PEOPLE V FRANCISCO78 SCRA 696July 16, 1947FACTS:Defendant, who had been previously arrested on charges of robbery requested permissionfrom the chief of police of Mansalay to go home to see his wife about the procurement of bail forhis provisional release. Permission was granted.He was allowed to go with sergeant Pimentel.Upon reaching the house, the sergeant allowed the prisoner to see his wife. After a fewmoments, Pimentel heard the scream of a woman. till moments later, Pimentel saw defendantlying down with his little son !omeo, aged one year and a half, on his breast. Pimentelalsofound defendant to have a wound in his belly while his child had a wound in the bac".Pimentelfound the child dead.#he prosecution, in recommending the imposition of the capital penalty upon the accusedrelies mainly on the a$davit of the accused, the arraignment of the defendant upon which hemade a plea of guilty, and the rebuttal testimony of %milia #aladtad, wife of appellant.ISSUE: &hether or not the testimony of %milia #aladtad, wife of appellant, is admissible.HELD:'%.#he rule contained in section ()*d+ of !ule ,(- is an old one. .ourts have assigned asreasons therefor thefollowing/ 0rst, identityof interest1 second, theconsequent danger ofper2ury1 third, thepolicy of thelawwhichdeems it necessary toguardthesecurity andcon0dences of private life even at the ris" of and occasional failure of 2ustice, and which re2ectssuch evidence because itsadmission would lead to domesticdisunionand unhappiness1 and,fourth, because where a want of domestic tranquility e3ists, there is danger of punishing onespouse through the hostile testimony of the other.However, this rule has its e3ceptions as well.4n the instant case, the wife did not testify in the direct evidence for the prosecution. 4twill be noted that the wife only testi0ed against her husband after the latter, testifying in his owndefense, imputed upon her the "illing of their little son. 5y all rules of 2ustice and reason thisgavetheprosecution, whichhadtheretoforerefrainedfrompresentingthewifeasawitnessagainst her husband, the right to do so, as it did in rebuttal1 and to the wife herself the right to sotestify, at least, in self6defense, not, of course, against being sub2ected to punishment in thatcase in which she was not a defendant but against any or all of various possible consequenceswhich might 7ow from her silence.8urthermore, by his said act *imputing the crime to his wife+, the husband himself e3ercising thevery right which he would deny to his wife upon the ground of their marital relations must beta"en to have waived all ob2ection to the latter9s testimony upon rebuttal, even considering thatsuch ob2ection would have been available at the outset. As well settled as this rule of maritalincompetency itself is the other that it may be waived.ALVAREZ V RAMIREZ!R! N"! 14#4#9O$%"&'( 14, )**+FACTS:usan !amire:, herein respondent, is the complaining witness in .riminal .ase ;o. ,> to e3ercise its power both under the rules of Agency and underection B of %.?. ;o. ,F6A in relation to the upreme .ourtHs ruling in !epublic v. andiganbayan*,=- .!A =(+.#he P.>> has apparently oEered to the A..!A lawyers the same conditions availed of by!oco1 full disclosure in e3change for e3clusion from these proceedings. #he A..!A lawyers havepreferred not to ma"e the disclosures required by the P.>>.#heA..!Alawyerscannot, therefore, begrudgetheP.>>for "eepingthemaspartydefendants.4n the same vein, they cannot compel the P.>> to be accorded the same treatmentaccorded to !oco.ISSUE:&hether or not the andiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in not holdingthat, under thefacts of this case, theattorney6client privilegeprohibits petitioners A..!Alawyers from revealing the identity of their client*s+ and the other information requested by theP.>>.HELD:'%.!atio/As a matter of public policy, a client9s identity should not be shrouded in mystery. Underthis premise, the general rule in our 2urisdiction as well as in the United tates is that a lawyermay not invo"e the privilege and refuse to divulge the name or identity of his client. #he reasonsadvanced for the general rule are well established.8irst, the court has a right to "now that the client whose privileged information is sought tobe protected is 7esh and blood. econd, the privilege begins to e3ist only after the attorney6client relationship has been established.#he attorney6client privilege does not attach until thereis a client. #hird, the privilege generally pertains to the sub2ect matter of the relationship. 