Cases Legislative,Executive

8/3/2019 Cases Legislative,Executive

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1.

SENATOR BENIGNO SIMEONC. AQUINO III and MAYORJESSE ROBREDO,

Petitioners,

-versus-

COMMISSION ONELECTIONS represented byits ChairmanJOSE A.R. MELOand its Commissioners, RENEV. SARMIENTO, NICODEMOT. FERRER, LUCENITO N.TAGLE, ARMANDOVELASCO, ELIAS R. YUSOPHAND GREGORIOLARRAZABAL,

Respondents.

G.R. No. 189793

Present:

PUNO, C.J.,

CARPIO,

CORONA,

CARPIO MORALES,

VELASCO, JR.,

NACHURA,

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,

BRION,

PERALTA,

BERSAMIN,

DEL CASTILLO,

ABAD,*

VILLARAMA, JR.,

PEREZ, and

MENDOZA,JJ.

Promulgated:

April 7, 2010

x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

D E C I S I O N

This case comes before this Court by way of a Petition for Certiorari and

Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. In this original action, petitioners

Senator Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III and Mayor Jesse Robredo, as public officers,

taxpayers and citizens, seek the nullification as unconstitutional of Republic Act No.

9716, entitled An Act Reapportioning the Composition of the First (1st) and Second

(2nd) Legislative Districts in the Province of Camarines Sur and Thereby Creating a

New Legislative District From Such Reapportionment. Petitioners consequently


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pray that the respondent Commission on Elections be restrained from making any

issuances and from taking any steps relative to the implementation of Republic Act

No. 9716.

Republic Act No. 9716 originated from House Bill No. 4264, and was signed

into law by President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo on 12 October 2009. It took effect on

31 October 2009, or fifteen (15) days following its publication in the Manila

Standard, a newspaper of general circulation. In substance, the said law created an

additional legislative district for the Province of Camarines Sur by reconfiguring the

existing first and second legislative districts of the province.

Prior to Republic Act No. 9716, the Province of Camarines Sur was estimated

to have a population of 1,693,821, distributed among four (4) legislative districts in

this wise:

District Municipalities/Cities Population

1st District

Del Gallego

Ragay

Lupi

Sipocot

Cabusao

Libmanan

Minalabac

Pamplona

Pasacao

San Fernando

417,304

2nd District

Gainza

Milaor

Naga

Pili

Ocampo

Canaman

Camaligan

Magarao

Bombon

Calabanga

474,899

3rd District

Caramoan

Garchitorena

Goa

Lagonoy

Presentacion

Sangay

San Jose

Tigaon

Tinamba

Siruma

372,548


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4th District

Iriga

Baao

Balatan

Bato

Buhi

Bula

Nabua

429,070

Following the enactment of Republic Act No. 9716, the first and second

districts of Camarines Sur were reconfigured in order to create an additional

legislative district for the province. Hence, the first district municipalities of

Libmanan, Minalabac, Pamplona, Pasacao, and San Fernando were combined with

the second district municipalities of Milaor and Gainza to form a new second

legislative district. The following table illustrates the reapportionment made by

Republic Act No. 9716:

District Municipalities/Cities Population

1st District

Del Gallego

Ragay

Lupi

Sipocot

Cabusao

176,383

2nd District

Libmanan

Minalabac

Pamplona

Pasacao

San Fernando

Gainza

Milaor

276,777

3rd District(formerly 2nd

District)

Naga

Pili

Ocampo

Canaman

Camaligan

Magarao

Bombon

Calabanga

439,043


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4th District

(formerly 3rd

District)

Caramoan

Garchitorena

Goa

Lagonoy

Presentacion

Sangay

San Jose

Tigaon

Tinamba

Siruma

372,548

5th District(formerly 4th

District)

Iriga

Baao

Balatan

Bato

Buhi

Bula

Nabua

429,070

Republic Act No. 9716 is a well-milled legislation. The factual recitals by both

parties of the origins of the bill that became the law show that, from the filing of

House Bill No. 4264 until its approval by the Senate on a vote of thirteen (13) in

favor and two (2) against, the process progressed step by step, marked by public

hearings on the sentiments and position of the local officials of Camarines Sur on

the creation of a new congressional district, as well as argumentation and debate

on the issue, now before us, concerning the stand of the oppositors of the bill that a

population of at least 250,000 is required by the Constitution for such new district.

Petitioner Aquino III was one of two senators who voted against the approval

of the Bill by the Senate. His co-petitioner, Robredo, is the Mayor of Naga City,

which was a part of the former second district from which the municipalities of

Gainza and Milaor were taken for inclusion in the new second district. No other

local executive joined the two; neither did the representatives of the former third

and fourth districts of the province.

Petitioners contend that the reapportionment introduced by Republic Act No.

9716, runs afoul of the explicit constitutional standard that requires a minimum

population of two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) for the creation of a legislative

district. The petitioners claim that the reconfiguration by Republic Act No. 9716 of

the first and second districts of Camarines Sur is unconstitutional, because the

proposed first district will end up with a population of less than 250,000 or only

176,383.

Petitioners rely on Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution as basis

for the cited 250,000 minimum population standard. The provision reads:


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Article VI

Section 5. (1) x x x x(2) x x x x

(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable,contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory. Each city with apopulation of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or eachprovince, shall have at least one representative.(4) x x x x (Emphasis supplied).

The petitioners posit that the 250,000 figure appearing in the above-citedprovision is the minimum population requirement for the creation of a legislative

district. The petitioners theorize that, save in the case of a newly created province,each legislative district created by Congress must be supported by a minimumpopulation of at least 250,000 in order to be valid. Under this view, existinglegislative districts may be reapportioned and severed to form new districts,provided each resulting district will represent a population of at least 250,000. Onthe other hand, if the reapportionment would result in the creation of a legislativeseat representing a populace of less than 250,000 inhabitants, the reapportionmentmust be stricken down as invalid for non-compliance with the minimum populationrequirement.

In support of their theory, the petitioners point to what they claim is the

intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution to adopt a population minimum of

250,000 in the creation of additional legislative seats. The petitioners argue that

when the Constitutional Commission fixed the original number of district seats in

the House of Representatives to two hundred (200), they took into account the

projected national population of fifty five million (55,000,000) for the year 1986.

According to the petitioners, 55 million people represented by 200 district

representatives translates to roughly 250,000 people for every one (1)

representative. Thus, the 250,000 population requirement found in Section 5(3),Article VI of the 1987 Constitution is actually based on the population constant used

by the Constitutional Commission in distributing the initial 200 legislative seats.

Thus did the petitioners claim that in reapportioning legislative districts

independently from the creation of a province, Congress is bound to observe a

250,000 population threshold, in the same manner that the Constitutional

Commission did in the original apportionment.

Verbatim, the submission is that:

1. Republic Act 9716 is unconstitutional because the newly apportioned

first district of Camarines Sur failed to meet the population requirement for the

creation of the legislative district as explicitly provided in Article VI, Section 5,

Paragraphs (1) and (3) of the Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended

thereto; and


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2. Republic Act 9716 violates the principle of proportionalrepresentation as provided in Article VI, Section 5 paragraphs (1), (3)and (4) of the Constitution.

The provision subject of this case states:

Article VI

Section 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composedof not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixedby law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportionedamong the provinces, cities and the Metropolitan Manila area inaccordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on thebasis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided bylaw, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national,regional and sectoral parties or organizations.

(2) x x x x

(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable,contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory. Each city with a populationof at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have atleast one representative.

(4) Within three years following the return of every census, theCongress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based onthe standards provided in this section.

On the other hand, the respondents, through the Office of the

Solicitor General, seek the dismissal of the present petition based onprocedural and substantive grounds.

On procedural matters, the respondents argue that the petitioners are guilty

of two (2) fatal technical defects: first, petitioners committed an error in choosing

to assail the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9716 via the remedy ofCertiorari

and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court; and second, the petitioners

have no locus standi to question the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9716.

