Case Number: PC-2015-3821 Filed in Providence/Bristol ...providencerules.com/docs/Harris_v_Dana_3-Dec-2015_PC-2015-3821... · 03.12.2015 · [20] Malicious Prosecution Nature and

Butera v. Boucher, 798 A.2d 340 (2002)

© 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 1

KeyCite Yellow Flag - Negative Treatment

Distinguished by Konar v. PFL Life Ins. Co., R.I., January 9, 2004

798 A.2d 340Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

David BUTERA, d/b/a/ Butera Building and Designv.

Richard N. BOUCHER et al.

No. 99-409-Appeal. | May 21, 2002.

Builder sued homeowners for wrongful termination ofbuilding contract, slander, malicious prosecution, and abuseof process, and homeowners counterclaimed for breach ofcontract. The Superior Court, Providence County, Ragosta,J., entered judgment on jury verdict awarding builderunrealized profits, finding for homeowners on slander claim,and awarding them damages for breach of contract. Allparties appealed. The Supreme Court, Flanders, J., heldthat: (1) scope of subpoena was properly restricted by trialcourt; (2) evidence did not warrant jury instruction onsubstantial performance; (3) builder was entitled to damagesfor lost profits; (4) homeowners did not slander builder;(5) homeowners' complaints to contractors' board did notconstitute malicious prosecution; and (6) complaints to policedid not constitute abuse of process.

Affirmed.

West Headnotes (31)

[1] WitnessesSubpoena duces tecum

Subpoena duces tecum issued against builderwas properly restricted to exclude records ofconstruction projects other than the one atissue in homeowners' contract counterclaimagainst builder, although homeowners assertedthat they needed these records to establish thatbuilder was neglecting their project; subpoenaissued two days before trial, in violation ofnormal discovery deadlines, building was notcontractually barred from working on otherprojects, and these documents might haveconfused jury and encouraged speculation on

an immaterial point. Superior Court RulesCiv.Proc., Rules 34, 45.

1 Cases that cite this headnote

[2] WitnessesSubpoena duces tecum

Parties should not be allowed to employ asubpoena after a discovery deadline on theeve of trial to obtain materials from thirdparties or parties that could have been producedbefore discovery closed. Superior Court RulesCiv.Proc., Rules 34, 45.


[3] ContractsBuildings and Other Works

Evidence at trial of homeowners' counterclaimagainst builder for breach of contract didnot warrant jury instruction on substantialperformance; evidence showed that homeownersterminated contracted before builder had achance to complete contract.

Cases that cite this headnote

[4] TrialConstruction and Effect of Charge as a

Whole

In reviewing a trial justice's charge to ajury, the Supreme Court examines the chargein its entirety, in light of the meaning andinterpretation that a jury composed of ordinary,intelligent lay persons would give to theinstructions.


[5] Appeal and ErrorPrejudicial Effect

An erroneous jury charge warrants reversal onlyif it can be shown that the jury could havebeen misled, to the resultant prejudice of thecomplaining party.


Case Number: PC-2015-3821Filed in Providence/Bristol County Superior CourtSubmitted: 12/3/2015 5:17:23 PMEnvelope: 423689Reviewer: Carol Graziano

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[6] ContractsRight to recover for partial performance in

general

Substantial performance of a constructioncontract entitles a party to the contract to recoverthe contract price less the amount needed bythe party benefiting from that performance toremedy any defects in the work.



Substantial-performance doctrine isinappropriate in situations in which a propertyowner has terminated a builder's contract beforethe builder has had an adequate opportunity tocomplete the performance required under thecontract.



The substantial-performance doctrine does notapply when a builder is still in the act ofperforming the contract when the owner haspurported to terminate it; thus, the substantial-performance doctrine ordinarily is applicableonly when the time for completion has pastbecause, until that time, the contractor still maybe able to remedy any alleged defects in theperformance.



general

A builder who fails to substantially perform aconstruction contract still is entitled to recoverthe contract price minus the cost of completionand correction, when the contract has been so farperformed that the structure can be used by theowner for its intended purpose, or the work is ofsome value to the owner.



general

A party to a building and construction contractwho has performed part of it according toits terms, but is prevented by the other partyfrom completing the contract, may recovercompensation for the work performed and thematerials furnished.


