Case Studies in Project Management - Miller Park Stadium

7/21/2019 Case Studies in Project Management - Miller Park Stadium

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Project Management Institute

Case Studies in Project Management

Miller Park Stadium Project

By:

Scott Serich, PhD, PMP, Graham Bale, MSPM, PMP, Mary Kay Kwasny, MSPM, PMP,Steven Patneaude, MSPM, ASCPM, Jeff Stack, MSPM, PMP

Edited by:

Frank T. Anbari, PhD, PMP

The George Washington University

This case study was originally prepared as part of Project Management Applications, the capstone

course of the Master of Science in Project Management in the Department of Decision Sciences at The George

Washington University, by the graduating students listed above with the supervision of Professor Serich.

This case study was adapted to make it a learning resource and might not reflect all historical facts

related to this project.

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Case Study


Table of Contents

Introduction .............................................................................................................................................................3

The Inception Phase ...............................................................................................................................................4

The Development Phase ........................................................................................................................................8

The Implementation Phase ..................................................................................................................................11

The Closeout Phase ...............................................................................................................................................15

Summary of Project Assessment and Analysis ..................................................................................................18

References ..............................................................................................................................................................19

Teaching Note .......................................................................................................................................................21

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Case Study


Introduction

Miller Park is a 42,500-seat baseball stadium and the result of a project undertaken to replace

County Stadium, home of the Milwaukee Brewers since 1953. Wisconsin Legislature created the Southeast

Wisconsin Professional Baseball Park District through the 1995 Wisconsin Act 56 to give it the authority

to issue revenue bonds and impose a local sales and use tax to provide public funding for the new stadium.

The official groundbreaking for the new stadium took place November 9, 1996. It was scheduled to be a

three-and-one-half-year project, with construction set to be completed by 1 March 2000. The stadium was

designed to have a natural grass playing field and convertible roof to make a more comfortable environment

for players and fans throughout the season.

Miller Park had a cost of US$400 million including US$72 million to improve the area surrounding

the park. Ownership of the completed project is divided. The Southeast Wisconsin Professional Baseball

Park District owns 64% of the park, and the Milwaukee Brewers owns 36% of the park. Miller Brewing

Company gave the Milwaukee Brewers more than $41 million for naming rights to the new stadium

hence the name, Miller Park.

The Miller Park Joint Venture was created to manage the project consisting of three prime construc-

tion contractors: Hunzinger Construction Company, Clark Construction, and Hunt Construction (HCH).

Over the life of the project, there were 447 prime contracts and first-tier subcontracts. Of those, 180 were

targeted firms (minority owned, women owned, disadvantaged or small businesses). In total, there were

more than 5,000 personnel who contributed to the project, working more than 2.4 million worker-hours,

or 1,600 construction-worker years.

The stadium building has an area of 1.2 million square feet (111,484 m 2), 70,000 cubic yards (53,519

m3) of concrete, 24,000 tons of structural steel, and 8,500 tons of rebar. For the fans, there are 70 luxury

suites, 550 television sets, 2,000 stereo speakers, and 33 restrooms each for men and women.

The project took a year longer to complete than originally planned, mostly the result of a crane

accident in July 1999. There was also a cost surprise. A Wisconsin Legislative Audit Bureau summary

revealed that to complete the project, taxpayers of Milwaukee and the surrounding counties would be in

part footing US$76 million more than originally projected in the 1995 Wisconsin Act 56, bringing the total

to $400 million.

This case study covers various Project Management Knowledge Areas (Project Management Insti-

tute, 2004) within four project phases: inception, development, implementation, and closeout. Within eachproject phase, the activities, accomplishments, and performance shortcomings in the Initiating, Planning,

Executing, Monitoring and Controlling, and Closing Process Groups processes are discussed. The case

study is structured to allow an evaluation of the appropriate processes of various Project Management

KnowledgeAreasat the endof each phase.An overall assessment of performance is then conducted, resulting

in a numeric evaluation of the management of this project, including areas of strength, opportunities for

improvement, and lessons learned.

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The Inception Phase

Scope management on the Miller Park Stadium project was evident throughout the project. How-

ever, there were some areas of scope management that were found lacking. These areas are associated

with the inception and implementation phases. There was no broad consensus regarding the sources offunding, and no subsequent consensus on how ownership would change with a corresponding change in

cost. The funding issue is addressed as part of the scope section as well as the cost section because

stakeholder fiduciary interest should be specifically addressed in the project proposal and charter.

The project proposal team made significant efforts to build consensus and garner support for the

project in the year preceding the proposed start. Specific efforts included heavy use of media coverage

and 11 lobbyists costing over US$94,000. The park was twice proposed as a privately funded enterprise.

However, when the proposal grew, the project sponsors had to look for public sources of funding. Although

the officials involved got the stadium approved, it was not without political cost. The appeal for public

funding was not well received by the Milwaukee constituency as they voted it down twice. Regardless,

Governor Tommy Thompson implemented a five-county sales tax hike in 1996 to build Miller Park. The

voters responded by recalling the state senator whose vote secured the deal. (Kagan and Demause).

Given the political contention surrounding this project, the inception phase of scope was managed

as best as could be expected by the project proposal team. Although the proposal for the new stadium

was accepted, public funding was secured, and construction begun, the event created much public outcry.

Due to the protest and lawsuits, it is evident that the stakeholder interest alignment necessary during

inception did not occur, or could not be accomplished. This project was forced on the Milwaukee constitu-

ency. As such, it created enough controversy to garner national attention and legislative debate. The

Libertarian Party of Wisconsin filed an injunctive lawsuit to halt the project. Additionally, legislation was

proposed in the U.S. Congress, which would forever change the way stadium projects could be funded

across the country.

The funding of stadium projects across the United States is quite varied. Stadium projects use at

least some private money, but due to the extremely high cost of engineering projects done on this scale,

many require public funding as well. Public funding comes from sources such as state lotteries, bond

issues, sales tax levies, and use taxes. The Miller Park Stadium project cost was proposed several times as

the scope changed and features were added to the ballpark. Costs and sources of capital were well identified

for this project. However, as the groundbreaking grew closer in 1995, the cost escalated and the funding

structure changed.

The stadium project proposal was treated as an iterative process. The first proposal was an open-

air US$120 million stadium. However, as the project neared its start, the costs escalated as new information

was gained and features were added such as a convertible roof. The sources of funding were identified to

accommodate the new cost projections. However, problems that arose later in the project regarding owner-

ship rights and the definitions of what was to be included in cost estimates might have been avoided with

better planning. A quote from the Wisconsin Legislative Audit Bureau referring to a memorandum of

understanding (MOU) between the park district and the Brewers indicated that the specific problem washow any cost escalations would be handled and how the securing of additional funding would affect the

ownership rights of the original investors. They stated:

Under the MOU and subsequent agreements signed by the District and the Brewers, the

Brewers are to have a 36% ownership in the stadium when it is completed. This percentage

was based on the proportion of the total cost of the stadium the Brewers were to finance.

However, when all expenditures are taken into account, the Brewers US$90 million contribu-

tion reflects only 29.7% of the $303.3 million now estimated to be expended on stadium

construction. If actual stadium construction expenditures reflect budgeted costs when the

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project is completed, then an adjustment to the Brewers percentage of ownership will need

to be made.