On substantive matters, the respondents call attention to an apparent

distinction between cities and provinces drawn by Section 5(3), Article VI of the

1987 Constitution. The respondents concede the existence of a 250,000 population

condition, but argue that a plain and simple reading of the questioned provision will

show that the same has no application with respect to the creation of legislative

districts in provinces. Rather, the 250,000 minimum population is only a

requirement for the creation of a legislative district in a city.

In sum, the respondents deny the existence of a fixed population requirement

for the reapportionment of districts in provinces. Therefore, Republic Act No. 9716,

which only creates an additional legislative district within the province of Camarines

Sur, should be sustained as a perfectly valid reapportionment law.

We first pass upon the threshold issues.


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The respondents assert that by choosing to avail themselves of the remedies of

Certiorari and Prohibition, the petitioners have committed a fatal procedural lapse.

The respondents cite the following reasons:

1. The instant petition is bereft of any allegation that the respondents had

acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion.

2. The remedy ofCertiorari and Prohibition must be directed against a tribunal,

board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial

functions. Respondents maintain that in implementing Republic Act No. 9716,

they were not acting as a judicial or quasi-judicial body, nor were they engaging

in the performance of a ministerial act.

3. The petitioners could have availed themselves of another plain, speedy

and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Considering that the

main thrust of the instant petition is the declaration of unconstitutionality

of Republic Act No. 9716, the same could have been ventilated through a

petition for declaratory relief, over which the Supreme Court has only

appellate, not original jurisdiction.

The respondents likewise allege that the petitioners had failed to show that

they had sustained, or is in danger of sustaining any substantial injury as a result of

the implementation of Republic Act No. 9716. The respondents, therefore, conclude

that the petitioners lack the required legal standing to question the constitutionality

of Republic Act No. 9716.

This Court has paved the way away from procedural debates when confronted

with issues that, by reason of constitutional importance, need a direct focus of the

arguments on their content and substance.

The Supreme Court has, on more than one occasion, tempered the application

of procedural rules, as well as relaxed the requirement of locus standi whenever

confronted with an important issue of overreaching significance to society.

Hence, in Del Mar v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation

(PAGCOR) andJaworski v. PAGCOR, this Court sanctioned momentary deviation

from the principle of the hierarchy of courts, and took original cognizance of cases

raising issues of paramount public importance. TheJaworski case ratiocinates:


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Granting arguendo that the present action cannot be properlytreated as a petition for prohibition, the transcendental importanceof the issues involved in this case warrants that we set asidethe technical defects and take primary jurisdiction over thepetition at bar. One cannot deny that the issues raised herein havepotentially pervasive influence on the social and moral well being of thisnation, specially the youth; hence, their proper and just determination is

an imperative need. This is in accordance with the well-entrenched principle that rules of procedure are not inflexibletools designed to hinder or delay, but to facilitate and promotethe administration of justice. Their strict and rigid application,which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate,rather than promote substantial justice, must always beeschewed. (Emphasis supplied)

Anent the locus standi requirement, this Court has already uniformly ruled inKilosbayan v. Guingona, Tatad v. Executive Secretary, Chavez v. PublicEstates Authority and Bagong Alyansang Makabayan v. Zamora, just to

name a few, that absence of direct injury on the part of the party seeking judicialreview may be excused when the latter is able to craft an issue of transcendentalimportance. In Lim v. Executive Secretary, this Court held that in cases oftranscendental importance, the cases must be settled promptly and definitely, andso, the standing requirements may be relaxed. This liberal stance has been echoedin the more recent decision on Chavez v. Gonzales.

Given the weight of the issue raised in the instant petition, the foregoing

principles must apply. The beaten path must be taken. We go directly to the

determination of whether or not a population of 250,000 is an indispensable

constitutional requirement for the creation of a new legislative district in a

province.

We deny the petition.

We start with the basics. Any law duly enacted by Congress carries with it

the presumption of constitutionality. Before a law may be declared unconstitutional

by this Court, there must be a clear showing that a specific provision of the

fundamental law has been violated or transgressed. When there is neither a

violation of a specific provision of the Constitution nor any proof showing that there

is such a violation, the presumption of constitutionality will prevail and the law must

be upheld. To doubt is to sustain.

There is no specific provision in the Constitution that fixes a 250,000 minimumpopulation that must compose a legislative district.

As already mentioned, the petitioners rely on the second sentence of Section

5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, coupled with what they perceive to be the

intent of the framers of the Constitution to adopt a minimum population of 250,000

for each legislative district.


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The second sentence of Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution, succinctly

provides: Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or

each province, shall have at least one representative.

The provision draws a plain and clear distinction between the entitlement of a

city to a district on one hand, and the entitlement of a province to a district on the

other. For while a province is entitled to at least a representative, with nothing

mentioned about population, a city must first meet a population minimum of

250,000 in order to be similarly entitled.

The use by the subject provision of a comma to separate the phrase each city with

a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand from the phrase or each

province point to no other conclusion than that the 250,000 minimum population is

only required for a city, but not for a province.

Plainly read, Section 5(3) of the Constitution requires a 250,000 minimum

population only for a city to be entitled to a representative, but not so for

a province.

The 250,000 minimum population requirement for legislative districts in cities

was, in turn, the subject of interpretation by this Court in Mariano, Jr. v.

COMELEC.

In Mariano, the issue presented was the constitutionality of Republic Act No.

7854, which was the law that converted the Municipality of Makati into a Highly

Urbanized City. As it happened, Republic Act No. 7854 created an additional

legislative district for Makati, which at that time was a lone district. The petitioners

in that case argued that the creation of an additional district would violate Section

5(3), Article VI of the Constitution, because the resulting districts would be

supported by a population of less than 250,000, considering that Makati had a total

population of only 450,000. The Supreme Court sustained the constitutionality of

the law and the validity of the newly created district, explaining the operation of the

Constitutional phrase each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty

thousand, to wit:

Petitioners cannot insist that the addition of another legislativedistrict in Makati is not in accord with section 5(3), Article VI of theConstitution for as of the latest survey (1990 census), the population ofMakati stands at only four hundred fifty thousand (450,000). Saidsection provides, inter alia, that a city with a population ofat least twohundred fifty thousand(250,000) shall have at least one representative.Even granting that the population of Makati as of the 1990

census stood at four hundred fifty thousand (450,000), itslegislative district may still be increased since it has met theminimum population requirement of two hundred fifty thousand


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(250,000). In fact, Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to theConstitution provides that a city whose population hasincreased to more than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000)shall be entitled to at least one congressional representative.(Emphasis supplied)

The Mariano case limited the application of the 250,000 minimum

population requirement for cities only to its initial legislative district. In other

words, while Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution requires a city to have a

minimum population of 250,000 to be entitled to a representative, it does not have

to increase its population by another 250,000 to be entitled to an additional district.

There is no reason why the Mariano case, which involves the creation of an

additional district within a city, should not be applied to additional districts in

provinces. Indeed, if an additional legislative district created within a city is not

required to represent a population of at least 250,000 in order to be valid, neither

should such be needed for an additional district in a province, considering moreover

that a province is entitled to an initial seat by the mere fact of its creation and

regardless of its population.

Apropos for discussion is the provision of the Local Government Code on the

creation of a province which, by virtue of and upon creation, is entitled to at least a

legislative district. Thus, Section 461 of the Local Government Code states:

Requisites for Creation. (a) A province may be created if it hasan average annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, ofnot less than Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) based on 1991constant prices and either of the following requisites:

(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000)square kilometers, as certified by the Lands ManagementBureau; or

(ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand(250,000) inhabitants as certified by the National StatisticsOffice.

Notably, the requirement of population is not an indispensable requirement,

but is merely an alternative addition to the indispensable income requirement.


