Case Digest - Procedural Due Process

8/9/2019 Case Digest - Procedural Due Process

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Summary: Simon vs. Commission on Human Rights (GR 100150, 5 January 1994)

Simon vs. Commission on Human Rights

[GR 100150, 5 January 1994]

En Banc, Vitug (J): 12 concur

Facts: A "Demolition Notice," dated 9 July 1990, signed by Carlos Quimpo in his capacity as an Executive Officer of the Quezon City Integrated Hawkers

Management Council under the Office of the City Mayor, was sent to, and received by, the Roque Fermo, et. al. (being the officers and members of the

North Edsa Vendors Association, Incorporated). In said notice, Fermo, et. al. were given a grace-period of 3 days (up to 12 July 1990) within which to vacate the premises of North EDSA. Prior to their receipt of the demolition notice, Fermo, et. al. were informed by Quimpo that their stalls should be

removed to give way to the "People's Park". On 12 July 1990, the group, led by their President Roque Fermo, filed a letter-complaint (Pinag-samang

Sinumpaang Salaysay) with the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) against Brigido R. Simon, Carlos Quimpo, Carlito Abelardo, and Generoso Ocampo,

asking the late CHR Chairman Mary Concepcion Bautista for a letter to be addressed to then Mayor Simon of Quezon City to stop the demolition of Fermo,

et. al.'s stalls, sari-sari stores, and carinderia along North EDSA (CHR Case 90-1580). On 23 July 1990, the CHR issued an Order, directing Simon, et. al.

"to desist from demolishing the stalls and shanties at North EDSA pending resolution of the vendors/squatters' complaint before the Commission" and

ordering Simon, et. al. to appear before the CHR. On the basis of the sworn statements submitted by Fermo, et. al. on 31 July 1990, as well as CHR's own

ocular inspection, and convinced that on 28 July 1990 Simon, et. al. carried out the demolition of Fermo, et. al.'s stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia,

the CHR, in its resolution of 1 August 1990, ordered the disbursement of financial assistance of not more than P200,000.00 in favor of Fermo, et. al. to

purchase light housing materials and food under the Commission's supervision and again directed Simon, et. al. to "desist from further demolition, with

the warning that violation of said order would lead to a citation for contempt and arrest." A motion to dismiss, dated 10 September 1990, questioned

CHR's jurisdiction. During the 12 September 1990 hearing, Simon, et. al. moved for postponement, arguing that the motion to dismiss set for 21

September 1990 had yet to be resolved, and likewise manifested that they would bring the case to the courts. In an Order, dated 25 September 1990, the

CHR cited Simon, et. al. in contempt for carrying out the demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia despite the "order to desist", and it

imposed a fine of P500.00 on each of them. On 1 March 1991, the CHR issued an Order, denying Simon, et.al.'s motion to dismiss and supplemental

motion to dismiss. In an Order, dated 25 April 1991, Simon, et. al.'s motion for reconsideration was denied. Simon, et. al. filed the petition for prohibition,

with prayer for a restraining order and preliminary injunction, questioning the extent of the authority and power of the CHR, and praying that the CHR be

prohibited from further hearing and investigating CHR Case 90 —1580, entitled "Fermo, et al. vs. Quimpo, et al."

Issue: Whether the CHR has the power to issue the “order to desist” against the demolition of Fermo, et. al.’s stalls, and to cite Mayor Simon, et. al. for

contempt for proceeding to demolish said stalls despite the CHR order.

Held: Section 18, Article XIII, of the 1987 Constitution, is a provision empowering the Commission on Human Rights to "investigate, on its own or on

complaint by any party, all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights." Recalling the deliberations of the Constitutional

Commission, it is readily apparent that the delegates envisioned a Commission on Human Rights that would focus its attention to the more severe cases of

human rights violations; such areas as the "(1) protection of rights of political detainees, (2) treatment of prisoners and the prevention of tortures, (3) fair

and public trials, (4) cases of disappearances, (5) salvagings and hamletting, and (6) other crimes committed against the religious." While the enumeration

has not likely been meant to have any preclusive effect, more than just expressing a statement of priority, it is, nonetheless, significant for the tone it has

set. In any event, the delegates did not apparently take comfort in peremptorily making a conclusive delineation of the CHR's scope of investigatorial

jurisdiction. They have thus seen it fit to resolve, instead, that "Congress may provide for other cases of violations of human rights that should fall within

the authority of the Commission, taking into account its recommendation." Herein, there is no cavil that what are sought to be demolished are the stalls,

sari-sari stores and carinderia, as well as temporary shanties, erected by Fermo, at. al. on a land which is planned to be developed into a "People's Park."

More than that, the land adjoins the North EDSA of Quezon City which, the Court can take judicial notice of, is a busy national highway. The consequent

danger to life and limb is thus to be likewise simply ignored. It is indeed paradoxical that a right which is claimed to have been violated is one that cannot,

in the first place, even be invoked, if its is not, in fact, extant. Be that as it may, looking at the standards vis-a-vis the circumstances obtaining herein, the

Court not prepared to conclude that the order for the demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia of Fermo, et. al. can fall within the

compartment of "human rights violations involving civil and political rights" intended by the Constitution. On its contempt powers, the CHR is

constitutionally authorized to "adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for violations thereof in accordance with the

Rules of Court." Accordingly, the CHR acted within its authority in providing in its revised rules, its power "to cite or hold any person in direct or indirect

contempt, and to impose the appropriate penalties in accordance with the procedure and sanctions provided for in the Rules of Court." That power to cite

for contempt, however, should be understood to apply only to violations of its adopted operational guidelines and rules of procedure essential to carry out

its investigatorial powers. To exemplify, the power to cite for contempt could be exercised against persons who refuse to cooperate with the said body, or

who unduly withhold relevant information, or who decline to honor summons, and the like, in pursuing its investigative work. The "order to desist" (asemantic interplay for a restraining order) herein, however, is not investigatorial in character but prescinds from an adjudicative power that it does not

possess. As held in Export Processing Zone Authority vs. Commission on Human Rights, "The constitutional provision directing the CHR to 'provide for

preventive measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection' may not be construed to

confer jurisdiction on the Commission to issue a restraining order or writ of injunction for, it that were the intention, the Constitution would have

expressly said so. 'Jurisdiction is conferred only by the Constitution or by law'. It is never derived by implication. Evidently, the 'preventive measures and

legal aid services' mentioned in the Constitution refer to extrajudicial and judicial remedies (including a writ of preliminary injunction) which the CHR may

seek from the proper courts on behalf of the victims of human rights violations. Not being a court of justice, the CHR itself has no jurisdiction to issue the

writ, for a writ of preliminary injunction may only be issued ̀by the judge of any court in which the action is pending [within his district], or by a Justice o





published in the Manila Chronicle. Copies of the application as well as the notice of hearing were mailed to all affected parties. Subsequently, hearings

were conducted on the amended application. But before Bayantel could complete the presentation of its evidence, the NTC issued an Order dated 19

December 1993 stating that in view of the recent grant of 2 separate Provisional Authorities in favor of ISLACOM and GMCR, Inc., which resulted in the

closing out of all available frequencies for the service being applied for by Bayantel, and in order that the case may not remain pending for an indefinite

period of time, the case was ordered archived without prejudice to its reinstatement if and when the requisite frequency becomes available. On 17 May

1999, Bayantel filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Revive Case, citing the availability of new frequency bands for CMTS operators. On 1 February 2000, the NTC

granted BayanTel's motion to revive the latter's application and set the case for hearings on February 9, 10, 15, 17 and 22, 2000. The NTC noted that the

application was ordered archived without prejudice to its reinstatement if and when the requisite frequency shall become available. Express

Telecommunication Co., Inc. (Extelcom) filed in NTC Case 92-486 an Opposition (With Motion to Dismiss) praying for the dismissal of Bayantel's

application; arguing that Bayantel's motion sought the revival of an archived application filed almost 8 years ago, and thus, the documentary evidence and

the allegations of Bayantel in said application are all outdated and should no longer be used as basis of the necessity for the proposed CMTS service. On 3

May 2000, the NTC issued an Order granting in favor of Bayantel a provisional authority to operate CMTS service, applying Rule 15, Section 3 of its 1978

Rules of Practice and Procedure. Extelcom filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari and prohibition (CA-GR SP 58893), seeking the

annulment of the Order reviving the application of Bayantel, the Order granting Bayantel a provisional authority to construct, install, operate and

maintain a nationwide CMTS, and Memorandum Circular 9-3-2000 allocating frequency bands to new public telecommunication entities which are

authorized to install, operate and maintain CMTS. On 13 September 2000, the Court of Appeals granted the writs of certiorari and prohibition prayed for,

annulling and setting aside the NTC orders dated 1 February and 3 May 2000 in NTC Case 92-486, dismissing Bayantel's Amended Application without

prejudice to the filing of a new CMTS application. Bayantel and the NTC, the latter being represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a

motion for reconsideration of the above decision. On the other hand, Extelcom filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, praying that NTC Memorandum

Circular 9-3-2000 be also declared null and void. On 9 February 2001, the Court of Appeals issued a resolution denying all of the motions for

reconsideration of the parties for lack of merit. Hence, the NTC and Bayantel filed their petitions for review on certiorari (GR 147096, and GR 147210

respectively). In the present petition, Extelcom contends, among others, that the NTC should have applied the Revised Rules which were filed with the

Office of the National Administrative Register on 3 February 1993. These Revised Rules deleted the phrase "on its own initiative;" accordingly, a provisional

authority may be issued only upon filing of the proper motion before the Commission. The NTC, on the other hand, issued a certification to the effect that

inasmuch as the 1993 Revised Rules have not been published in a newspaper of general circulation, the NTC has been applying the 1978 Rules. Issue:

Whether the 1978 or 1993 NTC Rules of Practice and Procedure should govern in the approval of Bayantel’s application. Held: The absence of publication,

coupled with the certification by the Commissioner of the NTC stating that the NTC was still governed by the 1978 Rules, clearly indicate that the 1993

Revised Rules have not taken effect at the time of the grant of the provisional authority to Bayantel. The fact that the 1993 Revised Rules were filed with

the UP Law Center on February 3, 1993 is of no moment. There is nothing in the Administrative Code of 1987 which implies that the filing of the rules

with the UP Law Center is the operative act that gives the rules force and effect. The National Administrative Register is merely a bulletin of codified rules

and it is furnished only to the Office of the President, Congress, all appellate courts, the National Library, other public offices or agencies as the Congress

may select, and to other persons at a price sufficient to cover publication and mailing or distribution costs. Still, publication in the Official Gazette or a

newspaper of general circulation is a condition sine qua non before statutes, rules or regulations can take effect. The Rules of Practice and Procedure of

the NTC, which implements Section 29 of the Public Service Act (Commonwealth Act 146, as amended), fall squarely within the scope of these laws, as

explicitly mentioned in the case Tañada v. Tuvera. Administrative rules and regulations must be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement

existing law pursuant to a valid delegation. The only exceptions are interpretative regulations, those merely internal in nature, or those so-called letters of

instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules and guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their

duties. Hence, the 1993 Revised Rules should be published in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation before it can take effect. Even

the 1993 Revised Rules itself mandates that said Rules shall take effect only after their publication in a newspaper of general circulation. In the absence of

such publication, therefore, it is the 1978 Rules that governs.

Judicial Due Process Requisites

Engracio Palanca was indebted to El Banco and he had his parcel of land as security to his debt. His debt amounted to P218,294.10. His property is worth

75k more than what he owe. Due to the failure of Engracio to make his payments, El Banco executed an instrument to mortgage Engracio’s property

Engracio however left for China and he never returned til he died. Since Engracio is a non resident El Banco has to notify Engracio about their intent to

sue him by means of publication using a newspaper. The lower court further orderdd the clerk of court to furnish Engracio a copy and that it’d be sent to

Amoy, China. The court eventually granted El Banco petition to execute Engracio’s property. 7 years thereafter, Vicente surfaced on behalf of Engracio as

his administrator to petition for the annulment of the ruling. Vicente averred that there had been no due process as Engracio never received the summons

ISSUE: Whether or not due process was not observed.

HELD: The SC ruled against Palanca. The SC ruled that the requisites for judicial due process had been met. The requisites are;

1. There must be an impartial court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and decide the matter before it.

2. Jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant or over the property subject of the proceedings.

3. The defendant must be given the opportunity to be heard.



4. Judgment must be rendered only after lawful hearing.

On Due Process

xxx As applied to a judicial proceeding, however, it may be laid down with certainty that the requirement of due process is satisfied if the following

conditions are present, namely; (1) There must be a court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it; (2)

jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of thedefendant or over the property which is the subject of the proceeding; (3) the defendant must

be given an opportunity to be heard; and (4) judgment must be rendered upon lawful hearing.

Passing at once to the requisite that the defendant shall have an opportunity to be heard, we observe that in aforeclosure case some notification of the

proceedings to the nonresident owner, prescribing the time within which appearance must be made, is everywhere recognized as essential. To answer this

necessity the statutes generally provide for publication, and usually in addition thereto, for the mailing of notice to the defendant, if his residence is

known. Though commonly called constructive, or substituted service of process in any true sense. It is merely a means provided by law whereby the owner

may be admonished that his property is the subject of judicial proceedings and that it is incumbent upon him to take such steps as he sees fit to protect

it.

It will be observed that this mode of notification does not involve any absolute assurance that the absent owner shall thereby receive actual notice. The

periodical containing the publication may never in fact come to his hands, and the chances that he should discover the notice may often be very slight.

Even where notice is sent by mail the probability of his receiving it, though much increased, is dependent upon the correctness of the address to which it

is forwarded as well as upon the regularity and security of the mail service. It will be noted, furthermore, that the provision of our law relative to the

mailing of notice does not absolutely require the mailing of notice unconditionally and in every event, but only in the case where the defendant's residence

is known. In the light of all these facts, it is evident that actual notice to the defendant in cases of this kind is not, under the law, to be considered

absolutely necessary.

The idea upon which the law proceeds in recognizing the efficacy of a means of notification which may fall short of actual notice is apparently this:

Property is always assumed to be in the possession of its owner, in person or by agent; and he may be safely held, under certain conditions, to be affected

with knowledge that proceedings have been instituted for its condemnation and sale.

Did the failure of the clerk to send notice to defendant’s last known address constitute denial of due process?

The observations which have just been made lead to the conclusion that the failure of the clerk to mail the notice, if in fact he did so fail in his duty, is not

such an irregularity, as amounts to a denial of due process of law; and hence in our opinion that irregularity, if proved, would not avoid the judgment in

this case. Notice was given by publication in a newspaper and this is the only form of notice which the law unconditionally requires. This in our opinion is

all that was absolutely necessary to sustain the proceedings.

It will be observed that in considering the effect of this irregularity, it makes a difference whether it be viewed as a question involving jurisdiction or as a

question involving due process of law. In the matter of jurisdiction there can be no distinction between the much and the little. The court either has

jurisdiction or it has not; and if the requirement as to the mailing of notice should be considered as a step antecedent to the acquiring of jurisdiction,

there could be no escape from the conclusion that the failure to take that step was fatal to the validity of the judgment. In the application of the idea of

due process of law, on the other hand, it is clearly unnecessary to be so rigorous. The jurisdiction being once established, all that due process of law

thereafter requires is an opportunity for the defendant to be heard; and as publication was duly made in the newspaper, it would seem highlyunreasonable to hold that failure to mail the notice was fatal. We think that in applying the requirement of due process of law, it is permissible to reflect

upon the purposes of the provision which is supposed to have been violated and the principle underlying the exercise of judicial power in these

proceedings. Judge in the light of these conceptions, we think that the provision of Act of Congress declaring that no person shall be deprived of his

property without due process of law has not been infringed.

