Case for Reading 2

7/30/2019 Case for Reading 2

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TITLE: Soliven Vs. MakasiarCITATION: 167 SCRA 393

FACTS:

In these consolidated cases, threeprincipal issues were raised: (1) whether ornot petitioners were denied due process wheninformation for libel were filed against themalthough the finding of the existence of aprima facie case was still under review by the

Secretary of Justice and, subsequently, by thePresident; and (2) whether or not theconstitutional rights of Beltran were violatedwhen respondent RTC judge issued a warrantfor his arrest without personally examiningthe complainant and the witnesses, if any, todetermine probable cause. Subsequent eventshave rendered the first issue moot andacademic. On March 30, 1988, the Secretaryof Justice denied petitioners' motion forreconsideration and upheld the resolution of the Undersecretary of Justice sustaining theCity Fiscal's finding of a prima facie caseagainst petitioners. A second motion forreconsideration filed by petitioner Beltran was

denied by the Secretary of Justice on April 7,1988. On appeal, the President, through theExecutive Secretary, affirmed the resolutionof the Secretary of Justice on May 2, 1988.The motion for reconsideration was denied bythe Executive Secretary on May 16, 1988.With these developments, petitioners'contention that they have been denied theadministrative remedies available under thelaw has lost factual support.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not petitioners weredenied due process when informationfor libel were filed against themalthough the finding of the existenceof a prima facie case was still underreview by the Secretary of Justiceand, subsequently, by the President.

2. Whether or not the constitutionalrights of Beltran were violated whenrespondent RTC judge issued a

warrant for his arrest withoutpersonally examining the complainantand the witnesses, if any, todetermine probable cause

RULING:

With respect to petitioner Beltran, theallegation of denial of due process of law inthe preliminary investigation is negated bythe fact that instead of submitting his

counter- affidavits, he filed a "Motion toDeclare Proceedings Closed," in effect waivinghis right to refute the complaint by filingcounter-affidavits. Due process of law doesnot require that the respondent in a criminalcase actually file his counter-affidavits beforethe preliminary investigation is deemedcompleted. All that is required is that therespondent be given the opportunity tosubmit counter-affidavits if he is so minded.

The second issue, raised by petitionerBeltran, calls for an interpretation of theconstitutional provision on the issuance of warrants of arrest. The pertinent provision

reads:

Art. III, Sec. 2. The right of thepeople to be secure in their persons, houses,papers and effects against unreasonablesearches and seizures of whatever nature andfor any purpose shall be inviolable, and nosearch warrant or warrant of arrest shall issueexcept upon probable cause to be determinedpersonally by the judge after examinationunder oath or affirmation of the complainantand the witnesses he may produce, andparticularly describing the place to besearched and the persons or things to beseized.

The addition of the word "personally"after the word "determined" and the deletionof the grant of authority by the 1973Constitution to issue warrants to "otherresponsible officers as may be authorized bylaw," has apparently convinced petitionerBeltran that the Constitution now requires the

judge to personally examine the complainantand his witnesses in his determination of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest. This is not an accurate interpretation.

What the Constitution underscores isthe exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of theexistence of probable cause. In satisfyinghimself of the existence of probable cause forthe issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge

is not required to personally examine thecomplainant and his witnesses. Followingestablished doctrine and procedure, he shall:(1) personally evaluate the report and thesupporting documents submitted by the fiscalregarding the existence of probable causeand, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he findsno probable cause, he may disregard thefiscal's report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid himin arriving at a conclusion as to the existenceof probable cause.

Sound policy dictates this procedure,

otherwise judges would be unduly laden withthe preliminary examination and investigationof criminal complaints instead of concentrating on hearing and deciding casesfiled before their courts. It has not beenshown that respondent judge has deviatedfrom the prescribed procedure. Thus, withregard to the issuance of the warrants of arrest, a finding of grave abuse of discretionamounting to lack or excess of jurisdictioncannot be sustained. The petitions fail toestablish that public respondents, throughtheir separate acts, gravely abused theirdiscretion as to amount to lack of jurisdiction.Hence, the writs of certiorari and prohibition

prayed for cannot issue.

WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuseof discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction on the part of the publicrespondents, the Court Resolved to DISMISSthe petitions in G. R. Nos. 82585, 82827 and83979. The Order to maintain the status quo

contained in the Resolution of the Courtbanc dated April 7, 1988 and reiteratedResolution dated April 26, 1988 is LIFTE

TITLE: Estrada vs. DesiertoCITATION: G.R. No. 146710-15. March2001

FACTS:

In the May 11, 1998 elections, petitioneJoseph Estrada was elected President wrespondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo waelected Vice-President. From the beginnhis term, however, petitioner was plaguproblems that slowly eroded his popularOn October 4, 2000, Ilocos Sur GovernoChavit Singson, a longtime friend of thepetitioner, accused the petitioner, his faand friends of receiving millions of peso

jueteng lords. The expose‘ immediatelyignited reactions of rage. On November2000, House Speaker Villar transmitted

Articles of Impeachment signed by 115representatives or more than 1/3 of all members of the House of Representativthe Senate. On November 20, 2000, theSenate formally opened the impeachmetrial of the petitioner. On January 16, 2by a vote of 11-10, the senator-judges against the opening of the second envewhich allegedly contained evidence showthat petitioner held P3.3 billion in a secbank account under the name ―Jose VelThe ruling was met by a spontaneousoutburst of anger that hit the streets ofmetropolis. Thereafter, the Armed Forcethe PNP withdrew their support to the E

government. Some Cabinet secretaries,undersecretaries, assistant secretaries abureau chiefs resigned from their posts

On January 20, 2001, at about 12 noonJustice Davide administered the oath torespondent Arroyo as President of thePhilippines. On the same day, petitioner



issued a press statement that he was leavingMalacanang Palace for the sake of peace andin order to begin the healing process of thenation. It also appeared that on the sameday, he signed a letter stating that hewas transmitting a declaration that he wasunable to exercise the powers and duties of his office and that by operation of law and theConstitution, the Vice-President shall be theActing President. A copy of the letter was sentto Speaker Fuentebella and Senate President

Pimentel on the same day.

After his fall from the power, the petitioner‘slegal problems appeared in clusters. Severalcases previously filed against him in theOffice of the Ombudsman were set in motion.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the petitionerresigned as President

2. Whether or not the petitioner is onlytemporarily unable to act as President

RULING:

Petitioner denies he resigned as President orthat he suffers from a permanent disability.

Resignation is a factual question. In order tohave a valid resignation, there must be anintent to resign and the intent must becoupled by acts of relinquishment. Thevalidity of a resignation is not governed byany formal requirement as to form. It can beoral. It can be written. It can be express. Itcan be implied. As long as the resignation isclear, it must be given legal effect. In thecases at bar, the facts show that petitionerdid not write any formal letter of resignation before leaving Malacanang Palace.Consequently, whether or not petitionerresigned has to be determined from his actsand omissions before, during and after Jan.20, 2001 or by the totality of prior,contemporaneous and posterior facts andcircumstantial evidence bearing a material

relevance on the issue. The Court had anauthoritative window on the state of mind of the petitioner provided by the diary of Executive Sec. Angara serialized in the Phil.Daily Inquirer. During the first stage of negotiation between Estrada and theopposition, the topic was already about apeaceful and orderly transfer of power. Theresignation of the petitioner was implied.During the second round of negotiation, theresignation of the petitioner was again treated

as a given fact. The only unsettled points atthat time were the measures to beundertaken by the parties during and afterthe transition period. The Court held that theresignation of the petitioner cannot bedoubted. It was confirmed by his leavingMalacanang. In the press release containinghis final statement, (1) he acknowledged theoath-taking of the respondent as President of the Republic, but with the reservation aboutits legality; (2) he emphasized he was leavingthe Palace, the seat of the presidency, for thesake of peace and in order to begin thehealing process of the nation. He did not sayhe was leaving the Palace due to any kind of

inability and that he was going to reassumethe presidency as soon as the disabilitydisappears; (3) he expressed his gratitude tothe people for the opportunity to serve them;(4) he assured that he will not shirk from anyfuture challenge that may come ahead in thesame service of the country; and (5) he calledon his supporters to join him in the promotionof a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity.

The Court also tackled the contention of thepetitioner that he is merely temporarilyunable to perform the powers and duties of the presidency, and hence is a President on

leave. The inability claim is contained in theJan. 20, 2001 letter of petitioner sent toSenate Pres. Pimentel and SpeakerFuentebella. Despite said letter, the House of Representatives passed a resolutionsupporting the assumption into office byArroyo as President. The Senate also passed aresolution confirming the nomination of

Guingona as Vice-President. Both houses of Congress have recognized respondent Arroyoas the President. Implicitly clear in thatrecognition is the premise that the inability of petitioner Estrada is no longer temporary.Congress has clearly rejected petitioner‘sclaim of inability. The Court cannot pass uponpetitioner‘s claim of inability to discharge thepowers and duties of the presidency. Thequestion is political in nature and addressedsolely to Congress by constitutional fiat. It is

a political issue which cannot be decided bythe Court without transgressing the principleof separation of powers.

TITLE: Almonte et. Al. vs. VasquezCITATION: G.R. No. 95367. May 2, 2001

FACTS:

This is a case wherein respondentOmbudsman, requires petitioners Nerio

Rogado and Elisa Rivera, as chief accountantand record custodian, respectively, of theEconomic Intelligence and InvestigationBureau (EIIB) to produce "all documentsrelating to Personal Services Funds for theyear 1988" and all evidence such as vouchersfrom enforcing his orders.

Petitioner Almonte was formerlyCommissioner of the EIIB, while Perez is Chief of the EIIB's Budget and Fiscal ManagementDivision. The subpoena duces tecum wasissued by the Ombudsman in connection withhis investigation of an anonymous letteralleging that funds representing savings from

unfilled positions in the EIIB had been illegallydisbursed. The letter, purporting to have beenwritten by an employee of the EIIB and aconcerned citizen, was addressed to theSecretary of Finance, with copies furnishedseveral government offices, including theOffice of the Ombudsman.

May be erased: [The letter reads in pertparts: that the EIIB has a syndicate heaby the Chief of Budget Division who ismanipulating funds and also the brain oso called "ghost agents" or the "EmergeIntelligence Agents" (EIA); that when thagency had salary differential last Oct '8money for the whole plantilla were releaand from that alone, Millions were savedconverted to ghost agents of EIA; AlmoEIIB agents collects payroll from the big

smuggler syndicate monthly and brokerevery week for them not to beapprehended.]

In his comment on the letter-complaintpetitioner Almonte denied all the allegatwritten on the anonymous letter. Petitiomove to quash the subpoena and thesubpoena duces tecum but was denied.

Disclosure of the documents in questionresisted with the claim of privilege of anagency of the government on the groun"knowledge of EIIB's documents relativPersonal Services Funds and its plantilla

necessarily lead to knowledge of itsoperations, movements, targets, strateand tactics and the whole of its being" athis could "destroy the EIIB."

ISSUE:

Whether petitioners can be ordered toproduce documents relating to personalservices and salary vouchers of EIIBemployees on the plea that such documare classified without violating their equprotection of laws.

RULING:

YES. At common law a governmentalprivilege against disclosure is recognizerespect to state secrets bearing on militdiplomatic and similar matters and inaddition, privilege to withhold the identipersons who furnish information of viola



of laws. In the case at bar, there is no claimthat military or diplomatic secrets will bedisclosed by the production of recordspertaining to the personnel of the EIIB.Indeed, EIIB's function is the gathering andevaluation of intelligence reports andinformation regarding "illegal activitiesaffecting the national economy, such as, butnot limited to, economic sabotage, smuggling,tax evasion, dollar salting." Consequently,while in cases which involve state secrets it

may be sufficient to determine from thecircumstances of the case that there isreasonable danger that compulsion of theevidence will expose military matters withoutcompelling production, no similar excuse canbe made for a privilege resting on otherconsiderations.

The Ombudsman is investigating a complaintthat several items in the EIIB were filled byfictitious persons and that the allotments forthese items in 1988 were used for illegalpurposes. The plantilla and other personnelrecords are relevant to his investigation asthe designated ―protectors of the people‖ of

the Constitution.

Nor is there violation of petitioners' right tothe equal protection of the laws. Petitionerscomplain that "in all forum and tribunals theaggrieved parties can only hale respondentsvia their verified complaints or swornstatements with their identities fullydisclosed," while in proceedings before theOffice of the Ombudsman anonymous letterssuffice to start an investigation. In the firstplace, there can be no objection to thisprocedure because it is provided in theConstitution itself. In the second place, it isapparent that in permitting the filing of

complaints "in any form and in a manner,"the framers of the Constitution took intoaccount the well-known reticence of thepeople which keep them from complainingagainst official wrongdoings. As this Courthad occasion to point out, the Office of theOmbudsman is different from the otherinvestigatory and prosecutory agencies of the

government because those subject to its jurisdiction are public officials who, throughofficial pressure and influence, can quash,delay or dismiss investigations held againstthem. On the other hand complainants aremore often than not poor and simple folk whocannot afford to hire lawyers.

Finally, it is contended that the issuance of the subpoena duces tecum would violatepetitioners' right against self-incrimination. It

is enough to state that the documentsrequired to be produced in this case arepublic records and those to whom thesubpoena duces tecum is directed aregovernment officials in whose possession orcustody the documents are. Moreover, if, aspetitioners claim the disbursement by the EIIof funds for personal service has already beencleared by the COA, there is no reason whythey should object to the examination of thedocuments by respondent Ombudsman.

TITLE: DOROMAL VS. SANDIGANBAYAN

CITATION: G. R. NO. 85468, SEPTEMBER07, 1989

FACTS:

Quintin S. Doromal, a former Commissionerof the Presidential Commission on GoodGovernment (PCGG), for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019),Sec. 3(h), in connection with hisshareholdings and position as president anddirector of the Doromal International TradingCorporation (DITC) which submitted bids tosupply P61 million worth of electronic,electrical, automotive, mechanical andairconditioning equipment to the Departmentof Education, Culture and Sports (or DECS)and the National Manpower and Youth Council(or NMYC).

An information was then filed by the ―Tanodbayan‖ against Doromal for the said

violation and a preliminary investigation wasconducted.

The petitioner then filed a petition forcertiorari and prohibition questioning the

jurisdiction of the ―Tanodbayan‖ to file theinformation without the approval of theOmbudsman.

The Supreme Court held that the incumbentTanodbayan (called Special Prosecutor under

the 1987 Constitution and who is supposed toretain powers and duties NOT GIVEN to theOmbudsman) is clearly without authority toconduct preliminary investigations and todirect the filing of criminal cases with theSandiganbayan, except upon orders of theOmbudsman. Subsequently annulling theinformation filed by the ―Tanodbayan‖.

A new information, duly approved by theOmbudsman, was filed in the Sandiganbayan,alleging that the Doromal, a public officer,being then a Commissioner of the PresidentialCommission on Good Government, did thenand there willfully and unlawfully, participatein a business through the DoromalInternational Trading Corporation, a familycorporation of which he is the President, andwhich company participated in the biddingsconducted by the Department of Education,Culture and Sports and the NationalManpower & Youth Council, which act orparticipation is prohibited by law and theconstitution.

The petitioner filed a motion to quash theinformation on the ground that it was invalidsince there had been no preliminaryinvestigation for the new information that wasfiled against him.

The motion was denied by Sandiganbayanclaiming that another preliminaryinvestigation is unnecessary because both oldand new information involve the same subjectmatter.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the act of Doromal wconstitute a violation of the Constitution

2. Whether or not preliminary investiganecessary even if both information invosame subject matter.

3. Whether or not the information shall effected as invalid due to the absence opreliminary investigation.

RULING:

Yes, as to the first and second issues.

No, as to the third issue. Petition was gby the Supreme Court.

RATIO:

(1) The presence of a signed documentbearing the signature of Doromal as pathe application to bid shows that he canrightfully be charged with having particiin a business which act is absolutelyprohibited by Section 13 of Article VII oConstitution" because "the DITC remain

family corporation in which Doromal haleast an indirect interest."

Section 13, Article VII of the 1987Constitution provides that "the PresidenVice-President, the members of the Caband their deputies or assistants shall noduring there tenure, directly or indirectlparticipate in any business.

(2) The right of the accused to a preliminvestigation is "a substantial one." Its dover his opposition is a "prejudicial errothat it subjects the accused to the loss liberty, or property without due process

law" provided by the Constitution.

Since the first information was annulledpreliminary investigation conducted at ttime shall also be considered as void. Dthat fact, a new preliminary investigatiomust be conducted.



(3) The absence of preliminary investigationdoes not affect the court's jurisdiction overthe case. Nor do they impair the validity of the information or otherwise render itdefective; but, if there were no preliminaryinvestigations and the defendants, beforeentering their plea, invite the attention of thecourt to their absence, the court, instead of dismissing the information should conductsuch investigation, order the fiscal to conductit or remand the case to the inferior court so

that the preliminary investigation may beconducted.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari andprohibition is granted. The Sandiganbayanshall immediately remand Criminal Case No.12893 to the Office of the Ombudsman forpreliminary investigation and shall hold inabeyance the proceedings before it pendingthe result of such investigation.

TITLE: Civil Liberties Union vs. ExecutiveSecretary

CITATION: 194 SCRA 317

FACTS:

On 25 July 1987, Cory issued EO 284 whichallows members of the Cabinet, theirundersecretaries and assistant secretaries tohold other government offices or positions inaddition to their primary positions subject tolimitations set therein. The CLU excepted thisEO averring that such law is unconstitutional.The constitutionality of EO 284 is beingchallenged by CLU on the principal submissionthat it adds exceptions to Sec 13, Art 7 otherthan those provided in the Constitution; CLU

avers that by virtue of the phrase ―unlessotherwise provided in this Constitution,‖ theonly exceptions against holding any otheroffice or employment in Government arethose provided in the Constitution, namely:(i) The Vice-President may be appointed as aMember of the Cabinet under Sec 3, par. (2),Article 7; and (ii) the Secretary of Justice is

an ex-officio member of the Judicial and BarCouncil by virtue of Sec 8 (1), Article 8.

ISSUE:Whether or not EO 284 is

constitutional.

RULING:

Sec 13, Art 7 provides:

―Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, theMembers of the Cabinet, and their deputies orassistants shall not, unless otherwiseprovided in this Constitution, hold any otheroffice or employment during their tenure.They shall not, during said tenure, directly orindirectly practice any other profession,participate in any business, or be financiallyinterested in any contract with, or in anyfranchise, or special privilege granted by theGovernment or any subdivision, agency, orinstrumentality thereof, includinggovernment-owned or controlled corporationsor their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoidconflict of interest in the conduct of their

office.‖

It is clear that the 1987 Constitution seeks toprohibit the President, Vice-President,members of the Cabinet, their deputies orassistants from holding during their tenuremultiple offices or employment in thegovernment, except in those cases specifiedin the Constitution itself and as aboveclarified with respect to posts held withoutadditional compensation in an ex-officiocapacity as provided by law and as requiredby the primary functions of their office, thecitation of Cabinet members (then calledMinisters) as examples during the debate and

deliberation on the general rule laid down forall appointive officials should be considered asmere personal opinions which cannot overridethe constitution‘s manifest intent and thepeople‘s understanding thereof. In the light of the construction given to Sec 13, Art 7 inrelation to Sec 7, par. (2), Art IX-B of the1987 Constitution, EO 284 is unconstitutional.

Ostensibly restricting the number of positionsthat Cabinet members, undersecretaries orassistant secretaries may hold in addition totheir primary position to not more than 2positions in the government and governmentcorporations, EO 284 actually allows them tohold multiple offices or employment in directcontravention of the express mandate of Sec13, Art 7 of the 1987 Constitution prohibitingthem from doing so, unless otherwiseprovided in the 1987 Constitution itself.

