Caste Class and Politics

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South Asia Research

DOI: 10.1177/026272800702700305 2007; 27; 333 South Asia Research

Ashok K. Pankaj

Engaging with Discourse on Caste, Class and Politics in India

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ENGAGING WITH DISCOURSE ONCASTE, CLASS AND POLITICS IN INDIAAshok K. PankajINSTITUTE FOR HUMAN DEVELOPMENT, NEW DELHI, INDIA

ABSTRACT This article maps the changing profile of pre-Mandaland post-Mandal debates on caste, class and politics in India, show-ing that the centrality of caste as an agent of politics and its dom-inant role in public-political life has remained a reality throughout.What is contested now is the extent to which recognition of casteas an instrument of socio-political change (following the MandalCommission) and caste-centric socio-political movements of the1980s and 1990s (the Dalit and Backward Class movements) hasreinforced caste-centric public-political life by giving it a modernvalue and a secular purpose.

The article argues that the contemporary elaborate discourseson caste, class, and politics in India should seek to develop newparadigms for the discussion of caste and should interrogate morevigorously the democratic and secular roles of caste in relation toclass and politics.

KEYWORDS: backward class movements, caste, class, Dalits, MandalCommission, modernisation, politics, secularism, tradition

Introduction

Even though the contemporary discourse on caste, class and politics in India has beenliberated from the straitjacket debate of modernisation vs. traditionalisation anddichotomous vs. dynamic relations, the centrality of caste as an agent of politics andits dominant role in Indian socio-political life have neither been removed nor firmlychallenged. Rather, recognition of caste as an instrument of socio-political change bythe Mandal Commission and caste-centric socio-political movements of the 1980sand 1990s, such as Dalit and Backward Class movements, have not only enlivenednew debates in India, but have reinforced a caste-centric public-political life, givingit a modern value and a secular purpose.

While during the pre-Mandal phase of the 1960s and 1970s, the discourse oncaste, class and politics in India was dominated by theories of political modernisation,

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334 South Asia Research Vol. 27 (3): 333–353

since the 1980s it has been inspired by the new awakening of Dalits and BackwardClasses and their movements for social and political empowerment. Hence, thecontemporary discourse is deeply interested in investigating the changing landscapeof socio-political life as a result of the political assertion of Dalits and BackwardClasses and its overall impacts on Indian politics. Moreover, if the earlier discoursewas conditioned by transition from a colonial political system to parliamentarydemocracy, political stability of the dominant party system based on consensus politicsand social coalition, the contemporary discourse has been contexualised by declineof the dominant party system, recurrent political instability triggered by the dismantl-ing of old models of caste coalition, assertion of Dalits and Backward Classes, Mandal-isation of politics, proliferation of caste-based political parties, frustration with castepolitics and violent caste wars. Whereas early discourses culminated in the developmentof functional perspectives on caste, class and politics, present ones are equally con-cerned with dysfunctional roles of caste in Indian politics. The salient features of thesetwo phases of debate can be presented in tabular form (see Table 1):

Table 1 Changing Discourse on Caste, Class and Politics in India

(Pre-1980) (Post-1980)

1. Influenced by theories of political No longer inspired by modernisationmodernisation theories

2. Theoretically rooted in modernity vs. Empirically rooted in new socio-politicaltradition debate and dynamic vs. movements of Dalits and Backward Classesdichotomous relations

3. Conditioned by political stability, Conditioned by volatile politics, increasingsmooth transition to democracy, successful political instability, violent caste warselectoral politics and cohesive social life and incessant caste tensions

4. Focused on functional perspectives Equally concerned withof caste in Indian politics dysfunctional role of caste in Indian politics

The contemporary discourse on caste, class and politics in India appears unable tocontest vigorously enough the new rationalisations of caste. In particular, it has failedto challenge and derationalise its modern roles and secular values. The present studyargues that the changed profile of this caste-politics discourse needs to be consideredafresh. This task can be achieved either through the quarantining of caste frompolitics—though how that is possible will need to be vigorously examined—or/andthrough the search for a new paradigm of politics. The former must necessarily followthe latter, as the first cannot be achieved without the second. The contemporary dis-course on caste, class and politics in India should thus urgently look for new paradigms.

This article consists of three major sections. The first one briefly maps out thedebate on caste, class and politics in the pre-Mandal phase. The second one focuses in



Pankaj: Engaging with Discourse on Caste, Class and Politics in India 335

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more detail on the main thrusts of more recent debates, while the third section examinesthe future of caste in Indian politics and the role of social scientists in the formulationof new paradigms.

The Debates of the Pre-Mandal Phase

Caste with its cultural and structural attributes was essentially perceived as a traditionalsocial institution, whereas politics in its contemporary meaning was seen as a modernprocess. Juxtaposition of caste and politics led to serious debates about the relationshipbetween tradition and modernity (Kothari, 1970a; 1970b). What is the relationshipbetween tradition and modernity where caste and politics meet? Do they createdynamic processes of interaction based on continuity and change, or do we find a di-chotomous relationship? Does it lead to fission or fusion? How does tradition respondto modernisation? How do the forces of modernisation influence traditions and how,in turn, do they get affected? Is tradition anachronistic to the process of modernisation?If it is, why is it surviving despite the onslaught of modernity? And if it is not, howdoes ‘tradition’ cope with the challenges of ‘modernity’? These were the basic questionsraised in the early phase of discourses on caste, class and politics in India, which tookplace with reference to three settings (a) the tradition vs. modernity debate; (b) casteand class relations; and (c) interaction of caste and politics.