STATE PROSECUTORS VS MURO

State Prosecutors vs Muro, 236 SCRA 505 (19 September 1994)

“the doctrine of judicial notice rests on the wisdom and discretion of the courts. The power to take judicial notice is to be exercised by the courts with caution;

care must be taken that therequisite notoriety exists; and reasonable doubt on the subject should be resolved in the negative”

Facts:

The state prosecutors who are members of the DOJ Panel of Prosecution filed a complaint against respondent Judge Muro on the ground of ignorance othe law, grave misconduct and violation of the provisions in the Code of Judicial Conduct. The case at bar involves the prosecution of the 11 charges

against Imelda Marcos in violation of the Central Bank Foreign Exchange Restriction in the Central BankCircular 960. The respondent judge dismissed al

11 cases solely on the basis of the report published from the 2 newspapers, which the judgebelieves to be reputable and of national circulation, that the

Pres. of the Philippines lifted all foreign exchange restrictions. The respondent’s decision was founded on his belief that the reported announcement of the

Executive Department in the newspaper in effect repealed the CB 960 and thereby divested the court of its jurisdiction to further hear the pending case

thus motu propio dismissed the case. He further contends that the announcement of the President as published in the newspaper has made such fact a





Petitioner allegedly acquired portions of the parcel of land covered by TCT No. N-7873 by inheritance from his father Felix Carvajal who came to possess

the unregistered land in 1938, continuously, openly, adversely and peacefully in the concept of an owner up to the time of his death.

On August 12, 1998, the trial court dismissed petitioner's complaint.

On August 3,1999, the Court of Appeals issued the questioned resolution. The decretal portion reads:

"WHEREFORE, for being insufficient in form and substance, the petition for certiorari should be, as it is hereby, DENIED DUE COURSE and accordingly

DISMISSED. “The petition revealed that petitioner failed to comply with Rule 46, Section 3, par. 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure requiring the

statement of the material dates showing when notice of the judgment or final order or resolution subject thereof was received, when a motion for the new

trial or reconsideration, if any, was filed, and when notice of the denial thereof was received. On May 25, 2000, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner's

motion for reconsideration. Hence, this Petition filed on July 7, 2000.

HELD:

The court ruled on denying the petition because the issues raised are factual. This Court is not a trier of facts. Blancovs. Quasha, G.R. No. 133148,

November 17, 1999. Well-settled is the rule that the factual findings and conclusions of the trial court and the Court of Appeals are entitled to great

weight and respect, and will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of any clear showing that the trial court overlooked certain facts or circumstance

which would substantially affect the disposition of the case. There would be no end to litigations if parties who unsuccessfully availed themselves of any of

the appropriate remedies or lost them through their fault would still be heard.IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition isDENIED

WEBB VS DE LEON

247 SCRA 652

Facts:

On June 19, 1994, the National Bureau of Investigation filed with the DOJ a letter-complaint

charging petitioners Hubert Webb, Michael Gatchalian, Antonio J. Lejano and 6 other persons with the crime of Rape andHomicide of Carmela N.

Vizconde, her mother Estrellita Nicolas-Vizconde, and her sister Anne Marie Jennifer in their home at Number 80 W. Vinzons, St., BF Homes, Paranaque,

Metro Manila on June 30, 1991.Forthwith, the DOJ formed a panel of prosecutors headed by Asst Chief State Prosecutor Jovencio R. Zuno to conduct the

preliminary investigation. The DOJ Panel for its finding of probable cause. The credibility of Jessica Alfaro was assailed as inherently weak and

uncorroborated due to her inconsistencies between her April 28, 1995 and May 22, 1995 sown statements. They criticize the procedure followed by the

DOJ Panel when it did not examine witnesses to clarify the alleged inconsistencies. Petitioners charge that respondent Judge Raul de Leon and respondent

Judge Amelita Tolentino issued warrants of arrest against them without conducting the required preliminary examination. Complain about the denial of

their constitutional right to due process and violation of their right to an impartial investigation. They also assail the prejudicial publicity that attended

their preliminary investigation.

ISSUES:

(1) Did the DOJ Panel gravely abuse its discretion in holding that there is probable cause to charge accused with crime of rape and homicide?(2) Did

respondent judges de Leon and Tolentino gravely abuse their discretion when they failed to conduct a preliminary examination before issuing warrants ofarrest against the accused?(3) Did the DOJ Panel deny them their constitutional right to due process during their preliminary investigation?(4) Did the

DOJ Panel unlawfully intrude into judicial prerogative when it failed to charge Jessica Alfaro in the information as an accused?

HELD:

(1) NO. Valid determination -- A probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not, a crime has been committed and was

committed by the suspects. Probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt beyond

reasonable doubt and definitely, not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt.(2) NO. Valid arrest -- In arrest cases, there must be a probable

cause that a crime has been committed and that the person arrested committed it. Section 6 of Rule 112 provides that

–

“upon filing of an information, the RTC may issue a warrant for the accused. ”Clearly then, our laws repudiate the submission that respondent judges

should have conducted “searching examination of witnesses” before issuing warrants of arrest against them.

(3) NO. There is no merit in this contention because petitioners were given all the opportunities to be heard. The DOJ Panel precisely requested the parties

to adduce more evidence in their behalf and for the panel to study the evidence submitted more fully.(4) NO. Petitioner's argument lacks appeal for it lies

on the faulty assumption that the decision whom to prosecute is a judicial function, the sole prerogative of courts and beyond executive and legislative

interference. In truth, the prosecution of crimes appertains to the executive department whose principal power and responsibility is to see that our laws

are faithfully executed. A necessary component of this right is to prosecute their violators.

PEOPLE VS TEEHANKEE

The facts:



In 1991, Jussi Olavi Leino was taking Maureen Hultman to her home at Campanilla Street, Dasmarinas Village, Makati. Roland John Chapman went with

them. When they entered the village, Maureen asked Leino to stop about a block away from her house, as she wanted to walk the rest of the way for she

did not want her parents to know that she was going home that late. Leino offered to walk with her while Chapman stayed in the car and listened to the

radio.

While Leino and Maureen were walking, a light-colored Mitsubishi box-type Lancer car, driven by accused Claudio Teehankee, Jr., came up from behind

them and stopped on the middle of the road. Accused alighted from his car, approached them, and asked: “Who are you? (Show me your) I.D.” When Leino

handed his I.D., the accused grabbed and pocketed the I.D., without bothering to look at it.

Chapman saw the incident. He stepped down on the sidewalk and asked accused: “Why are you bothering us?” Accused pushed Chapman, dug into his

shirt, pulled out a gun and fired at him. Chapman felt his upper body, staggered for a moment, and asked: “Why did you shoot me?” Chapman crumpled

on the sidewalk. Leino knelt beside Chapman to assist him but accused ordered him to get up and leave Chapman alone. Accused then turned his ire on

Leino. He pointed gun at him and asked: “Do you want a trouble?” Leino said “no” and took a step backward.

The shooting initially shocked Maureen. When she came to her senses, she became hysterical and started screaming for help. She repeatedly shouted:

“Oh, my God, he’s got a gun. He’s gonna kill us. Will somebody help us?” All the while, accused was pointing his gun to and from Leino to Maureen, warning

the latter to shut up. Accused ordered Leino to sit down on the sidewalk. Leino obeyed and made no attempt to move away. Accused stood 2-3 meters away

from him. Maureen continued to be hysterical. She could not stay still. She strayed to the side of accused’s car. Accused tried but failed to grab her.

Maureen circled around accused’s car, trying to put some distance between them. The short chase lasted for a minute or two. Eventually, accused caught

Maureen and repeatedly enjoined her to shut up and sit down beside Leino. Maureen finally sat beside Leino on the sidewalk.

For a moment, the accused turned his back from the two. He faced them again and shot Leino. Leino was hit on the upper jaw, fell backwards on the

sidewalk, but did not lose consciousness. Leino heard another shot and saw Maureen fall beside him. He lifted his head to see what was happening and

saw accused return to his car and drive away. Leino struggled to his knees and shouted for help. He noticed at least 3 people who saw the incident.

As a result of the incident, 3 separate criminal cases were filed against accused Claudio Teehankee, Jr. Initially, he was charged with: MURDER for the

killing of ROLAND CHAPMAN, and two (2) FRUSTRATED MURDER for the shooting and wounding of JUSSI LEINO and MAUREEN HULTMAN. When

Hultman subsequently died after 97 days of confinement at the hospital and during the course of the trial, the Information for Frustrated Murder wasamended to MURDER.

The defense:

Accused relied on the defense of denial and alibi. Accused claimed that during the shooting incident, he was not anywhere near the scene of the crime, bu

in his house in Pasig. Accused averred that he only came to know the 3 victims in the Dasmarinas shooting when he read the newspaper reports about it.

Accused admitted ownership of a box-type, silver metallic gray Mitsubishi Lancer, with plate number PDW 566. He, however, claimed that said car ceased

to be in good running condition after its involvement in an accident. Until the day of the shooting, his Lancer car had been parked in the garage of his

mother’s house in Dasmarinas Village. He has not used this car since then. Accused conceded that although the car was not in good running condition, it

could still be used.

The ruling:

Eyewitness identification and out-of-court identification.

The accused was convicted on the strength of the testimonies of 3 eyewitnesses who positively identified him as the gunman. However, he vigorously

assails his out-of-court identification by these eyewitnesses.

He starts by trying to discredit the eyeball account of Leino, the lone surviving victim of the crimes at bar. Appellant urges: First, that Leino’s identification

of him outside an unoccupied house in Forbes Park was highly irregular; Second, that Leino saw his pictures on television and the newspapers before he

identified him; Third, that Leino’s interview at the hospital was never put in writing; Fourth, that the sketch of appellant based on the description given by

Leino to the CIS agents was suppressed by the NBI. It is surmised that the sketch must have been among the evidence turned over to the NBI when the

latter assumed jurisdiction over the investigation; and, lastly, that Leino could not have remembered the face of the accused. The shooting lasted for only

five (5) minutes. During that period, his gaze could not have been fixed only on the gunman’s face. His senses were also dulled by the five (5) bottles of beer

he imbibed that night.

It is understandable for the accused to assail his out-of-court identification by the prosecution witnesses in his first assignment of error. Eyewitness

identification constitutes vital evidence and, in most cases, decisive of the success or failure of the prosecution. Yet, while eyewitness identification is

significant, it is not as accurate and authoritative as the scientific forms of identification evidence such as the fingerprint or DNA testing. Some authors

even describe eyewitness evidence as “inherently suspect.” The causes of misidentification are known, thus:

Identification testimony has at least three components. First, witnessing a crime, whether as a victim or a bystander, involves perception of an event

actually occurring. Second, the witness must memorize details of the event. Third, the witness must be able to recall and communicate accurately.

Dangers of unreliability in eyewitness testimony arise at each of these three stages, for whenever people attempt to acquire, retain, and retrieve information

accurately, they are limited by normal human fallibilities and suggestive influences.

Out-of-court identification is conducted by the police in various ways. It is done thru show-ups where the suspect alone is brought face to face with the

witness for identification. It is done thru mug shots where photographs are shown to the witness to identify the suspect. It is also done thru line-ups



where a witness identifies the suspect from a group of persons lined up for the purpose. Since corruption of out-of-court identification contaminates the

integrity of in-court identification during the trial of the case, courts have fashioned out rules to assure its fairness and its compliance with the

requirements of constitutional due process. In resolving the admissibility of and relying on out-of-court identification of suspects, courts have adopted the

totality of circumstances test where they consider the following factors, viz: (1) the witness’ opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2)

the witness’ degree of attention at that time; (3) the accuracy of any prior description given by the witness; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the

witness at the identification; (5) the length of time between the crime and the identification; and, (6) the suggestiveness of the identification procedure.

Using the totality of circumstances test, the alleged irregularities cited by the accused did not result in his misidentification nor was he denied due

process. There is nothing wrong in Leino’s identification of the accused in an unoccupied house in Forbes Park. The records reveal that this mode was

resorted to by the authorities for security reasons. The need for security even compelled that Leino be fetched and escorted from his house in Forbes Park

by U.S. embassy security officials and brought to the house where he was to make the identification. The Leinos refused to have the identification at the

NBI office as it was cramped with people and with high security risk. Leino’s fear for his safety was not irrational. He and his companions had been shot in

cold blood in one of the exclusive, supposedly safe subdivisions in the metropolis.

There is no hard and fast rule as to the place where suspects are identified by witnesses. Identification may be done in open field. It is often done in

hospitals while the crime and the criminal are still fresh in the mind of the victim.

Accused can’t also gripe that Leino saw his pictures and heard radio and TV accounts of the shooting before he personally identified him. The records

show that while Leino was still in the hospital, he was shown 3 pictures of different men by the investigators. He identified the accused as the gunman

from these pictures. He, however, categorically stated that, before the mug shot identification, he has not seen any picture of accused or read any report

relative to the shooting incident. The burden is on accused to prove that his mug shot identification was unduly suggestive. Failing proof of impermissible

suggestiveness, he cannot complain about the admission of his out-of-court identification by Leino.

There is no reason to doubt the correctness of the accused’s identification by Leino. The scene of the crime was well-lighted by a lamp post. The accused

was merely 2-3 meters away when he shot Leino. The incident happened for a full 5 minutes. Leino had no ill-motive to falsely testify against the accusedt.

His testimony at the trial was straightforward. He was unshaken by the brutal cross-examination of the defense counsels. He never wavered in his

identification of the accused. When asked how sure he was that the accused was responsible for the crime, he confidently replied: “I’m very sure. It could

not have been somebody else.”

The accused cannot likewise capitalize on the failure of the investigators to reduce to a sworn statement the information revealed by Leino during his

hospital interviews. It was sufficiently established that Leino’s extensive injuries, especially the injury to his tongue, limited his mobility. The day he

identified appellant in the line-up, he was still physically unable to speak. He was being fed through a tube inserted in his throat. There is also no rule of

evidence which requires the rejection of the testimony of a witness whose statement has not been priorly reduced to writing.

The SC also rejected the accused’s contention that the NBI suppressed the sketch prepared by the CIS on the basis of the description given by Leino.

There is nothing on the record to show that said sketch was turned over by the CIS to the NBI which could warrant a presumption that the sketch was

suppressed. The suspicion that the sketch did not resemble the accused is not evidence. It is unmitigated guesswork.

The SC was also not impressed with the contention that it was incredible for Leino to have remembered the accused’s face when the incident happened

within a span of 5 minutes. Five minutes is not a short time for Leino to etch in his mind the picture of the accused. Experience shows that precisely

because of the unusual acts of bestiality committed before their eyes, eyewitnesses, especially the victims to a crime, can remember with a high degree of

reliability the identity of criminals. The natural reaction of victims of criminal violence is to strive to see the appearance of their assailants and observe the

manner the crime was committed. Most often, the face end body movements of the assailant create an impression which cannot be easily erased from their

memory. In this case, there is absolutely no improper motive for Leino to impute a serious crime to the accused. The victims and the accused were

unknown to each other before their chance encounter. If Leino identified the accused, it must be because the accused was the real culprit.

The SC also gave credence to the testimony of the other two witnesses. As to the testimony of Cadenas, his initial reluctance to reveal to the authorities

what he witnessed was sufficiently explained during the trial – he feared for his and his family’s safety. The Court has taken judicial notice of the natural

reticence of witnesses to get involved in the solution of crimes considering the risk to their lives and limbs. In light of these all too real risks, the court has

not considered the initial reluctance of fear-gripped witnesses to cooperate with authorities as an authorities as an indicium of credibility. As to the

testimony of Mangubat, the SC found nothing in the records to suspect that Mangubat would perjure himself.

2. Proof beyond reasonable doubt

According to the the accused, the trial court erred in not holding that the prosecution failed to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. First, he

claims the trial court erred in citing in its Decision his involvement in previous shooting incidents. Second, the NBI failed to conduct an examination to

compare the bullets fired from the gun at the scene of the crime with the bullets recovered from the body of Chapman. Third, the prosecution eyewitnesses

described the gunman’s car as white, but the trial court found it to be silver metalic gray. Fourth, the accused could not have been the gunman, for

Mangubat said that he overheard the victim Hultman plead to the gunman, thus: “Please, don’t shoot me and don’t kill me. I promise Mommy, Daddy.” The

accused also contends that a maid in a house near the scene of the crime told Makati police Alberto Fernandez that she heard Maureen say: “Daddy don’t

shoot. Don’t.” Fifth, the NBI towed accused’s car from Dasmarinas Village to the NBI office which proved that the same was not in good running condition.

Lastly, the result of the paraffin test conducted on appellant showed he was negative of nitrates.

