of the various states impliesthe using of a complex system of mechanisms and instru-ments, both externally, and domestically, in order to success-fully reach the energy-related strategic objectives (Infosfera,Bucharest, 2011). But they have been unable to deal withall the challenges. All this, cumulated with the non-uniformdistribution of natural resources, explains the different ratesof qualitative systemic transformation of the three states, aswell as the establishing of a hierarchy with respect to theimportance of choosing each state’s direction of politicalorientation: some have managed to connect to Europeanforms of cooperation, others keep hesitating between Eastand West and between several forms of regional integration.

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the region is based on the existence of several political diver-gences between the three states, on private interests, on theway each state approaches the problems it is confrontedwith or its relationships with the great world powers havinggeo-strategic interests in the area. The creation of a commoneconomic space, after the European pattern, for instance,would inevitably lead to the growth of the South-Caucasianattractiveness for the potential Western and Asian investors.Moreover, it would create the preconditions for the acces-sing of economic integration formats, whether European orinternational. All three South-Caucasian states have signedJoined Action Plans with the European Union and havebeen included in the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP)through the Eastern Partnership that was initiated withinthe ENP in 2008, at the initiative of Poland and Sweden,and has been implemented from the spring of 2009 on. Themain benefit of such an intra-regional cooperation is theguaranteeing of economic security. To lay the foundations ofa form of regional integration, the South-Caucasian statesshould continue the reforms initiated more than a decadeago, because a lot of negative economic phenomena typicalfor the ex-Soviet countries are capable of slowing down evenmore the processes of transition to the market economyand, by way of consequence, of lowering down the interestfor investments.

II. The Economy of Energy-Related Policies inSouth Caucasus

Most of the disfunctionality in the economic sector andin that of energy security in the South-Caucasian states hasto do with the process of dissolution of the Soviet Union.The international recognition of the political independencehas not necessarily brought about the economic or energy-related independence from the rightful heir of the SovietUnion, i.e. from the Russian Federation, which has maintained

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1. Energy resources, economy, and energy policies

After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the warbetween Armenia and Azerbaijan immediately following it,during which the Russian Federation upheld the cause ofArmenia, the latter was confronted with heavy problems ofan economic nature, but most of all with an acute energycrisis. Azerbaijan stopped supplying Armenia with naturalgas, which interrupted the adequate charging of the gaspipeline built on the territory of Georgia and put on holdthe railroad traffic that crossed Abkhazia and connectedRussia to Georgia and Armenia. Although the authorities inYerevan have been supported by the Kremlin during theirtwo decades of independence, the good diplomatic relationsbetween the two sides have not managed to compensate thenegative effects of the political and economic isolation ofthe South-Caucasian state. Unlike Azerbaijan, Armenia doesnot have oil and natural gas resources, its necessary energyboth for consume, and the economy being imported fromthe Russian Federation. In 1997, a company with a mixed,Russo-Armenian capital, called ArmRosGazprom wascreated, whose officially declared purpose was to rebuildArmenia’s energy infrastructure and to resume the supply-ing of natural gas through the only functional gas pipelinethat connected Georgia to the Russian energy system to theNorth with the Armenian one to the South. Thus, Russiamanaged to reestablish Yerevan’s energy supplying system.Unfortunately for the Armenian economy, Russia later alsomanaged to purchase up to 80% of the ArmRosGazpromstock, which could not have had any other buyers, due to itshaving been structured as society with a closed-type stock.Even if the bilateral relations between Russia and Armeniaseemed to be privileged ones, the necessity of taking supple-mentary measures for Armenia’s guaranteeing its own ener-gy security was imminent. There were several possibilitiesto diversify the number of energy suppliers, but all shouldaim, ultimately, at obtaining independence from Russia:

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An economic system becomes stable when all its componentshave their resources assured for a satisfactory functioning.The energy policy is the basic component of any developedeconomy. Without encouraging well-justified initiatives inthis field, no political party will succeed to implement itsgoverning programs and will hence, fuel up even more theelectorate’s discontent. As mentioned earlier, South Cau-casus has many energy sources of several types, but theirunequal distribution has been determining in the establish-ment of the multilateral and bilateral relationships betweenthe region’s constituent states. Cumulated with the politicalcontroversies, i.e., with the conflicts existing betweenAzerbaijan and Armenia or between the Russian Federationand Georgia, they have drawn the attention of the interna-tional public opinion on the processes and phenomenaoccurring in the region. Oil and natural gas are the two ele-ments that transform South Caucasus, making it attractivefor political and financial investments. The authorities’incapacity to alleviate the controversies between govern-ment and opposition, as well as the legislative gaps in thedomain of investments, plus the presence of monopolies andcorruption significantly reduce the possibilities of implement-ing the latest technological results, so the modernization ofeconomy remains uncertain.

South Caucasus also has multiple development possi-bilities and nobody can contest it. This is where the mainEast-West and North-South routes of transport for goodsand commodities intersect, where connections betweenEurope and Asia are made, where opportunities are createdfor the improvement of the routes of access towards theenergy resources of the Caspian Sea basin, that are neces-sary to the economies of the developed states. The imple-mentation of independent energy-related policies meant tofurther the interests of nations, not of the governing elites,is an essential condition for economic modernization.

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Armenia was a real alternative solution for the transporta-tion of the energy products of Russian origin. The Kremlinofficials decided to subsidize the Armenian citizens’ con-sumption of natural gas, by transferring to the Armeniangovernment’s accounts partial compensations for the newtariffs meant to grow between 2009 and 2011, which werebeing imposed on the final consumers, but also to partiallyfinance the works of the Iran – Armenia pipeline, by invest-ing about $550 million. This is an energy-related response,but its final purpose is to sustain Russia’s own politicalobjectives. The two partner states involved in the develop-ment of the project went on working on it. The official dataabout the project claim that 2.3 billion cubic meters of gascould be supplied to Armenia through this pipeline, whichwould cover fully the needs of the Armenian economy.23

The peculiarity of the project is this: at this moment, all thenecessary natural gas for Armenia is being ensured byRussia through the gas pipeline crossing the territory ofGeorgia. After the bilateral economic relationship betweenMoscow and Tbilisi was resumed, Yerevan managed to sta-bilize its energy system. However, gas is still being suppliedthrough the Iran – Armenia pipeline. The energy resourcesreach Armenia, where they are transformed into electricpower in the Armenian power plants, then exported back toIran.24

Armenia wishes to develop viable energy-related policies.The domestic conditions and the nature of the country’srelationships with its neighbor countries require that con-crete measures be taken, as mentioned above. After theFukushima disaster, the subject of using nuclear energy hasbeen debated publicly more and more. Several states —Germany especially — have declared themselves willing to

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“We think it is necessary to obtain an alternative to theRussian solution for energy needs; therefore, it is useful toget closer to Romania and Bulgaria”21. The representativesof the academic environment also seem to confirm the ideathat the Russian Federation is upset by the energy-relatedinitiatives of the Armenian authorities. According to thepublic opinion in Yerevan, the state’s energy security shouldnot rely on oil and gas alone. The energy strategy should bediversified and the private initiatives meant to multiply theenergy-related potential from alternative sources: solar ener-gy, wind energy, and hydro-energy, should be supported. Theauthorities in Yerevan will also sustain the development ofnuclear energy. The international debate gained momentumafter the March 2011 earthquake in Japan that brought con-siderable damage to the Fukushima nuclear plant. Thereare, though, divided opinions that depend on the interestsand resources of the states active in the region: France,Great Britain, Russia, the Ukraine, and Romania will notrenounce nuclear energy, but consolidate this sector.22 Onthe other hand, there is an equally sound opinion that mostenergy-related projects, especially those in which the oil andnatural gas pipelines are being charged from Azerbaijan,avoid Armenia. This is not the best solution for the Azer-baijani energy policy, because it increases considerably theexpenses necessary for the development of regional oil-relat-ed projects. This attitude, although not justified economi-cally, enjoys a political support, even at international level,due to the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh. There is only onesolution left, and that is to look towards the Arab world, i.e.towards the same Iran Armenia intended to sign severalenergy-related treaties with, which conflicts with theRussian Federation’s foreign policy interests in the region.The project of a natural gas transit pipeline from Iran to

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23 The Russo-Armenian Interaction and Regional Problems. Papers ofthe International Conference of June 5th, 2010, Yerevan, NAAPET, 2011,p. 19.