Indian Tradition-Modernity Debates

Theoretical approaches to the study of tradition and modernity in relation to casteand politics consisted in turn of two main streams, emphasising either the dichotomyof tradition and modernity or the dynamic relations between them. In the dichotomousperspective, tradition and modernity are mainly seen in opposition to each other.The idea was that modernity would be realised only when tradition was destroyedand superseded, as modernity evolves, so it was imagined, through the destruction oftradition (Rudolph and Rudolph, 1969: 3). In terms of caste-politics relations inparticular, analysts of this school tend to contemplate castes as valueless and mean-ingless institutions in a modern democratic political set-up, putting the cultural andstructural attributes of both into opposition. Whereas the traditional system of castesis based on notions of hierarchy/holism; pollution/purity; sacred/non-sacred; her-editary occupation and ascribed status; local and parochial perspectives, modernityassumes that local ties and ‘little’ perspectives give way to ‘great’ universal commitmentsand cosmopolitan attitudes; that the rational way of thinking and action takes prece-dence over irrationality of emotion, pollution and purity; that the status of an in-dividual is achieved rather than ascribed; that social position and economic occupationare decided by capability and skill, not by virtue of birth; that the individual will bethe primary unit of society and politics, and not the group. Modernist approachesmore or less inevitably find caste anachronistic to modern politics.




The continuity and change model, on the other hand, emphasises dynamic relationsbetween tradition and modernity, caste and politics. The prominent argument ofthis school is that modernity is never a complete and neat break with tradition, rathera process of evolution that generates new forces of modernisation while retainingelements of tradition. Tradition holds components of modernity, and modernity retainselements of tradition. Weber (2002 [1958]) had linked ‘modern’ entrepreneurship in theWest to a character structure associated with ‘traditional’ Protestant ethics. Singerand Cohn (1968) in their early study of Hindu industrialists of Madras found jointfamily systems suitably converted into joint business houses based on division of labour.

Therefore, explaining modernity and tradition as mutually exclusive and contra-dictory would appear to rest on misdiagnosis of tradition as found in traditional so-cieties and a misunderstanding of modernity as seen in modern societies. Every societyencompasses in itself a range of sentiments, psychological predispositions, normsand structures that may belong to typical ideal-type traditional attributes, yet willalso have inherent and latent forces of modernisation. Similarly, all civilisations called‘modern’ encompass in themselves manifest and latent values, structures and norms,dominant values and motifs that fit a model of ‘tradition’. The risk of overlookingthis was succinctly put by Rudolph and Rudolph (1969: 3):

The assumption that modernity and tradition are radically contradictory rests on amisdiagnosis of tradition as it is found in traditional societies, a misunderstanding ofmodernity as it is found in modern societies, and a misapprehension of the relationshipbetween them.

The modernity-tradition debate as articulated through caste-politics relations hasbeen increasingly dominated by the continuity and change model. In this dynamicperspective, tradition itself becomes a facilitator of modernisation and yet does notget consumed in the process. Caste, though essentially a traditional institution, getsabsorbed in modern political processes without shedding all its cultural and structuralattributes. Rudolph and Rudolph (1969: 10) setting the theoretical paradigm of thecontinuity and change model of caste politics study, write:

If tradition and modernity are seen as continuous rather than separated by an abyss, ifthey are dialectically rather than dichotomously related, and if internal variations areattended to and taken seriously, then those sectors of traditional society that containor express potentialities for change from dominant norms and structures become criticalfor understanding the nature and processes of modernization.

Therefore, ‘the components of “new” men may exist among the “old”’ (Rudolph andRudolph, 1969: 11), and caste with its traditional attributes can become a structuraland ideological means of political mobilisation in modern competitive electoral pol-itics. Kothari (1970a: 8) held that modernisation is an upward movement from onestage of progress to another, but this does not mean the end of ‘tradition’. Citing from





his own earlier work (Kothari, 1970a: 8), Kothari (1997: 58) demonstrates the growingstrength of this approach when he reiterates that ‘[a] “modernizing” society is neithermodern nor traditional. It simply moves from one threshold of integration and per-formance to another, in the process transforming both the indigenous structures andattitudes and the newly introduced institutions and ideas’. This perceives modern-isation as a dynamic process that takes place in dialectical terms through mutualinteraction between tradition and modernity; through the process of fusion not fission;and through complex processes of continuity and change. Singh (1986: 191), amongothers, supports this approach and writes that traditional Indian society has relevancenot only for analysing the direction that the process of modernisation may eventuallytake through major socio-cultural transformations, but is also important for under-standing the causality and sequence of events through which modernisation impactson traditional Indian society. The continued incorporation of caste into democraticpolitics in India illustrates prominently that tradition and modernity interact in adynamic process, and its essence is continuity and change, not static rigidity. Wellbefore Mandalisation, it seems, this was recognised by more and more scholars.

Debates about Caste and Class

Caste-class relations in the pre-Mandal phase were prominently debated throughapproaches to the study of tradition and modernity. The debate polarised at twolevels, exclusiveness of caste and class and fusion of caste and class respectively. Thosewho believed in the dichotomy of tradition and modernity and tended to subscribeto cultural perspectives of caste, highlighted its uniqueness and favoured the ex-clusiveness of caste and class. Dumont (1998 [1966]), Hocart (1950), Hutton (1946),Pocock (1955), Srinivas (1962), and others argued that caste and class belong to dif-ferent social realities. They tended to explain caste as a unique traditional phenomenonof Indian society and class as a universal phenomenon of modern society. The formeris portrayed as a backward social institution, the latter belongs to advanced industrialsocieties. Since tradition and modernity are perceived as mutually exclusive, casteand class maintain a distinct reality. Moreover, cultural perspectives of caste emphasisecertain dominant ideas and values, such as pollution and purity, rules of social inter-course and endogamy, distinguishing caste from class and creating fixed boundariesrather than fuzzy edges and overlaps. Defining caste through concepts of status-rigidity and immutability, organic solidarity and functional interdependence, whilelinking class to the ideology of individualism, competition and equality, put casteand class into polar opposites. Such scholars also considered caste as a closed andrigid system, whereas class is perceived as open and flexible. Therefore, in the castesystem units of ranking are groups, status is ascribed and there is legitimacy of ritualhierarchy. In a class system, the units of rankings are individuals, status is achievedand is legitimised through material achievements.