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Mariano, it would turn out, is but a reflection of the pertinent ideas that ran

through the deliberations on the words and meaning of Section 5 of Article VI.

The whats, whys, and wherefores of the population requirement of at leasttwo hundred fifty thousand may be gleaned from the records of the Constitutional

Commission which, upon framing the provisions of Section 5 of Article VI, proceeded

to form an ordinance that would be appended to the final document. The

Ordinance is captioned APPORTIONING THE SEATS OF THE HOUSE OF

REPRESENTATIVES OF THE CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES TO THE DIFFERENT

LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS IN PROVINCES AND CITIES AND THE METROPOLITAN

MANILA AREA. Such records would show that the 250,000 population benchmark

was used for the 1986 nationwide apportionment of legislative districts among

provinces, cities and Metropolitan Manila. Simply put, the population figure was

used to determine how many districts a province, city, or Metropolitan Manila

should have. Simply discernible too is the fact that, for the purpose, population had

to be the determinant. Even then, the requirement of 250,000 inhabitants was not

taken as an absolute minimum for one legislative district. And, closer to the point

herein at issue, in the determination of the precise district within the province to

which, through the use of the population benchmark, so many districts have been

apportioned, population as a factor was not the sole, though it was among, several

determinants.

From its journal, we can see that the Constitutional Commission originally

divided the entire country into two hundred (200) districts, which corresponded to

the original number of district representatives. The 200 seats were distributed by

the Constitutional Commission in this manner: first, one (1) seat each was given to

the seventy-three (73) provinces and the ten (10) cities with a population of at least

250,000; second, the remaining seats were then redistributed among the provinces,

cities and the Metropolitan Area in accordance with the number of their inhabitants

on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio. Commissioner Davide, who later

became a Member and then Chief Justice of the Court, explained this in his

sponsorship remark for the Ordinance to be appended to the 1987 Constitution:

Commissioner Davide: The ordinance fixes at 200 the number oflegislative seats which are, in turn, apportioned among provinces andcities with a population of at least 250, 000 and the Metropolitan Area inaccordance with the number of their respective inhabitants on the basisof a uniform and progressive ratio. The population is based on the 1986projection, with the 1980 official enumeration as the point of reckoning.

This projection indicates that our population is more or less 56 million.Taking into account the mandate that each city with at least250, 000 inhabitants and each province shall have at least one


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representative, we first allotted one seat for each of the 73provinces, and each one for all cities with a population of atleast 250, 000, which are the Cities of Manila, Quezon, Pasay,Caloocan, Cebu, Iloilo, Bacolod, Cagayan de Oro, Davao andZamboanga. Thereafter, we then proceed[ed] to increasewhenever appropriate the number of seats for the provincesand cities in accordance with the number of their inhabitants on

the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio. (Emphasis supplied).

Thus was the number of seats computed for each province and city.

Differentiated from this, the determination of the districts within the province had to

consider all protests and complaints formally received which, the records show,

dealt with determinants other than population as already mentioned.

Palawan is a case in point. Journal No. 107 of the Constitutional Commission

narrates:

INTERPELLATION OF MR. NOLLEDO:

Mr. Nolledo inquired on the reason for including Puerto Princesain the northern towns when it was more affinity with the southern townof Aborlan, Batarasa, Brookes Point, Narra, Quezon and Marcos. Hestated that the First District has a greater area than the Second District.He then queried whether population was the only factor considered bythe Committee in redistricting.

Replying thereto, Mr. Davide explained that the Committee tookinto account the standards set in Section 5 of the Article on theLegislative Department, namely: 1) the legislative seats should beapportioned among the provinces and cities and the Metropolitan Manilaarea in accordance with their inhabitants on the basis of a uniform andprogressive ratio; and 2) the legislative district must be compact,adjacent and contiguous.

Mr. Nolledo pointed out that the last factor was not met whenPuerto Princesa was included with the northern towns. He then inquiredwhat is the distance between Puerto Princesa from San Vicente.

x x x x

Thereupon, Mr. Nolledo stated that Puerto Princesa has apopulation of 75,480 and based on the apportionment, its inclusion withthe northern towns would result in a combined population of 265,000 asagainst only 186,000 for the south. He added that Cuyo and Coron arevery important towns in the northern part of Palawan and, in fact, Cuyowas the capital of Palawan before its transfer to Puerto Princesa. Healso pointed out that there are more potential candidates in the northand therefore if Puerto Princesa City and the towns of Cuyo and Coronare lumped together, there would be less candidates in the south, mostof whose inhabitants are not interested in politics. He then suggested

that Puerto Princesa be included in the south or the Second District.


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Mr. Davide stated that the proposal would be considered duringthe period of amendments. He requested that the COMELEC staff studysaid proposal.

PROPOSED AMENDMENT OF MR. NOLLEDO

On the districting of Palawan, Mr. Nolledo pointed out that it wasexplained in the interpellations that District I has a total population of265,358 including the City of Puerto Princesa, while the Second Districthas a total population of 186,733. He proposed, however, that PuertoPrincesa be included in the Second District in order to satisfy thecontiguity requirement in the Constitution considering that said City isnearer the southern towns comprising the Second District.

In reply to Mr. Monsods query, Mr. Nolledo explained that withthe proposed transfer of Puerto Princesa City to the Second District,the First District would only have a total population of 190,000 whilethe Second District would have 262,213, and there would be no

substantial changes.

Mr. Davide accepted Mr. Nolledos proposal to insert PuertoPrincesa City before the Municipality of Aborlan.

There being no objection on the part of the Members the samewas approved by the Body.

APPROVAL OF THE APPORTIONMENT AND DISTRICTING OF PALAWAN

There being no other amendment, on motion of Mr. Davide, therebeing no objection, the apportionment and districting for theprovince of Palawan was approved by the Body.

The districting of Palawan disregarded the 250,000 population figure. It was

decided by the importance of the towns and the city that eventually composed the

districts.

Benguet and Baguio are another reference point. The Journal further

narrates:

At this juncture, Mr. Davide informed the Body that Mr. Regaladomade a reservation with the Committee for the possible reopening ofthe approval of Region I with respect to Benguet and Baguio City.

REMARKS OF MR. REGALADOMr. Regalado stated that in the formulation of the Committee,

Baguio City and Tuba are placed in one district. He stated that he wastoying with the idea that, perhaps as a special consideration for Baguiobecause it is the summer capital of the Philippines, Tuba could bedivorced from Baguio City so that it could, by itself, have its own

constituency and Tuba could be transferred to the Second Districttogether with Itogon. Mr. Davide, however, pointed out that thepopulation of Baguio City is only 141,149.


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Mr. Regalado admitted that the regular population of Baguio maybe lower during certain times of the year, but the transient populationwould increase the population substantially and, therefore, for purposesof business and professional transactions, it is beyond question thatpopulation-wise, Baguio would more than qualify, not to speak of theofficial business matters, transactions and offices that are also there.

Mr. Davide adverted to Director de Limas statement that unlessTuba and Baguio City are united, Tuba will be isolated from the rest ofBenguet as the place can only be reached by passing through BaguioCity. He stated that the Committee would submit the matter to theBody.

Upon inquiry of the Chair whether he is insisting on his

amendment, Mr. Regalado stated that the Body should have a say onthe matter and that the considerations he had given are not on thedemographic aspects but on the fact that Baguio City is the summercapital, the venue and situs of many government offices and functions.

On motion of Mr. Davide, there being no objection, the Body

approved the reconsideration of the earlier approval of theapportionment and districting of Region I, particularly Benguet.

Thereafter, on motion of Mr. Davide, there being no objection, the

amendment of Mr. Regalado was put to a vote. With 14 Members votingin favor and none against, the amendment was approved by the Body.