24 Ibidem.

21 Interview with an official, Yerevan, June 2011.22 Interview with an expert in energy security, Bucharest, August

2011.

To serve this purpose, another mixed capital company wascreated in 2008, which was meant to conduct geologicalresearch, as well as to extract uranium and other mineralsfrom the Armenian territory. This company is called the“The Russo-Armenian company for mining extractions”; atpresent, Yerevan is being connected judicially to the AngarskInternational Center for the enrichment of uranium.25

During its twenty years of independence, Azerbaijan’senergy policy has constantly been in focus by the authori-ties. It has always served the promotion of the country’s for-eign policy interests and has been an efficient instrumentfor maintaining stable relationships with most of Azerbai-jan’s partners. In fact, the energy policy of the Baku admin-istration tries to create a more diverse network of clients forthe energy resources it possesses. It is a correct and respon-sible attitude, according to the specialists in the transparentuse of the income resulting from the trading of oil, whoargue that the aggressive energy policy that Azerbaijan prac-tices today is the best strategy available; it is implementedthrough SOCAR, the Azerbaijani state oil company. Theresults are not only economic in nature, but mainly geo-political, since they become visible at regional level. The mostimportant component of the Azerbaijani foreign policy isenergy-related aggressiveness.26 It offers the Baku authoritiesa political independence in the process of decision-makingnot only in the South-Caucasian space, turning Azerbaijan

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renounce this type of energy sources on a medium term, butnot Armenia, on whose territory one of the most dangerousnuclear plants still exists, that of Metsamor. It is over thirtyyears old and situated in a delicate seismic area (WorldNuclear Association, 2010), only thirty kilometers awayfrom the Armenian capital, Yerevan. In 2007, the Armenianauthorities adopted a new energy strategy that confirmedthat the state is not going to renounce nuclear energy, eventhough the EU suggested that Armenia should gradually giveit up (European Commission, 2006a, p. 8). The same recom-mendation was reiterated in the evaluation reports of theJoint Action Plan Armenia – EU (A1plus.am, 2011). GivenArmenia’s energy situation, i.e., the existence of a minimumnumber of energy partners, Yerevan does not show anydesire to stop developing such plants, especially since it hassufficient quantities of uranium on its territory. In 2006,the Armenian government made public its intentions tobegin working on a new energy project: the construction ofyet another nuclear plant. The first steps in this directionwere made in 2009, when the Armenian parliament votedin favor of the law regarding the creation of a Russo-Armeniancompany called Metsamorenergoatom, meant to build thenew plant. The project costs reach up to $5 billion, with ausability of 60 years. It is estimated that this nuclear elec-tric plant will become operational in 2016. It will supplyelectricity for domestic consumption, but not for the entireArmenian economy. This is why the authorities in Yerevanhave decided to support the project of building the nuclearplant with Russian capital, although it was initially estimat-ed that the investment would be a German and Americanone. To obtain the German and American support for theinitiative, Georgia had to be associated to the project, sincethe latter would have received foreign support for the projectdevelopment, which would have led to the improvement ofArmenia’s own political position in the region.

Cooperation in the field of nuclear energy represents anew stage of the Russo-Armenian economic relationships.

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25 The first meeting of the commission for the creation of aninternational center for the enrichment of uranium took place in2006, under the auspices of the Russian company Rosatom. At thatfirst meeting the concept, the judicial form, and the future forms ofcooperation between the center and the International Atomic EnergyAgency (IAEA) were discussed. The center is part of a network ofinternational centers for the studying of the process of uraniumenrichment. The Angarsk center was initially meant to treat onlyuranium produced in Russia and Kazakhstan. It is situated nearLake Baikal, in Siberia.

26 Interview with an expert in economy, Baku, June 2011.

For Azpetrol, conquering the Moldovan market representedan outstanding opportunity to penetrate the Europeanmarkets. Yet the company ceased all its activities soon after.This withdrawal had to do with events that took place inthe Azerbaijani political life. Azpetrol was controlled by theMinistry of Economic Development of the Republic of Azer-baijan. In October 2005, the acting Minister of EconomicDevelopment in Baku, Farhad Aliyev (Aze.az, 2007a) wasarrested, being charged with an attempted coup d’état andwith exceeding his attributions. His brother, Rafik Aliyev,former president of Azpetrol, was later also put under arrestfor money laundering. The latter has recently been releasedfrom prison, however.

At present, Azpetrol has a reduced presence even on theAzerbaijani domestic market: it only administrates 66 oilrefueling stations and five natural gas-based ones (Azpetrol,2011). SOCAR was one of the potential buyers that negoti-ated the takeover of the Azpetrol stock.27 To reduce the neg-ative effects of the worldwide economic crisis, SOCAR wasthe company that financed the Azerbaijani non-oil-relatedsector. Thus, in 2010, over 60% of the investments in theRepublic of Azerbaijan were of domestic origin. Even so, thesectors of the Azerbaijani industry that are not directly con-nected to energy still suffer from insufficient financing.

Problems occur when the distribution of income is doneunfairly and other sectors of the economy receive insuffi-cient funding for the implementation of economic modern-ization, in the light industry or in agriculture, for instance.Surely, their current energy allows the Azerbaijani authori-ties more than any other to dribble among the geo-strategicobjectives of the regional great actors, sustaining also theirown endeavor to make this South-Caucasian state into themain link in the region, that must be consulted when deci-sions are being made regarding the foreign policy vectors of

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into a necessary state, one that possesses the resources itneeds in order to sustain a certain type of negotiation. TheAzerbaijani company SOCAR is most important to Romaniain the bilateral projects of energy investments. In the nearfuture, SOCAR intends to open over 300 gas stations inRomania. According to SOCAR representatives in Romania,the Azerbaijani company’s penetration on the Romanianmarket will contribute to the lowering of fuel prices. Thereis political will and economic potential for the developmentof such projects, but the SOCAR management is very cau-tious when it comes to foreign investments. One of the argu-ments for such an attitude is the type of negotiationsbetween the Russians and the Azerbaijanis on energy-relat-ed projects, the details of which are never made public; thecompany’s strategy is to discuss small- and medium-sizedprojects in which it does not commit itself excessively froma financial point of view. This may explain why SOCAR hasonly acquired a couple of fuel stations in the Moldavianpart of Romania so far. SOCAR also negotiates its penetra-tion on the markets in Bulgaria, Serbia, the Ukraine, andthe Republic of Moldova. In Bulgaria, the SOCAR represen-tatives negotiate the taking over of the single oil refininginstallation, Neftochim, which is controlled by the Russiancompany Lukoil. The negotiating process for the acquisitionof the Neftochim stock began in the context of the disputebetween the Bulgarian custom authorities and the manage-ment of Lukoil, when the Russians’ license was temporarilywithdrawn for not having monitored the production processwithin the time-limit they had negotiated with the Bulgarianauthorities. Ultimately, the disagreement led to the cease ofall oil-refining activities at the Burgas refinery during amonth and a half (Vedomosti, 2011).