8inally,due process considerations require that the opposing party should, as a general rule, "now hisadversary.;otwithstandingtheseconsiderations, thegeneral ruleis however quali0edbysomeimportant e3ceptions. ,+ .lient identity is privileged where a strong probability e3ists that revealing the clientHs namewould implicate that client in the very activity for which he sought the lawyerHs advice. (+ &here disclosure would open the client to civil liability, his identity is privileged.-+ &herethegovernmentHs lawyers havenocaseagainst anattorneyHs client unless, byrevealing the clientHs name, the said name would furnish the only lin" that would form the chainof testimony necessary to convict an individual of a crime, the clientHs name is privileged. Apart from these principal e3ceptions, there e3ist other situations which could qualify ase3ceptionstothegeneral rule. 8or e3ample, thecontentof anyclientcommunicationtoalawyer lies within the privilege if it is relevant to the sub2ect matter of the legal problem on whichthe client see"s legal assistance. Moreover, where the nature of the attorney6client relationshiphasbeenpreviouslydisclosedanditistheidentitywhichisintendedtobecon0dential, theidentity of the client has been held to be privileged, since such revelation would otherwise resultin disclosure and the entire transaction. ummari:ing these e3ceptions, information relating tothe identity of a client may fall within the ambit of the privilege when the clientHs name itself hasan independent signi0cance, such that disclosure would then reveal client con0dences.!easoning/#he circumstances involving the engagement of lawyers in the case at bench, therefore,clearly reveal that the instant case falls under at least two e3ceptions to the general rule.8irst,disclosure of the alleged clientHs name would lead to establish said clientHs connection with thevery fact in issue of the case, which is privileged information, because the privilege, as statedearlier, protects the sub2ect matter or the substance *without which there would be no attorney6client relationship+.#he lin" between the alleged criminal oEense and the legal advice or legal service soughtwas duly established in the case at bar, by no less than the P.>> itself.#he "ey lies in the threespeci0c conditions laid down by the P.>> which constitutes petitioners9 tic"et to non6prosecutionshould they accede thereto/ the disclosure of the identity of its clients1 submission of documentssubstantiatingthelawyer6clientrelationship1 andthesubmissionof thedeedsof assignmentpetitioners e3ecuted in favor of their clients covering their respective shareholdings.8rom these conditions, particularly the third, we can readily deduce that the clients indeedconsultedthepetitioners, intheircapacityaslawyers, regardingthe0nancial andcorporatestructure, framewor" and set6up of the corporations in question. 4n turn, petitioners gave theirprofessional adviceintheformof, amongothers, theaforementioneddeedsof assignmentcovering their clients9 shareholdings.#hereisnoquestionthatthepreparationof theaforestateddocumentswaspartandparcel of petitioners9 legal service to their clients.More important, it constituted an integral partof their duties as lawyers. Petitioners, therefore,have a legitimate fear that identifying theirclients would implicate them in the very activity for which legal advice had been sought, i.e., thealleged accumulation of ill6gotten wealth in the aforementioned corporations.8urthermore, under the third main e3ception, revelation of the clientHs name wouldobviously provide the necessary lin" for the prosecution to build its case, where none otherwisee3ists. 4t is the lin", in the words of 5aird, Mthat would inevitably form the chain of testimonynecessary to convict the *client+ of a... crime.CAnimportantdistinctionmust bemadebetweenacasewhereaclient ta"esontheservices of an attorney for illicit purposes, see"ing advice about how to go around the law for thepurpose of committing illegal activities and a case where a client thin"s he might have previouslycommittedsomething illegal andconsults his attorneyabout it.#hesecases maybe readilydistinguished, because the privilege cannot be invo"ed or used as a shield for an illegal act, as inthe 0rst e3ample1 while the prosecution may not have a case against the client in the seconde3ample and cannot use the attorney client relationship to build up a case against the latter.