TITLE: Joseph Estrada vs. ArroyoCITATION: G.R. NO. 146738

FACTS:

Estrada alleges that he is thePresident on leave while respondent GloriaMacapagal-Arroyo claims she is the President.From the beginning of Erap‘s term, he wasplagued by problems that slowly but surelyeroded his popularity. His sharp descent

from power started on October 4,2000. Singson, a longtime friend of theEstrada, went on air and accused the Estrada,his family and friends of receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords. The exposéimmediately ignited reactions of rage.

On January 19, the fall from power of the petitioner appeared inevitable. At1:20p.m., the petitioner informed ExecutiveSecretary Edgardo Angara that GeneralAngelo Reyes, Chief of Staff of the ArmedForces of the Philippines, had defected.January 20 turned to be the day of surrender.On January 22, the Monday after taking her

oath, respondent Arroyo immediatelydischarged the powers and duties of thePresidency. After his fall from the pedestal of power, the Erap‘s legal problems appeared inclusters. Several cases previously filedagainst him in the Office of the Ombudsmanwere set in motion.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Arroyo is a legitimate (d jure) president.

RULING:

The SC holds that the resignatioEstrada cannot be doubted. It wasconfirmed by his leaving Malacañang. Inpress release containing his final statem(1) he acknowledged the oath-taking ofrespondent as President of the Republicwith the reservation about its legality; (emphasized he was leaving the Palace, seat of the presidency, for the sake of pand in order to begin the healing procesour nation. He did not say he was leavinPalace due to any kind of inability and twas going to re-assume the presidency soon as the disability disappears; (3) heexpressed his gratitude to the people foopportunity to serve them. Without douwas referring to the past opportunity gihim to serve the people as President; (4assured that he will not shirk from any challenge that may come ahead in the sservice of our country.

Estrada‘s reference is to a futurchallenge after occupying the office of tpresident which he has given up; and (5called on his supporters to join him in tpromotion of a constructive national spireconciliation and solidarity. Certainly, tnational spirit of reconciliation and solidcould not be attained if he did not give presidency. The press release waspetitioner‘s valedictory, his final act of farewell.

His presidency is now in the pastense. Even if Erap can prove that he diresign, still, he cannot successfully claimhe is a President on leave on the groundhe is merely unable to governtemporarily. That claim has been laid to



by Congress and the decision that respondentArroyo is the de jure President made by a co-equal branch of government cannot bereviewed by this Court.

TITLE: Marcos vs. ManglapusCITATION: 177 SCRA 668 AND 178 SCRA760

FACTS:Ferdinand E. Marcos who was deposed

from his seat through the EDSA people powerrevolution was forced into exile in 1986.When Marcos was dying, he wished to returnto the country along with his family. However,Pres. Aquino, the president under therevolutionary government, stood in his wayand contended that Marcos cannot return tothe country considering that his return wouldbe a threat to the stability of the governmentand the country‘s economy which was justbeginning to rise and moving forward.

The Marcoses assert that their right toreturn to the country is guaranteed by the Billof Rights of the 1987 Constitution and thatunder the international law, the right of Marcos and his family to return to thePhilippines is guaranteed by the UniversalDeclaration of Human Rights.

ISSUE: Whether or not, in the exercise of the

powers granted by the constitution, thePresident may prohibit the Marcoses fromreturning to the Philippines.

RULING:

Section 6 of the Bill of Rights statecategorically that the liberty of abode and of changing the same with limits prescribed bylaw may be impaired only upon lawful orderof the court. Not by an executive officer. Not

even by the President. Sec 6 further providesthat the right to travel, and this obviouslyincludes to travel out of or back in to thePhilippines, cannot be impaired except in theinterest of national security, public safety, orpublic health, as may be provided by law.

It must be emphasized that theindividual right involved is not the right totravel from the Philippines to other countries

or within the Philippines. These are what theright to travel would normally connote.Essentially, the right involved is the right toreturn to one's country, a totally distinct rightunder the international law, independent fromalthough related to the right to travel. Thus,the Universal Declaration of Human Rightsand the International covenant on Civil andPolitical rights treat the right to freedom of movement and abode within the territory of astate, the right to leave a country, and theright to enter one's country as separate anddistinct rights.

The right to return to one's country is not

among the rights specifically guaranteed bythe Bill of Rights, which treats only of theliberty of abode and the right to travel, but itis our well considered view that the right toreturn may be considered, as a generallyaccepted principle of international law andunder our Constitution, is part of the law of the land. However, it is distinct and separateform the right to travel and enjoys adifferent protection under the InternationalCovenant and Political Rights, i.e. againstbeing "arbitrarily deprived" thereof.

The resolution of the problem is made

difficult because the persons who seek toreturn to the country are the deposed dictatorand his family at whose door the travails of the country are laid and from whom billions of dollars believed to be ill-gotten wealth aresought to be recovered. The constitutionalguarantees they invoke are neither absolutenor flexible. For the exercise of even the

preferred freedoms of speech and of expression, although couched in absoluteterms, admits of limits and must be adjustedto the requirements of equally importantpublic interests.

The preservation of the State - thefruition of the people's sovereignty - is anobligation in the highest order. The President,sworn to preserve and defend the constitution

and to see the faithful execution of the laws,cannot shirk from that responsibility.

The court held that President did notact arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in determining that the return of the Former Pres. Marcos and his family posesa serious threat to national interest andwelfare. President Aquino has determinedthat the destabilization caused by the returnof the Marcoses would wipe away the gainsachieved during the past few years after theMarcos regime.

The return of the Marcoses poses a seriousthreat and therefore prohibiting their returnto the Philippines, the instant petition wasDISMISSED.

TITLE: Biraogo, et. Al. vs. Philippine TruthCommission

CITATION: G.R. No. 192935

FACTS:

After a month in office, President BenignoAquino III issued Executive Order No. 1 (E.O.1) on July 30, 2010 creating the PhilippineTruth Commission (PTC). The PTC was taskedto conduct a thorough fact-findinginvestigation of reported cases of graft andcorruption involving third level public officersduring the administration of Aquino's

predecessor Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, athereafter submit its findings andrecommendations to the Office of thePresident, Congress, and the Ombudsm

Private citizen Louis Biraogo and a grouof congressmen led by Lakas KampiCMD chairman Rep. Edcel Lagman filed Supreme Court separate petitions forcertiorari and prohibition assailing theconstitutionality of E.O. 1 based on theibelief that the creation of the PTC const

usurpation of the legislative power to crpublic office, threatens the independencthe Office of the Ombudsman, and violathe equal protection clause of the PhilipConstitution for specifically targeting ceofficials of the Arroyo administration.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the president can creapublic office such as the PTC witusurping the powers of Congres

2. Whether the PTC supplants the

powers already vested on theOmbudsman and the DepartmeJustice (DOJ); and,

3. Whether the purpose of the PTCtransgresses the constitutionalguarantee of equal protection olaws.

RULING:

The president has the authority to cthe Truth Commission

Majority of the members of the Suprem

Court rejected the justification of the SoGeneral (OSG) that the creation of the finds basis on the president‘s power of cover all executive offices. The Decisionstressed that ―control‖ is essentially thepower to alter, modify, nullify or set asiwhat a subordinate officer had done in tperformance of his duties and to substit

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/President_of_the_Philippines

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Benigno_Aquino_III


http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gloria_Macapagal-Arroyo

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Congress_of_the_Philippines

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ombudsman_of_the_Philippines

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Congressmen

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lakas_Kampi_CMD


http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Equal_protection

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Constitution_of_the_Philippines


http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Solicitor_General_of_the_Philippines









http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Congressmen


http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Congress_of_the_Philippines

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gloria_Macapagal-Arroyo



http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/President_of_the_Philippines



the judgment of the former with that of thelatter. Clearly, the power of control is entirelydifferent from the power to create publicoffices. The majority also rejected the OSG‘sclaim that that the E.O. finds basis under sec.31 of the Administrative Code, whichauthorizes the president to restructure theOffice of the President. Clearly, ―restructure‖ under the said provision refers to reduction of personnel, consolidation or abolition of officesby reason of economy or redundancy. This

presupposes an already existing office. Thecreation of an office is nowhere mentioned,much less envisioned in said provision.

Nonetheless, the ponencia agreed with theargument of the OSG that the president‘spower to create the PTC may find justificationunder the president‘s duty under sec. 17,Article VII of the Constitution ―to ensure thatthe laws be faithfully executed.‖ The Courtheld that while it is true that the authority of the president to conduct investigations and tocreate bodies to execute this power is notexplicitly mentioned in the Constitution or instatutes, it does not necessarily mean that hedoes not have such authority. The president

has the obligation to ensure that all executiveofficials and employees (whether from past orpresent administrations) faithfully complywith the law. The purpose of ad hocinvestigating bodies such as the PTC is toallow an inquiry into matters which thepresident is entitled to know so that he canbe properly advised and guided in theperformance of his duties relative to theexecution and enforcement of the laws of theland.

The PTC will not erode the powers orindependence of the Ombudsman

The Court also held that the investigative

function of the commission will not supplantnor threaten the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman. If at all, it will complementthe functions of the Ombudsman and theDepartment of Justice. As correctly pointedout by the OSG, the function of the PTC ismerely to recommend prosecution, which is

just a consequence of its fact-findinginvestigation. The actual prosecution of suspected offenders, much less adjudicationon the merits of the charges against them, iscertainly not a function given to the PTC.

The purpose of the PTC offends the equalprotection clause

While the Court was almost unanimous inholding that the president indeed had theauthority to create the PTC and that it would

not unduly duplicate the powers of theOmbudsman, nine (9) of the justices joined Associate Justice Jose CatralMendoza in refusing to uphold theconstitutionality of E.O. 1 in view of itsapparent transgression of the equalprotection clause enshrined in sec. 1, Art. IIIof the Constitution. Senior AssociateJustice Antonio Carpio was joined by four (4)others in their strong dissent.

Laying down a long line of precedents, theponencia reiterated that equal protectionsimply requires that all persons or thingssimilarly situated should be treated alike,both as to rights conferred and

responsibilities imposed. The purpose of theequal protection clause is to secure everyperson against intentional and arbitrarydiscrimination. Applying this precept, themajority held that E.O. 1 should be struckdown as violative of the equal protectionclause.

The Decision stressed that the clear mandateof the PTC is to investigate and find out thetruth ―concerning the reported cases of graftand corruption during the previousadministration‖ only. The intent to single outthe previous administration is plain, patentand manifest. Mention of it has been made in

at least three portions of the questionedexecutive order. The Arroyo administration,according to the ponencia, is just a memberof a class, that is, a class of pastadministrations. It is not a class of its own.Not to include past administrations similarlysituated constitutes arbitrariness which theequal protection clause cannot sanction. Such

discriminating differentiation gave themajority an impression that the PTC is justbeing used ―as a vehicle for vindictivenessand selective retribution‖ and that E.O. 1 isonly an ―adventure in partisan hostility.‖

While the Court recognized that the creationof the PTC was inspired with noble intentions,the ponencia nonetheless reminded thegovernment of the ethical principle that ―theend does not justify the means.‖ Itemphatically closed by stressing that the

search for the truth must be withinconstitutional bounds, for ―ours is still agovernment of laws and not of men.‖

TITLE: DENR VS. DENR EMPLOYEESCITATION: G.R. NO. 149725. AUGUST 19,2003

FACTS:

Respondents, employees of the DENR Region

XII who are members of the employeesassociation, ―COURAGE‖, represented by theirActing President, Baguindanai A. Karim, filedwith the Regional Trial Court of Cotabato, apetition for nullity of orders with prayer forpreliminary injunction. On December 8, 1999,the trial court issued a temporary restrainingorder enjoining petitioner from implementingthe assailed Memorandum. The defendantsDENR Secretary Antonio H. Cerilles andRegional Executive Director Israel C. Gaddiwere ordered to cease and desist from doingthe act complained of, namely, to stop thetransfer of DENR [Region] 12 offices fromCotabato City to Korandal (Marbel), South

Cotabato.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsiderationwith Motion to Dismiss, raising the followinggrounds: (1) The power to transfer theRegional Office of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) is

executive in nature. (2) The decistransfer the Regional Office is basExecutive Order No. 429, which reorgRegion XII. (3) The validity of EO 42been affirmed by the Honorable SuCourt in the Case of Chiongbian vs. (1995) 245 SCRA 255. (4) Since the poreorganize the Administrative RegioExecutive in Nature citing ChiongbiaHonorable Court has no jurisdictientertain this petition.

Petitioner‘s motion for reconsideratiodenied in an Order dated April 10, 20petition for certiorari under Rule 65 wabefore the Court of Appeals, docketed G.R. SP No. 58896. The petitiodismissed outright for: (1) failure to suwritten explanation why personal servinot done on the adverse party; (2) faiattach affidavit of service; (3) failindicate the material dates when copiesorders of the lower court were receivefailure to attach certified true copy order denying petitioner‘s motioreconsideration; (5) for improper verifi

the same being based on petit ―knowledge and belief,‖ and (6) remedy of certiorari under Rule substitute a lost appeal. In essence, petargues that the trial court erred in enjofrom causing the transfer of the DERegional Offices, considering that it wapursuant to DENR Administrative Ord14.

ISSUE:

Whether DAO-99-14 and Memorandum implementing thewere valid?

Whether the DENR Secretary hauthority to reorganize the DEN



http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prosecution

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Associate_Justice_of_the_Supreme_Court_of_the_Philippines

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jose_C._Mendoza




http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Antonio_Carpio

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Antonio_Carpio





http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Associate_Justice_of_the_Supreme_Court_of_the_Philippines

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prosecution





RULING:

As head of the Executive Department, thePresident cannot be expected to exercise hiscontrol (and supervisory) powers personallyall the time. He may delegate some of hispowers to the Cabinet members except whenhe is required by the Constitution to act inperson or the exigencies of the situationdemand that he acts personally Applying thedoctrine of qualified political agency, thepower of the President to reorganize theNational Government may validly bedelegated to his cabinet members exercisingcontrol over a particular executivedepartment. Thus, in DOTC Secretary v.Mabalot,[21] we held that the President – through his duly constituted political agentand alter ego, the DOTC Secretary – maylegally and validly decree the reorganizationof the Department, particularly theestablishment of DOTC-CAR as the LTFRBRegional Office at the CordilleraAdministrative Region, with the concomitanttransfer and performance of public functionsand responsibilities appurtenant to a regionaloffice of the LTFRB.

Similarly, in the case at bar, the DENRSecretary can validly reorganize the DENR byordering the transfer of the DENR XIIRegional Offices from Cotabato City toKoronadal, South Cotabato. The exercise of this authority by the DENR Secretary, as analter ego, is presumed to be the acts of thePresident for the latter had not expresslyrepudiated the same.

In Chiongbian v. Orbos, this Court stressedthe rule that the power of the President toreorganize the administrative regions carrieswith it the power to determine the regional

centers. In identifying the regional centers,the President purposely intended the effectivedelivery of the field services of governmentagencies. The same intention can be gleanedfrom the preamble of the assailed DAO-99-14which the DENR sought to achieve, that is, to

improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the DENR in delivering its services.

It may be true that the transfer of the officesmay not be timely considering that: (1) thereare no buildings yet to house the regionaloffices in Koronadal, (2) the transfer falls onthe month of Ramadan, (3) the children of the affected employees are already enrolledin schools in Cotabato City, (4) the RegionalDevelopment Council was not consulted, and(5) the Sangguniang Panglungsond, througha resolution, requested the DENR Secretary toreconsider the orders. However, theseconcern issues addressed to the wisdom of the transfer rather than to its legality. It isbasic in our form of government that the judiciary cannot inquire into the wisdom orexpediency of the acts of the executive or thelegislative department,[24] for eachdepartment is supreme and independent of the others, and each is devoid of authoritynot only to encroach upon the powers or fieldof action assigned to any of the otherdepartment, but also to inquire into or passupon the advisability or wisdom of the actsperformed, measures taken or decisionsmade by the other departments.

The Supreme Court should not be thought of as having been tasked with the awesomeresponsibility of overseeing the entirebureaucracy. Unless there is a clear showingof constitutional infirmity or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of

jurisdiction, the Court‘s exercise of the judicial power, pervasive and limitless it mayseem to be, still must succumb to theparamount doctrine of separation of powers.[26] After a careful review of therecords of the case, we find that this jurisprudential element of abuse of discretionhas not been shown to exist.

In view of the foregoing, the petition forreview was granted. The resolutions of theCourt of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 58896dated May 31, 2000 and August 20, 2001, aswell as the decision dated January 14, 2000

of the Regional Trial Court of Cotabato City,Branch 15, in Civil Case No 389, wereREVERSED and SET ASIDE. The permanentinjunction, which enjoined the petitioner fromenforcing the Memorandum Order of theDENR XII Regional Executive Director waslifted.

TITLE: Mondano vs. SilvosaCITATION: 97 Phil. 143

FACTS:

Mondano was the mayor of Mainit, Surigao. Acomplaint was filed against him for rape andconcubinage. The information reached theAssistant Executive Secretary who orderedthe governor to investigate the matter.Silvosa then summoned Mondano and thelatter appeared before him. Thereafter Silvosasuspended Mondano. Mondano filed a petitionfor prohibition enjoining the governor fromfurther proceeding. Silvosa invoked the RAC

which provided that he, as part of theexecutive and by virtue o the order given bythe Asst Exec Sec, is with ―direct control,direction, and supervision over all bureausand offices under his jurisdiction . . .‖ and tothat end ―may order the investigation of anyact or conduct of any person in the service of any bureau or office under his Departmentand in connection therewith may appoint acommittee or designate an official or personwho shall conduct such investigations.

ISSUE:Whether or not the Governor can

exercise the power of control.

RULING:

The executive departments of theGovernment created and organized before theapproval of the Constitution continued to existas ―authorized by law until the Congress shall

provide otherwise.‖ The Constprovides: ―The President shall have conall the executive departments, bureaoffices, exercise general supervision olocal governments as may be providlaw, and take care that the laws be faexecuted.‖ Under this constitutional prthe President has been invested wipower of control of all the exdepartments, bureaus, or offices, but all local governments over which he ha

granted only the power of general supeas may be provided by law. The Depahead as agent of the President has control and supervision over all bureaoffices under his jurisdiction as providesection 79(c) of the Revised AdminisCode, but he does not have the same of local governments as that exercised over bureaus and offices unde jurisdiction. Likewise, his authority tothe investigation of any act or conduct person in the service of any bureau orunder his department is confined to bor offices under his jurisdiction and doextend to local governments over wh

already stated, the President exercisegeneral supervision as may be providlaw. If the provisions of section 79 (c)Revised Administrative Code are construed as conferring upon corresponding department head control, direction, and supervision olocal governments and that for that reamay order the investigation of an officilocal government for malfeasance in such interpretation would be contrary provisions of par 1, sec 10, Article 7, 1935 Constitution. If ―general supeover all local governments‖ is to be conas the same power granted to

Department Head in sec 79 (c) of thethen there would no longer be a distincdifference between the power of contrthat of supervision. In administrativsupervision means overseeing or the poauthority of an officer to see that suboofficers perform their duties. If the latto fulfill them the former may take



action or step as prescribed by law to makethem perform their duties. Control, on theother hand, means the power of an officer toalter or modify or nullify or set aside what asubordinate officer had done in theperformance of his duties and to substitutethe judgment of the former for that of thelatter. Such is the import of the provisions of sec 79 (c) of the RAC. The Congress hasexpressly and specifically lodged theprovincial supervision over municipal officials

in the provincial governor who is authorizedto ―receive and investigate complaints madeunder oath against municipal officers forneglect of duty, oppression, corruption orother form of maladministration of office, andconviction by final judgment of any crimeinvolving moral turpitude.‖ And if the chargesare serious, ―he shall submit written chargestouching the matter to the provincial board,furnishing a copy of such charges to theaccused either personally or by registeredmail, and he may in such case suspend theofficer (not being the municipal treasurer)pending action by the board, if in his opinionthe charge be one affecting the official

integrity of the officer in question.‖ Sec 86 of the Revised Administrative Code adds nothingto the power of supervision to be exercised bythe Department Head over the administrationof municipalities. If it be construed that itdoes and such additional power is the sameauthority as that vested in the DepartmentHead by sec 79 (c) of the RAC, then suchadditional power must be deemed to havebeen abrogated by sec10(1), Article 7, of theConstitution.