The interest for the Moldovan market is neither new, norfortuitous. At the end of 2003, the Azpetrol Companyentered the Moldovan market with the intention of takingover the construction of the Giurgiuleºti oil terminal andlater of building up a nationwide network of gas stations.

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27 Interview with an economic expert and an expert in the trans-parent use of the income of processed oil sales, Baku, June 2011.

not seem to grasp this reality when they orientate the state’seconomy towards one single industrial sector. The State OilFund of the Republic of Azerbaijan (2011) was created in1999.29 The most recent estimates said that in 2011SOFAZ would have accumulated over $30 billion, i.e. $10billion more than in 2009 (ABC.az, 2011c). This estimatedfigure was surpassed in July of last year. Thus, according tothe data presented by SOFAZ representatives on June 28th,2011, the State Oil Fund’s reserves had reached the sumtotal of $30.2 billion (ABC.az, 2011d). The growth of theFund’s reserves had been made possible, the same SOFAZrepresentatives added, thanks to the successful implementa-tion of the national oil strategy conceived by the leader ofthe nation, Ilham Aliyev (ibidem). The amount reached bythis reserve fund for the future is projected to reach $50 bil-lion in 2050. This State Oil Fund that gathers up the moneyresulting from the sales of oil products is being administeredinefficiently, say the experts in the transparent use of statefunds, because the money is destined to projects that aremuch too ambitious for the authorities to be able to execute.Among the SOFAZ-financed projects, there are several ini-tiatives meant to reform the country’s educational system,especially to attract back home the young people who studyabroad, there is financial support for the project of buildinga new railroad connection Baku – Tbilisi – Kars or for theconstruction of a pipeline for transporting drinking waterfrom the Oguz-Obala area to the capital city Baku (but thisis very difficult to put into practice, because of a very poor-ly developed infrastructure), as there are other initiatives

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the South-Caucasian actors. The other leaders’ willingnessto consult with the Baku authorities regarding the evolutionof the region turns out to be, as mentioned earlier, one ofthe outcomes of practicing the right energy-related policy.No one can deny that the Azerbaijani leadership has madeconsiderable progress in this field, guaranteeing itself also astable dialogue with Moscow. The interests of an economicnature are at least as important as the political ones. It isvery difficult for the Baku government to keep a balancebetween the great powers’ energy, economic, and politicalinterests in the region of South Caucasus, yet there exists apositive trend in this direction.28

One of the problems that Azerbaijan is confronted withnowadays has to do with the transparent distribution of theincome obtained from the energy sector. There is limitedaccess to public information about the way in which thefunds accumulated after the trading of energy products arebeing spent and their administration is not efficient. Thus,the transparency of decision-making, which should be acharacteristic of a democratic state, remains just a desidera-tion, and proves hard to implement. Private interests prevailover the national ones. The Azerbaijani economy is fullydependent on its energy sector, even if the Baku authoritiesinsist that the other economic sectors are given the sameattention by the government. The following question shouldbe asked: What will happen in twenty years’ time to aneconomy dependent on oil and gas? Experts in the transpar-ent use of the income of the energy sector state that only15% of the Azerbaijani state budget consists of taxes andimpositions, the remaining 85% coming from payments forthe state’s energy-related contracts. An idea circulating amongthe economic experts is that the Azerbaijani oil is turninginto a “curse of Azerbaijan”. The explanation for this is onlylogical and accessible enough: the oil and gas resources areexhaustible, hence limited in time, but the authorities do

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29 SOFAZ, the State Oil Fund of the Republic of Azerbaijan, wascreated by Decree of the President of Azerbaijan, issued onDecember 29th, 1999. The purpose of SOFAZ was to guarantee theequality between generations with regard to the advantages to beobtained by the exploitation of the country’s oil resources. Theendeavor for today’s economic welfare must lead to the guarantee-ing of economic stability for the future generations — this is thephilosophy behind the State Oil Fund of the Republic of Azerbaijan.28 Interview with a political analyst, Baku, June 2011.

Georgia’s dependence on the Russian energy resources hasbeen felt during its two decades of political independence,but, nevertheless, this has not affected the country’s interestin applying an energy policy based on diversifying thesources of oil and natural gas. The international publicopinion often tends to associate this South-Caucasian statewith protests, with violations of human rights, and with theAugust 2008 Russo-Georgian conflict, in the aftermath ofwhich the authorities in Tbilisi decided to leave the Com-munity of Independent States and only remain affiliated tothis form of regional cooperation through treaties alreadysigned, that are still in effect.

Georgia’s energy strategy is based on a simple philosophyof action: diversifying the sources from which the necessaryoil and natural gas are being supplied, both for the economicsector, and for the end-users, with a slight orientationtowards integrating the country’s own energy sector in theEU-supported projects. Unlike the Republic of Moldovaand the Ukraine, Georgia has not yet signed the EnergyCommunity Treaty, but has been accepted as an observer ofthe European Energy Community on December 18th, 2007(EEC, 2007). The delay in Georgia’s participation in thevarious European initiatives related to energy is also geo-graphically explained, Georgian experts say. The Republic ofMoldova and the Ukraine have common borders with theEuropean Union, so it is easier for them to access the variousprograms destined to the states included in the EuropeanNeighborhood Policy and in other forms of cooperation.30

Georgia’s connection to the European Union energy pro-grams will only be possible through Turkey. But, to obtaintheir energy independence from the Russian Federation, theauthorities in Tbilisi have to accommodate the legislationthat regulates the Georgian energy sector to EU standardsand norms. Although the EU does not seem interested toencourage a regional solidarity with regard to energy, mainly

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meant to improve the situation of the refugees from theNagorno-Karabakh area. Since 2001, SOFAZ has been pay-ing over 765 million AZN to improve the living conditionsof the refugees having settled in various parts of Azerbaijan,but mainly in Baku.

The usefulness of the State Oil Fund of the Republic ofAzerbaijan is being questioned by the economic experts whoargue that only 5% of the total financial resources goingthere are destined for long-term projects, i.e. for investmentsin the future, in the next generations. The remaining 95%are being distributed for present-day projects that moreoften than not lack well-documented feasibility studies,even if they are conceived by foreign partners. For instance,the feasibility study for the pipeline meant to supply drink-ing-water to Baku was made with the help of a Germancompany, CES Consulting Engineers, and cost over 2.1 mil-lion AZN. But not all projects meant to be supported finan-cially by SOFAZ are long-term ones. The money is invested,it produces an economic circuit, but its profitability is onlyshort-term and has nothing to do with future generations.The conclusion at hand is that the Azerbaijani governmentdoes not have economic sustainability in mind. Diversifyingthe sources of energy is one possibility, but diversifying theproduction of goods and services and supporting the existingones, with no connection to the energy sector, is the onlychance for guaranteeing the country’s economic, social, andeven political security. The concentration of companies inthe cities, especially in the capital city of Baku, reduces thepossibility of making any major investments in the country-side. To illustrate, it is worth mentioning that 93% of thetaxes and impositions collected by the state budget come fromcompanies having their official address in the capital city ofAzerbaijan. The rest of the country contributes only 7%.

Georgia is not an independent state from the point ofview of energy. Most of the time, the Georgian civil societycalls upon the administration to make some political con-cessions for the purpose of gaining its energy independence.

