William & Mary Law ReviewVolume 20|Issue 2 Article 2Procedural Due Process in Quasi in Rem ActionsAfer Shafer v. HeitnerKaren Nelson MooreCopyright c 1978 by the authors. Tis article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.htp://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlrRepository CitationKaren Nelson Moore, Procedural Due Process in Quasi in Rem Actions Afer Shafer v. Heitner, 20 Wm.& Mary L. Rev. 157 (1978), htp://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr/vol20/iss2/2WilliamandMaryLawReviewVOLUME20WINTER1978NUMBER2PROCEDURALDUEPROCESSINQUASIINREMACTIONSAFTERSHAFFERV.HEITNERKARENNELSONMOORE*Quasiin rem jurisdiction,Ilonga static alternativeto the evolvinganddynamicdoctrineof in personamjurisdiction,hasbeenmodi-fieddramaticallybytheSupremeCourt'sopinioninShafferv.Heitner.2 Byapplyinga minimumcontactstest, historicallyapartof*thelawofinpersonamjurisdiction,theCourtrecognizedtheapplicabilityofcertaindueprocessconsiderationsindeterminingthevalidityofanassertionofquasiinremjurisdiction,therebylimitingtheusefulnessof quasiin remasanalternativetoin per-sonamjurisdiction.AlthoughtheCourtinShafferexpresslyde-clinedtodecidewhetherproceduraldueprocess3 considerationsofthetypeenunciatedinFuentesv.Shevin4 shouldbeappliedtoseizuresof propertytoobtain quasiin remjurisdiction,thatissueremainscriticalaslongasquasiinremjurisdictionretainsanyvitality.ThisArticleconcludesthatproceduraldueprocessprotectionsmustbe accordeddefendantswhosepropertyisseizedfor jurisdic-tionalpurposes,althoughthe precisenatureof theprotections thatare necessaryand appropriate willdiffer fromthose suitablefor the*A.B.,J.D.,HarvardUniversity.Assistant Professorof Law,CaseWesternReserveUni-versity.1.Throughoutthis Article,"quasiinrem"isusedtoexpress theconceptof jurisdictionbasedonthe presenceof property ina state. Althoughtwo typesof quasi in rem jurisdictionmay be distinguished,in additionitothe purein remjurisdiction, see note 5 infra & accompa-nyingtext,thetermwillbeusedinreferencetotheconceptgenerallyunlessotherwiseindicated.2.433U.S.186(1977).3."Proceduraldueprocess,"although implicating many other rights, is used in this Articleto referto the requirementsof noticeand anopportunity fora hearingprior to a deprivationof property.4.407U.S.67(1972).WILLIAMANDMARYLAWREVIEWtraditionalcreditorattachmentofpropertyinvolvedinFuentes.Despite dictain Supreme Court opiflionsand a conflictamong lowercourts,this Articlearguesthatseizureof property for jurisdictionalpurposesdoes notconstitutean extraordinarysituationwhichwar-rantsanexceptionfromthebasicprinciplesof Fuentes thatnoticeandanopportunityforahearingmustbeaffordedpriorto seizureof property.Part I explores the doctrine of quasiin remjurisdiction by review-ingtheearlycasesanddiscussingtheimpactofShafferontheavailabilityandattributesofquasiinremjurisdictionAlthoughShaffer mayreducetheavailabilityof quasiin remjurisdictionbyimposingtheadditionalandimportantrequirementofminimumcontactswiththeforumstate,thisjurisdictionalmechanismstillretainsusefulnessandcontinuesto beasserted.Thus,thescopeoftheproceduraldueprocessprotectionsnecessaryremainsasignifi-cantissue whichcourts,includingtheSupremeCourt,willhave toaddress.PartIIreviewstheindicationsfromtheSupremeCourtconcerningtheapplicabilityof proceduraldueprocessprotectionstoseizuresofpropertyforjurisdictionalpurposesandnotestheapproachestaken by lower courts. Finally, Part III presentsa ration-aleappropriate for resolvingthe issue and concludesthat proceduraldueprocessprotectionsmustbeappliedtoseizuresofproperty,evenforjurisdictionalpurposes,butthatthenoticeandhearingopportunitiesmust be shaped to accommodatethe variousandcon-flictinginterestsinvolved.PARTI.QUASIINREMJURISDICTIONINITSHISTORICALANDMODERNFORMSQuasi in RemJurisdictionPrior toShaffer v.Heitner.Foratleastacentury,jurisdictionoveradefendanthasbeendividedgenericallyintotwoconcepts:inpersonamjurisdiction,predicatedonpoweroverthepersonofthedefendant,andinremandquasiin remjurisdiction,basedonpoweroverpropertyof thedefendant,whethertangibleorintangibleproperty.'Thisdichot-omyin theformandcharacteristicsof jurisdictionwasarticulated5.In remjurisdictioninvolvesa determinationof all persons'interestsin particularprop-erty.Quasiin remjurisdiction