This scenario could have been anticipated in either inception or development for either scope or cost. It

most directly relates to cost, but scope directly addresses stakeholders interests in projects. Sadly, it was

not dealt with until the problem became apparent in the later stages of implementation as costs were

escalating. However, the funding and ownership issues were finally resolved during implementation and

closeout as the stakeholders negotiated and accepted contingency funding proposals.

Three construction firms worked together in a joint venture to manage the construction of Miller

Park stadium. The main project manager was from one of the construction firms. There were multiple

subcontractors, most notably the one which designed, built, and installed the stadiums roof.

The Miller Park project was filled with holes and discrepancies during the inception phase, develop-

ment phase, and implementation phase with regards to how the project was contracted. Throughout the

projects life cycle there were continuous disputes about who should cover the projects cost overruns, the

Miller Park Joint Venture or the Milwaukee Brewers baseball organization. Implementing and communicat-

ing the appropriate contract structure to support the project from its inception to closeout would haveeliminated a tremendous amount of confusion and frustration for city officials, public taxpayers, and the

Brewers baseball organization. Ultimately, if the appropriate contract strategy would have been imple-

mented to support the Miller Park project, all parties supporting the project would have know when and

how much money would be spent to support the project and if the project would have met its expected

scope and schedule targets.

During the inception phase of the Miller Park project, it was clear that the proponents for the

stadium had conceived the strategy and architecture, and established the priorities to which the projects

framework would be managed. What the Miller Park Joint Venture failed to do was to provide the proper

financial documentation to correspond to its strategy and architecture.

The Miller Park Joint Venture established a MOU, which outlined its strategic plan for integrating

the stadium, provided documentation, and forecasted cost elements. The MOU was misleading, incomplete,and held no contractual relevance other than that it provided initial cost estimates that were to be paid

by Milwaukee County, the City of Milwaukee, and the Brewers. Although the MOU had legal significance

with regards to cost, it had become a model for a fixed-price lump-sum contract that was never generated.

At the center of this dispute is a document known formally as the memorandum of under-

standing, or MOU, which was signed in 1995 by representatives of the state, Milwaukee

County, the City of Milwaukee, and the Brewers. In that document, all parties agreed that

the cost of the stadium, set to open March 1, 2000, would be $322 million: US$250 million

for stadium construction and US$72 million for infrastructure improvements.

If the proper contract strategy had been implemented, contracts would have been generated to support

the MOUs guidelines for cost; if costs associated with the Miller Park project began to escalate the

contracting manager could have negotiated price contingencies common to the MOU within the projectscontract infrastructure. This concept never came to fruition.

Although the HCH Miller Park Joint Ventures ability to clearly communicate the details associated

with the projects contractual infrastructure at inception were dismal; they were able to clearly define and

document the core attributes Kerzner (2006) considers to be essential in the contractual planning phase:

Define need;

Develop the statement of work, specifications, and work breakdown structure;

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Performing a make/buy process;

Laying out the major milestones and the timing/schedule;

Estimating cost;

Obtaining authorization and approval to proceed.

Thus, the Miller Park Joint Venture was able to estimate the schedules and costs associated with building

the stadium. The problem was that they were not able to properly communicate the costs for the project

as estimates, and further inhibited their efforts by producing a MOU to the public that created the false

misconception that the estimates were fixed as the lump-sum total for building the stadium.

Risk managementthe process of identifying, addressing, and responding to potential and real

project riskappeared to be prevalent throughout most of the entire life cycle of the Miller Park Stadium

project. During the projects inception, the business reasons and benefits for undertaking the project were

well defined. Brewer ticket sales had been sagging in recent years. The then-current ballpark, County

Stadium, was 40 years old, and other Milwaukee professional sports teams, the Bucks and the Admirals,had the brand-new Bradley Center to call home. Market research showed the city wanted a new park to

keep both major league baseball and the Milwaukee Brewers in town, fearing losing them would cause

baseball dollars to go elsewhere. Other financial and political justifications included indications by major

area employers that they needed the stadium to help recruit employees to Milwaukee, asserting that

investments of this sort create a vibrant, growing community as opposed to a city that dies a slow death.

The organizations involved demonstrated the capacity to undertake the project. The HCH Miller

Park Joint Venture comprised three major construction companies that brought a good mix of strengths

and related experience, including recent stadium construction, to the project. Their discussions began

about a year prior to funding approval and they had worked out which firm would ultimately lead the

project and how the project management and engineering supervision would be divided among them.

Although no formal documentation could be found, the Miller Park project demonstrated goodproject quality management during all phases of its life cycle. The project utilized the necessary processes

to ensure that it satisfied all the deliverables which it undertook. It can be assumed that the Miller Park

Joint Venture included the appropriate processes within the project management discipline that determine

quality policy, objectives, and responsibilities, and thatthey were implemented by means of quality planning,

quality control, quality assurance, and quality improvement. Project quality management must address

both the management of the project and the product of the project.

Although one might argue that the Miller Park project contained poor quality management practices

because of the Big Blue Crane incident of 1999, it needs to be noted that the crane operating company,

Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, used poor risk mitigation planning and operated their crane in severe weather

conditions. Moreover, because the architectural design of Miller Park was complex to integrate, it can be

assumed that the Miller Park Joint Venture and its subcontractors utilized standard construction guidelines

and enforced Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) requirements.

The Miller Park Joint Venture was comprised of three construction firms that were given the

authority to subcontract work to supporting firms. Given this authority, the companies that comprised the

Miller Park Joint Venture were able to partner with subcontractors and implement quality management

plans that detailed the procedures and processes that made certain the City of Milwaukee would receive

a quality stadium. The schedule that needed to be achieved to have the stadium ready for opening day

2000 was clearly defined within their expectations.

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Furthermore, the Miller Park Joint Venture was able to produce an MOU that was developed by

the City of Milwaukee, the District, and the Brewers. In addition, the MOU represented a legal understanding

of the cost all parties involved with the Miller Park project were obligated to support.

Although the MOU was perceived to be a formal contract by many parties involved with the project,

it really represented only a component of quality planning. The MOU, focused on delivering the stadium

to the public and the Brewers, specified what all parties wanted, when the project would be complete, and

what the forecasted budget would be. Because the Miller Park Joint Venture consistently reported its project

status to the public and reported the completion of major milestones, it can be assumed that the Miller

Park Joint Venture instituted the appropriate quality control measures to report the projects progress and

mitigate quality insufficiencies.

Over 5,000 workers contributed to the successful completion of Miller Park, a feat that could not

have been accomplished without effective teamwork. The majority of funding for the park required cultural

and business diversity among the contractors, subcontractors, and workers. A tight schedule, new building

designs and techniques, and the need to work through brutal Wisconsin winters fostered the need for a

structured team-building and teamwork environment.

The three lead contractors for this project had each worked with the others on other projects in

the past. They had not all worked together on one project, but based on their previous working relationships,

had all moved past Tuckmans (1965 and 1977) forming and storming stages of team development.

They needed to norm to this project, and moving on to the performing stage was a natural and quick

evolution. Also helping move this team forward were the regular discussions and meetings that they had

regarding this project for the year prior to formally creating their joint venture.

Communications planning generally takes place behind the scenes, yet is of vital importance,

particularly on a large construction project, such as the Miller Stadium project. Many people are concerned

with their piece of the project, and are unable to see the big picture (Foti, 2001). The project manager

must communicate sufficiently to make sure that each stakeholder is aware of the status of the project,

and when his or her contribution is required.