The accused points to other possible suspects,viz:. ANDERS HULTMAN, since one of the eyewitnesses was quoted in the newspapers as having overheard

Maureen plead to the gunman: “Huwag, Daddy.”; and, (b) JOSE MONTAÃ‘O, another resident of DasmariÃ±as Village, who had a white Lancer car, also

bearing license plate number 566.



The accused, however, cannot hope to exculpate himself simply because the trial judge violated the rule onres inter alios acta when he considered his

involvement in previous shooting incidents. This rule has long been laid to rest. The harmless error rule is also followed in our jurisdiction. In dealing with

evidence improperly admitted in trial, the court examines its damaging quality and its impact to the substantive rights of the litigant. If the impact is sligh

and insignificant, the court disregards the error as it will not overcome the weight of the properly admitted evidence against the prejudiced party.

In the case at bar, the reference by the trial judge to reports about the troublesome character of appellant is a harmless error. The reference is not the

linchpin of the inculpatory evidence appreciated by the trial judge in convicting the accused. As aforestated, the accused was convicted mainly because of

his identification by 3 eyewitnesses with high credibility.

The NBI may have also failed to compare the bullets fired from the fatal gun with the bullets found at the scene of the crime. The omission, however,

cannot exculpate the accused. The omitted comparison cannot nullify the evidentiary value of the positive identification of the accused.

There is also little to the contention of the accused that his Lancer car was not in running condition. Allegedly, this was vicariously proved when the NBI

towed his car from DasmariÃ±as Village where it was parked to the NBI office. Again, the argument is negated by the records which show that said car was

towed because the NBI could not get its ignition key which was then in the possession of the accused. Clearly, the car was towed not because it was not in

running condition. Even the accused’s evidence show that said car could run. After its repairs, the accused’s son, Claudio Teehankee III, drove it from the

repair shop in Banawe, Quezon City to Dasmarinas Village, in Makati, where it was parked.

Nor was the SC impressed by the alleged discrepancies in the eyewitnesses’ description of the color of the gunman’s car. Leino described the car as light-

colored; Florece said the car was somewhat white (“medyo puti”); Mangubat declared the car was white; and Cadenas testified it was silver metallic gray.

These alleged discrepancies amount to no more than shades of differences and are not meaningful, referring as they do to colors white, somewhat white

and silver metallic gray. Considering the speed and shocking nature of the incident which happened before the break of dawn, these slight discrepancies in

the description of the car do not make the prosecution eyewitnesses unworthy of credence.

The accused’s attempt to pin the crimes at bar on Anders Hultman, the adoptive father of Maureen Hultman, deserves scant consideration. The accused

cites a newspaper item where Maureen was allegedly overheard as saying to the gunman: “Huwag, Daddy. Huwag, Daddy.” The evidence on record,

however, demonstrates that Anders Hultman could not have been the gunman. It was clearly established that Maureen could not have uttered said

statement for two (2) reasons: Maureen did not speak Tagalog, and she addressed Anders Hultman as “Papa,” not “Daddy.” Moreover, Leino outrightlydismissed this suspicion. While still in the hospital and when informed that the Makati police were looking into this possibility, Leino flatly stated that

Anders Hultman was NOT the gunman. Leino is a reliable witness.

The accused cannot also capitalize on the paraffin test showing he was negative of nitrates. Scientific experts concur in the view that the paraffin test has

“. . . proved extremely unreliable in use. The only thing that it can definitely establish is the presence or absence of nitrates or nitrites on the hand. It

cannot be established from this test alone that the source of the nitrates or nitrites was the discharge of a firearm. The person may have handled one or

more of a number of substances which give the same positive reaction for nitrates or nitrites, such as explosives, fireworks, fertilizers, pharmaceuticals,

and leguminous plants such as peas, beans, and alfalfa. A person who uses tobacco may also have nitrate or nitrite deposits on his hands since these

substances are present in the products of combustion of tobacco.” In numerous rulings, we have also recognized several factors which may bring about the

absence of gunpowder nitrates on the hands of a gunman,viz: when the assailant washes his hands after firing the gun, wears gloves at the time of the

shooting, or if the direction of a strong wind is against the gunman at the time of firing. In the case at bar, NBI Forensic Chemist, Leonora Vallado, testified

and confirmed that excessive perspiration or washing of hands with the use of warm water or vinegar may also remove gunpowder nitrates on the skin.

She likewise opined that the conduct of the paraffin test after more than seventy-two (72) hours from the time of the shooting may not lead to a reliable

result for, by such time, the nitrates could have already been removed by washing or perspiration. In the Report on the paraffin test conducted onappellant, Forensic Chemist Elizabeth Ayonon noted that when the accused was tested for the presence of nitrates, more than 72 hours has already lapsed

from the time of the alleged shooting.

3. The right to an impartial trial.

The the accused blames the press for his conviction as he contends that the publicity given to his case impaired his right to an impartial trial. He

postulates there was pressure on the trial judge for high-ranking government officials avidly followed the developments in the case (as no less than then

Vice-President Estrada and then DOJ Secretary Drilon attended some of the hearings and, President Aquino even visited Hultman while she was still

confined at the hospital). He submits that the trial judge failed to protect him from prejudicial publicity and disruptive influences which attended the

prosecution of the cases.

The SC did not sustain the accused’s claim that he was denied the right to impartial trial due to prejudicial publicity. It’s true that the print and broadcast

media gave the case at bar pervasive publicity, just like all high profile and high stake criminal trials. Then and now, we rule that the right of an accused

to a fair trial is not incompatible to a free press. To be sure, responsible reporting enhances an accused’s right to a fair trial for, as well pointed out, “a

responsible press has always been regarded as the handmaiden of effective judicial administration, especially in the criminal field . . . The press does not

simply publish information about trials but guards against the miscarriage of justice by subjecting in the police, prosecutors, and judicial processes to

extensive public scrutiny and criticism.”

Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair trial. The mere fact that the trial of appellant was given a day-to-day, gavel-to-

gavel coverage does not by itself prove that the publicity so permeated the mind of the trial judge and impaired his impartiality. For one, it is impossible to

seal the minds of members of the bench from pre-trial and other off-court publicity of sensational criminal cases. The state of the art of our

communication system brings news as they happen straight to our breakfast tables and right to our bedrooms. These news form part of our everyday

menu of the facts and fictions of life. For another, our idea of a fair and impartial judge is not that of a hermit who is out of touch with the world. We have

not installed the jury system whose members are overly protected from publicity lest they lose their impartiality. Our judges are learned in the law and



trained to disregard off-court evidence and on-camera performances of parties to a litigation. Their mere exposure to publications and publicity stunts

does not per se fatally infect their impartiality.

At best, the accused can only conjure possibility of prejudice on the part of the trial judge due to the barrage of publicity that characterized the

investigation and trial of the case. The SC had previously rejected this standard of possibility of prejudice and adopted the test of actual prejudice as we

ruled that to warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity, there must be allegation and proof that the judges have been unduly influenced, not simply that

they might be, by the barrage of publicity. In the case at bar, the records do not show that the trial judge developed actual bias against appellant as a

consequence of the extensive media coverage of the pre-trial and trial of his case. The totality of circumstances of the case does not prove that the trial

judge acquired a fixed opinion as a result of prejudicial publicity which is incapable of change even by evidence presented during the trial. The accused

has the burden to prove this actual bias and he has not discharged the burden. There is no evidence showing that the trial judge allowed the proceedings

to turn into a carnival. Nor did he consent to or condone any manifestation of unruly or improper behavior or conduct inside the courtroom during the

trial of the case at bar.

Parenthetically, the accused should be the last person to complain against the press for prejudicial coverage of his trial. The records reveal he presented in

court no less than 7 newspaper reporters and relied heavily on selected portions of their reports for his defense. The defense’s documentary evidence

consists mostly of newspaper clippings relative to the investigation of the case at bar and which appeared to cast doubt on his guilt. The press cannot be

fair and unfair to appellant at the same time.

Finally, it would not be amiss to stress that the trial judge voluntarily inhibited himself from further hearing the case, but the SC, nothing in the conduct

of the proceedings to stir any suspicion of partiality against the trial judge, directed the trial judge to proceed with the trial to speed up the administration

of justice.

4. The presence of treachery

The accused claims that treachery was not present in the killing of Hultman and Chapman, and the wounding of Leino for it was not shown that the

gunman consciously and deliberately adopted particular means, methods and forms in the execution of the crime. The accused asserts that mere

suddenness of attack does not prove treachery.

The 3 Informations charged the accused with having committed the crimes with treachery and evident premeditation. Evident premeditation was correctly

ruled out by the trial court for, admittedly, the shooting incident was merely a casual encounter or a chance meeting on the street since the victims were

unknown to the accused andvice-versa. It, however, appreciated the presence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery.

On the other hand, the prosecution failed to prove treachery in the killing of Chapman. Prosecution witness Leino established the sequence of events

leading to the shooting. He testified that for no apparent reason, the accused suddenly alighted from his car and accosted him and Maureen Hultman who

were then walking along the sidewalk.

Appellant questioned who they were and demanded for an I.D. After Leino handed him his I.D., Chapman appeared from behind Leino and asked what

was going on. Chapman then stepped down on the sidewalk and inquired from appellant what was wrong. There and then, the accused pushed Chapman,

pulled a gun from inside his shirt, and shot him. The gun attack was unexpected. “Why did you shoot me?” was all Chapman could utter. Concededly, the

shooting of Chapman was carried out swiftly and left him with no chance to defend himself. Even then, there is no evidence on record to prove that the

accused consciously and deliberately adopted his mode of attack to insure the accomplishment of his criminal design without risk to himself. The accused

acted on the spur of the moment. Their meeting was by chance. They were strangers to each other. The time between the initial encounter and theshooting was short and unbroken. The shooting of Chapman was thus the result of a rash and impetuous impulse on the part of the accused rather than

a deliberate act of will. Mere suddenness of the attack on the victim would not, by itself, constitute treachery. Hence, absent any qualifying circumstance,

the accused should only be held liable for Homicide for the shooting and killing of Chapman.

As to the wounding of Leino and the killing of Hultman, treachery clearly attended the commission of the crimes. The evidence shows that after shooting

Chapman in cold blood, the accused ordered Leino to sit on the pavement. Maureen became hysterical and wandered to the side of appellant’s car. When

the accused went after her, Maureen moved around his car and tried to put some distance between them. After a minute or two, the accused got to

Maureen and ordered her to sit beside Leino on the pavement. While seated, unarmed and begging for mercy, the two were gunned down by the accused .

Clearly, the accused purposely placed his two victims in a completely defenseless position before shooting them. There was an appreciable lapse of time

between the killing of Chapman and the shooting of Leino and Hultman – a period which the accused used to prepare for a mode of attack which ensured

the execution of the crime without risk to himself.

Penalties:(Note: Mr. Teehankee was pardoned in 2008)

(1) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide for the shooting of Roland John Chapman. He was sentenced to suffer an indeterminate

penalty of imprisonment of 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor as minimum to 14 years, 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum, and to

pay the heirs of the said deceased the following amounts: P50,000 as indemnity for the victim’s death; and, P1,000,000 as moral damages.

(2) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder, qualified by treachery, for the shooting of Maureen Navarro Hultman. He was sentenced to

suffer imprisonment of reclusion perpetua, and to pay the heirs of the said deceased the following amounts: P50,000 as indemnity for her death;

P2,350,461.83 as actual damages; P564,042.57 for loss of earning capacity of said deceased; P1,000,000 as moral damages; and P2,000,000 as exemplary

damages.

http://jlp-law.com/blog/primer-on-the-presidents-power-to-grant-pardon/






(3) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Frustrated Murder, qualified by treachery, for the shooting of Jussi Olavi Leino, and sentenced to suffer

the indeterminate penalty of 8 years of prision mayor as minimum, to 14 years and 8 months of reclusion temporal as maximum, and to pay the said

offended party the following amounts: P30,000 as indemnity for his injuries; P118,369.84 and equivalent in Philippine Pesos of U.S.$55,600.00, both as

actual damages; P1,000,000 as moral damages; and, P2,000,000 as exemplary damages.

(4) In all three cases, to pay each of the 3 offended parties the sum of P1,000,000, or a total of P3,000,000, for attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation;

and

(5) To pay the costs in all 3 cases.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MAYOR ANTONIO L. SANCHEZ, GEORGEMEDIALDEA, ZIOLO AMA, BALDWIN BRION,

LUIS CORCOLON, ROGELIO CORCOLON, and PEPITOKAWIT, accused-appellants

G.R. No. 121039-45 October 18, 2001

FACTS:

This is a review on the Pasig City Regional Trial Court‟s decision on the “Allan Gomez

-Eileen Sarmenta rape-

slay” case that drew strong condemnation from an outraged

populace in the middle of 1993. After a protracted and grueling 16-month trial, all those charged appellants herein were found guilty beyond reasonable

doubt of the crime of rape with homicide on seven counts and sentenced each one of them to suffer the maximum penalty of reclusion perpetual for each

of the seven offenses or a total of seven reclusion perpetua for each accused. In addition, the Court ordered all the accused to jointly and severally pay the

victims‟ respective families by way of civil indemnities.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the publicity given to this case impaired their right to a fair trial of the appellants?

HELD:

No. The Supreme Court cannot sustain their claim that they were denied the right to impartial trial due to prejudicial publicity. It is true that the

print and broadcast media gave the case at bar pervasive publicity, just like all high profile and high stake criminal trials, but the right of an accused to a

fair trial is not incompatible to a free press. Responsible reporting enhances an accused’s right to a fair trial. The press does not simply publish

information about

trials but guards against the miscarriage of justice by subjecting the police, prosecutors, and judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and criticism.

Our judges are learned in the law and trained to disregard off-court evidence and on camera performances of parties to a litigation. Their mere exposure to

publications and publicity stunts does not per se fatally infect their impartiality. To warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity, there must be allegation

and proof that the judges have been unduly influenced by the barrage of publicity. Records herein do not show that the trial judge developed actual bias

against Mayor Sanchez, et. al., as a consequence of the extensive media coverage of the pre-trial and trial of his case.

Perez v. Estrada

AM No. 01-4-03-SC June 29, 2001FACTS:

On March 13, 2001, the Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster ng Pilipinas (KBP), an association representing duly franchised and authorized television and radio

networks throughout the country, sent a letter requesting the Supreme Court to allow live media coverage of the anticipated trial of the plunder and other

criminal cases filed against former President Joseph E. Estrada before the Sandiganbayan in order "to assure the public of full transparency in

the proceedings of an unprecedented case in our history." The request was seconded by Mr. Cesar N. Sarino in his letter of 5 April 2001 to the Chief

Justice and, still later, by Senator Renato Cayetano and Attorney Ricardo Romulo. On 17April 2001, the Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez formally

filed the petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not media coverage be allowed to air Estrada‟s trial to the public

.HELD:

No. In Estes v. Texas, US SC held that television coverage of judicial proceedings involves an inherent denial of due process rights of the criminal

defendant: "Witnesses might be frightened, play to the cameras, become nervous. They are then subject to extraordinary out-of-court influences that

might affect their testimony. Telecasting increases the trial judge's responsibility to avoid actual prejudice to the defendant. For the defendant, telecasting

is a form of mental harassment and subjects him to excessive public exposure and distracts him from an effective presentation of his defense. Finally, the



television camera is a powerful weapon which intentionally or inadvertently can destroy an accused and his case in the eyes of the public. “The right of

people to information does not prescribe that TV cameras be installed in the courtroom. This right might be fulfilled by less distracting,

degrading and more judicial means. In a criminal case, a life is at stake, and the due process rights of the accused shall take precedence over the people's

right to information. The accused has the right to a public trial, and the exercise of such a right is his to make, because it is his life and liberty that is in

the balance. A public trial is not the same as a publicized trial. IBP: "TV coverage can negate the rule on the exclusion of the witness intended to ensure a

fair trial...could allow the ‘hooting throng' to arrogate upon themselves the task of judging the guilt of the accused...will not subserve the ends of justice,

but will only pander to the desire of publicity of a few grandstanding lawyers. “Court is not unmindful of the recent technological advances but to chance

forthwith the life and liberty of any person in a hasty bid to use and apply them, even before ample safety nets are provided and the concerns heretofore

expressed are aptly addressed, is a price too high to pay.