takestwo forms, either requiringa determinationof particularpersons'interests in property,or involvingpropertyconcededto bethe defendant's but whichthe plaintiff wishes to applyto a personalclaimmadeagainst the defendant.See textaccom-[Vol.20:1571978] QUASIINREMACTIONSfullybytheCourt in Pennoyer v.Neffand has been reiteratedandelaboratedfrequentlythereafter.Underthe bipolaranalysisappliedin Pennoyer,jurisdictionoveradefendantmustsatisfycertainelementalrequirementsderivingfrom the restrictionof a court's powersto the territoriallimits of thestate inwhich itsits.Accordingto"twowellestablishedprinciplesofpubliclaw,"'stemmingfromthedoctrineofstatesovereignty,everystateanditsjudiciaryhasexclusivejurisdictionoverbothpersonsand propertywithin its boundaries;correlatively,this juris-dictionmaynotbeexerciseddirectlyoverpersonsandpropertybeyondthestate.Accordingly,inpersonamjurisdictionmaybeassertedonlyif thedefendantispersonallywithintheterritoryofthe state and is thereserved with process.Quasi in rem jurisdiction,however,existsifpropertyof thedefendantislocatedwithinthestate regardlessof thedefendant'spersonallocation.Thepowerofpanyingnotes47-48infra. Seealso Hansonv.Denckla,357U.S.235,246n.12(1958);RESTATEMENTOFJUDGMENTS,IntroductoryNote1-3;id. 32,Commenta(1942).6.95U.S.714(1878).Pennoyer providesthe most completeearly articulationof thechar-acteristicsof jurisdictionand formsthe point of departure for later SupremeCourt opinions.Justice Fieldsuggestedthat theviewsexpressedin hismajorityopinion in Pennoyer, demar-cating the two basic forms of jurisdiction, werenot newbut rather had beenstated previouslybyotherjudges,includingJusticeStory.See,e.g.,Picquetv.Swan,19F. Cas.609(C.C.Mass.1828)(No. 11,134).Particularemphasis wasplacedon Justice Miller'sopinion for theCourt in Cooperv.Reynolds,77 U.S.(10Wall.)308(1870),in whichthe Court had differen-tiated betweenjurisdictionover the person,obtained throughserviceof processor voluntaryappearance,andjurisdictionovertheres,obtainedthroughseizureoftheres.AlthoughJustice Fielddissented fromthe judgment in Cooper, apparentlyhe embraced its philosophy.InPennoyer, theplaintiff,Mitchell,broughtanactionagainstNeff,anonresident,torecoverpaymentforlegalservicesfurnishedbyMitchell.AlthoughNeffwasnotservedpersonally withprocess,judgment wasenteredagainsthim uponhisdefaultafterconstruc-tiveservicebypublication.Afterthis personaljudgmentwasrendered,propertyownedbyNeff, whichhad not been attachedorbrought within the controlof the court, was soldunderanexecutionissueduponthejudgment.Neff thenfiledan actiontorecoverthelandfromPennoyer,the purchaserat thesheriff'ssale.TheSupremeCourtconcludedthat, becausetheinitial judgmentamountedtoa personal judgmentagainsta nonresidentdefendantnotpersonallyservedwithprocesswithinthestateandbecausethenonresidentdefendant'spropertywithin thestatehad not beenseizedbeforetheinitial judgmentwas rendered,thejudgmentwasinvalid.17.95U.S.at 722.Theseprinciplespertainto"independent"states.Recognizing thatthestatesof the Unionwerenotfully independentin themannerthat nationsare independent,JusticeFieldnonetheless concludedthat th4 states of the Union have thepowers and author-ityofindependentstatesexceptaslimitedbytheConstitutionandthat,therefore,theprinciplesapplied.Commentatorshave questionedthewisdomof the applicationof princi-plesof internationallaw of independentstates to the intra-nationalstates. See, e.g.,Hazard,AGeneral Theory of State Court Jurisdiction, 1965Sup.CT.Rav.241,262-68.WILLIAMANDMARYLAWREVIEW [Vol.20:157the court, evenin this simple model,is both established and limitedbythenatureof the jurisdiction:inpersonamjurisdictionpermitsapersonaljudgmentagainstthedefendant;quasiin remjurisdic-tionrestrictsthepowerof thecourttothepropertythatprovidesthebasisfor jurisdiction,thus limitingthe amountof the potentialjudgment.Althoughthis simplemodel is useful,theCourt inPennoyer fur-therelabdratedthecharacteristicsnecessaryforavalidexerciseofjurisdiction.TheCourtdeterminedthat,toobtainvalidinper-sonamjurisdiction,thedefendantmustreceivepersonalserviceofprocesswithinthestate;8 constructiveservice,whetherbypublica-tionwithinthe stateor otherwise,wouldbeinadequateto establishsuch jurisdiction. In contrast, sufficient notice