In the inception phase, there was a significant amount of public relations-type communication

needed. Although the project team used media specialists and lobbyists to handle the public relations

work, many of the citizens were not supportive of the project at taxpayer expense. So, one may question

the effectiveness of the communication strategy in this phase.

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Assessment and Analysis

1. Please complete your evaluation of project management during this phase, using the following grid:

Rating Scale: 5Excellent, 4Very Good, 3Good, 2Poor, 1Very Poor.

Project Management Area Inception Phase

Scope Management

Time Management

Cost Management

Quality Management

Human Resource Management

Communications Management

Risk Management

Procurement ManagementIntegration Management

2. Please highlight the major areas of strength in the management of this phase of the project:

3. Please highlight the major opportunities for improvement in the management of this phase of the project:

The Development Phase

Scope development appeared to proceed without contention as there were no major scope changes

related to the construction of the stadium save those caused by the crane accident in 1999 during implemen-

tation that pushed back the completion date almost a full year. The accident is not considered a part of

scope development because changes to the project stemming from the accident are under the purview of

contracts and risk.

As the start date of the project was approaching, the state legislature passed a plan to build a

US$250 million stadium. However, cost estimates rose to US$322 million before construction even began

due to site preparation costs of US$72 million being omitted. To restore the price tag to the original

estimate, the builders then cut costs and pushed the opening date back from 1999 to 2000. As the costs

and funding sources were identified, mechanisms were designed to procure those funds. However, there

seemed to be ongoing contention among stakeholders as to what constituted costs in the original budget.

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The cause of the cost squabbles was blamed on the MOU, which was never intended to be a summary of

all project costs. For example, the following is a quote from the Wisconsin Legislative Audit Bureau:

The total budgeted cost for a new stadium included in a memorandum of understanding

(MOU) signed by representatives of the State, Milwaukee County, the City of Milwaukee,

and the Brewers before enactment of Act 56 is $322 million: $250 million for stadium

construction, and $72 million for infrastructure improvements. Although the provisions of

Act 56 were based on the MOU, the District believes that it is an inappropriate benchmark

because it is a generally worded, out-of-date document. Nevertheless, because the Districts

current stadium project budget includes amounts similar to those included in the MOU

$249.5 million for stadium construction and $71.9 million for infrastructure improvements

the District asserts the project is within its established budget.

The District has, however, budgeted additional amounts for leased equipment and opera-

tions, management, and administration. Although the District asserts the budget included

in the MOU was never intended to cover these costs, many of them are directly associated

with stadium construction and infrastructure improvements. When the costs for which the

District has budgeted separately and costs associated with issuing revenue bonds are takeninto account, a total of $397.6 million will be spent, including $303.3 million for stadium

construction, $82.5 million for infrastructure improvements, and $11.8 million for the Dis-

tricts day-to-day operating costs.

One assumption on the Miller Park project scheduling related to the roof. The roof is one of a kind and it

opens radially. It helps shield the crowd and the batters from the sun, as well as helps keep the stadium

warm in cold weather. Because its one of a kind, the risk was great for the length of time it would take

to construct. The lead-time to get the roof parts was seven to eight months. This became a factor when

one part of the roof folded in half and needed to be replaced. There was no time to wait seven to eight

months for a replacement, so an alternate source was identified in the United States to make the roof with

lesser quality materials in four months.

Perhaps the Miller Park Joint Ventures biggest downfall was its pursuit of establishing an end datefor the project that focused solely on accommodating opening day for the Brewers in 2000. Their blind

pursuit of meeting the end date significantly hampered their leverage of incorporating the proper facets

of a formal contract agreement during the projects development phase.

For example, incorporating procurement risk mitigation plans to manage the uncontrolled escala-

tion of theprojects cost would have been beneficial. The contractmanager overseeing theprojects contracts

could have conducted trade-off analysis against the risks associated with the projects escalation in cost.

Knowing that the costs associated with the stadium project were growing, the contract manager could have

utilized cost-benefit analysis to recommend what items were detrimental to the projects incorporation;

hence, dropping deliverables that were nonvalue-added to complete. Not having these measures in place

allowed the project to grow nearly US$76 million or 23% in cost, which significantly contradicted the cost

figures that were outlined and bought-off in association with the projects memorandum of understanding.

There is evidence that extensive risk management was performed during the development stage

including the establishment of a site safety team to develop, implement, and enforce safety programs. This

was a four-member team with 60 years of construction and safety experience that wrote an extensive site

safety manual that all contractors and workers were obligated to comply with if they did not have their

own safety-team approved manual. There were regular weekly safety meetings held prior to breaking

ground (Hunzinger Construction Company, 1999). These meetings were to evolve into weekly toolbox

talks once construction began with all workers required to attend.

The property and accident risks were identified and analyzed. To mitigate these risks, the stadium

board secured US$325 million in property damage insurance policies, coordinated through the Milwaukee

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offices of the Chubb group of insurance companies. For a US$400 million project, this was termed to be

adequate by the board chairman. The Milwaukee Brewers realized their risk exposure and further insured

themselves from losses due to a delayed opening of the stadium. This policy was for US$20 million.

During the development phase of the Miller Park project, there was a letdown in the quality

control measures that the project management team supporting the project should have identified and

implemented. Clearly, the project team was focused on its completion date and had structured its quality

control measures to report the progress of the project in terms of its progress to completion date. However,

the project team forgot to measure financial attributes pertaining to the projects scope and deliverables

that coincided with its scheduled completion dates. Implementing a quality control auditing system that

measured both financial and schedule progress would have prevented some problems that arose during

the implementation phase that were concerned with the overall financial escalation of the project.

It would have been interesting to know if the Miller Park Joint Venture had implemented earned

value during the development phase, but no information could be found. Implementing earned value to

support the project would have provided the proper quality control and audit structure to know if the

project was being completed within its forecasted schedule and budget; and it would have supported the

financial understanding of the projects cost that public representatives were looking for from the MillerPark Joint Venture.

Weekly toolbox talks provided evidence that the management team was concerned with creating

a cooperative environment conducive to team building during the development phase. These weekly talks

were a carry-over from meetings initiated by the lead contractors during the inception phase and were

organized to get and keep all workers and contractors informed of their roles and responsibilities, especially

as these roles and responsibilities changed throughout the project.

There were thousands of stakeholders to communicate with, the most notable being city and

county taxpayers, city, county, and state governments, the Miller Brewing Company, the many construction

companies and workers that participated, the Milwaukee Brewers owners, the Southeast Wisconsin Profes-

sional Baseball District, various subcontractors who handled the lights, sound, and furnishings inside the

park, and the media.

Although there was no evidence of the development of a communications plan, one was likely

developed in this phase due to the apparent success of workers knowing when to show up. One of the

largest communications tasks was communicating with the thousands of workers who were needed to

perform the project work. Keeping the many contractors, subcontractors, and other players in the stadiums

construction in the loop on the schedule and what exactly they were being asked to do was a significant

task. There was success in the area of human resources knowing where to be and when to perform their

work on the stadium project.

By virtue of the fact that three construction companies formed a joint venture to build Miller

Stadium, they were able to apply their combined experience in the planning and implementation, and use

the best practices among them. They also had the benefit of their combined years of experience and past

projects for a variety of lessons learned.