Perez v. Estrada

A.M. No. 01-4-03-SC September 13, 2001 FACTS:

This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision denying petitioners‟ request for permission to televise

and broadcast live the trial of former President Estrada before the Sandiganbayan. The motion was filed by the Secretary of Justice, as one of the

petitioners, who argues that there is really no conflict between the right of the people to public information and the freedom of the press, on the one hand

and, on the other, the right of the accused to a fair trial; that if there is a clash between these rights, it must be resolved in favor of the right of the people

and the press because the people, as the repository of sovereignty, are entitled to information; and that live media coverage is a safeguard against

attempts by any party to use the courts as instruments for the pursuit of selfish interests. On the other hand, former President Joseph E. Estrada

reiterates his objection to the live TV and radio coverage of his trial on the ground that its allowance will violate the sub judice rule and that, based on his

experience with the impeachment trial, live media coverage will only pave the way for so-called "expert commentary" which can trigger massive

demonstrations aimed at pressuring the Sandiganbayan to render a decision one way or the other. Mr. Estrada contends that the right of the people to

information may be served through other means less distracting, degrading, and prejudicial than live TV and radio coverage.

ISSUE:

Whether or not television and radio coverage of plunder case be allowed.

HELD:

No. The Court has considered the arguments of the parties on this important issue and, after due deliberation, finds no reason to alter or in any way

modify its decision prohibiting live or real time broadcast by radio or television of the trial of the former president. By a vote of nine (9) to six (6) of its

member, the Court denies the motion for reconsideration of the Secretary of Justice.

In lieu of live TV and radio coverage of the trial, the Court, by the vote of eight (8) Justices, has resolved to order the audio-visual recording of the trial for

documentary purposes. Seven (7) Justices vote against the audio-visual recording of the trial. Considering the significance of the trial before the

Sandiganbayan of former President Estrada and the importance of preserving the records thereof, the Court believes that there should be an audio-visual

recording of the proceedings. The recordings will not be for live or real time broadcast but for documentary purposes. Only later will they be available forpublic showing, after the Sandiganbayan shall have promulgated its decision in every case to which the recording pertains. The master film shall be

deposited in the National Museum and the Records Management and Archives Office for historical preservation and exhibition pursuant to law.

ANG TIBAY VS CIR

Due Process – Admin Bodies – CIR

Teodoro Toribio owns and operates Ang Tibay a leather company which supplies the Philippine Army. Due to alleged shortage of leather, Toribio caused the

lay off of members of National Labor Union Inc. NLU averred that Toribio’s act is not valid as it is not within the CBA. That there are two labor unions in

Ang Tibay; NLU and National Worker’s Brotherhood. That NWB is dominated by Toribio hence he favors it over NLU. That NLU wishes for a new tria

as they were able to come up with new evidence/documents that they were not able to obtain before as they wereinaccessible and they were not able to

present it before in the CIR.

ISSUE: Whether or not there has been a due process of law.

HELD: The SC ruled that there should be a new trial in favor of NLU. The SC ruled that all administrative bodies cannot ignore or disregard the

fundamental and essential requirements of due process. They are;

(1) The right to a hearing which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof.





Whether or not the evidences presented against Judge Filomeno Pascual were strong enough toconvict him.

Held:

We find that the evidence on record does not warrant conviction.

We note that the only bases for the Report and Recommendation submitted by Executive Judge Natividad G. Dizon consist of: The Complaint, the Answer,

the Memorandum of the respondent, and the transcript of stenographic notes of the hearing of the bribery case of respondent judge at

the Sandiganbayan. The respondent was, therefore, not afforded the right to open trial wherein respondent can confront the witnesses against him and

present evidence in his defense.

This lapse in due process is unfortunate. The Rules, even in an administrative cases, demand that, if the respondent judge should be disciplined for grave

misconduct or any graver offense, the evidence against him should be competent and should be derived from direct knowledge. The Judiciary to which

respondent belongs demands no less. Before any of its members could be faulted, it should be only after dueinvestigation and after presentation of

competent evidence, especially since the charge is penal in character.[7] The above-quoted Report and Recommendation of the investigating judge had

fallen short of the requirements of due process. The evidence aforesaid admits of irreconcilable inconsistencies in the testimonies of principal witness,

Candido Cruz, and NBI Agent SI Reynaldo Olazo on several material points. It will be remembered that the charge was intimated by someone who must

have had an ax to grind againstthe respondent judge but who, by reason of cowardice or lack of evidence to put up a righteous case, did not come out in

the open and instead wrote an anonymous letter. The letter-writer, naming himself as Ceferino Tigas, did not specify crimes committed or illegal acts

perpetrated but charged respondent with anomalies in general terms. Respondent judge could not have been expected to make a valid answer or to

otherwise defend himself from such vague accusations. While then NBI Director Epimaco Velasco, upon being apprised of the Tigas letter, ordered the NBI

investigating team to make a “discreet investigation” of respondent, the NBI team had instead caused an instigation or the entrapment of respondent

judge. Not having found letter-writer Tigas and concluding that no such person exists, they sought out an accused before respondent‟s court who could

possibly be respondent judge‟s virtual victim. Approached by the NBI team was Candido Cruz, a person who had been brought before the Municipal TrialCourt of Angat, Bulacan, for preliminary investigation on the charge ofFrustrated Murder. Respondent judge gave judgment to the effect that the crime

committed by Candido Cruz was that of physical injuries merely. He declared then that he had original jurisdiction to try the case.

But, respondent‟s action in this regard was perpetrated some time before Candido Cruz was “persuaded

to participate in what they (the NBI agents) called „entrapment operation.‟” The opportune time to bribe the respondent should have been before he acted

in reducing Cruz‟ criminal liability from Frustrated Murder to Physical Injuries. No bribe was asked then. It was unlikely that respondent would ask for it

on the date of the entrapment on March 26, 1993, the favorable verdict having been rendered already.

It is significant to note that NBI Agent Olazo admitted[8] that, despite the fact that he “scoured” the table of the respondent in search of the envelope, with

marked money in it, no envelope was found and so he had to call Candido Cruz who was already outside so that Cruz can locate the envelope. In view of

these antecedents, we find reason to favorably consider the allegations of respondent judge in his defense that, at around 9:30 o‟clock in the morning of

March 26, 1993, Candido Cruz, along with the NBI agents, went to the Municipal Building of Angat, Bulacan. Candido Cruz, alone, went inside

respondent judge‟s chambers, located thereat, and placed before respondent judge an envelope containing marked money. Respondent judge thought that

what was placed before him was a pleading for filing and so, he told Candido Cruz to file it with the Office of the Clerk of Court, that is, in a room adjacentto his chambers. Candido Cruz replied that it was the money the judge was asking for. Upon hearing this reply, respondent judge suddenly erupted in

anger. He grabbed the envelope on the desk and hurled it at Candido Cruz. The envelope fell on the floor. Respondent judge then picked it up and inserted

it inside the pocket of Cruz‟ polo shirt and drove him out of his chambers. NBI Agents Villarta and Olazo immediately entered the door of the judge‟s

chambers, introduced themselves, and told respondent judge that the money that Cruz gave him was marked. Respondent judge told them that he did not

receive or accept money from Candido Cruz. After respondent judge said this, the NBI Agents nevertheless proceeded to search the room, examined tables,

drawers, and every nook and cranny of respondent‟s chambers, and the pockets of the pants of respondent judge. Even after rigid search of the chambers

of respondent, the NBI Agents failed to find the envelope containing marked money allegedly given by Candido Cruz to respondent judge.

Valenzuela vs Bellosillo Case Digest

Atty. NapoleonS. Valenzuela v. Judge Reynaldo Bellosillo

A.M. No. MTJ-00-1241

January 20, 2000

Facts:Respondent Judge is being charged with gross violation of the constitutional right of subject accused to assistance by counsel of her own choice

gross misconduct, oppression, partiality and violation of the Code of Judicial Ethics.

In a BP 22 case, Judge allegedly granted bail to the accused despite not being accompanied and represented by her counsel at that time. It appears that Judge granted bail without the assistance of the counsel of record, Atty. Valenzuela and he even suggested that the latter should be replaced by another

counsel. Aghast by such decision, Atty. V filed his Notice of Withdrawal, in conformity with his client’s decision, Meriam Colapo. Subsequently, he filed theinstant administrative complaint against respondent Judge. To support his position, he attached an Affidavit allegedly executed by his client Colapo.

However, during the hearing of the case, he failed to present Colapo as Witness as she was allegedly out of the country although she was willing to testifyat that time.

Held: NOT GUILTY. On the issue of granting bail without the assistance of counsel, the Court held that it was valid and sufficiently based on the

Manifestation filed by Atty. Valenzuela. With regard to the alleged act of respondent Judge suggesting to the accused that she should change her counsel



(complainant Atty. V) and recommending a different lawyer, the Court found that the evidence adduced by the complainant was insufficient to substantiatethe charges against him. The only evidence offered by complainant was the Affidavit of his client Meriam Colapo, and it cannot be the basis of a finding ofguilt even in an administrative case. The complainant’s failure to present his principal witness, in the absence of other evidence to prove his charges wasfatal and said Affidavit cannot be given credence and is inadmissible without the said affiant being placed on the witness stand.

The employment or profession of a person is a property right within the constitutional guaranty of due process of law. This applies also to JudgesRespondent judge cannot therefore be adjudged guilty of the charges against him without affording him a chance to confront the said witness, Meriam

Colapo. Otherwise, his right to due process would be infringed.

LUMIQUED VS EXEVEA

Due Process – Assistance by Counsel

Lumiqued was the Regional Director of DAR-CAR. He was charged by Zamudio, the Regional Cashier, for dishonesty due to questionable gas expenses

under his office. It was alleged that he was falsifying gas receipts for reimbursements and that he had an unliquidated cash advance worth P116,000.00

Zamudio also complained that she was unjustly removed by Lumiqued two weeks after she filed the two complaints. The issue was referred to the DOJ.

Committee hearings on the complaints were conducted on July 3 and 10, 1992, but Lumiqued was not assisted by counsel. On the second hearing date

he moved for its resetting to July 17, 1992, to enable him to employ the services of counsel. The committee granted the motion, but neither Lumiqued nor

his counsel appeared on the date he himself had chosen, so the committee deemed the case submitted for resolution. The Investigating Committee

recommended the dismissal of Lumiqued. DOJ Sec Drilon adopted the recommendation. Fidel Ramos issued AO 52 dismissing Lumiqued.

ISSUE:Does the due process clause encompass the right to be assisted by counsel during an administrative inquiry?

HELD: The SC ruled against Lumiqued. The right to counsel, which cannot be waived unless the waiver is in writing and in the presence of counsel, is a

right afforded a suspect or an accused during custodial investigation. It is not an absolute right and may, thus, be invoked or rejected in a crimina

proceeding and, with more reason, in an administrative inquiry. In the case at bar, petitioners invoke the right of an accused in criminal proceedings to

have competent and independent counsel of his own choice. Lumiqued, however, was not accused of any crime in the proceedings below. The investigation

conducted by the committee created by Department Order No. 145 was for the purpose of determining if he could be held administratively liable under the

law for the complaints filed against him. The right to counsel is not indispensable to due process unless required by the Constitution or the law.

“. . . There is nothing in the Constitution that says that a party in a non-criminal proceeding is entitled to be represented by counsel and that, without such

representation, he shall not be bound by such proceedings. The assistance of lawyers, while desirable, is not indispensable. The legal profession was not

engrafted in the due process clause such that without the participation of its members, the safeguard is deemed ignored or violated. The ordinary citizen is not

that helpless that he cannot validly act at all except only with a lawyer at his side.”

In administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to explain one’s side. Whatever irregularity attended the proceedings

conducted by the committee was cured by Lumiqued’s appeal and his subsequent filing of motions for reconsideration.

FABELLA VS CA

FACTS:

On September 17, 1990, DECS Secretary Carino issued a return-to-work order to all public school teachers who had participated in walk-outs and strikes

on various dates during the period of September to October 1990. The mass action had been staged to demand payment of 13th month pay, allowances

and passage of debt cap bill in Congress. On October 1990, Secretary Carino filed administrative cases against respondents, who are teachers of

Mandaluyong High School. The charge sheets required respondents to explain in writing why they should not be punished for having taken part in the

mass action in violation of civil service laws. Administrative hearings started on December 1990. Respondents, through counsel assailed the legality of the

proceedings on the following due process grounds: first, they were not given copies of the guidelines adopted by the committee for the investigation and

denied access to evidence; second, the investigation placed the burden of proof on respondents to prove their innocence; third, that the investigating body

was illegally constituted, their composition and appointment violated Sec.9 of the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers. Pending the action assailing the

validity of the administrative proceedings, the investigating committee rendered a decision finding the respondents guilty and ordered their immediate

dismissal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not private respondents were denied due process?



HELD:

YES. In administrative proceedings, due process has been recognized to include the following: (1) the right to actual or constructive notice of the

institution of proceedings which may affect a respondent’s legal rights; (2) a real opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance of counsel, to

present witnesses and evidence in one’s favor, and to defend one’s rights; (3) a tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a

person charged administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality; and (4) a finding by said tribunal which is supported by

substantial evidence submitted for consideration during the hearing or contained in the records or made known to the parties affected. The legislature

enacted a special law, RA 4670 known as the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers, which specifically covers administrative proceedings involving public

schoolteachers. Section 9 of said law expressly provides that the committee to hear public schoolteachers’ administrative cases should be composed of the

school superintendent of the division as chairman, a representative of the local or any existing provincial or national teachers’ organization and a

supervisor of the division. In the present case, the various committees formed by DECS to hear the administrative charges against private respondents did

not include “a representative of the local or, in its absence, any existing provincial or national teacher’s organization” as required by Section 9 of RA 4670.

Accordingly, these committees were deemed to have no competent jurisdiction. Thus, all proceedings undertaken by them were necessarily void. They

could not provide any basis for the suspension or dismissal of private respondents. The inclusion of a representative of a teachers’ organization in these

committees was indispensable to ensure an impartial tribunal. It was this requirement that would have given substance and meaning to the right to be

heard. Indeed, in any proceeding, the essence of procedural due process is embodied in the basic requirement of notice and a real opportunity to be heard.

Other minor issues: Petitioners allege that Sec 9 of RA 4670 was complied with because the respondents are members of Quezon City Teachers Federation

We disagree. Mere membership of said teachers in their respective teachers’ organizations does not ipso facto make them authorized representatives of

such organizations as contemplated by Section 9 of RA 4670. Under this section, the teachers’ organization possesses the right to indicate its choice of

representative to be included by the DECS in the investigating committee. Such right to designate cannot be usurped by the secretary of education or the

director of public schools or their underlings. In the instant case, there is no dispute that none of the teachers appointed by the DECS as members of its

investigating committee was ever designated or authorized by a teachers’ organization as its representative in said committee. Sec 9 of RA 4670 was

repealed by PD 807. Statcon principle, a subsequent general law cannot repeal a previous specific law, unless there is an express stipulation. Always

interpret laws so as to harmonize them.

Summary Dismissal Board v. Torcita

[GR 130442, 6 April 2000]

Facts:On 26 April 1994, a red Cortina Ford, driven by C/Insp. Lazaro Torcita, with his aide, PO2 Java, in the front seat and his wife with two ladies at the

backseat, were overtaken by a Mazda pick-up owned byCongressman Manuel Puey and driven by one Reynaldo Consejo with four (4) passengers in the persons of Alex Edwin del Rosario, Rosita Bistal, CarmenBraganza and Cristina Dawa. After the Mazda pick-up has overtaken the red Cortina Ford, and after a vehicular collision almost took place, it acceleratedspeed and proceeded to Hacienda Aimee, a sugarcane plantation owned by the congressman. The red Cortina Ford followed also at high speed until i

reached the hacienda where Torcita and Java alighted and the confrontation with del Rosario and Jesus Puey occurred. Torcita identified himself but thesame had no effect.