to conferquasi in remjurisdictioncouldbegiventhroughsubstitutedservicebypublica-tion orotherauthorizedformif thepropertyupon whichthe juris-diction was founded had been seizedor otherwise broughtwithin thecontrolof the court.'Althoughnoticeby publication,without more,wasunlikely toreach thedefendant,he wasmorelikely to becomeawareof aseizureof hisproperty,whichwasassumedto bein thedefendant'spossession."08.95U.S.at 726-27.Exceptedfromthegeneralrule requiringpersonalservicewithin thestate weresuch situationsas actionsbrought by aresident to determinehis statusrelativetoanonresident,asinactionsfordivorce;actionsconcerningpartnerships,associations,orcontractsenteredinto bynonresidentswithin thestateandthatrequire theappointmentofan agentforservice ofprocessunder statelaw;actionsinvolvingstate-createdcorporations;and actionsinwhich thedefendantspreviouslyhadconsentedtobebound without personalservice.Id.at 734-36.9.Pennoyer did not use the term"quasiin rem"but relied instead on"inrem"to describeallactionsinwhichjurisdictionwasbasedonproperty.Strictlyused,theterm"inrem"referredonlytoaproceedingdirectlyagainstthepropertywithnoreferencetoindividualclaimants.Moregenerally,however,JusticeFieldsuggestedthat"inrem"alsopertainsiftheactionisbroughtbyindividualsto affectproperty,orinterestsinproperty,ownedbythem.Id.at 734.Substitutedservice without seizureof the propertyseemsto bepermittedbythe Pennoyeropinioninpurelyinremcases,inwhichtheclaimsraisedpertaindirectlytothepropertythat forms the basis for theexercise of jurisdiction.Serviceby publicationor otherauthorizedformalsomaybeadequati underPennoyer forthefirstofthetwobasictypesofquasiinremactions,involvingconflictingclaimstotheproperty.Quasiinremactionsinvolvingpersonalclaimsunrelated totheproperty,however,requiredseizureofthepropertyaswellasnoticebypublication.Id.at 727.InviewoftheCourt'semphasisin Pennoyer onseizureof theproperty,thislanguage,seeminglypermittingsubstitutedservicewithoutseizure,isbestinterpretedasconcerningthe notice,ratherthan the jurisdictional,requirements.10.Id.at 726-27.This presumptionthat thedefendantisin possessionof theproperty andtherebywillreceivenotice,of course,is notalwaysaccurateandwillnot necessarilyassureactualnotice.QUASIINREMACTIONSCriticaltotheCourt'sanalysisin Pennoyer wasthe requirementthatvalidquasiinremjurisdictioncouldbeobtainedonlyifthecourtfirst determinedthat the property upon whichits jurisdictionwastobebasedwaswithinthestateandwasbroughtwithinthecontrolof thecourtat theoutset of the case."TheCourtconcludedthat the presenceof jurisdictionmust beascertainedbeforea judg-mentcouldbereached.Graveuncertaintywouldresultifcourtscoulddecidethemeritsofacasebeforedeterminingwhetherthedefendanthadpropertywithin thestate.Similarlyuntenablewasthepossibilityofvoidjudgmentsbecomingvalidif propertysud-denly werefound in thestate, or,conversely,the possibility of validjudgmentsbecomingvoidif propertywere removedfromthe state.Underthesecircumstances,jurisdictioncouldbeobtainedonly bybringingthepropertyunderthecontrolofthecourtatthecom-mencement of thecase.'2The theoreticalbasis forthis conclusion that seizureor othercon-trolof the propertywasnecessary beforethe exerciseof jurisdictionremainsunclear.Onetheory,urgedbyJusticeField,emphasizedtheresponsibilitiesofthestatesunderthefullfaithandcreditclause to respect judgments renderedby sister states. Thisconstitu-tional requirement,however,wasirrelevantto thethresholdques-tionof jurisdiction,whichwasgovernedinsteadbythe doctrineofstatesovereigntyandbya"principleof natural justice"requiringnoti'cetothedefendantbeforehemaybesubjectedtoabindingjudgment.3 Operatingunder theseprinciples,uniformlyappliedinpreviouscases,JusticeFieldconcludedthatjudgmentswerevoidunlessthepropertythatwastheobjectof theactionwasbrought11.Id.at 726. ThisrequirementwasdrawnfromCooperv. Reynolds,77U.S.(10Wall.)308(1870),in which theCourt, without citation,set forthseizureorequivalent actsof courtcontroloverthepropertyasnecessarytoestablishjurisdictionbasedontheexistenceofpropertywithinthestate.TherequirementofseizureenunciatedinPennoyer hasbeentermed"whollynovel"and inappropriate.Hazard,supra note7,at 269-71;cf. C.DRAKE,ATREATISEONTHELAWOFSurrsnyATTACHMENT 236(7thed.1891)(indicatingseizureisrequiredonly whenthestatestatute somandates).JusticeHunt's dissentingopinionurgedthatonlynoticeand an opportunitytodefend,not seizure,werenecessaryconstitutionally.95U.S.at748.12.95 U.S.at 728.See generally Note, The Requirement of Seizure inthe Exercise of Quasiin RemJurisdiction:Pennoyer v.Neff Re-Examined, 63HARv.L. Rzv.657(1950).13.95U.S.at 729-30(quoting LafayetteIns. Co.v. French,59 U.S.