[11] ContractsAs to performance or breach in general

Evidence at trial on homeowner's counterclaimagainst builder for breach of contract did notwarrant jury instruction on lack of adequatestaffing at construction site; homeowners offeredno evidence about allegedly inadequate staffing,and builder appointed one of his subcontractorsto act as site foreman.


[12] Appeal and ErrorRequests and Failure to Give Instructions

Homeowners could not raise on appeal allegederror in judge's failure to instruct jury on changeorders, at trial of their counterclaim againstbuilder for breach of contract, where they did notadvise judge of alleged error at trial.


[13] DamagesBreach of contract

Builder was entitled to damages for lost profitson construction project, in his action againsthomeowners for breach of contract, although hedid not complete the project, where homeownerscaused some delays themselves, and terminatedcontract before time for work was completed.



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[14] Appeal and ErrorOn Appeal from Decision on Motion for

New Trial or After Grant of New Trial

Appeal and ErrorAppeal from order granting new trial

In considering a motion for a new trial, if thetrial justice reviews the evidence, comments onthe weight of the evidence and the credibilityof the witnesses, and exercises his independentjudgment, his determination either granting ordenying a motion for a new trial will notbe disturbed, unless he has overlooked ormisconceived material and relevant evidence, orwas otherwise clearly wrong.


[15] DamagesParticular cases

Damages award to builder of $15,500, inhis action against homeowners for breachof contract, was reasonable, not speculative;homeowners terminated contract before it ended,and builder filed mechanics' lien for $12,066,and testified that he expected to make a profit of$15,961.


[16] DamagesWeight and Sufficiency

Damages do not have to be calculated withmathematical exactitude; all that is required isthat they are based on reasonable and probableestimates.


[17] Libel and SlanderDischarge of duty to public

Homeowners did not slander builder bycomplaining to police that builder had stolena custom-made door from their work site;homeowners had good-faith belief that thiswas true, and had qualified privilege to reportsuspected crime.


[18] Appeal and ErrorOn Appeal from Decision on Motion for

New Trial or After Grant of New Trial

An improperly supported decision on a motionfor new trial is deprived of the weight it isnormally accorded on appeal.


[19] Appeal and ErrorVerdict

Appeal and ErrorSufficiency of Evidence in Support

If a trial justice has failed to perform his functionin analyzing the evidence and passing uponthe credibility of the witnesses, the SupremeCourt will apply the appellate rule, and thejury's verdict will be sustained if, as the Courtexamines the evidence in the light most favorableto the prevailing party, there is any competentevidence which supports the verdict.


[20] Malicious ProsecutionNature and elements of malicious

prosecution in general

An action for malicious prosecution, or wrongfulcivil procedure, lies whenever a defendant: (1)has instituted or continued to press a civil claim,(2) which terminated in favor of the plaintiff,(3) when the defendant had no probable causeto believe in the validity of the proceedingor pursued the claim with malice toward theplaintiff and, consequently, (4) injured theplaintiff.


[21] Malicious ProsecutionNecessity

Homeowners' complaints about builder to statecontractor's registration board did not constitute


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malicious prosecution, where complaints werenot finally determined in favor of builder.


[22] Malicious ProsecutionMode of Termination

When a proceeding is withdrawn merely inorder to substitute immediately another one forthe same offense, it is to be regarded as onecontinuous proceeding, which is not terminated,for purposes of malicious prosecution.


[23] Malicious ProsecutionMode of Termination

Any proceeding which does not terminate anaction, but permits it to be renewed, cannotserve as a foundation for the action of maliciousprosecution; it will be enough that the proceedingis terminated in such a manner that it cannot berevived.


[24] ProcessPleading

Builder stated claim for abuse of process againsthomeowners, although this claim was embeddedin another claim for malicious prosecution;all that was required in the complaint wasa statement that gave homeowners fair andadequate notice of the type of claim beingpursued.


[25] PleadingMatters of Fact or Conclusions

PleadingCertainty, definiteness, and particularity

PleadingStatement of cause of action in general

Vagueness, lack of detail, conclusionarystatements, or failure to state facts or ultimatefacts, or facts sufficient to constitute a cause of

action in a complaint are not fatal defects; allthat is required is that the complaint give theopposing party fair and adequate notice of thetype of claim being asserted.