TITLE: Villena vs. Secretary of the InteriorCITATION: 67 Phil. 451

FACTS:

Villena was the then mayor of Makati. Afterinvestigation, the Secretary of Interiorrecommended the suspension of Villena with

the Office of the president who approved thesame. The Secretary then suspended Villena.Villena averred claiming that the Secretaryhas no jurisdiction over the matter. Thepower or jurisdiction is lodged in the localgovernment [the governor] pursuant to sec2188 of the Administrative Code. Further,even if the respondent Secretary of theInterior has power of supervision over localgovernments, that power, according to theconstitution, must be exercised in accordance

with the provisions of law and the provisionsof law governing trials of charges againstelective municipal officials are thosecontained in sec 2188 of the AdministrativeCode as amended. In other words, theSecretary of the Interior must exercise hissupervision over local governments, if he hasthat power under existing law, in accordancewith sec 2188 of the Administrative Code, asamended, as the latter provisions govern theprocedure to be followed in suspending andpunishing elective local officials while sec 79(C) of the Administrative Code is the generalaw which must yield to the special law.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Secretary of Interior can suspend an LGU official underinvestigation.

RULING:

There is no clear and express grant of powerto the secretary to suspend a mayor of amunicipality who is under investigation. Onthe contrary, the power appears lodged in theprovincial governor by sec 2188 of theAdministrative Code which provides that ―Theprovincial governor shall receive and

investigate complaints made under oathagainst municipal officers for neglect of duty,oppression, corruption or other form of maladministration of office, and conviction byfinal judgment of any crime involving moralturpitude. The fact, however, that the powerof suspension is expressly granted by sec2188 of the Administrative Code to the

provincial governor does not mean that thegrant is necessarily exclusive and precludesthe Secretary of the Interior from exercising asimilar power. For instance, counsel for thepetitioner admitted in the oral argument thatthe President of the Philippines may himself suspend the petitioner from office in virtue of his greater power of removal (sec. 2191, asamended, Administrative Code) to beexercised conformably to law. Indeed, if thePresident could, in the manner prescribed by

law, remove a municipal official; it would be alegal incongruity if he were to be devoid of the lesser power of suspension. And theincongruity would be more patent if,possessed of the power both to suspend andto remove a provincial official (sec. 2078,Administrative Code), the President were tobe without the power to suspend a municipalofficial. The power to suspend a municipalofficial is not exclusive. Preventive suspensionmay be issued to give way for an impartialinvestigation.

TITLE: Lacson-Magallanes Co. Inc. vs. PanoCITATION: 21 SCRA 895

FACTS:

Magallanes was permitted to use and occupya land used for pasture in Davao. The saidland was a forest zone which was laterdeclared as an agricultural zone. Magallanesthen ceded his rights to LMC of which he is aco-owner. Paño was a farmer who assertedhis claim over the same piece of land. TheDirector of Lands denied Paño‘s request. The

Secretary of Agriculture likewise denied hispetition hence it was elevated to the Office of the President. Exec Sec Pajo ruled in favorof Paño. LMC averred that the earlierdecision of the Secretary is already conclusivehence beyond appeal. He also averred thatthe decision of the Executive Secretary is anundue delegation of power. The Constitution,

LMC asserts, does not contain any prwhereby the presidential power of may be delegated to the Executive SecIt is argued that it is the constitutional the President to act personally upomatter.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the power of

may be delegated to the Exec Sec and be further delegated by the ExeSecretary.

RULING:

The President‘s duty to execulaw is of constitutional origin. So, toocontrol of all executive departments. is, that department heads are men confidence. His is the power to appointhis, too, is the privilege to dismiss thpleasure. Naturally, he controls and their acts. Implicit then is his authority

over, confirm, modify or reverse the taken by his department secretaries. context, it may not be said that the Precannot rule on the correctness of a decia department secretary. Parentheticamay be stated that the right to appealPresident reposes upon the President‘sof control over the executive departmAnd control simply means ―the powerofficer to alter or modify or nullify or sewhat a subordinate officer had done performance of his duties and to subthe judgment of the former for that latter.‖

It is correct to say that constitpowers there are which the Presidenexercise in person. Not as correct, hois it to say that the Chief Executive mdelegate to his Executive Secretarywhich the Constitution does not comthat he perform in person. Reason



wanting for this view. The President is notexpected to perform in person all themultifarious executive and administrativefunctions. The office of the ExecutiveSecretary is an auxiliary unit which assists thePresident. The rule which has thus gainedrecognition is that ―under our constitutionalsetup the Executive Secretary who acts forand in behalf and by authority of thePresident has an undisputed jurisdiction toaffirm, modify, or even reverse any order‖ that the Secretary of Agriculture and NaturalResources, including the Director of Lands,may issue.

TITLE: Ganzon vs Court of Appeals


FACTS:

Ganzon was the then mayor of Iloilo City. 10complaints were filed against him on groundsof misconduct and misfeasance of office. The

Secretary of Local Government issued a 600day suspension against Ganzon based on themerits of the complaints filed against him.Ganzon appealed the issue to the CA and theCA affirmed the suspension order by theSecretary. Ganzon asserted that the 1987Constitution does not authorize the Presidentnor any of his alter ego to suspend andremove local officials; this is because the1987 Constitution supports local autonomyand strengthens the same. What was givenby the present Constitution was meresupervisory power.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Secretary of LocalGovernment, as the President‘s alter ego, cansuspend and or remove local officials.

RULING:

Ganzon is under the impression thatthe Constitution has left the President meresupervisory powers, which supposedlyexcludes the power of investigation, anddenied her control, which allegedly embracesdisciplinary authority. It is a mistakenimpression because legally, ―supervision‖ isnot incompatible with disciplinary authority.

The SC had occasion to discuss thescope and extent of the power of supervisionby the President over local governmentofficials in contrast to the power of controlgiven to him over executive officials of ourgovernment wherein it was emphasized thatthe two terms, control and supervision, aretwo different things which differ one from theother in meaning and extent. ―Inadministration law supervision meansoverseeing or the power or authority of anofficer to see that subordinate officersperform their duties. If the latter fail orneglect to fulfill them the former may takesuch action or step as prescribed by law tomake them perform their duties.

Control, on the other hand, meansthe power of an officer to alter or modify ornullify of set aside what a subordinate officerhad done in the performance of his duties andto substitute the judgment of the former forthat of the latter.‖ But from thispronouncement it cannot be reasonablyinferred that the power of supervision of thePresident over local government officials doesnot include the power of investigation when inhis opinion the good of the public service sorequires.

The Secretary of Local Government, as thealter ego of the president, in suspendingGanzon is exercising a valid power. Hehowever overstepped by imposing a 600 daysuspension.

TITLE: DADOLE VS COMMISSION ON AUDITCITATION: G.R. NO. 125350. DECEMBER 3,2002

FACTS:

In 1986, the RTC and MTC judges of MandaueCity started receiving monthly allowances of P1,260 each through the yearly appropriationordinance enacted by the SangguniangPanlungsod of the said city. In 1991,Mandaue City increased the amount to P1,500for each judge. On March 15, 1994, theDepartment of Budget and Management(DBM) issued the disputed Local BudgetCircular No. 55 (LBC 55) which provided that- In the light of the authority granted to thelocal government units under the LocalGovernment Code to provide for additionalallowances and other benefits to nationalgovernment officials and employees assignedin their locality, such additional allowances inthe form of honorarium at rates notexceeding P1,000.00 in provinces and citiesand P700.00 in municipalities may be grantedsubject to the following conditions: a) Thatthe grant is not mandatory on the part of theLGUs; b) That all contractual and statutoryobligations of the LGU including theimplementation of R.A. 6758 shall have beenfully provided in the budget; c) That thebudgetary requirements/limitations underSection 324 and 325 of R.A. 7160 should besatisfied and/or complied with; and d) Thatthe LGU has fully implemented the devolutionof functions/personnel in accordance withR.A. 7160.

Acting on the DBM directive, the MandaueCity Auditor issued notices of disallowance toherein petitioners, namely, Honorable RTC

Judges Mercedes G. Dadole, Ulric R. Cañete,Agustin R. Vestil, Honorable MTC JudgesTemistocles M. Boholst, Vicente C. Fanilagand Wilfredo A. Dagatan, in excess of theamount authorized by LBC 55. BeginningOctober, 1994, the additional monthlyallowances of the petitioner judges werereduced to P1,000 each. They were also

asked to reimburse the amount they rein excess of P1,000 from April to Septe1994.

The petitioner judges filed with the Ofthe City Auditor a protest against the nof disallowance. But the City Auditor tthe protest as a motion for reconsidand indorsed the same to the COA ReOffice No. 7. In turn, the COA Regionareferred the motion to the head office

recommendation that the same be deni

On September 21, 1995, respondenrendered a decision denying petitmotion for reconsideration. On Novemb1995, Executive Judge Mercedes Dadole, for and in behalf of the pet judges, filed a motion for reconsiderathe decision of the COA. In a resolutionMay 28, 1996, the COA denied the mot

ISSUE:

Whether or not the adminiscircular or guideline such as

Budget Circular No. 55 inoperative the power olegislative body of a city by selimit To the extent of the exersuch power?

RULING:

According to respondent COA, even if Lwere void, the ordinances enacteMandaue City granting additional allowto the petitioner judges would ―stibereft of legal basis for want of a source of funds considering that thcannot be used for such purpRespondent COA showed that Mandauefunds consisted of locally generated revand the IRA. From 1989 to 1995, MaCity‘s yearly expenditures exceeded itsgenerated revenues, thus resulting deficit. During all those years, it was tthat enabled Mandaue City to incur a s



Respondent avers that Mandaue City used itsIRA to pay for said additional allowances andthis violated paragraph 2 of the SpecialProvisions, page 1060, of RA 7845 (TheGeneral Appropriations Act of 1995)1[12] andparagraph 3 of the Special Provision, page1225, of RA 7663 (The GeneralAppropriations Act of 1994)2[13] whichspecifically identified the objects of expenditure of the IRA. Nowhere in saidprovisions of the two budgetary laws does itsay that the IRA can be used for additionalallowances of judges. Respondent COA thusargues that the provisions in the ordinanceproviding for such disbursement are againstthe law, considering that the grant of thesubject allowances is not within the specifieduse allowed by the aforesaid yearlyappropriations acts.

Respondent COA failed to prove that MandaueCity used the IRA to spend for the additionalallowances of the judges. There was noevidence submitted by COA showing thebreakdown of the expenses of the citygovernment and the funds used for said

expenses. All the COA presented were theamounts expended, the locally generatedrevenues, the deficit, the surplus and the IRAreceived each year. Aside from these items,no data or figures were presented to showthat Mandaue City deducted the subjectallowances from the IRA. In other words, justbecause Mandaue City‘s locally generatedrevenues were not enough to cover itsexpenditures, this did not mean that theadditional allowances of petitioner judges

were taken from the IRA and not from thecity‘s own revenues.

Moreover, the DBM neither conducted aformal review nor ordered a disapproval of Mandaue City‘s appropriation ordinances, inaccordance with the procedure outlined bySections 326 and 327 of RA 7160 whichprovide that:

Section 326. Review of Appropriation

Ordinances of Provinces, Highly UrbanizedCities, Independent Component Cities, andMunicipalities within the Metropolitan ManilaArea. The Department of Budget andManagement shall review ordinancesauthorizing the annual or supplementalappropriations of provinces, highly-urbanizedcities, independent component cities, andmunicipalities within the Metropolitan ManilaArea in accordance with the immediatelysucceeding Section.

Section 327. Review of AppropriationOrdinances of Component Cities andMunicipalities.- The sangguniang

panlalawigan shall review the ordinanceauthorizing annual or supplementalappropriations of component cities andmunicipalities in the same manner and withinthe same period prescribed for the review of other ordinances.

If within ninety (90) days from receipt of copies of such ordinance, the sangguniangpanlalawigan takes no action thereon, thesame shall be deemed to have been reviewedin accordance with law and shall continue tobe in full force and effect.

Within 90 days from receipt of the copies of the appropriation ordinance, the DBM shouldhave taken positive action. Otherwise, suchordinance was deemed to have been properlyreviewed and deemed to have taken effect.Inasmuch as, in the instant case, the DBM didnot follow the appropriate procedure for

reviewing the subject ordinance of MandaueCity and allowed the 90-day period to lapse, itcan no longer question the legality of theprovisions in the said ordinance grantingadditional allowances to judges stationed inthe said city.

The petition was granted and the assaileddecision and resolution, dated September 21,1995 and May 28, 1996, respectively, of theCommission on Audit were set aside.

TITLE: GPI VS. SPRINGERCITATION: 50 PHIL 259. APRIL 1, 1927

FACTS:

Sometime in the 1900s, the National CoalCompany (NCC) was created by the PhilippineCongress. The law created it (Act No. 2822)provides that: ―The voting power … shall bevested exclusively in a committee consisting

of the Governor-General, the President of theSenate, and the Speaker of the House of Representatives.‖

In November 1926, the Governor-General(Leonard Wood) issued E.O. No. 37 whichdivested the voting rights of the SenatePresident and House Speaker in the NCC. TheEO emphasized that the voting right shouldbe solely lodged in the Governor-General whois the head of the government (President atthat time was considered the head of statebut does not manage government affairs). Acopy of the said EO was furnished to theSenate President and the House Speaker.

However, in December 1926, NCC held itselections and the Senate President as well asthe House Speaker, notwithstanding EO No.37 and the objection of the Governor-General, still elected Milton Springer and fourothers as Board of Directors of NCC.

Thereafter, a quo warranto proceedbehalf of the government was filed aSpringer et al questioning the validity oelection into the Board of NCC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Senate Preas well as the House Speak

validly elect the Board MembNCC?

RULING:

E.O. No 37 is valid. It is in accordancthe doctrine of separation of powerSupreme Court emphasized thatlegislature creates the public office butnothing to do with designating the persfill the office. Appointing persons to aoffice is essentially executive. The NCgovernment owned and concorporation. It was created by Congreextend the power of Congress into allow

through the Senate President and the Speaker, to appoint members of the already an invasion of executive poweSupreme Court however notes that there are exceptions to this rule whelegislature may appoint persons to filloffice. Such exception can be found appointment by the legislature of persfill offices within the legislative branchexception is allowable because it doweaken the executive branch.

Every other consideration to one sidremains certain—The congress of the States clearly intended that the Gov

General‘s power should be commenwith his responsibility. The Congressintended that the Governor-General shosaddled with the responsibilityadministering the government anexecuting the laws but shorn of the podo so. The interests of the Philippines



best served by strict adherence to the basicprinciples of constitutional government.

There was no hesitancy in concluding that somuch of section 4 of Act No. 2705, asamended by section 2 of Act No. 2822, aspurports to vest the voting power of thegovernment-owned stock in the National CoalCompany in the President of the Senate andthe Speaker of the House of Representatives,is unconstitutional and void. It results,

therefore, in the demurrer being overruled,and as it would be impracticable for thedefendants to answer, judgment shall berendered ousting and excluding them fromthe offices of directors of the National CoalCompany.

TITLE: Sarmiento v. MisonCITATION: 156 SCRA 549

FACTS:

Petitioners, who are taxpayers, lawyers,members of the IBP and professors of Constitutional Law, seek to enjoin SalvadorMison from performing the functions of theOffice of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and Guillermo Carague, as Secretaryof the Department of Budget, from effectingdisbursements in payment of Mison‘s salariesand emoluments, on the ground that Mison‘sappointment as Commissioner of the Bureauof Customs is unconstitutional by reason of itsnot having been confirmed by theCommission on Appointments. Therespondents, on the other hand, maintain the

constitutionality of Mison‘s appointmentwithout the confirmation of the Commissionon Appointments.

The Supreme Court held that the Presidenthas the authority to appoint Mison asCommissioner of the Bureau of Customs

without submitting his nomination to theCommission on Appointments forconfirmation, and thus, the latter is entitledthe full authority and functions of the officeand receive all the salaries and emolumentspertaining thereto. Thus, the Supreme Courtdismissed the petition and the petition inintervention, without costs.

ISSUE:

Whether the appointments of Mison et. al. is

unconstitutional?

RULING:

No. Section 16, Article VII of the 1987Constitution empowers the President toappoint 4 groups of officers: (1) the heads of the executive departments,ambassadors, other public ministers andconsuls, officers of the armed forces from therank of colonel or naval captain, and otherofficers whose appointments are vested inhim in this Constitution; (2) all other officersof the Government whose appointments arenot otherwise provided for by law; (3) those

whom the President may be authorized bylaw to appoint; and (4) officers lower inrank 4 whose appointments the Congressmay by law vest in the President alone. Thefirst group is clearly appointed with theconsent of the Commission on Appointments.Appointments of such officers are initiatedby nomination and, if the nomination isconfirmed by the Commission onAppointments, the President appoints. Thesecond and third groups of officers can bemade by the President without the consent(confirmation) of the Commission onAppointments, as can be determined throughthe recorded proceedings of Constitutional

Commission. It is an accepted rule inconstitutional and statutory construction thatan express enumeration of subjects excludesothers not enumerated. In the case at bar, itwould follow that only those appointments topositions expressly stated in the first grouprequire the consent (confirmation) of the

Commission on Appointments. Aconstitutional provision must be presumed tohave been framed and adopted in the lightand understanding of prior and existing lawsand with reference to them. Courts are boundto presume that the people adopting aconstitution are familiar with the previous andexisting laws upon the subjects to which itsprovisions relate, and upon which theyexpress their judgment and opinion in itsadoption. In the 1935 Constitution, almost allpresidential appointments requiredthe consent (confirmation) of the Commissionon Appointments. Under the1935 Constitution, the commission wasfrequently transformed into a venue of

―horse- trading‖ and similar malpractices.

On the other hand, the 1973 Constitution,consistent with the authoritarian pattern inwhich it was molded and remolded bysuccessive amendments, placed the absolutepower of appointment in the President withhardly any check on the part of thelegislature. Given the above two in extremes,one, in the 1935 Constitution and the other,in the 1973 Constitution, it is not difficult forthe Court to state that the framers of the1987 Constitution and the people adopting it,struck a ―middle ground‖ by requiring theconsent (confirmation) of the Commission onAppointments for the first group of appointments and leaving to the President,without such confirmation, the appointmentof other officers, i.e., those in the second andthird groups as well as those in the fourthgroup, i.e., officers of lower rank. Theproceedings in the 1986 ConstitutionalCommission support this conclusion. The word

―also‖ could mean ―in addition; as well;besides, too‖ besides ―in like manner‖ whichmeanings could stress that the word ―also‖ in

said second sentence means that thePresident, in addition to nominating and, withthe consent of the Commission onAppointments, appointing the officersenumerated in the first sentence, can appoint(without such consent or confirmation) theofficers mentioned in the second sentence,

contrary to the interpretation that thePresident shall appoint the officers menin said second sentence in the same maas he appoints officers mentioned in thesentence. Rather than limit the area of consideration to the possible meanings word ―also‖ as used in the context of sasecond sentence, the Court has chosen derive significance from the fact that thsentence speaks of nomination by thePresident and appointment by the Presiwith the consent of the Commission onAppointments, whereas, the second senspeaks only of appointment by the PresAnd, this use of different language in 2sentences proximate to each otherunderscores a difference in messageconveyed and perceptions established. Twords are not pebbles in alien juxtaposThe power to appoint is fundamentallyexecutive or presidential in character.Limitations on or qualifications of such pshould be strictly construed. Such limitaor qualifications must be clearly stated order to be recognized. In the case at bfirst sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII clearlystated that appointments by the Presidethe positions therein enumerated requirconsent of the Commission onAppointments. After a careful study of tdeliberations of the 1986 ConstitutionalCommission, the Court found the use ofword ―alone‖ after the word ―President‖said third sentence of Sec. 16, Article Vmore than anything else, a slip or laps udraftmanship.