Mr. Davide informed that in view of the approval of the

amendment, Benguet with Baguio City will have two seats. The FirstDistrict shall comprise of the municipalities of Mankayan, Buguias,Bakun, Kabayan, Kibungan, Bokod, Atok, Kapangan, Tublay, La Trinidad,Sablan, Itogon and Tuba. The Second District shall comprise of BaguioCity alone.

There being no objection, the Body approved the apportionment

and districting of Region I.

Quite emphatically, population was explicitly removed as a factor.

It may be additionally mentioned that the province of Cavite was divided into

districts based on the distribution of its three cities, with each district having a city:

one district supposed to be a fishing area; another a vegetable and fruit area; and

the third, a rice growing area, because such consideration fosters common

interests in line with the standard of compactness. In the districting of

Maguindanao, among the matters discussed were political stability and common

interest among the people in the area and the possibility of chaos and disunity

considering the accepted regional, political, traditional and sectoral leaders. For

Laguna, it was mentioned that municipalities in the highland should not be grouped

with the towns in the lowland. For Cebu, Commissioner Maambong proposed that

they should balance the area and population.


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Consistent with Mariano and with the framer deliberations on district

apportionment, we stated in Bagabuyo v. COMELEC that:

x x x Undeniably, these figures show a disparity in the population sizes

of the districts. The Constitution, however, does not requiremathematical exactitude or rigid equality as a standard ingauging equality of representation. x x x. To ensure qualityrepresentation through commonality of interests and ease of access bythe representative to the constituents, all that the Constitution requiresis that every legislative district should comprise, as far as practicable,contiguous, compact and adjacent territory. (Emphasis supplied).

This 2008 pronouncement is fresh reasoning against the uncompromising

stand of petitioner that an additional provincial legislative district, which does not

have at least a 250,000 population is not allowed by the Constitution.

The foregoing reading and review lead to a clear lesson.

Neither in the text nor in the essence of Section 5, Article VI of the

Constitution can, the petition find support. And the formulation of the Ordinance in

the implementation of the provision, nay, even the Ordinance itself, refutes the

contention that a population of 250,000 is a constitutional sine qua non for the

formation of an additional legislative district in a province, whose population growth

has increased beyond the 1986 numbers.

Translated in the terms of the present case:

1. The Province of Camarines Sur, with an estimated population of

1,693,821 in 2007 is based on the formula and constant number of 250,000

used by the Constitutional Commission in nationally apportioning legislativedistricts among provinces and cities entitled to two (2) districts in addition

to the four (4) that it was given in the 1986 apportionment. Significantly,

petitioner Aquino concedes this point. In other words, Section 5 of Article VI

as clearly written allows and does not prohibit an additional district for the

Province of Camarines Sur, such as that provided for in Republic Act No. 9786;

2. Based on the pith and pitch of the exchanges on the Ordinance

on the protests and complaints against strict conformity with the population

standard, and more importantly based on the final districting in the Ordinance


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on considerations other than population, the reapportionment or the

recomposition of the first and second legislative districts in the Province of

Camarines Sur that resulted in the creation of a new legislative district is valid

even if the population of the new district is 176,383 and not 250,000 as

insisted upon by the petitioners.

3. The factors mentioned during the deliberations on House Bill No.

4264, were:

(a) the dialects spoken in the grouped municipalities;

(b) the size of the original groupings compared to that of the regrouped

municipalities;

(c) the natural division separating the municipality subject of the

discussion from the reconfigured District One; and

(d) the balancing of the areas of the three districts resulting from the

redistricting of Districts One and Two.

Each of such factors and in relation to the others considered together, with

the increased population of the erstwhile Districts One and Two, point to the utter

absence of abuse of discretion, much less grave abuse of discretion, that would

warrant the invalidation of Republic Act No. 9716.

To be clear about our judgment, we do not say that in the reapportionment of

the first and second legislative districts of Camarines Sur, the number of inhabitants

in the resulting additional district should not be considered. Our ruling is that

population is not the only factor but is just one of several other factors in the

composition of the additional district. Such settlement is in accord with both the

text of the Constitution and the spirit of the letter, so very clearly given form in the

Constitutional debates on the exact issue presented by this petition.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. Republic Act No. 9716entitled An Act Reapportioning the Composition of the First (1st) and Second (2nd)

Legislative Districts in the Province of Camarines Sur and Thereby Creating a New

Legislative District From Such Reapportionment is a VALID LAW.

SO ORDERED.

2.


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EN BANC

G.R. No. 191002 March 17, 2010

ARTURO M. DE CASTRO, Petitioner,vs.JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC) and PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL -

ARROYO, Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 191032

JAIME N. SORIANO, Petitioner,vs.JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC), Respondent.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 191057

PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA), Petitioner,vs.JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC), Respondent.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC

IN RE APPLICABILITY OF SECTION 15, ARTICLE VII OF THE CONSTITUTIONTO APPOINTMENTS TO THE JUDICIARY, ESTELITO P. MENDOZA, Petitioner,

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 191149

JOHN G. PERALTA, Petitioner,vs.JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC). Respondent.PETER IRVING CORVERA; CHRISTIAN ROBERT S. LIM; ALFONSO V. TAN, JR.;NATIONAL UNION OF PEOPLE'S LAWYERS; MARLOU B. UBANO; INTEGRATEDBAR OF THE PHILIPPINES-DAVAO DEL SUR CHAPTER, represented by itsImmediate Past President, ATTY. ISRAELITO P. TORREON, and the latter inhis own personal capacity as a MEMBER of the PHILIPPINE BAR; MITCHELLJOHN L. BOISER; BAGONG ALYANSANG BAYAN (BAYAN) CHAIRMAN DR.CAROLINA P. ARAULLO; BAYAN SECRETARY GENERAL RENATO M. REYES,JR.; CONFEDERATION FOR UNITY, RECOGNITION AND ADVANCE-MENT OFGOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES (COURAGE) CHAIRMAN FERDINAND GAITE;KALIPUNAN NG DAMAYANG MAHIHIRAP (KADAMAY) SECRETARY GENERALGLORIA ARELLANO; ALYANSA NG NAGKAKAISANG KABATAAN NG

SAMBAYANAN PARA SA KAUNLARAN (ANAKBAYAN) CHAIRMAN KENLEONARD RAMOS; TAYO ANG PAG-ASA CONVENOR ALVIN PETERS; LEAGUEOF FILIPINO STUDENTS (LFS) CHAIRMAN JAMES MARK TERRY LACUANANRIDON; NATIONAL UNION OF STUDENTS OF THE PHILIPPINES (NUSP)CHAIRMAN EINSTEIN RECEDES; COLLEGE EDITORS GUILD OF THEPHILIPPINES (CEGP) CHAIRMAN VIJAE ALQUISOLA; and STUDENTCHRISTIAN MOVEMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES (SCMP) CHAIRMAN MA.CRISTINA ANGELA GUEVARRA; WALDEN F. BELLO and LORETTA ANN P.ROSALES; WOMEN TRIAL LAWYERS ORGANIZATION OF THE PHILIPPINES,represented by YOLANDA QUISUMBING-JAVELLANA; BELLEZA ALOJADODEMAISIP; TERESITA GANDIONCO-OLEDAN; MA. VERENA KASILAG-

VILLANUEVA; MARILYN STA. ROMANA; LEONILA DE JESUS; and GUINEVEREDE LEON. Intervenors.


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x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 191342

ATTY. AMADOR Z. TOLENTINO, JR., (IBP Governor-Southern Luzon), andATTY. ROLAND B. INTING (IBP Governor-Eastern Visayas), Petitioners,vs.

JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC), Respondent.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 191420

PHILIPPINE BAR ASSOCIATION, INC., Petitioner,vs.JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL and HER EXCELLENCY GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

BERSAMIN,J.:

The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010 occursjust days after the coming presidential elections on May 10, 2010. Even before theevent actually happens, it is giving rise to many legal dilemmas. May the incumbentPresident appoint his successor, considering that Section 15, Article VII (ExecutiveDepartment) of the Constitution prohibits the President or Acting President frommaking appointments within two months immediately before the next presidentialelections and up to the end of his term, except temporary appointments toexecutive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public serviceor endanger public safety? What is the relevance of Section 4 (1), Article VIII(Judicial Department) of the Constitution, which provides that any vacancy in theSupreme Court shall be filled within 90 days from the occurrence thereof, to thematter of the appointment of his successor? May the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC)resume the process of screening the candidates nominated or being considered tosucceed Chief Justice Puno, and submit the list of nominees to the incumbentPresident even during the period of the prohibition under Section 15, Article VII?Does mandamus lie to compel the submission of the shortlist of nominees by theJBC?

Precs of the Consolidated Cases

Petitioners Arturo M. De Castro and John G. Peralta respectively commenced G.R.No. 1910021 and G.R. No. 1911492 as special civil actions for certiorari andmandamus, praying that the JBC be compelled to submit to the incumbent Presidentthe list of at least three nominees for the position of the next Chief Justice.

In G.R. No. 191032,3 Jaime N. Soriano, via his petition for prohibition, proposes toprevent the JBC from conducting its search, selection and nomination proceedingsfor the position of Chief Justice.

In G.R. No. 191057, a special civil action for mandamus,4 the Philippine ConstitutionAssociation (PHILCONSA) wants the JBC to submit its list of nominees for the positionof Chief Justice to be vacated by Chief Justice Puno upon his retirement on May 17,2010, because the incumbent President is not covered by the prohibition thatapplies only to appointments in the Executive Department.

In Administrative Matter No. 10-2-5-SC,5 petitioner Estelito M. Mendoza, a formerSolicitor General, seeks a ruling from the Court for the guidance of the JBC onwhether Section 15, Article VII applies to appointments to the Judiciary.

In G.R. No. 191342,

6

which the Court consolidated on March 9, 2010 with thepetitions earlier filed, petitioners Amador Z. Tolentino, Jr. and Roland B. Inting,Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Governors for Southern Luzon and Eastern
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Visayas, respectively, want to enjoin and restrain the JBC from submitting a list ofnominees for the position of Chief Justice to the President for appointment duringthe period provided for in Section 15, Article VII.

All the petitions now before the Court pose as the principal legal question whetherthe incumbent President can appoint the successor of Chief Justice Puno upon hisretirement. That question is undoubtedly impressed with transcendental importance

to the Nation, because the appointment of the Chief Justice is any Presidents mostimportant appointment.

A precedent frequently cited is In Re Appointments Dated March 30, 1998 of Hon.Mateo A. Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B. Vallarta as Judges of the Regional TrialCourt of Branch 62, Bago City and of Branch 24, Cabanatuan City, respectively(Valenzuela),7 by which the Court held that Section 15, Article VII prohibited theexercise by the President of the power to appoint to judicial positions during theperiod therein fixed.

In G.R. No. 191002, De Castro submits that the conflicting opinions on the issue

expressed by legal luminaries one side holds that the incumbent President isprohibited from making appointments within two months immediately before thecoming presidential elections and until the end of her term of office as President onJune 30, 2010, while the other insists that the prohibition applies only toappointments to executive positions that may influence the election and, anyway,paramount national interest justifies the appointment of a Chief Justice during theelection ban has impelled the JBC to defer the decision to whom to send its list ofat least three nominees, whether to the incumbent President or to her successor.8

He opines that the JBC is thereby arrogating unto itself "the judicial function that isnot conferred upon it by the Constitution," which has limited it to the task ofrecommending appointees to the Judiciary, but has not empowered it to "finallyresolve constitutional questions, which is the power vested only in the SupremeCourt under the Constitution." As such, he contends that the JBC acted with graveabuse of discretion in deferring the submission of the list of nominees to thePresident; and that a "final and definitive resolution of the constitutional questionsraised above would diffuse (sic) the tension in the legal community that would go along way to keep and maintain stability in the judiciary and the political system."9

In G.R. No. 191032, Soriano offers the view that the JBC committed a grave abuse ofdiscretion amounting to lack or excess of its jurisdiction when it resolvedunanimously on January 18, 2010 to open the search, nomination, and selectionprocess for the position of Chief Justice to succeed Chief Justice Puno, because theappointing authority for the position of Chief Justice is the Supreme Court itself, thePresidents authority being limited to the appointment of the Members of theSupreme Court. Hence, the JBC should not intervene in the process, unless anominee is not yet a Member of the Supreme Court.10

For its part, PHILCONSA observes in its petition in G.R. No. 191057 that "unorthodoxand exceptional circumstances spawned by the discordant interpretations, dueperhaps to a perfunctory understanding, of Sec. 15, Art. VII in relation to Secs. 4(1),8(5) and 9, Art. VIII of the Constitution" have bred "a frenzied inflammatory legaldebate on the constitutional provisions mentioned that has divided the bench and

the bar and the general public as well, because of its dimensional impact to thenation and the people," thereby fashioning "transcendental questions or issuesaffecting the JBCs proper exercise of its "principal function of recommendingappointees to the Judiciary" by submitting only to the President (not to the nextPresident) "a list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Councilfor every vacancy" from which the members of the Supreme Court and judges of thelower courts may be appointed."11 PHILCONSA further believes and submits thatnow is the time to revisit and review Valenzuela, the "strange and exotic Decision ofthe Court en banc."12

Peralta states in his petition in G.R. No. 191149 that mandamus can compel the JBC

"to immediately transmit to the President, within a reasonable time, its nominationlist for the position of chief justice upon the mandatory retirement of Chief JusticeReynato S. Puno, in compliance with its mandated duty under the Constitution" in


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the event that the Court resolves that the President can appoint a Chief Justice evenduring the election ban under Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution.13

The petitioners in G.R. No. 191342 insist that there is an actual controversy,considering that the "JBC has initiated the process of receiving applications for theposition of Chief Justice and has in fact begun the evaluation process for theapplications to the position," and "is perilously near completing the nomination

process and coming up with a list of nominees for submission to the President,entering into the period of the ban on midnight appointments on March 10, 2010,"which "only highlights the pressing and compelling need for a writ of prohibition toenjoin such alleged ministerial function of submitting the list, especially if it will becone within the period of the ban on midnight appointments."14

Antecedents

These cases trace their genesis to the controversy that has arisen from theforthcoming compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010, or sevendays after the presidential election. Under Section 4(1), in relation to Section 9,

Article VIII, that "vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrencethereof" from a "list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and BarCouncil for every vacancy."

On December 22, 2009, Congressman Matias V. Defensor, an ex officio member ofthe JBC, addressed a letter to the JBC, requesting that the process for nominationsto the office of the Chief Justice be commenced immediately.

In its January 18, 2010 meeting en banc, therefore, the JBC passed a resolution,15

which reads:

The JBC, in its en banc meeting of January 18, 2010, unanimously agreed to startthe process of filling up the position of Chief Justice to be vacated on May 17, 2010upon the retirement of the incumbent Chief Justice Honorable Reynato S. Puno.

It will publish the opening of the position for applications or recommendations;deliberate on the list of candidates; publish the names of candidates; acceptcomments on or opposition to the applications; conduct public interviews ofcandidates; and prepare the shortlist of candidates.

As to the time to submit this shortlist to the proper appointing authority, in the lightof the Constitution, existing laws and jurisprudence, the JBC welcomes and willconsider all views on the matter.

18 January 2010.

(sgd.)MA. LUISA D. VILLARAMAClerk of Court &Ex-Officio SecretaryJudicial and Bar Council

As a result, the JBC opened the position of Chief Justice for application orrecommendation, and published for that purpose its announcement dated January20, 2010,16viz:

The Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) announces the opening for application orrecommendation, of the position of CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT, whichwill be vacated on 17 May 2010 upon the retirement of the incumbent Chief Justice,HON. REYNATO S. PUNO.