[26] ProcessMalicious prosecution, or other causes of

action, distinguished

“Abuse of process,” as distinguished frommalicious prosecution, arises when a legalproceeding, although set in motion in properform, becomes perverted to accomplish anulterior or a wrongful purpose for which it wasnot designed.


[27] ProcessImproper, ulterior, collateral, or unlawful

purpose

The improper purpose involved in abuse ofprocess usually takes the form of coercionto obtain a collateral advantage, not properlyinvolved in the proceeding itself, such as thesurrender of property or the payment of money,by the use of the process as a threat or a club;there is, in other words, a form of extortion.


[28] ProcessParticular cases

Homeowners' complaint to police, accusingbuilder of stealing a custom-made door, did notconstitute abuse of process, where there was onlyan investigation, but no arrest.


[29] ProcessParticular cases

Homeowners' complaints to state contractors'registration board about cost discrepancies andlack of oversight, and about discrepancy incontractor registration number, did not constituteabuse of process; the purpose of the board was


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to iron out disputes between contractors andhomeowners.


[30] ProcessUse of process

A judicial process must in some manner beinvolved for an abuse-of-process claim to lie.


[31] ProcessImproper, ulterior, collateral, or unlawful

purpose

The gist of an abuse-of-process claim is themisuse of legal process to obtain an advantage,not properly involved in the proceeding itself;however, even a pure spite motive is notsufficient where process is used only toaccomplish the result for which it was created.


Attorneys and Law Firms

*343 Gerard M. DeCelles, Smithfield, for Plaintiff.

David Edward Maglio, III /Richard E. Kirby, Providence,Jonathan Oster, Lincoln, for Defendant.

Present: WILLIAMS, C.J., LEDERBERG, BOURCIER,FLANDERS, and GOLDBERG, JJ.

OPINION

FLANDERS, Justice.

The American dream of building a home of one's own cansometimes turn into a nightmare. This case deals with someof the problems that arise when that dream bumps up againstthe reality of all that can go awry in the construction process.After a jury verdict, two disappointed homeowners and afrustrated builder appeal from a Superior Court judgment thatawarded lost profits to the builder and damages for breach ofcontract to the homeowners. For the reasons crafted below,we affirm the Superior Court's judgment in all respects.

Facts and Travel

In April 1993, a builder, David Butera (plaintiff orbuilder) contracted to build an energy-efficient single-family residence for Richard N. Boucher (Boucher) andhis wife, Janice E. Boucher (defendants or homeowners),for approximately $175,000. Two days before the datespecified in the contract for completing construction, thehomeowners terminated the builder's contract, alleging lackof job oversight and failure to accomplish substantialconstruction of the house by August 15, 1993, the completiondate specified in the contract. In response, the builder fileda lawsuit in Superior Court, alleging wrongful terminationof the contract, slander, malicious prosecution, and abuseof process. The homeowners answered the complaint, raisedaffirmative defenses, and filed a counterclaim for breach ofcontract. They also sought damages for the cost of remedialwork, asserting that the builder had constructed the home inan unworkmanlike manner.

After a trial, a Superior Court jury returned a verdict in favorof the builder in the amount of $15,500 for his unrealizedprofits on this project, finding that the *344 homeownershad terminated the contract without justification. But italso returned a verdict in favor of the homeowners on thebuilder's slander claim and awarded them $1,200 on theircounterclaim against the builder for breach of contract. Afterthe verdict, both parties moved for a new trial, but the trialjustice denied their motions. Thereafter, the homeownersappealed and the builder cross-appealed. The builder arguesthat the trial justice erred in denying his motion for anew trial on the counts of slander, malicious prosecution,and abuse of process. See note 2, infra. In support of thatassertion, he contends that on or about August 9, 1993, thesupplier notified Boucher that a custom-ordered door hadbeen returned for credit. Boucher disputed this fact, assertingthat he was not aware that the door had been returned untilSeptember 8 or 9. In any event, on September 4, 1993,the homeowners filed a complaint against the builder withthe Lincoln Police Department, accusing him of stealing thedoor. Later that month, Boucher returned to the police tofile another complaint, accusing the builder of “fraud anddeception.” The homeowners also filed a complaint againstthe builder with the Rhode Island Contractors' RegistrationBoard (board). The builder alleged that the homeownerssubjected him to embarrassment and to public humiliationbecause of these and other accusations and that he had been


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forced to expend great sums of money financing his defenseof these false charges.