PO2 Java whispered to him that there are armed men around them and that it is dangerous for them to continue. That at this point, theyradioed for back-up. Torcita,upon the arrival of the back-up force of PNP Cadiz City, proceeded to the place where Capt. Jesus Puey and Alex Edwin delRosario were. On 6 July 1994, 12 verified administrative complaints were filed against Torcita for Conduct Unbecoming of a Police Officer, Illegal SearchGrave Abuse of Authority and Violation of Domicile, and Abuse of Authority and Violation of COMELEC Gun Ban. The 12 administrative complaints wereconsolidated into 1 major complaint for conduct unbecoming of a police officer. The Summary Dismissal Board, however, did not find sufficient evidence toestablish that Torcita threatened anybody with a gun, nor that a serious confrontation took place between the parties, nor that the urinating incident took

place, and held that the charges of violation of domicile and illegal search were not proven. Still, while the Board found that Torcita was "in theperformance of his official duties" when the incident happened, he allegedly committed a simple irregularity in performance of duty (for being in the

influence of alcohol while in performance of duty) and was suspended for 20 days and salary suspended for the same period of time. Torcita appealed hisconviction to the Regional Appellate Board of the Philippine National Police (PNP, Region VI, Iloilo City), but the appeal was dismissed for lack of

jurisdiction. Whereupon, Torcita filed a petition for certiorari in the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City (Branch 31), questioning the legality of the convictionof an offense for which he was not charged (lack of procedural due process of law). The Board filed a motion to dismiss, which was denied. The RTCgranted the petition for certiorari and annulled the dispositive portion of the questioned decision insofar as it found Torcita guilty of simple irregularity inthe performance of duty. The Board appealed from the RTC decision, by petition of review to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the same for the reasonthat the respondent could not have been guilty of irregularity considering that the 12 cases were eventually dismissed. The Board filed the petition forreview on certiorari before the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether Torcita may be proceeded against or suspended for breach of internal discipline, when the original charges against him were for Conduct

Unbecoming of a Police Officer, Illegal Search, Grave Abuse of Authority and Violation of Domicile, and Abuse of Authority and Violation of COMELEC GunBan.

Held:Notification of the charges contemplates that the respondent be informed of the specific charges against him. The absence of specification of the

offense for which he was eventually found guilty is not a proper observance of due process. There can be no short-cut to the legal process. While thedefinition of the more serious offense is broad, and almost all-encompassing a finding of guilt for an offense, no matter how light, for which one is notproperly charged and tried cannot be countenanced without violating the rudimentary requirements of due process. Herein, the 12 administrative casesfiled against Torcita did not include charges or offenses mentioned or made reference to the specific act of being drunk while in the performance of officialduty. There is no indication or warning at all in the summary dismissal proceedings that Torcita was also being charged with breach of internal disciplineconsisting of taking alcoholic drinks while in the performance of his duties. The omission is fatal to the validity of the judgment finding him guilty of theoffense for which he was not notified nor charged. Further, the cursory conclusion of the Dismissal Board that Torcita "committed breach of internaldiscipline by taking drinks while in the performance of same" should have been substantiated by factual findings referring to this particular offense. Even

if he was prosecuted for irregular performance of duty, he could not have been found to have the odor or smell of alcohol while in the performance of duty because he was not on duty at the time that he had a taste of liquor; he was on a privatetrip fetching his wife.



Office of the Ombudsman v Coronel

G.R. No. 164460, June 27, 2006

In administrative cases, a finding of guilt must be supported by substantial evidence. In the present case, an unauthenticated photocopy of an allegedreceipt does not constitute substantial evidence to show that respondent is guilty of dishonesty. In fact, absent any authentication, the photocopy is

inadmissible in evidence; at the very least, it has no probative value.

Facts: Carmencita D. Coronel is a Senior Accounting Processor of the Linamon Water District, Lanao del Norte. Board of Directors of Linamon Water

District, by virtue of Resolution No. 056, Series of 1997, designated [respondent] as Officer-in-Charge, effective October 1, 1997 until a General Managershall have been appointed. In the morning of October 14, 1998, [respondent] called for a meeting the officers of the different Water Districts in Lanao deNorte and Lanao del Sur. Since it was nearing lunchtime, the group opted to continue their meeting the luncheon meeting, attended by more or less ten

(10) persons. [respondent] paid for the lunch in the amount of [P]esos (P1,213.00), as shown in cash Invoice No. 0736 dated October 14, 1998.[respondentclaimed for reimbursement of her expenses covered by Voucher No. 98-11-23, chargeable against the representation and entertainment account of her

office. That very same day, the voucher was approved and [respondent] got her reimbursement in the amount of One Thousand Two [H]undred Thirteen

[P]esos (P1,213.00). Pedro C. Sausal, Jr. was appointed General Manager of Linamon Water District filed with the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao asworn letter-complaint against herein Coronel for dishonesty. The complaint alleges that [respondent] falsified the cash invoice she submitted forreimbursement by making it appear that the (P1,213.00) when in fact, it was only (P213.00), as reflected in the photocopy of the original duplicate of cashinvoice No. 0736 dated October 14, 1998.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this office finds and so holds that respondent CARMENCITA D. CORONEL is guilty of DISHONESTY and ishereby DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture of all leave credits and retirement benefits, pursuant to Section 22 (a) in relation to Sec. 9 of Rule XIV

of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987. She is disqualified from re-employment in the national and locagovernments, as well as in any agency, including government-owned or controlled corporations. Let a copy of this decision be entered in the personal

records of respondent.

Issue: Whether or not Coronel was deprived of due process

Whether or not the administrative proceedings of the Ombudsman erred in the decision rendered.

Held: The notation does not deny respondent of her right to due process. In administrative proceedings, the essence of due process lies simply in the

opportunity to explain one’s side or to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. What is proscribed is the absolute lack of notice or

hearing. In this case, respondent was given every opportunity to be heard. Significantly, her intelligible pleadings before the CA and this Court indicatethat she knew the bases for the ombudsman’s Decision. In fact, she very ably pinpointed its alleged errors that she thought would merit our review. Nothaving been left in the dark as to how it was reached, respondent’s insistence on a denial of due process has no legal leg to stand on.

In administrative cases, the quantum of proof necessary for a finding of guilt is substantial evidence;that is, such relevant evidence that a

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. In the instant case, the complainant did not present evidence to support his theorythat the photocopy of the original duplicate reflected the true amount, or that OR No. 0736 had indeed been falsified. That oversight was fatal to thedischarge of his burden of proof. A reasonable mind will not carelessly jump to the conclusion that respondent is the guilty party.

The complainant’s evidence to prove falsification consisted of an unauthenticated45 photocopy of the original duplicate. He could have obtainedan affidavit from the restaurant proprietor or employee who had issued the receipt, in order to attest to its due execution and authenticity. Absent anyproof of due execution and authenticity, the alleged photocopy of the original duplicate of OR No. 0736 does not convince us that it is an accuratereflection of the actual bill incurred.

While this Court adheres to a liberal view of the conduct of proceedings before administrative agencies, it also consistently requires some proof

of authenticity or reliability as a condition for the admission of documents.

Absent any such proof of authenticity, the photocopy of the original duplicate should be considered inadmissible and, hence, without probative value.

Given the flimsy charge and the paucity of the evidence against respondent, there is no need for her to present additional evidence to vindicateherself. The Office of the Ombudsman should have dismissed the Administrative Complaint against her in the first place. Clearly, her guilt was not proven

by substantial evidence.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. Respondent Carmencita D. Coronel is hereby EXONERATED of the charge against her for lack osubstantial evidence. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.

SECRETARY OF JUSTICE VS LANTION

FACTS:

Secretary Of Justice Franklin Drilon, representing the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, signed in Manila the “extradition Treaty Between the

Government of the Philippines and the Government of the U.S.A. The Philippine Senate ratified the said Treaty.

On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs U.S Note Verbale No. 0522 containing a request for the

extradition of private respondent Mark Jiminez to the United States.

On the same day petitioner designate and authorizing a panel of attorneys to take charge of and to handle the case. Pending evaluation of the aforestated

extradition documents, Mark Jiminez through counsel, wrote a letter to Justice Secretary requesting copies of the official extradition request from the U.S

Government and that he be given ample time to comment on the request after he shall have received copies of the requested papers but the petitioner

denied the request for the consistency of Article 7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty stated in Article 7 that the Philippine Government must present the

interests of the United States in any proceedings arising out of a request for extradition.

ISSUE: Whether or not to uphold a citizen’s basic due process rights or the governments ironclad duties under a treaty.



RULING: Petition dismissed.

The human rights of person, whether citizen or alien , and the rights of the accused guaranteed in our Constitution should take precedence over treaty

rights claimed by a contracting state. The duties of the government to the individual deserve preferential consideration when they collide with its treaty

obligations to the government of another state. This is so although we recognize treaties as a source of binding obligations under generally accepted

principles of international law incorporated in our Constitution as part of the law of the land.

The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are confronted with situation in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule

of international law and the provision of the constitution or statute of the local state. Petitioner (Secretary of Justice) is ordered to furnish Mark Jimenez

copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers, and to grant him (Mark Jimenez) a reasonable period within which to file his comment with

supporting evidence. “Under the Doctrine of Incorporation, rules of international law form part of the law of the land and no further legislative action is

needed to make such rules applicable in the domestic sphere.

“The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are confronted with situations in which there appears to be a conflict between a

rule of international law and the provisions of the constitution or statute of the local state.

“Efforts should first be exerted to harmonize them, so as to give effect to both since it is to be presumed that municipal law was enacted with proper

regard for the generally accepted principles of international law in observance of the incorporation clause in the above cited constitutional provision.

“In a situation, however, where the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to be made between a rule of international law and a municipal law,

jurisprudence dictates that municipal law should be upheld by the municipal courts, for the reason that such courts are organs of municipal law and are

accordingly bound by it in all circumstances.

“The fact that international law has been made part of the law of the land does not pertain to or imply the primacy of international law over national or

municipal law in the municipal sphere. The doctrine of incorporation, as applied in most countries, decrees that rules of international law are given equal

standing with, but are not superior to, national legislative enactments. Accordingly, the principle lex posterior derogate priori takes effect – a treaty may

repeal a statute and a statute may repeal a treaty. In states where the Constitution is the highest law of the land, such as the Republic of the Philippines,

both statutes and treaties may be invalidated if they are in conflict with the constitution.

GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES VS PURGANAN

FACTS:

Petition is a sequel to the case “Sec. of Justice v. Hon. Lantion”. The Secretary was ordered to furnish Mr. Jimenez copies of the extradition request and

its supporting papers and to grant the latter a reasonable period within which to file a comment and supporting evidence. But, on motion for



reconsideration by the Sec. of Justice, it reversed its decision but held that the Mr. Jimenez was bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the

evaluation stage of the extradition process. On May 18, 2001, the Government of theUSA, represented by the Philippine Department of Justice, filed with

the RTC, the Petition for Extradition praying for the issuance of an order for his “immediate arrest” pursuant to Sec. 6 of PD 1069 in order to prevent the

flight of Jimenez. Before the RTC could act on the petition, Mr. Jimenez filed before it an “Urgent Manifestation/Ex-Parte Motion” praying for his

application for an arrest warrant be set for hearing. After the hearing, as required bythe court, Mr. Jimenez submitted his Memorandum. Therein

seeking an alternative prayer that in case a warrant should issue, he be allowed to post bail in the amount of P100,000. The court ordered the issuance o

a warrant for his arrest and fixing bail for his temporary liberty at P1M in cash. After he had surrendered hispassport and posted the required cash

bond, Jimenez was granted provisional liberty.

Government of the USA filed a petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to set aside the order for the issuance of a warrant for his

arrest and fixing bail for his temporary liberty at P1M in cash which the court deems best to take cognizance as there is still no local jurisprudence to

guide lower court.

ISSUES:

i. Whether or NOT Hon. Purganan acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction

in adopting a procedure of first hearing a potential extraditee before issuing an arrest warrant under Section 6 of PD No. 1069

ii. Whether or NOT Hon. Purganan acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction

in granting the prayer for bail

iii. Whether or NOT there is a violation of due process

HELD: Petition is GRANTED. Bail bond posted is CANCELLED. Regional Trial Court of

Manila is directed to conduct the extradition proceedings before it.

i. YES.

By using the phrase “if it appears,” the law further conveys that accuracy is not as

important as speed at such early stage. From the knowledge and the material then available to it, the courtis expected merely to get a good first

impression or a prima facie finding sufficient to make a speedy initial determination as regards the arrest and detention of the accused. The prima facie

existence of probable cause for hearing the petition and, a priori, for issuing an arrest warrant was already evident from the Petition itself and its

supporting documents. Hence, after having already determined therefrom that a prima facie finding did exist, respondent judge gravely abused his



discretion when he set the matter for hearing upon motion of Jimenez. The silence of the Law and the Treaty leans to the more reasonable interpretation

that there is no intention to punctuate with a hearing every little step in the entire proceedings. It also bears emphasizing at this point that extradition

proceedings aresummary in nature. Sending to persons sought to be extradited a notice of the request for their arrest and setting it for hearing at some

future date would give them ample opportunity to prepare and execute an escape which neither the Treaty nor the Law could have intended.

Even Section 2 of Article III of our Constitution, which is invoked by Jimenez, does not require a notice or a hearing before the issuance of a warrant of

arrest. To determine probable cause for the issuance of arrest warrants, the Constitution itself requires only the examination under oath or affirmation of

complainants and the witnesses they may produce.

The Proper Procedure to “Best Serve The Ends Of Justice” In Extradition Cases

Upon receipt of a petition for extradition and its supporting documents, the judge must study them and make, as soon as possible, a prima facie finding

whether

a) they are sufficient in form and substance

b) they show compliance with the Extradition Treaty and Law

c) the person sought is extraditable

At his discretion, the judge may require thesubmission of further documentation or may personally examine the affiants and witnesses of the petitioner.

If, in spite of this study and examination, no prima facie finding is possible, the petition may be dismissed at the discretion of the judge. On the other

hand, if the presence of a prima facie case is determined, then the magistrate must immediately issue a warrant for the arrest of the extraditee, who is at

the same time summoned to answer the petition and to appear at scheduled summary hearings. Prior to the issuance of the warrant, the judge must not

inform or notify the potential extraditee of the pendency of the petition, lest the latter be given the opportunity to escape and frustrate the proceedings.

ii. Yes.

The constitutional provision on bail on Article III, Section 13 of the Constitution, as well

as Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a person has been arrested and detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does

not apply to extradition proceedings, because extradition courts do not render judgments of conviction or acquittal. Moreover, the constitutional right to

bail “flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be

entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt. In extradition, the presumption of innocence is not at issue. The provision in

the Constitution stating that the “right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended” finds application



“only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion.”

That the offenses for which Jimenez is sought to be extradited are bailable in the United States is not an argument to grant him one in the present

case. Extradition proceedings are separate and distinct from the trial for the offenses for which he is charged. He shouldapply for bail before the courts

trying the criminal cases against him, not before the extradition court.

Exceptions to the “No Bail” Rule

Bail is not a matter of right in extradition cases. It is subject to judicial discretion in the context of the peculiar facts of each case. Bail may be applied

for and granted as an exception, only upon a clear and convincing showing

1) that, once granted bail, the applicant will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community; and

2) that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances including, as a matter of reciprocity, those cited by the highest court in the

requesting state when it grants provisional liberty in extradition cases therein

Since this exception has no express or specific statutory basis, and since it is derived essentially from general principles of justice and fairness, the

applicant bears the burden of proving the above two-tiered requirement with clarity, precision and emphatic forcefulness.

It must be noted that even before private respondent ran for and won a congressional seat in Manila, it was already of public knowledge that the United

States was requesting his extradition. Therefore, his constituents were or should have been prepared for the consequences of the extradition case.

Thus, the court ruled against his claim that his election to public office is by itself a compelling reason to grant him bail.

Giving premium to delay by considering it as a special circumstance for the grant of bail would be tantamount to giving him the power to grant bail to

himself. It would also encourage him to stretch out and unreasonably delay the extradition proceedings even more. Extradition proceedings should be

conducted with all deliberate speed to determine compliance with the Extradition Treaty and Law; and, while safeguarding basic individual rights, to avoid

the legalistic contortions, delays and technicalities that may negate that purpose.

That he has not yet fled from the Philippines cannot be taken to mean that he will stand his ground and still be within reach of our government if and

when it matters; that is, upon the resolution of the Petition for Extradition.

iii. NO.