#hereasonforthe0rstruleisthatitisnotwithintheprofessional characterofalawyertogiveadvice on the commission of a crime. #he reason for the second has been stated in the casesabovediscussedandarefoundedonthesamepolicygroundsfor whichtheattorney6clientprivilege, in general, e3ists.4n 0ne, the cru3 of petitionersH ob2ections ultimately hinges on their e3pectation that if theprosecutionhasacaseagainsttheirclients, thelatterHscaseshouldbebuiltuponevidencepainsta"inglygatheredbythemfromtheir ownsourcesandnot fromcompelledtestimonyrequiring them to reveal the name of their clients, information which unavoidably reveals muchabout the nature of the transaction which may or may not be illegal. A lawyer cannot reveal suchcommunicationwithout e3posinghimself tochargesof violatingaprinciplewhichformsthebulwar" of the entire attorney6client relationship.&e have no choice but to uphold petitionersH right not to reveal the identity of their clientsunder pain of the breach of 0duciary duty owing to their clients, because the facts of the instantcase clearly fall within recogni:ed e3ceptions to the rule that the client9s name is not privilegedinformation. 5y compelling petitioners, not only to reveal the identity of their clients, but worse,to submit to the P.>> documents substantiating the client6lawyer relationship, as well as deedsof assignment petitioners e3ecuted in favor of its clients covering their respective shareholdings,the P.>> would e3act from petitioners a lin" Mthat would inevitably form the chain of testimonynecessary to convict the *client+ of a crime.N/ANCO FILIPINO, 26! MONETAR0 /OARD, ET AL!,!R! N"! 7**+4 3RESOLUTION7July *8, 1986FACTS: 4t appears that duetothe0nancial troubles of 5ancoPilipino, it was placedunderconservatorship by the Monetary 5oard.#he .onservator Mr. #4A?VU4 tendered his report dated@anuary ,atchalian.Gt. Martine: testi0ed that in the investigation conducted by Vuintans, >atchalian statedthat each of them approached an MP and 0red at them and that he was sure they would die.&itnesses for the defense gave their own testimonies. egundo >uevara saw >atchalian duringthe pabasa and when gunshots were heard, he saw >atchalian run carrying his child and thenthe latter lay in a pile of palay.>atchalian remained in >uevara9s house the whole night.#hiswas corroborated by a testimony by %varisto Paras.#he 0scal 0led a motion for the dismissal of the case against %usebio Pere: forinsu$ciencyof evidence. #hiswasgranted. Healsoas"edthattheaccusedPedro!eyesbedischarged so that the latter may be used as prosecution witness. #his was also granted.#he .84 2udge found the accused Ma3imino Austria alias everino Australia alias 5ig 5oyand Ricente >atchalian alias Magallanes guilty of the oEenses set forth in the diEerentinformations.#hey were sentenced to reclusion perpetua and indemnity for the deaths of ;eryand Gaguitan.!eyes didbecomeastatewitness but hedidnot con0rmeverystatement hehadpreviously made at the 0scalHs investigation.He testi0ed that before the crime was committed,>ervacio had as"ed him to tal" to the MPs but he refused. Gater on, he heard gunshots andwhen he ran to the rice0eld, he saw and heard >ervacio saying that the MP he shot would surelydie and >atchalian assuring him that the M? would indeed die.?rsino narrated a similar incident but could not identify the assailants e3cept Austria.Gts.Martine: and Vuintans declared under oath that >atchalian admitted to themduring theinvestigation that he had shot one of the MPs.>atchalian even demonstrated how he shot thevictim whih was captured in a photograph. Gt. Vuintans also testi0ed that Austria had voluntarilysigned the confession.>atchalian denies that he made a confession before Gt. Vuintans.He denied that he hadta"en part in the "illing and that he was merely threatened to be "illed lest he reenact the crimeas shown in the photograph.He alleged that he was maltreated and even showed his supposedin2uries in court.ISSUE:&hether or not the 2udgment appealed from should be reversedHELD:;?.!easoning/#hepictureof thereenactment of thecrimeisconvincingenoughtoshowtheguiltyparticipationof theappellants. #heir defenseof alibi is wea"anduntenable. #heolicitor>eneralHs brief substantially proves conspiracy between them and their other co6accused whoare still at large. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V THE HON! NICASIO 0ATCO!R! N"! L,9181N"2':&'( )8, 19++FACTS:@uan.onsun2i, AlfonsoPanganiban, andanother whoseidentityisstill un"nown, werecharged with having conspired together in the murderof one @ose !amos. During the progress ofthe trial, counsel for the defendant Panganiban interposed a general ob2ection to any evidenceon such confession made by defendant consun2i on the ground that it was hearsay and thereforeincompetent as against the other accused Panganiban. #he lower court ordered the e3clusion ofthe ob2ected evidence but on a diEerent ground which is Mthe prosecution could not be permittedtointroducetheconfessionsof defendants@uan.onsun2i andAlfonsoPanganibantoproveconspiracy between them, without prior proof of such conspiracy by a number of de0nite acts,conditions, and circumstancesN.?