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30 Interview with an energy expert, Tbilisi, May 2011.

proclamation of independence of the separatist region andits recognition by the Russian Federation. That is why theGeorgian authorities have no right to initiate the procedureof privatization of the hydro-electric power plant, with theparticipation of Azerbaijani investors: “Geographically, theInguri hydro-electric power plant is at the border betweenAbkhazia and Georgia, this is well-known to the Azerbaijaniside” (Kavkaz Uzel, 2008), Zantaria added. There is stillfear, among the Georgian authorities, that Russia will some-how manage, after the August 2008 war, to appropriate thisenergy objective, but officials of the two conflicting stateshave reached an agreement for the equally shared adminis-tration of the Inguri power plant.32 According to this agree-ment, 60% of the total electricity produced there goes toGeorgia, while the remaining 40% partially cover the neces-sities of the Abkhazian consumers. The reconstruction worksfor this power plant lasted several years and were carried outby the German company Siemens.

Although both the Georgian and the international presstackle some taboo subjects that cannot be publicly debatedin Tbilisi, the most accessible discussion platforms for theGeorgian civil society are those regarding the energy and theenvironment sectors. The state’s energy-related policy hasbeen used in Georgia as a pretext for the aggravation of thedivergences between government and opposition. Thus, theGeorgian Labor Party put up a protest, on January 13th,2011, before the central headquarters of the Telasi ElectricPower Distribution Company in Tbilisi, demanding that theauthorities cancel the unique receipt for communal services.The Georgian citizens were obliged to pay for water, elec-tricity, natural gas, and other services according to the dis-positions of a new, unified system. In case they did not pay,Telasi was entitled to disconnect them from the grid.Georgian Labor Party leader Shalva Natelashvili stated in apress briefing that the Saakashvili regime set up a new bomb

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after the recurring economic crises that have been registeredseveral years running because of the deterioration of thepolitical relationship between the Ukraine and the RussianFederation, the benefits that Georgia might obtain by joiningthe European energy-related initiatives could be long-termones, since they would require that the technical parametersof the Georgian energy system itself be modified. What theGeorgian experts in energy efficiency must pay attention to,first and foremost, is the part, in any energy project, refer-ring to the transit routes, because, since their objective is tobecome independent from Russia as far as energy is con-cerned, the Georgian authorities are tempted to ignore thepart referring to environment security, i.e. to ecology.Therefore, the development of the AGRI project could bemet with hostility by the civil society. It is worth mention-ing here that the Georgian officials keep stating that theyare in favor of the development of such energy projects as toencourage the use of regenerative energy, i.e. 90% of theenergy consumption should be ensured by hydro-energy,although the European Union does not require that morethan 20% of the necessary energy for the economic sectorshould be from regenerative sources.31 Ever since 2006,Georgia has become an exporter of electric power, its mainconsumers being the Russian Federation, Armenia, Azer-baijan, and Turkey. Even after August 2008, Russia is stillthe main consumer of electric power produced in Georgia,which will continue to develop hydro-electric power plants.While in Tbilisi there is talk about the possibility thathydro-electricity become the basic element for the restoringof dialogue between Abkhazia and Georgia, in Sukhumi theopinion is divided. The political context does not allow it.Rezo Zantaria, director of the hydro-electric power plant onthe Inguri river, stated in November 2008 that his installa-tion was under the jurisdiction of the Abkhazian authorities,which were not recognized by the ones in Tbilisi after the

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32 Interview with an energy expert, Tbilisi, May 2011.31 Interview with an energy expert, Tbilisi, May 2011.

especially from the point of view of energy, which makes iteven more attractive geo-strategically. While Georgia andArmenia, as mentioned earlier, show affinities for theWestern processes of political and economic integration, inAzerbaijan there is no general inclination towards limitingthe country’s own possibilities of penetrating the world cir-cuit. Its energy resources allow it to play several regionalcards simultaneously. Azerbaijan is often studied as belong-ing to Central Asia, even if this approach has been given uprecently. One can reshape a region according to the interestsone has there, hence the statement that Azerbaijan was partof Central Asia.33 The oil, natural gas, uranium and, morerecently, the plutonium to be found here give those interestsa different weight within the worldwide system of interna-tional relationships. There is a struggle going on, not so muchfor the qualitative change of the political systems existing inthe region, as for establishing a certain degree of politicalsubordination, in order to get sufficient control of thoseresources as to obtain economic profit from their adminis-tration. Unfortunately, this is seldom admitted by the stateand private actors who have foreign policy, security, and ener-gy interests in South Caucasus. The presence and involve-ment in the region of the Russian Federation, the US, andthe EU has not discouraged the other great powers’ interestin the region of South Caucasus. Besides the actors listedabove, one should mention China as a very important suchpower, the great winner of the worldwide economic crisis, asbeing interested in those oil and gas resources. What theauthorities in Beijing try to do may obstruct more or lessthe reaching of strategic objectives by Russia, the EU, or theUS — everything depends on the ability of reaching a con-sensus as to how the transport routes are going to be builtand the oil-related contracts shared. China’s industryrequires large quantities of oil products to sustain its currentrate of growth. This is one of the explanations for the fact

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in the relationships between Russia and Georgia by takingsuch a decision. He reminded that the owner of the Georgiandistribution network for electricity was the Russian compa-ny INTER RAO UES, that had no right to punish theGeorgian consumers for some foreign debts. According toNatelashvili, the party he spoke for had taken all the neces-sary measures for that action to be cancelled, for instance ithad called upon the Constitutional Court to advise aboutthe lawfulness of such a decision, and it had negotiated withTelasi and the Russian company. The GLP threatened tolaunch other protests intended to overthrow the currentgovernment. The action, however, did not have the resultsthe opposition leaders wished to obtain. The current gov-ernment in Georgia is often accused of limiting the opposi-tion’s possibilities to protest, but the energy-related protestsdid not enjoy the same support as the May 2011 ones, forinstance. In South Caucasus, it is a vital necessity to applyenergy-related policies and strategies for the efficient devel-opment of the energy sector, which is the basis of the goodfunctioning of the entire economic system. But, withoutguaranteeing the necessary resources for the development ofthe infrastructure in this field, any public policy becomesfutile. The basic requirement for making any progress is tocreate adequate conditions for the existence of a politicalwillingness that can only be educated while staying thecourse and turning mistakes into achievements.

2. Energy-related projects and transport corridors in SouthCaucasus

South Caucasus has managed to draw the great powers’attention through several elements that may contribute tothe reaching of certain national objectives and interestsincluded in foreign policy or energy security strategies to befound in this region or showing openly their intent to makeinvestments in the area. Another quality of South Caucasusis its proximity to Central Asia not only geographically, but

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33 Interview with a political analyst, Baku, June 2011.

may be implemented without difficulties, especially in theirfinal stages. The quantities of oil and natural gas thatshould feed the main energy projects in South Caucasusallow for their prioritization, but the authorities in thevarious states of the region try to give assurances that theyare not going to prioritize a project and overlook another.The role of South Caucasus in the world economy could besummarized as such: an access zone to the Caspian Sea oilby the shortest transport corridors.

The energy project Nabucco34 was conceived as an exten-sion to the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline and meant toguarantee the energy security of the European states (seeMap 1, previous page). The decisions regarding the develop-ment of the projects were taken during the worldwide eco-nomic crisis, but the states that have launched this initiativehave not given it up, because of the energy stability it mayoffer (ACGRC, 2011, p. 35).