(18How.)404 (1856)).Thetwopubliclawprincipleslimit thepowerofastateto propertyor personswithinthestate.Seizureof propertyclearlyinsuresthepresenceof thepropertywithinthestatethroughoutthelitigation.Seetextaccompanyingnote7supra.1978]WILLIAMANDMARYLAWREVIEWunder the controlof the court in connectionwith the process againstthedefendant."Rather than explaining why seizureor other court control is neces-sary to obtain quasiin rem jurisdiction,Justice Field's full faith andcreditargument simply justifies the reexaminationin anothercourtof theinitialstatecourt'sexerciseof jurisdictionoveradefendant.Noreasonedanalysisisprovidedtosupporttheconclusionthatseizureof thepropertywasrequiredbythe"principleofnaturaljustice"ofnoticeuponwhichtheCourtin Pennoyer andpreviouscourtsrelied.ThealternativetheoreticalbasissuggestedbyJusticeField,es-sentiallyarudimentarydueprocessargumentdrawn fromthe thenrecentlyratifiedfourteenthamendment,suffersfromtherelatedproblemsof beinghighlyconclusoryandminimallyanalytical.Ac-cordingto JusticeField, dueprocessrequiredthat judicialproceed-ingsfollow the"rulesand principles whichhave been establishedinoursystemsof jurisprudencefor theprotectionandenforcementofprivaterights."'5 In particular, theserules included the requirementthat adefendant be servedpersonallywithprocesswithin the stateorappearvoluntarily.Otherwise,thecourtwouldbeunableto de-terminethepersonalliabilityofthedefendant.Onlyifpropertywithinthe statewas brought under the controlof the courtor if theactionitself concernedthe propertyorsomeinterest thereinwouldsubstitutedservicebeeffective.Thelanguageof theopinionthusappearedtorequireseizureof thepropertyservingasthebasisforin remjurisdictiononlyif the judgmentwasnot soughtdirectlytoreachthepropertyitself orsomeinterestin theproperty.6 JusticeField againadduced little analyticalsupport for this conclusion-an14.95U.S.at 733.15.Id.at 733.JusticeFieldfailedtodiscusswhether,sincethefourteenthamendment'sratificationin1868followedbymorethantwo yearsthejudgmentquestionedinthecase,theremightbeanissueconcerningtheretroactiveapplicationofthedueprocessclause.16.JusticeFieldwroteinconnectionwithhisdueprocessanalysis:[Slubstitutedserviceof processby publication. . . iseffectualonlywhere,inconnectionwith processagainst the personfor commencingtheaction,propertyintheStateisbroughtunderthecontrolofthecourt,andsubjectedtoitsdisposition by processadaptedto that purpose,or wherethe judgmentis soughtas a meansof reachingsuch propertyor affecting some interest therein;in otherwords,wheretheactionisin thenatureof aproceedingin rem.Id. Themeaningof thiscomment,.however,isnotentirelyclear.Itmayrelatemoretotheadequacyofsubstitutedservicethantothequestionofseizureof thepropertyformingthebasisof quasiin remjurisdiction.See note9supra.[Vol.20:157QUASIINREMACTIONSomissionespecially noticeablein viewof the relatively recentadop-tionof thefourteenthamendment.Despiteitsanalyticaldeficiencies,theconclusionreachedinPennoyer that propertymust bebroughtwithinthecourt'scontrolif itformsthe basisfor asserting jurisdiction,exceptperhapsif thejudgmentissoughttoaffectdirectlyanexistinginterestinthesubject property, received widespread support in subsequent cases.7Just as personalservice of processis intendedto assure notice to thedefendantof a pendingsuit, the requirementof seizureof propertyalsotendstoprotectthedefendantfromthepossibilityof lackofnoticeinherentintheconceptofsubstitutedservice.Successinachievingthis end,actualnoticeto the defendant,dependslargelyuponthe methodby which noticeof seizureis communicatedto thedefendant. This aspect was ignored by the Court in Pennoyer, whichassumedthe defendant-owneror hisagent to be in possessionof theproperty and thereby automaticallyto be awareof its seizure.More-over,thisgoalofsecuringactualnoticecanbeachievedthroughmeasuresotherthantheseizureof