The homeowners' appeal argues that both the jury verdict andthe trial justice's denial of their motion for a new trial werein error, against the weight of the evidence, and that otherprocedural errors during the trial deprived them of a fair trial.We address and resolve each of these issues below.

I

Quashing the Homeowners' Eve-of-Trial SubpoenaFor the Builder's Records Concerning Another Project

[1] The homeowners asserted that the builder's chronicabsence from the job site contributed to the constructiondelay, justifying their termination of the contract. Just twodays before the trial began, the homeowners caused twoextremely broad subpoenas duces tecum to be served onthe builder, requiring him to produce a great number ofdocuments, including, inter alia, his construction files andrecords for another house that he also was building while hewas under contract to build the house for these homeowners.In response to the builder's motion to quash, the trial justicelimited the scope of the records he had to produce by quashingthe request for records pertaining to his other constructionproject. On appeal, the homeowners argue the court's grantingof the motion to quash prejudiced them, and that their“defenses to [the builder's] petition for wrongful terminationhad essentially been emasculated * * *.”

The trial justice concluded that the records in question were“not relevant to this case,” and that, in any event, the contractdid not prevent the builder from constructing more than onehome at a time. Furthermore, he found that contractors donot keep attendance records of the days and hours they spendon various job sites, especially when they have agreed toa contract price. In sum, it was the trial justice's judgmentthat the subpoenaed documents had nothing to do withthe gravamen of the claims at issue in this case because,regardless of the builder's other contractual commitments,contractors “have to comply with the terms of their contract.”We agree.

Additionally, the homeowners' eve-of-trial issuance of ablunderbuss subpoena- *345 requesting the builder toproduce reams of documents-was both overbroad anduntimely because they served the subpoena on him just before

trial without giving him adequate time to gather, review,and produce the requested records. Compare Rule 34 of theSuperior Court Rules of Civil Procedure (allowing partiesforty days to respond to document requests) with Rule 45of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure (allowingparties to subpoena trial witnesses and to require them tobring specified documents with them). In any event, thesubpoena was objectionable because of its gross overbreadth.In National Exchange Bank v. Lubrano, 29 R.I. 64, 68 A. 944(1908), this Court held that a trial justice properly quashed asubpoena duces tecum when the defendant moved for a writof subpoena duces tecum, during trial, after the plaintiff hadclosed its case. The Court in Lubrano held that the defendantcould have called a witness available in the court to providetestimony concerning the matter, and that in any case, it didnot appear that the information, if produced, would have beenmaterial to the controversy.

[2] When an analogous federal rule and our own staterule of civil procedure are similar, this Court has lookedto the federal courts for interpretative guidance in applyingthe rules in question. Heal v. Heal, 762 A.2d 463, 466-67(R.I.2000). Several federal district courts have held that aRule 45 subpoena duces tecum, when used as a means ofbelated discovery, should not be allowed to circumvent thediscovery deadlines for parties established by the other rulesof civil procedure or by court order. See Dreyer v. GACS,Inc., 204 F.R.D. 120 (N.D.Ind.2001); Integra LifesciencesI, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 190 F.R.D. 556 (S.D.Cal.1999);Rice v. United States, 164 F.R.D. 556 (N.D.Okla.1995).For example, in Marvin Lumber and Cedar Co. v. PPGIndustries, Inc., 177 F.R.D. 443 (D.Minn.1997) the courtrecognized that, although subpoenas can be used as a meansof discovery, they, too, are subject to Rule 26 of the FederalRules of Civil Procedure, and to the same time constraintsand other limitations that apply to other methods of discovery.The court also recognized that, when used improperly, aRule 45 subpoena “unnecessarily lengthens [the] discoveryprocess, and diverts the parties' attention, from the post-discovery aspects of preparing a case for Trial.” Id. at445. As a general proposition, we subscribe to the notionthat “parties should not be allowed to employ a subpoenaafter a discovery deadline [on the eve of trial] to obtainmaterials from third parties [or parties] that could have beenproduced before discovery [closed].” Charles Alan Wright &Arthur. R. Miller, 9A Federal Practice & Procedure § 2452(Supp.2002).