However, this was not the only perspective. Barth (1960), Beteille (1966), Desai(1975), Ghurye (1950), Kothari (1970a; 1970b), Sharma (1980) and others subscribed




more to structural perspectives and argued that both caste and class represent the samestructural reality. Domination and subjugation, surplus and exploitation, privilegesand deprivations are reference points universally found in caste and class. Some be-lieved in the universality of caste as a social category. Ghurye (1961) found throughcomparative study that almost all the major civilisations of ancient times recogniseddistinctions by birth. Barth’s (1960) study of Muslims of North Pakistan locatedstructural elements of caste in different social groups, much as Imtiaz Ahmad (1978)later confirmed the presence of caste-like structures in Muslim societies of India.

Moreover, such scholars affirm that caste holds the tendency and potentiality tobecome a class; caste inheres an underdeveloped but potentially explosive class char-acter. Secondly, they hold that caste as class is a real and empirical phenomenon ofIndian society. When a caste behaves as an interest group, as Karl Marx explained interms of dialectical logic, a ‘class in itself ’ becomes a ‘class for itself ’ (Marx and Engels,1958), as elements of class-consciousness and unity develop into class antagonism.Rudolph and Rudolph (1969) and Kothari (1970a and 1970b) proved beyond doubtassociational features of caste and its class behaviour in Indian politics. Further, casteconflicts are also class conflicts. Upper and lower castes can also be upper and lowerclasses respectively.

Caste-class convergence is much evident in landowning pattern. Gough (1977;1980) in her early study of landowning pattern of Tanjore district found, hardly sur-prising, that Brahmins are landowners as well. On the other hand, non-Brahminsand Adi-Dravidas, the lower castes, are often landless. Mukherjee (1981) and Beteille(1966; 1969) found similar caste-class convergences in their studies. Also, caste riotsare often pronounced class conflicts between upper castes/class and lower castes/class(Omvedt, 1982). Caste conflicts, particularly attacks on landless low-caste labour-ers and their counter attacks, not only in feudal, backward and economically less de-veloped states such as Bihar, but even more in modern, capitalistically developedstates like Punjab, Gujarat and Maharashtra, created reason to believe that the under-lying factor behind such caste conflicts is the summation and articulation of classinterests (Omvedt, 1982).

Lastly, such scholarship suggested caution while studying Indian society, in viewof a tendency among Western scholars to locate class in India as seen in the early in-dustrial societies of the West. Clear polarisation of classes, however, is not evident inthe agrarian society of India. To a large extent, caste and class thus represent the samestructural reality. Since caste incorporates class and class incorporates caste, neitherthe ‘caste view’ alone, nor the ‘class view’ on its own can explain the entire gamut ofIndia’s social reality (Sharma, 1980).

Caste and Politics in the Pre-Mandal Phase

The central concern of caste-politics debates in this phase has been absorption of newdemocratic political institutions and processes into traditional Indian society. Howdoes modern politics negotiate with traditional Indian society and what is the response





of the latter to the former? Is caste/tradition a constraint to democratic politics andpolitical modernisation, or is it a facilitator of modern politics? Is tradition-based pol-itical modernisation essentially functional, or is it latent with dysfunctional tensions?Caste-politics relations in this phase have been mainly explored through these questions.

Scholars who focused on dynamic relations have mainly come out with a functionalperspective of caste-politics relations and have argued that caste has helped in the as-similation of democratic politics in India, adopting many of the roles of modern pol-itical institutions and process. Some of the important roles played by caste in thisrespect have been explained as (a) mediator between tradition and modernity; (b) agentof political mobilisation; and (c) creation of caste associations as a base for politicalcommunication, representation and leadership recruitment.

Kothari (1970a: 224–49; 1970b: 8–23) and Rudolph and Rudolph (1969: 24–103) produced interesting studies of caste-based political modernisation in India andanalysed in detail various roles of caste in modern democratic politics. These roleshave generally been subsumed under political mobilisation processes, expressed interms of vertical, horizontal and differential mobilisation, as Rudolph and Rudolph(1969: 24–6) explain:

Vertical mobilization is the marshaling of political support by traditional notables inlocal societies that are organized and integrated by rank, mutual dependence, and thelegitimacy of traditional authority…Vertical mobilization remains a viable strategy fordominant classes and castes…. Horizontal mobilization involves the marshaling ofpopular political support by class or community leaders and their specialized organ-izations…. Differential mobilization involves the marshaling of direct and indirectpolitical support by political parties (and other integrative structures) from viable, butinternally differentiated, communities through parallel appeals to ideology, sentimentsand interest. The agent of mobilization in this case is the political party rather than thelocal notable or community association.

These three types of political mobilisation also reflect stages of political awarenessand development. In vertical mobilisation, the society is least politicised and politicalawareness is limited to certain individuals or an elite group. Horizontal mobilisationindicates a moderate level of political awareness, as the caste or community group be-comes politicised, but political awareness still remains a group phenomenon. In dif-ferential mobilisation, political awareness has penetrated to the level of the individual,the exercise of political rights becomes now a matter of individual choice.

Scholars who believe in the dichotomy of tradition and modernity cry of ‘casteismin politics’, as they perceive tradition and modernity as polar opposites and even con-tradictory. Nationalist elites of newly independent states and Western intellectualshave expressed deep apprehensions about the use of linguistic, religious, ethnic, tribaland caste identities in democratic politics (Harrison, 1960). First, they argue thattraditional structures and loyalties have inherent potentialities to organise as a strongpolitical force and identity, which may even culminate in demands for separate nation-hood. Second, all encompassing roles of ascriptive structures negate the very essence




of democracy, as associations claim and get precedence over individuals in time andimportance. To substantiate such arguments, scholars have alluded to India and otherAfro-Asian countries as theatres of frequent civil wars, religious clashes, ethnic geno-cide, and separatist and secessionist movements. Partition of the Indian subcontin-ent on the basis of the ‘two-nation theory’, the linguistic reorganisation of Indianstates in 1956 and the violent language movement of the early 1960s are often quoted.Harrison (1960) expresses deep concern about the use of such primordial loyalties inpolitics. More recent movements for Khalistan, Bodoland and greater Nagaland weresaid to reflect the same trend.

