Cases - The Legislative Department (1st Set)

8/11/2019 Cases - The Legislative Department (1st Set)

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The Legislative Department

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 180088 January 19, 2009

MANUEL B. JAPZON,Petitioner,

vs.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JAIME S. TY,Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

CHICO-NAZARIO,J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rules 64 1 and 652of the Revised Rules of Court

seeking to annul and set aside the Resolution3dated 31 July 2007 of the First Division of public

respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and the Resolution4dated 28 September 2007

of COMELEC en banc, in SPA No. 07-568, for having been rendered with grave abuse of

discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Both petitioner Manuel B. Japzon (Japzon) and private respondent Jaime S. Ty (Ty) werecandidates for the Office of Mayor of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, in the

local elections held on 14 May 2007.

On 15 June 2007, Japzon instituted SPA No. 07-568 by filing before the COMELEC a Petition5to

disqualify and/or cancel Tys Certificate of Candidacy on the ground of material misrepresentation.

Japzon averred in his Petition that Ty was a former natural-born Filipino, having been born on 9

October 1943 in what was then Pambujan Sur, Hernani Eastern Samar (now the Municipality of

General Macarthur, Easter Samar) to spouses Ang Chim Ty (a Chinese) and Crisanta Aranas

Sumiguin (a Filipino). Ty eventually migrated to the United States of America (USA) and became a

citizen thereof. Ty had been residing in the USA for the last 25 years. When Ty filed his Certificate of

Candidacy on 28 March 2007, he falsely represented therein that he was a resident of Barangay 6,

Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for one year before 14 May 2007, and was not a

permanent resident or immigrant of any foreign country. While Ty may have applied for thereacquisition of his Philippine citizenship, he never actually resided in Barangay 6, Poblacion,

General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for a period of one year immediately preceding the date of

election as required under Section 39 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local

Government Code of 1991. In fact, even after filing his application for reacquisition of his

Philippine citizenship, Ty continued to make trips to the USA, the most recent of which was on 31

October 2006 lasting until 20 January 2007. Moreover, although Ty already took his Oath of

Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, he continued to comport himself as an American

citizen as proven by his travel records. He had also failed to renounce his foreign citizenship as

required by Republic Act No. 9225, otherwise known as the Citizenship Retention and

Reacquisition Act of 2003, or related laws. Hence, Japzon prayed for in his Petition that the

COMELEC order the disqualification of Ty from running for public office and the cancellation of the

latters Certificate of Candidacy.

In his Answer6 to Japzons Petition in SPA No. 07-568, Ty admitted that he was a natural-born

Filipino who went to the USA to work and subsequently became a naturalized American citizen. Ty

claimed, however, that prior to filing his Certificate of Candidacy for the Office of Mayor of the

Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, on 28 March 2007, he already performed the

following acts: (1) with the enactment of Republic Act No. 9225, granting dual citizenship to

natural-born Filipinos, Ty filed with the Philippine Consulate General in Los Angeles, California,

USA, an application for the reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship; (2) on 2 October 2005, Ty

executed an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before Noemi T. Diaz, Vice

Consul of the Philippine Consulate General in Los Angeles, California, USA; (3) Ty applied for a

Philippine passport indicating in his application that his residence in the Philippines was at A.Mabini St., Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar. Tys application was

approved and he was issued on 26 October 2005 a Philippine passport; (4) on 8 March 2006, Ty

personally secured and signed his Community Tax Certificate (CTC) from the Municipality of

General Macarthur, in which he stated that his address was at Barangay 6, Poblacion, General

Macarthur, Eastern Samar; (5) thereafter, on 17 July 2006, Ty was registered as a voter in Precinct

0013A, Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar; (6) Ty secured another CTC

dated 4 January 2007 again stating therein his address as Barangay 6, Poblacion, General

Macarthur, Eastern Samar; and (7) finally, Ty executed on 19 March 2007 a duly notarized

Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship. Given the aforementioned facts, Ty argued that he had

reacquired his Philippine citizenship and renounced his American citizenship, and he had been a

resident of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for more than one year prior to

the 14 May 2007 elections. Therefore, Ty sought the dismissal of Japzons Petition in SPA No.

07-568.

Pending the submission by the parties of their respective Position Papers in SPA No. 07-568, the 14

May 2007 elections were already held. Ty acquired the highest number of votes and was declared

Mayor of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, by the Municipal Board of

Canvassers on 15 May 2007.7

Following the submission of the Position Papers of both parties, the COMELEC First Division

rendered its Resolution8dated 31 July 2007 in favor of Ty.

The COMELEC First Division found that Ty complied with the requirements of Sections 3 and 5 of

Republic Act No. 9225 and reacquired his Philippine citizenship, to wit:

Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an elective public office, and the

purpose of the citizenship qualification is none other than to ensure that no alien, i.e., no person

owing allegiance to another nation, shall govern our people and our country or a unit of territory

thereof. Evidences revealed that [Ty] executed an Oath of Allegiance before Noemi T. Diaz, Vice

Consul of the Phil ippine Consulate General, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. on October 2, 2005 and

executed a Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship on March 19, 2007 in compliance with R.A. [No.]

9225. Moreover, neither is [Ty] a candidate for or occupying public office nor is in active service as

commissioned or non-commissioned officer in the armed forces in the country of which he was

naturalized citizen.9

The COMELEC First Division also held that Ty did not commit material misrepresentation in stating

in his Certificate of Candidacy that he was a resident of Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur,

Eastern Samar, for at least one year before the elections on 14 May 2007. It reasoned that:


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Although [Ty] has lost his domicile in [the] Philippines when he was naturalized as U.S. citizen in

1969, the reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship and subsequent acts thereof proved that he

has been a resident of Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar for at least one (1)

year before the elections held on 14 May 2007 as he represented in his certificate of candidacy[.]

As held in Coquilla vs. Comelec:

"The term residence is to be understood not in its common acceptation as referring to dwelling

or habitation, but rather to domicile or legal residence, that is, the place where a party actually or

constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any giventime, eventually intends to return and remain (animus manendi). A domicile of origin is acquired

by every person at birth. It is usually the place where the childs parents reside and continues until

the same is abandoned by acquisition of new domicile (domicile of choice).

In the case at bar, petitioner lost his domicile of origin in Oras by becoming a U.S. citizen after

enlisting in the U.S. Navy in 1965. From then on and until November 10, 2000, when he reacquired

Philippine citizenship, petitioner was an alien without any right to reside in the Philippines save as

our immigration laws may have allowed him to stay as a visitor or as a resident alien.

Indeed, residence in the United States is a requirement for naturalization as a U.S. citizen. Title 8,

1427(a) of the United States Code provides:

Requirements of naturalization: Residence

(a) No person, except as otherwise provided in this subchapter, shall be naturalized unless such

applicant, (1) year immediately preceding the date of filing his application for naturalization has

resided continuously, after being lawfully admitted for permanent residence, within the United

States for at least five years and during the five years immediately preceding the date of filing his

petition has been physically present therein for periods totaling at least half of that time, and who

has resided within the State or within the district of the Service in the United States in which the

applicant filed the application for at least three months, (2) has resided continuously within the

United States from the date of the application up to the time of admission to citizenship, and (3)

during all period referred to in this subsection has been and still is a person of good moral

character, attached to the principles of the Constitution of the United States, and well disposed to

the good order and happiness of the United States. (Emphasis added)

In Caasi v. Court of Appeals, this Court ruled that immigration to the United States by virtue of a

greencard, which entitles one to reside permanently in that country, constitutes abandonment of

domicile in the Philippines. With more reason then does naturalization in a foreign country result in

an abandonment of domicile in the Philippines.