Potential extraditees are entitled to the rights to due process and to fundamental fairness. The doctrine of right to due process and fundamental

fairness does not always call for a prior opportunity to be heard. A subsequent opportunity to be heard is enough. He will be given full opportunity to be

heard subsequently, when the extradition court hears the Petition for Extradition. Indeed, available during the hearings on the petition and the answer is

the full chance to be heard and to enjoy fundamental fairness that is compatible with the summary nature of extradition.

It is also worth noting that before the US government requested the extradition of respondent, proceedings had already been conducted in that country.

He already had that opportunity in the requesting state; yet, instead of taking it, he ran away.

Other Doctrines:

Five Postulates of Extradition

1) Extradition Is a Major Instrument for the Suppression of Crime

In this era of globalization, easier and faster international travel, and an expanding ring of

international crimes and criminals, we cannot afford to be an isolationist state. We need to cooperate with other states in order to improve our chances of

suppressing crime in our own country.

2) The Requesting State Will Accord Due Process to the Accused

By entering into an extradition treaty, the Philippines is deemed to have reposed its trust

in the reliability or soundness of the legal and judicial system of its treaty partner, as well as in the ability and the willingness of the latter to grant basic

rights to the accused in the pending criminal case therein.

3) The Proceedings Are Sui Generis

An extradition proceeding is sui generis:

a) It is not a criminal proceeding which will call into operation all the rights of an accused as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. It does not involve the

determination of the guilt or innocence of an accused. His guilt or innocence will be adjudged in the court of the state where he will be extradited.

b) An extradition proceeding is summary in nature while criminal proceedings involve a full-blown trial.

c) In terms of the quantum of evidence to be satisfied, a criminal case requires proof “beyond reasonable doubt” for conviction while a fugitive may be





defraud, penalized by the common law of Hong Kong and a warrant for his arrest was issued on August 23, 1997 and October 25, 1999.

On September 13, 1999, the DOJ forwarded the received request from the Hong Kong

Department of Justice for theprovisional arrest of Muñoz to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) which filed with the RTC of Manila, Branch 19

anapplication for his provisional arrest.

On September 23, 1999, the RTC issued an Order of Arrest and the NBI agents arrested and detained him. Muñoz filed with the Court of Appeals a

petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus withapplication for preliminary mandatoryinjunction and/or writ of habeas corpus questioning the

validity of the Order of Arrest. The Court of Appeals rendered the Order of Arrest void. This Court granted the petition for review on certiorari filed by the

DOJ praying the reversal of the Court of Appeals decision which became final and executory on April 10, 2001.

Meanwhile, on November 22, 1999, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region filed with the RTC of Manila a petition for the extradition of Muñoz where the

latter filed a petition for bail. Judge Bernardo, Jr. issued an Order denying the petition for bail, holding that there is no Philippine law granting bail in

extradition cases and that private respondent is a high "flight risk." Judge Bernardo, Jr. inhibited himself so the case was re-raffled to Hon. Olalia Jr. who

on the motion for reconsideration, allowed the posting of bail.Hongkong filed an urgent motion to vacate the order for bail which was denied.

Thus, Hongkong filed an instant Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, seeking to nullify the 2 orders of

the RTC ordering post bail and denying the motion to vacate order on the grounds of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction

as there is no provision in the Constitution granting bail to a potential extraditee.

ISSUE: Whether or NOT bail can be granted.

HELD: YES. DISMISS the petition. T REMANDED to the trial court determine whether private respondent is entitled to bail on the basis of "clear and

convincing evidence”

1) The exercise of the State’s power to deprive an individual of his liberty is not necessarily limited to criminal proceedings

2) Philippine jurisprudence has not limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal proceedings only

If bail can be granted in deportation cases such as in US v. Go-Sioco, Mejoff v.

Director of Prisons and Chirskoff v. Commission of Immigration, we see no justification why it should not also be allowed in extradition cases. Likewise,





It does not necessarily mean that in keeping with its treaty obligations under the time-honored principle of pacta sunt servanda that the Philippines

should diminish a potential extraditee’s rights to life, liberty, and due process. More so, where these rights are guaranteed, not only by our Constitution,

but also by international conventions, to which the Philippines is a party. We should not deprive an extraditee of his right to apply for bail, provided that a

certain standard for the grant is satisfactorily met.

GUZMAN VS NATIONAL UNIVERSITY

Facts:

Petitioners Diosdado Guzman, Ulysses Urbiztondo and Ariel Ramacula, students of respondent National University, seek relief from what they described as

their school's "continued and persistent refusal to allow them to enrol."

In their petition on August 7, 1984 for extraordinary legal and equitable remedies with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction, they alleged that they

were denied due to the fact that they were active participation in peaceful mass actions within the premises of the University.

The respondents on the other hand claimed that the petitioners’ failure to enroll for the first semester of the school year 1984-1985 is due to their own

fault and not because of their alleged exercise of their constitutional and human rights. As regards to Guzman, his academic showing was poor due to his

activities in leading boycotts of classes. They said that Guzman is facing criminal charges for malicious mischief before the Metropolitan Trial Court o

Manila in connection with the destruction of properties of respondent University.

The petitioners have failures in their records, and are not of good scholastic standing.

Issue:

Whether or Not there is violation of the due process clause.

Held:

Immediately apparent from a reading of respondents' comment and memorandum is the fact that they had never conducted proceedings of any sort to

determine whether or not petitioners-students had indeed led or participated in activities within the university premises, conducted without prior permit

from school authorities, that disturbed or disrupted classes therein or perpetrated acts of vandalism, coercion and intimidation, slander, noise barrage

and other acts showing disdain for and defiance of University authority. The pending civil case for damages and a criminal case for malicious mischief

against petitioner Guzman, cannot, without more, furnish sufficient warrant for his expulsion or debarment from re-enrollment. Also, apparent is the

omission of respondents to cite this Court to any duly published rule of theirs by which students may be expelled or refused re-enrollment for poor

scholastic standing.

To satisfy the demands of procedural due process, the following requisites must be met:

1. the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against them;

2. they shag have the right to answer the charges against them, with the assistance of counsel, if desired;

3. they shall be informed of the evidence against them;

4. they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and

5. the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case

RULING:



The petition was granted wherein the respondents are directed to allow the petitioners (students) to re-enrol without prejudice to any disciplinary

proceedings.

ALCUAZ VS PSBA

SOPHIA ALCUAZ, ET AL., petitioners vs. PHILIPPINE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION Quezon City FACTS: In 1986, some PSBA students,

herein petitioners Alcuaz et. al. staged demonstrations in the premises of the school. In order for the demonstration to be settled, an agreement was

entered into among others the regulations for the conduct of protest action. In spite of the agreement, it was alleged that the petitioners, committed

tumultuous and anarchic acts within the premises of the school, fanned by the cooperation of the intervening professors, causing disruption of classes to

the prejudice of the majority students. The school took administrative sanctions upon them in view of their participation in the demonstration. The

students and the intervening professors were sanctioned. They were dismissed and terminated.

ISSUE: Whether or not there has been a deprivation of constitutional rights of expression and assembly and of due process of law of the students who

have been barred from re-enrollment.

HELD: The Supreme Court held that due process in disciplinary cases such as the case at bar does not entail proceedings and hearings similar to those

prescribed for actions and proceedings in the courts of justice. The Court has already recognized the right of the school to refuse re-enrollment of students

for academic delinquency and violation of disciplinary regulations. In the school’s administrative process, both students and professors were given three

(3) days from receipt of letter to explain in writing why the school should not take administrative sanction against them. With respect to the academic

activities of the students and the teaching loads of the teachers, the respondent school has created new class for the petitioners and the intervening

professors during and when the investigation was going on.

The Court then upheld that there is no denial of due process where all requirements of administrative due process were met by the school and the

students were given the opportunity to be heard and that the right of expression and assembly are not absolute especially when parties are bound to

certain rules under a contract.

NON VS DAMES

Non v. Dames [GR 89317, 20 May 1990]

Facts: Ariel Non, Rex Magana, Alvin Agura, Normandy Occiano, Jorge Dayaon, Lourdes Banares, Bartolome Ibasco, Emmanuel Barba, Sonny Moreno

Giovani Palma, Joselito Villalon, Luis Santos and Daniel Torres, students in Mabini Colleges, Inc. in Daet, Camarines Norte, were not allowed to re-enrol by the school for the academic year 1988-1989 for leading or participating in student mass actions against the school in the preceding semester. They thusfiled a petition in the Regional Trial Court of Daet (Branch 38) seeking their readmission or re-enrollment to the school, but the trial court dismissed thepetition in an order dated 8 August 1988. A motion for reconsideration was filed, but this was denied by the trial court on 24 February 1989; stating thatthey waived-their privilege to be admitted for re-enrollment with respondent college when they adopted, signed, and used its enrollment form for the firssemester of school year 1988-89. In addition, for the same semester, they duly signed pledges "to abide and comply with all the rules and regulations laiddown by competent authorities in the College Department or School in which I am enrolled." Hence, the affected students filed the petition for certiorar

with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction before the Supreme Court.





14 and 20clearly show that respondent students were given ample opportunity to adduce evidence in their behalf and to answer the charges leveled against

them.

The requisite assistance of counsel was met when, from the very start of the investigations before the Joint Administration Faculty- Student Committee, the law

firm of Gonzales Batiler and Bilog and Associates put in its appearance and filed pleadings in behalf of respondent students.

Respondent students may not use the argument that since they were not accorded the opportunity to see and examine the written statements

which became the basis of petitioners' February 14, 1991 order, they were denied procedural due process. Granting that they were denied

such opportunity, the same may not be said to detract from the observance of due process, for disciplinary cases involving students need not

necessarily include the right to cross examination. An ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGconducted to investigate students' participation in a hazing

activity need not be clothed with the attributes of a judicial proceeding. A closer examination of the March 2, 1991hearing which characterized the rules on

the investigation as beingsummary in natureand that respondent students have no righ t to examine affiants-neophytes, reveals that this is but a

reiteration of our previous ruling in Alcuaz. Respondent students' contention that the investigating committee failed to consider their evidence is far from

the truth because the February 14, 1992 ordered clearly states that it was reached only after receiving the written statements and hearing the testimoniesof several witnesses. Similarly, the Disciplinary Board's resolution dated March 10, 1991 was preceded by a hearing on March 2, 1991 wherein respondentstudents were summoned to answer clarificatory questions.

222 SCRA 644 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Academic Freedom – Power of School to Dismiss Erring Students

On February 8, 9, and 10 of 1991, a fraternity in Ateneo Law School named Aquila Legis conducted its initiation rites upon neophytes. Unfortunately, one

neophyte died as a result thereof and one was hospitalized due to serious physical injuries. In a resolution dated March 9, 1991, the Disciplinary Board

formed by Ateneo found seven students guilty of violating Rule 3 of the Rules on Discipline. Fr. Joaquin Bernas, then president of Ateneo, on the basis o

the findings, ordered the expulsion of the seven students. However, on May 17, 1991, Judge Ignacio Capulong of the Makati RTC, upon the students

petition forcertiorari, prohibition, and mandamus, ordered Ateneo to reverse its decision and reinstate the said students.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Ateneo Law School has competence to issue an order dismissing such students pursuant to its rules.

HELD: Yes, Ateneo has the competence and the power to dismiss its erring students and therefore it had validly exercised such power. The students do no

deserve to claim such a venerable institution such as Ateneo as their own a minute longer for they may forseeably cast a malevolent influence on

students currently enrolled as well as those who come after them. This is academic freedom on the part of the school which includes:

a. freedom to determine who may teach;

b. freedom to determine what may be taught;

c. freedom to determine how it shall be taught;

d.freedom to determine who may be admitted to study.

UP vs. Ligot-Telan

227 SCRA 342 G.R. No. 110280 October 12, 1993

Facts: In an effort to make the University of the Philippines (U.P.) truly the University of the People, U.P. administration conceptualized and implemented

the socialized scheme of tuition fee payments through

the Socialized Tuition Fee and Assistance Program (STFAP), popularly known as the "Iskolar ng Bayan" program. After broad consultations with the

various university constituencies, U.P. President Jose V.

Abueva, the U.P. Board of Regents issued on April 28, 1988 a Resolution establishing the STFAP. A year later, it was granted official recognition

when the Congress of the Philippines allocated a portion of

the National Budget for the implementation of the program. In the interest of democratizing admission to the State University, all students are entitled to

apply for STFAP benefits which include reduction in

fees, living and book subsidies and student assistantships which give undergraduate students the opportunity to earn P12.00 per hour by working for the

University. Applicants are required to accomplish a questionnaire where, among others, they state the amount and source of the annual income of the



family, their real and personal properties and special circumstances from which the University may evaluate their financial status and need on the basis of

which they are categorized into brackets. To further insure the integrity of the program, a random sampling scheme of verification of data indicated in a

student's application form is undertaken. Among those who applied for STFAP benefits for School

Year 1989-90 was Ramon P. Nadal, a student enrolled in the College of Law. A team composed of Arsenio L. Dona and Jose Carlo Manalo conducted

a home investigation at the residence of Nadal. Ms. Cristeta Packing, Nadal's aunt, was interviewed and the team submitted a home visit report.

Consolacion Urbino, Scholarship Affairs Officer II, found discrepancies between the report and Nadal's application form. Forthwith, she and Bella M

Villanueva, head of the Office of Scholarships and Student Services, presented the matter to the Diliman Committee on Scholarships and

Financial Assistance. In compliance with the said Committee's directive, Bella Villanueva wrote Nadal informing him that the investigation showed that

he had failed to declare, not only the fact that he had been maintaining a 1977 Corolla car which was owned by his brother but also the income of his

mother who was supporting his brothers Antonio and Federico. Nadal was likewise informed that the Diliman Committee had reclassified him to Bracket 9

(from Bracket 4), retroactive to June 1989, unless he could

submit "proofs to the contrary." Nadal was required "to pay back the equivalent amount of full school fees" with "interest based on current commercial

rates." Failure to settle his account would mean the

suspension of his registration privileges and the withholding of clearance and transcript of records. He was also warned that his case might be

referred to the Student Disciplinary Tribunal for further

investigation. commercial rates." Failure to settle his account would mean the suspension of his registration privileges and the withholding of clearance

and transcript of records. He was also warned that his case might be referred to the Student Disciplinary Tribunal for further investigation. Nadal issued a

certification stating, among other things, that his mother migrated to the United States in 1981 but because her residency status had not yet been

legalized, she had not been able to find a "stable, regular, well-paying employment." U.P. charged Nadal before the Student Disciplinary Tribunal (SDT)

that he committed acts which find him guilty of willfully and deliberately withholding information about the income of his mother, who is living abroad and

that he was maintaining a Toyota Corolla car. As such, the SDT imposed upon Nadal the penalty of expulsion from the University and required him

to reimburse

all STFAP benefits he had received but if he does not voluntarily make reimbursement, it shall be "effected” by the University thru outside legal action. The

SDT decision was thereafter automatically elevated to the Executive Committee of U.P. Diliman for review pursuant to Sec. 20 of the U.P. Rules on

Student Conduct and Discipline. Board of regents modified the penalty from Expulsion to One Year- Suspension, effective immediately, plus

reimbursement of all benefits received from the STFAP, with legal interest. However the BOR also decided against giving Nadal, a certification of good mora

character. Nadal forthwith filed a motion for reconsideration of the BOR decision, in the next BOR meeting Regent Antonio T. Carpio raised the "material

importance" of the truth of Nadal's claim that earlier, he was a beneficiary of a scholarship and financial aid from the Ateneo de Manila University

(AdeMU). Learning that the "certification issued by the AdeMU that it had not given Nadal financial aid while he was a student there was made through a

telephone call," Regent Carpio declared that there was

as yet "no direct evidence in the records to substantiate the charge." According to Carpio, if it should be disclosed that Nadal falsely stated that he received

such financial aid, it would be a clear case of gross and material misrepresentation that would even warrant the penalty of expulsion. Hence, he cast a

conditional vote that would depend on the verification of Nadal's claim on the matter. U.P. President and concurrently Regent Jose V. Abueva

countered by stating that "a decision should not be anchored solely on one piece of information which he considered irrelevant, and which wouldignore the whole pattern of the respondent's dishonesty and deception from 1989 which had been established in the investigation and the

reviews."In the morning of March 29, 1993, the AdeMU issued a certification to the effect that Nadal was indeed a recipient of a scholarship grant from

1979 to 1983. That evening, the BOR met again at a special meeting, according to Regent Carpio, in executive session, the BOR found Nadal "guilty."