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Project Management Area Development Phase

Scope Management

Time Management

Cost Management

Quality Management



Risk Management

Procurement Management

Integration Management



The Implementation Phase

Until the crane accident, the project was on schedule and progressing according to plan. An

argument had been levied that there may have been some scope pressure that translated into schedule

pressure that caused the construction accident to occur. However, no specific information to support this

claim has been found from either public or private sources.

Cost control during implementation had mixed results. As was previously mentioned, there was

contention surrounding what costs should or should not have been included in the original budget. Also,

there were cost overruns not related to the stadium accident. With the rise in cost came a commensurate

rise in funding source requirements. This escalation triggered problems of ownership rights and responsibili-

ties. This scenario was not anticipated or planned for, as noted earlier.

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The project team did take some measures to control the costs as they were escalating by exercising

an option to cap project cost (Wisconsin Legislative Audit Bureau, 1999). This option awarded the contractor

25% of the cost savings if the project was completed for less than the contract maximum price. However,

this was not considered an effective cost containment measure because the option was not exercised until

75% of the work had been contracted. Its effectiveness as a cost control measure was negligible.

The groundbreaking for the Miller Park stadium took place on November 9, 1996. The goal was

to open the stadium in time for the opening game of the 2000 baseball season.

The biggest impact to the schedule, if not the most notable, was the crane accident on 14 July

1999, that killed three and injured five workers. There were accusations that the cause of the accident was

due to the rush to complete the stadium on time while sacrificing safety. Work on the stadium was suspended

and the accident took months to clean up.

The weather in Milwaukee can be extreme: hot in the summer and below zero in the winter, with

snow and frozen ground the norm. Milwaukees climate was considered in the orientation of the stadium,

as well as in the design of the fields irrigation system.

The field construction was supposed to start in September or early October. Due to schedule delays,

it did not start until 4 December 1996. Brossard said, No one has ever installed a field in the winter,

myself included. There were many times we took two steps forward and one step back. When you get 14

inches of snow while youre in the middle of putting in drain tile, you suddenly become snow removal

experts for a few days. We used a machine called ditch witch to put in drain tile. It has a chain on it and

it digs the ditch. By the beginning of December the frost line was about 14 to 16 inches down. We had to

come in with a bulldozer with a frost tooth first. We had to let him dig down and loosen up the soil so we

could come with the ditch witch and lay the drain tile. (Midwest Construction. A modern field).

Additional accommodations had to be made to complete the playing field in the winter. After the

drainage system was installed, clay was installed on the infield. Because clay has a high moisture content,

it was impossible to work with it in the freezing weather. A 45-foot high, 25,600 square foot (2,378 m 2)

inflatable dome tent was erected over the entire infield to warm the clay enough to install.

The nature of the project meant that workers would be high off the ground at times, on scaffolding,

ladders, or cranes. Weather was a safety consideration, particularly the wind. Hunt Construction Company

had 30 years of experience building sports facilities, which meant that they had the benefit of many projects

before this one to learn lessons from. Safety Programs is listed as one of the construction phase services

on the Hunt Construction Group Web site, yet Miller Park Joint Venture and multiple subcontractors were

issued citations and fined for alleged workplace safety violations (not related to the fatal crane accident)

during the Miller Park construction. Prior to the fatal crane accident in July 1999, several workers were

injured when a steel girder being lowered into position collided with an aerial basket, and a worker fell 60

ft (18 m) from the retractable roof and sustained multiple injuries.

The playing field had to be the final item on the construction agenda. The roof work was a

mandatory dependency (predecessor) that needed to be complete before the fieldwork could begin. Thesignificant delay due to the crane accident pushed the installation of the playing field to the winter months.

The turf superintendent planned an infield that included 5,000 tons of sand, five and two-thirds miles of

drainage pipe under the field, about a half-mile of irrigation pipe, pea gravel, and athletic turf.

During the implementation phase of the Miller Park project, one of the state representatives called

for an audit to be conducted on the costs associated with implementing the stadium. The audit revealed

that the project was more than US$50 million over budget. The state representatives posed a legitimate

question: Clearly the stadium is going to be built, theres no question about that, but where do the

taxpayers go for an answer? Because the MOU issued in 1995 defined that the Brewers were responsible

for providing only US$90 million of the projects financing, were taxpayers going to cover the projects cost

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overruns? No documentation existed within the contracts governing the project other than what had been

drafted in the MOU.

Although the provisions of Act 56 were based on the MOU, the District believes that it is an

inappropriate benchmark because it is a generally worded, out-of-date document. Neverthe-

less, because the Districts current stadium project budget includes amounts similar to those

included in the MOUUS$249.5 million for stadium construction, and US$71.9 million for

infrastructure improvementsthe District asserts the project is within its established budget.

What the District failed to account for were lease costs associated with the project that escalated

the cost an additional US$76 million. One significant item that was leased was Miller Parks scoreboard.

Establishing the proper risk mitigation tools into the projects contractual infrastructure during the develop-

ment phase of the project would have definitely benefited the circumstances that came into fruition

when the audit was conducted on the Miller Park project during the implementation phase. The lack of

coordination between communicating the cost overruns associated with the project directly reflect on the

contract managers ability to communicate the variances from the MOU and what was actually being

expended. The project manager overseeing the project should have been communicating this information

as well, via schedule and cost control analysis. Working together, the contract manager and project managercould have been able to make the necessary recommendations to limit cost overruns and improve the

contracts to support required changes. Instead, the projects cost grew and was paid for by the public.

The risk picture changed, however, during implementation. Most notable of those that led to the

change were the events that preceded the collapse of a 567-foot crane on 14 July 1999. Ten weeks before

the incident, the site safety coordinator for the project quit both the project and his position as field safety

director with his construction company, citing that he was given inadequate authority to carry out his

safety responsibilities. In addition, iron workers were threatening to stay homea clear violation of the

unions no walk-out or strike agreement for this projectuntil an official who helped supervise the roof

lifts was removed. Other workers were quitting the project and one subcontractor was fired only days prior

to the accident for being unwilling to make the lift during high winds. It was also noted after the accident

that the crane had been extended from 467 ft (142 m) to 567 ft (173 m) two weeks prior to the accident

without any additional ballast added to offset the additional boom.

On the day of the accident, the subcontractor doing the lifting did not ensure the crane operators

were present for pre-lift meetings, something of no surprise given the lack of enforced mandatory toolbox

talk meeting attendance. It was also revealed there were no lift calculations made for the ill-fated lift to

assess the effect of the 26-mph winds blowing just prior to the lift.

To the credit of the project managers, there were few accidents prior to the crane incident, the

most significant of which involved a worker who survived a 60-foot fall on May 10, 1999. Also, the operator

of the crane that collapsed had 47 years of experience with cranes, and 15 years of experience with the

crane that toppled. Unfortunately, however, the crane operator carrying the three men who were killed

was far less experienced.

The project managers reacted effectively by agreeing to bring in outside consulting services toassess the status of the project and monitor the work being performed. They also re-phased the construction

of the project to keep workers idled by the accident from moving on to other jobs. Also agreed to were

the insurance companies demands for more authority to be given to the projects safety officers as well

as insurance company oversight of all future project safety issues.

As early as 1997, the Miller Park Joint Venture knew that the Miller Park project was severely over

budget. TheMilwaukee Journal Sentinelreported on 13 November 1997, that Miller Park, the Milwaukee

Brewers new stadium, will cost nearly US$398 million, almost US$76 million more than originally agreed

upon, a new state audit released Wednesday concludes (Walker, 1997). To ensure the projects costs were

being properly reported to the public, a state representative had called the audit.