In the 1987 Constitution, the clear andexpressed intent of its framers was to epresidential appointments from confirmby the Commission on Appointments, exappointments to offices expressly mentiin the first sentence. Consequently, theno reason to use in the third sentencethe word ―alone‖ after the word ―Presideproviding that Congress may by law vesthe appointment of lower-ranked officerthe President alone, or in the courts, orthe heads of departments, because the



to appoint officers whom the Presidentmay be authorized by law to appoint isalready vested in him, without need of confirmation by the Commission onAppointments, in the second sentence. Theword ―alone‖ in the third sentence, as a literalimport from the last part of par. 3, section10, Article VII of the 1935 Constitution,appears to be redundant in the light of thesecond sentence. This redundancy cannotprevail over the clear and positive intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution thatpresidential appointments, except thosementioned in the first sentence, are notsubject to confirmation by the Commission onAppointments.

The position of Commissioner of the Bureauof Customs (a bureau head) is not one of those within the first group of appointmentswhere the consent of the Commissionon Appointments is required. The 1987Constitution deliberately excluded the positionof ―heads of bureaus‖ from appointments thatneed the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments. Moreover,the President is expressly authorized by law

to appoint the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (RA 1937, Tariff and CustomsCode of the Philippines, Section 601, asamended by PD34 on 27 October 1972). RA1937 and PD 34 were approved during theeffectivity of the 1935 Constitution, underwhich the President may nominate and, withthe consent of the Commission onAppointments, appoint the heads of bureaus,like the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs. After the effectivity of the 1987Constitution, however, RA 1937 and PD 34have to be read in harmony with Sec. 16, Art.VII, with the result that, while theappointment of the Commissioner of the

Bureau of Customs is one that devolves onthe President, as an appointment he isauthorized by law to make, suchappointment, however, no longer needs theconfirmation of the Commission onAppointments.

TITLE: Concepcion-Bautista vs. SalongaCITATION: 172 SCRA 160

FACTS:

On 27 Aug 1987, Cory designated Bautista asthe Acting Chairwoman of CHR. In December

of the same year, Cory made the designationof Bautista permanent. The CoA, ignoring thedecision in the Mison case, averred thatBautista cannot take her seat w/o theirconfirmation. Cory, through the Exec Sec,filed with the CoA communications aboutBautista‘s appointment on 14 Jan 1989.Bautista refused to be placed under the CoA‘sreview hence she filed a petition before theSC. On the other hand, Mallillin invoked EO163-A stating that since CoA refusedBautista‘s appointment, Bautista should beremoved. EO 163-A provides that the tenureof the Chairman and the Commissioners of the CHR should be at the pleasure of the

President.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Bautista‘sappointment is subject to Commission onAudit confirmation.

RULING:

Since the position of Chairman of the CHR isnot among the positions mentioned in thefirst sentence of Sec. 16, Art. 7 of the 1987Constitution, appointments to which are to be

made with the confirmation of the CoA itfollows that the appointment by the Presidentof the Chairman of the CHR is to be madewithout the review or participation of the CoA.To be more precise, the appointment of theChairman and Members of the CHR is notspecifically provided for in the Constitution

itself, unlike the Chairmen and Members of the CSC, the CoE and the COA, whoseappointments are expressly vested by theConstitution in the President with the consentof the CoA. The President appoints theChairman and Members of the CHR pursuantto the second sentence in Sec 16, Art. 7, thatis, without the confirmation of the CoAbecause they are among the officers of government ―whom he (the President) maybe authorized by law to appoint.‖ And Sec2(c), EO 163 authorizes the President toappoint the Chairman and Members of theCHR.

Because of the fact that the presidentsubmitted to the CoA on 14 Jan 1989 theappointment of Bautista, the CoA argued thatthe president though she has the soleprerogative to make CHR appointments mayfrom time to time ask confirmation with theCoA. This is untenable according to the SC.The Constitution has blocked off certainappointments for the President to make withthe participation of the Commission onAppointments, so also has the Constitutionmandated that the President can confer nopower of participation in the Commission onAppointments over other appointmentsexclusively reserved for her by theConstitution. The exercise of political optionsthat finds no support in the Constitutioncannot be sustained.

Further, EVEN IF THE PRESIDENT MAYVOLUNTARILY SUBMIT TO THE COMMISSIONON APPOINTMENTS AN APPOINTMENT THATUNDER THE CONSTITUTION SOLELYBELONGS TO HER, STILL, THERE WAS NOVACANCY TO WHICH AN APPOINTMENTCOULD BE MADE ON 14 JANUARY 1989.There can be no ad interim appointments inthe CHR for the appointment thereto is notsubject to CoA‘s confirmation. Appointmentsto the CHR is always permanent in nature.

The provisions of EO 163-A is unconstitutionaland cannot be invoked by Mallillin. TheChairman and the Commissioners of the CHR

cannot be removed at the pleasure president for it is constitutionally guarthat they must have a term of office.

TITLE: Rufino V. EndrigaCITATION: G.R. No. 139554. July 21,

FACTS:

Article VII, Section 16

- Presidential Decree No. 15 (Pcreated the Cultural Center Philippines (CCP) for the ppurpose of propagating artculture in the Philippines. Pincreased the members of Board from seven to nine truLater, Executive Order No. increased further the trustees to

- Eventually, during the term of Rthe CCP Board included the EGroup

- Estrada appointed seven new trto the CCP Board for a term years to replace the Endriga grwell as two other incumbent truThe Rufino group took their oaoffice and assumed the perforof their duties.

- the Endriga group filed a petitquo warranto questioning Esappointment of seven new meto the CCP Board. They claimed

is only when the CCP Board is evacant may the President Philippines fill such vacancies, in consultation with the rofficers of the CCP.

o The clear and catelanguage of Section 6



PD 15 states that vacancies inthe CCP Board shall be filledby a majority vote of theremaining trustees. Shouldonly one trustee survive, thevacancies shall be filled bythe surviving trusteeacting in consultation withthe ranking officers of theCCP. Should the Boardbecome entirely vacant,the vacancies shall befilled by the President of the Philippines acting inconsultation with the sameranking officers of the CCP.Thus, the remaining trustees,whether one or more, electtheir fellow trustees for afixed four-year term. On theother hand, Section 6(c) of PD15 does not allow trustees toreelect fellow trustees formore than two consecutiveterms.

o The Endriga group assertedthat when former PresidentEstrada appointed the Rufinogroup, only one seat wasvacant due to the expirationof Mañosa's term. The CCPBoard then had 10 incumbenttrustees. They maintainedthat under the CCP Charter,the trustees' fixed four-yearterm could only be terminated"by reason of resignation,incapacity, death, or othercause." Presidential actionwas neither necessary nor

justified since the CCP Board then still had 10 incumbent trustees who had thestatutory power to fill by

election any vacancy in theBoard.

o The Endriga group refused toaccept that the CCP wasunder the supervision and

control of the President. TheEndriga group cited Section 3of PD 15, which states thatthe CCP "shall enjoyautonomy of policy andoperation x x x."

- Rufino Group: that the law could only delegate to the CCP Board the power to appoint officers lower in rank thanthe trustees of the Board. Section6(b) of PD 15 authorizing the CCP

trustees to elect their fellow trusteesshould be declared unconstitutionalbeing repugnant to Section 16, ArticleVII of the 1987 Constitution allowingthe appointment only of "officerslower in rank" than the appointingpower.

- CA: Endriga group entitled to theoffice.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Section 6(b) of PD 15 isunconstitutional considering that:

1. it is an invalid delegation of thePresident's appointing power underthe Constitution;

2. it effectively deprives the Presidentof his constitutional power of controland supervision over the CCP

RULING:

UNCONSTITIONAL

POWER TO APPOINT

- The source of the President's power toappoint, as well as the Legislature'sauthority to delegate the power toappoint, is found in Section 16, ArticleVII of the 1987 Constitution which

provides: ―the President shallnominate and, with the consent of theCommission on Appointments,appoint the heads of the executivedepartments, ambassadors, otherpublic ministers and consuls, orofficers of the armed forces from therank of colonel or naval captain, andother officers whose appointments arevested in him in this Constitution. Heshall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointmentsare not otherwise provided for by law,and those whom he may beauthorized by law to appoint. TheCongress may, by law, vest theappointment of other officerslower in rank in the Presidentalone, in the courts, or in theheads of departments, agencies,commissions, or boards….ThePresident shall have the power tomake appointments during the recessof the Congress, whether voluntary orcompulsory, but such appointmentsshall be effective only untildisapproval by the Commission onAppointments or until the nextadjournment of the Congress.(Emphasis supplied)‖

- The power to appoint is theprerogative of the President, except inthose instances when the Constitutionprovides otherwise. Usurpation of thisfundamentally Executive power by theLegislative and Judicial branchesviolates the system of separation of powers that inheres in our democraticrepublican government.

- Under Section 16, Article VII of the1987 Constitution, the President

appoints three groups of officers.1. heads of the Executivedepartments, ambassadors,other public ministers andconsuls, officers of the armedforces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and

other officers appointments are vesthe President by Constitution. wCommission of Appointconsent

2. those whom the Premay be authorized by appoint. consenrequired

3. all other officers oGovernment appointments are otherwise provided by consent not required

appoints the group of officerlaw is silent on the appointing or if the authorizing theof a deparagency, commor board to appdeclaredunconstitutionaThus, if Sectioand (c) of PD foundunconstitutionaPresident appoint the trof the CCP because the trfall under thegroup of officers

o * there is a fourth grlower-ranked officers appointments Congresby law vest in the hedepartments, agcommissions, or boards

- The grant of the power to apto the heads of agecommissions, or boards matter of legislative Congress has the discretion toto, or withhold from, the heagencies, commissions, or boa



power to appoint lower-rankedofficers. If it so grants, Congress mayimpose certain conditions for theexercise of such legislative delegation,like requiring the recommendation of subordinate officers or theconcurrence of the other members of the commission or board.

- This is in contrast to the President'spower to appoint which is a self-executing power vested by the

Constitution itself and thus notsubject to legislative limitations orconditions.28 The power to appointconferred directly by the Constitutionon the Supreme Court en banc 29 andon the Constitutional Commissions30 is also self-executing and not subjectto legislative limitations or conditions.

- The framers of the 1987 Constitutionclearly intended that Congress couldby law vest the appointment of lower-ranked officers in the headsof departments, agencies,commissions, or boards. theseinferior or lower in rank officers

are the subordinates of the headsof departments, agencies,commissions, or boards who arevested by law with the power toappoint. The express language of theConstitution and the clear intent of itsframers point to only one conclusion— the officers whom the heads of departments, agencies, commissions,or boards may appoint must be of lower rank than those vested by lawwith the power to appoint.

- Also, the power to appoint can onlybe vested in the HEADS of the namedoffices. The word "heads" refers to

the chairpersons of the commissionsor boards and NOT TO THEIRMEMBERS, for several reasons:

o a plain reading of the lastsentence of the firstparagraph of Section 16,Article VII of the 1987

Constitution shows that theword "heads" refers to all theoffices succeeding that term,namely, the departments,agencies, commissions, orboards. This plain reading isconsistent with other relatedprovisions of the Constitution.

o agencies, like departments,have no collegial governingbodies but have only chief executives or heads of agencies. Thus, the word"heads" applies to agencies.Any other interpretation isuntenable.

o all commissions or boardshave chief executives who aretheir heads. Since theConstitution speaks of "heads" of offices, and allcommissions or boards havechief executives or heads, theword "heads" could only referto the chief executives orheads of the commissions orboards.

o the counterpart provisions of Section 16, Article VII of the1987 Constitution in the 1935and 1973 Constitutionsuniformly refer to "heads" of offices. The 1935 Constitutionlimited the grant of theappointment power only to"heads of departments."32 The1973 Constitution expandedsuch grant to other officers,namely, "members of theCabinet, x x x, courts, headsof agencies, commissions, andboards x x x."33 If the 1973

Constitution intended toextend the grant to membersof commissions or boards, itcould have followed the samelanguage used for "membersof the Cabinet" so as to state"members of commissions or

boards." Alternatively, the1973 Constitution could haveplaced the words commissionsand boards after the word"courts" so as to state"members of the Cabinet, x xx, courts, commissions andboards." Instead, the 1973Constitution used "heads of agencies, commissions, andboards."

o the 1935, 1973, and 1987Constitutions make a cleardistinction whenever grantingthe power to appoint lower-ranked officers to members of a collegial body or to the headof that collegial body. Thus,the 1935 Constitution speaksof vesting the power toappoint "in the courts, or inthe heads of departments."Similarly, the 1973Constitution speaks of "members of the Cabinet,courts, heads of agencies,commissions, and boards."

o As an enumeration of offices, what applies to thefirst office in the enumerationalso applies to the succeedingoffices mentioned in theenumeration. Since the words"in the heads of " refer to"departments," the samewords "in the heads of " alsorefer to the other offices listedin the enumeration, namely,"agencies, commissions, orboards."

- Thus, the Chairman of the CCP Boardis the "head" of the CCP who may bevested by law, under Section 16,Article VII of the 1987 Constitution,with the power to appoint lower-ranked officers of the CCP.

- the CCP is a public corporationgoverned by a Board of Trustees. The

CCP, being governed by a bonot an agency but a boapurposes of Section 16, Articlethe 1987 Constitution.

- ** Section 6(b) and (c) of PDthus irreconcilably inconsistenSection 16, Article VII of theConstitution. Section 6(b) andPD 15 empowers the remtrustees of the CCP Board vacancies in the CCP Board, a

them to elect their fellow trustethe other hand, Section 16, Artof the 1987 Constitution allowsof departments, agcommissions, or boards to aonly "officers lower in ranksuch "heads of departagencies, commissions, or boThis excludes a situation wheappointing officer appoints an equal in rank as him. Thus, insit authorizes the trustees of thBoard to elect their co-truSection 6(b) and (c) of PD unconstitutional because it v

Section 16, Article VII of theConstitution.o It does not matter

Section 6(b) of Pempowers the remtrustees to "elect" an"appoint" their fellow trfor the effect is the which is to fill vacanciesCCP Board. A statute circumvent the constitlimitations on the powappoint by filling vacana public office telection by the co-worthat office. Such manfilling vacancies in a office has no constitbasis.

- Further, Section 6(b) and (c) ofmakes the CCP trusteesindependent appointing power o

http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/jul2006/gr_139554_2006.html#fnt28






















fellow trustees. The creation of anindependent appointing powerinherently conflicts with thePresident's power to appoint. Thisinherent conflict has spawnedrecurring controversies in theappointment of CCP trustees everytime a new President assumes office.

POWER OF CONTROL OVER THEEXECUTIVE BRANCH

- The presidential power of control overthe Executive branch of governmentextends to all executive employeesfrom the Department Secretary to thelowliest clerk.35 This constitutionalpower of the President is self-executing and does not require anyimplementing law. Congress cannotlimit or curtail the President's powerof control over the Executivebranch.36

- The CCP falls under the Executivebranch. Since the President exercisescontrol over "all the executivedepartments, bureaus, and offices,"the President necessarily exercisescontrol over the CCP which is an officein the Executive branch. In mandatingthat the President "shall have controlof all executive offices," Section 17,Article VII of the 1987 Constitutiondoes not exempt any executive office— one performing executive functionsoutside of the independentconstitutional bodies — from thePresident's power of control. There isno dispute that the CCP performsexecutive, and not legislative, judicial,or quasi-judicial functions.

- The Legislature cannot validly enact alaw that puts a government office inthe Executive branch outside thecontrol of the President in the guise of insulating that office from politics ormaking it independent. If the office is

part of the Executive branch, it mustremain subject to the control of thePresident. Otherwise, the Legislaturecan deprive the President of hisconstitutional power of control over"all the executive x x x offices." If theLegislature can do this with theExecutive branch, then theLegislature can also deal a similarblow to the Judicial branch byenacting a law putting decisions of certain lower courts beyond the

review power of the Supreme Court.This will destroy the system of checksand balances finely structured in the1987 Constitution among theExecutive, Legislative, and Judicialbranches.

- Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15, whichauthorizes the trustees of the CCPBoard to fill vacancies in the Board,runs afoul with the President's powerof control under Section 17, ArticleVII of the 1987 Constitution. Theintent of Section 6(b) and (c) of PD15 is to insulate the CCP from politicalinfluence and pressure, specificallyfrom the President.44 Section 6(b) and(c) of PD 15 makes the CCP a self-perpetuating entity, virtually outsidethe control of the President. Such apublic office or board cannot legallyexist under the 1987 Constitution.

TITLE: Aytona vs. CastilloCITATION: 4 SCRA 1. January 19, 1962

FACTS:

On December 29, 1961, Carlos P. Garcia, whowas still President that time, made lastminute appointments while the Commissionon Appointments was not in session. Said lastminute appointment included Dominador R.Aytona, who was appointed as ad interimGovernor of Central Bank. The latter took

oath on the same day.

At noon on December 30, 1961, President-elect Diosdado Macapagal assumed office. Heissued Administrative Order No. 2 onDecember 31, 1961 recalling, withdrawingand canceling all ad interim appointmentsmade by President Garcia after December 13,1961, which was the date when Macapagalwas proclaimed President by the Congress.He then appointed Andres V. Castillo as adinterim Governor of the Central Bank and the

latter qualified immediately.

On January 2, 1962, both exercised thepowers of their office. However, Aytona wasprevented from holding office the followingday and thus instituted a quo warrantoproceeding, challenging Castillo‘s right toexercise the powers of the Governor of theCentral Bank. Aytona claims that he wasvalidly appointed and had qualified for thepost, therefore making Castillo‘s appointmentvoid. Castillo then contended that Aytona‘sappointment had already been revoked byAdministrative Order No. 2 issued byPresident Macapagal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the new president hasthe power to cancel all ad interimappointments made by the previous presidentafter they have all qualified?

RULING:

To quote ―We are informed, it isMalacañan's practice — which we find to belogical — to submit ad interim appointmentsonly when the Commission on Appointments

is in session. One good reason for the practiceis that only those who have accepted theappointment and qualified are submitted forconfirmation. Nevertheless, this time,Malacañan submitted its appointments on thesame day they were issued; and theCommission was not then in session;

obviously because it foresaw the possibthat the incoming President would refussubmit later the appointees of hispredecessor. As a result, as already advto, some persons whose names weresubmitted for confirmation had not quanor accepted their appointments.‖

Ad interim appointments are made wheCongress is in recess and as such, theCommission on Appointments cannot coand vote on the appointment. Even with

the confirmation, however, the appointeto sit and perform the functions and powof the position until rejected by the CA until the next adjournment of Congressad interim appointment is exercised by president as he‘s special prerogative anbound to be prudent to insure approvalselection either previous consultation wmembers of the Commission on Appointor by thereafter explaining to themthe reason such selection. It is expectedthe President should exercise double caextending such appointments. In the cabar, it is hard to believe that in signing appointments in one night, President Ga

exercised double care; and therefore, sappointments fall beyond the intent andspirit of the constitutional provision grathe Executive authority to issue ad interappointments.

