Cassirer: Symbolic Forms and Historyby John Michael Krois

Cassirer: Symbolic Forms and History by John Michael KroisReview by: Randall E. AuxierThe Journal of Speculative Philosophy, New Series, Vol. 7, No. 2 (1993), pp. 159-165Published by: Penn State University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25670069 .

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BOOK REVIEWS

Cassirer: Symbolic Forms and History. John Michael Krois. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1987. Pp. ix-xvii + 262. $27.50 cloth.

During his lifetime, Ernst Cassirer failed to establish for himself a signifi cant discipleship which might have sustained his fertile thought into the

present generation. The result of this is that most American philosophers have, at most, a nodding acquaintance with his name and little else. Many factors can be cited to explain Cassirer's decline towards anonymity, but the most compelling reasons are biographical. Cassirer, being Jewish, was

forced to leave Germany, at the height of his philosophical ability and

influence, when Hitler rose to power in 1933. Subsequently, his work fell into disfavor in Germany, and by the time the smoke had cleared in 1945,

Germany had lost the entire generation that might have carried Cassirer's work forward. He spent his remaining years in England (two years), Sweden (seven years), and the rest in the United States. He died in 1945. His magnum opus, the three-volume Philosophie der symbolischen Formen, was written in German and has gone generally unread by English-speaking philosophers. Instead, his late works, An Essay on Man and The Myth of the State (written in English), were briefly examined by the philosophical public and promptly forgotten in the face of the snowballing popularity of

logical positivism. Cassirer's work did come to enjoy a temporary, but nonetheless remarkable, popularity among anthropologists in the late fifties and the sixties, but this has waned in recent years.

The fact remains, however, that Cassirer's work is an untapped well

THE JOURNAL OF SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHY, Vol. VII, No. 2, 1993. Copyright ? 1993 The Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA.

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spring of erudite scholarship and original systematic philosophy with few rivals in the present century. John Michael Krois has endeavored to deliver a comprehensive summary of the central precepts of Cassirer's system, while simultaneously dispelling the old rumors and misconceptions about Cassirer which are based on only a partial understanding of his work. This has not been done before in either English or German. Cassirer's corpus is

enormous, with works spanning every discipline in the Geisteswissen

schaften. Krois, working from a knowledge of the full breadth of this corpus, has condensed it to just those themes that are germane to grasping a

philosophical sense of the whole. What will be of particular interest to those who specialize in American

thought is that Cassirer not only drew heavily upon that tradition, but his

systematic philosophy is a dynamic, temporal philosophy of process?not at all the stilted, Marburg, neo-Kantian beast it is often supposed to be. In

arguing that Cassirer does not fit the neo-Kantian mold, Krois says that "Cassirer upheld no such primacy of consciousness but rather the primacy of meaning and the fact that the person is bound to a body" (p. 7). The

followers of Dewey and Peirce will take notice of this. Although there is no

evidence that Cassirer read Peirce (pp. 44-45, 226-27 n. 37), still, "Cassirer's theory of signs stands in close proximity to Peirce's" (p. 45). Krois tells us that "Cassirer referred to Charles Morris's work on the theory of signs to make his own ideas clearer to American readers. These refer ences indicate his readiness to regard the theory of symbolic forms in the context of what the American pragmatists called semiotic . . ." (p. 45).

Regarding Dewey, Krois points out that "a few American interpreters have

perceived a relationship between Cassirer's philosophy and American

Pragmatism. John Herman Randall [Jr.] has noted fundamental agreement between Cassirer and Dewey." Krois cites a Randall review of Cassirer's