Azerbaijan is willing to provide natural gas to theNabucco project, but it cannot supply the entire quantityrequired for its good functioning. This is one of the reasonsfor which Turkmenistan was also invited to take part in thedevelopment of Nabucco, so as to connect the Caspian Seato it. The basic condition of the Baku authorities was thatthe states who need the project declare firmly that they areready to make financial investments in the construction of

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that Azerbaijan is constantly being attracted by Asia andthe energy projects in which it is involved are being redirect-ed — some, at least — towards the East. The philosophiesof these great powers differ considerably. While Russia isbased on its political influence on the region and the sup-port it grants certain actors on the scene by artificially sus-taining crises and conflicts, the European Union is trying tobecome attractive through its democratic and economicmodel, advocating above all the idea of an institutionalchange by applying democratic principles and helping thesubjects in the region turn their faces naturally towards theWest. China, in exchange, is literally obliged to concentrateall its efforts to the redirecting of the economic interests ofall the actors in the region towards the East, so it may takeover, at least partially, the potential of their presence there.A detailed analysis of the energy potential of South Caucasusis difficult to make if one ignores the main transport cor-ridors that link Asia to Europe and North to South. Theselling of energy products makes it compulsory to developtransport routes, storage facilities, but also processing units.The development of the oil sector is paralleled by the sus-taining of investments in the complementary sectors, sothat the ongoing projects or the ones still in preparation

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Map 1 — The track of the Nabucco project (Source: Nabucco Pipeline http://www.nabucco-

pipeline.com/portal/page/portal/en/pipeline/route)

34 Nabucco is a natural gas pipeline launched in 2006, with theinitial transportation capacity of 7.2 billion cubic meters per year,which could be increased to 20 billion cubic meters. It was con-ceived as an extension of another gas pipeline in which Azerbaijanwas involved as well: the Baku – Tbilisi – Erzurum corridor. The lat-ter has an almost identical track as the oil pipeline Baku – Tbilisi –Ceyhan. Nabucco will finally be 3,300 kilometers long and have atransportation capacity of about 31 billion cubic meters per year.The duration of the project is fifty years (Nabucco Pipeline Over-view). The other sources of supply for this pipeline have their ori-gins in the Middle East and Egypt. It is one of the most ambitiousprojects. The estimated costs of the works will reach 7.9 billion euros(Nabucco Pipeline Facts and Figures), but this figure is provisional.

the European Union, in spite of its insistence that the ener-gy market should be liberalized — hence, there is a majorrisk.36 The Turkish authorities are not going to risk rightnow their economic relationship with the European Union,because there are no political guarantees regarding the evo-lution of Turkey’s bilateral relationship with the RussianFederation. This is why it will be content, on a short term,to treat Russia as a market for its own goods and services.It is interesting that the Azerbaijani authorities do not wantto contribute financial resources either for Nabucco, or forAGRI (see below), which is faced with several difficultiesof a technological, but also of a financial nature. Moreover,Armenia’s foreign policy agenda does not rule out its join-ing the project. The Yerevan authorities are being pressed bytheir own energy interests to join this regional initiative atsome time in the future. In the case of Armenia, this couldbecome feasible through the Joint Action Plan Armenia – EU(European Commission, 2006b), that prefigures cooperationin the energy sector between the two partners. Accordingto the document, the EU is to sustain Armenia’s actionsfor the development of a long-term energy strategy, but thebasic condition is that Armenia should renounce its inten-tions to build a new nuclear plant. In its turn, Yerevan istempted to decline the EU’s requirements because of thelack of an alternative solution, which the European commu-nity is yet to suggest. Under these circumstances, Nabuccomay very well be such an alternative solution, but it greatlydepends on the Armenian relationship with Azerbaijan,which has so far opposed the involvement of the state it is ina territorial conflict with in several regional energy-relatedinitiatives, insisting every time on keeping out.

The Azerbaijan – Georgia – Romania Interconnector(AGRI, see Map 2, following page) is an ambitious projectthat has enjoyed much attention from the partners involved

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the pipeline. The Azerbaijani authorities favor the imple-mentation of as many energy projects as possible. This is tosay, once again, that the energy-related policy of Azerbaijanis focused on diversifying aa much as possible the trans-portation routes for its oil and gas towards the internation-al markets. Nabucco is an ambitious project and there aretoo many difficulties to overcome for it to be actually feasi-ble on short term. The Azerbaijani infrastructure for natu-ral gas transportation is very poorly developed. At present,the focus should be on the development of the necessaryinfrastructure for storing the quantities of natural gas forwhich Nabucco has been designed. The authorities in Baku,however, are politically motivated to sustain and encouragetheir foreign partners who are interested in the Azerbaijanienergy resources to go on investing in this project. Playingthe cards of several energy projects, the current governmenthas the possibility to remain in power for a longer time, sotheir support for Nabucco will remain a firm one. SOCARguarantees it will be able to provide the quantities of natu-ral gas that are necessary for Nabucco, but only after 2020,when most of the works of improvement of transportationcapabilities, that are now faced with a lot of difficulties, arecompleted. Nabucco’s potential will only grow after 2015,when the natural gas production also grows. At present, theproduction of natural gas is still behind that of oil.35 Whenspeaking of Nabucco, there are many political variables weneed to consider, which may hinder the evolution of theproject. Energy independence from Russia is but one to bementioned at this point, but attention must be drawn toanother, equally important aspect: most energy projects thatthe European Union is interested to develop with regard tothe Caspian Sea oil and gas resources cross Turkey. The lat-ter will not only gain importance in the region, it will alsohold an energy monopoly on the southern axis, which mayvery well turn into a future threat for the energy security of

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36 Interview with an economic expert, Tbilisi, May 2011.35 Interview with an economic expert, Baku, June 2011.

Federation, which can be interpreted as harmful for theRussian energetic, economic, and political interests towardsthe South. But AGRI is a much more appreciated projectthan Nabucco and the interest of the partners involved inits implementation seems to argue in favor of grantingcertain special priorities to it, since it is one of the cheapestinitiatives of its kind in spite of the fact that none of its fourinitiator states possesses the technical or financial meansto implement it at this time. Likewise, as mentioned above,neither does Azerbaijan seem to agree to finance the projectout of its own resources. The natural gas liquefying terminalmust be built on the territory of Georgia, which does notpossess the necessary technology to begin working on it.Moreover, experts in energy security argue that guarantee-ing the security of the transports across the Black Sea isproblematic, since there are no available special tankers forcarrying the liquefied gas across the Black Sea (those areusually built with a huge transportation capacity and madeto travel far greater distances).38 The same energy securityexperts think that AGRI is rather the result of a politicalgame that Azerbaijan plays in order to promote its interestsand to occupy a better negotiating position in the dialogueon energy between the European Union and the RussianFederation, so as to obtain political advantages. Neither arethe available and not yet contracted gas resources certain.The fact that no other EU-member state except Romaniaand Hungary has joined this project says a lot.39 Privatefinancing for AGRI is the likeliest solution. The earliest esti-mates of the project costs indicate a figure ranging between2 and 5 billion euros for a transportation capacity of 8 bil-lion cubic meters per year, with a potential increase later.40

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in its implementation. The purpose of this energy project isto transport natural gas from the Shakh Deniz deposittowards Romania, Hungary, and other European statesinterested in diversifying their sources of energy supplies;it is part of the southern corridor of natural gas transit. Thecompany that will attend to the implementation of the proj-ect, called AGRI LNG Project Company, has been createdby participants belonging to four states: Romgaz (Romania),the Georgian Oil and Gas Company, the State Oil Companyof the Republic of Azerbaijan, and MVM (Hungary). Eachof the four states holds an equal share of 25% of the AGRILNG Project Company social capital.37

The states involved in the development of the AGRIproject have problems of a political nature with the Russian