TITLE: Jorge vs. MayorCITATION: 10 SCRA 33. FEBRUARY 21964

FACTS:

Petition for mandamus and quo warrandirectly in this Court to have petdeclared as the sole legally appointequalified Director of Lands, and to rrespondent to turn over said office petitioner as well as to desist from h















himself out as "Acting Director, Bureau of Lands".

It is undisputed that petitioner, Nicanor G.Jorge, is a career official in the Bureau of Lands. He started working there as a JuniorComputer in the course of 38 years service,from February 1, 1922 to October 31, 1960,and attained the position of Acting Director,through regular and successive promotions, inaccordance with civil service rules. On June

17, 1961, he was designated Acting Directorof the same Bureau, and on December 13,1961 was appointed by President CarlosGarcia ad interim Director. He qualified bytaking the oath of office on the 23rdDecember of 1961. His appointment was onDecember 26, 1961, transmitted to theCommission on Appointments, and on May14, 1962, petitioner's ad interim appointmentas Director of Lands was confirmed by theCommission.

Petitioner discharged the duties as Directoruntil on November 14, 1962 he received aletter from Benjamin Gozon, then Secretary

of Agriculture and Natural Resources of theMacapagal administration, informing him thatpursuant to a letter from the AssistantExecutive Secretary Bernal, served onpetitioner on November 13, his appointmentwas among those revoked by AdministrativeOrder No. 2 of President Diosdado Macapagal;that the position of Director of Lands wasconsidered vacant; and that petitioner Jorgewas designated Acting Director of Lands,effective November 13, 1962. Upon learningthat respondent Mayor, an outsider, had beendesignate by the President to be ActingDirector of Lands Jorge protested (in a letterof November 16, 1962) to the Secretary of

Agriculture informing the latter that he wouldstand on his rights, and issued office circularsclaiming to be the legally appointed Directorof Lands. Finally, on September 2, 1963, heinstituted the present proceedings.

The answer of respondent pleads that the ad interim appointment of petitioner and itsconfirmation were invalid having been dulyrevoked by President Macapagal byAdministrative Order No. 2 dated December31, 1961; that petitioner voluntarilyrelinquished his position and accepted hisdesignation as Acting Director, issuing pressstatements to said effect, and voluntarilyaccompanying and introducing respondent tomeet officials of the Bureau as the new actingDirector of Lands.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Administrative OrderNo. 2 of President Macapagaloperated as a valid revocation of petitioner's ad interim appointment?

RULING:

In common with the Gillera appointmentsustained by this Court less than a monthago, Jorge's appointment is featured by a

recognition of his tenure by the Macapagaladministration itself, since he was allowed tohold and discharge undisturbed his duties asde jure Director of Lands for nearly elevenmonths; it was only in mid-November of 1962that the attempt was actually made todemote him and appoint a rank outsider in hisplace in the person of respondent Mayor.

As to the alleged voluntary acquiescence andrelinquishment by petitioner of his position asde jure Director of Lands, the evidence is thathe did protect against his demotion in lettersto the Secretary of Agriculture and in officecirculars. That he did not immediately adopt a

hostile attitude towards the authorities, andthe respondent herein was merely evidence of that courtesy and "delicadeza" to be expectedof a man in a high position who does not wishto obstruct the functions of the office, and isin no way incompatible with his determinationto protect his right. It must also be

remembered that the precedent' case of theformer Chairman of the National ScienceBoard, suspended indefinitely on charges thatwere subsequently found to be false, did notencourage precipitate action, and was areminder of the unpleasant consequences of defying the administration. At any rate,"abandonment of an office by reason of acceptance of another, in order to be effectiveand binding, should spring from and beaccompanied by deliberation and freedom of choice, either to keep the old office or

renounce it for another" (Teves vs. Sindiong81 Phil. 658), and the record is unconvincingthat the alleged acts of acquiescence, mostlyequivocal in character, were freely andvoluntarily accomplished.

The writs applied for were granted, thepetitioner Nicanor G. Jorge is declared to bethe duly appointed, confirmed, and qualifiedDirector of Lands, the respondent, JovencioQ. Mayor, was required to turn over saidoffice to the petitioner and to desist fromholding self out as "Acting Director of Lands"

TITLE: De Castro vs. JBCCITATION: G.R. No. 1910002. March 17,2010

FACTS:

This case is based on multiple cases field withdealt with the controversy that has arisenfrom the forthcoming compulsory requirementof Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010 orseven days after the presidential election. OnDecember 22, 2009, Congressman Matias V.Defensor, an ex officio member of the JBC,addressed a letter to the JBC, requesting that

the process for nominations to the office of the Chief Justice be commencedimmediately.

In its January 18, 2010 meeting en banc, theJBC passed a resolution which stated thatthey have unanimously agreed to start the

process of filling up the position of ChieJustice to be vacated on May 17, 2010 the retirement of the incumbent Chief Justice.

As a result, the JBC opened the positionChief Justice for application orrecommendation, and published for thapurpose its announcement in the PhilippDaily Inquirer and the Philippine Star.In its meeting of February 8, 2010, the resolved to proceed to the next step of

announcing the names of the followingcandidates to invite to the public to file sworn complaint, written report, oropposition, if any, not later than Februa2010.

Although it has already begun the procethe filling of the position of Chief Justicein accordance with its rules, the JBC is decided on when to submit to the Presidits list of nominees for the position due controversy in this case being unresolve

The compiled cases which led to this cathe petitions of intervenors called for eit

the prohibition of the JBC to pass theshortlist, mandamus for the JBC to passshortlist, or that the act of appointing thnext Chief Justice by GMA is a midnightappointment.

A precedent frequently cited by the partthe In Re Appointments Dated March 301998 of Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela and HPlacido B. Vallarta as Judges of the RTCBranch 62, Bago City and of Branch 24,Cabanatuan City, respectively, shortlyreferred to here as the Valenzuela casewhich the Court held that Section 15, AVII prohibited the exercise by the Presid

the power to appoint to judicial positionduring the period therein fixed.

ISSUES:



1. Whether or not the petitioners have legalstanding?

2.Whether or not there is justiciablecontroversy that is ripe for judicialdetermination?3. Whether or not the incumbent Presidentappoint the next Chief Justice?4. Whether or not mandamus and prohibitionwill lie to compel the submission of theshortlist of nominees by the JBC?

RULING:

Petitioners have legal standing because suchrequirement for this case was waived by theCourt.

Legal standing is a peculiar concept inconstitutional law because in some cases,suits are not brought by parties who havebeen personally injured by the operation of alaw or any other government act but byconcerned citizens, taxpayers or voters whoactually sue in the public interest.‖ But evenif, strictly speaking, the petitioners ―are not

covered by the definition, it is still within thewide discretion of the Court to waive therequirement and so remove the impedimentto its addressing and resolving the seriousconstitutional questions raised.‖

There is a justiciable issue.

We hold that the petitions set forth an actualcase or controversy that is ripe for judicialdetermination. The reality is that the JBCalready commenced the proceedings for theselection of the nominees to be included in ashort list to be submitted to the President forconsideration of which of them will succeed

Chief Justice Puno as the next Chief Justice.Although the position is not yet vacant, thefact that the JBC began the process of nomination pursuant to its rules andpractices, although it has yet to decidewhether to submit the list of nominees to theincumbent outgoing President or to the next

President, makes the situation ripe for judicialdetermination, because the next steps are thepublic interview of the candidates, thepreparation of the short list of candidates,and the ―interview of constitutional experts,as may be needed.‖

The resolution of the controversy will surelysettle – with finality – the nagging questionsthat are preventing the JBC from moving onwith the process that it already began, or thatare reasons persuading the JBC to desist from

the rest of the process.PROHIBITION UNDER SECTION 15, ARTICLEVII DOES NOT APPLY TO APPOINTMENTS TOFILL A VACANCY IN THE SUPREME COURT ORTO OTHER APPOINTMENST TO THEJUDICIARY.

Two constitutional provisions seemingly inconflict:

The first, Section 15, Article VII (ExecutiveDepartment), provides:

Section 15. Two months immediately beforethe next presidential elections and up to the

end of his term, a President or ActingPresident shall not make appointments,except temporary appointments to executivepositions when continued vacancies thereinwill prejudice public service or endangerpublic safety.

The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (JudicialDepartment), states:

Section 4. (1). The Supreme Court shall becomposed of a Chief Justice and fourteenAssociate Justices. It may sit en banc or in itsdiscretion, in division of three, five, or sevenMembers. Any vacancy shall be filled within

ninety days from the occurrence thereof.

Justification of the Supreme Court:

First. The records of the deliberations of theConstitutional Commission reveal that theframers devoted time to meticulously

drafting, styling, and arranging theConstitution. Such meticulousness indicatesthat the organization and arrangement of theprovisions of the Constitution were notarbitrarily or whimsically done by the framers,but purposely made to reflect their intentionand manifest their vision of what theConstitution should contain.

The Constitution consists of 18 Articles, threeof which embody the allocation of theawesome powers of government among the

three great departments, the Legislative(Article VI), the Executive (Article VII), andthe Judicial Departments (Article VIII). Thearrangement was a true recognition of theprinciple of separation of powers thatunderlies the political structure

As can be seen, Article VII is devoted to theExecutive Department, and, among others, itlists the powers vested by the Constitution inthe President. The presidential power of appointment is dealt with in Sections 14, 15and 16 of the Article.

Had the framers intended to extend the

prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VIIto the appointment of Members of theSupreme Court, they could have explicitlydone so. They could not have ignored themeticulous ordering of the provisions. Theywould have easily and surely written theprohibition made explicit in Section 15, ArticleVII as being equally applicable to theappointment of Members of the SupremeCourt in Article VIII itself, most likely inSection 4 (1), Article VIII.

Although Valenzuela came to hold that theprohibition covered even judicialappointments, it cannot be disputed that the

Valenzuela dictum did not firmly rest on thedeliberations of the ConstitutionalCommission.

Moreover, the usage in Section 4(1), ArticleVIII of the word shall – an imperative,operating to impose a duty that may be

enforced – should not be disregarded.Thereby, Sections 4(1) imposes on thePresident the imperative duty to make aappointment of a Member of the SupremCourt within 90 days from the occurrenthe vacancy. The failure by the Presidendo so will be a clear disobedience to theConstitution.

The 90-day limitation fixed in Section 4Article VIII for the President to fill thevacancy in the Supreme Court was

undoubtedly a special provision to estabdefinite mandate for the President as thappointing power, and cannot be defeatmere judicial interpretation in Valenzuethe effect that Section 15, Article VIIprevailed because it was ―couched in strnegative language.‖

Second. Section 15, Article VII does noapply as well to all other appointments Judiciary.

There is no question that one of the reaunderlying the adoption of Section 15 aof Article VII was to eliminate midnight

appointments from being made by anoutgoing Chief Executive. Given thebackground and rationale for the prohibin Section 15, Article VII, we have no dothat the Constitutional Commission conthe prohibition to appointments made inExecutive Department. The framers didneed to extend the prohibition toappointments in the Judiciary, because establishment of the JBC and their subjethe nomination and screening of candidfor judicial positions to the unhurried andeliberate prior process of the JBC ensuthat there would no longer be midnightappointments to the Judiciary. Indeed, t

creation of the JBC was precisely intendde-politicize the Judiciary by doing awaythe intervention of the Commission onAppointments.

Third. As earlier stated, the non-applicaof Section 15, Article VII to appointmen



the Judiciary was confirmed by then SeniorAssociate Justice Regalado to the JBC itself when it met on March 9, 1998 to discuss thequestion raised by some sectors about the

―constitutionality of xxx appointments‖ to theCourt of Appeals in light of the forthcomingpresidential elections. He assured that ―on thebasis of the (Constitutional) Commission‘srecords, the election ban had no applicationto appointments to the Court of Appeals.‖ This confirmation was accepted by the JBC,which then submitted to the President for

consideration the nominations for the eightvacancies in the Court of Appeals.

Fourth. Of the 23 sections in Article VII,three (i.e., Section 14, Section15, andSection 16) concern the appointing powers of the President.

Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 areobviously of the same character, in that theyaffect the power of the President to appoint.The fact that Section 14 and Section 16 referonly to appointments within the ExecutiveDepartment renders conclusive that Section

15 also applies only to the ExecutiveDepartment. This conclusion is consistentwith the rule that every part of the statutemust be interpreted with reference to thecontext, i.e. that every part must beconsidered together with the other parts, andkept subservient to the general intent of thewhole enactment.

Fifth. To hold like the Court did in Valenzuelathat Section 15 extends to appointments tothe Judiciary further undermines the intent of the Constitution of ensuring the independenceof the Judicial Department from the Executiveand Legislative Departments. Such a holding

will tie the Judiciary and the Supreme Courtto the fortunes or misfortunes of politicalleaders vying for the Presidency in apresidential election. Consequently, thewisdom of having the new President, insteadof the current incumbent President, appointthe next Chief Justice is itself suspect, and

cannot ensure judicial independence, becausethe appointee can also become beholden tothe appointing authority. In contrast, theappointment by the incumbent President doesnot run the same risk of compromising judicial independence, precisely because herterm will end by June 30, 2010.

Sixth. The argument has been raised to theeffect that there will be no need for theincumbent President to appoint during theprohibition period the successor of Chief

Justice Puno within the context of Section 4(1), Article VIII, because anyway there willstill be about 45 days of the 90 daysmandated in Section 4(1), Article VIIIremaining.

The argument is flawed, because it is focusedonly on the coming vacancy occurring fromChief Justice Puno‘s retirement by May 17,2010. It ignores the need to apply Section4(1) to every situation of a vacancy in theSupreme Court.

Section 4 (3), Article VII requires the regularelections to be held on the second Monday of

May, letting the elections fall on May 8, at theearliest, or May 14, at the latest. If theregular presidential elections are held on May8, the period of the prohibition is 115 days. If such elections are held on May 14, the periodof the prohibition is 109 days. Either period of the prohibition is longer than the fullmandatory 90-day period to fill the vacancy inthe Supreme Court. The result is that thereare at least 19 occasions (i.e., the differencebetween the shortest possible period of theban of 109 days and the 90-day mandatoryperiod for appointments) in which theoutgoing President would be in no position tocomply with the constitutional duty to fill up a

vacancy in the Supreme Court. It is safe toassume that the framers of the Constitutioncould not have intended such an absurdity.

Seventh. As a matter of fact, in an extremecase, we can even raise a doubt on whether aJBC list is necessary at all for the President –

any President – to appoint a Chief Justice if the appointee is to come from the ranks of the sitting justices of the Supreme Court.

Sec. 9, Article VIII says: The Members of theSupreme Court xxx shall be appointed by thePresident from a list of at least threenominees prepared by the Judicial and BarCouncil for any vacancy. Such appointmentsneed no confirmation.

The provision clearly refers to an appointee

coming into the Supreme Court from theoutside, that is, a non-member of the Courtaspiring to become one. It speaks of candidates for the Supreme Court, not of those who are already members or sitting justices of the Court, all of whom havepreviously been vetted by the JBC.

WRIT OF MANDAMUS DOES NOT LIEAGAINST THE JBC

Mandamus shall issue when any tribunal,corporation, board, officer or personunlawfully neglects the performance of an act

that the law specifically enjoins as a dutyresulting from an office, trust, or station. It isproper when the act against which it isdirected is one addressed to the discretion of the tribunal or officer. Mandamus is notavailable to direct the exercise of a judgmentor discretion in a particular way.

TITLE: Guevara vs. InocentesCITATION: 16 SCRA 379. March 15, 1966

FACTS:

The petitioner, Onofre Guevara was extendedan ad interim appointment as Undersecretaryof Labor by the former Executive onNovember 18, 1965. Took his oath of officeon November 25th same year. The incumbent

Executive issued Memorandum Circulardated January 23, 1966 declaring that ainterim appointments made by the formExecutive lapsed with the adjournment special session of Congress at about miof January 22, 1966. The respondent,Raoul Inocentes was extended an adinterim appointment for the same positithe incumbent Executive on January 231966. Guevara filed before the court aninstant petition for Quo Warranto seekinbe declared person legally entitled to th

Officer of the Undersecretary of Labor uArt. VII Sec. 10 (4) of the 1935 Constitwhich states that:

The president shall have the power tomake appointments during the recess oCongress, but such appointments shall effective only until disapproval by theCommission on Appointments or untilthe next adjournment of Congress.

Since there was no Commissionon Appointments organized during the ssession which commenced on January 11966, the respondent contended that th

petitioner‘s ad interim appointment as wother made under similar conditions muhave lapsed when the Congress adjournlast special session. But the pet itioner sthat (1) the specific provision inthe Constitution which states that: ―untthe next adjournment of Congress‖ meaadjournment of a regular session of Conand not by a special session and (2) onSenate adjourned sine die at midnight oJanuary 22, 1966 and the House of theRepresentative merely ‗suspended‘ its session and to be resumed on Janua1966 at 10:00 AM. The petitioner therefconcludes that Congress has been in

continuous session without interruptionJanuary 17.

ISSUES:



1. Whether or not, the petitioner‘s contentionregarding ―the next adjournment of Congressspecifically provides for regular session only.

2. Whether or not, the petitioner‘s contentionthat Congress is still in continuous session?

RULING:

1. NO. The phrase ―untilthe next adjournment of Congress‖ does notmake any reference to specific session of

Congress, whether regular or special. But awell-know Latin maxim is statutoryconstruction stated that ‗when thelaw does not distinguish we should notdistinguish. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nosdistinguere debemus. It is safe to concludethat the authors of the1935 Constitution used theword ―adjournment‖ had in mind eitherregular or special and not simply the regularone as the petitioner contended.

2. NO. The mere fact that the Senateadjourned sine die at midnight of January 22,1966, the House of the Representative is only

a part of the Congress and not the Congressitself. So logically, the adjournment of one of its Houses is considered adjournment of theCongress as a whole. And the petitioner‘s adinterim appointment must have been lapsedon January 22, 1966 upon adjournment of theSenate.

TITLE:Matigbag vs. BenipayoCITATION:G.R. No. 149036, April 2, 2002

FACTS:

On February 1999, petitioner Matibag wasappointed Acting Director IV of theCOMELEC‘S EID by then COMELECChairperson Harriet Demetriou in a temporarycapacity. On

March 2001, respondent Benipayo was appointed COMELEC Chairmantogether withother commissioners in an ad interim appointment. While on such ad interimappointment, respondent Benipayo in hiscapacity as Chairman issued a Memorandumaddress transferring petitioner to the LawDepartment. Petitioner requested Benipayo toreconsider herrelief as Director IV of the EID and her re-assignment to the LawDepartment. She citedCivil Service Commission

Memorandum Circular No. 7 dated April 10, 2001, reminding heads of government offices that "transfer and detail of employees areprohibited during the election period.Benipayo denied her requestfor reconsideration on April 18, 2001,citing COMELEC Resolution No. 3300 datedNovember 6, 2000, exempting COMELEC fromthe coverage of the said Memo Circular.Petitioner appealed the denial of her requestfor reconsideration to the COMELEC en banc.

She also filed an administrative and criminal complaint with the Law Department againstBenipayo, alleging that her reassignment

violated Section 261of the Omnibus Election Code, COMELEC Resolution No. 3258, Civil Service MemorandumCircular No. 07, s. 001, and other pertinentadministrative and civil service laws, rulesand regulations. During the pendency of hercomplaint before the Law Department,petitioner filed the instant petition questioningthe appointment and the right to remain inoffice of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason,as Chairman and Commissioners of theCOMELEC, respectively. Petitioner claims thatthe ad interim appointments of Benipayo,Borra and Tuason violate the constitutionalprovisions on the independence of the

COMELEC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the assumption of office byBenipayo, Borra and Tuason on the basis

of the ad interim appointments issued by thePresident amounts to atemporary appointment prohibited by Section 1 (2),Article IX-C of the Constitution.