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The Miller Park Joint Venture and the District supporting and monitoring the stadiums build

progress maintained that the audit left out information and that the budget for the project was being met.

Although the ability to effectively implement a solid contract structure was not evident in the

audits findings, the Miller Park Joint Venture could have alleviated numerous problems by committing to

improved tracking of the projects costs with enhanced quality control measures that examined cost and

schedule. Unbelievably, even after the 1997 audit, everyone involved with the project, including the state

representative, did not demand cost elements to be monitored or reported by the Miller Park Joint Venture.

Therefore, the focus remained on implementing the schedule to meet its expected completion date of

opening day 2000.

Ironically, it should be considered that the Miller Park Joint Venture maintained good quality

planning and control standards through the implementation phase because they were meeting their custom-

ers needs in terms of schedule completion. Ultimately, the implementation of Miller Park would cost

US$562.7 million, all of which, with the exception of US$90 million would be paid by taxpayers. From a

credibility standpoint, the companies implementing the project should have been reporting these costs

even though their customer turned a blind eye on the costs being expended.

During the implementation phase of this project, there was a growing sense of fragmentation among

team members, mostly a result of the mounting tension created from being asked to meet unreasonable and

perceived unsafe deadlines to keep the project on track. In one sense, there was an ironic sense of teamwork

resulting from the iron workers growing concern for safety, yet being contractually barred from any type

of work slowdown or walkout. The resulting frustration led some workers to resign the project and/or the

company they worked for.

Once the crane accident occurred, the project managers were being held to greater safety standards,

which helped reunite workers and management. The managers also made serious efforts to rephase the

project to minimize the possibility of losing workers to other jobs due to construction delays. This helped

to bolster morale and team spirit that held through the completion of the project, which was a year later

than originally planned.

There were many formal reports required for the use of taxpayer funds. Additionally, there were

reports required for the U.S. Department of Labor and other governmental oversight agencies. Evidence

of governmental audits indicates that the project manager was supplying project reports as needed.

What was questionable was the regular status reporting that should have been provided to a large

percentage of the projects stakeholders regarding whether the project was on track schedule- and cost-

wise. If schedule and cost variances were being measured, they werent distributed widely, and there did

not appear to be any corrective action taken. Given the serious schedule and cost problems, consistent

corrective actionbeginning early in theprojectmighthaveprevented some of thecost and scheduleoverruns.

The project managers did not do a good job of communicating in other areas, such as contract

structure and cost responsibilities. There was a lack of details communicated to the people who needed

the information.

The focus on the end date seemed to rob other areas of attention. The lack of communication

caused concern among the workers, and some quit. On a positive note, there were the weekly Toolbox

Talk meetings for the workers. Unfortunately, althoughthey were mandatory, attendance wasnt monitored.

There should have been a better forum for worker feedback to management.

Given the serious problems encountered in this project, one wonders why the project management

office didnt intervene with consultative advice, or why this office didnt insist on regular schedule and

cost variance reports, and suggest corrective action.

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Project Management Area Implementation Phase

Scope Management

Time Management

Cost Management

Quality Management



Risk Management





The Closeout Phase

The closeout of scope was fairly well managed. The follow-up audit conducted by the State of

Wisconsin in June 1999 is devoid of any language that would indicate remaining contention regarding the

scope of the project. Additionally, little information could be located on this project at the state governments

websites. It is peculiar that there would be so little information considering that the state was responsiblefor oversight of the project. Possibly, the State chose to not make certain facts concerning scope pub-

licly available.

Although problems arose with the funding and ownership percentages, cost escalations, and bridge

financing for forthcoming insurance payments, it appears that these issues were managed and resolved

prior to the completion of the project. There is no specific mention of these items in the audit bureaus

archives or lawsuits being filed following the last audit report. However, some subcontractors still had

financial claims following closeout.

There was an imposed date for the stadium completion date of 1 March 2000, to be ready for the

2000 baseball season. The time frame was tight, and there were expectations that corners would be cut,

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including the possibility of eliminating the retractable roof (it wasnt). In the end, schedule challenges such

as the delay due to the crane accident and winter weather conditions resulted in the stadium not being

ready until the seasons opening game in April 2001.

Lessons learned would include that planning to cut corners has the potential to cause more

problems than opportunities, and should be avoided. Certainly, there should not have been anycompromise

on the safety of workers for any reason, including the schedule. Taking a chance on that windy day in July

1999 cost the project loss of life, and serious losses of time and money.

Miller Park opened for the 2001 baseball season. Had it not been for the tragic crane accident, it

is likely that the stadium would have been completed as originally scheduled in 2000. Two important

occurrences should have taken place during the project closeout phase: First, the Miller Park Joint Venture

should have closed out and paid all its contractual obligations to subcontractors. Second, the Miller Park

Joint Venture should have documented its lessons learned. The primary lesson learned should have been

that the proper detailed planning to support the projects scope should have been done and carried over

into the projects contractual infrastructure. This project team had important challenges in handling the

contractual aspects of this project.

The most significant evidence that risk closeout functions were performed involves the proposal

of the Safe Building Act in Wisconsin by the two unions involved in the projectLocal 8 and Operating

Engineers Local 139. This act addresses the OSHA and American National Standards Institute (ANSI)

standards shortcomings for the on-site erection process and operation of cranes, specifically the lack of

certification or licensure by these organizations to operate a construction crane. This, of course is a direct

outcome of the lessons learned from the crane accident. The irony cited includes the need to be licensed

to cut hair or serve liquor in Wisconsin, or, to drive a car to a Wisconsin job site, yet once there, no

qualification is given to rig or lift 450 tons of steel 300 ft (91 m) into the air.

In addition, there were lessons learned from OSHA and insurance company reports from the

accident, as well as the incident being filed with construction and crane accident tracking organizations

such as CraneAccidents.com.

The contractors leading this project were allowed considerable costoverruns because theircustomer

was more focused on the schedule pertaining to Miller Parks completion date. In due course, it could be

considered that the District supporting the Miller Park project was not concerned with the projects cost.

The inception and development phases contained the quality parameters expected by the Miller Park Joint

Ventures customers. They may have performed better if they had included control features that monitored

the projects costs. The implementation phase of the Miller Park project demonstrated the lack of connection

of instilling the proper quality infrastructure in relation to monitoring of the projects schedule and cost.

This became evident when a financial audit was conducted on the project in 1997 and it revealed cost

overruns of nearly US$76 million. The contractors managing the project could have had the foresight to

begin reporting costs to their customers.

In the closeout phase, the bottom line of completing the project by the replanned completion date

was successfully met. The customer could have requested the contractors to implement the appropriatequality planning and control measures to accurately report the projects schedule and completion statistics;

however, the Joint Ventures customers never made such demands. There was no clear documentation of

the administrative closeout and the lessons learned from this project.

Relevant to Miller Park projects closeout phase it should be considered that the project satisfied

the quality elements that had been governed from the Miller Park Joint Ventures customers. Barring that

the project was delayed one year because of the tragic occurrence of the Big Blue Crane incident of

1999, the project was delivered within the specifications of its replan date and was ready for opening day

2001. Although the costs of the project grew wildly, the customers obtaining the stadium were focused

only on the projects schedule and not on its costs.

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There is minimal evidence suggesting how teamwork was managed during the closeout phase.