Records showed that after taking an Oath of Allegiance before the Vice Consul of the Philippine

Consulate General on October 2, 2005, [Ty] applied and was issued a Philippine passport on

October 26, 2005; and secured a community tax certificate from the Municipality of General

Macarthur on March 8, 2006. Evidently, [Ty] was already a resident of Barangay 6, Poblacion,

General Macarthur, Eastern Samar for more than one (1) year before the elections on May 14,

2007.10(Emphasis ours.)

The dispositive portion of the 31 July 2007 Resolution of the COMELEC First Division, thus, reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. 11

Japzon filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the foregoing Resolution of the COMELEC First

Division. On 28 September 2007, the COMELEC en banc issued its Resolution 12denying Japzons

Motion for Reconsideration and affirming the assailed Resolution of the COMELEC First Division,

on the basis of the following ratiocination:

We have held that a Natural born Filipino who obtains foreign citizenship, and subsequently

spurns the same, is by clear acts of repatriation a Filipino Citizen and hence qualified to run as a

candidate for any local post.

x x x x

It must be noted that absent any showing of irregularity that overturns the prevailing status of a

citizen, the presumption of regularity remains. Citizenship is an important aspect of every

individuals constitutionally granted rights and privileges. This is essential in determining whether

one has the right to exercise pre-determined political rights such as the right to vote or the right to

be elected to office and as such rights spring from citizenship.

Owing to its primordial importance, it is thus presumed that every person is a citizen of the country

in which he resides; that citizenship once granted is presumably retained unless voluntarily

relinquished; and that the burden rests upon who alleges a change in citizenship and allegiance to

establish the fact.

Our review of the Motion for Reconsideration shows that it does not raise any new or novel issues.

The arguments made therein have already been dissected and expounded upon extensively by

the first Division of the Commission, and there appears to be no reason to depart from the wisdom

of the earlier resolution. We thus affirm that [Ty] did not commit any material misrepresentation

when he accomplished his Certificate of Candidacy. The only ground for denial of a Certificate of

Candidacy would be when there was material misrepresentation meant to mislead the electorate

as to the qualifications of the candidate. There was none in this case, thus there is not enough

reason to deny due course to the Certificate of Candidacy of Respondent James S. Ty.13

Failing to obtain a favorable resolution from the COMELEC, Japzon proceeded to file the instant

Petition for Certiorari, relying on the following grounds:

A. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION

AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT CAPRICIOUSLY, WHIMSICALLY

AND WANTONLY DISREGARDED THE PARAMETERS SET BY LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE FOR THE

ACQUISITION OF A NEW DOMICILE OF CHOICE AND RESIDENCE.14

B. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION

AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT CAPRICIOUSLY, WHIMSICALLY

AND WANTONLY REFUSED TO CANCEL [TYS] CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY, AND

CONSEQUENTLY DECLARE [JAPZON] AS THE DULY ELECTED MAYOR OF GEN. MACARTHUR,

EASTERN SAMAR.15

Japzon argues that when Ty became a naturalized American citizen, he lost his domicile of origin.

Ty did not establish his residence in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar,

Philippines, just because he reacquired his Philippine citizenship. The burden falls upon Ty to


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prove that he established a new domicile of choice in General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, a burden

which he failed to discharge. Ty did not become a resident of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar,

by merely executing the Oath of Allegiance under Republic Act No. 9225.

Therefore, Japzon asserts that Ty did not meet the one-year residency requirement for running as a

mayoralty candidate in the 14 May 2007 local elections. The one-year residency requirement for

those running for public office cannot be waived or liberally applied in favor of dual citizens.

Consequently, Japzon believes he was the only remaining candidate for the Office of Mayor of the

Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, and is the only placer in the 14 May 2007 local

elections.

Japzon prays for the Court to annul and set aside the Resolutions dated 31 July 2007 and 28

September 2007 of the COMELEC First Division and en banc, respectively; to issue a new

resolution denying due course to or canceling Tys Certificate of Candidacy; and to declare Japzon

as the duly elected Mayor of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar.

As expected, Ty sought the dismissal of the present Petition. According to Ty, the COMELEC

already found sufficient evidence to prove that Ty was a resident of the Municipality of General

Macarthur, Eastern Samar, one year prior to the 14 May 2007 local elections. The Court cannot

evaluate again the very same pieces of evidence without violating the well-entrenched rule that

findings of fact of the COMELEC are binding on the Court. Ty disputes Japzons assertion that the

COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in rendering the assailed Resolutions, and avers

that the said Resolutions were based on the evidence presented by the parties and consistent withprevailing jurisprudence on the matter. Even assuming that Ty, the winning candidate for the Office

of Mayor of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, is indeed disqualified from

running in the local elections, Japzon as the second placer in the same elections cannot take his

place.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), meanwhile, is of the position that Ty failed to meet the

one-year residency requirement set by law to qualify him to run as a mayoralty candidate in the 14

May 2007 local elections. The OSG opines that Ty was unable to prove that he intended to remain

in the Philippines for good and ultimately make it his new domicile. Nonetheless, the OSG still

prays for the dismissal of the instant Petition considering that Japzon, gathering only the second

highest number of votes in the local elections, cannot be declared the duly elected Mayor of the

Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, even if Ty is found to be disqualified from

running for the said position. And since it took a position adverse to that of the COMELEC, the

OSG prays from this Court to allow the COMELEC to file its own Comment on Japzons Petition.

The Court, however, no longer acted on this particular prayer of the COMELEC, and with the

submission of the Memoranda by Japzon, Ty, and the OSG, it already submitted the case for

decision.

The Court finds no merit in the Petition at bar.

There is no dispute that Ty was a natural-born Filipino. He was born and raised in the Municipality

of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines. However, he left to work in the USA and

eventually became an American citizen. On 2 October 2005, Ty reacquired his Philippine

citizenship by taking his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before Noemi T.

Diaz, Vice Consul of the Philippine Consulate General in Los Angeles, California, USA, inaccordance with the provisions of Republic Act No. 9225.16 At this point, Ty still held dual

citizenship, i.e., American and Philippine. It was only on 19 March 2007 that Ty renounced his

American citizenship before a notary public and, resultantly, became a pure Philippine citizen

again.

It bears to point out that Republic Act No. 9225 governs the manner in which a natural-born

Filipino may reacquire or retain17his Philippine citizenship despite acquiring a foreign citizenship,

and provides for his rights and liabilities under such circumstances. A close scrutiny of said statute

would reveal that it does not at all touch on the matter of residence of the natural-born Filipino

taking advantage of its provisions. Republic Act No. 9225 imposes no residency requirement for

the reacquisition or retention of Philippine citizenship; nor does it mention any effect of suchreacquisition or retention of Philippine citizenship on the current residence of the concerned

natural-born Filipino. Clearly, Republic Act No. 9225 treats citizenship independently of residence.

This is only logical and consistent with the general intent of the law to allow for dual citizenship.

Since a natural-born Filipino may hold, at the same time, both Philippine and foreign citizenships,

he may establish residence either in the Philippines or in the foreign country of which he is also a

citizen.

Residency in the Philippines only becomes relevant when the natural-born Filipino with dual

citizenship decides to run for public office.

Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 reads:

SEC. 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. Those who retain or reacquire Philippinecitizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant

liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:

x x x x

(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualifications for holding

such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of

the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign

citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.

Breaking down the afore-quoted provision, for a natural born Filipino, who reacquired or retained

his Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225, to run for public office, he must: (1) meet

the qualifications for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws;and (2) make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenships before any

public officer authorized to administer an oath.

That Ty complied with the second requirement is beyond question. On 19 March 2007, he

personally executed a Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship before a notary public. By the time he

filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the Office of Mayor of the Municipality of General Macarthur,

Eastern Samar, on 28 March 2007, he had already effectively renounced his American citizenship,

keeping solely his Philippine citizenship.

The other requirement of Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 pertains to the qualifications

required by the Constitution and existing laws.