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Here, the trial justice considered that the subpoenaeddocuments either were irrelevant or immaterial to thebreach-of-contract claim in question. Moreover, the builderacknowledged that he was working on two constructionprojects, and this fact was not lost on the jury during thetrial. Under these circumstances, we are of the opinionthat the trial justice exercised appropriate discretion ingranting the motion to quash this overbroad, eve-of-trialsubpoena insofar as it sought to obtain documents pertainingto the builder's other continuing construction project. Thisinformation was not discovered in a timely fashion and, ifintroduced into evidence, it could have confused the jury,encouraged speculation on an immaterial point, and delayedthe trial. Moreover, the homeowners suffered no prejudicefrom this ruling because the evidence was undisputed that thebuilder did not personally spend most of his working time atthe site.

*346 II

The Challenged Jury Instructions

A. Substantial Performance

[3] The homeowners next argue that the trial justice erredin failing to instruct the jury on the issue of substantialperformance of a contract. During the trial, the homeowners'attorney suggested the following jury charge:

“With regard to the claim asserted byDavid Butera, d/b/a/ Butera Buildingand Design that he was discharged bythe Defendants after having performedhis obligations under the contract,you are instructed that in orderfor you to find in favor of Mr.Butera, you must first find that Mr.Butera had substantially performedhis obligations under the contract.If you find that Mr. Butera didnot substantially perform under theterms of the written contract, heis precluded from recovering frombreach of contract.”

The trial justice declined to give this instruction, stating thatthe doctrine of substantial performance was inapplicable in

this case because the builder “was terminated before [thecontract] was completed.” The trial justice also observed that,even according to the contract, there still were two days left tocomplete the house when the homeowners terminated it andthat the contract did not specify that time was of the essence.He reasoned that it would be inconsistent to give a substantial-performance charge and then tell the jury that time was not ofthe essence under this contract.

[4] [5] In reviewing a trial justice's charge to a jury,we examine the charge “in its entirety, ‘in light of themeaning and interpretation that a jury composed of ordinary,intelligent lay persons would give [to the instructions].’ ”Patino v. Suchnik, 770 A.2d 861, 866 (R.I.2001) (quotingNeri v. Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Co., 719 A.2d1150, 1153 (R.I.1998)). “An erroneous charge warrantsreversal only if it can be shown that the jury ‘could havebeen misled’ to the resultant prejudice of the complainingparty.” Id. (quoting Brodeur v. Desrosiers, 505 A.2d 418, 422(R.I.1986)).

[6] [7] [8] Substantial performance entitles a party to thecontract to recover the contract price less the amount neededby the party benefiting from that performance to remedy anydefects in the work. National Chain Co. v. Campbell, 487A.2d 132, 135 (R.I.1985); see also 13 Am.Jur.2d Buildingand Construction Contracts §§ 46-48 (2000). This doctrine,however, is inappropriate in situations such as this one inwhich the owner has terminated the builder's contract beforethe builder has had an adequate opportunity to complete theperformance required under the contract. In other words, thesubstantial-performance doctrine does not apply when, ashere, the builder is still in the act of performing the contractwhen the owner has purported to terminate it. Thus, thesubstantial-performance doctrine ordinarily is applicable onlywhen the time for completion has past because, until that time,the contractor still may be able to remedy any alleged defectsin the performance. See Wells Benz, Inc. v. United States,333 F.2d 89, 95 n. 5 (9th Cir.1964). Thus, the homeowners'reliance on National Chain Co. as well as DiMario v. Heeks,116 R.I. 44, 351 A.2d 837 (1976) is misplaced because, unlikethe contract in this case, those cases involved completedcontracts.