property.Alesscompellingrationale for the conclusionin Pennoyer is thatseizureof propertyisnecessaryto preventeither a valid judgmentfrombecomingvoidthroughthetransferofpropertytoanotherperson or out of the state beforeexecutionof the judgment, or a voidjudgment frombecoming valid through a conveyanceof property tothe defendantwithin the state.8 The problemsof subsequent valid-ity or voidness,however,couldbe judgedsimply on the basisof thepresenceof thepropertyinthestateat thecommencementof theaction:ifthepropertyispresentwhentheactioniscommenced,jurisdictionthereafterexiststorenderajudgmentbasedontheproperty;ifnopropertyisprese'ntwhensuitisfiled,theactionshouldbe dismissed notwithstandingthe possibility of a subsequentconveyanceofpropertyintothestate.This rulecouldbeappliedeasily to avoid uncertainty,despite the possibility that a valid judg-ment might becomeunenforceablebecauseof a later transferof theproperty.'9 Thus,Pennoyer restrictedtheconceptof quasiin rem17.See textaccompanyingnotes21-24infra. See also Note,The Requirement ofSeizurein the Exercise ofQuasi in RemJurisdiction:Pennoyer v.NeffRe-Examined, 63HARv.L.REv.657(1950).18.SeeShafferv.Heitner,433U.S.186,210&n.35(1977).19.This problemof enforceabilityis magnifiedsomewhatby thedoctrine adoptedin casessuchas Cooper v. Reynolds,77U.S.(10 Wall.)308,318(1870),which preventedsubsequent1978]WILLIAMANDMARYLAWREVIEW [Vol.20:157jurisdictionbylimitingthe judgmenttothepropertyinvolved,byrequiringthatthe propertybebroughtunder thecourt'scontrolatanearlystageintheproceedings,andbylimitingthecollateralestoppeleffectsof such judgments.0 Subsequentcasesfollowedthisframework enunciated inPennoyer.21EnsuingdecisionsbytheCourtperpetuatedandexpandedtheconceptof quasiinrem jurisdiction.In Harris v.Balk,22 theCourtheldthat adebt followedthe debtor whereverhe went;hence,quasiin rem jurisdiction overthe defendant-creditorcould beestablishedbyattachingthedebt whenthedebtor wasin theforumstate.TheCourtin Harris notedattheoutsetthatattachment3 wascreatedactionsbasedonajudgmentinwhichthefoundationfor jurisdictionwasquasiinrem.InCooper, theCourtalsoprohibitedthecollateralattackofajudgmentinaquasiinremproceeding on such groundas insufficient publicationof notice.Recentcases,such as Mullanev.CentralHanoverBank&TrustCompany,339U.S.306(1950),makethisconclusiondubious.Mullane involvedasuccessfulcol lateralattack ona judidicalsettlementof acom-montrustfundonthegroundthatstatutorynoticebypublicationwasconstitutionallyinadequate.20.95U.S.at 726(citingCooper v.Reynolds,77U.S.(10Wall.)308(1870)).TheCourtstated:Nosuit canbemaintainedonsuchajudgmentinthesamecourt,orinanyother;nor canit beusedasevidenceinanyotherproceedingnot affectingtheattached property;nor couldthecostsin that proceedingbecollectedof defen-dant outofanyotherpropertythanthatattachedinthesuit.21.See,e.g.,Harrisv.Balk,198U.S.215(1905).See also RESTATEMENTOFJUDGMENTS73,75,76(1942)(limiting the collateralestoppel effecttoonly thosefacts onwhichthequasiin remjudgmentisbased andwhichactually werelitigated by thedefendant);RESTATEMENT(SEcoND)OFJUDGMENTS73,commentdat 195;id. 75,commentd, at 213-14(Tent. DraftNo.1,1973)(indicatingpossibilityof issuepreclusionregardingissuesactuallylitigatedinquasi inremaction).Other sources, however,indicate that such judgments havenocollateralestoppeleffectwhatsoever,evenregardingissuesactuallylitigated.See4C.WRIGHT& A.MILLER,FEDERALPRACTICEANDPROCEDURE:CivI.1070(1969& Supp.1978).22.198U.S.215(1905).Harris,a NorthCarolinaresident, wasindebtedto anotherNorthCarolinaresident,Balk.Thisdebtwasattachedby aMarylandresident byhaving aMary-landsheriff serve Harriswitha writ ofattachmentanda summonstoappearin courtwhileHarriswasvisitingMarylandonbusiness.Harris,however,left Marylandandsubsequentlyconsentedto anorderof condemnationagainst him asgarnisheein theamountof hisdebt toBalk.TheMarylandcourtenteredjudgment,whichwaspaidbyHarris.Meanwhile,BalksuedHarrisinNorthCarolinaforrecoveryof the debt.Harris'defensethat paymentof theMaryland judgmentwas satisfactionofa validjudgment,entitledto fullfaithand credit inNorthCarolinacourts,wasrejectedbytheNorthCarolinacourtonthegroundthattheMarylandcourt had no jurisdictionto attach or garnish thedebt because the situs of thedebtwasin