However, on April 22, 1993, Nadal filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a petition for mandamus with preliminary injunction and prayer for a

temporary restraining order against President Abueva, the BOR, Oscar M. Alfonso, Cesar A. Buenaventura, Armand V. Fabella and Olivia C. Caoili.

Issue: Whether or not the Board of Regent violated Nadal's right to due process when it rendered a decision finding Nadal guilty of the charges

against him" during the March 29, 1993 meeting.

Held: With respect to the March 29, 1993 meeting, respondent considers the same as "unquestionably void for lack of due process" inasmuch as he

was not sent a notice of said meeting, that imposition of sanctions on students requires "observance of procedural due process," the phrase

obviously referring to the sending of notice of the meeting. However BOR ruled that in any event it is gross error to equate due process in the instant case

with the sending of notice of the March 29, 1993 BOR meeting to respondent. University rules do not require the attendance in BOR meetings o

individuals whose cases are included as items on the agenda of the Board. This is not exclusive of students whose disciplinary cases have been appealed

to the Board of Regents as the final review body. At no time did respondent complain of lack of notice given to him to attend any of the regular and

special BOR meetings where his case was up for deliberation. Counsel for Nadal charged before the lower court that Nadal was not given due process in





There must be a determination of the existence of the ground charged, particularly illegal entry into the country. Only after the hearing can the alien be

deported. Also, there must be appositive finding from the CID that they are aliens before compelling them to register as such. This power is

the police power to protect the state from undesirable aliens injurious to the public good.

Since the deportation is a harsh process, due process must be observed. In the same law, it is provided that:

No alien shall be deported without being informed of the specific grounds for deportation nor without being given

a hearing under rules of procedure to be prescribed by the Commissioner of Immigration.

The acts or omissions that they are charged of must be in ordinary language for the person to be informed and

for the CID to make a proper judgment. Also, the warrants of arrewst must be in accordance with the rules on

criminal procedure.

On the information of a private prosecutor in the case: Deportation is the sole concern of the state. There is no justification for a private party to intervene

Philcomsat vs Alcuaz

180 SCRA 218

Facts:By virtue of Republic Act No. 5514, the Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT) was granted the authority to “construct

and operate such ground facilities as needed to deliver telecommunications services from the communications satellite system and ground terminal or

terminals” in the Philippines. PHILCOMSAT provides satellite services to companies like Globe Mackay (now Globe) and PLDT.

Under Section 5 of the same law, PHILCOMSAT was exempt from the jurisdiction, control and regulation of the Public Service Commission later known as

the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC). However, Executive Order No. 196 was later promulgated and the same has placed

PHILCOMSAT under the jurisdiction of the NTC. Consequently, PHILCOMSAT has to acquire permit to operate from the NTC in order to continue operating

its existing satellites. NTC gave the necessary permit but it however directed PHILCOMSAT to reduce its current rates by 15%. NTC based its power to fix

the rates on EO 546.

PHILCOMSAT now sues NTC and its commissioner (Jose Luis Alcuaz) assailed the said directive and holds that the enabling act (EO 546) of the NTC

empowering it to fix rates for public service communications, does not provide the necessary standards which were constitutionally required, hence, there

is an undue delegation of legislative power, particularly the adjudicatory powers of NTC. PHILCOMSAT asserts that nowhere in the provisions of EO 546

providing for the creation of NTC and granting its rate-fixing powers, nor of EO 196, placing PHILCOMSAT under the jurisdiction of NTC, can it be

inferred that NTC is guided by any standard in the exercise of its rate-fixing and adjudicatory powers. PHILCOMSAT subsequently clarified its said

submission to mean that the order mandating a reduction of certain rates is undue delegation not of legislative but of quasi-judicial power to NTC, the

exercise of which allegedly requires an express conferment by the legislative body.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is an undue delegation of power.

HELD:No. There is no undue delegation. The power of the NTC to fix ratesis limited by the requirements of public safety, public interest, reasonable

feasibility and reasonable rates, which conjointly more than satisfy the requirements of a valid delegation of legislative power. Fundamental is

the rule that delegation of legislative power may be sustained only upon the ground that some standard for its exercise is provided and that the legislature

in making the delegation has prescribed the manner of the exercise of the delegated power.



Therefore, when the administrative agency concerned, NTC in this case, establishes a rate, its act must both be non-confiscatory and must have been

established in the manner prescribed by the legislature; otherwise, in the absence of a fixed standard, the delegation of power becomes unconstitutional

In case of a delegation of rate-fixing power, the only standard which the legislature is required to prescribe for the guidance of the administrative authority

is that the rate be reasonable and just. However, it has been held that even in the absence of an express requirement as to reasonableness, this standard

may be implied.

However, in this case, it appears that the manner of fixing the rates was done without due process since no hearing was made in ascertaining the rate

imposed upon PHILCOMSAT.

Radio Communications v NTC

G.R. No. L-68729 May 29, 1987

Facts:RCPI operated a radio communications system since 1957 under legislative franchise granted byRepublic Act No. 2036 (1957). The petitione

established a radio telegraph service in Sorsogon, Sorsogon (1968). inSan Jose, Mindoro (1971), and Catarman, Samar (1983).

Kayumanggi Radio, on the other hand, was given the rights by the NTC to operate radio networks in the same areas.

RCPI filed a complaint in the NTC and sought to prohibit Kayumanggi Radio to operate in the same areas. The NTC ruled against the RTC’s favor and

commanded RCPI to desist in the operation of radio telegraphs in the three areas.

RTC filed a MFR in 1984. This was denied.

In the SC, Petitioner alleged that the Public Service Law had sections that was still in effect even if the Public Service Commission was abolished and the

NTC was established.

These were S13- the Commission shall have jurisdiction, supervision, and control over all public services and their franchises

S 14- Radio companies are exempt from the commission’s authority except with respect to the fixing of rates

And S 15-no public service shall operate in the Philippines without possessing a valid and subsisting certificate from the Public Service Commission

known as "certificate of public convenience,"

Issue: Whether or not petitioner RCPI, a grantee of a legislative franchise to operate a radio company, is required to secure a certificate of public

convenience and necessity before it can validly operate its radio stations including radio telephone services in the aforementioned areas

Held: Yes. Petition dismissed.

Ratio:

Presidential Decree No. 1- the Public Service Commission was abolished and its functions were transferred to three specialized regulatory boards, as

follows: the Board of Transportation, the Board of Communications and the Board of Power and Waterworks. The functions so transferred were stil

subject to the limitations provided in sections 14 and 15 of the Public Service Law, as amended.

The succeeding Executive Order No. 546- the Board of Communications and the Telecommunications Control Bureau were abolished and their functions

were transferred to the National Telecommunications Commission

Section 15- b. Establish, prescribe and regulate areas of operation of particular operators ofpublic service communications; and determine and prescribe

charges or rates pertinent to the operation of such public utility facilities and services except in cases where charges or rates are established by

international bodies or associations of which the Philippines is a participating member or by bodies recognized by the Philippine Government as the proper

arbiter of such charges or rates;

c. Grantpermits for the use of radio frequencies for wireless telephone and telegraph systems and radio communication systemsincluding amateur radio

stations and radio and television broadcasting systems;

The exemption enjoyed by radio companies from the jurisdiction of the Public ServiceCommission and the Board of Communications no longer exists

because of the changes effected by the Reorganization Law and implementing executive orders.

The petitioner's claim that its franchise cannot be affected by Executive Order No. 546 on the ground that it has long been in operation since 1957 cannot

be sustained.



Today, a franchise, being merely a privilege emanating from the sovereign power of the state and owing its existence to a grant, is subject to regulation by

the state itself by virtue of its police power through its administrative agencies. Pangasinan transportation Co.- statutes enacted for the regulation of

public utilities, being a proper exercise by the State of its police power, are applicable not only to those public utilities coming into existence after its

passage, but likewise to those already established and in operation .

Executive Order No. 546, being an implementing measure of P.D. No. I insofar as it amends thePublic Service Law (CA No. 146, as amended) is applicable

to the petitioner who must be bound by its provisions.

The position of the petitioner that by the meregrant of its franchise under RA No. 2036 it can operate a radio communications system anywhere within

the Philippines is erroneous.

Sec. 4(a). This franchise shall not take effect nor shall any powers thereunder be exercised by the grantee until the Secretary of Public worksand

Communications shall have allotted to the grantee the frequencies and wave lengths to be used, and issued to the grantee a license for such case.

Thus, in the words of R.A. No. 2036 itself, approval of the then Secretary ofPublic Works and Communications was a precondition before the petitione

could put up radio stations in areas where it desires to operate.

The records of the case do not show anygrantof authority from the then Secretary of Public Worksand Communications before the petitioner installed

the questioned radio telephone services in San Jose, Mindoro in 1971. The same is true as regards the radio telephone services opened in Sorsogon

Sorsogon and Catarman, Samar in 1983. No certificate of public convenience and necessity appears to have been secured by the petitioner from the public

respondent when such certificate,was required by the applicable public utility regulations.

The Constitution mandates that a franchise cannot be exclusive in nature nor can a franchise be granted except that it must be subject to amendment

alteration, or even repeal by the legislaturewhen the common good so requires.

Globe Telecom vs NTC

435 SCRA 110

FACTS:On 4 June 1999, Smart filed a Complaint with public respondent NTC,praying that NTC order the immediate interconnection of Smarts and

Globes GSM networks. Smart alleged that Globe, with evident bad faith and malice, refused to grant Smarts request for the interconnection of SMS.

Globe filed its Answer with Motion to Dismiss on 7 June 1999, interposing grounds that the Complaint was premature, Smarts failure to comply with the

conditions precedent required in Section 6 of NTC Memorandum Circular 9-7-93,19 and its omission of the mandatory Certification of Non-Forum

Shopping.

On 19 July 1999, NTC issued the Order now subject of the present petition.

Both Smart and Globe were equally blameworthy for their lack of cooperation in the submission of the documentation required for interconnection and forhaving unduly maneuvered the situation into the present impasse. NTC held that since SMS falls squarely within the definition of value-added service or

enhanced-service given in NTC Memorandum Circular No. 8-9-95 (MC No. 8-9-95) their implementation of SMS interconnection is mandatory.The

NTC also declared that both Smart and Globe have been providing SMS without authority from it.

Globe filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition to nullify and set aside the Order and to prohibit NTC from taking

any further action in the case. Globe reiterated its previous arguments that the complaint should have been dismissed for failure to comply with

conditions precedent and the non-forum shopping rule.They claimed that NTC acted without jurisdiction in declaring that it had no authority to render

SMS, pointing out that the matter was not raised as an issue before it at all.They alleged that the Order is a patent nullity as it imposed an administrative

penalty for an offense for which neither it nor Smart was sufficiently charged nor heard on in violation of their right to due process. The CA issued a TRO

on 31 Aug 1999. In its Memorandum, Globe called the attention of the CA in an earlier NTC decision regarding Islacom, holding that SMS is a deregulated

special feature and does not require the prior approval of the NTC.

ISSUE: Whether or not the NTC’s order is not supported by substantial evidence.

HELD: There is no legal basis under the PTA or the memorandum circulars promulgated by the NTC to denominate SMS as VAS, and any subsequent

determination by the NTC on whether SMS is VAS should be made with proper regard for due process and in conformity with the PTA; the assailed Order

violates due process for failure to sufficiently explain the reason for the decision rendered, for being unsupported by substantial evidence, and for imputing

violation to, and issuing a corresponding fine on, Globe despite the absence of due notice and hearing which would have afforded Globe the right to

present evidence on its behalf.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 22 November 1999, as well as its Resolution dated 29 July 2000, and

the assailed Order of the NTC dated 19 July 1999 are hereby SET ASIDE. No cost.



CORONA VS. UHPAP

283 SCRA 31

FACTS: The Philippine Ports Authority [PPA] was created through PD 505, as amended by PD857 to “control, regulate, supervise pilots and the pilot age

profession”.

After hearing from relevant government agencies, pursuant to said charter, PPA General Manager Rogelio A. Dayan issued Administrative Order 04-92

[PPA-AO 04-92] and corresponding Memorandum Order in 1992, stating that all existing regular appointments which have been previously issued shal

remain valid up to 31 December 1992 only and that all appointments to harbor pilot positions in all pilot age districts shall, henceforth, be only for a term

of one year from date of effectivity subject to yearly renewal or cancellation by the Authority after conduct of a rigid evaluation of performance” to regulate

and improve pilot services by instilling discipline and give better protection to port users. PPA-AO 04-92 replaces PPA-AO 03-85 which succinctly provides

that, aspiring pilots must have a license and train as probationary pilots, and only upon satisfactory performance, are given permanent and regular

appointments by the PPA itself and to exercise harbor pilot age until they reach the age of 70.Upon learning of PPA-AO 04-92 only after publication in the

newspaper, the United Harbor Pilots Association of the Philippines: (a) questioned said PPA-AO twice before the DOTC, which Secretary Garcia said twice

that only the PPA Board of Directors [as governing body] has exclusive jurisdiction to review, recall or annul PPA-AOs, (b) appealed to the Office o

the President, which first issued a restraining order to the PPA on the implementation of the PPA-AO, and after PPA’s answer, then dismissed the

appeal/petition and lifted said order, stating, through Assistant Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs Renato C. Corona, that the PPA-AO (i) merely

implements PPA Charter, (ii) issuance is an act of PPA, not of its General Manager, (iii) merely regulates, not forbids practice of the profession, recognizing

that such exercise is property right, and (iv) sufficiently complied with the requirement in the PD to consult only with relevant Government Agencies and

(d) finally finding affirmative relief with Manila RTC Br. 6. Court, which ruled that (i) said PPA-AO is null and void (ii) PPA acted in excess of jurisdiction

with grave abuse of discretion and (iii) imposed a permanent restraining order on PPA on its implementation.Assistant Executive Secretary Corona thus

filed petition for review [of the Manila RTC Decision] to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondents have acted in excess of jurisdiction.

Whether or not the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) violate respondents’ right to exercise their profession and t heir right to due process o

law.

HELD:

WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, this Court hereby rules that:

Respondents (herein petitioners) have acted in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion and in a capricious, whimsical and

arbitrary manner in promulgating PPA Administrative Order 04-92 including all its implementing Memoranda, Circulars and Orders;

PPA Administrative Order 04-92 and its implementing Circulars and Orders are declared null and void;

The respondents are permanently enjoined from implementing PPA Administrative Order 04-92 and its implementing Memoranda, Circulars and Orders.

No costs. SO ORDERED

CENTRAL BANK VS. CA

220 SCRA 536

FACTS:Central Bank discovered that certain questionable loans extended by Producer’s Bank of the Philippines (PBP), totaling approximately P300

million (the paid-in capital of PBP amounting only to P 140.544 million, were fictitious as they were extended, without collateral, to certain interests

related to PBP owners themselves. Subsequently and during the same year, several blind items about a family-owned bank in Binondo which granted

fictitious loans to its stockholders appeared in major newspapers which triggered a bank-run in PBP and resulted in continuous over-drawings on the

bank’s demand deposit account with the Central Bank; reaching to P 143.955 million. Hence, on the basis of the report submitted by the Supervision andExamination Sector, the Monetary Board (MB), placed PBP under conservatorship.

PBP submitted a rehabilitation plan to the CB which proposed the transfer to PBP of 3 buildings owned by Producers Properties, Inc. (PPI), its principal

stockholder and the subsequent mortgage of said properties to the CB as collateral for the bank’s overdraft obligation but which was not approved due to

disagreements between the parties. Since no other rehabilitation program was submitted by PBP for almost 3 years its overdrafts with the CB continued to

accumulate and swelled to a staggering P1.023 billion. Consequently, the CB Monetary Board decided to approve in principle what it considered a viable

rehabilitation program for PBP. There being no response from both PBP and PPI on the proposed rehabilitation plan, the MB issued a resolution

instructing Central Bank management to advise the bank that the conservatorship may be lifted if PBP complies with certain conditions.