One gesture that does stand out is the creation of a tribute to all the workers involved in the project titled,

Workers Walkway. It also memorializes those who lost their lives in the 14 July 1999, crane accident.

This tribute and memorial was not a direct result of the efforts of the project management team, but rather

donated to Miller Park by a charitable foundation organized by the attorneys who represented the widows

of the three workers who died.

The Big Blue Crane case involving the death of the three ironworkers was settled. Separately, the

Miller Park stadium district filed a lawsuit in January 2002 alleging that Mitsubishi Heavy Industries of

America (Mitsubishi) and HCH mismanaged the Miller Park project and were negligent in construction.

Mitsubishi countersued, arguing that it had to spend millions of dollars more to finish the roof (Walker,

2005). After a three-year legal battle, Mitsubishi and the stadium district reached an out-of-court settlement

on the costs to build and repair the stadiums roof. Court documents unsealed in 2006 revealed that the

settlement between the stadium district and Mitsubishi was in the amount of US$44.95 million. The legal

fees and costs of the warring parties were US$37 million. The insurance company responsible for some of

the legal fees is contesting them claiming that there was little or no overview of how the money was spent

(Walker, 2006). Taxpayers are being assessed a 0.1% sales tax until 2014 (or beyond) to pay for the stadium.




Project Management Area Closeout Phase

Scope Management

Time Management

Cost Management

Quality Management



Risk Management





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Summary of Project Assessment and Analysis

1. Please complete your evaluation of project management for this project and calculate the average rating,

using the following grid:


Project Management Area Inception Development Implementation Closeout Average

Phase Phase Phase Phase

Scope Management

Time Management

Cost Management

Quality Management

Human Resource

Management

CommunicationsManagement

Risk Management



Average

2. Please highlight the major areas of strength in the management of this project:

3. Please highlight the major opportunities for improvement in the management of this project:

4. Please highlight the major project management lessons learned from this project:

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References

Borowski, Greg. (1999, July 18). Some works return to Miller Park today. JSOnline. Retrieved on 27 April 2006from http://www.jsonline.com/news/metro/jul99/stadium19071899.asp

Channel 3000. (2001, August 24). Miller Park unveils tribute to workers. Retrieved on 27 April 2006 from http://

www.channel3000.com/sports/931121/detail.htmlChilsen, Jim. (1997, November 13). Brewers Park may cost $50 million more. Pioneer Press Online. Retrieved on

27 April 2006 from http://www.pioneerplanet.com/archieve/newstadium/dox/sta1113.htmEmons, Brent. (2001). Cut hair? Lift iron? Licensed? Engineering News-Record.2001. Retrieved on 27 April 2006

from http://enr.ecnext.com/free-scripts/comsite2.pl?pageenr document&articleopviar010212Foti, Ross. (2001, August). Managing large construction projects. PM Network, 15 (8), p. 26.Frame, David. (1995). Managing projects in organizations. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers.Hellriegel, Don, Slocum, John W., Jr., & Woodman, Richard W. (1998). Organizational behavior(8th ed.).Cincinnati:

South-Western College Publishing.Hunt Construction Group. Industry Experience. Retrieved on 30 October 2001 from http://www.attsbh.com/

huntcorpindy/Pages/InExperience.htmlHunzinger Construction Company. (1999, Spring). Hunzinger highlights. Retrieved on 30 October 2001 from

http://www.hunzinger.comKagan, J. and Demause, N. Field of schemes. Retrieved on April 27, 2006 from http://www.fieldof-

schemes.com/citiesKerzner, Harold. (2006). Project management, A systems approach to planning, scheduling, and controlling(9th

ed.). New York: John Wiley & Sons.Lamke, Kenneth R. (2001, August 8). Judge rules Milwaukee Stadium insurers must cover damage from crane

accident. Knight Ridder/Tribune. Retrieved on 30 October 2001 from http://www.enr.com/equip/2001/08/08/krtbn/0000-0234-MW-INSURERS.asp

Lamke, Kenneth R. (1999, October 14). Stadium boards Miller Park cost: $562.7 million. Milwaukee JournalSentinel Online. Retrieved on 30 October 2001 from http://jsonline.com/news/metro/oct99/stad15101499.asp

Midwest Construction.A modern field. Special supplement. Retrieved on 30 October 2001 from http://www.midw-estconstructionmag.com/MWCN/MWcover/MWmillerpark6.htm1

Midwest Construction. A winning joint venture. Special supplement. Retrieved on 30 October 2001 from http://www.midwestconstructionmag.com/MWCN/MWcover/MWmillerpark4.htm1

Midwest Construction. Fast facts on Miller Park construction. Special supplement. Retrieved on 30 October 2001from http://www.midwestconstructionmag.com/MWCN/MWcover/MWmillerparkl l .html

Milwaukee Brewers. Miller Park: Its all here, under one roof. Retrieved on 30 October 2001 from http://brew-ers.mlb.com/NASApp/mlb/miUballpark/milballpark history.isp

Milwaukee Channel. (1999, July 15) 3 Dead in Miller Park crane crash. Retrieved on 30 October 2001 from http://www.themilwaukeechannel.com/sh/sports/wisconsin/brewers/sports-brewerswisco nsin-5565632001032 3-080347.htm1

Milwaukee Channel. (2001, March 29). Miller Park announces damage price tag. The Milwaukee ChanYel, WISNChannel 12. Retrieved on 30 October 2001 from http://www.themilwaukeechannel.com/sh/sports/wisconsin/brewers/sports-brewerswisconsin-55657720010323-090357.htm1

Obert, S. L. (1983). Developmental patterns of organizational task groups: A preliminary study. Human Rela-tions,36.

OSHA Regional News Release. (2000, Jan. 12). OSHA cites general contractor and others at Miller Park site forFall protection issues. Retrieved on 30 October 2001 from http://www.osha.gov/medialoshnews/jan00/reg5-20000112.htm1

Project Management Institute. (2004). A guide to the project management body of knowledge - third edition.Newtown Square, PA: Project Management Institute.

Scholtes, Peter R. (1998). The team handbook-how to use teams to improve quality, 6 th ed., Madison, WI: JoinerAssociates Inc.

Schultz, Steve. (2000). Insurer makes Miller Park agree to safety conditions. The Daily Reporter ConstructionNews. Retrieved on 30 October 2001 from http://www.dailyreporter.com/news/261/construction/1684-1.html

Stavropoulos, Peter. (1999, July 23). Rush to complete new stadium blamed for deaths of three US constructionworkers. World Socialist Web Site, The International Committee of the Fourth International (ICFI). Retrievedon 27 April 2006 from http://www.wsws.org/articles/1999/jul1999/milw-j23.shtml

Tuckman, B.W. (1965). Development sequence in small groups. Psychological Bulletin, 62.Tuckman, B. W., & M. A. C. Jensen. (1977). Stages of small group development revisited. Group & Organizational

Studies: 2.