RULING:

We find petitioner‘s argument withoutmerit. An ad interim appointmentis a permanent appointment because it takeseffect immediately and can no longer be

withdrawn by the President once theappointee has qualified into office. The factthat it is subject to confirmation by theCommission on Appointments does not alterits permanent character. The constitutionitself makes an ad interim appointmentpermanent by making it effective untildisapproved by the Commission onAppointments or until the next adjournmentsof Congress.

ARTICLE IX

Section 1. The Constitutional Commissions,which shall be independent, are the CivilService Commission, the Commission onElections, and the Commission on Audit.

Section 2. No member of a ConstitutionalCommission shall, during his tenure, hold anyother office or employment. Neither shall heengage in the practice of any profession or inthe active management or control of anybusiness which, in any way, may be affectedby the functions of his office, nor shall he befinancially interested, directly or indirectly, inany contract with, or in any franchise orprivilege granted by the Government, any of its subdivisions, agencies, orinstrumentalities, including government-

owned or controlled corporations or theirsubsidiaries.

TITLE: De Rama vs. Court of Appeals

CITATION: G.R. No. 131136. February2001

FACTS:

Upon his assumption to the position of Mof Pagbilao, Quezon, petitioner ConradoRama wrote a letter to the CSC seekingrecall of the appointments of 14 municiemployees. Petitioner justified his recalrequest on the allegation that

the appointments of said employees we ―midnight‖ appointments of the formermayor, done in violation of Art. VII, Secof the Constitution. The CSC deniedpetitioner‘s request for the recall of the appointments of the 14 employees flack of merit. The CSC d ismissed petitioallegation that these were

―midnight‖ appointments, pointing outthat the constitutional provision relied uby petitioner prohibits only thoseappointments made by an outgoing Preand cannot be made to apply to local elofficials. The CSC opined that the appoiauthority can validly issue appointment

his term has expired, as long as theappointee meets the qualification standfor the position.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the appointments madethe outgoing Mayor are forbidden underVII, Sec. 15 of the Constitution

RULING:

The CSC correctly ruled that theconstitutional prohibition on so-called

―midnight appointments,‖ specifically th

made within 2 months immediately priothe next presidential elections, applies othe President or Acting President. Therelaw that prohibits local elective officials making appointments during the last daof his or her tenure.

http://cofferette.blogspot.com/2009/01/de-rama-vs-ca-gr-no-131136-february-28.html








ARTICLE VII

Section 15. Two months immediately beforethe next presidential elections and up to theend of his term, a President or ActingPresident shall not make appointments,except temporary appointments to executivepositions when continued vacancies thereinwill prejudice public service or endangerpublic safety.

Rule V, Section 9 of the Omnibus

Implementing Regulations of the RevisedAdministrative Code specifically provides that

―an appointment accepted by the appointeecannot be withdrawn or revoked by theappointing authority and shall remain in forceand in effect until disapproved by theCommission.‖ Thus, it is the CSC that isauthorized to recall an appointment initiallyapproved, but only when such appointmentand approval are proven to be in disregard of applicable provisions of the civil service lawand regulations.

Moreover, Section 10 of the same ruleprovides:

Sec. 10. An appointment issued inaccordance with pertinent laws and rules shalltake effect immediately upon its issuance bythe appointing authority, and if the appointeehas assumed the duties of the position, heshall be entitled to receive his salary at oncewithout awaiting the approval of hisappointment by the Commission. Theappointment shall remain effective untildisapproved by the Commission. In no caseshall an appointment take effect earlier thanhe date of its issuance.

Section 20 of Rule VI also provides:

Sec. 20. Notwithstanding the initial approvalof an appointment, the same may be recalledon any of the following grounds:

(a) Non-compliance with theprocedures/criteria provided inthe agency‘s Merit PromotionPlan;

(b) Failure to pass through theagency‘s Selection/PromotionBoard;

(c) Violation of the existingcollective agreement betweenmanagement and employeesrelative to promotion; or

(d) Violation of other existing civilservice law, rules andregulations.

Accordingly, the appointments of theprivate respondents may only be recalled onthe above-cited grounds. And yet, the onlyreason advanced by the petitioner to justifythe recall was that these were ―midnightappointments.‖ The CSC correctly ruled,however, that the constitutional prohibitionon so-called ―midnight appointments,‖ specifically those made within two (2) monthsimmediately prior to the next presidential

elections, applies only to the President orActing President.

WHEREFORE, in view of all theforegoing, the instant petition for review isDENIED and the Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 42896 affirmingCSC Resolutions Nos. 96-2828 and 96-7527 ishereby AFFIRMED in toto.

TITLE: Llamas vs. Orbos


FACTS:Ocampo III was the governor of TarlacProvince. Llamas together with some othercomplainants filed an administrative caseagainst Ocampo III for alleged acts

constituting graft and corruption. Ocampo IIIwas found guilty. He was suspended for officefor 90 days hence his vice governor, Llamas,assumed office. In not less than 30 dayshowever, Ocampo III returned with an AOshowing that he was pardoned hence he canresume office without completing the 90 daysuspension imposed upon him.The petitioner argues that President maygrant executive clemency only in criminalcases. They say that the qualifying phrase

―after conviction by final judgment‖ applies

solely to criminal cases, and no other lawallows the grant of executive clemency orpardon to anyone who has been ―convicted inan administrative case, allegedly because theword ―conviction‖ refers only to criminalcases.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the President of thePhilippines has the power to grant executiveclemency in administrative cases.

RULING:

Yes. It is not specified in the constitutionwhether it may be considered under criminalor administrative cases. , if the law does notdistinguish, so we must not distinguish. TheConstitution does not distinguish betweenwhich cases executive clemency may beexercised by the President, with the soleexclusion of impeachment cases. By the sametoken, if executive clemency may beexercised only in criminal cases, it wouldindeed be unnecessary to provide for the

exclusion of impeachment cases from thecoverage of Article VII, Section 19 of theConstitution. Cases of impeachment areautomatically excluded inasmuch as the samedo not necessarily involve criminal offenses.

The do not clearly see any valid andconvincing reason why the President cagrant executive clemency in administratcases. It is the court‘s considered view the President can grant reprieves,commutations and pardons, and remit fand forfeitures in criminal cases, with mmore reason can she grant executiveclemency in administrative cases, whichclearly less serious than criminal offens

The court stressed, however, that whensay the President can grant executiveclemency in administrative cases, we reonly to all administrative cases in theExecutive branch, not in the Judicial orLegislative branches of the governmentIn criminal cases, the quantum of eviderequired to convict an individual is proobeyond reasonable doubt. On the other in administrative cases, the quantum ofevidence required is mere substantialevidence to support a decision.

TITLE: TORRES v. GONZALESCITATION: 152 SCRA 272

FACTS: 1978, Torres was convicted of estafa. In1979, he was pardoned by the presidenthe condition that he shall not violate apenal laws again. Should this condition violated, he will be proceeded against inmanner prescribed by law. Petitioner acthe conditional pardon and was consequreleased from confinement. In 1982, To

was charged with multiple crimes of est1986, Gonzales petitioned for the canceof Torres‘ pardon. Hence, the presidentcancelled the pardon. Torres appealed tissue before the SC averring that the ExDep‘t erred in convicting him for violatinconditions of his pardon because the es



charges against him were not yet final andexecutory as they were still on appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not conviction of a crime by final judgment of a court is necessary before thepetitioner can be validly rearrested andrecommitted for violation of the terms of hisconditional pardon and accordingly to servethe balance of his original sentence.

RULING:

In proceeding against a convict who hasbeen conditionally pardoned and who isalleged to have breached the conditions of hispardon, the Executive Department has twooptions: (1) Section 64 (i) of the RevisedAdministrative Code, a purely executive act,

not subject to judicial scrutiny, or (2) Article159 of the Revised Penal Code, a judicial actconsisting of trial for and conviction of violation of a conditional pardon.

Where the President opts to proceed underSection 64 (i) of the Revised AdministrativeCode, no judicial pronouncement of guilt of asubsequent crime is necessary, much lessconviction therefore by final judgment of acourt, in order that a convict may berecommended for the violation of hisconditional pardon.

Under art. 159 of the RPC, parolee or convictwho is regarded as having violated theprovisions thereof must be charged,prosecuted and convicted by final judgmentbefore he can be made to suffer the penaltyprescribed.

In the case at bar, President has chosen toproceed against the petitioner under Section64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code.That choice is an exercise of the President‘sexecutive prerogative and is not subject to judicial scrutiny.

*Who determines if violated? The PRESIDENT.When the person was conditionally pardonedit was a generous exercise by the Chief Executive of his constitutional prerogative.

The acceptance thereof by the convict orprisoner carried with it the authority or powerof the Executive to determine whether acondition or conditions of the pardon has orhave been violated. To no other departmentof the Government has such power beenentrusted.

TITLE: Barrioquinto vs. FernandezCITATION: 82 Phil 642

FACTS:

Petitioners Norberto Jimenez and LoretoBarrioquinto were charged with the crimeof murder. As the latter had not yet beenarrested the case proceeded against theformer, and after trial Court of First Instanceof Zamboanga sentenced Jimenez to lifeimprisonment. Before the period forperfecting an appeal had expired, thedefendant Jimenez became aware of theProclamation No. 8, dated September 7,1946, which grants amnesty in favor of allpersons who may be charged with an actpenalized under the Revised Penal Code in

furtherance of the resistance to the enemy oragainst persons aiding in the war efforts of the enemy, and committed during the periodfrom December 8, 1941, to the date whenparticular area of the Philippines where theoffense was actually committed was liberatedfrom enemy control and occupation, and said

Jimenez decided to submit his case to theGuerrilla Amnesty Commission presided bythe respondents herein, and the otherpetitioner Loreto Barrioquinto, who had thenbeen already apprehended, did the same.After a preliminary hearing had started,the Amnesty Commission, prescribed by therespondents, issued on January 9, 1947, anorder returning the cases of the petitioners tothe Court of First Instance of Zamboanga,without deciding whether or not they areentitled to the benefits of he said Amnesty

Proclamation, on the ground that inasmuch asneither Barrioquinto nor Jimenez haveadmitted having committed the offense,because Barrioquinto alleged that it wasHipolito Tolentino who shot and killed thevictim, they cannot invoke the benefits of amnesty.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners are

entitled to the benefits of amnesty.

RULING:

In order to entitle a person to the benefits of the Amnesty Proclamation of September 7,1946, it is not necessary that he should, as acondition precedent or sine qua non, admithaving committed the criminal act or offensewith which he is charged and allege theamnesty as a defense; it is sufficient that theevidence either of the complainant or theaccused, shows that the offense committedcomes within the terms of said AmnestyProclamation.

Amnesty is hereby granted to all active andformer personnel of the AFP and PNP as wellas their supporters who have or may havecommitted crimes punishable under the

Revised Penal Code, the Articles of War orother laws in connection with, in relation orincident to the July 27, 2003 OakwoodMutiny, the February 2006 Marines Stand-Off and the November 29, 2007 Manila PeninsulaIncident who shall apply therefore; Providedthat amnesty shall not cover rape, acts of

torture, crimes against chastity and othcrimes committed for personal ends.

TITLE: Vera vs. PeopleCITATION: 7 SCRA 152

FACTS:

Vera, Figueras, Ambas, Florido, Bayra92 others (97 in all) were charged w

complex crime of kidnapping with muAmadeo Lozanes. They invoked the bof the amnesty proclamation of the preand the case was referred to the 8th gamnesty commission. none of the petiadmitted having committed the crimewas the only one who took the witnessand denied having killed Lozanes.

The commission said it could notcognizance of the case because the bof amnesty could only be invokdefendants in a criminal case who, adcommission of the crime, plead that thcrime was committed in pursuance

resistance movement and perpetrated apersons who aided the enemy durinJapanese occupation.

When Vera appealed, the amcommission denied the appeal, addinthe facts of the case showed that the was a member of another guerilla grothat the murder seemed to have stefrom a rivalry between the two groups.

Vera brought the case to the CoAppeals, asking the CA to also rule, onor another, of the murder case. But truled that amnesty applies only to thoshad admitted the fact but said they not be punished for the crime done pursuance of resistance to the enemy. said it could not take cognizance murder case because that came froamnesty commission, which ha jurisdiction over the murder case.



The case was brought to the Court on appeal,which cited People vs Llanita, which said thatit was inconsistent for an appellant to justifyan act or seek forgiveness for somethingwhich he said he has not committed.

ISSUE:

• Whether or not there is adistinction between pardon andamnesty?

RULING:

Amnesty presupposes the commission of acrime, and when the accused maintains thathe has not committed a crime, he cannothave any use for amnesty.

Where an amnesty proclamation imposescertain conditions, as in this case, it isincumbent upon the accused to prove theexistence of such conditions. The invocationof amnesty is in the nature of a plea of confession and avoidance, which means thatthe pleader admits the allegations againsthim but disclaims liability therefore on

account of intervening facts which, if proved,would bring the crime charged within thescope of the amnesty proclamation.

The term "amnesty" belongs to internationallaw, and is applied to rebellions which by theirmagnitude are properly within internationallaw, but has no technical meaning in thecommon law. It is a synonym of oblivion,which in the English law is the synonym of pardon. (Bouvier, "Amnesty.") In so far asthe proclamation extends to the offenses of treason and sedition, it may be regarded asan amnesty.

But as to those offenses which have arisenout of internal political feuds and dissensionsamong the Filipinos themselves, such as theordinary crimes of murder, robbery, arson,etc., the proclamation must be regarded inthe nature of a pardon. A pardon may begeneral, applying to all persons falling within

a certain category, or it may be conceded to asingle individual for an ordinary crime, inwhich latter case it is a special pardon, and isevidenced by a writing, the acceptance of which is necessary in order that it maybecome effectual.

Where the pardoning power is vested in thelegislature and is exercised by legislativegrant, and is in the nature of a generalamnesty for strictly political offenses, it hasbeen considered in the nature of a public law,thus having the same effect on the case as if the general law punishing the offense hadbeen repealed or annulled. (United States vs. Wilson, 7 Peters, 163.)

TITLE: Monsanto v. FactoranCITATION: G.R. No. 78239. February 9,1989

FACTS:

Monsanto was the Asst. Treasurer of Calbayug City. She was charged for the crimeof Estafa through Falsification of PublicDocuments. She was found guilty and wassentenced to jail. She was however grantedpardon by Marcos. She then wrote a letter tothe Minister of Finance for her to bereinstated to her former position since it wasstill vacant. She was also requesting for backpays.

The Minister of Finance referred the issue tothe Office of the President and Factorandenied Monsanto‘s request averring thatMonsanto must first seek appointment andthat the pardon does not reinstate her formerposition. Also, Monsanto avers that by reasonof the pardon, she should no longer becompelled to answer for the civil liabilitiesbrought about by her acts.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Monsanto should bereinstated to her former post.

RULING:

Pardon is defined as "an act of grace,proceeding from the power entrusted with theexecution of the laws, which exempts the

individual, on whom it is bestowed, from thepunishment the law inflicts for a crime he hascommitted. It is the private, though officialact of the executive magistrate, delivered tothe individual for whose benefit it is intended,and not communicated officially to the Court.A pardon is a deed, to the validity of whichdelivery is essential, and delivery is notcomplete without acceptance."Petitionermaintains that when she was issued absolutepardon, the Chief Executive declared her notguilty of the crime for which she wasconvicted. In the case of State v. Hazzard,we find this strong observation: "To assumethat all or even a major number of pardons

are issued because of innocence of therecipients is not only to indict our judicialsystem, but requires us to assume that whichwe all know to be untrue.

A pardon looks to the future. It is notretrospective. It makes no amends for thepast. It affords no relief for what has beensuffered by the offender. It does not imposeupon the government any obligation to makereparation for what has been suffered. ―Sincethe offense has been established by judicialproceedings, that which has been done orsuffered while they were in force is presumedto have been rightfully done and justly

suffered, and no satisfaction for it can berequired.‖ This would explain why petitioner,though pardoned, cannot be entitled toreceive back pay for lost earnings andbenefits. On the other hand, civil liabilityarising from crime is governed by the RPC. Itsubsists not withstanding service of sentence,

or for any reason the sentence is not seby pardon, amnesty or commutation of sentence. Petitioner‘s civil liability may be extinguished by the same causesrecognized in the Civil Code, namely:payment, loss of the thing due, remissithe debt, merger of the rights of creditodebtor, compensation and novation.

TITLE: TORRES VS. DIRECTOR OF BUOF PRISONSCITATION: G.R. NO. 122338. DECEMB1995

FACTS:

The wife and children of convictedWilfredo Sumulong Torres pray foimmediate release from prison on the gthat the exercise of the Presprerogative under Section 64 (i) o

Revised Administrative Code to determoccurrence, if any, of a breach of a coof a pardon in violation of pardonee's rdue process and the constitpresumption of innocence, constitutes aabuse of discretion amounting to lexcess of jurisdiction.

Of two counts of estafa Torres was conby the Court of First Instance of Manilatime before 1979. These convictionsaffirmed by the Court of Appealsmaximum sentence would expirNovember 2, 2000. On April 18, 19conditional pardon was granted to Tor

the President of the Philippines on cothat petitioner would "not again violatethe penal laws of the Philippines. 5" Petaccepted the conditional pardon anconsequently released from confinemen



On May 21, 1986, the Board of Pardons andParole resolved to recommend to thePresident the cancellation of the conditionalpardon granted to Torres because Torres hadbeen charged with twenty counts of estafabefore, and convicted of sedition by, theRegional Trial Court of Quezon City. OnSeptember 8, 1986, the President cancelledthe conditional pardon of Torres. On October10, 1986, then Minister of Justice Neptali A.Gonzales issued "by authority of thePresident" an Order of Arrest and

Recommitment 7 against petitioner. Thepetitioner was accordingly arrested andconfined in Muntinlupa to serve the unexpiredportion of his sentence. Torres impugned thevalidity of the Order of Arrest andRecommitment in the aforecited case of Torres v. Gonzales 8. There we ruled that-Succinctly put, in proceeding against a convictwho has been conditional pardoned and whois alleged to have breached the conditions of his pardon, the Executive Department hastwo options: (i) to proceed against him underSection 64 (i) of the Revised AdministrativeCode, or (ii) to proceed against him underArticle 159 of the Revised Penal Code. Here,

the President has chosen to proceed againstthe petitioner under Section 64 (i) of theRevised Administrative Code. That choice isan exercise of the President's executiveprerogative and is not subject to judicialscrutiny.

ISSUE:

• Whether or not the exerciseof the President's prerogativeunder Section 64 (i) of theRevised Administrative Codeviolates the pardonee's right todue process and the constitutional

presumption of innocence,constitutes a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack orexcess of jurisdiction?

RULING:

A conditional pardon is in the nature of acontract between the sovereign power or theChief Executive and the convicted criminal tothe effect that the former will release thelatter subject to the condition that if he doesnot comply with the terms of the pardon, hewill be recommitted to prison to serve theunexpired portion of the sentence or anadditional one. 10 By the pardonee's consentto the terms stipulated in this contract, the

pardonee has thereby placed himself underthe supervision of the Chief Executive or hisdelegate who is duty-bound to see to it thatthe pardonee complies with the terms andconditions of the pardon. Under Section 64 (i)of the Revised Administrative Code, the Chief Executive is authorized to order "the arrestand re-incarceration of any such person who,in his judgment, shall fail to comply with thecondition, or conditions of his pardon, parole,or suspension of sentence." It is now a well-entrenched rule in this jurisdiction that thisexercise of presidential judgment is beyond judicial scrutiny. The determination of theviolation of the conditional pardon rests

exclusively in the sound judgment of theChief Executive, and the pardonee, havingconsented to place his liberty on conditionalpardon upon the judgment of the power thathas granted it, cannot invoke the aid of thecourts, however erroneous the findings maybe upon which his recommitment wasordered. 11

It matters not that in the case of Torres, hehas allegedly been acquitted in two of thethree criminal cases filed against himsubsequent to his conditional pardon, andthat the third case remains pending forthirteen (13) years in apparent violation of his

right to a speedy trial.