While scholars have voiced apprehensions about the use of ascriptive institutionsin politics, the behaviour of castes in politics has been different from linguistic, re-ligious and tribal associations. Political mobilisation of caste groups often has specificpurposes, aimed at distribution of status or resources, or securing representation inlegislatures and services through reservations. The nature of their demands often indi-cates a willingness to become part of the mainstream. Such demands are amenable tomanagement through party politics and there are various limitations to caste-basedpolitical mobilisation, as Rudolph and Rudolph (1969) show. Moreover, Kothari (1970a;1997: 58) defends caste in politics as a natural phenomenon. He argues that democraticpolitics will essentially operate and articulate themselves through social organisationsand institutions. Since the bulk of India’s population is organised around caste, it isbut natural that politics will be organised and articulated through caste. Here again,then, the close inter-linkage of caste and politics remains a prominent feature andachieved increasing recognition during the debates in the pre-Mandal phase.

Debates of the Post-Mandal Period

While the Indian discourse on caste, class and politics in the 1960s and 1970s providedthe broader theoretical framework for the study of caste-politics relations, during the1980s and 1990s scholars looked for alternative paradigms to explain caste-classrelations and caste-politics interaction. The earlier modernising perspective of caste-politics relation that had explained caste-based politics and mobilisation as functionalfor Indian democracy could no longer explain the destabilising developments of the1980s and 1990s. The increasingly evident inability of the modernisation theory toexplain dysfunctional consequences of increasing political instability, political fission,proliferation of parties, rise of Dalits and Backward Classes and their socio-politicalassertion, and the decline of the Congress model of social coalition provided the firsturge to search for alternative paradigms of understanding. The legitimacy of traditionalinstitutions as facilitator of modernisation became questionable. While the earlierdiscourse on caste, class and politics was much more rooted in theory, new develop-ments required empirical testing. For example, the emergence of a new middle classhad to be verified empirically. Hence, the new discourse maintains a fine balance be-tween theory building and empirical testing. The developments of the 1980s and





1990s have added new dimensions to the study of caste, class and politics, characterisedby the prominence of three themes: (a) caste vs. class to measure socio-economicbackwardness; (b) formation of a new middle class; and (c) Dalit assertion and Back-ward Class politics.

The Caste-Class Debate on a New Plank

While the pre-Mandal discourse on caste-class relations was framed by the theory ofsocial stratification, more recent debates have been triggered by the state policy ofpositive discrimination for socially and educationally backward classes. In 1972, theGujarat Government constituted a Commission for the Socially and EducationallyBackward Classes under the chairmanship of Justice A.R. Baxi to identify sociallyand educationally backward groups of people who deserve special concession as werealready given to Scheduled Castes (SCs) and Scheduled Tribes (STs). The Commissionsubmitted its report in 1976, recommending caste as a unit of identification for in-corporation also in socially and educationally backward classes. In 1977, Bihar intro-duced a caste-based reservation policy for Other Backward Classes (OBCs), whichled to massive protests and violence by upper castes and forward classes. In 1978, theJanata Party-led Coalition Government at the Centre constituted a Backward ClassCommission under the Chairmanship of B.P. Mandal. The Mandal Commissionalso recommended caste as a category for incorporation in socially and educationallybackward classes for the purpose of extending reservations in government services tothe OBCs along the lines of the SCs and STs. The Mandal Commission Reportcould not be implemented till another coalition government of the erstwhile JanataParty came to power under V.P. Singh at the Centre in 1989. On 9 August 1990 itdeclared its decision to implement the report of the Mandal Commission. The decisionof the Janata Dal Government to implement 27 per cent reservation in governmentservices for the OBCs resulted in unprecedented levels of pan-Indian caste polarisationfor and against reservation, with massive impacts on the socio-political life in contem-porary India. The new debates on caste and class have been contexualised by theabove developments.

Hence, whereas in the early phase, the central question was whether a caste is aclass, the contemporary concern focuses on empirical identification of units for themeasurement of social and educational backwardness. The central question of enquiryis now whether a caste should be accepted as a permanent and fixed category for theidentification of socially and educationally backward classes, or should we go beyondcaste to find out a more secular and flexible criterion? This shift in emphasis has notonly pushed the caste-class debate to a new horizon, but has made the modernity-tradition approach virtually redundant for contemporary purposes.

Desai (1984) and Shah (1985) have immortalised the new debate on caste andclass, the former appearing to initiate the debate by arguing that a secular and flexibleunit for the measurement of social and educational backwardness should be evolvedfor the state policy of positive discrimination, while Shah responded that caste is a




permanent and fixed category for the identification of socially and educationallybackward classes. Both scholars have advanced convincing arguments and used em-pirical data to substantiate them.

Desai (1984) finds the Mandal Commission Report inconsistent in its perspectiveand recommendations. He contends that the selection of caste as a fixed and perman-ent category for the identification of socially and educationally backward classes maynot only legitimise the institution of caste, but stands against the new reality of Indiansocial life, characterised by the formation of a new class consciousness and unity,often leading to the destruction of caste consciousness and unity. His opposition tocaste-based reservation policy for the OBCs is on two counts. First, according to Desai(1984: 1111):

Recognition of caste as the unit for inclusion or exclusion in the SEBC [Socially andEducationally Backward Classes] goes against the Backward Class movements whichare to be understood as a refusal to accept, or as protests against, the caste status ascribedto some groups in the traditional hierarchy. Some of these movements, though maynot be all, indicate also the way to assert ‘equality’. It will be the negation of this con-sciousness of equality which is in keeping with the spirit of the Constitution…if casteis recognised as the unit equivalent to socially and educationally backward class. Itwould mean legitimising caste by state action and perpetuating the caste system, whichis inconsistent with the ideal of the Constitution.

Second, according to Desai (1984: 1111):

Apart from the perspective and spirit of the Constitution, there is the question of fact.In what sense do ‘the caste and ethnic groups’ exist as ‘recognisable and persistent col-lectivities’? The pertinent question is: are and were these collectivities called castes andgroups the same or homogeneous everywhere in different regions of the state or every-where in the state horizontally? Is each such horizontal segment vertically homogeneouseconomically, occupationally and educationally or even status-wise in the same regionand the state? If yes, with reference to which elements? Are these elements persistent?