Article X, Section 3 of the Constitution left it to Congress to enact a local government code which

shall provide, among other things, for the qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term,


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salaries, powers and functions and duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to the

organization and operation of the local units.

Pursuant to the foregoing mandate, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 7160, the Local

Government Code of 1991, Section 39 of which lays down the following qualifications for local

elective officials:

SEC. 39. Qualifications. (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a

registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city or province or, in the case of a member of the

sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or sanggunian bayan, the district where heintends to be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of

the election; and able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect.

x x x x

(c) Candidates for the position of mayor or vice mayor of independent component cities,

component cities, or municipalities must be at least twenty-one (21) years of age on election day.

The challenge against Tys qualification to run as a candidate for the Office of Mayor of the

Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, centers on his purported failure to meet the

one-year residency requirement in the said municipality.

The term "residence" is to be understood not in its common acceptation as referring to "dwelling"or "habitation," but rather to "domicile" or legal residence, that is, "the place where a party actually

or constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any

given time, eventually intends to return and remain (animus manendi)."18

A domicile of origin is acquired by every person at birth. It is usually the place where the childs

parents reside and continues until the same is abandoned by acquisition of new domicile

(domicile of choice). In Coquilla,19 the Court already acknowledged that for an individual to

acquire American citizenship, he must establish residence in the USA. Since Ty himself admitted

that he became a naturalized American citizen, then he must have necessarily abandoned the

Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines, as his domicile of origin; and

transferred to the USA, as his domicile of choice.

As has already been previously discussed by this Court herein, Tys reacquisition of his Philippinecitizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 had no automatic impact or effect on his residence/

domicile. He could still retain his domicile in the USA, and he did not necessarily regain his

domicile in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines. Ty merely had the

option to again establish his domicile in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar,

Philippines, said place becoming his new domicile of choice. The length of his residence therein

shall be determined from the time he made it his domicile of choice, and it shall not retroact to the

time of his birth.

How then could it be established that Ty indeed established a new domicile in the Municipality of

General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines?

In Papandayan, Jr. v. Commission on Elections,20the Court provided a summation of the different

principles and concepts in jurisprudence relating to the residency qualification for elective local

officials. Pertinent portions of the ratio in Papandayan are reproduced below:

Our decisions have applied certain tests and concepts in resolving the issue of whether or not a

candidate has complied with the residency requirement for elective positions. The principle of

animus revertendi has been used to determine whether a candidate has an "intention to return" to

the place where he seeks to be elected. Corollary to this is a determination whether there has

been an "abandonment" of his former residence which signifies an intention to depart therefrom.

In Caasi v. Court of Appeals, this Court set aside the appealed orders of the COMELEC and the

Court of Appeals and annulled the election of the respondent as Municipal Mayor of Bolinao,

Pangasinan on the ground that respondents immigration to the United States in 1984 constituted

an abandonment of his domicile and residence in the Philippines. Being a green card holder,

which was proof that he was a permanent resident or immigrant of the United States, and in theabsence of any waiver of his status as such before he ran for election on January 18, 1988,

respondent was held to be disqualified under 68 of the Omnibus Election Code of the

Philippines (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881).

In Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, respondent Jose Ong, Jr. was

proclaimed the duly elected representative of the 2nd District of Northern Samar. The House of

Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) upheld his election against claims that he was not a

natural born Filipino citizen and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar. In sustaining the ruling of

the HRET, this Court, citing Faypon v. Quirino, applied the concept of animus revertendi or "intent

to return," stating that his absence from his residence in order to pursue studies or practice his

profession as a certified public accountant in Manila or his registration as a voter other than in the

place where he was elected did not constitute loss of residence. The fact that respondent made

periodical journeys to his home province in Laoag revealed that he always had animus revertendi.

In Abella v. Commission on Elections and Larrazabal v. Commission on Elections, it was explained

that the determination of a persons legal residence or domicile largely depends upon the

intention that may be inferred from his acts, activities, and utterances. In that case, petitioner

Adelina Larrazabal, who had obtained the highest number of votes in the local elections of

February 1, 1988 and who had thus been proclaimed as the duly elected governor, was

disqualified by the COMELEC for lack of residence and registration qualifications, not being a

resident nor a registered voter of Kananga, Leyte. The COMELEC ruled that the attempt of

petitioner Larrazabal to change her residence one year before the election by registering at

Kananga, Leyte to qualify her to run for the position of governor of the province of Leyte was proof

that she considered herself a resident of Ormoc City. This Court affirmed the ruling of the

COMELEC and held that petitioner Larrazabal had established her residence in Ormoc City, not inKananga, Leyte, from 1975 up to the time that she ran for the position of Provincial Governor of

Leyte on February 1, 1988. There was no evidence to show that she and her husband maintained

separate residences, i.e., she at Kananga, Leyte and her husband at Ormoc City. The fact that she

occasionally visited Kananga, Leyte through the years did not signify an intention to continue her

residence after leaving that place.

In Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City, the Court held that "domicile" and "residence" are

synonymous. The term "residence," as used in the election law, imports not only an intention to

reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of

such intention. "Domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for

business or pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to return. In that case, petitioner Philip G.

Romualdez established his residence during the early 1980s in Barangay Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte. It

was held that the sudden departure from the country of petitioner, because of the EDSA PeoplesPower Revolution of 1986, to go into self-exile in the United States until favorable conditions had


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been established, was not voluntary so as to constitute an abandonment of residence. The Court

explained that in order to acquire a new domicile by choice, there must concur (1) residence or

bodily presence in the new locality, (2) an intention to remain there, and (3) an intention to

abandon the old domicile. There must be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi.

The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the

change of residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the new

domicile must be actual.

Ultimately, the Court recapitulates in Papandayan, Jr. that it is the fact of residence that is the

decisive factor in determining whether or not an individual has satisfied the residency qualificationrequirement.

As espoused by Ty, the issue of whether he complied with the one-year residency requirement for

running for public office is a question of fact. Its determination requires the Court to review,

examine and evaluate or weigh the probative value of the evidence presented by the parties

before the COMELEC.

The COMELEC, taking into consideration the very same pieces of evidence presently before this

Court, found that Ty was a resident of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, one

year prior to the 14 May 2007 local elections. It is axiomatic that factual findings of administrative

agencies, such as the COMELEC, which have acquired expertise in their field are binding and

conclusive on the Court. An application for certiorari against actions of the COMELEC is confined

to instances of grave abuse of discretion amounting to patent and substantial denial of dueprocess, considering that the COMELEC is presumed to be most competent in matters falling

within its domain.21

The Court even went further to say that the rule that factual findings of administrative bodies will

not be disturbed by courts of justice, except when there is absolutely no evidence or no

substantial evidence in support of such findings, should be applied with greater force when it

concerns the COMELEC, as the framers of the Constitution intended to place the COMELEC

created and explicitly made independent by the Constitution itselfon a level higher than statutory

administrative organs. The factual finding of the COMELEC en banc is therefore binding on the

Court.22

The findings of facts of quasi-judicial agencies which have acquired expertise in the specific

matters entrusted to their jurisdiction are accorded by this Court not only respect but even finality

if they are supported by substantial evidence. Only substantial, not preponderance, of evidence is

necessary. Section 5, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides that in cases filed before

administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, a fact may be deemed established if it is supported by

substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept

as adequate to justify a conclusion.23

The assailed Resolutions dated 31 July 2007 and 28 September 2007 of the COMELEC First

Division and en banc, respectively, were both supported by substantial evidence and are, thus,

binding and conclusive upon this Court.

Tys intent to establish a new domicile of choice in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern

Samar, Philippines, became apparent when, immediately after reacquiring his Philippine

citizenship on 2 October 2005, he applied for a Philippine passport indicating in his application

that his residence in the Philippines was at A. Mabini St., Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur,

Eastern Samar. For the years 2006 and 2007, Ty voluntarily submitted himself to the local tax

jurisdiction of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, by paying community tax and

securing CTCs from the said municipality stating therein his address as A. Mabini St., Barangay 6,

Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar. Thereafter, Ty applied for and was registered as a

voter on 17 July 2006 in Precinct 0013A, Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar.