Habeas corpus lies only where the restraint of a person's liberty has been judicially adjudgedas illegal or unlawful. In the instant petition,the incarceration of Torres remains legalconsidering that, were it not for the grant of

conditional pardon which had been revokedbecause of a breach thereof, thedetermination of which is beyond judicialscrutiny, he would have served his finalsentence for his first conviction untilNovember 2, 2000.

Ultimately, solely vested in the Chief Executive, who in the first place was theexclusive author of the conditional pardon andof its revocation, is the corollary prerogativeto reinstate the pardon if in his own

judgment, the acquittal of the pardonee fromthe subsequent charges filed against him,warrants the same. Courts have no authorityto interfere with the grant by the President of a pardon to a convicted criminal.

It has been our fortified ruling that a final judicial pronouncement as to the guilt of apardonee is not a requirement for thePresident to determine whether or not therehas been a breach of the terms of aconditional pardon. There is likewise nil abasis for the courts to effectuate thereinstatement of a conditional pardon revokedby the President in the exercise of powers

undisputedly solely and absolutely lodged inhis office.

The instant petition for habeas corpus wasdismissed for lack of merit.

TITLE: MACAGA-AN VS. PEOPLECITATION: 152 SCRA 430 G.R. NOS. 77317-50. JULY 29, 1987

FACTS:

On 14 March 1986, petitioners moved "toclose their cases and release [their] bond[s]"on the ground that they had been givenamnesty by former President F. E. Marcos on28 January 1986. The Sandiganbayanrequired them to submit originals orauthenticated copies of their amnesty papers,

which petitioners were unable to prThereupon, the Sandiganbayan petitioners' motion. In a motioreconsideration, the accused sought toby secondary evidence their claim thahad been granted amnesty by President Marcos. The Tanodbayan obto allowing the accused to adduce secevidence of grant(s) of amnesty taccused. In an extended resolution daJanuary 1987, the respondent Sandigandenied the motion for reconsideration.

The petitioners now seek certiorari to and set aside the extended resolution Sandiganbayan, claiming that the respcourt committed reversible error, firsholding that Presidential Decree No. 108applicable amnesty statue accordipetitioners, did not apply to themsecondly, in not allowing them to psecondary evidence of the amnesty algranted by the former President tpetitioners.

The petitioners state that they appliamnesty through the 3rd and 11th AmCommission (sic) of Lanao del Sur and City and that on 2 February 1985, thegranted conditional amnesty b , thCommission, subject to the approval oaction of the President of the Philpursuant to P.D. No. 1082, dated 2 Fe1977. The Amnesty Commissionpetitioners continue, endorsed the amapplications of the petitioners toPresident, recommending approval thegrant of executive clemency topetitioners. The petitioners' amapplications are said to have been sub

to the Office of the President by thPresidential Assistant Victor Nituda. Governor Mohammed Ali Dimaporopetitioners further state, made wrepresentations dated 27 January 198former President Marcos concerninpetitioners' applications during a politic



of the Kilusang Bagong Lipunan on 22January 1986. Mr. Marcos apparently wroteon the upper righthand corner of formerGovernor Dimaporo's letter the following:"Approved" and signed the same with a partlyillegible date. The petitioners state, finally,that the original copies of the amnesty paperswere in the possession of then PresidentialAdviser Joaquin Venus and were lost ordestroyed at Malacanang "during theFebruary 1986 bloodless military revolution"and could not now be located.

The respondent Sandiganbayan declined toallow the petitioners to submit secondaryevidence of the claimed applications for andgrant of amnesty, upon the ground that evenif the petitioners were to succeed in provingor authenticating the alleged amnesty papersthrough secondary evidence, petitionerswould nonetheless not be entitled todischarge from the convictions rendered bythat court. The respondent court held that thebenefits of amnesty were never available tothe petitioners under P.D. No. 1182.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner can be grantedon the applied amnesty.

RULING:

No. P.D. No. 1182 as amended by P.D. No.1429, dated 10 June 1978, provides, inrelevant portion, as follows:

SECTION 1. Proclamation of Amnesty .— Amnesty is hereby decreed in favorof all persons who have been arrested

and/or charged, or although notarrested and/or charged may havecommitted acts which make themliable for, violation of the provisions of

Republic Act No. 1700, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 885. andthose who have been arrested for,

and or charged or chargeablewith crimes against public order asdefined and penalized under RevisedPenal Code, including those crimesand offenses which may have beencommitted by said persons infurtherance thereof.

SEC. 2. Persons Disqualified. — Thefollowing persons are disqualifiedfrom amnesty under this Decree:

(a) Those who havepromoted, maintained orheaded a rebellion orinsurrection or who, whileholding public office or

employment took parttherein, engaged in waragainst the forces of theGovernment, destroyedproperty or committed seriousviolence, exactedcontributions or diverted

public funds from the lawful purpose for which they had been appropriated; provided,that persons who have beenarrested and/or charged withhaving merely participated orexecuted the commands of others in a rebellion may begranted amnesty.

(b) Those who have beenarrested and/or charged withmurder, homicide, seriousphysical injuries, crimesagainst chastity, robbery,piracy, arson, hijacking,violations of the Firearms and

Explosives Law, and assaultupon and resistance anddisobedience to persons inauthority and their agents,except if such crime oroffense was committed infurtherance of subversion or

crimes against public order asa mereparticipant/affiliate/member.

SEC. 4. Conditions for the grant of amnesty .— Any person applying for amnesty pursuantto this Decree must satisfy the followingrequirements:

a. If under arrest or charged as of thedate of this decree, he must submithis application not later thanSeptember 30, 1978 in the prescribedform hereto attached as Annex A;

If not under arrest, he must submitsuch application within six monthsafter his arrest or surrender;

b. He must renew his oath of allegiance to the Republic of thePhilippines and swear or affirm tosupport and defend the Constitutionof the Philippines; and

c. He must surrender whateverunlicensed firearms and/or explosivesand ammunition he may have in hispossession." (Emphasis supplied)

As pointed out by the Sandiganbayan, underthe very legislation authorizing the amnesty,

(a) The crimes to be amnestied musthave been for violations of subversionlaws or those defined and proscribedunder crimes against public order under the Revised Penal Code;and

(b) The applications for amnesty musthave been filed not later thanSeptember 30, 1978 or six monthsafter the arrest or surrender of theapplicant for amnesty."

The instant case therefore presents the of what effect, if any, may be given tosupposed acts of the former President wwere in conflict with or in violation of deissued by that same former President. Sviewed, this Court has no alternative sadeclare that the supposed acts of the foPresident done in 1985 in clear conflict the restrictions embodied in the very depromulgated by that same former Presicannot be given any legal effect. It maysupposed that the former President cou

have validly amended Presidential DecrNos. 1082 and 1182 so as to wipe awayrestrictions and limitations in fact foundthose decrees. But the former Presidentdid not so amend his own decrees and must be held to the terms and conditionhe himself had promulgated in the exerlegislative power.

It may be — we do not completely discothe possibility — that the former Presidin fact act in contravention of the decrehere involved by granting the amnestyclaimed by petitioners, and that by suchhe may indeed have aroused expectatio

(however unjustified under the terms ofexisting law) in the minds of the petitioIf such be the case, then the appropriatrecourse of the petitioners is not to thisCourt, nor to any other court, but rathethe Executive Department of the govern

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. ThResolution dated 27 January 1987 of threspondent Sandiganbayan is AFFIRMEDpronouncement as to costs.

TITLE: IBP vs. Zamora

CITATION: G.R. No. 141284. Augu2000

FACTS:



Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution,the President directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each otherfor the proper deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in preventing orsuppressing criminal or lawless violence. ThePresident declared that the services of theMarines in the anti-crime campaign aremerely temporary in nature and for areasonable period only, until such time whenthe situation shall have improved. The IBP

filed a petition seeking to declare thedeployment of the Philippine Marines null andvoid and unconstitutional.

ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the President‘s factualdetermination of the necessity of calling thearmed forces is subject to judicial review(2) Whether or not the calling of the armedforces to assist the PNP in joint visibilitypatrols violates the constitutionalprovisions on civilian supremacy over themilitary and the civilian character of the PNP

RULING:When the President calls the armed forces toprevent or suppress lawless violence, invasionor rebellion, he necessarily exercises adiscretionary power solely vested in hiswisdom. Under Sec. 18, Art. VII of theConstitution, Congress may revoke suchproclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus andthe Court may review the sufficiency of thefactual basis thereof. However, there is nosuch equivalent provision dealing with therevocation or review of the President‘s actionto call out the armed forces. The distinction

places the calling out power in a differentcategory from the power to declare martiallaw and power to suspend the privilege of thewrit of habeas corpus, otherwise, the framersof the Constitution would have simply lumpedtogether the 3 powers and provided for theirrevocation and review without any

qualification.

The reason for the difference in the treatmentof the said powers highlights the intent togrant the President the widest leeway andbroadest discretion in using the power to callout because it is considered as the lesser andmore benign power compared to the power tosuspend the privilege of the writ of habeascorpus and the power to impose martial law,both of which involve the curtailment andsuppression of certain basic civil rights and

individual freedoms, and thus necessitatingsafeguards by Congress and review by theCourt.

In view of the constitutional intent to give thePresident full discretionary power todetermine the necessity of calling out thearmed forces, it is incumbent upon thepetitioner to show that the President‘sdecision is totally bereft of factual basis. Thepresent petition fails to discharge such heavyburden, as there is no evidence to support theassertion that there exists no justification forcalling out the armed forces.

The Court disagrees to the contention that bythe deployment of the Marines, the civiliantask of law enforcement is ―militarized‖ inviolation of Sec. 3, Art. II of the Constitution.The deployment of the Marines does notconstitute a breach of the civilian supremacyclause. The calling of the Marines constitutespermissible use of military assets for civilianlaw enforcement. The local police forces arethe ones in charge of the visibility patrols atall times, the real authority belonging to thePNP

Moreover, the deployment of the Marines toassist the PNP does not unmake the civilian

character of the police force. The realauthority in the operations is lodged with thehead of a civilian institution, the PNP, and notwith the military. Since none of the Marineswas incorporated or enlisted as members of the PNP, there can be no appointment tocivilian position to speak of. Hence, the

deployment of the Marines in the jointvisibility patrols does not destroy the civiliancharacter of the PNP.

TITLE: Lacson Vs. PerezCITATION: 357 SCRA 756 G.R. No. 147780.May 10, 2001

FACTS:

President Macapagal-Arroyo declared a Stateof Rebellion (Proclamation No. 38) on May 1,2001 as well as General Order No. 1 orderingthe AFP and the PNP to suppress the rebellionin the NCR. Warrantless arrests of severalalleged leaders and promoters of the

―rebellion‖ were thereafter effected. Petitionerfiled for prohibition, injunction, mandamusand habeas corpus with an application for theissuance of temporary restraining orderand/or writ of preliminary injunction.Petitioners assail the declaration of Proc. No.38 and the warrantless arrests allegedlyeffected by virtue thereof. Petitionersfurthermore pray that the appropriate court,

wherein the information against them werefiled, would desist arraignment and trial untilthis instant petition is resolved. They alsocontend that they are allegedly faced withimpending warrantless arrests and unlawfulrestraint being that hold departure orderswere issued against them.

ISSUE:

Whether or Not Proclamation No. 38 is valid,along with the warrantless arrests and holddeparture orders allegedly effected by thesame.

RULING:

President Macapagal-Arroyo ordered thelifting of Proc. No. 38 on May 6, 2006,accordingly the instant petition has beenrendered moot and academic. Respondentshave declared that the Justice Department

and the police authorities intend to regular warrants of arrests from the couall acts committed prior to and until M2001. Under Section 5, Rule 113 of theof Court, authorities may only reswarrantless arrests of persons suspecrebellion in suppressing the rebellioncircumstances so warrant, thuswarrantless arrests are not based onNo. 38. Petitioner‘s prayer for mandamprohibition is improper at this time bean individual warrantlessly arreste

adequate remedies in law: Rule 112 Rules of Court, providing for preliinvestigation, Article 125 of the RevisedCode, providing for the period in wwarrantlessly arrested person mudelivered to the proper judicial authotherwise the officer responsible for sucbe penalized for the delay of the samedetention should have no legal grounarresting officer can be charged with ardetention, not prejudicial to claim of daunder Article 32 of the Civil Code. Petitwere neither assailing the validity subject hold departure orders, nor werexpressing any intention to leave the c

in the near future. To declare thedeparture orders null and void ab initiobe made in the proper proceedings infor that purpose. Petitioners‘ prayer foregarding their alleged impending warrarrests is premature being that no comhave been filed against them for any furthermore, the writ of habeas coruncalled for since its purpose is to unlawful restraint which Petitioners asubjected to.

Petition is dismissed. Respondents, conand congruent with their undertaking adverted to, together with their a

representatives, and all persons acttheir behalf, are hereby enjoinedarresting Petitioners without the re judicial warrants for all acts commitrelation to or in connection with the M2001 siege of Malacañang.



TITLE: David vs. Macapagal-Arroyo

CITATION: G.R. No. 171396. May 3, 2006

FACTS:

In February 2006, due to the escape of someMagdalo members and the discovery of a plan(Oplan Hackle I) to assassinate GMA shedeclared PP 1017 and is to be implementedby GO 5. The said law was aimed to suppresslawlessness and the connivance of extremists

to bring down the government. Pursuant tosuch PP, GMA cancelled all plans to celebrateEDSA I and at the same time revoked allpermits issued for rallies and other publicorganization/meeting. Notwithstanding thecancellation of their rally permit, KMU headRandolf David proceeded to rally which led tohis arrest. Later that day, the Daily Tribune,which Cacho-Olivares is the editor, was raidedby the CIDG and they seized and confiscatedanti-GMA articles and write ups. Later still,another known anti-GMA news agency(Malaya) was raided and seized. On the sameday, Beltran of Anakpawis, was also arrested.His arrest was however grounded on a

warrant of arrest issued way back in 1985 forhis actions against Marcos. His supporterscannot visit him in jail because of the currentimposition of PP 1017 and GO 5. In March,GMA issued PP 1021 w/c declared that thestate of national emergency ceased to exist.David and some opposition Congressmenaverred that PP1017 is unconstitutional for ithas no factual basis and it cannot be validlydeclared by the president for such power isreposed in Congress. Also such declaration isactually a declaration of martial law. Olivares-Cacho also averred that the emergencycontemplated in the Constitution are those of natural calamities and that such is an over

breadth. Petitioners claim that PP 1017 is anover breadth because it encroaches uponprotected and unprotected rights. The Sol-Gen argued that the issue has become mootand academic by reason of the lifting of PP1017 by virtue of the declaration of PP 1021.The Sol-Gen averred that PP 1017 is within

the president‘s calling out power, take carepower and take over power.

ISSUE:

Whether or not PP 1017 and GO 5 isconstitutional.

RULING:

The issue cannot be considered as moot and

academic by reason of the lifting of thequestioned PP. It is still in fact operativebecause there are parties still affected due tothe alleged violation of the said PP. Hence,the SC can take cognition of the case at bar.The SC ruled that PP 1017 is constitutional inpart and at the same time some provisions of which are unconstitutional. The SC ruled inthe following way;

Resolution by the SC on the Factual Basis of its declaration

The petitioners were not able to prove thatGMA has factual basis in issuing PP 1017 and

GO 5. A reading of the Solicitor General‘sConsolidated Comment and Memorandumshows a detailed narration of the eventsleading to the issuance of PP 1017, withsupporting reports forming part of therecords. Mentioned are the escape of theMagdalo Group, their audacious threat of theMagdalo D-Day, the defections in the military,particularly in the Philippine Marines, and thereproving statements from the communistleaders. There was also the Minutes of theIntelligence Report and Security Group of thePhilippine Army showing the growing alliancebetween the NPA and the military. Petitionerspresented nothing to refute such events.

Thus, absent any contrary allegations, theCourt is convinced that the President was justified in issuing PP 1017 calling for militaryaid. Indeed, judging the seriousness of theincidents, GMA was not expected to simplyfold her arms and do nothing to prevent orsuppress what she believed was lawless

violence, invasion or rebellion. However, theexercise of such power or duty must not stifleliberty.

Resolution by the SC on the OverbreadthTheory

First and foremost, the overbreadth doctrineis an analytical tool developed for testing ‗ontheir faces‘ statutes in free speech cases. The7 consolidated cases at bar are not primarily

‗freedom of speech‘ cases. Also, a plain

reading of PP 1017 shows that it is notprimarily directed to speech or even speech-related conduct. It is actually a call upon theAFP to prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence. Moreover, the overbreadthdoctrine is not intended for testing thevalidity of a law that ‗reflects legitimate stateinterest in maintaining comprehensive controlover harmful, constitutionally unprotectedconduct.‘ Undoubtedly, lawless violence,insurrection and rebellion are considered

‗harmful‘ and ‗constitutionally unprotectedconduct.‘ Thus, claims of facial overbreadthare entertained in cases involving statuteswhich, by their terms, seek to regulate only

‗spoken words‘ and again, that ‗overbreadthclaims, if entertained at all, have beencurtailed when invoked against ordinarycriminal laws that are sought to be applied toprotected conduct.‘ Here, the incontrovertiblefact remains that PP 1017 pertains to aspectrum of conduct, not free speech, whichis manifestly subject to state regulation.

Resolution by the SC on the Calling OutPower Doctrine

On the basis of Sec 17, Art 7 of theConstitution, GMA declared PP 1017. The SCconsidered the President‘s ‗calling-out‘ power

as a discretionary power solely vested in hiswisdom, it stressed that ‗this does notprevent an examination of whether suchpower was exercised within permissibleconstitutional limits or whether it wasexercised in a manner constituting graveabuse of discretion. The SC ruled that GMA

has validly declared PP 1017 for theConstitution grants the President, asCommander-in-Chief, a ‗sequence‘ of graduated powers. From the most to thbenign, these are: the calling-out powepower to suspend the privilege of the whabeas corpus, and the power to declarMartial Law. The only criterion for theexercise of the calling-out power is that

‗whenever it becomes necessary,‘ thePresident may call the armed forces ‗toprevent or suppress lawless violence, in

or rebellion.‘ And such criterion has beemet.

Resolution by the SC on the Take CaDoctrine

Pursuant to the 2ndsentence of Sec 17,of the Constitution (He shall ensure thalaws be faithfully executed.) the presidedeclared PP 1017. David et al averred t1017 however violated Sec 1, Art 6 of tConstitution for it arrogated legislative pto the President. Such power is vested Congress. They assail the clause ‗to enfobedience to all the laws and to all decr

orders and regulations promulgated by personally or upon my direction.‘ The SCnoted that such provision is similar to tpower that granted former President Malegislative powers (as provided in PP 10The SC ruled that the assailed PP 1017 unconstitutional insofar as it grants GMAauthority to promulgate ‗decrees.‘ Legispower is peculiarly within the province oLegislature. Sec 1, Article 6 categoricallstates that ‗[t]he legislative power shallvested in the Congress of the Philippinewhich shall consist of a Senate and a Hoof Representatives.‘ To be sure, neitherMartial Law nor a state of rebellion nor

of emergency can justify GMA‘[s exercislegislative power by issuing decrees. Thpresident can only ―take care‖ of the caout of laws but cannot create or enact l

Resolution by the SC on the Take OvPower Doctrine

d th Cit f C t b t d t t f RULING D i th t i l th US G t f



The president cannot validly order the takingover of private corporations or institutionssuch as the Daily Tribune without anyauthority from Congress. On the other hand,the word emergency contemplated in theconstitution is not limited to naturalcalamities but rather it also includes rebellion.The SC made a distinction; the president candeclare the state of national emergency buther exercise of emergency powers does notcome automatically after it for such exercise

needs authority from Congress. The authorityfrom Congress must be based on thefollowing:

1 There must be a war or other emergency.

(2) The delegation must be for a limitedperiod only.