NorthCarolina.InreviewingtheNorthCarolina judgment,theSupremeCourtcon-cludedthattheMarylandcourthadinfact obtainedvalidjurisdiction,onthetheorythatthesitus ofadebtfollowedthedebtorandthedebtcouldbe attachedwhereverthe debtorwasfound.23.Attachmentand garnishmentare used interchangeably in some courts'opinions.A writQUASIINREMACTIONSandgovernedbystatelaw.If astateprovidedfor theattachmentof adebt,then jurisdictionoverthatdebt would beacquiredif thedebtor wereserved personally with processof attachment within thestateandif thecreditorcouldhavesued thedebtorin thestate.24The originalsitus of the debt, therefore,wasimmaterial;rather,theobligationcouldbeattachedwhereverthedebtorcouldbeservedwithprocess.2sForpurposesofthedevelopmentofquasiinremjurisdiction,Harrisis significant in severalrespects.Itis renowned for its conclu-sionthat theobligationto paya debtcan beattached and therebyprovidethe basisfor quasiin rem jurisdiction whereverprocesscanbeservedonthedebtor.Underlyingthisconclusion,however,wasthe requirementthat a writ be issued for the attachment of the debt.Althoughthecourt'spoweroverthepersonofthedebtorconfersjurisdictionon thecourtto issue thewrit of attachment,mereper-sonalserviceof a complaint on the debtor is insufficient to establishjurisdiction.28 Unliketheattachmentoftangibleproperty,attach-mentofintangibleproperty,suchasadebt,cannotproceedbyphysicalpossession;thedebtor'sobligationtopaythedefendantmust bearrested, and a lien must be placed on the debt. To accom-plishthis,thedebtormusthavereceivednoticeof thesuitandofof attachmentreferstothe writ bywhich property of adefendantisseizedand brought intothecustody of thecourt, either to furnish jurisdictionover the property seized,to compel anappearance,tofurnishsecurityfora judgment,orto satisfya judgment.If property withinthestateofanonresidentdefendantisseized,the term"foreignattachment"frequently isused incontrast to a "domesticattachment"issuing against a resident.Garnishment pertainstotheseizureof aperson's property owedby, orin the possessionor controlof athird party.The writ of garnishmentwarns thethird party not to provide the defendant with his property,but toappearandanswertheclaimsfiledbytheplaintiff.Seegenerally BLACK'SLAwDITONARY161,'810(4th ed.rev.1968).See also C.DRAKE,A TREAnrsONTHE LAwOFSUnTsBYATACHMENT 450-467(7th ed.1891).This Articlegenerally will use the term attachment,excepttodescribeactionslabeledotherwisebythecourts inquestion.24.TheCourtstressedthat theplaintiff, ineffect,stood inplace of the creditor,seekingto collectthedebt.Asrepresentativeof the creditor,therefore,the plaintiff couldsue only ifthecreditorcouldhaveattachedthedebtwithinthestate.198U.S.at 226.AstheCourtrecognizedinShafferv.Heitner,433U.S.186,201n.18(1977),however,thisrationaleisflawed;unlesstheplaintiff alreadyhasobtaineda judgment against thecreditor,theplain-tiff'srighttosueonbehalf ofthecreditorisanissueto belitigated.See also Beale,TheExercise of Jurisdictionin RemtoCompel Payment of a Debt, 27 HARV.L. REv.107,118-20(1913).25.198U.S.at 221-23.26.Id. at222.19781WILLIAMANDMARYLAWREVIEWhisobligationtorefrainfrompayingthedebtthroughserviceofprocess,whetherthe debtor wastemporarilyor permanentlyin thestate.27Harris thuscontinuedtheprocedureestablishedbyPennoyer,wherebyquasi in rem jurisdictioncould beacquiredonly by attach-mentorseizureof propertywithin thestate.Italsoextendedthisconceptto includeintangibleaswell astangible property,propertythataccompaniesthe debtorregardlessof hisintent.The durationof theproperty'spresenceinthestate,asmeasuredbythelengthofthedebtor'sstay,isimmaterial.Thatanintangiblecannotbeattachedinthetraditionalphysicalmannerdidnotprecludetheapplicationoftheattachmentconcept.Instead,theattachmentcouldbeachievedby serviceof awrit of attachmentonthe debtor,effectivelywarninghimnot to payhis obligationto thedefendant-creditor.Perhapsbecausethedebtorin theusualcasehas nocon-tactwiththeplaintiff,otherthantheobligationrunningtoth6defendant-creditor,the requirementof attachment servesto tie thedebtortothesubjectofthesuitbetweentheplaintiffandthedefendant-creditor.Despitethein personamaspectof thedebtor'spresence,however,theactionessentiallyisquasiin rem,based