In addition, Ty has also been bodily present in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern

Samar, Philippines, since his arrival on 4 May 2006, inarguably, just a little over a year prior to the

14 May 2007 local elections. Japzon maintains that Tys trips abroad during said period, i.e., to

Bangkok, Thailand (from 14 to 18 July 2006), and to the USA (from 31 October 2006 to 19 January2007), indicate that Ty had no intention to permanently reside in the Municipality of General

Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines. The COMELEC First Division and en banc, as well as this

Court, however, view these trips differently. The fact that Ty did come back to the Municipality of

General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines, after said trips, is a further manifestation of his

animus manendi and animus revertendi.

There is no basis for this Court to require Ty to stay in and never leave at all the Municipality of

General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for the full one-year period prior to the 14 May 2007 local

elections so that he could be considered a resident thereof. To the contrary, the Court has

previously ruled that absence from residence to pursue studies or practice a profession or

registration as a voter other than in the place where one is elected, does not constitute loss of

residence.24The Court also notes, that even with his trips to other countries, Ty was actually present

in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines, for at least nine of the 12

months preceding the 14 May 2007 local elections. Even if length of actual stay in a place is not

necessarily determinative of the fact of residence therein, it does strongly support and is only

consistent with Tys avowed intent in the instant case to establish residence/domicile in the

Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar.

Japzon repeatedly brings to the attention of this Court that Ty arrived in the Municipality of

General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, on 4 May 2006 only to comply with the one-year residency

requirement, so Ty could run as a mayoralty candidate in the 14 May 2007 elections. In Aquino v.

COMELEC,25 the Court did not find anything wrong in an individual changing residences so he

could run for an elective post, for as long as he is able to prove with reasonable certainty that he

has effected a change of residence for election law purposes for the period required by law. As

this Court already found in the present case, Ty has proven by substantial evidence that he had

established residence/domicile in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, by 4 May

2006, a little over a year prior to the 14 May 2007 local elections, in which he ran as a candidate for

the Office of the Mayor and in which he garnered the most number of votes.

Finally, when the evidence of the alleged lack of residence qualification of a candidate for an

elective position is weak or inconclusive and it clearly appears that the purpose of the law would

not be thwarted by upholding the victors right to the office, the will of the electorate should be

respected. For the purpose of election laws is to give effect to, rather than frustrate, the will of the

voters.26To successfully challenge Tys disqualification, Japzon must clearly demonstrate that Tys

ineligibility is so patently antagonistic to constitutional and legal principles that overriding such

ineligibility and thereby giving effect to the apparent will of the people would ultimately create

greater prejudice to the very democratic institutions and juristic traditions that our Constitution

and laws so zealously protect and promote. In this case, Japzon failed to substantiate his claim thatTy is ineligible to be Mayor of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines.


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WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO

Chief JusticeLEONARDO A. QUISUMBING

Associate Justice

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO

Associate Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice

RENATO C. CORONA

Associate Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

ADOLFO S. AZCUNAAssociate Justice

DANTE O. TINGA

Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION

Associate Justice

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in

the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the

opinion of the Court.

REYNATO S. PUNO

Chief Justice

Footnotes

1Review of Judgments and Final Orders or Resolutions of the Commission on Elections and the

Commission on Audit.2Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus.

3Penned by Commissioner Romeo A. Brawner with Presiding Commissioner Resurreccion Z. Borra,

concurring; rollo, pp. 29-36.4 Penned by Commissioner Nicodemo T. Ferrer with Chairman Benjamin S. Abalos, Sr. and

Commissioners Resurreccion Z. Borra, Florentino A. Tuason, Jr., Romeo A. Brawner, and Rene V.

Sarmiento, concurring; id. at 37-40.5Records, pp. 1-3.6Id. at 28-34.7Id. at 51.8Rollo, pp. 29-36.

9Id. at 33.10Id. at 34-35.11Id. at 35.12Id. at 37-40.13Id. at 38-39.14Id. at 10.15Id. at 18.16According to Section 2 of Republic Act No. 9225, natural-born citizens of the Philippines who

have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign

country are deemed to have reacquired their Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of

allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.17Depending on when the concerned natural-born Filipino acquired foreign citizenship: if before

the effectivity of Republic Act No. 9225 on 17 September 2003, he may reacquire his Philippine

citizenship; and if after the effectivity of the said statute, he may retain his Philippine citizenship.18Coquilla v. Commission on Elections, 434 Phil. 861, 871-872 (2002).19Id.20430 Phil. 754, 768-770 (2002).21Matalam v. Commission on Elections, 338 Phil. 447, 470 (1997).22 Dagloc v. Commision on Elections, 463 Phil. 263, 288 (2003); Mastura v. Commission on

Elections, 349 Phil. 423, 429 (1998).23Hagonoy Rural Bank v. National Labor Relations Commission, 349 Phil. 220, 232 (1998).24Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, G.R. Nos. 92191-92, 30 July 1991, 199

SCRA 692, 715-716.25G.R. No. 120265, 18 September 1995, 248 SCRA 400.26Papandayan, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, supra note 20 at 773-774.


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SUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 179313 September 17, 2009

MAKIL U. PUNDAODAYA,Petitioner,

vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONSN and ARSENIO DENSING NOBLE,Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

YNARES-SANTIAGO,J.:

This petition1for certiorari under Rule 65 assails the August 3, 2007 Resolution2of the Commission

on Elections (COMELEC) En Banc in SPA No. 07-202, which declared private respondent Arsenio

Densing Noble (Noble) qualified to run for municipal mayor of Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental, in the

May 14, 2007 Synchronized National and Local Elections.

The facts are as follows:

Petitioner Makil U. Pundaodaya (Pundaodaya) is married to Judith Pundaodaya, who ran against

Noble for the position of municipal mayor of Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental in the 2007 elections.

On March 27, 2007, Noble filed his Certificate of Candidacy, indicating therein that he has been a

resident of Purok 3, Barangay Esperanza, Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental for 15 years.

On April 3, 2007, Pundaodaya filed a petition for disqualification3against Noble docketed as SPA

No. 07-202, alleging that the latter lacks the residency qualification prescribed by existing laws for

elective local officials; that he never resided nor had any physical presence at a fixed place in Purok

3, Barangay Esperanza, Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental; and that he does not appear to have the

intention of residing therein permanently. Pundaodaya claimed that Noble is in fact a resident of

Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City, where he also maintains a business called OBERT Construction

Supply.

In his Answer,4Noble averred that he is a registered voter and resident of Barangay Esperanza,

Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental; that on January 18, 1992, he married Bernadith Go, the daughter of

then Mayor Narciso Go of Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental; that he has been engaged in electoral

activities since his marriage; and that he voted in the said municipality in the 1998, 2001 and 2004

elections.

In a resolution dated May 13, 2007,5 the Second Division of the COMELEC ruled in favor of

Pundaodaya and disqualified Noble from running as mayor, thus:

Respondent Nobles claim that he is a registered voter and has actually voted in the past three (3)

elections in the said municipality does not sufficiently establish that he has actually elected

residency at Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental. Neither does campaigning in previous electionssufficiently establish residence.

Respondent Noble failed to show that he has indeed acquired domicile at Kinoguitan, Misamis

Oriental. He failed to prove not only his bodily presence in the new locality but has likewise failed

to show that he intends to remain at Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental and abandon his residency at

Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition to Disqualify Aresnio Densing Noble is

hereby GRANTED.

SO ORDERED.6

Noble filed a motion for reconsideration of the above resolution. In the meantime, he garnered the

highest number of votes and was proclaimed the winning candidate on May 15, 2007.