Logic of the Humanities (History and Theory 2 [1962]: 67). Randall also wrote an essay for the Library of Living Philosophers series, Volume 6 (The Philos

ophy of Ernst Cassirer, ed. Paul A. Schilpp, LaSalle, III.: Open Court, 1949,

pp. 689-728). His concern there, however, is Cassirer's philosophy of his

tory more than his relation to pragmatism or American naturalism. In the same volume, Felix Kaufmann undertook a brief (and in some limited ways

helpful) comparison of Dewey's and Cassirer's systems. What Kaufmann

failed to note is that the points upon which Dewey and Cassirer differed are

precisely those where Cassirer's views tend more in the direction of Peirce's

(towards systematic idealism of some sort, and away from naturalism; cf., The Philosophy of Ernst Cassirer, pp. 209-13). Krois believes that "an

examination of the pragmatic elements in Cassirer's thought or of his refer



BOOK REVIEWS 161

ences to American Pragmatist writings, which are not infrequent, would be

interesting, but . . . [t]his is not the typical approach to Cassirer" (p. 10). While Krois could not undertake such a comparison in this work, the

book definitely opens the door for such a study by providing those who

might be inclined to do it with a "guidebook" to get them started. Most of Cassirer's major works have now been translated and are generally avail

able, but the summary and exposition of their central core given by Krois

will save American philosophers much effort in wading through them.

Followers of Peirce may also be interested to learn that in the debate

between dyadic and triadic approaches to semiotics, they have in Cassirer a

powerful ally. Krois says: "Mistaking the triadic character of Cassirer's

theory of signs and symbolism for a dyadic one results in great confusion because such a perspective overlooks the pragmatic dimension of Cassirer's

thought. Recognizing the triadic structure of the symbolic forms reveals several important points of agreement between Cassirer's theory and Prag

matist semiotic" (p. 52). The book has a fairly long introduction in which Krois accomplishes four

things. 1. He summarizes the state of secondary literature on Cassirer in

both German and English. 2. He confronts and dispels the prevailing "Continental" understanding of Cassirer as the last of the Marburg neo

Kantians: "According to John Herman Randall, Jr., who knew Cassirer at

Columbia, Cassirer at the end of his life was 'provoked that the label

[Kantian] was still attached to him'" (p. 41). The attempt to distinguish Cassirer from neo-Kantianism persists throughout the book. 3. He chal

lenges the "Anglo-American Interpretation" that Cassirer is nothing more

than a historian of ideas?a view due in part to the fact that Cassirer's

major systematic contributions (excepting his first such work, Substance and Function), were not available in English until well after his death. Thus, this view rests on a partial understanding of Cassirer, Krois argues. 4.

Finally, Krois provides a brief and clear account of Cassirer's life and

writings, concluding that Cassirer's thought is not, at bottom, either an

epistemology or a rarified philosophy of mind. Rather, "Cassirer's philoso phy is a theory of historical life, but it is not a form of historicism; it conceives history in a normative sense. This conception of history depends upon a fundamental transformation of transcendental philosophy" (p. 32).

The main body of the book consists of five chapters. The first, entitled "Cassirer's Transformation of Philosophy," aims to give the nature of the transformation just mentioned. Basically, Cassirer broadened what we nor

mally mean by "transcendental," by claiming that "the transcendental method was really a way to ask questions and not a dogmatic doctrine about




things" (p. 41), something he had learned from his teacher, Hermann Cohen. As a result, "Cassirer extends the transcendental question to the 'more comprehensive' question of meaning (p. 43). Thus, the "fact of

intersubjective understanding of meaning is the starting point for Cassirer's

philosophy" (p. 43). From here Cassirer built up a philosophy of communi cation ("language" is too narrow a word, being only one sort of communica

tion) on the basis of a logic of relations. This philosophy of communication is fleshed out by means of the idea of a symbolic form. A symbolic form is "a

way of having a world" (p. 51), or one might say it is a set of related horizons within which the communicative activities of human beings and cultures

transpire, and which also relate to one another (e.g., art, science, religion, myth, etc.). This is Cassirer's transformation, but its nature has only been outlined here.

Krois covers the most important intricacies of this move in the re

mainder of the chapter, culminating with a discussion of Cassirer's surpris ing willingness to "do metaphysics" in his later years. Here, just as "Cassirer overcomes the hurdle of the epistemological strictures of neo-Kantianism," he also "reinterprets the problem of being and metaphysics in light of the

problem of meaning" (p. 63). Krois concludes that "the symbol is Cassirer's

key to the problem posed by life philosophy [i.e., Bergson]: how to take full

cognizance of historical life without sacrificing the transcendence [in the new sense] of the ideal" (p. 71).