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Map 2 — The Azerbaijan – Georgia – Romania – Interconnector(AGRI, Stratfor) (Source: Plano 10 [AGRI in green])

http://www.plano10.com/2011/04/proiectul-agri-o-bila-alba-pentru.html

38 Interview with an expert in energy security, Bucharest, August2011.

39 Interview with an expert in energy security, Bucharest, August2011.

40 Interview with officials, Baku, June, 2011.

37 The Memorandum of Agreement for the beginning of theAGRI program was signed in Bucharest on April 13th, 2010, and theDeclaration regarding the AGRI project was signed in Baku onSeptember 14th, 2010. The intermediary feasibility study for thisproject is being drawn by experts from the USA.

partially finance the project costs and supply transport tech-nology in exchange for Azerbaijani natural gas. Neither dothe Russian Federation, Bulgaria, and the Ukraine hide theirinterest to be parts of this project — proving that the eco-nomic interests often prevail over the political ones. Turkey,in exchange, does not seem too happy about the enthusiasmshown by certain regional actors for the development ofAGRI, since any such involvement would diminish its keyrole in the southern corridor by which energy resources arebeing transported to Europe. The EU’s position as to thisproject is not a hostile one. On the contrary, Brusselsencourages the starting of AGRI works, since that wouldcontribute in an essential manner to the diversifying of thetransit routes for other EU-member states as well. More-over, AGRI seems to be a project with an excellent econom-ic justification in the first place.41 The Serbian authorities,that are well-known for being stable partners of the RussianFederation in the West Balkans, have also shown their inter-est in joining the project. For the Georgian side, i.e. for oneof the four states that have contributed the social capital ofthe AGRI LNG Project Company, there seem to be certaindelicate points of an ecologic nature attached to this proj-ect. The natural gas transit pipeline is designed to crosssome sensitive areas, for instance the area of origin of thefamous Borjomi waters, an important Georgian product rec-ognized both domestically and abroad for its curative prop-erties. In case of an ecologic disaster, that cannot be ruledout, but is barely taken into consideration in the designingof the gas pipeline, the first to suffer will be the bottlingfacilities for the Borjomi water, which is primarily meant forexport, but then also the Georgian economy in its entirety.42

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There are three possibilities regarding the future capacity ofthe project AGRI to transport natural gas from Azerbaijanto Europe: 2, 4.5, and 8 billion cubic meters. If the thirdfigure is going to be the preferred one, then Romania will beable to negotiate a share of 2 billion cubic meters of thetotal quantity of gas transiting its territory.

The authorities in Baku do not give priority to anyregional energy-related project. Nabucco or AGRI — bothare equally important and Azerbaijan wishes that the twocomplement each other. The former project is strongly sup-ported by the EU and will connect Europe to the oildeposits from the Caspian Sea and the Middle East. BothNabucco, and AGRI are given the same attention by theAzerbaijani authorities; the difference is that the former ismore difficult to implement, because, first, states like Iranand Turkmenistan have been invited to participate in itsdevelopment, that are perceived as regional actors capableof producing regional instability and, second, there arehigher tariffs to be paid for the gas that will transit throughNabucco. Moreover, in 2010 the EU has renounced theinvolvement of Iran in this project as a sanction for thatcountry’s continuation of its nuclear program. Consequent-ly, the Iranian authorities have declared their availability forthe development of yet another project that could rival withNabucco and would supply natural gas to Europe beneaththe bottom of the Mediterranean.

Several companies have also shown their willingness toinvest in AGRI. Among those are investors from Japan,Germany, South Korea, and France that have offered to helpwith the drawing of some feasibility studies for the project.According to a press statement issued by the RomanianMinistry of Economy, Commerce, and Business Environmenton February 14th, 2011, the feasibility study for Project AGRImust be completed by April 1st, 2012, in order to acceleratethe completion of the project.

Unlike the states that have just offered to draw feasibilitystudies, Japan has gone a bit further and suggested it may

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41 Interview with an energy expert, Tbilisi, May 2011.42 Interview with an ecology expert, Tbilisi, May 2011.

Although Azerbaijan’s economic ties with the RussianFederation are still significant, its strategy of energy-relateddevelopment is orientated, as earlier mentioned, towardspromoting projects that offer alternative sources to theRussian ones. This attitude offers the authorities in Baku anadditional perspective in the negotiation of their nationalinterests and political objectives, but strongly outlines theeconomic aspect of the bilateral relationship between Bakuand Moscow. The strategy of diversifying the suppliers of oilproducts and of the transportation routes for oil and gas ofother than Russian origin will alter the Russian Federation’sposition on the world stage, forcing it to be more friendly,more oriented towards carrying out another type of nego-tiations. At the same time, the Russian leaders are bound tobecome more receptive to the international mechanismsand norms specific to the specialized institutions withwhich they negotiate in order to obtain full membership.The purpose of this endeavor — to have Russia open itselfto the world markets in conditions of loyal competition —is to ensure energy stability on European soil.

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The “Heydar Aliyev” Baku – Tbilisi – Ceyhan oil pipe-line43 (State Oil Fund of the Republic of Azerbaijan, 2011b)is an international project that took shape in 1994, at theinitiative of Turkey, Georgia, and Azerbaijan, in order tostrengthen the economic independence of the countries inthe region (Haciyev, Iqbal, 2010, pp. 227-242). The pipelineis being supplied with oil extracted from the Azerbaijani sec-tor of the Caspian Sea and takes it to the international mar-kets, being designed in such a way as to take over a part ofthe Kazakh oil production, too (ibidem). The length of thepipeline is 1,767 kilometers, of which 443 on the territoryof Azerbaijan, 248 in Georgia, and 1,076 in Turkey. It wasdesigned to last forty years. The maximum transport capac-ity is 50 million tons per year. The Azerbaijani participationin the project was accomplished through AzBTC Co., one ofSOCAR’s subsidiaries. The percentage of the latter’s invest-ment in BTC Co. is 25% of the sum total of 3 billion eurosoverall cost (see the other investors in Figure 1, oppositepage).

The importance of the BTC oil pipeline is a complex one.Besides guaranteeing a part of the domestic necessities ofthe states involved in the development of the project, it alsohas a political significance. Its geopolitical significance comesfrom the fact that it reduces dependence on the RussianFederation energy. The second function of this oil pipelineis to offer the US and other Western states the possibility ofno longer depending so much on the Persian Gulf oil, byavoiding the Russian territory and the crowded routes fromthe Bosphorus and Dardanelles straits.

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43 The BTC oil pipeline was the oil-related contract of the 20th

century for the states that contributed to the realization of the proj-ect. It was signed on September 20th, 1994. In 1999, the Agreementfor the transportation of crude oil through the BTC pipeline wassigned in Istanbul by the presidents of Azerbaijan, Georgia, andTurkey. Officially, the pipeline became operative on July 13th, 2006.Its construction was carried out by the BTC Co., created in Londonin August 2002.