Pundaodaya then filed an Urgent Motion to Annul Proclamation.7

On August 3, 2007, the COMELEC En Banc reversed the decision of the Second Division and

declared Noble qualified to run for the mayoralty position.

The COMELEC En Banc held that when Noble married Bernadith Go on January 18, 1992, the

couple has since resided in Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental; that he was a registered voter and that

he participated in the last three elections; and although he is engaged in business in Cagayan de

Oro City, the fact that he resides in Kinoguitan and is a registered voter and owns property thereat,

sufficiently meet the residency requirement.8Thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission (en banc) RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES,

to GRANT the instant Motion for Reconsideration and to REVERSE AND SET ASIDE the Resolution

promulgated on May 13, 2007 issued by the Commission (Second Division).

ACCORDINGLY, respondent ARSENIO DENSING NOBLE is QUALIFIED to run for the local elective

position of Municipal Mayor of the Municipality of Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental in the May 14,

2007 Synchronized National and Local Elections.

SO ORDERED.9

Pundaodaya filed the instant petition for certiorari, alleging that the COMELEC En Banc acted with

grave abuse of discretion when it declared Noble qualified to run; when it did not annul Nobles

proclamation; and when it failed to proclaim the true winning candidate, Judith Pundaodaya.

In a resolution dated November 13, 2007,10the Court required the respondents to comment on

the petition.

Public respondent, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed a Manifestation and Motion 11

praying that it be excused from filing a separate comment and that the said pleading be

considered sufficient compliance with the November 13, 2007 Resolution.

Meanwhile, for Nobles failure to comply, the Court issued Resolutions 12dated July 15, 2008 and

December 9, 2008 requiring him to show cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with or

held in contempt, imposing a fine of P1,000.00, and requiring him to file a comment. On June 2,

2009, the Court deemed Noble to have waived the filing of the comment. 13


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The issues for resolution are: whether the COMELEC En Banc gravely abused its discretion: 1) in

declaring Noble qualified to run for the mayoralty position; and 2) in failing to order the annulment

of Nobles proclamation and refusing to proclaim Judith Pundaodaya as the winning candidate.

Section 39 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code, requires

that an elective local official must be a resident in the barangay, municipality, city or province

where he intends to serve for at least one year immediately preceding the election. 14

In Japzon v. Commission on Elections,15it was held that the term "residence" is to be understood

not in its common acceptation as referring to "dwelling" or "habitation," but rather to "domicile" orlegal residence, that is, "the place where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home,

where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and

remain (animus manendi)."

In Domino v. Commission on Elections,16 the Court explained that domicile denotes a fixed

permanent residence to which, whenever absent for business, pleasure, or some other reasons,

one intends to return. It is a question of intention and circumstances. In the consideration of

circumstances, three rules must be borne in mind, namely: (1) that a man must have a residence or

domicile somewhere; (2) when once established it remains until a new one is acquired; and (3) a

man can have but one residence or domicile at a time. 1avvphi1

If one wishes to successfully effect a change of domicile, he must demonstrate an actual removal

or an actual change of domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place ofresidence and establishing a new one, and definite acts which correspond with the purpose.17

Without clear and positive proof of the concurrence of these three requirements, the domicile of

origin continues.18

Records show that Nobles domicile of origin was Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City. However, he

claims to have chosen Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental as his new domicile. To substantiate this, he

presented before the COMELEC his voter registration records; 19 a Certification dated April 25,

2007 from Election Officer II Clavel Z. Tabada;20 his Marriage Certificate;21 and affidavits of

residents of Kinoguitan22 attesting that he established residence in the municipality after his

marriage to Bernadith Go. In addition, he presented receipts23 from the Provincial Treasurer for

payment of his water bills, and Certifications from the Municipal Treasurer and Municipal Engineer

that he has been a consumer of the Municipal Water System since June 2003. To prove ownership

of property, he also presented a Deed of Sale24over a real property dated June 3, 1996.

The above pieces of documentary evidence, however, fail to convince us that Noble successfully

effected a change of domicile. As correctly ruled by the COMELEC Second Division, private

respondents claim that he is a registered voter and has actually voted in the past 3 elections in

Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental do not sufficiently establish that he has actually elected residency in

the said municipality. Indeed, while we have ruled in the past that voting gives rise to a strong

presumption of residence, it is not conclusive evidence thereof. 25Thus, in Perez v. Commission on

Elections,26we held that a persons registration as voter in one district is not proof that he is not

domiciled in another district. The registration of a voter in a place other than his residence of

origin is not sufficient to consider him to have abandoned or lost his residence. 27

To establish a new domicile of choice, personal presence in the place must be coupled with

conduct indicative of that intention. It requires not only such bodily presence in that place but also

a declared and probable intent to make it ones fixed and permanent place of abode. 28

In this case, Nobles marriage to Bernadith Go does not establish his actual physical presence in

Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental. Neither does it prove an intention to make it his permanent place of

residence. We are also not persuaded by his alleged payment of water bills in the absence of

evidence showing to which specific properties they pertain. And while Noble presented a Deed of

Sale for real property, the veracity of this document is belied by his own admission that he does

not own property in Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental.29

On the contrary, we find that Noble has not abandoned his original domicile as shown by the

following: a) Certification dated April 12, 2007 of the Barangay Kagawad of Barangay Lapasan,

Cagayan de Oro City stating that Noble is a resident of the barangay; 30 b) Affidavit31 of theBarangay Kagawad of Esperanza, Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental dated April 14, 2007, attesting that

Noble has not resided in Barangay Esperanza in Kinoguitan; c) photos32 and official receipts33

showing that Noble and his wife maintain their residence and businesses in Lapasan; d) tax

declarations34 of real properties in Cagayan de Oro City under the name of Noble; and e) the

"Household Record of Barangay Inhabitants"35of Mayor Narciso Go, which did not include Noble

or his wife, Bernadith Go, which disproves Nobles claim that he resides with his father-in-law.

From the foregoing, we find that Nobles alleged change of domicile was effected solely for the

purpose of qualifying as a candidate in the 2007 elections. This we cannot allow. In Torayno, Sr. v.

Commission on Elections, 36 we held that the one-year residency requirement is aimed at

excluding outsiders "from taking advantage of favorable circumstances existing in that community

for electoral gain." Establishing residence in a community merely to meet an election law

requirement defeats the purpose of representation: to elect through the assent of voters thosemost cognizant and sensitive to the needs of the community.37Thus, we find Noble disqualified

from running as municipal mayor of Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental in the 2007 elections.

Notwithstanding Nobles disqualification, we find no basis for the proclamation of Judith

Pundaodaya, as mayor. The rules on succession under the Local Government Code, explicitly

provides:

SECTION 44. Permanent Vacancies in the Offices of the Governor, Vice-Governor, Mayor, and Vice-

Mayor. If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the xxx mayor, the xxx vice-mayor

concerned shall become the xxx mayor.

x x x x

For purposes of this Chapter, a permanent vacancy arises when an elective local official fills a

higher vacant office, refuses to assume office, fails to qualify or is removed from office, voluntarily

resigns, or is otherwise permanently incapacitated to discharge the functions of his office.

x x x x (Emphasis ours)

Thus, considering the permanent vacancy in the Office of the Mayor of Kinoguitan, Misamis

Oriental occasioned by Nobles disqualification, the proclaimed Vice-Mayor shall then succeed as

mayor.38

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The August 3, 2007 Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc

in SPA No. 07-202 declaring respondent Arsenio Densing Noble qualified to run as Mayor of

Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental, is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. In view of the permanent vacancy in


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the Office of the Mayor of Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental, the proclaimed Vice-Mayor is ORDERED

to succeed as Mayor.

SO ORDERED.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO

Chief Justice

(On Official Leave)

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING

Associate Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

RENATO C. CORONA

Associate Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO

Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.Associate Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION

Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABAD

Associate Justice

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in

the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the

opinion of the Court.