In the second chapter, Krois is concerned to show how Cassirer inte

grates this new slant on the theory of meaning into a communitarian and normative philosophy of culture, while maintaining its status as "first

philosophy" (in the Aristotelian sense). Here Krois explains Cassirer's "three symbolic 'functions'?expression (Ausdruck), representation (Dar

stellung), and pure significance (reine Bedeutung)?as 'dimensions' of mean

ing" (p. 81). Cassirer attempted to "broaden the ordinary conception of

symbolism to give it a universal sense" (p. 81). Krois discusses these

functions in some detail, as he puts them to work in showing the relations

among the various symbolic forms that have arisen in culture (language, art, myth, religion, science, etc.). These three functions are successive

manifestations of the general human symbolizing function, and they be come differentiated as culture develops and diversifies. They are not,

however, reducible to one another, and this requires a somewhat compli cated story. The chapter concludes with a brief discussion of the role of

technology in culture for Cassirer. According to Krois, "myth, language, and technical activity are the origins of human culture" (p. 104).

The third chapter broaches the issue of truth: What would truth be for



BOOK REVIEWS 163

such a system of philosophy? Krois argues that "the concept of truth in

'systematic philosophy'" like Cassirer's does not involve "searching for an

'absolute ground' or 'foundation for truth' in a metaphysical principle," but rather "the totality of the different symbolic forms provides a unifying

methodological approach to truth" (p. 134). Thus, "the limits of one sym bolic form do not limit access to truth absolutely," but instead "the man

ifold nature of the symbolic forms is what gives us access to the truth as a

totality" (p. 134). This will be recognized as bearing close kinship to the

Hegelian dictum that "The True is the Whole," but Cassirer's view is not

exactly a coherence theory of truth in the linguistic sense?it is not

exhausted in the mere compatibility of a set of propositions. Cassirer's alternative is a kind of pluralism that American philosophers

will find engagingly familiar. We may be moved to ask, in this regard, what sort of "totality" one can justifiably extract from the plurality of symbolic forms. Is each form a finite or limited form? In answer to this sort of query, Krois says that "Cassirer maintains that the unity of truth should not be confused with homogeneity. . . . Physical science, history, and art provide distinct types of knowledge" (p. 139). Even though Cassirer holds out for a

unity in the totality of truth, he "denies that truth takes only one form"

(p. 139). Regarding this set of apparently contrary views Cassirer holds, we are finally told that "Cassirer proposes that the unity of truth should be conceived as a harmony of oppositions" (p. 140). Cassirer is a Heraclitean, then, in the last analysis, and this will endear him to many process

philosophers (an explicit affirmation of this point is later made on pp. 173

74). For those more inclined to the pragmatic view of truth, there will be some consolation in Cassirer's narrowing of this "harmony of oppositions" as follows: "[T]he problem of truth belongs to . . . the 'level of meaning' and therefore gains its systematic place in the whole of philosophy only when it is considered in contrast to other levels of meaning" (p. 141). This move seems to open up a space in which to insert Dewey's logic of inquiry, propositional formulation, and warranted assertibility. Still it is unlikely that Cassirer (or Krois) would accept Dewey's view as an exhaustive account of truth. In all, the pragmatist will find more to take issue with in this third

chapter than any other, while the process philosopher may well find it the most agreeable aspect of the whole book.

I will not discuss the fourth chapter ("Morality and Law") in any detail, but it should be said that it fills a gaping hole in Cassirer scholarship (what little of it there is). While there is evidence that Cassirer thought about the

ethical/legal dimension of philosophy to a limited extent throughout his

work, his interest in this intensified greatly in his later years?perhaps in




response to his own plight and the world situation. Still, very little in the

way of detailed ethical study was published until Cassirer was advanced in

years, and some pieces have not yet reached the presses. Krois writes this

chapter to stress the centrality of ethical thinking to Cassirer's systematic

project, and does this by claiming that morality has the status of a symbolic form in Cassirer's system. This thesis can be disputed on the grounds that

"morality" is not treated as a symbolic form, and not listed as one, in many

places where it should have been (if Cassirer truly thought of it that way). Cassirer is notoriously vague on the exact makeup of the list of symbolic forms. Krois says they must be finite in number, and gives us some indica tion of how to tell something that is a symbolic form from something that is

not, but that is as clear as the matter becomes. The evidence and arguments Krois provides for "morality" as a symbolic form leave one with some doubt as to whether it can maintain a distinct enough identity as a symbolic form

under scrutiny, and whether Cassirer really meant it to have that status.