Figure 1 —The investment percentages in the developmentof the BTC oil pipeline (Source: State Oil Fund of Azerbaijan,

http://www.oilfund.az/en/content/10/95)

among which British Petroleum, Stateoil, SOCAR, Lukoil,NICO, Total, and TPAO, was accepting proposals untilOctober 1st, 2011, for the construction of adjacent trans-portation routes, besides the ones that would supply theAGRI project, for the natural gas extracted from the ShakhDeniz field. Up to now, three proposals have been received,which are being studied by the authorities in Baku. All threeare Europe-oriented:

– ITGI, the Interconnector Turkey – Greece – Italy; – TAP, the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline; – Nabucco. The first gas extractions from the Shakh Deniz field for

the most ambitious European energy project, Nabucco, areestimated to take place in 2017 (News.az, 2011a), a datethe Azerbaijani officials confirm, adding that, from thepoint of view of the viability of an economic and logistictransportation, Nabucco will be the one to contribute most-ly to the development of the southern energy corridor.Although SOCAR holds only 10% of the stock of the ShakhDeniz consortium that was created especially to exploit thatdeposit, the representatives of the Azerbaijani state ownedcompany confirm that by 2017, the extraction capacitywill reach the volume of 25 billion cubic meters per year.Nabucco was designed to transport 31 billion cubic metersper year with a potential growth to 35 billion cubic metersper year. The Azerbaijani officials have guaranteed a pro-duction of 10 billion cubic meters per year for Nabucco.As far as AGRI is concerned, as mention earlier, the quantityof resources that will pass through the pipeline has not yetbeen determined. Until 2006, although it possesses largequantities of natural gas, Azerbaijan was an importer state(EIA, 2011). Domestic consumption exceeded the extracted

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BTC Co. is a consortium of oil companies and financerswith a total contribution to the project of 3 billion euros,30% of which has been invested by AzBTC, a SOCARsubsidiary especially created for the development of theAzerbaijani side of the project. The remaining 70% is madeup of contributions from the other members of the consor-tium: international financial institutions, credit agencies,and commercial banks. The Ministry of Economic Develop-ment of the Republic of Azerbaijan has obtained the officialrepresentation of the interests of the Azerbaijani govern-ment, by securing itself an 80% participation in AzBTC.Thus, the income resulting from the involvement and supportof the Ministry of Economic Development is accumulatedin SOFAZ, the State Oil Fund of the Republic of Azerbaijan.SOFAZ has financed the construction of the portion of theBTC oil pipeline crossing the territory of Azerbaijan, in con-formity with the provisions of the Presidential Decree no.739 of July 30th, 2002, signed by then-president HeydarAliyev. In February 2007, 298 million AZN were allocatedto the financing of the Azerbaijani share in the BTC project.The Azerbaijani section of the BTC pipeline was inaugu-rated on May 25th, 2005, by the presidents of Azerbaijan,Georgia, and Turkey, on the occasion of an official ceremo-ny held at the Sangachal terminal near Baku. BTC is one ofthe most expensive energy projects implemented before2005 and brought together eleven partner states. It modifiesthe geopolitical situation in the Caucasus, creating tensionsbetween the Russian Federation and the US.

The Shakh Deniz Platform44 — the Shakh Deniz con-sortium, made up of several energy-specialized companies,

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in 2001. It referred to the supplying of such resources to Turkey.The earliest deliveries were made in 2006. The total volume of gasexported annually, according to that contract, reached up to 222 bil-lion cubic meters at the end of 2009.

44 The first stage of the Shakh Deniz project was completed in2003. It required that new platforms for the exploitation of thenatural gas deposits and two underwater pipelines be installed, thatwould transport the gas to shore, near Sangachal. Exporting the nat-ural gas extracted at Shakh Deniz began in 2004. The first contractfor natural gas exportation was signed by the Azerbaijani authorities

of the European states and to offset the growing dependenceon the imports of natural gas from the Russian Federation.The main share-holders of the joint venture company thatwill manage the TAP connecting Europe to the Caspian Seathrough the Adriatic are EGL from Switzerland, Statoilfrom Norway, and E.ON Ruhrgas from Germany. The trans-port capacity of the TAP will be 10 billion cubic meters peryear, with the possibility to be doubled (Trans-Adriatic Pipe-line, 2011). The TAP company will contribute to the devel-opment of the gas storing infrastructure on the territory ofAlbania, which was invited, alongside Greece, to participatein the development of the project. These storage installationsfor natural gas are meant to ensure the necessary energyproducts for the European states in case of an energy crisis.Last July, TAP representatives signed a memorandum ofcooperation with the Albanian government (Penn Energy,2011), according to which they will study the possibilityof connecting the Ionian-Adriatic Pipeline for gas to theTrans-Adriatic Pipeline, so that the network of pipelines ofthe southern corridor will be better interconnected and itsfunctioning will be improved. The deliveries of natural gasto TAP from the Shakh Deniz deposit are estimated tobegin in 2017. Experts are currently studying the impact ofthe future pipeline on the environment.

The “Viking” Project is a merchandise transport routeoperating from Odessa to Klaipeda (Railway Pro, 2011) onthe Jonava – Siauliai railroad, part of the Rail Baltica. Thisproject came up in 2003, as an initiative of three states:Lithuania, Belarus, and the Ukraine. Economically, it is animportant initiative, since it offers a possibility of unifyingthe transport routes between Northern and Central Europewith those of the CIS and other Asian states, includingChina. The project feasibility has been enhanced by theeffects of the worldwide economic crisis that has made it anecessity, for the states involved in the international tradingon the East-West transport corridor, to take measures of

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volume of gas. Its main supplier was the Russian companyGazprom (Haciyev, Iqbal, 2010, p. 242). The exploitationof the Shakh Deniz reserves allowed the Azerbaijani author-ities to lower the country’s dependence on the natural gasof Russian origin. The greatest impediments in the swiftdevelopment of the project are the lack of a storage infra-structure and of a processing one for the gas extracted fromShakh Deniz. This has not impeded, however, the Azer-baijani authorities to negotiate with the Turkish ones forsigning of agreements for the transiting of the Shakh Denizgas, through Turkey, towards the European consumers. Thisis confirmed by the statements of the Azerbaijani officials(News.az, 2011b) who declare that, irrespective of the stagethe works have reached, the volume of natural gas to bedelivered in Europe has already been established.

The Interconnector Turkey – Greece – Italy (ITGI,2011) is a project whose purpose it is to create a linkingbridge between Europe and the natural gas resources of theCaspian Sea area. The EU-member states’ imports are to bemade through Turkey, which will result in the growth of thisstate’s role in the southern energy corridor. Like the otherenergy corridors, ITGI aims at diversifying the sources fromwhich natural gas is being supplied to the European compa-nies. Cumulated with the other projects, it will contribute tothe transformation of the Republic of Azerbaijan into one ofthe largest suppliers of natural gas for Europe. The intentionis that ITGI will interconnect the energy-supplying systemsof Greece and Bulgaria to the Italian one through the offshorecompany that manages the Poseidon45 pipeline.

The Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) is yet another ener-gy project belonging to the system of pipelines that make upthe southern corridor, meant to guarantee the energy security

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45 The company that manages the development of the Poseidonpipeline is called IGI Poseidon SA.

of container transportation of goods between the Black Seaand the Baltic Sea and is a component of an inter-modalproject of international transportation launched in 2003.The reduced capacity of several transport corridors is athreat for the future economic growth and for Europeanintegration. In the near future, the production of goods willincrease in volume, which will lead to the necessity of devel-oping transport projects that already exist or to initiate newones. Project Viking is designed to deal with such a quanti-tative growth.

TRACECA46 is a project launched in 1993 to ensure theaccess of the European and Asian goods to the internationalmarkets through road, railroad, and maritime transportationmeans. It has been the basis of an alternative route fromEurope to Central Asia, from the Black Sea basin, crossingthe Caucasus, towards Mongolia and China. This alterna-tive route has been created in order to lower the transporta-tion costs for the Euro-Asian trade exchanges and to providea route other than the trans-Siberian one for the sameEuropean and Asian goods. Moreover, TRACECA plays apolitical role as well, since it will lead, in time, to the cre-ation of some efficient levers by which to ensure, at least inpart, the commercial independence of the South-Caucasianand Central Asian states from the transport routes created atthe initiative of the Russian Federation. What is attemptedhere is to minimize the importance of the economic projects

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counteracting its consequences. Railroad transportation ofgoods lowers their acquisition prices, since it is one of thecheapest means of international transfer. If supported byother means of transportation along the route, its efficiencygrows even more.