onthepresenceinthestateofpropertybelongingtothedefen-dant-thedebtowedtothedefendant.FordecadesafterHarris, quasiinremjurisdictionremainedquiescentdespitesubstantialalterationsininpersonamjurisdic-tion. Foremost among the developmentsaffectingin personam juris-dictionwas theadoptionof the minimumcontactstest, articulatedinInternationalShoeCo.v.Washington,28 bywhichinpersonamjurisdictioncouldbeassertedoveradefendantonlyifhehadatleastminimumcontactswith the forumstate.Ina seminalopinionwrittenbyChiefJusticeStone,theCourtinInternational Shoeconcludedthat:27.Toprotectthe defendant-creditor,Harrisrequiredthat noticebe givenbythe debtor-garnisheetohisowncreditorofthependingsuitandthatthegarnisheemustaffordhiscreditoranopportunityto defend.Theabsenceof noticewouldnot affectthevalidity of thejudgmentagainstthedebtor,butwouldpreventthedebtorfromassertingpaymentofthejudgmentasadefensetoasubsequentproceedingbythecreditor.Id.at 227.28.326U.S.310(1945).PriortoInternational Shoe,inpersonamjurisdictionhadbeenexpandedinseveralrespects:forexample,jurisdictionovercorporationsbasedon"presence;"jurisdiction over nonresident motoristsbased onautomobileaccidentswithin thestate.ThisexpansioniscanvassedthoroughlyinDevelopments intheLaw-Stdte-CourtJurisdiction, 73HARv.L.REv.909(1960).[Vol.20:157QUASIINREMACTIONS[N]owthatthecapias ad respondendum hasgivenwaytoper-sonalserviceofsummonsorotherformof notice,dueprocessrequiresonly thatinordertosubjecta defendantto a judgmentin personam, if hebenotpresentwithintheterritoryof theforum,hehavecertainminimumcontactswithit suchthat themaintenanceofthesuitdoesnot offend"traditionalnotionsoffairplayandsubstantialjustice."2Theseminimumcontactsmustbesufficienttomakeit"reasonable" torequirethedefendant todefendanactionagainsthimin the forumstate. Relevant factorsto be consideredin makingthis determinationinclude whether the defendantis inconveniencedbydefendinganactionfarfromhome,whetherthecontactsarecontinuousand systematicratherthan singleor isolated acts or thecasualpresenceof an agent, and the connectionof the lawsuit to thedefendant'sactivitiesin thestate. Thesefactorscannot beassessedinamechanicalorquantitativefashion:"Whetherdueprocessissatisfiedmustdependratheruponthequalityandnatureoftheactivity in relation to the fair and orderlyadministrationof the lawswhichitwasthepurposeof thedueprocessclausetoinsure."'"0InternationalShoe was apurelyin personamcase,in which juris-dictionwasbasedonthedefendant-corporation'scontinuousandsystematicactivitieswithin the state, resulting in alargevolumeofbusiness.TheStateof Washington'sclaimthat thedefendanthadfailedto contributeto a state unemploymentcompensationfund foremployeeserviceswithinthe statearoseoutof theseintrastateac-tivities.Serviceof processuponanagentof thecorporationwithinthe statewasadequate,and the mailing of notice by registered mailtothedefendant'shomeofficewas"reasonablycalculatedtoap-prise"thedefendant of suit.3'TheCourt'sopinioninInternationalShoecontainednodiscus-sion of quasiin rem jurisdiction;however,itdid not expresslylimittheminimumcontactstesttoinpersonamjurisdiction.TheCourt'somissionofanydiscussionof theimplicationsof thistestfortheconceptof quasiinremjurisdictionisunderstandable;thequestionsimplywasnotraisedbythefactsof thatcasebecausethedefendanthadnosubstantialpropertywithintheStateofWashington.32 Nevertheless,insubsequentcasescourts,including29.326U.S.at 316(quotingMillikenv.Meyer,311U.S.457,463(1940)).30.Id.at 319.31.Id.at 320.32.Id.at 313-14.1978]WILLIAMANDMARYLAWREVIEW [Vol.20:157theSupremeCourt,limitedapplicationoftheminimumcontactstesttocasesinvolvinginpersonamjurisdiction.Notwithstandingsubstantialcriticismintheacademiccommunityurgingthatdueprocess requiredapplicationof aminimumcontactstest to quasi inremaswellasinpersonamjurisdiction,33 thecourtsdistinguishedsharplybetweenthetwojurisdictionalconceptsanddidnotapplya minimumcontactsdue process requirementto cases predicated onquasiin remjurisdiction.3AfterInternationalShoe,manystatelegislaturesenacted"long-armstatutes,l"pursuantto whichvariousactivitiesorcontactsbyapersonwithinastatewould subjecthimtosuit concerningthoseactivities.Thejurisdictionalbasisundertheselong-armstatuteswasin personam,not onlyif the statute providedforsuits basedonthe transactionof businessorcommissionof anactwithinastate,butalsoif