Applications or recommendations for this position must be submitted not later than4 February 2010 (Thursday) to the JBC Secretariat xxx:

The announcement was published on January 20, 2010 in the Philippine DailyInquirer and The Philippine Star.17
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Conformably with its existing practice, the JBC "automatically considered" for theposition of Chief Justice the five most senior of the Associate Justices of the Court,namely: Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio; Associate Justice Renato C. Corona;Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales; Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.;and Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura. However, the last two declinedtheir nomination through letters dated January 18, 2010 and January 25, 2010,respectively.18

Others either applied or were nominated. Victor Fernandez, the retired DeputyOmbudsman for Luzon, applied, but later formally withdrew his name fromconsideration through his letter dated February 8, 2010. Candidates who acceptedtheir nominations without conditions were Associate Justice Renato C. Corona;Associate Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro; Associate Justice Arturo D. Brion;and Associate Justice Edilberto G. Sandoval (Sandiganbayan). Candidates whoaccepted their nominations with conditions were Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpioand Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales.19 Declining their nominations wereAtty. Henry Villarica (via telephone conversation with the Executive Officer of theJBC on February 5, 2010) and Atty. Gregorio M. Batiller, Jr. (via telephone

conversation with the Executive Officer of the JBC on February 8, 2010).20

The JBC excluded from consideration former RTC Judge Florentino Floro (for failureto meet the standards set by the JBC rules); and Special Prosecutor Dennis Villa-Ignacio of the Office of the Ombudsman (due to cases pending in the Office of theOmbudsman).21

In its meeting of February 8, 2010, the JBC resolved to proceed to the next step ofannouncing the names of the following candidates to invite the public to file theirsworn complaint, written report, or opposition, if any, not later than February 22,2010, to wit: Associate Justice Carpio, Associate Justice Corona, Associate JusticeCarpio Morales, Associate Justice Leonardo-De Castro, Associate Justice Brion, andAssociate Justice Sandoval. The announcement came out in the Philippine DailyInquirer and The Philippine Star issues of February 13, 2010.22

Issues

Although it has already begun the process for the filling of the position of ChiefJustice Puno in accordance with its rules, the JBC is not yet decided on when tosubmit to the President its list of nominees for the position due to the controversynow before us being yet unresolved. In the meanwhile, time is marching in quickstep towards May 17, 2010 when the vacancy occurs upon the retirement of ChiefJustice Puno.

The actions of the JBC have sparked a vigorous debate not only among legalluminaries, but also among non-legal quarters, and brought out highly disparateopinions on whether the incumbent President can appoint the next Chief Justice ornot. Petitioner Mendoza notes that in Valenzuela, which involved the appointmentsof two judges of the Regional Trial Court, the Court addressed this issue now beforeus as an administrative matter "to avoid any possible polemics concerning thematter," but he opines that the polemics leading to Valenzuela "would be miniscule[sic] compared to the "polemics" that have now erupted in regard to the current

controversy," and that unless "put to a halt, and this may only be achieved by aruling from the Court, the integrity of the process and the credibility of whoever isappointed to the position of Chief Justice, may irreparably be impaired."23

Accordingly, we reframe the issues as submitted by each petitioner in the order ofthe chronological filing of their petitions.

G.R. No. 191002

a. Does the JBC have the power and authority to resolve the constitutionalquestion of whether the incumbent President can appoint a Chief Justice

during the election ban period?


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b. Does the incumbent President have the power and authority to appointduring the election ban the successor of Chief Justice Puno when he vacatesthe position of Chief Justice on his retirement on May 17, 2010?

G.R. No. 191032

a. Is the power to appoint the Chief Justice vested in the Supreme Court en

banc?

G.R. No. 191057

a. Is the constitutional prohibition against appointment under Section 15,Article VII of the Constitution applicable only to positions in the ExecutiveDepartment?

b. Assuming that the prohibition under Section 15, Article VII of theConstitution also applies to members of the Judiciary, may such appointmentsbe excepted because they are impressed with public interest or are

demanded by the exigencies of public service, thereby justifying theseappointments during the period of prohibition?

c. Does the JBC have the authority to decide whether or not to include andsubmit the names of nominees who manifested interest to be nominated forthe position of Chief Justice on the understanding that his/her nomination willbe submitted to the next President in view of the prohibition againstpresidential appointments from March 11, 2010 until June 30, 2010?

A. M. No. 10-2-5-SC

a. Does Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution apply to appointments topositions in the Judiciary under Section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution?

b. May President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo make appointments to the Judiciaryafter March 10, 2010, including that for the position of Chief Justice after ChiefJustice Puno retires on May 17, 2010?

G.R. No. 191149

a. Does the JBC have the discretion to withhold the submission of the short listto President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo?

G.R. No. 191342

a. Does the JBC have the authority to submit the list of nominees to theincumbent President without committing a grave violation of the Constitutionand jurisprudence prohibiting the incumbent President from making midnightappointments two months immediately preceding the next presidentialelections until the end of her term?

b. Is any act performed by the JBC, including the vetting of the candidates for

the position of Chief Justice, constitutionally invalid in view of the JBC's illegalcomposition allowing each member from the Senate and the House ofRepresentatives to have one vote each?

On February 16, 2010, the Court directed the JBC and the Office of the SolicitorGeneral (OSG) to comment on the consolidated petitions, except that filed in G.R.No. 191342.

On February 26, 2010, the JBC submitted its comment, reporting therein that thenext stage of the process for the selection of the nominees for the position of ChiefJustice would be the public interview of the candidates and the preparation of the

short list of candidates, "including the interview of the constitutional experts, asmay be needed."24 It stated:25
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Likewise, the JBC has yet to take a position on when to submit the shortlist to theproper appointing authority, in light of Section 4 (1), Article VIII of the Constitution,which provides that vacancy in the Supreme Court shall be filled within ninety (90)days from the occurrence thereof, Section 15, Article VII of the Constitutionconcerning the ban on Presidential appointments "two (2) months immediatelybefore the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term" and Section261 (g), Article XXII of the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines.

12. Since the Honorable Supreme Court is the final interpreter of the Constitution,the JBC will be guided by its decision in these consolidated Petitions andAdministrative Matter.

On February 26, 2010, the OSG also submitted its comment, essentially stating thatthe incumbent President can appoint the successor of Chief Justice Puno upon hisretirement by May 17, 2010.

The OSG insists that: (a) a writ of prohibition cannot issue to prevent the JBC fromperforming its principal function under the Constitution to recommend appointees in

the Judiciary; (b) the JBC's function to recommend is a "continuing process," whichdoes not begin with each vacancy or end with each nomination, because the goal is"to submit the list of nominees to Malacaang on the very day the vacancy arises";26

the JBC was thus acting within its jurisdiction when it commenced and set in motionthe process of selecting the nominees to be submitted to the President for theposition of Chief Justice to be vacated by Chief Justice Puno;27 (c) petitionerSoriano's theory that it is the Supreme Court, not the President, who has the powerto appoint the Chief Justice, is incorrect, and proceeds from his misinterpretation ofthe phrase "members of the Supreme Court" found in Section 9, Article VIII of theConstitution as referring only to the Associate Justices, to the exclusion of the ChiefJustice; 28 (d) a writ of mandamus can issue to compel the JBC to submit the list ofnominees to the President, considering that its duty to prepare the list of at leastthree nominees is unqualified, and the submission of the list is a ministerial act thatthe JBC is mandated to perform under the Constitution; as such, the JBC, the natureof whose principal function is executive, is not vested with the power to resolve whohas the authority to appoint the next Chief Justice and, therefore, has no discretionto withhold the list from the President; 29 and (e) a writ of mandamus cannot issueto compel the JBC to include or exclude particular candidates as nominees,considering that there is no imperative duty on its part to include in or exclude fromthe list particular individuals, but, on the contrary, the JBC's determination of who itnominates to the President is an exercise of a discretionary duty.30