Georgia and the Republic of Moldova have been invitedto join this project. They may contribute to the develop-ment of merchandise transportation in the Black Sea area.In May 2011, the two countries officially showed interestfor the Viking Project and took over some of its works. Theinitial length of the route was 1,753 kilometers. Then,Azerbaijan was also invited to join the project (Web-portalof the Ukrainian Government, 2011). Ukrainian premierMykola Azarov stated in a press conference that Azerbaijanwould take part in the project in order to have the routeextended towards Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and otherCentral Asian countries. Thus, the project could gain furthersignificance: joining the Caspian to the Baltic Sea throughOdessa. It is a very important project for the transportationof goods between Europe and Asia because it will connect toyet another transport corridor, TRACECA (The Europe –Caucasus – Asia Transport Corridor; see Kusch, Prause, andHunke, 2011, p. 25). In places, the railroad transport couldbe doubled by the ferry one, which would facilitate the localconnections even more.

There are two possibilities for extending the East-Westtransport corridor to Central Asia: (1) the southern regionof the Baltic Sea – Lithuania – Belarus – the Russian Feder-ation – Kazakhstan – China and (2) the southern region ofthe Baltic Sea – Lithuania – Belarus – the Ukraine – Georgia – Azerbaijan – Kazakhstan – China, i.e. by potentially usingcertain components of the TRACECA route. The costs oftransporting goods by railroad are lower than by using othermeans of transportation. There may be a problem, however,with the different gauges that have to be adapted to inter-national standards in order to unify infrastructures of dif-ferent types. The Viking project is meant to create a system

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46 The document on which Project TRACECA relies was signedon May 3rd, 1993, in Brussels by the ministries of Transportationand Commerce from eight Central Asian and South-Caucasian states:Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, plusArmenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. The project was financed by theEuropean Union in order to develop the East-West transport corri-dor that starts in Europe, crosses the Black Sea, the Caucasus, andthe Caspian Sea and reaches Central Asia. After 1996, the Ukraine,Mongolia, the Republic of Moldova, Bulgaria, Romania, and Turkeyalso joined TRACECA.

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proposed by Moscow as well as the influence and role of theCommunity of Independent States, through a project ofEuropean origin. Thus, TRACECA is one of the linkingbridges with Asia created by Brussels that partially bringsprejudice to the Kremlin’s geo-strategic interests in the region.Joining this alternative transport route also implied theintroduction of such legislative measures as to unify thetransportation policies. The states wishing to join TRACE-CA, but also the Viking Project, had to undergo a processof harmonization and adaptation of their public policiesand legislative transportation-related framework to theEuropean ones.

Conclusions

The development of the South-Caucasian economicpotential is mostly conditioned by the interest of the greatpowers in this region, inasmuch as it is a supplier of energyresources, but also by the opportunities it offers for thetransportation of goods and services from East to West andfrom North to South. This territory has become a crossingpoint for the interests and the political, economic, and geo-strategic objectives of various state and private actors.

In this context, while the importance of the regionsteadily grows, since it is capable of producing both stability,and instability, regional initiatives and projects are bound toappear, that will be of interest for the three South-Cau-casian states either separately, or together, but those will notbe aimed at the consolidation of the regional unity, but willattract the states separately towards various forms of regionalcooperation, which will determine even more the weakeningof the interconnections between them. Armenia, Azerbaijan,and Georgia must keep up the process of reformation oftheir economic systems, by adopting tough measures thatthe population will be inclined to oppose. It is an exercise ofboth politics, and democracy, but its benefic impact on theeconomies could work for the benefit of future generations.

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Map 3 — The East-West transport corridor (Source: Thomas Kusch,Gunnar Prause, Kristina Hunke, The East-West Transport Corridorand the Shuttle Train "VIKING", Hochschule Wismar, Fakultät für

Wirtschaftswissenschaften, 2011, p. 11, http://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/48566/1/66468520X.pdf)

Map 4 — The extension of the Viking route (Source: ThomasKusch, Gunnar Prause, Kristina Hunke, The East-West TransportCorridor and the Shuttle Train "VIKING", Hochschule Wismar,

Fakultät für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, 2011, p. 24, http://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/48566/1/66468520X.pdf)

ãîäó äîñòèãíóò $30 ìëðä., 23 May 2011 (available at:http://abc.az/rus/news/54411.html).

ABC.az d, Àêòèâû Íåôòÿïîãî ôîíäà Àçåðáàéäæàíà âïåðâûå ïðåâûñèëè $30 ìëðä., 06 July 2011 (available at:http://abc.az/rus/news/55687.html).

Analytical Centre on Globalization and Regional Coopera-tion, Agenda for Armenian Foreign Policy 2011, Edit Print,Yerevan, 2010.

Aze.az, Ðàôèê Àëèåâ: Äåíüãè ìíå ïîäáðîñèëè òàìîæåí-íèêè ïðè àðåñòå, 11 July 2007 (available at: http://www.aze.az/news.php?id=9071).

Azpetrol, Îáùàÿ èíôîðìàöèÿ, 2011 (available at: http://azpetrol.az/ru/content/8/).

Baku – Tbilisi – Ceyhan Oil Pipeline (BTC) (available at:http://www.oilfund.az/en/content/10/95).

Baratashvili, Evghenii and Baidoshvili, David, Georgia’sEconomic Integration in South Caucasus, Kavkaz Online,31 January 2011 (available at: http://kavkasia.net/Georgia/article/1296532063.php).

Civilitas Foundation, Armenia in 2010. A Year of Uncertainty,Yerevan, 2010. Economic Review of Azerbaijan in 2010,in Informational and Analytical Bulletin, Baku, April 2011.

EIA, Imports of Dry Natural Gas in Azerbaijan, 2011 (availableat: http://www.eia.gov/cfapps/ipdbproject/iedindex3.cfm?tid=3&pid=26&aid=3&cid=AJ,&syid=2006&eyid=2010&unit=BCF).

Energy Community, Decision no. 2007 107 IMG-EnC of18 December 2002, on the acceptance of Georgia as anObserver, December 2007 (available at: http://www.ener-gy-community.org/pls/portal/docs/296188.PDF).

Estate.am, ENP Country Progress Report 2010 — Armenia,27 May 2011 (available at: http://www.a1plus.am/en/pol-itics/2011/05/27/report).

European Commission a, Armenia-EU Action Plan, Brussels,November 2006 (available at: http://ec.europa.eu/envi-ronment/enlarg/pdf/enp_action_plan_armenia.pdf).

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The three South-Caucasian states must also find the neces-sary solutions to overcome the conflicts and divergences ofa political nature existing even in a latent form betweenthem. If such solutions cannot be found in the political area,then a successful economic model should be chosen, thatwould help create a stable regional system. It is not alwayspossible to turn the economic factor into a solution for solv-ing the political issues. But the process can be justified bythe national interests it may serve. Political decisions mustbe shaped pragmatically, so as to ensure as many economicbenefits as possible. “Breaking” South Caucasus in accor-dance with the separate objectives of the great consumers ofenergy and political resources is a good short-term strategy.The region may become vulnerable to new challenges if theleaders of its three states deny its importance as a whole.South Caucasus is not just a bridge for the great economiesof the world to be able to access the Caspian Sea oil and gas,it is also an area where dangers and threats for the regionalsecurity still lurk.

Acknowledging the importance of economic connectionsand intra-regional trade exchanges is one of the multiplesolutions the three South-Caucasian states have at their dis-posal and resorting to those is a vital necessity to acceleratethe qualitative development of their respective societies.

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