His other resentment of caste-based reservation policy is its potentiality to transferinegalitarian ideology and values to egalitarian religious communities like Muslimsand Christians. On the positive side, Desai (1984: 1113) pleads that the caste systemis giving way to a system of secular identification, where ‘the two central principles ofcaste system have strong rivals in the new secular basis of differentiation and strati-fication. The old basis of unity, namely, caste consciousness, is weakening in the faceof interest conscious unities’. These are products of contemporary economic andpolitical developments along with corresponding changes in social norms and standardsof behaviour and in the aspiration of all people. Therefore, Desai pleads foridentification of social and educational backwardness on the basis of secular criteria,where individuals matter, not collectivities, and where individual status is determined





by occupational position, educational background, lifestyle, consumption patternand the source of livelihood obtained through one’s own efforts and not through thelegacy of ancestral occupation. Hence Desai (1984: 1115) confirms his perceptionthat ‘caste is not co-terminous with secular class and much less does the new strati-fication based on secular attributes concur with traditional caste hierarchy or statussystem’. To Desai (1984: 1116), ‘[b]ackwardness is not a permanent and ‘persistent’attribute of a citizen. It is the result of secular social forces of power and pelf ’. Thus,caste should not be identified with class.

Shah (1985) takes the opposite position by arguing that social and educationalbackwardness still has much to do with one’s birth in a particular caste group, whichis ascriptive and not achieved. He contests Desai’s proposition that in contemporaryIndian society, the life chances of an individual are determined by economic conditionsand not by birth in a particular caste. For him, even economic conditions of an indi-vidual are determined by birth in a particular family or caste. As Shah (1985: 133–4)writes: ‘It is true that birth should not decide one’s backwardness. But it is equallytrue that in the given economic and political structure, one’s birth in a particularfamily by and large determines one’s life chances’. The so-called upper castes havenot only enjoyed control over resources for centuries but also dominated the cultureof the masses, providing ideology and spreading it through various devices. Thus, soShah (1985: 134): ‘It takes time, even if we assume that the upper castes and classesare generous and have become secular, for the lower castes to get liberated from theBrahminical ideological hegemony’. A 1983 household survey conducted by theCentre for Social Studies in Surat illustrates the importance of caste in terms ofeducational and economic achievements (Shah, 1985: 133):

There are more hurdles in the path of the poor Koli than that of the poor Patidar toobtain educational and economic opportunities. These differences are not necessarilybecause of their traditional unequal social status in the caste hierarchy based on purityand pollution. They are because of the different historical experience, as one receivedcertain advantages in the past in the feudal economic and political structure which theother was denied. The persons from the lower caste were denied access to educationalinstitutions for centuries. Hence, one belonging to higher castes has inherited the trad-ition of education whereas the other has to open a new chapter… Because of theoverall environment of the collectivity, the poor Brahmin boy gets somewhat morecongenial environment for study than the poor Koli boy.

Other differences with Desai pertain to class formation. Desai (1984) observes theformation of a secular class of individuals cutting across caste identities in contem-porary Indian society. Shah (1985) argues that even though economic differenti-ations among the individuals of a particular caste may have widened and this mayhave happened in most castes, that does not necessarily lead to formation of class-consciousness cutting across caste consciousness. Rather, new economic stratification




may have taken place within a caste, but this has not happened at the cost of casteconsciousness. Shah (1985: 134) argues:

I suspect that economic stratification, and not class formation, has taken place withinmany castes engaged in agriculture. Economic stratification does influence the life styleand values of the members as the life style of a highly paid industrial worker differs fromthat of a low paid worker in the same factory. But such differences do not necessarilylead to the emergence of antagonistic ‘class interests’. Needless to say, economicdifferentiations have yet to cross caste boundaries to lead to the formation of classes.

Therefore, class is not formed simply by interest-conscious unities, but it has to besupported by interest antagonism as well, which is not well pronounced in con-temporary Indian society. Other scholars, including Alam (1999), Bhambhri (1999),Kothari (1994), Pushpendra (1999), Sheth (1999) and Srinivas (2003) have con-tributed to this debate by taking either position. The Government and the higher ju-diciary are other parties to this ongoing debate, putting their weight firmly behindthe ‘caste is class’ theory.

The Rise of a New Middle Class

An offshoot of the caste-class debate in the more recent period concerns the theory ofthe rise of a new middle class. Desai (1984) provided a grounding for the study ofnew class formation when he challenged caste-based reservation policies and pleadedfor a class-based policy defined through secular terms rather than caste. Sheth (1999:2508) has theorised this development through the admittedly inelegant conceptof ‘classisation of caste’ and proposed that as a cumulative result of detachment ofcaste from ritual status hierarchy and its linkage to the power structure of representa-tive democracy, a different kind of class structure has evolved over the last 40 years.He explains that political and economic forces of India’s post-Independence periodhave detached caste from its traditional ideological, political and economic roles toproduce a new kind of social structure where an individual’s income, occupationalposition, educational achievement and lifestyle matter more in terms of social statusthan ritually defined fixed status as commanded traditionally. Differentiations ofincome, occupation and consumption patterns have also led to new kinds of socialrelations established among individuals, cutting across caste lines and transcendingcaste ideologies. Moreover, politicisation of caste has produced a new kind of collectiveconsciousness among castes detached from ritual status consciousness, driven bythe common aspirations of individuals for greater political participation, increasingrepresentation in bureaucracy and modern status based on better earnings, educationaland occupational positions. Therefore, de-ritualisation of caste and its politicisationthrough democratic politics have produced a new kind of stratification, a social systemwhich cannot be defined either purely in caste or class terms. It is neither completely





devoid of features of the caste system, nor completely based on class sentiments.Sheth (1999: 2508) explains this ‘classisation of caste’ theory:

I, therefore, view classisation as a twofold process: (a) releasing of individual membersof all castes (albeit, extent of which may vary from one caste to another) from the re-ligiously sanctioned techno-economic and social organisation (i e, occupationaland status hierarchy) of the village system; (b) and linking of their interests and iden-tities to organisations and categories relevant to urban-industrial system and modernpolitics… Thus viewed, classisation is a process by which castes, but more frequentlytheir individual members, relate to categories of social stratification of a type differentfrom that of caste…. In short, caste has ceased to ‘reproduce’ itself, as it did in the past.