The OSG contends that the incumbent President may appoint the next Chief Justice,because the prohibition under Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution does notapply to appointments in the Supreme Court. It argues that any vacancy in theSupreme Court must be filled within 90 days from its occurrence, pursuant toSection 4(1), Article VIII of the Constitution; 31 that in their deliberations on themandatory period for the appointment of Supreme Court Justices, the framersneither mentioned nor referred to the ban against midnight appointments, or itseffects on such period, or vice versa;32 that had the framers intended the prohibitionto apply to Supreme Court appointments, they could have easily expressly stated soin the Constitution, which explains why the prohibition found in Article VII (Executive

Department) was not written in Article VIII (Judicial Department); and that theframers also incorporated in Article VIII ample restrictions or limitations on thePresident's power to appoint members of the Supreme Court to ensure itsindependence from "political vicissitudes" and its "insulation from politicalpressures,"33 such as stringent qualifications for the positions, the establishment ofthe JBC, the specified period within which the President shall appoint a SupremeCourt Justice.

The OSG posits that although Valenzuela involved the appointment of RTC Judges,the situation now refers to the appointment of the next Chief Justice to which theprohibition does not apply; that, at any rate, Valenzuela even recognized that there

might be "the imperative need for an appointment during the period of the ban,"like when the membership of the Supreme Court should be "so reduced that it willhave no quorum, or should the voting on a particular important question requiring
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expeditious resolution be divided";34 and that Valenzuela also recognized that thefilling of vacancies in the Judiciary is undoubtedly in the public interest, mostespecially if there is any compelling reason to justify the making of theappointments during the period of the prohibition.35

Lastly, the OSG urges that there are now undeniably compelling reasons for theincumbent President to appoint the next Chief Justice, to wit: (a) a deluge of cases

involving sensitive political issues is "quite expected";36 (b) the Court acts as thePresidential Electoral Tribunal (PET), which, sitting en banc, is the sole judge of allcontests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President andVice President and, as such, has "the power to correct manifest errors on thestatement of votes (SOV) and certificates of canvass (COC)";37 (c) if history hasshown that during ordinary times the Chief Justice was appointed immediately uponthe occurrence of the vacancy, from the time of the effectivity of the Constitution,there is now even more reason to appoint the next Chief Justice immediately uponthe retirement of Chief Justice Puno;38 and (d) should the next Chief Justice comefrom among the incumbent Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, therebycausing a vacancy, it also becomes incumbent upon the JBC to start the selection

process for the filling up of the vacancy in accordance with the constitutionalmandate.39

On March 9, 2010, the Court admitted the following comments/oppositions-in-intervention, to wit:

(a) The opposition-in-intervention dated February 22, 2010 of Atty. PeterIrving Corvera (Corvera);40

(b) The opposition-in-intervention dated February 22, 2010 of Atty. ChristianRobert S. Lim (Lim);

(c) The opposition-in-intervention dated February 23, 2010 of Atty. Alfonso V.Tan, Jr. (Tan);

(d) The comment/opposition-in-intervention dated March 1, 2010 of theNational Union of People's Lawyers (NUPL);

(e) The opposition-in-intervention dated February 25, 2010 of Atty. Marlou B.Ubano (Ubano);

(f) The opposition-in-intervention dated February 25, 2010 of Integrated Bar ofthe Philippines-Davao del Sur Chapter and its Immediate Past President, Atty.Israelito P. Torreon (IBP- Davao del Sur);

(g) The opposition-in-intervention dated February 26, 2010 of Atty. MitchellJohn L. Boiser (Boiser);

(h)The consolidated comment/opposition-in-intervention dated February 26,2010 of BAYAN Chairman Dr. Carolina P. Araullo; BAYAN Secretary GeneralRenato M. Reyes, Jr.; Confederation for Unity, Recognition and Advancementof Government Employees (COURAGE) Chairman Ferdinand Gaite; Kalipunan

ng Damayang Mahihirap (KADAMAY) Secretary General Gloria Arellano;Alyansa ng Nagkakaisang Kabataan ng Samayanan Para sa Kaunlaran(ANAKBAYAN) Chairman Ken Leonard Ramos; Tayo ang Pag-asa ConvenorAlvin Peters; League of Filipino Students (LFS) Chairman James Mark TerryLacuanan Ridon; National Union of Students of the Philippines (NUSP)Chairman Einstein Recedes, College Editors Guild of the Philippines (CEGP)Chairman Vijae Alquisola; and Student Christian Movement of the Philippines(SCMP) Chairman Ma. Cristina Angela Guevarra (BAYAN et al.);

(i) The opposition-in-intervention dated March 3, 2010 of Walden F. Bello andLoretta Ann P. Rosales (Bello et al.); and

(j) The consolidated comment/opposition-in-intervention dated March 4, 2010of the Women Trial Lawyers Organization of the Philippines (WTLOP),
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represented by Atty. Yolanda Quisumbing-Javellana; Atty. Belleza AlojadoDemaisip; Atty. Teresita Gandionco-Oledan; Atty. Ma. Verena Kasilag-Villanueva; Atty. Marilyn Sta. Romana; Atty. Leonila de Jesus; and Atty.Guinevere de Leon (WTLOP).

Intervenors Tan, WTLOP, BAYAN et al., Corvera, IBP Davao delSur, and NUPL takethe position that De Castro's petition was bereft of any basis, because under Section

15, Article VII, the outgoing President is constitutionally banned from making anyappointments from March 10, 2010 until June 30, 2010, including the appointmentof the successor of Chief Justice Puno. Hence, mandamus does not lie to compel theJBC to submit the list of nominees to the outgoing President if the constitutionalprohibition is already in effect. Tan adds that the prohibition against midnightappointments was applied by the Court to the appointments to the Judiciary madeby then President Ramos, with the Court holding that the duty of the President to fillthe vacancies within 90 days from occurrence of the vacancies (for the SupremeCourt) or from the submission of the list (for all other courts) was not an excuse toviolate the constitutional prohibition.

Intervenors Tan, Ubano, Boiser, Corvera, NULP, BAYAN et al., and Bello et al. opposethe insistence that Valenzuela recognizes the possibility that the President mayappoint the next Chief Justice if exigent circumstances warrant the appointment,because that recognition is obiter dictum;and aver that the absence of a ChiefJustice or even an Associate Justice does not cause epic damage or absolutedisruption or paralysis in the operations of the Judiciary. They insist that evenwithout the successor of Chief Justice Puno being appointed by the incumbentPresident, the Court is allowed to sit and adjudge en banc or in divisions of three,five or seven members at its discretion; that a full membership of the Court is notnecessary; that petitioner De Castro's fears are unfounded and baseless, beingbased on a mere possibility, the occurrence of which is entirely unsure; that it is notin the national interest to have a Chief Justice whose appointment isunconstitutional and, therefore, void; and that such a situation will create a crisis inthe judicial system and will worsen an already vulnerable political situation.

ice is imperative for the stability of the judicial system and the political situation inthe country when the election-related questions reach the Court as false, becausethere is an existing law on filling the void brought about by a vacancy in the officeof Chief Justice; that the law is Section 12 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, which has notbeen repealed by Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 or any other law; that a temporary or anacting Chief Justice is not anathema to judicial independence; that the designationof an actingChief Justice is not only provided for by law, but is also dictated bypractical necessity; that the practice was intended to be enshrined in the 1987Constitution, but the Commissioners decided not to write it in the Constitution onaccount of the settled practice; that the practice was followed under the 1987Constitution, when, in 1992, at the end of the term of Chief Justice Marcelo B.Fernan, Associate Justice Andres Narvasa assumed the position as Acting ChiefJustice prior to his official appointment as Chief Justice; that said filling up of avacancy in the office of the Chief Justice was acknowledged and even used byanalogy in the case of the vacancy of the Chairman of the Commission on Elections,per Brillantes v. Yorac, 192 SCRA 358; and that the history of the Supreme Courthas shown that this rule of succession has been repeatedly observed and has

become a part of its tradition.