REYNATO S. PUNO

Chief Justice

Footnotes

1Rollo,pp. 9-35.2Id.at 58-64. Penned by Commissioner Resurreccion Z. Borra and concurred in by Commissioners

Benjamin S. Abalos, Sr., Romeo A. Brawner, and Nicodemo T. Ferrer. Commissioners Florentino A.

Tuason, Jr. and Rene V. Sarmiento dis sented.3Comelec Records, pp. 1-11.4Id.at 27-41.5Rollo,pp. 50-57. Penned by Commissioner Florentino A. Tuason, Jr.6Id.at 56.7Id.at 59.

8Id.at 62.9Id.at 63.10Id.at 65.11Id.at 66-67.12Id.at 71 and 73.13Id.at 75.14 (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a registered voter in the

barangay, municipality, city, or province or, in the case of a member of the sangguniang

panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan, the district where he intends to

be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the

election; and able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect.15G.R. No. 180088, January 19, 2009.16369 Phil. 798, 818 (1999).17Id.at 819.18 In the Matter of the Petition for Disqualification of Tess Dumpit-Michelena, G.R. Nos. 163619-20,

November 17, 2005, 475 SCRA 290, 303.19Comelec Records, pp. 44-45.20Id.at 43.21Id.at 75.22Id.at 46-48.23Id.at 49-73.24Id.at 74.25Domino v. Commission on Elections,supra note 16 at 820.26375 Phil. 1106 (1999).27Id.at 1118, citing Faypon v. Quirino, 96 Phil. 294 (1954).28

Domino v. Commission on Elections,supra note 16 at 819.29Comelec Records, p. 33.30Rollo,p. 36.31Id.at 40.32Id.at 37, 43.33Id.at 37, 44.34Id.at 45-49.35Id.at 41-42.36G.R. No. 137329, August 9, 2000, 337 SCRA 574.37Id.at 584, citingAquino v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 120265, September 18, 1995, 248

SCRA 400, 420-421.38Limbona v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 181097, June 25, 2008, 555 SCRA 391, 404.


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SUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 195649 April 16, 2013

CASAN MACODE MAQUILING, Petitioner,

vs.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ROMMEL ARNADO y CAGOCO, LINOG G. BALUA, Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

SERENO, CJ.:

THE CASE

This is a Petition for Certiorari ender Rule 64 in conjunction with Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to

review the Resolutions of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). The Resolution1 in SPA No.

10-1 09(DC) of the COMELEC First Division dated 5 October 201 0 is being assailed for applying

Section 44 of the Local Government Code while the Resolution2of the COMELEC En Banc dated 2

February 2011 is being questioned for finding that respondent Rommel Arnado y Cagoco(respondent Arnado/Arnado) is solely a Filipino citizen qualified to run for public office despite his

continued use of a U.S. passport.

FACTS

Respondent Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen.3 However, as a consequence of his

subsequent naturalization as a citizen of the United States of America, he lost his Filipino

citizenship. Arnado applied for repatriation under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 before the

Consulate General of the Philippines in San Franciso, USA and took the Oath of Allegiance to the

Republic of the Philippines on 10 July 2008.4 On the same day an Order of Approval of his

Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition was issued in his favor.5

The aforementioned Oath of Allegiance states:

I, Rommel Cagoco Arnado, solemnly swear that I will support and defend the Constitution of the

Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by the duly

constituted authorities of the Philippines and I hereby declare that I recognize and accept the

supreme authority of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I

impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of evasion.6

On 3 April 2009 Arnado again took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic and executed an

Affidavit of Renunciation of his foreign citizenship, which states:

I, Rommel Cagoco Arnado, do solemnly swear that I absolutely and perpetually renounce all

allegiance and fidelity to the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA of which I am a citizen, and I divest

myself of full employment of all civil and political rights and privileges of the United States ofAmerica.

I solemnly swear that all the foregoing statement is true and correct to the best of my knowledge

and belief.7

On 30 November 2009, Arnado filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao

del Norte, which contains, among others, the following statements:

I am a natural born Filipino citizen / naturalized Filipino citizen.

I am not a permanent resident of, or immigrant to, a foreign country.

I am eligible for the office I seek to be elected to.

I will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and will maintain true

faith and allegiance thereto. I will obey the laws, legal orders and decrees promulgated by the duly

constituted authorities.

I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of evasion.8

On 28 April 2010, respondent Linog C. Balua (Balua), another mayoralty candidate, filed a petition

to disqualify Arnado and/or to cancel his certificate of candidacy for municipal mayor of

Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in connection with the 10 May 2010 local and national elections. 9

Respondent Balua contended that Arnado is not a resident of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte andthat he is a foreigner, attaching thereto a certification issued by the Bureau of Immigration dated

23 April 2010 indicating the nationality of Arnado as "USA-American."10To further bolster his claim

of Arnados US citizenship, Balua presented in his Memorandum a computer-generated travel

record11 dated 03 December 2009 indicating that Arnado has been using his US Passport No.

057782700 in entering and departing the Philippines. The said record shows that Arnado left the

country on 14 April 2009 and returned on 25 June 2009, and again departed on 29 July 2009,

arriving back in the Philippines on 24 November 2009.

Balua likewise presented a certification from the Bureau of Immigration dated 23 April 2010,

certifying that the name "Arnado, Rommel Cagoco" appears in the available Computer Database/

Passenger manifest/IBM listing on file as of 21 April 2010, with the following pertinent travel

records:

DATE OF Arrival : 01/12/2010

NATIONALITY : USA-AMERICAN

PASSPORT : 057782700

DATE OF Arrival : 03/23/2010

NATIONALITY : USA-AMERICAN

PASSPORT : 05778270012

On 30 April 2010, the COMELEC (First Division) issued an Order

13

requiring the respondent topersonally file his answer and memorandum within three (3) days from receipt thereof.


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After Arnado failed to answer the petition, Balua moved to declare him in default and to present

evidence ex-parte.

Neither motion was acted upon, having been overtaken by the 2010 elections where Arnado

garnered the highest number of votes and was subsequently proclaimed as the winning candidate

for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.

It was only after his proclamation that Arnado filed his verified answer, submitting the following

documents as evidence:14

1. Affidavit of Renunciation and Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines dated 03

April 2009;

2. Joint-Affidavit dated 31 May 2010 of Engr. Virgil Seno, Virginia Branzuela, Leoncio Daligdig, and

Jessy Corpin, all neighbors of Arnado, attesting that Arnado is a long-time resident of Kauswagan

and that he has been conspicuously and continuously residing in his familys ancestral house in

Kauswagan;

3. Certification from the Punong Barangay of Poblacion, Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte dated 03

June 2010 stating that Arnado is a bona fide resident of his barangay and that Arnado went to the

United States in 1985 to work and returned to the Philippines in 2009;

4. Certification dated 31 May 2010 from the Municipal Local Government Operations Office ofKauswagan stating that Dr. Maximo P. Arnado, Sr. served as Mayor of Kauswagan, from January

1964 to June 1974 and from 15 February 1979 to 15 April 1986; and

5. Voter Certification issued by the Election Officer of Kauswagan certifying that Arnado has been a

registered voter of Kauswagan since 03 April 2009.

THE RULING OF THE COMELEC FIRST DIVISION

Instead of treating the Petition as an action for the cancellation of a certificate of candidacy based

on misrepresentation,15 the COMELEC First Division considered it as one for disqualification.