The observable formation of a middle class is a major derivative of his classisation ofcaste theory, which Sheth (1999: 2509) has called the ‘new middle class’, seen as‘socially much more diversified compared to the old, upper caste oriented middleclass that existed at the time of independence’. It is also new because entry into thenew middle class has not been facilitated by, and does not depend on, ritual socialstatus and Sanskritisation, but the acquisition of modern status based on educationalachievements, occupational positions, economic earnings and modern consumptionpatterns. This new middle class, recruited from various castes, develops distinctcharacteristics in terms of ritual detachment, acquisition of identity or consciousnessof belonging to the middle class and convergence of their economic and politicalinterests with other members of the middle class rather than their caste fellows. Thus,the new middle class is becoming politically and culturally more unified, thoughsocially much more diversified. This process of formation of the new middle class hasbeen substantiated by a survey conducted by the Centre for the Study of DevelopingSocieties in Delhi during June–July 1996.

Remarkably, M.N. Srinivas, a votary of caste-based reservation policy as a memberof the expert committee of the Mandal Commission, also accepted the emergence ofthe new middle class as a social fact at the fag end of his life. In a special article pub-lished posthumously, Srinivas (2003: 459) wrote ‘An obituary on caste as a system’and noted:

While the middle class is primarily urban, and it is dominated largely by the upper,and dominant castes, and elite sections of minorities and ethnic groups, all sections ofIndian society are represented within it, thanks to the spread of education, and massiveaffirmative action policies by the state…. Consumerism is an important characteristicof the middle classes and it is spreading to other sections of society…. Among themiddle classes, similarity of education, lifestyle and proximity, are becoming increasinglymore important than caste in forming friendships, and marriages.

Srinivas (2003: 458) also found this new middle class a more powerful dissolver ofcaste than the purely ideological Bhakti Movement of the medieval period or other




social movements. Probably fed up with the ‘reincarnation of caste’, he wished Indiato move on towards a more secular social reality, asserting that ‘[a] massive assault onmass poverty plus rapid economic growth will be the best dissolvers of caste identities.Membership of the middle class seems to provide a solvent to the caste divisiveness’(Srinivas, 2003: 459).

Pushpendra (1999) also supports his ‘classisation of caste’ theory through the studyof electoral behaviour of Dalits. A National Survey of the parliamentary elections of1996 and 1998 conducted by the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies inDelhi revealed the presence of a sizeable section of middle class and elite Dalits. Italso recorded that a large section of Scheduled Caste voters belonging to the upper orupper middle class preferred to vote for the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) (apparentlyan upper caste party), whereas most of the lower class Dalits voted exclusively for theBahujan Samaj Party (BSP) or other Dalit parties. This adds a political dimension tothe classisation of caste theory. Whereas Pushpendra (1999) explains this developmentthrough the voting behaviour of Dalits, Alam (1999) observes that oppressed casteshave forged a class-like solidarity to fight for equality.

However, scholars of the opposite spectrum have vehemently registered theirprotests against the classisation of caste theory, arguing that caste identity has notdissolved, even though class-based stratification may have become a new referencepoint for individuals. Shah (1985) in his reply to Desai (1984) admitted that thetraditional pollution-purity concept may have become diluted in relation to caste.Nonetheless, caste consciousness has survived all kinds of economic and politicalchanges and cuts across the different economic classes to sustain the ethnic ideologyof caste ‘we-ness’. Therefore, the social reality is that ‘[p]ersons of different economicstrata of the same caste feel as one… without much effort, whereas one has to makeconsistent efforts to feel one with the members of the same economic stratumbelonging to a different caste’ (Shah, 1985: 134). Singh, in private communicationto Desai (1984: 1107) takes a more rigid cultural perspective of caste and commentsin this connection:

Even granting that the process of modernisation and mobility and industrial expansionhas created a serious hiatus between caste status and social status in some parts of thecountry, and in some pockets in all parts of the country, the entrenchment of people’sidentity in caste and community remains intact not only endogamously but alsopolitically and culturally.

Kothari (1994) finds that the rise of Dalits and their socio-political assertion havere-entrenched caste identity and consciousness. He explains that consciousness ofcaste has been ironically invoked by those who have suffered most from the system.Earlier, it was upper castes that used to invoke caste identities in socio-political life;today, it is Dalits who do the same, which rather indicates strengthening of the castesystem than its erosion or weakening. Mukherjee (1999: 1761) sums up the debateby proposing that ‘[t]oday, in India, caste in class depicts the reality, and not caste per





se or caste and class’. Bhambhri (1999: 2619) suggests that caste in India has survivedas an ideological superstructure of Hindu society, an integral part of the social base ofmaterial arrangements for extraction of surplus values, and explains:

… caste has been used as an instrument for the ‘extraction and appropriation of surplusvalue’ in Indian agrarian social structure. Caste is both an ideological superstructureof Hinduism and it is also an integral part of the ‘social base of material arrange-ments’…Hinduism of every variety is very much in existence as a reference point ofthe worldview of the oppressed castes.

Bhambri’s first proposition that caste is still an instrument of economic exploitationof the oppressed by upper castes has to be accepted with a caveat. But one has to re-spect his second proposition that caste as an ideological superstructure of Hinduismhas survived as a reference point for the worldview of oppressed castes.