Intervenors Ubano, Boiser, NUPL, Corvera, and Lim maintain that the OmnibusElection Code penalizes as an election offense the act of any government officialwho appoints, promotes, or gives any increase in salary or remuneration or privilegeto any government official or employee during the period of 45 days before aregular election; that the provision covers all appointing heads, officials, and officersof a government office, agency or instrumentality, including the President; that forthe incumbent President to appoint the next Chief Justice upon the retirement ofChief Justice Puno, or during the period of the ban under the Omnibus Election Code,constitutes an election offense; that even an appointment of the next Chief Justice

prior to the election ban is fundamentally invalid and without effect because therecan be no appointment until a vacancy occurs; and that the vacancy for the positioncan occur only by May 17, 2010.


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Intervenor Boiseradds that De Castro's prayer to compel the submission ofnominees by the JBC to the incumbent President is off-tangent because the positionof Chief Justice is still not vacant; that to speak of a list, much more a submission ofsuch list, before a vacancy occurs is glaringly premature; that the proposedadvance appointment by the incumbent President of the next Chief Justice will beunconstitutional; and that no list of nominees can be submitted by the JBC if there isno vacancy.

All the intervenors-oppositorssubmit that Section 15, Article VII makes nodistinction between the kinds of appointments made by the President; and that theCourt, in Valenzuela, ruled that the appointments by the President of the two judgesduring the prohibition period were void.

Intervenor WTLOP posits that Section 15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution doesnot apply only to the appointments in the Executive Department, but also to judicialappointments, contrary to the submission of PHILCONSA; that Section 15 does notdistinguish; and that Valenzuela already interpreted the prohibition as applicable tojudicial appointments.

Intervenor WTLOP further posits that petitioner Soriano's contention that the powerto appoint the Chief Justice is vested, not in the President, but in the Supreme Court,is utterly baseless, because the Chief Justice is also a Member of the Supreme Courtas contemplated under Section 9, Article VIII; and that, at any rate, the term"members" was interpreted in Vargas v. Rillaroza (G.R. No. L-1612, February 26,1948) to refer to the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court;that PHILCONSA's prayer that the Court pass a resolution declaring that personswho manifest their interest as nominees, but with conditions, shall not beconsidered nominees by the JBC is diametrically opposed to the arguments in thebody of its petition; that such glaring inconsistency between the allegations in thebody and the relief prayed for highlights the lack of merit of PHILCONSA's petition;that the role of the JBC cannot be separated from the constitutional prohibition onthe President; and that the Court must direct the JBC to follow the rule of law, thatis, to submit the list of nominees only to the next duly elected President after theperiod of the constitutional ban against midnight appointments has expired.

Oppositor IBP Davao del Sur opines that the JBC - because it is neither a judicial nora quasi-judicial body - has no duty under the Constitution to resolve the question ofwhether the incumbent President can appoint a Chief Justice during the period ofprohibition; that even if the JBC has already come up with a short list, it still has tobow to the strict limitations under Section 15, Article VII; that should the JBC defersubmission of the list, it is not arrogating unto itself a judicial function, but simplyrespecting the clear mandate of the Constitution; and that the application of thegeneral rule in Section 15, Article VII to the Judiciary does not violate the principle ofseparation of powers, because said provision is an exception.

Oppositors NUPL, Corvera, Lim and BAYAN et al. state that the JBC's act ofnominating appointees to the Supreme Court is purely ministerial and does notinvolve the exercise of judgment; that there can be no default on the part of the JBCin submitting the list of nominees to the President, considering that the call forapplications only begins from the occurrence of the vacancy in the Supreme Court;

and that the commencement of the process of screening of applicants to fill thevacancy in the office of the Chief Justice only begins from the retirement on May 17,2010, for, prior to this date, there is no definite legal basis for any party to claimthat the submission or non-submission of the list of nominees to the President bythe JBC is a matter of right under law.

The main question presented in all the filings herein - because it involves twoseemingly conflicting provisions of the Constitution - imperatively demands theattention and resolution of this Court, the only authority that can resolve thequestion definitively and finally. The imperative demand rests on the ever-presentneed, first, to safeguard the independence, reputation, and integrity of the entire

Judiciary, particularly this Court, an institution that has been unnecessarily draggedinto the harsh polemics brought on by the controversy; second, to settle once andfor all the doubt about an outgoing President's power to appoint to the Judiciary


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within the long period starting two months before the presidential elections until theend of the presidential term; and third, to set a definite guideline for the JBC tofollow in the discharge of its primary office of screening and nominating qualifiedpersons for appointment to the Judiciary.

Thus, we resolve.

Ruling of the Court

Locus Standiof Petitioners

The preliminary issue to be settled is whether or not the petitioners have locusstandi.

Black defines locus standi as "a right of appearance in a court of justice on a givenquestion."41 In public or constitutional litigations, the Court is often burdened withthe determination of the locus standi of the petitioners due to the ever-present needto regulate the invocation of the intervention of the Court to correct any official

action or policy in order to avoid obstructing the efficient functioning of publicofficials and offices involved in public service. It is required, therefore, that thepetitioner must have a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy, for, asindicated in Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc.:42

The question on legal standing is whether such parties have "alleged such apersonal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concreteadverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court solargely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions."43 Accordingly, ithas been held that the interest of a person assailing the constitutionality of astatute must be direct and personal. He must be able to show, not only that the lawor any government act is invalid, but also that he sustained or is in imminent dangerof sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely thathe suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It must appear that the personcomplaining has been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to which he islawfully entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties byreason of the statute or act complained of.44

It is true that as early as in 1937, in People v. Vera,45 the Court adopted the directinjury test for determining whether a petitioner in a public action had locus standi.There, the Court held that the person who would assail the validity of a statute musthave "a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, orwill sustain direct injury as a result." Vera was followed in Custodio v. President ofthe Senate,46Manila Race Horse Trainers' Association v. De la Fuente,47Anti-ChineseLeague of the Philippines v. Felix,48and Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works.49

Yet, the Court has also held that the requirement oflocus standi, being a mereprocedural technicality, can be waived by the Court in the exercise of its discretion.For instance, in 1949, inAraneta v. Dinglasan,50 the Court liberalized the approachwhen the cases had "transcendental importance." Some notable controversieswhose petitioners did not pass the direct injury testwere allowed to be treated inthe same way as inAraneta v. Dinglasan.51

In the 1975 decision inAquino v. Commission on Elections,52 this Court decided toresolve the issues raised by the petition due to their "far-reaching implications,"even if the petitioner had no personality to file the suit. The liberal approach ofAquino v. Commission on Elections has been adopted in several notable cases,permitting ordinary citizens, legislators, and civic

organizations to bring their suits involving the constitutionality or validity of laws,regulations, and rulings.53

However, the assertion of a public right as a predicate for challenging a supposedly

illegal or unconstitutional executive or legislative action rests on the theory that thepetitioner represents the public in general. Although such petitioner may not be asadversely affected by the action complained against as are others, it is enough that
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he sufficiently demonstrates in his petition that he is entitled to protection or relieffrom the Court in the vindication of a public right.

Quite often, as here, the petitioner in a public action sues as a citizen or taxpayer togain locus standi. That is not surprising, for even if the issue may appear to concernonly the public in general, such capacities nonetheless equip the petitioner withadequate interest to sue. In David v. Macapagal-Arroyo,54 the Court aptly explains

why:

Case law in most jurisdictions now allows both "citizen" and "taxpayer" standing inpublic actions. The distinction wa

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