Without responding to the communications of the CB, PBP filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Makati against the CB, the MB and CB

Governor alleging that the resolutions issued were arbitraty and made in bad faith. Respondent Judge issued a temporary restraining order and

subsequently a writ of preliminary injunction. CB filed a motion to dismiss but was denied and ruled that the MB resolutions were arbitrarily issued. CB

filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals seeking to annul the orders of the trial court but CA affirmed the said orders. Hence this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in not dismissing the case for lack of cause of action and declaring the MB resolutions as arbitrary.

HELD: The following requisites must be present before the order of conservatorship may be set aside by a court: (1) The appropriate pleading must be filed

by the stockholders of record representing the majority of the capital stock of the bank in the proper court; (2) Said pleading must be filed within ten (10

days from receipt of notice by said majority stockholders of the order placing the bank under conservatorship; and (3) There must be convincing proofafter hearing, that the action is plainly arbitrary and made in bad faith.

In the instant case, the original complaint was filed more than 3 years after PBP was placed under conservator, long after the expiration of the 10-day

period deferred to above. It is also beyond question that the complaint and the amended complaint were not initiated by the stockholders of record

representing the majority of the capital stock.

RURAL BANK VS. CA

162 SCRA 288

FACTS:Petitioner Rural Bank of Buhi is a juridical entity existing under the laws of the Philippines. Buhi started its operations on Dec. 26, 1975. Under

the law, Central Bank has charge of the supervision and examination of Rural Banks. However, Rural Bank of Buhi refused to be examined and as a result

thereof, financial assistance was suspended.

Upon general examination of Buhi’s affair and operations conducted by DRBSLA and represented by Consolacion Odra, director of DRBSLA, there

was a massive irregularities in its operations (consisting of loans and fictitious borrowers). Thereby, Odra submitted a report recommending the Monetary

Board of the Central Bank the placing of Buhi under receivership in accordance with Sec. 29 of the RA 285 as amended, the designation of the Director

DRBSLA, as receiver thereof.

Rural Bank of Buhi filed a motion to dismiss averring that the petition alleged a valid cause of action and that the respondents have violated the due

process clause of the Constitution.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Monetary Board of Central Bank is correct in placing the Rural Bank of Buhi under receivership in accordance with Sec. 29 of

the RA 285.

HELD: The decision of the CA is hereby modified. There is lacking that “convincing proof” prerequisite to justify the temporary restraining order issued by

the court.

We hereby order the remand of this case to the RTC for further proceedings but we lift the temporary restraining order issued by the trial court in this

order.

PHILIPPINE MERCHANT VS. CA

GR 112844, June 2, 1995

FACTS:On May 22, 1995, the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 61, rendered a decision adverse to petitioner in Civil Cases Nos. 90-3490 and 91-

685, upholding the validity of an auction sale over a piece of land and ordering the issuance of a new Certificate of Title in favor of herein respondent.

On August 15, 1996, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal from the adverse decision of the RTC.

On March 26, 1998, petitioner received a Notice to File Appellant’s Brief from the Court of Appeals. Petitioner had 45 days or until May 10, 1998 to file its

brief. Since May 10 was a Sunday and May 11 was a holiday, petitioner had until May 12, 1998 to file it.



On May 7, 1998, or five days before its deadline, petitioner allegedly filed by mail an “Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Extension of Time to File Appellant’s

Brief,” praying for an additional period of 60 days or from May 13, 1998 to July 13, 1998 within which to file the brief.

On July 13, 1998, the last day of the extension prayed for, petitioner filed its appellant’s brief.

On July 23, 1998, the Court of Appeals (Special Sixth Division) dismissed the appeal in a resolution, for failure to file the appellant’s brief within the

required period of 45 days from receipt of notice to file the same. It was further noted by the CA that the appellant’s brief, received only on July 13, 1998,

was without any accompanying motion for leave to admit the same.

The CA found that: Record shows that a notice to file brief dated March 17, 1998 was received by appellant on March 26, 1998. Consequently, the 45-day

period within which to file appellant’s brief expired on May 10, 1998.

On July 2, 1998, the Judicial Records Division (Civil Cases Section) submitted a report stating that no appellant’s brief has been filed in this case.

However, the appellant’s brief was received by this court on July 13, 1998, without any accompanying motion for leave to admit the same.

ISSUE: Whether or not the resolutions made by the CA are: filed out of time and and filed without a motion for leave for its admission.

HELD: WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Resolutions dated July 23, 1998 and February 26, 1999 of the Court of

Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED. The denial of the appeal in CA-G.R. CV No. 56325 due to the late filing of the Appellant’s Brief pursuant to Rule 50 (e) of

the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, is hereby declared FINAL.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

PHILIPPINE MERCHANT MARINE SCHOOL, INC., vs.CA

FACTS:

Petitioner PHILIPPINE MERCHANT MARINE SCHOOL, INC. (PMMSI), was established in Manila in 1950 to train and produce competent marine officers.

Public respondent Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) has repeatedly disapproved petitioner's requests for renewal permit/recognition

due to the following recurrent violations against public respondent’s orders:

1). That Petitioner is ordered to cease operating without a renewal permit/recognition;

2.) That Petitioner is deficient in terms of the minimum requirements as provided in DECS Order No. III, series of 1987, which refers to the policies andstandards for Maritime Education Plan.

3.) The Petitioner school has not acquired its own school site and building. The present school campus is not conducive for training and is found to be very

limited in space so that there is difficulty for school development and expansion.

4.) That the petitioner is ordered to phase-out its Marine Engineering and Marine Transportation courses.

Despite these violations, petitioner still continued to enrol students and still offered courses in Marine Engineering and Marine Transportation. The DECS

informed petitioner that it had received reports that petitioner enrolled freshmen for its maritime programs which were ordered phased out.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration regarding the non-compliance with the DECS’ minimum requirements and subsequently moved for reconsideration

regarding the phasing out of the two Marine courses stated above. Both motions were denied by the DECS.

Petitioner appealed to the Office of the President. Pending appeal, the DECS issued a Closure Order. Thereafter, petitioner sought reconsideration of the

Closure Order alleging compliance with the DECS’ requirements.

The Office of the President dismissed the appeal finding no reason to disturb the DECS’ action. Petitioner moved for reconsideration praying that the case

be remanded to the DECS for another ocular inspection and evaluation of its alleged improved facilities. Petitioner anchored its motion on the proposition

that since it had made substantial improvements on school equipment and facilities there existed no valid ground to deny them a permit to offer maritime

courses. After another circumspect review of the case, the Office of the President found no cogent reason to set aside its previous resolution.

Petitioner assailed both resolutions of the Office of the President before respondent Court of Appeals by way ofcertiorari. It alleged that the resolutions

failed to meet the constitutional requirement of due process because the basis for affirming the DECS phase-out and closure orders was not sufficiently

disclosed.



Respondent CA dismissed the petition and denied the motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner was denied due process of law.

RULING:

Set against the records of the case, the assertion of petitioner that it was deprived of its right to a hearing and any opportunity whatsoever to correct the

alleged deficiencies readily collapses. The earlier narration of facts clearly demonstrates that before the DECS issued the phase-out and closure orders

petitioner was duly notified, warned and given several opportunities to correct its deficiencies and to comply with pertinent orders and regulations.

We agree with the observation of the Office of the Solicitor General that —

As long as the parties were given opportunity to be heard before judgment was rendered, the demands of due process were

sufficiently met (Lindo v. COMELEC, 194 SCRA 25). It should also be noted that petitioner herein repeatedly sought reconsideration

of the various orders of respondent DECS and its motions were duly considered by respondent DECS to the extent of allowing and

granting its request for re-inspection of its premises. In connection therewith, it has been ruled that the opportunity to be heard is

the essence of procedural due process and that any defect is cured by the filing of a motion for reconsideration (Medenilla v. Civi

Service Commission, 194 SCRA 278)

Petition DENIED.

AGABON VS NLRC

Facts:Private respondent Riviera Home Improvements, Inc. is engaged in the business of selling and installing ornamental and construction materials. It

employed petitioners Virgilio Agabon and Jenny Agabon as gypsum board and cornice installers on January 2, 1992 until February 23, 1999 when they

were dismissed for abandonment of work.

Petitioners then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and payment of money claims and on December 28, 1999, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision

declaring the dismissals illegal and ordered private respondent to pay the monetary claims.

Issue: Whether or not respondent’s dismissal is illegal and if not, entitles them benefits.

Ruling: The Court ruled that the dismissal is legal and entitles them of payment of benefits.

Dismissals based on just causes contemplate acts or omissions attributable to the employee while dismissals based on authorized causes involve grounds

under the Labor Code which allow the employer to terminate employees. A termination for an authorized cause requires payment of separation pay. When

the termination of employment is declared illegal, reinstatement and full back wages are mandated under Article 279. If reinstatement is no longer

possible where the dismissal was unjust, separation pay may be granted.

Procedurally, (1) if the dismissal is based on a just cause under Article 282, the employer must give the employee two written notices and a hearing or

opportunity to be heard if requested by the employee before terminating the employment: a notice specifying the grounds for which dismissal is sought a

hearing or an opportunity to be heard and after hearing or opportunity to be heard, a notice of the decision to dismiss; and (2) if the dismissal is based on

authorized causes under Articles 283 and 284, the employer must give the employee and the Department of Labor and Employment written notices 30

days prior to the effectivity of his separation.

From the foregoing rules four possible situations may be derived: (1) the dismissal is for a just cause under Article 282 of the Labor Code, for an

authorized cause under Article 283, or for health reasons under Article 284, and due process was observed; (2) the dismissal is without just or authorized

cause but due process was observed; (3) the dismissal is without just or authorized cause and there was no due process; and (4) the dismissal is for jus

or authorized cause but due process was not observed.



In the fourth situation, the dismissal should be upheld. While the procedural infirmity cannot be cured, it should not invalidate the dismissal. However

the employer should be held liable for non-compliance with the procedural requirements of due process.

The present case squarely falls under the fourth situation. The dismissal should be upheld because it was established that the petitioners abandoned

their jobs to work for another company. Private respondent, however, did not follow the notice requirements and instead argued that sending notices to the

last known addresses would have been useless because they did not reside there anymore. Unfortunately for the private respondent, this is not a valid

excuse because the law mandates the twin notice requirements to the employee’s last known address. Thus, it should be held liable for non-compliance

with the procedural requirements of due process.

The Court ruled that respondent is liable for petitioners’ holiday pay, service incentive leave pay and 13th month pay without deductions. The evident

intention of Presidential Decree No. 851 is to grant an additional income in the form of the 13th month pay to employees not already receiving the same so

as “to further protect the level of real wages from the ravages of world-wide inflation.” Clearly, as additional income, the 13th month pay is included in the

definition of wage under Article 97(f) of the Labor Code.

An employer is prohibited under Article 113 of the same Code from making any deductions without the employee’s knowledge and consent.

AGABON vs. NLRC

G.R. No. 158693, November 17, 2004

Facts: Virgilio and Jenny Agabon were cornice installers of Riviera Home Improvements, a company engaged in the business of selling ornamental

construction materials.

They were employed from January 2, 1992 until February 23, 1999, when they were dismissed for abandonment of work.

The Agabons filed a complaint for illegal dismissal before the LA, who ruled in their favor. The NLRC reversed on appeal. The CA sustained the NLRC’s

decision

The Agabons further appealed to the SC, disputing the finding of abandonment, and claiming that the company did not comply with the twin requirements

of notice and hearing.

Issue: WON the Agabons were illegally dismissed

Held: NO. Substantive due process (EEs must be dismissed for just or authorized cause): SC upheld the finding of abandonment, because the act of the

Agabons in seeking employment elsewhere clearly showed a deliberate intent to sever the ER-EE relationship.

Procedural due process (for just cause, there must be a written notice informing him of grounds for termination, a hearing or opportunity to be heard, and

a final notice of termination stating the grounds therefor): There was no due process because ER did not send the requisite notices to the last known

address of the EEs. ER only gave a flimsy excuse that the notice would be useless because the EEs no longer lived there. This is not a valid excuse, they

should have still sent a notice as mandated by law.

For not sending the requisite notices, the ER should be held liable for non-compliance with the procedural requirements of due process.

Jaka Food Processing v. Pacot

FACTS:

Respondents were hired by JAKA until their termination on August 29, 1997 because the Corporation was “in dire financial straits”. It was not disputedthat they were terminated without complying with the requirement under Art. 283 of the Labor Code regarding the service of notice upon the employeesand DOLE at least one month before the intended date of termination

ISSUE:

Whether or not full backwages and separation pay be awarded to respondents when employers effected termination without complying with the twin notice

rule.

RULING:

The dismissal of the respondents was for an authorized cause under Article 283. A dismissal for authorized cause does not necessarily imply delinquency



or culpability on the part of the employee. Instead, the dismissal process is initiated by the employer’s exercise of his management prerogative, i.e. whenthe employer opts to install labor-saving devices, when he decides to cease business operations or when… he undertakes to implement a retrenchmentprogram.

Accordingly, it is wise to hold that

1) if the dismissal is based on a just cause but the employer failed to comply with the notice requirement, the sanction to be imposed upon him should be

tempered because the dismissal was initiate by an act imputable to the employee

2) if the dismissal is based on an authorized cause but the employer fails to comply with the notice requirement, the sanction should be stiffer because thedismissal process was initiated by the employer’s exercise of his management prerogative. Thus, dismissal was upheld but ordered JAKA to pay each of therespondents the amount of PhP 50,000.00 representing nominal damages for non-compliance with statutory due process.

JAKA FOOD PROCESSING CORPORATION, vs. DARWIN PACOT, ROBERT PAROHINOG, DAVID BISNAR, MARLON DOMINGO, RHOEL LESCANO and

JONATHAN CAGABCAB.

G.R. No. 151378. March 28, 2005

Facts: Respondents were earlier hired by petitioner JAKA Foods Processing Corporation until the latter terminated their employment because the

corporation was “in dire financial straits”. It is not disputed, however, that the termination was effected without JAKA complying with the requirement

under Article 283 of the Labor Code regarding the service of a written notice upon the employees and the Department of Labor and Employment at least

one (1) month before the intended date of termination. Respondents filed complaints for illegal dismissal, underpayment of wages and nonpayment of

service incentive leave and 13th month pay against JAKA. The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision declaring the termination illegal and ordering JAKA to

reinstate respondents with full backwages, and separation pay if reinstatement is not possible. The Court of Appeals reversed said decision and ordered

respondent JAKA to pay petitioners separation pay equivalent to one (1) month salary, the proportionate 13th month pay and, in addition, full backwages

from the time their employment was terminated.

Issue: What are the legal implications of a situation where an employee is dismissed for cause but such dismissal was effected without the employer’s

compliance with the notice requirement under the Labor Code?

Held: It was established that there was ground for respondents’ dismissal, i.e., retrenchment, which is one of the authorized causes enumerated under

Article 283 of the Labor Code. Likewise, it is established that JAKA failed to comply with the notice requirement under the same Article. Considering the

factual circumstances in the instant case, the Court deem it proper to fix the indemnity at P50, 000.00. The Court of Appeals have been in error when it

ordered JAKA to pay respondents separation pay equivalent to one (1) month salary for every year of service. “In all cases of business closure or cessation

of operation or undertaking of the employer, the affected employee is entitled to separation pay. This is consistent with the state policy of treating labor as

a primary social economic force, affording full protection to its rights as well as its welfare. The exception is when the closure of business or cessation of

operations is due to serious business losses or financial reverses; duly proved, in which case, the right of affected employees to separation pay is lost for

obvious reasons.”

Accordingly it is wise to hold that:

1) if the dismissal is based on a just cause but the employer failed to comply with the notice requirement, the sanction to be imposed upon him

should be tempered because the dismissal was initiate by an act imputable to the employee.2) if the dismissal is based on an authorized cause but the employer fails to comply with the notice requirement, the sanction should be stiffer

because the dismissal process was initiated by the employer’s exercise of his management prerogative. Thus, dismissal was upheld but ordered

JAKA to pay each of the respondents the amount of PhP 50,000.00 representing nominal damages for non-compliance with statutory due

process.

Documents

Case Digest - Procedural Due Process