Caste and Politics: The Political Assertion of Dalits and Backward Classes

The notable political upsurge of Dalits and Backward Classes in the 1980s and 1990shas contributed to a number of political developments, including decline in dominanceof the Congress Party and erosion of its social coalition base. Divisive politics and theproliferation of caste-based political parties led to the simultaneous rise of Brahmanicaland Dalit parties (the BJP and BSP respectively), casteisation of government andbureaucracy and also violent caste conflicts, with initial consolidation and later frag-mentation of the OBCs. Hence, studying the causes of the socio-political assertion ofDalits and Backward Classes and their major consequences for polity and society hasrecently acquired more prominence in the discourse on caste, class and politics in India.

‘Democratisation of politics’ and ‘consolidation of democracy’ are important ex-planations of this phase (Jaffrelot, 2003), while Kohli (2001) has argued that dem-ocracy in India has acquired greater legitimacy through the widening social baseand enhanced participation of the erstwhile marginalised sections. Phenomena likecaste conflicts, political instability and proliferation of caste-based political partieshave been explained as passing (temporal) developments, which may give wayto more permanent features of the democratisation of politics, strengthening Indiandemocracy.

Jaffrelot (2003) calls the political upsurge of Dalits and Backward Classes India’s‘Silent Revolution’. It is indeed a revolution in the sense that for the first time in Indianhistory, the lower castes have been able to exercise political power by snatching itfrom the upper castes, made possible through mobilising their numerical superiority ina parliamentary democracy based on universal adult franchise. This revolution issilent, as the whole process is incremental without much violence, even though casteconflicts are very much in evidence. ‘India is therefore’, Jaffrelot (2003: 494) writes:

experimenting with a silent revolution. Power is being transferred, on the whole peace-fully, from the upper caste elites to various subaltern groups…The relative calm of theIndian experience is primarily due to the fact that the whole process is incremental.




A major consequence of this silent revolution has been the widening social base ofIndian democracy. It has been transformed largely from a political to a social dem-ocracy, as Dalits and Backward Classes have increased their representation in gov-ernment and political parties. Ethnicisation of caste, achieved by Dravidianism in theSouthern and Western parts of India and by the Mandal Commission in North India,has completed the process of social democracy. Jaffrelot (2003) observes that the long-standing contradiction between social and political democracy, to which Ambedkarhad earlier drawn attention (Constituent Assembly Debates, 1989: 979) is becominggradually reconciled through the socio-political awakening of Dalits and BackwardClasses in the post-Mandal phase.

Atul Kohli has changed his earlier perception of growing crisis of governability(Kohli, 1990) to speak now of India’s successful democracy (Kohli, 2001), noting thatthe social base of Indian democracy, and with it power sharing, has broadened.Pushpendra (1999) also notes that India’s democratic institutions have acquired greaterlegitimacy in this phase. Dalits and Backward Classes, constituting a substantial partof the population, had till recently been captive voters of the Congress Party and theirpolitical electoral role in Indian politics was defined by voting behaviour based onpatron-client relations. However, in the post-Mandal period, they have been able toarticulate their political interests through exclusive parties like the BSP in Uttar Pradeshand the Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD) in Bihar. Nadkarni (1997) prefers to call this a‘broadening process’, whereby erstwhile marginalised sections of society become apart of mainstream social, political and economic life. Khilnani (1999: 60) adds thatthe idea of democracy has ‘irreversibly entered the Indian political imagination…Areturn to the old order of castes…is inconceivable: the principle of authority in societyhas been transformed’.

Kothari (1994) still prefers to study the Dalit and Backward Class upsurge inthe old-fashioned tradition-modernity framework. Seeing their invocation of casteidentity and use of numerical strength to obtain political power as a ‘secular upsurge’,he argues that this caste-based mobilisation of Dalits and Backward Classes mayprove of great emancipatory value and lead to processes of social change. His otherimportant reading is that the Dalit upsurge also represents an alternative to othersocial movements, given that liberal democratic and left-Marxist models have failedto liberate them from the oppressive social system and to make much impact on theirsocio-economic conditions.

Apart from understanding the political rise of Dalits and Backward Classes, thecontemporary discourse on caste and politics has to answer many new paradoxicaldevelopments. It has been presumed for long that the upper castes are the oppressorsand exploiters of Dalits. But the emergence of new oppressors from the OBCs likeYadavs and Jats shows a different reality. For example, what will explain the deeppolitical antagonism between the BSP and the Samajwadi Party in Uttar Pradesh,between the RJD and the Samata Party, now the Janata Dal-U in Bihar? In other recent





developments, the Indian National Lok Dal of Om Prakash Chautala is competingfor political space at the Centre with Ajit Singh, both of them essentially Jat leaders.Mulayam Singh Yadav and Laloo Prasad Yadav have different political alliances, andthe experimental coalition government of the BSP and the BJP in Uttar Pradesh andnow the Brahmin-Dalit social coalition that returned the BSP with a clear majorityin the 2007 assembly election in Uttar Pradesh. Even phenomena like the growingNaxalite movement and violence in Bihar and Andhra Pradesh in the 1990s, despitebeing ruled by Backward Class leaders during that period (Laloo and Rabri in Biharand Chandra Babu Naidu in Andhra Pradesh) have demanded new understandingsof caste, class and politics in India. The contemporary discourse has been trying tofind suitable explanations for these intriguing developments.

The Future of Caste and Social Science Debates

Social science debate in India has not yet written caste off, even though considerableopinion has developed that the system has lost many of its traditional ideological,political, economic and even social roles. This view has been countered by the per-spective that even if caste may have lost appeal for many of its old functions, it hasacquired a new lease of life from its modern secular roles as liberator of oppressedcastes, through democratisation of politics and substantiation of Indian democracy,and as an index for the measurement of socio-economic backwardness. The exponentsof the former view have made their points by theorising caste in terms of class formationand have amassed vast data to substantiate their grounds. The prominent argumentof the opposite school is that the essence of caste has survived attacks of all kinds oftransforming forces and caste has metamorphosed and remains useful to some as acategory.

What has been surprisingly missing in the debate for a long time is that scholarsof all persuasions have avoided prognosticating on the future of caste in India. Thosewho subscribe to the ‘classisation of caste/class formation view’ have taken it forgranted that modern political and economic forces would make or already have madecaste redundant in contemporary society and that modern forces, in course of time,would dismantle its remaining vestiges. Hence, the future of caste is inversely linkedto the progress of modernisation, industrialisation, urbanisation and democratisationof politics.