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U.S. Department of Labor, Office of Public Affairs. (2000, January 12). OSHA cites subcontractors in Miller Parkfatal crane collapse, Milwaukee, OSHA Regional News Release. Retrieved on 30 October 2001 from http://www.osha.gov/media/oshnews/jan00/reg520000112a.html

Walker, Don. (1997, November 13).Stadium far over budget, audit says. Milwaukee Journal Sentinel Online.Retrieved on 30 October 2001 from http://jsonline.com/sports/arc/brew/other/1113stad.stm

Walker, Don. (2001, April 5). A winning play? Milwaukee Journal Sentimental Online. Retrieved on 30 October2001 from http://www.jsonline.com/sports/brew/mpark/apr01/better06040501.asp

Walker, Don. (2005, January 4). Lawsuit deal near, sources say: Judge to get update from Mitsubishi, Miller ParkStadium District.Milwaukee Journal Sentinel Online. Retrieved on 27 April 2006 from http://www.jsonline.com/story/index.aspx?id290119

Walker, Don. (2006, March 4). Legal fees in Miller Park case go through the roof: Attorneys spent $37 million inbattle, one estimate shows. Milwaukee Journal Sentinel Online. Retrieved on 27 April 2006 from http://www.jsonline.com/story/index.aspx?id406014

Wisconsin Legislative Audit Bureau. (1997, November). Milwaukee Brewers Stadium Costs. Audit Summary Report97-17. Milwaukee, WI. Retrieved on 27 April 2006 from http://www.legis.state.wi.us/lab/reports/97-17tear.htm

Wisconsin Legislative Audit Bureau. (1999, June). Milwaukee Brewers Stadium Costs. Milwaukee, WI, Audit Report99-10, pp. 2122. Retrieved on 27 April 2006 from http://www.legis.state.wi.us/lab/reports/99-10full.pdf

Although not cited, the following works were also consulted while preparing this document:

Roberts, M. J. (2001). Developing a teaching case (Abridged). Boston: Harvard Business School Publishing.Swiercz, P. M. (2003). SWIF learning: A guide to student written-instructor facilitated case writing. Unpublished

manuscript. Washington, DC: The George Washington University.

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Project Management Institute

Case Studies in Project Management


Teaching Note

By:

Scott Serich, PhD, PMP, Graham Bale, MSPM, PMP, Mary Kay Kwasny, MSPM, PMP,

Steven Patneaude, MSPM, ASCPM, Jeff Stack, MSPM, PMP

Edited by:

Frank T. Anbari, PhD, PMP

The George Washington University

This case study was originally prepared as part of Project Management Applications, the capstone

course of theMaster of Science in Project Management in theDepartment of DecisionSciencesat The George

Washington University, by the graduating students listed above with the supervision of Professor Serich.

This case study was adapted to make it a learning resource and might not reflect all historical facts

related to this project.

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Case Study


Teaching Note

This case study is structured to allow the reader to evaluate the project management methods and

processes used in this project. It covers a wide range of project management areas within four project

phases: inception, development, implementation, and closeout. Discussion is provided within each project

phase of specific activities, accomplishments, and performance shortcomings of performance in applicable

processes of the five project management process Groups (Initiating, Planning, Executing, Monitoring and

Controlling, and Closing). The reader is asked to perform an assessment of performance in terms of the

appropriate processes of various Project Management Knowledge Areas at the end of each phase. At the

end of the case, the reader is asked to summarize his or her assessments and to provide a list of lessons

learned from the case study.

In this teaching note the following is provided:

1. Assessment of appropriate project management processes in terms of the Project

Management Knowledge Areas. Suggested assessments are provided for each phase,

and an average is calculated for each knowledge area.

2. A discussion of major areas of strength, opportunities for improvement, and lessons

learned from the evaluation of the case study.

3. A brief description of project life-cycle phases, Project Management Process Groups,

and Project Management Knowledge Areas, based on A Guide to the Project Manage-

ment Body of Knowledge(PMBOKGuide)Third Edition (Project Management Insti-

tute, 2004).

It is expected that the reader will reach somewhat similar conclusions to those provided in this

teaching note. However, it is very possible that readers may conduct additional research, develop further

insights, and reach other conclusions.

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Assessment of Project Management

The following table summarizes the assessment of appropriate project management processes, in

terms of key Project Management Knowledge Areas, by phase:


Project Management Area Inception Development Implementation Closeout Average

Phase Phase Phase Phase

Scope Management 3.00 3.00 3.00 4.00 3.25

Time Management 3.00 3.00 3.00 4.00 3.25

Cost Management 2.00 2.00 2.00 3.00 2.25

Quality Management 3.00 3.00 2.00 4.00 3.00

Human Resource Management 4.00 3.00 2.00 2.00 2.75

Communications Management 2.00 3.00 2.00 2.00 2.25

Risk Management 4.00 4.00 1.00 3.00 3.00

Procurement Management 2.00 2.00 2.00 3.00 2.25

Integration Management 3.00 3.00 2.00 3.00 2.75

Average 2.89 2.89 2.11 3.11 2.75

Major Areas of Strength, Opportunities for Improvement, and Lessons Learned

As can be seen in the table, the Miller Park Stadium project was a moderate success. The major

strengths in the management of this project were in the areas of scope management and time management.

The major opportunities for improvement in this project were in cost management, communications

management, and procurement management. The averages by project phase, tell us that implementationwas the least well-managed project phase, primarily due to the crane accident.

The inception phase of this project created a firestorm of controversy. The stadium proposal

could have used more public relations work to align stakeholder interest. Both the development and

implementation phases were absent of either significantly positive or negative indicators of scope manage-

ment. In the closeout phase all contractual obligations were fulfilled without ongoing controversy.

Change in ownership versus change in capital contribution could have been easily addressed during

the projects proposal. Both development and implementation were challenged in the definitions of cost

categories, which led to significant cost items being excluded from the project budget, and ineffective cost

control measures led to significant cost overruns. In the closeout phase, there were no remaining cost or

revenue items disputed after project completion.

The project management team appeared to carry out the task of risk management well during the

inception and development phases of this project. There wasevidence of adequate and appropriate planning

and preparation demonstrated and problem areas were anticipated. However, during implementation,

there is clear evidence there were failures to meet well-defined and documented procedures and commit-

ments. The closeout phase, especially given the crane accident, was evidenced as handled well, as did the

first two phases.

The risk management in this project can be subjectively viewed as challenged, mostly because of

the accident. The consequences of failing to manage risk that involved the sacrifice of human life far

overshadows most of what was done well on this project. Even if someone had stopped the lift prior to

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the accident that day, there is clear evidence that some type of accident having catastrophic consequences

was inevitable.

There was no evidence of glaring omissions or signs of superior performance in regards to the

schedule in the inception, development, or closeout phases. Schedule performance was challenged during

the implementation phase. Due mainly to safety violations that occurred during this phase, which appeared

to have the push to the completion date at the root of the problem, the project finished a year past the

planned completion date. The fatal crane accidents impact on the schedule was unanticipated, and caused

a significant delay in the projects completion date.

Although the size of the project was large, the project was complex, the number of resources was

in the thousands, and the project took many years to complete, the schedule was not managed sufficiently,

and the project suffered in cost overruns and a delayed completion date because of it. The trio of companies

managing this project each had significant experience in large construction projects and should have

anticipated some of the schedule problems. There was evidence that safety concerns may have been

compromised for the sake of the schedule, and certainly injuries and fatalities in the course of the project

are not to be taken lightly. There was evidence that other requirements were handled with care. The overall

rating includes for a penalty for completing the stadium one year behind schedule, in time for the openinggame in April 2001.

The contractors who led this project were essentially allowed to let scope-creep occur during the

life cycle of the Miller Park project because of the lack of planning and foresight to include the appropriate

contractual infrastructure during the inception phase and development phase. The inception phase and

development phase definitely lacked the type of infrastructure one would expect in a project of this size

and magnitude. The implementation phase showed the weaknesses of the projects contractual infrastruc-

ture. When the audit was done on the projects costs and the only document costs could be levied against

was the MOU drafted in 1995, it reflected poorly on the contract manager and project manager overseeing

the project. Those overruns should have been common knowledge for all parties involved in the project.