Regardless of the outcome of this internal debate, Krois has provided the

only comprehensive discussion of Cassirer's ethical/legal philosophy in the

English language, and this is the value of the chapter. The fifth and final chapter also aims at filling an important gap in the

secondary literature on Cassirer. No interpretation of the significance of Cassirer's philosophy of history to his systematic philosophy of symbolic forms had previously been attempted. It is in this context that Krois is

willing to make the most concrete claims about what symbolic forms are:

"The symbolic forms are not self-contained ways of having a world; they

always stand in relation to?and in conflict with?one another. . . . Part

of this opposition is the way the different symbolic forms interact as

stabilizing or innovative forces in society" (p. 173). Where myth, for

example, has a conservative influence on social structures, art is innova

tive. Krois continues that "[a]ll symbolic forms are social forces acting to

divide and unite people" (p. 173). Krois cites Cassirer's final paragraph in

the Essay on Man, claiming that it is his "most comprehensive statement of

the historical significance of human culture" (p. 174). There Cassirer says that "[h]uman culture taken as a whole is the process of man's progressive self-liberation" (p. 174). The book ends on a note reminiscent of Dewey's call for philosophy to act as the critical arm of the community: "Cassirer

sought to provide a systematic understanding of both lived experience and

scientific knowledge. The philosophy of symbolic forms attempts to relate

these two dominant directions of contemporary philosophy. This is a

reflection, at the level of philosophy, of Cassirer's attempt to find in all

culture a harmony in contrariety" (p. 215).



BOOK REVIEWS 165

Finally, we find an interesting parallel to Peirce's interpretation of the

progress of science in Krois's book. In a place where Cassirer "refers

concurringly to the works of John Dewey and William James," (p. 19), he

says: "We call a proposition 'true,' not because it agrees with a fixed reality

beyond all thought and all possibility of thought, but because it is verified in

the process of thought that leads to new and fruitful consequences" (p. 19). This statement was quoted from Substance and Function, and when it is

added to another claim Cassirer made just as early in his career, the debt to

Peirce (while it may be indirect) becomes obvious. Cassirer said: "The one

reality can only be indicated and defined as the ideal limit of the many

changing theories; yet the assumption of this limit is not arbitrary, but

inevitable, since only by it is the continuity of experience established"

(p. 19). In fact Cassirer's philosophy seems to run a systematic middle

ground between Dewey and Peirce as the previous quotes indicate. We will all recognize something akin to the pragmatic maxim in the first quote, and Peirce's famous statement about truth in the second.

Cassirer has roots in the classical American tradition, and explicitly so.

Krois has performed a great service to the community of scholars in

bringing them a clear, comprehensive, and thoroughly competent account

of Cassirer's thought, accessible to the nonspecialist.

Randall E. Auxier Oklahoma City University

Philosophy in World Perspective. David A. Dilworth. New Haven, London: Yale University Press, 1989. Pp. viii + 232.

The Architectonics of Meaning. Walter Watson. Albany, N.Y.: State Univer

sity of New York Press, 1985. Pp. xiii + 205.

David A. Dilworth's Philosophy in World Perspective is a reaction to impulses of several different kinds. It is before all a reaction to a certain cultural situa tion. The most general term we have for naming it is "pluralism." It is then the situation that results in people representing different religions, cultural

THE JOURNAL OF SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHY, Vol. VII, No. 2, 1993. Copyright ? 1993 The Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA.



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Cassirer: Symbolic Forms and Historyby John Michael Krois