[9] [10] Furthermore, a builder who fails to substantiallyperform a construction contract still is entitled to recover thecontract price minus the cost of completion and correctionwhen the contract has been *347 so far performed thatthe structure can be used by the owner for its intended


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purpose or the work is of some value to the owner. SeeMahoney v. Galokee Corp., 214 Kan. 754, 522 P.2d 428(1974); Kulseth v. Rotenberger, 320 N.W.2d 920 (N.D.1982);see also 13 Am.Jur.2d Building and Construction Contracts§ 84 (2000). “A party to a building and constructioncontract who has performed part of it according to its terms,but is prevented by the other party from completing thecontract, may recover compensation for the work performedand the materials furnished.” 13 Am.Jur.2d Building andConstruction Contracts § 50 (2000). See also Harris v.Holder, 217 Ark. 434, 230 S.W.2d 645 (1950); Valentev. Weinberg, 80 Conn. 134, 67 A. 369 (1907); Parrish v.Tahtaras, 7 Utah 2d 87, 318 P.2d 642 (1957).

This is precisely what happened in this case, as thehomeowners' attorney conceded in his argument for a newtrial. Although the jury held that both parties were liable forbreaching the contract, it awarded the builder $15,500 forlost profits after concluding that the homeowners prematurelyterminated the contract. But it also awarded the homeowners$1,200 to remedy defects in the builder's performance;namely: “cracks in the garage.” In short, a builder canrecover for lost profits, even though he has not substantiallyperformed the contract, if the owner has breached the contractby terminating it without justification before the completiondate. For these reasons, we hold, the trial justice did not err infailing to instruct the jury in accordance with the homeowners'proffered jury instruction that tied the builder's recovery towhether he had substantially performed the contract.

B. Adequate-Staffing Instruction

[11] The homeowners also argue that the trial justice erredin failing to instruct the jury on the builder's alleged failure toadequately staff this home-construction project. The contractstated, in pertinent part:

“In the prosecution of the work, thebuilder shall at all times keep acompetent foreman and a sufficientnumber of workers skilled in theirtrades to suitably perform their work.The foreman shall represent thebuilder and, in the absence of thebuilder, all instructions given by theowner to the foreman shall be bindingupon the builder as though given to thebuilder. Upon request of the foreman,

instructions shall be in writing andsigned by the owner.”

Because the homeowners attributed the builder's personalabsence from the job site to the delay in the builder'scompletion of the house, they requested the followinginstruction to be given by the court to the jury:

“The Defendants have asserted that Mr. Butera breachedthe contract in a number of ways. First, they allege that Mr.Butera failed to provide adequate and consistent staffing atthe project site in violation of the section of the contractentitled ‘Labor and Supervisor’ on page 2 of the contract.If you find that Mr. Butera failed to provide a ‘competentforeman and a sufficient number of workers skilled in theirtrades to suitably perform the work,’ then you must findfor the defendants and against the plaintiff on the Plaintiff'sbreach of contract claim.”

The trial justice correctly noted that during the trial thehomeowners offered no evidence concerning the builder'salleged inadequate staffing of the job site. While he wasaway from the site, the builder had assigned site-foremanauthority to a framer who was one of his subcontractors.The homeowners argue that the foreman-framer, *348 DeanRacicot, “was simply a framer and not a site foreman,” andthat the builder “would stop by in the morning, at best.”Significantly, the trial justice recognized that the homeownershad selected Racicot-the builder's framer-to be their newgeneral contractor after they terminated the builder's contract.Furthermore, Racicot also served as an expert witness forthe homeowners during the trial of this case. Under thesecircumstances, we conclude, the trial justice did not err infailing to give the requested instructions. The homeowners'proof at trial simply did not warrant such charges to the jury.

[12] Additionally, the homeowners argue that the trialjustice erred when he failed to instruct the jury, as they hadrequested, about the “change order procedures or adjustmentsin contract price and completion time.” But as we stated inPatino, we will not consider on appeal a party's objectionto jury instructions unless the objection was “ ‘specificenough to alert the trial justice as to the nature of hisalleged error.’ ” Patino, 770 A.2d at 866-67. Rule 51(b)of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedures states“[n]o party may assign as error the giving or the failure togive an instruction unless [they state] * * * distinctly thematter to which the party objects and the grounds of theparty's objection.” The record in this case shows that the


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homeowners failed to preserve their objection to the court'sfailing to give this proposed jury instruction concerningchange-order procedures, price adjustments, and completiontime, because they did not specifically advise the trial justicein what way the instructions the court proposed to giveallegedly were defective. Merely calling the trial justice'sattention to a proposed jury instruction that he or she hasnot given to the jury is inadequate to preserve any objectionthereto for appeal. Here, all that was said on this issue is asfollows:

“DEFENDANT: No. 6, Judge.