Baluas contention that Arnado is a resident of the United States was dismissed upon the finding

that "Balua failed to present any evidence to support his contention,"16whereas the First Division

still could "not conclude that Arnado failed to meet the one-year residency requirement under theLocal Government Code."17

In the matter of the issue of citizenship, however, the First Division disagreed with Arnados claim

that he is a Filipino citizen.18

We find that although Arnado appears to have substantially complied with the requirements of

R.A. No. 9225, Arnados act of consistently using his US passport after renouncing his US

citizenship on 03 April 2009 effectively negated his Affidavit of Renunciation.

x x x x

Arnados continued use of his US passport is a strong indication that Arnado had no real intention

to renounce his US citizenship and that he only executed an Affidavit of Renunciation to enablehim to run for office. We cannot turn a blind eye to the glaring inconsistency between Arnados

unexplained use of a US passport six times and his claim that he re-acquired his Philippine

citizenship and renounced his US citizenship. As noted by the Supreme Court in the Yu case, "a

passport is defined as an official document of identity and nationality issued to a person intending

to travel or sojourn in foreign countries." Surely, one who truly divested himself of US citizenship

would not continue to avail of privileges reserved solely for US nationals.19

The dispositive portion of the Resolution rendered by the COMELEC

First Division reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition for disqualification and/or to cancel the

certificate of candidacy of Rommel C. Arnado is hereby GRANTED. Rommel C. Arnados

proclamation as the winning candidate for Municipal Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Nore is

hereby ANNULLED. Let the order of succession under Section 44 of the Local Government Code

of 1991 take effect.20

The Motion for Reconsideration and

the Motion for Intervention

Arnado sought reconsideration of the resolution before the COMELEC En Banc on the ground that

"the evidence is insufficient to justify the Resolution and that the said Resolution is contrary to

law."21He raised the following contentions:22

1. The finding that he is not a Filipino citizen is not supported by the evidence consisting of his

Oath of Allegiance and the Affidavit of Renunciation, which show that he has substantially

complied with the requirements of R.A. No. 9225;

2. The use of his US passport subsequent to his renunciation of his American citizenship is not

tantamount to a repudiation of his Filipino citizenship, as he did not perform any act to swear

allegiance to a country other than the Philippines;

3. He used his US passport only because he was not informed of the issuance of his Philippine

passport, and that he used his Philippine passport after he obtained it;

4. Baluas petition to cancel the certificate of candidacy of Arnado was filed out of time, and the

First Divisions treatment of the petition as one for disqualification constitutes grave abuse ofdiscretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction;23

5. He is undoubtedly the peoples choice as indicated by his winning the elections;

6. His proclamation as the winning candidate ousted the COMELEC from jurisdiction over the

case; and

7. The proper remedy to question his citizenship is through a petition for quo warranto, which

should have been filed within ten days from his proclamation.

Petitioner Casan Macode Maquiling (Maquiling), another candidate for mayor of Kauswagan, and

who garnered the second highest number of votes in the 2010 elections, intervened in the case

and filed before the COMELEC En Banc a Motion for Reconsideration together with an Oppositionto Arnados Amended Motion for Reconsideration. Maquiling argued that while the First Division


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correctly disqualified Arnado, the order of succession under Section 44 of the Local Government

Code is not applicable in this case. Consequently, he claimed that the cancellation of Arnados

candidacy and the nullification of his proclamation, Maquiling, as the legitimate candidate who

obtained the highest number of lawful votes, should be proclaimed as the winner.

Maquiling simultaneously filed his Memorandum with his Motion for Intervention and his Motion

for Reconsideration. Arnado opposed all motions filed by Maquiling, claiming that intervention is

prohibited after a decision has already been rendered, and that as a second-placer, Maquiling

undoubtedly lost the elections and thus does not stand to be prejudiced or benefitted by the final

adjudication of the case.

RULING OF THE COMELEC EN BANC

In its Resolution of 02 February 2011, the COMELEC En Banc held that under Section 6 of Republic

Act No. 6646, the Commission "shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or

protest even after the proclamation of the candidate whose qualifications for office is questioned."

As to Maquilings intervention, the COMELEC En Banc also cited Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 which

allows intervention in proceedings for disqualification even after elections if no final judgment has

been rendered, but went on further to say that Maquiling, as the second placer, would not be

prejudiced by the outcome of the case as it agrees with the dispositive portion of the Resolution of

the First Division allowing the order of succession under Section 44 of the Local Government Code

to take effect.

The COMELEC En Banc agreed with the treatment by the First Division of the petition as one for

disqualification, and ruled that the petition was filed well within the period prescribed by law, 24

having been filed on 28 April 2010, which is not later than 11 May 2010, the date of proclamation.

However, the COMELEC En Banc reversed and set aside the ruling of the First Division and

granted Arnados Motion for Reconsideration, on the following premises:

First:

By renouncing his US citizenship as imposed by R.A. No. 9225, the respondent embraced his

Philippine citizenship as though he never became a citizen of another country. It was at that time,

April 3, 2009, that the respondent became a pure Philippine Citizen again.

x x x x

The use of a US passport does not operate to revert back his status as a dual citizen prior to his

renunciation as there is no law saying such. More succinctly, the use of a US passport does not

operate to "un-renounce" what he has earlier on renounced. The First Divisions reliance in the case

of In Re: Petition for Habeas Corpus of Willy Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, et al. is misplaced. The

petitioner in the said case is a naturalized citizen who, after taking his oath as a naturalized Filipino,

applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport. Strict policy is maintained in the conduct of

citizens who are not natural born, who acquire their citizenship by choice, thus discarding their

original citizenship. The Philippine State expects strict conduct of allegiance to those who choose

to be its citizens. In the present case, respondent is not a naturalized citizen but a natural born

citizen who chose greener pastures by working abroad and then decided to repatriate to

supposedly help in the progress of Kauswagan. He did not apply for a US passport after his

renunciation. Thus the mentioned case is not on a ll fours with the case at bar.

x x x x

The respondent presented a plausible explanation as to the use of his US passport. Although he

applied for a Philippine passport, the passport was only issued on June 18, 2009. However, he was

not notified of the issuance of his Philippine passport so that he was actually able to get it about

three (3) months later. Yet as soon as he was in possession of his Philippine passport, the

respondent already used the same in his subsequent travels abroad. This fact is proven by therespondents submission of a certified true copy of his passport showing that he used the same for

his travels on the following dates: January 31, 2010, April 16, 2010, May 20, 2010, January 12,

2010, March 31, 2010 and June 4, 2010. This then shows that the use of the US passport was

because to his knowledge, his Philippine passport was not yet issued to him for his use. As

probably pressing needs might be undertaken, the respondent used whatever is within his control

during that time.25

In his Separate Concurring Opinion, COMELEC Chairman Sixto Brillantes cited that the use of

foreign passport is not one of the grounds provided for under Section 1 of Commonwealth Act

No. 63 through which Philippine citizenship may be lost.

"The application of the more assimilative principle of continuity of citizenship is more appropriate

in this case. Under said principle, once a person becomes a citizen, either by birth or naturalization,it is assumed that he desires to continue to be a citizen, and this assumption stands until he

voluntarily denationalizes or expatriates himself. Thus, in the instant case respondent after

reacquiring his Philippine citizenship should be presumed to have remained a Filipino despite his

use of his American passport in the absence of clear, unequivocal and competent proof of

expatriation. Accordingly, all doubts should be resolved in favor of retention of citizenship."26

On the other hand, Commissioner Rene V. Sarmiento dissented, thus:

Respondent evidently failed to prove that he truly and wholeheartedly abandoned his allegiance

to the United States. The latters continued use of his US passport and enjoyment of all the

privileges of a US citizen despite his previous renunciation of the afore-mentioned citizenship runs

contrary to his declaration that he chose to retain only his Philippine citizenship. Respondents

submission with the twin requirements was obviously only for the purpose of complying with therequirements for running for the mayoralty post in connection with the May 10, 2010 Automated

National and Local Elections.