(3) The delegation must be subject to suchrestrictions as the Congress may prescribe.

(4) The emergency powers must be exercisedto carry out a national policy declared byCongress.

Resolution by the SC on the Issue that PP1017 is a Martial Law Declaration

The SC ruled that PP 1017 is not a MartialLaw declaration and is not tantamount to it. Itis a valid exercise of the calling out power of the president by the president.

TITLE: Ampatuan vs. Puno

CITATION: G.R. No. 190259. June 7, 2011

FACTS: On November 24, 2009, the day after thegruesome massacre of 57 men and women,then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyoissued Proclamation 1946, placing ―theProvinces of Maguindanao and Sultan Kudarat

and the City of Cotabato under a state of emergency.‖ She directed the AFP and thePNP ―to undertake such measures as may beallowed by the Constitution and by law toprevent and suppress all incidents of lawlessviolence‖ in the named places. Under AO 273,she also delegated to the DILG thesupervision of the ARMM.The petitioners claimed that the President‘sissuances encroached the ARMM‘s autonomy,that it constitutes an invalid exercise of emergency powers, and that the President

had no factual basis for declaring a state of emergency, especially in the Province of Sultan Kudarat and the City of Cotabato,where no critical violent incidents occurred.They want Proc. 1946 and AO 273 bedeclared unconstitutional.

The respondents, however, said that itspurpose was not to deprive the ARMM of itsautonomy, but to restore peace and order insubject places. It is pursuant to her ―callingout‖ power as Commander-in-Chief. Thedetermination of the need to exercise thispower rests solely on her wisdom.

The President merely delegated hersupervisory powers over the ARMM to theDILG Secretary who was her alter ego anyway. The delegation was necessary tofacilitate the investigation of the mass killings

ISSUE:1. Whether or not President Arroyo invalidlyexercised emergency powers when she calledout the AFP and the PNP to prevent andsuppress all incidents of lawless violence inMaguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and CotabatoCity.

2.Whether or not there is factual basis on thecalling out of the Armed Forces.

RULING:

1. NO. The President did not proclaim anational emergency, only a state of emergency in the three places mentioned.And she did not act pursuant to any lawenacted by Congress that authorized her toexercise extraordinary powers. The calling outof the armed forces to prevent or suppresslawless violence in such places is a power thatthe Constitution directly vests in the

President. She did not need a congressionalauthority to exercise the same.

2. Yes. The President‘ s call on the armedforces to prevent or suppress lawless violencesprings from the power vested in her underSection 18, Article VII of the Constitution.While it is true that the Court may inquire intothe factual bases for the President‘s exerciseof the above power, unless it is shown thatsuch determination was attended by graveabuse of discretion, the Court will accordrespect to the President‘s judgment.

TITLE: Nicolas vs. Romulo

CITATION: G.R. NO. 175888. February 11,2009

FACTS:

Herein respondent, Lance Corporal DanielSmith, is a member of the United StatesArmed Forces. He was charged with the crime

of rape committed against a Filipina, SuzetteS. Nicolas. Pursuant to the Visiting ForcesAgreement (VFA) between the Republic of thePhilippines and the United States, the UnitedStates, at its request, was granted custody of defendant Smith pending the proceedings.

During the trial, the US Government facomplied with its undertaking to defendant Smith to the trial court everhis presence was required. EventualRegional Trial Court rendered its Definding defendant Smith guilty. He shalhis sentence in the facilities that shagreed upon by appropriate PhilippinUnited States pursuant to the VFA. Pagreement on such facilities, accuhereby temporarily committed to the City Jail.

However, defendant was taken out Makati jail by a contingent of Philippienforcement agents, and brought to a for detention under the control of the States government, provided for undeagreements between the Philippines aUnited States, referred to as the RoKenney Agreement. This agreement prthat in accordance with the Visiting Agreement signed, Smith, United Marine Corps, be returned to United military custody at the U.S. EmbaManila.

Petitioners contend that the Philippines have custody of Smith because if theyallow such transfer of custody of an ato a foreign power is to provide for a dirule of procedure for that accused. Theprotection clause of the Constitution violated.

ISSUE:

• Whether or Not there violation of the equal proclause?

RULING:

The equal protection clause is not vibecause there is a substantial basisdifferent treatment of a member of a fmilitary armed forces allowed to entterritory and all other accused.

The rule in international law is that a foreign the United States towards an agreement on [The Court DISMISSED the Moreover it is inconseq



The rule in international law is that a foreignarmed forces allowed to enter one‘s territoryis immune from local jurisdiction, except tothe extent agreed upon. The Status of ForcesAgreements involving foreign military unitsaround the world vary in terms andconditions, according to the situation of theparties involved, and reflect their bargainingpower. But the principle remains, i.e., thereceiving State can exercise jurisdiction overthe forces of the sending State only to theextent agreed upon by the parties.

As a result, the situation involved is not onein which the power of this Court to adoptrules of procedure is curtailed or violated, butrather one in which, as is normallyencountered around the world, the laws(including rules of procedure) of one State donot extend or apply – except to the extentagreed upon – to subjects of another Statedue to the recognition of extraterritorialimmunity given to such bodies as visitingforeign armed forces.

Applying, however, the provisions of VFA, theCourt finds that there is a different treatment

when it comes to detention as againstcustody.

It is clear that the parties to the VFArecognized the difference between custodyduring the trial and detention after conviction,because they provided for a specificarrangement to cover detention. And thisspecific arrangement clearly states not onlythat the detention shall be carried out infacilities agreed on by authorities of bothparties, but also that the detention shall be"by Philippine authorities." Therefore, theRomulo-Kenney Agreements of December 19and 22, 2006, which are agreements on thedetention of the accused in the United StatesEmbassy, are not in accord with the VFA itself because such detention is not "by Philippineauthorities."

Respondents should therefore comply withthe VFA and negotiate with representatives of

the United States towards an agreement ondetention facilities under Philippine authoritiesas mandated by Art. V, Sec. 10 of the VFA.The Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) betweenthe Republic of the Philippines and the UnitedStates, was UPHELD as constitutional, but theRomulo-Kenney Agreements were DECLAREDnot in accordance with the VFA.

TITLE: Bayan v. ZamoraCITATION: 342 SCRA 449

FACTS:

The Republic of the Philippines andthe United States of America entered into anagreement called the Visiting ForcesAgreement (VFA). The agreement was treatedas a treaty by the Philippine government andwas ratified by then-President Joseph Estradawith the concurrence of 2/3 of the totalmembership of the Philippine Senate.

The VFA defines the treatment of U.S.troops and personnel visiting thePhilippines. It provides for the guidelines to

govern such visits, and further defines therights of the U.S. and the Philippinegovernments in the matter of criminal jurisdiction, movement of vessel and aircraft,importation and exportation of equipment,materials and supplies.

Petitioners argued, inter alia, that theVFA violates §25, Article XVIII of the 1987Constitution, which provides that ―foreignmilitary bases, troops, or facilities shall not beallowed in the Philippines except under atreaty duly concurred in by the Senate and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State.”

ISSUE: Was the VFA unconstitutional?

RULING:

[The Court DISMISSED theconsolidated petitions, held that the

petitioners did not commit grave abuse of discretion, and sustained the constitutionality of the VFA.]

NO, the VFA is not unconstitutional.

Section 25, Article XVIII disallowsforeign military bases, troops, or facilities inthe country, unless the following conditions

are sufficiently met, viz: (a) it must be undera treaty; (b) the treaty must be dulyconcurred in by the Senate and, when sorequired by congress, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a nationalreferendum; and (c) recognized as atreaty by the other contracting state.

There is no dispute as to the presenceof the first two requisites in the case of theVFA. The concurrence handed by the Senatethrough Resolution No. 18 is in accordancewith the provisions of the Constitution theprovision in [in §25, Article XVIII] requiringratification by a majority of the votes cast in a

national referendum being unnecessary sinceCongress has not required it.

This Court is of the firm view that thephrase “recognized as a treaty” meansthat the other contracting party accepts or acknowledges the agreement as a treaty.To require the other contracting state, theUnited States of America in this case, tosubmit the VFA to the United States Senatefor concurrence pursuant to its Constitution,is to accord strict meaning to the phrase.

Well-entrenched is the principle that

the words used in the Constitution are to begiven their ordinary meaning except wheretechnical terms are employed, in which casethe significance thus attached to themprevails. Its language should be understood inthe sense they have in common use.

Moreover, it is inconseqwhether the United States treats the VFas an executive agreement because, international law, an executive agreemas binding as a treaty. To be sure, as lthe VFA possesses the elements agreement under international law, thagreement is to be taken equally as a tr

The records reveal that the States Government, through AmbaThomas C. Hubbard, has stated th

United States government has committed to living up to the terms VFA. For as long as the United StaAmerica accepts or acknowledges the Va treaty, and binds itself further to cwith its obligations under the treaty, tindeed marked compliance with the mof the Constitution.

TITLE: Pimentel v. Executive SecretaryDigestCITATION: G.R. No. 158088. July 6, 2

FACTS:

1. The petitioners filed a petitiomandamus to compel the Office Executive Secretary and the DepartmForeign Affairs to transmit the signed cthe Rome Statute of the InternCriminal Court to the Senate oPhilippines for its concurrence pursuSec. 21, Art VII of the 1987 Constitutio

2. The Rome Statute established thCriminal Court which will have jurisover the most serious crimes as gencrimes against humanity, war crimecrimes of aggression as defined b

Statute. The Philippines through the Cdu Affairs in UN. The provisions of the Showever require that it be subjratification, acceptance or approval signatory state.

3 Petitioners contend that ratification of a Go Tek was arrested by the National Bureau action of Go Tek The President's power to Disposition CFI decision is reversed and

http://lawsandfound.blogspot.com/2012/11/pimentel-v-executive-secretary-digest.html






3. Petitioners contend that ratification of atreaty, under both domestic and internationallaw, is a function of the Senate, hence it isthe duty of the Executive Department totransmit the signed copy to the senate toallow it to exercise its discretion.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Exec. Secretaryand the DFA have the ministerial duty totransmit to the Senate the copy of the Rome

Statute signed by a member of the Philippinemission to the U.N. even without thesignature of the President.

RULING:

The Supreme Court held NO.

1. The President as the head of state is thesole organ and authorized in the externalrelations and he is also the country's solerepresentative with foreign nations. He is themouthpiece with respect to the country'sforeign affairs.

2. In treaty-making, the President has the

sole authority to negotiate with other statesand enter into treaties but this power islimited by the Constitution with the 2/3required vote of all the members of theSenate for the treaty to be valid. (Sec. 21, ArtVII).

3. The legislative branch part is essential toprovide a check on the executive in the fieldof foreign relations, to ensure the nation'spursuit of political maturity and growth.

TITLE: Go Tek vs. Deportation Board

CITATION: 79 SCRA 17. September 9, 1977

FACTS:

Go Tek was arrested by the National Bureauof Investigation after a search of an office inSta. Cruz, Manila. He was alleged to havewith him at the time of the arrest fake dollarchecks in violation of Article 168 of theRevised Penal Court which rendered him anundesirable alien.- The Chief Prose cutorof the Deportation filed a complaintagainst Go Tek with a prayer that afterthe trial the Deportation Boardrecommend to the President of thePhilippines Go Tek‘s immediate deportation as

his presence in this country having been, andwill always be a menace to the peace.welfare, and security of the community.- GoTek filed a motion to dismiss on the groundthat the complaint was premature becausethere was a pending case against him andthat the Board had no jurisdiction to try thecase in view of the ruling in

Qua Chee Gan vs. Deportation Board

118 Phil. 868 that aliens may be deportedonly on the grounds specified in the law.- TheBoard denied the motion. They reasoned thatit was not necessary for an alien to be

convicted before the State can exercise itsright to deport said alien. Besides theBoard isonly a fact finding body whose function is toreport and recommend to the President inwhom is lodged the exclusive power to deportan alien.- The CFI ruled in favor of Go Tekand issued a writ of prohibition against theBoard.- Hence this appeal to the SC.

ISSUE:

WON the Deportation Board can entertain adeportation proceeding based on a ground notspecified in Section 37 of the ImmigrationLaw and although the alien has not yet beenconvicted of the offense imputed to him.

RULING:

Yes.- A thorough comprehension of thePresident's power to deport aliens may showthe baselessness of the instant prohibition

action of Go Tek. The President s power todeport aliens and the investigation of alienssubject to deportation are provided for in thefollowing provisions of the RevisedAdministrative Code:- SEC. 69.

Deportation of subject of foreign power.

A subject of a foreign power residing in thePhilippine Islands shall not be deportedexpelled, or excluded from said Islands orrepatriated to his own country by the

Governor-General except upon priorinvestigator, conducted by said Executive orhis authorized agent, of the ground uponwhich such action is contemplated. In suchcase the person concerned shall he informedof the charge or charges against him and heshall be allowed not less than three days forthe preparation of his defense. He shall alsohave the right to be heard by himself orcounsel, to produce witnesses in his ownbehalf, and to cross-examine theopposingwitnesses.- On the other hand,section 37 of the Immigration Law Providesthat certain aliens may be arrested upon thewarrant of the Commissioner of Immigration

or of any other officer designated by him forthe purpose and deported upon theCommissioner's warrant - "after adetermination by the Board of Commissionersof the existence of the ground for deportationas charged against the alien."- So, underexisting law; the deportation of anundesirable alien may be effected (1) byorder of the President, after due investigation,pursuant to section 69 of the RevisedAdministrative Code and (2) by theCommissioner of Immigration uponrecommendation of the Board of Commissioners under section 37 of the immigration Law (Qua CheeGan vs-

Deportation Board, supra).- The State has theinherent power to deport undesirable aliens(Chuoco Tiaco vs. Forbes, 228 U.S. 549, 57 L.Ed. 960, 40 Phil. 1122, 1125). That powermay be exercise by the Chief Executive "whenhe deems such action necessary for the peaceand domestic tranquility of the nation.

Disposition CFI decision is reversed andaside

TITLE: Buscayno vs. Millitary CommissCITATION: G.R. No. L-58284. Novem19, 1981

FACTS:

Bernabe Buscayno alias Commander Daand Jose Ma. Sison alias Amado Guerrealleged subversives classified as"PKP/HMB/CPP/MAMAO and Traditional Group personalities", were wanted by thauthorities since 1971.

The habeas corpus case filed in behalf oBenigno S. Aquino, Jr., L-46909, wasdismissed on the ground of abandonmethis Court's resolution of January 8, 198

The habeas corpus case filed by Jose Luang other defendants in the rebellion caNo. MC-1-92 or SMC-1-1 of Special MilitCommission (Case No. MC-24-9) wasdismissed in this Court's decision of Jan16, 1981 (Luneta vs. Special MilitaryCommission No. 1, L-49473, 102 SCRA

The habeas corpus case filed by OthonieJimenez, who was charged with subversMilitary Commission No. 34, was dismisthis Court's decision of January 15, 198R. No. 54577, January 15, 1981, 102 SC39).

The habeas corpus case filed by SaturnOcampo and four others against Military

Commission No. 25 in connection with tsubversion charge against them and JosSison, G. R. No. 50155, is still pending.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Buscayno violated the military a member of the Communist Section 1 Short Title — This decree shall be action brought under this decree shall b



Whether or not Buscayno violated the militarypower.

RULING:

Yes.

Proclamation No. 2045 explicitly provides thatpersons, like petitioners who are underdetention for rebellion and the capital offenseof subversion, cannot enjoy the privilege of

the writ of habeas corpus. Because theprivilege of the writ of habeas corpus issuspended as to them, they are not entitledto bail.

Review of rulings of the military commission. — Ordinarily, this Court cannotreview the rulings and proceedings of themilitary commission. The National SecurityCode, Presidential Decree No. 1498, whichwas issued on June 11, 1978 (74 OG 11066),provides in its sections 86(f) and 87(e) thatwhat this Court can review are the decisionsof the Court of Military Appeals in casesappealed to it from the military commission.

Generally, this Court does not exercise overmilitary commissions the supervisory jurisdiction which it possesses over civil trialcourts whose interlocutory rulings anddecisions may be reviewed by this Court.

Republic Act No. 1700 (quoted in full inPeople vs. Ferrer, L-32613-14, December 27,1972, 48 SCRA 382), which took effect onJune 20, 1957 and which outlaws theCommunist Party and similar associationsbecause their existence and activitiesconstitute a clear, present and grave dangerto national security, punishes the followingacts:

1. By arresto mayor , anyonewho knowingly, wilfully andby overt acts affiliates himself with, becomes or remains

a member of the CommunistParty or its successor or anysubversive association asdefined in the law. Prisioncorreccional shall be imposedfor a secondconviction. Prision mayor shallbe imposed for subsequentconvictions.

2. By prision mayor to death,being an officer or a ranking

leader of the CommunistParty or of any subversiveassociation as defined in thelaw.

3. By prision mayor to death,any member of theCommunist Party or similarsubversive association whotakes up arms against thegovernment.

4. By prision correccional to prision mayor , one who

conspires with any otherperson to overthrow theGovernment of the Republicof the Philippines or thegovernment of any of itspolitical subdivisions by force,violence, deceit, subversion orother illegal means for thepurpose of placing suchGovernment or politicalsubdivision under the controland donation of any alienpower.

5. By prision correccional any

person who knowinglyfurnishes false evidence inany action brought under theAnti-Subversion Law.

Section 1. Short Title This decree shall beknown as the Revised Anti-Subversion Law.

Sec. 2. Subversive Associations and Organizations - Any association, organization,political party, or group of persons organizedfor the purpose of overthrowing theGovernment of the Republic of the Philippinesor for the purpose of removing from theallegiance to said Government or its laws, theterritory of the Philippines or any part thereof,with the open or covert assistance or support

of a foreign power or the open or covertsupport from a foreign source of anyassociation, group or person, whether publicor private, by force, violence, terrorism,arson, petition, deceit or other illegal shall beconsidered and is hereby d a subversiveorganization. (As amended by BatasPambansa Blg. 31, effective on June 6, 1979and P.D. No. 1736, Sept. 12, 1980.).

Sec. 3. Penalties — (a) Members. — Whoeverknowingly, wilfully and by overt act affiliateswith, becomes or remains a member of asubversive association or organization asdefined in Section 2 hereof shall be punished

by arresto mayor and shall be disqualifiedpermanently from holding any public office,appointive or elective, and from exercisingthe right to vote; in case of a secondconviction, the principal penalty shall beprision correccional and in all subsequentconvictions the penalty of prision mayor shallbe imposed.

Officers or Ranking Leaders.— If suchmember is an officer or a ranking leader of any subversive association or organization asdefined in Section 2 hereof, or i f suchmember takes up arms against theGovernment, he shall be punished by prisionmayor to death with all the accessorypenalties provided therefor in the RevisedPenal Code.

Sec. 4. False Testimony . — Any person whoknowingly furnishes false evidence in any

action brought under this decree shall bpunished by prision correccional.

Sec. 5. Sufficiency of Evidence. — Exceprovided in Section 7 hereof, the two-wrule heretofore provided in Republic ActNumbered Seventeen hundred is herebyobrogated and the accused may be conon the testimony of one witness if sufficunder the rules of evidence, or on hisconfession given in open court.