Although there was very little information provided with regards to the projects closeout all parties were

paid and Miller Park successfully opened.

The three contractors who led this project began their team-building efforts from an already solid

foundation having had successful working relationships in the past. Their inception and development

phase efforts were adequate and appropriate, exhibiting neither any real strength nor weakness in this

area. The implementation phase presented some challenges to the project management team, mostly by

forcing an adherence to schedule deadlines at the possible risk of safety that the workers clearly articulated.

Trying to balance the worker concerns with the schedule deadlines created challenges for the project man-

agers.

There is evidence that communication was a significant problem on this project. Lessons learned

include the need to plan communication well with a solid and well-publicized communications plan.

Workers should know where they can go to be heard, especially when their safety is at risk. And regular

reporting on whether the project is on track schedule and cost-wise is critical.

During the inception and development phases, there was a lack of clear definition regarding the

project office, but there were no major problems in these phases. During the implementation and closeout

phases, the project suffered due to a lack of project control, which could have potentially been lessened

with advice from the project management office. This project had a wealth of lessons learned, so one would

have liked to see evidence that there were efforts made to collect and catalog such information.

Although risk was being managed well during the inception, development, and closeout phases,

unfortunately, an accident with consequences as grave as the crane accident will always overshadow all

the good done in the other phases. Subjective thoughts or discussions of risk and the risk management

associated with this project will always bring to mind the crane tragedy first and foremost.

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The completed Miller Park stadium in Milwaukee creates a very pleasant baseball environment

for players and fans alike. The retractable roof and warm water under the field keep the stadium warm

when the outside temperature is cold, the roof can be moved to keep the sun out of the eyes of players

and fans, and natural light comes in, even when the roof is closed. And obviously, games can proceed

when its raining!

The Miller Park stadium was the result of a four-plus year construction project. Although the three

principal construction firms were experienced in building large sporting facilities, there were a number of

serious issues during the project that could have and should have been prevented.

Cost control, the priority of worker safety, the failure of adequate risk management during construc-

tion, and a clear contract structure were lacking. There appeared to be some control issues. Schedule

control analysis, for example, should have been a means for identifying cost and schedule overruns. The

project manager should have clearly communicated the variances appropriately, and taken swift and specific

corrective action to curb the cost and schedule overruns. Instead, confusion reigned, and it was unclear

who was responsible for the escalating costs.

The blind pursuit of meeting the end date most likely contributed the greatest to the projectsproblems. Time wasnt taken to analyze scope changes for impacts, and a clearer contract structure would

have benefited the project.

The push to the end date is highly suspected as the main cause of the fatal crane accident. The

safety of workers due to the wind was questioned by a number of workers on the very day of the accident,

and a worker was even fired shortly before the accident when he refused to go up on a lift on a windy

day. The project started out with an apparent large focus on safety, but the safety coordinator quit because

of inadequate authority to carry out his safety responsibilities. The unreasonable deadlines and safety

violations created tension on the project team.

The biggest failure on the project, the crane accident, was probably also the turning point for a

number of project issues. Teamwork improved, safety improved, and the project managers even worked

hard to find other work on the project for those workers whose primary tasks were delayed by the craneaccident. Given the combined number of years of experience of the primary construction firms, more

careful project management was expected of them in this project.

Project Life Cycle Phases, Project Management Process Groups, and

Knowledge Areas

Project Life-Cycle Phases

Project managers or the organization can divide projects into phases to provide better management

control with appropriate links to the ongoing operations of the performing organization. Collectively, thesephases are known as the project life cycle. The project life cycle defines the phases that connect the

beginning of a project to its end. Phases are generally sequential and are usually defined by some form of

technical information transfer or technical component handoff. Although many project life cycles have

similar phase names with similar deliverables, few life cycles are identical. Some can have four or five

phases, but others may have nine or more. (Project Management Institute, 2004, pp. 1922). In this case

study, the following phases are used:

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Inception

This phase may also be called initiation, conception, or preparation. It deals with project proposal,

selection, and initiation. It considers alignment of the project with the organizations overall strategy,

architecture, and priorities. It explores linkages of the project to other projects, initiatives, and operations.

It addresses methods of identification of the opportunity or definition of the problem leading to the need

for the project, and clarification of the projects general premises and basic assumptions. It considers the

project concept, feasibility issues, and possible alternative solutions.

Development

This phase may also be called detailed planning, definition and design, formulation, the formal

approach, preliminary engineering, and preliminary design. It covers project organizing, planning, schedul-

ing, estimating, and budgeting. It addresses development of plans for various project parameters, such as

risk, quality, resources, and so forth, as well as plan audits (possibly pre-execution). It considers development

of a project baseline and establishment of the detailed project work breakdown structure and master plan.

It discusses finalizing the project charter and obtaining approval to proceed with the project.

Execution

This phase may also be called implementation, implementing and controlling, adaptive implemen-

tation, and deployment. It examines directing, monitoring, forecasting, reporting, and controlling various

project parameters, such as scope, time, cost, quality, risk, and resources. It considers appropriate methods

for change management and configuration control in evolving conditions. It addresses resource assignment,

problem solving, communications, leadership, and conflict resolution. It also looks at documentation,

training, and planning for operations.

Closeout

This phase may also be called closing, termination, finish, conversion, cutover, conclusion, results,and final documentation. This last phase advises on finalizing and accepting the project, product, system,

or facility. It addresses transferring the responsibility for operations, maintenance, and support to the

appropriate organizational unit or individual. With reassignment or release of project resources, it considers

closing and settling any open project items. It addresses post-project evaluation (audit), and preparation

of lessons learned. It covers documentation of areas of strength and opportunities for improvement. It

frames the development of recommendations to support success in future projects.

Project Management Process Groups

Project management is accomplished through processes, using project management knowledge,

skills, tools and techniques that receive inputs and generate outputs. These processes are divided into five

groups, defined as the Project Management Process Groups: Initiating Process Group, Planning ProcessGroup, Executing Process Group, Monitoring and Controlling Process Group, and Closing Process Group.

Process Groups are seldom either discrete or one-time events; they are overlapping activities that occur

at varying levels of intensity throughout the project. The Process Groups are not project phases. Where

large or complex projects may be separated into distinct phases or subprojects, all of the Process Group

processes would normally be repeated for each phase or subproject. The project manager and the project

team are responsible for determining what processes from the Process Groups will be employed, by whom,

and the degree of rigor that will be applied to the execution of those processes to achieve the desired

project objective. (Project Management Institute, 2004, pp. 3767). In this case study, the Project Manage-

ment Process Group processes are imbedded within each phase, as appropriate.

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Project Management Knowledge Areas

The Project Management Knowledge Areas organize the project management processes from the

Project Management Process Groups into nine Knowledge Areas. These areas are: Project Integration

Management, Project Scope Management, Project Time Management, Project Cost Management, Project

Quality Management, Project Human Resource Management, Project Communications Management, Proj-

ect Risk Management, and Project Procurement Management (Project Management Institute, 2004, pp.

910). In this case study, the Project Management Knowledge Areas are considered within each phase and

are used for performance assessment, as appropriate.

Documents

Case Studies in Project Management - Miller Park Stadium