> 0led a petition for cetiorari before the . for the review and annulment of the lower.ourtHs order completely e3cluding anyevidence on the e3tra2udicial confessions of the accused@uan .onsun2iand Alfonso Panganiban without prior proof of conspiracy.ISSUE: &hether or not the lower court is correct in e3cluding the prosecutions9s evidence *e3tra62udicial confession by .onsun2i+WHELD:;?.&e believe that the lower .ourt committed a grave abuse of discretion in ordering thecomplete e3clusion of the prosecutionHs evidence on the alleged confessions of the accused @uan.onsun2i at the stage of the trial when the ruling was made. ection ,F, !ule ,(-, !ules of .ourt,is speci0c as to theadmissibility of thee3tra2udicial confession of an accused, freely andvoluntarily made, as evidence against him.%.. ,F. .onfession. X #he declaration of an accused e3pressly ac"nowledging the truthof his guilt as to the oEense charged, may be given in evidence against him. Under the rule ofmultipleadmissibilityof evidence, evenif .onsun2iHs confessionmaynot becompetent asagainst his co6accusedPanganiban, beinghearsayas tothelatter, or toproveconspiracybetweenthemwithout theconspiracybeingestablishedbyother evidence, theconfessionof.onsun2i was, nevertheless, admissible as evidence of the declarantHs own guilt and should beadmitted.!ule on admissibility/#he practice of e3cluding evidence on doubtfulob2ections to its materiality or technicalob2ections totheformof thequestions shouldbeavoided. 4nacaseof anyintricacyit isimpossible for a 2udge of 0rst instance, in the early stages of the development of the proof, to"now with any certainty whether testimony is relevant or not1 and where there is no indication ofbad faith on the part of the Attorney oEering the evidence, the court may as a rule safely acceptthe testimony upon the statement of the attorney that the proof oEered will be connected later.At any rate, in the 0nal determination and consideration of the case, the trial .ourt should beabletodistinguishtheadmissiblefromtheinadmissible, andre2ectwhat, undertherulesofevidence, should be e3cluded. #here is greater reason to adhere to such policy in criminal caseswherequestionsariseastoadmissibilityof evidencefor theprosecution, for theun2usti0ede3clusion of evidence may lead to the erroneous acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of thecharges, from which the People can no longer appeal.UNITED STATES 26 /A0CARSON1 Au; 14, 1914FACTS:ervando5aywaschargedof rapeof 8lorentinaAlcones. #heaccusedmet Alconeswal"ing along the beach, caught hold her, pic"ed her up, and carried her to the edge of somethic"ets, where he threw her on the ground and attempted to have carnal intercourse with her.However, a party who were passing near the place where the crime was committed heard hercries. ?ne of the parties stepped ashore, and seeing the accused get up from the place wherethewomanclaimsthecrimewascommitted, as"edC&hatHsthisWN#heaccusedmadenoe3planationof hisconduct orhispresencethere, andlefttheplaceforthwith. 4mmediatelythereafter the woman, accompanied by some of the party from the boat, went to the councilmanof the barrio and made complaint. #he accused, having been brought before the councilman andas"ed had he committed the crime of which he was charged, admitted that he had.#hereafterthe accused was sent to the 2ustice of the peace, who held him for trial.#he accused was convicted. ISSUE:&hether or not 0nding the accused guilty has basis.HELD:'%. #here can be no possible doubt that he was present when the party on board the boat wasattracted to the place where the victim raised her outcry charging him with the assault, and thathe was present later on when the victim presented her complaint to the councilman of the barrio.Under such circumstances, we are convinced that an innocent man would instantly andindignantlyrepudiatesuchacharge, andattemptthereandthentoestablishhisinnocence,e3plaining how he came to be there present with the woman, and the conditions under which shehad made the false charge1 yet there is not the slightest indication in the evidence that therewas on the part of the accused any such indignant denials and protests as would be e3pectedfromaninnocent mansuddenlyconfrontedwithsuchachargeunder suchcircumstances.4ndeed, his conduct at that time was, to the minds of the .ourt, wholly at variance with thatwhich might fairly be e3pected from him, granting the truth of his testimony and that of theother witnesses for the defense.