Therefore, the task to prophesise on the future of caste rests with those who subscribeto the view that caste is not disappearing. Shah (1985) who led the frontal attack oncaste becoming class theory has argued that unless and until an ideological battle islaunched against caste, it would not easily disappear from the Indian scenario, forcaste has survived more in terms of consciousness than in terms of traditional pollution/purity concepts or caste-based division of labour.

Bhambhri (1999) was neither impressed by a purely ideological attack on castenor by purely materialistic arguments. For him, since caste has survived in dialectical




relations between ideology of caste and caste-based agrarian modes of production,it has to be attacked through dialectical logic. The structure of caste-based agrarianmodes of production has to be knocked down first to dismantle its superstructure,the ideology of caste and caste consciousness. If that logic were not followed, castewould remain present, not only in the mind.

In his final ‘obituary on caste as a system’, Srinivas (2003: 455) saw these complexdevelopments towards a phasing out of caste emerging in contemporary India whenhe observed that ‘the localised system of production of foodgrains and other ne-cessities…based on a caste-wise division of labour is fast breaking down all over ruralIndia, and is likely to disappear in the near future’, while ‘[t]he lineaments of the newsocial order—if it can indeed be called an order—are already visible’. Thus, so virtuallythe last words from Srinivas (2003: 459), shortly before his death:

A massive assault on mass poverty plus rapid economic growth will be the best dissolversof caste identities. Membership of the middle class seems to provide a solvent to thecaste divisiveness…The situation may be summed up by saying that a variety of forcesare bringing about the destruction of the caste-based system of production in the villagesand at the local level…On the other hand, individual castes are competing with eachother for access to secular benefits. The conflict is likely to become sharper. India’srevolution seems destined to be a slow, bleeding one, largely unrecognised by the middleclasses in urban areas….The moral to be drawn is that an ideological attack on castewhich is not backed up or underpinned by a mode of social production ignoring orviolating caste-based division of labour, is totally inadequate. A combination of whollynew technologies, institutions, based on new principles, and a new ideology whichincludes democracy, equality and the idea of human dignity and self-respect has to bein operation for a considerable time in order to uproot the caste system.

Ideological challenges and socio-economic change, thus have to go hand in hand andno single method of getting rid of ‘caste’ and the various types of consciousness re-lated to it are feasible. But as Srinivas (2003) also pointedly notes throughout, pol-iticians are likely to exploit caste consciousness. Thus, do we blame political scientistsfor the ‘cultivation’ of caste?

The role of social science discourse as an interdisciplinary enterprise comes inprecisely here. Complex interdisciplinary research is required to define new paradigmsof public-political life to de-legitimise old ones. Unfortunately, social science debateson caste, class and politics in India have so far not been able to displace caste fromthe centre-stage of public-political life, while opinions remain divided over caste-based reservation policy and caste-based politics. Desai’s (1984) frontal attack oncaste-based reservation policy degenerated into a highly politicised caste-class debateand therefore could not make much progress. More importantly, the 1990 decisionof the V.P. Singh Government to implement caste-based reservations in government





services for the OBCs, as recommended by the Mandal Commission and its legal-judicial endorsement by the Supreme Court seems to have settled the debate furtherin favour of the ‘caste equals class’ approach.

Whatever may be the merits of the caste-based reservation policy and its theoreticalversion, caste-based political modernisation and democratisation of politics throughcaste remain inherently flawed, encouraging retrograde processes and discouragingprogressive routes of modernisation and democratisation. For example, caste-politicshas not allowed Indian democracy to move sufficiently towards a policy-based, goal-oriented politics and has also discouraged articulation of secular interests throughpolitics. Issues of governance and economic development have not acquired enoughprominence in electoral politics. This is also one major reason that the economicreforms of the 1990s were not introduced through open democratic politics but‘through stealth’ (Jenkins, 1999).

Suri (2004) argues that the issue of economic reforms has little impact on electoralverdicts. Similarly, caste-based reservation policy and its politicisation robbed theBackward Class movements of many positive agenda. Even the Mandal CommissionReport was reduced to reservation policy, though it had many positive things (likeland reforms) for the Backward Classes in store. Dalit and Backward Class movements,which should have become a vehicle for total social, political and economic upliftmentof Dalits and Backward Classes, would not be able to utilise their transformingpotentialities as long as they remain narrowly focussed on identity and representativepolitics. The limits of caste-based reservation politics and dangers of sectarian promisesappear exemplified by the violent conflicts in summer 2007 between OBC Gujjarsand ST Meenas in Rajasthan, the former agitating to obtain ST status and the latterprotesting against inclusion of Gujjars into the ST list. So long as it remains desirablefor some to argue for ‘more backward’ status, such problems will raise their head.

Hence, the prospects for full debate at present seem restricted. Contemporarysocial science discourse on caste, class and politics in India faces the challenge to setpositive agenda for change by moving beyond caste-class debates and by definingnew paradigms of public policy and new instruments of politics in the wider publicinterest of a nation composed of many competing elements. Social and political move-ments in contemporary India have failed to articulate comprehensive secular modelsof change and have not moved much beyond traditional symbols and goals. It appearsthat social and political movements have to borrow and adapt programmes of actionfrom other social science discourses. In Western societies, many progressive movementshave been fired from the ideological canons of the intelligentsia. In our own historyof renaissance and freedom struggle, ideological battles were launched first. In thecontemporary Indian society, the intelligentsia seem to follow the path of social andpolitical leaders. The process needs to be reversed. This is the broader challenge, amajor ongoing task for social science discourse in contemporary India.




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Dr Ashok K. Pankaj is a Senior Fellow, Institute for Human Development, NIDMBuilding, Third Floor, IIPA Campus, I.P. Estate, Mahatma Gandhi Marg, New Delhi110002, India. [email: [email protected]]



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Caste Class and Politics