“THE COURT: I gave them a charge on that. If you findit's clear and unambiguous you must enforce the terms,but if there's any ambiguity, you must determine what theintention of the parties were * * *. What else?

“DEFENDANT: No. 7 Judge * * *.”

As this excerpt reveals, the homeowners proceeded to the nextrequested jury charge without specifically advising the trialjustice of the alleged error in the court's failure to instruct thejury in accord with their proposed instruction “No. 6.” Hence,the homeowners failed to preserve this objection for appeal.

III

Denial of New-Trial Motion

[13] [14] The homeowners next argue that the jury verdictwas against the weight of the evidence, and that, thereafter,the trial justice should have granted their motion for a newtrial. In considering a motion for a new trial, if the trial justice“ ‘reviews the evidence, comments on the weight of theevidence and the credibility of the witnesses, and exerciseshis [or her] independent judgment, his [or her] determinationeither granting or denying a motion for a new trial will not bedisturbed unless he [or she] has overlooked or misconceivedmaterial and relevant evidence or was otherwise clearlywrong.’ ” English v. Green, 787 A.2d 1146, 1149 (R.I.2001)(quoting Kurczy v. St. Joseph Veterans Association, Inc., 713A.2d 766, 770 (R.I.1998)).

The homeowners contend that the builder failed to prove hisdamages with specificity, and that he speculated about theamount of damages. Furthermore, they maintain, the jury'sfinding, on the one *349 hand, that the builder breached

the contract, and, on the other hand, that he was entitled todamages for lost profits, was clearly wrong and not supportedby competent evidence. The homeowners also argue that thetrial justice did not exercise independent judgment when heruled on the new-trial motion.

We are of the opinion that the trial justice reviewed theevidence in a methodical and thoughtful manner. He did notmisconceive or overlook material evidence when he foundthat reasonable minds could conclude that the builder was atleast partly deserving of compensatory damages for his lostprofits because of the homeowners' wrongful termination ofthe contract. The trial justice found that title to the propertystill had not passed to the homeowners when the builderwas supposed to begin constructing the house. In fact, thehomeowners were unable to close on the property until threeweeks later than the original closing date. And the buildingpermits for the house did not issue until two weeks after theclosing on May 28. Further, the homeowners failed to submittheir first payment to the builder until May 29. The jury wasentitled to conclude that these circumstances pushed back thebuilder's ability to complete the project by the August 15

date specified in the contract. 1 Indeed, the contract's August15 completion date was expressly “[d]ependent on completetransfer of clear title and financing to be completed by April21,” neither of which occurred by that date.

Furthermore, the trial justice found that the homeownerswere personally involved in the work on this project; indeed,Boucher himself was usually on the site every morning by7 a.m. Boucher also ordered the windows for the house,chose the subcontractor that would excavate the property, andbought materials from various suppliers for the constructionof the home. His personal involvement in some instancescaused additional delays in completing the project. Based onthe evidence, the trial justice ruled that it was unreasonablefor the homeowners to believe that the builder would finishthe job by August 15, and that the terms of the contract itselfdid not state that time was of the essence. Both the trial justiceand the jury found that, given the above-referenced delays thatwere beyond the builder's control and the absence of a time-is-of-the-essence clause, the homeowners had breached theircontract with the builder when they prematurely terminatedthe contract on August 13. We lack any basis to conclude thatthey erred in doing so.