Qualifications for elective office, such as citizenship, are continuing requirements; once any of

them is lost during his incumbency, title to the office itself is deemed forfeited. If a candidate is not

a citizen at the time he ran for office or if he lost his citizenship after his election to office, he is

disqualified to serve as such. Neither does the fact that respondent obtained the plurality of votes

for the mayoralty post cure the latters failure to comply with the qualification requirements

regarding his citizenship.

Since a disqualified candidate is no candidate at all in the eyes of the law, his having received the

highest number of votes does not validate his election. It has been held that where a petition for

disqualification was filed before election against a candidate but was adversely resolved against

him after election, his having obtained the highest number of votes did not make his election valid.


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His ouster from office does not violate the principle of vox populi suprema est lex because the

application of the constitutional and statutory provisions on disqualification is not a matter of

popularity. To apply it is to breath[e] life to the sovereign will of the people who expressed it when

they ratified the Constitution and when they elected their representatives who enacted the law. 27

THE PETITION BEFORE THE COURT

Maquiling filed the instant petition questioning the propriety of declaring Arnado qualified to run

for public office despite his continued use of a US passport, and praying that Maquiling be

proclaimed as the winner in the 2010 mayoralty race in Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.

Ascribing both grave abuse of discretion and reversible error on the part of the COMELEC En

Banc for ruling that Arnado is a Filipino citizen despite his continued use of a US passport,

Maquiling now seeks to reverse the finding of the COMELEC En Banc that Arnado is qualified to

run for public office.

Corollary to his plea to reverse the ruling of the COMELEC En Banc or to affirm the First Divisions

disqualification of Arnado, Maquiling also seeks the review of the applicability of Section 44 of the

Local Government Code, claiming that the COMELEC committed reversible error in ruling that

"the succession of the vice mayor in case the respondent is disqualified is in order."

There are three questions posed by the parties before this Court which will be addressed seriatim

as the subsequent questions hinge on the result of the first.

The first question is whether or not intervention is allowed in a disqualification case.

The second question is whether or not the use of a foreign passport after renouncing foreign

citizenship amounts to undoing a renunciation earlier made.

A better framing of the question though should be whether or not the use of a foreign passport

after renouncing foreign citizenship affects ones qualifications to run for public office.

The third question is whether or not the rule on succession in the Local Government Code is

applicable to this case.

OUR RULING

Intervention of a rival candidate in a

disqualification case is proper when

there has not yet been any

proclamation of the winner.

Petitioner Casan Macode Maquiling intervened at the stage when respondent Arnado filed a

Motion for Reconsideration of the First Division Resolution before the COMELEC En Banc. As the

candidate who garnered the second highest number of votes, Maquiling contends that he has an

interest in the disqualification case filed against Arnado, considering that in the event the latter is

disqualified, the votes cast for him should be considered stray and the second-placer should beproclaimed as the winner in the elections.

It must be emphasized that while the original petition before the COMELEC is one for cancellation

of the certificate of candidacy and / or disqualification, the COMELEC First Division and the

COMELEC En Banc correctly treated the petition as one for disqualification.

The effect of a disqualification case is enunciated in Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646:

Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. - Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to

be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any

reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he

is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commissionshall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the

complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the

proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.

Mercado v. Manzano28

clarified the right of intervention in a disqualification case. In that case, the Court said:

That petitioner had a right to intervene at that stage of the proceedings for the disqualification

against private respondent is clear from Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646, otherwise known as the

Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, which provides: Any candidate who has been declared by final

judgment to be disqualified shall not be v oted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted.

If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualifiedand he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or

Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon

motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the

suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of guilt is strong. Under

this provision, intervention may be allowed in proceedings for disqualification even after election if

there has yet been no final judgment rendered.29

Clearly then, Maquiling has the right to intervene in the case. The fact that the COMELEC En Banc

has already ruled that Maquiling has not shown that the requisites for the exemption to the

second-placer rule set forth in Sinsuat v. COMELEC30 are present and therefore would not be

prejudiced by the outcome of the case, does not deprive Maquiling of the right to elevate the

matter before this Court.

Arnados claim that the main case has attained finality as the original petitioner and respondents

therein have not appealed the decision of the COMELEC En Banc, cannot be sustained. The

elevation of the case by the intervenor prevents it from attaining finality. It is only after this Court

has ruled upon the issues raised in this instant petition that the disqualification case originally filed

by Balua against Arnado will attain finality.

The use of foreign passport after renouncing ones foreign citizenship is a positive and voluntary

act of representation as to ones nationality and citizenship; it does not divest Filipino citizenship

regained by repatriation but it recants the Oath of Renunciation required to qualify one to run for

an elective position.

Section 5(2) of The Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003 provides:


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Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and

political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of

the Philippines and the following conditions:

x x x x

(2)Those seeking elective public in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for holding such

public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the

certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign before any

public officer authorized to administer an oath.

x x x31

Rommel Arnado took all the necessary steps to qualify to run for a public office. He took the Oath

of Allegiance and renounced his foreign citizenship. There is no question that after performing

these twin requirements required under Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 or the Citizenship Retention

and Re-acquisition Act of 2003, he became eligible to run for public office.

Indeed, Arnado took the Oath of Allegiance not just only once but twice: first, on 10 July 2008

when he applied for repatriation before the Consulate General of the Philippines in San Francisco,

USA, and again on 03 April 2009 simultaneous with the execution of his Affidavit of Renunciation.

By taking the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic, Arnado re-acquired his Philippine citizenship. At

the time, however, he likewise possessed American citizenship. Arnado had therefore become adual citizen.

After reacquiring his Philippine citizenship, Arnado renounced his American citizenship by

executing an Affidavit of Renunciation, thus completing the requirements for eligibility to run for

public office.

By renouncing his foreign citizenship, he was deemed to be solely a Filipino citizen, regardless of

the effect of such renunciation under the laws of the foreign country.32

However, this legal presumption does not operate permanently and is open to attack when, after

renouncing the foreign citizenship, the citizen performs positive acts showing his continued

possession of a foreign citizenship.33

Arnado himself subjected the issue of his citizenship to attack when, after renouncing his foreign

citizenship, he continued to use his US passport to travel in and out of the country before filing his

certificate of candidacy on 30 November 2009. The pivotal question to determine is whether he

was solely and exclusively a Filipino citizen at the time he filed his certificate of candidacy, thereby

rendering him eligible to run for public office.

Between 03 April 2009, the date he renounced his foreign citizenship, and 30 November 2009, the

date he filed his COC, he used his US passport four times, actions that run counter to the affidavit

of renunciation he had earlier executed. By using his foreign passport, Arnado positively and

voluntarily represented himself as an American, in effect declaring before immigration authorities

of both countries that he is an American citizen, with all attendant rights and privileges granted by

the United States of America.

The renunciation of foreign citizenship is not a hollow oath that can simply be professed at any

time, only to be violated the next day. It requires an absolute and perpetual renunciation of the

foreign citizenship and a full divestment of all civil and political rights granted by the foreign

country which granted the citi zenship.

Mercado v. Manzano34already hinted at this situation when the Court declared:

His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking made under oath.

Should he betray that trust, there are enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his Philippine

citizenship through expatriation in appropriate proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, wesustained the denial of entry into the country of petitioner on the ground that, after taking his oath

as a naturalized citizen, he applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport and declared in

commercial documents executed abroad that he was a Portuguese national. A similar sanction can

be taken against anyone who, in electing Philippine citizenship, renounces his foreign nationality,

but subsequently does some act constituting renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.

While the act of using a foreign passport is not one of the acts enumerated in Commonwealth Act

No. 63 constituting renunciation and loss of Philippine citizenship,35it is nevertheless an act which

repudiates the very oath of renunciation required for a former Filipino citizen who is also a citizen

of another country to be qualified to run for a local elective position.

When Arnado used his US passport on 14 April 2009, or just eleven days after he renounced his

American citizenship, he recanted his Oath of Renu

Documents

Cases - The Legislative Department (1st Set)