[15] With respect to the $15,500 in damages that the juryawarded to the builder, the trial justice found that the builder'smechanic's-lien exhibit showed that the homeowners owed


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him $12,066 for work he already had completed at the sitewhen the homeowners wrongfully terminated the contract.There was also testimony that the builder expected to makea profit of $15, 961 on this project. As the trial justiceconcluded, “[the jury] accepted the testimony of Mr. Buterathat he expected *350 to make $15,961 profit on thecontract. * * * I don't think the jury speculated in the case ** * so I think the award of $15,500 is appropriate in this casefor the Plaintiff, and I will deny the Motion for New Trial onthat basis.”

[16] Damages do not have to be calculated withmathematical exactitude; all that is required is that theyare based on reasonable and probable estimates. See RhodeIsland Turnpike Authority and Bridge Authority v. BethlehemSteel Corp., 119 R.I. 141, 167-68, 379 A.2d 344, 358(1977). “This court has held that ‘a damage award maybe disregarded by the trial justice and a new trial grantedonly if the award shocks the conscience or indicates thatthe jury was influenced by passion or prejudice or if theaward demonstrates that the jury proceeded from a clearlyerroneous basis in assessing the fair amount of compensationto which a party is entitled.’ ” English, 787 A.2d at 1150(quoting Dilone v. Anchor Glass Container Corp., 755 A.2d818, 820-21 (R.I.2000)). We are persuaded the trial justice didnot err in ruling that the jury's award of damages to the builderwas reasonable, not speculative, and that it responded to theevidence presented during the trial. Consequently, we declineto overturn his decision denying the homeowners' motion fora new trial.

IV

Denial of Judgment as a Matter of Law and Denialof Motion for a New Trial on the Slander Count

[17] The jury returned a verdict for the homeowners on thebuilder's claim for slander. In his cross-appeal, the builderalleges that Boucher went on a “prosecutorial rampage” afterbeing served with a mechanic's lien for the builder's work.In particular, Boucher filed successive complaints with theRhode Island Contractors' Registration Board (board) andwith the Lincoln Police that the builder had stolen buildingmaterials, particularly a custom-ordered door, from the jobsite. After the jury found for the homeowners on this slandercount, the builder moved for a judgment as a matter of law, aswell as for a new trial on this count. The trial justice deniedboth motions.

[18] [19] It is well settled that this Court will not disturbthe decision of a trial justice to grant or deny a motion for newtrial if that justice reviewed the evidence, commented on theweight of the evidence, and evaluated the credibility of thewitnesses, while applying his or her independent judgment.Anderson v. Botelho, 787 A.2d 468, 471 (R.I.2001) (citingKurczy, 713 A.2d at 770). On the other hand, “an improperlysupported decision [on a motion for new trial] is deprived ofthe weight it is normally accorded.” Id. (quoting Lariviere v.Dayton Safety Ladder Co., 525 A.2d 892, 900 (R.I.1987)). Ifa trial justice has failed to perform his function in analyzingthe evidence and passing upon the credibility of the witnesses,this Court will apply “the appellate rule,” and “the jury'sverdict will be sustained if as we examine the evidence inthe light most favorable to the prevailing party, there is anycompetent evidence which supports the verdict.” Id.

When the trial justice denied the builder's motion for a newtrial on his slander claim, he remarked, “the jury obviouslyfelt that Boucher filed his complaint in good faith. I disagreewith this * * * I think he did it for spite and ill will * * *.”Despite this observation, however, the trial justice denied thebuilder's motion for a new trial without indicating whetherhe believed that the verdict was against the weight of theevidence. Therefore, because the trial justice failed to performhis *351 function on this aspect of the builder's new-trialmotion, we will proceed to examine the evidence under the“appellate rule” doctrine.

In doing so, we conclude that the record contains evidencethat supports the jury's verdict for the homeowners on thebuilder's slander claim. The parties' relationship had turnedsour and contentious after the homeowners ended the contractin mid-August. Thereafter, the homeowners complained tothe Lincoln police that the builder had stolen a door fromthe job site, together with other building supplies costingin excess of $500. If true, this would amount to accusingthe builder of criminal misconduct. Although the evidenceestablished that the supplier sold the door in question toBoucher himself, who later requested the builder to “[t]akethis door back,” the homeowner testified that he was notaware that the builder had returned the door until September8 or 9, several days after reporting the builder's alleged theftof the door to the Lincoln police. The supplier of the door,however, testified that he

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