thestatutepermittedsuitsonclaimsarisingfromtheownershiporuseofrealpropertywithinthestate.15 Inthelatter33.See,e.g.,Carrington,The Modern Utility ofQuasi in RemJurisdiction, 76HARv.L.REV.303,305-09,317 (1962)(arguing that exposure of a defendanttoquasi in rem jurisdictionabsent ashowingof voluntarycontactwiththe forumis"manifestlyunsatisfactory");Haz-ard, supra note7,at 281(advocating that "all jurisdictionalproblems beapproachedasonesof theexistenceof minimumcontactsbetweentheforumand thetransactionin litigation");Traynor,IsThisConflict ReallyNecessary?,37TEx.L.REv.657,662-63(1959)(urgingabolitionof"mechanicaldistinctionsbetweeninremandinpersonam"jurisdiction);VonMehren&Trautman,Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: ASuggested Analysis, 79HARV.L.REV.1121,1135-36(1966)(contendingthat,becauseadjudicationnecessarilyinvolvesrightsanddutiesofindividuals,distinctionsdrawnbetweeninremandinpersonamjurisdictionareartificialand should be viewedas"generaljurisdiction");Note, JurisdictionInRemand theAttachment of Intangibles: Erosion ofthe Power Theory,1968DUKEL.J.725,734-44(con-cludingthat"thesamenotionsof fundamentalfairnesstothedefendantespousedinInternational Shoewouldseemtoapplyequallytojurisdictioninremaswellasinper-sonam").34.See generally Developments in theLaw-State-Court Jurisdiction,73HARV.L. REv.909,948-55(1960).But see Atkinsonv.SuperiorCourt,49Cal.2d338,316 P.2d960(1957),appeal dismissed and cert. denied subnom.Columbia BroadcastingSys.,Inc.v.Atkinson,357 U.S.569(1958)(applying aminimumcontacts test inaquasi inremcontext);Simpsonv.Loehmann,21N.Y.2d 305,234N.E.2d 669,287 N.Y.S.2d633(1967)(criticizingtheartifi-cialand anachronisticcharacteroftraditionaldistinctionsbetweeninpersonamand inremjurisdiction).35.See,e.g.,ILL.ANN.STAT.ch.110, 17(1)(c)(Smith-Hurd Supp.1977);OHIoREv.CODANN.2307.382(A)(8)(PageSupp.1978).See generally UNIFORMINTERSTATEANDINTERNA-TIONALPROCEDUREAcT1.03(a)(5),andstatutescitedintheCommissioners'Comment.Thesestatuteslimit in personamjurisdiction to causesof action arising fromtheenumeratedactsoractivities,suchasownershipofrealproperty.TheCommissioners'Commentstatesthat personal propertywasexcludedbecauseof potentialdifficulties incases involvingstolenQUASIINREMACTIONScases,theminimumcontactstestnecessarilywouldbeapplied,althoughtheclaim,arisingfromtheownershipof property,couldhavebeenfoundedonquasiinremjurisdiction.Thus,defendantsinsomesuitsbasedontheownershipofpropertybutbroughtinpersonamwereentitledtothesafeguardsenunciatedinInterna-tional Shoe,whileothers,incasesbroughtquasiin rem,werenot.Thelogicalexplanationforthisapplicationof theminimumcon-tactstestonlytoinpersonamsuitsbasedonpropertyownershipandnotto quasiin remsuitsbasedonthesameproperty,and thejudgmenthad limited res judicata effects.Until the Court'sdecisioninShafferv.Heitner,6 thisimplicitexplanationwaschallengedonlybysomecommentatorsandafewcourts.31Thesharpdistinctionbetweenquasiinremandinpersonamjurisdictionwas amelioratedsomewhat in Mullane v.CentralHano-ver Bank and Trust Co.38 The action in Mullane, involvingthe judi-cialsettlementofaccountsof thetrusteeofacommontrustfundestablishedpursuanttostatelaw,wasbroughtasaninpersonamaction;no propertywasseizedor otherwisesecured to acquirequasiin rem jurisdiction. The proceedingsin Mullane, however,includedattributesof both quasiinremand in personamjurisdiction:judi-cialsettlementof accountshadbeenconsideredbysomecourtstobe in rem,byothers to be quasi in rem,and by still othersto be"inthenatureof aproceedinginrem.39TheCourtin Mullane heldthat noticegiven to beneficiariesonlythroughstatutorilyapprovedpublicationinalocalnewspaper,withoutnamingthebeneficiariesor attemptingto providepersonalnoticeto knownbeneficiaries,violateddueprocess.TheCourtex-pressedconcernthatthedistinctionsbetweenquasiin remand inpersonamjurisdictionwerenotalwaysusefulorsuitableanalyti-cally.Althoughbelievingthatthejurisdictionaldistinctionex-pressedin proceduraltermsaconcept thatwas fundamentallyandhistoricallyassociatedwithsubstantivepropertylaw,theCourtnotedthatthedevelopmentofnewformsof proceedingsandtheproperty, conditionalsales,or chattel mortgages.See also RESTATEMENT(SECOND)OFCONFLICTOFLAWS38(1971).36.433U.S.186(1977).37.Seenotes33-34supra.38.339U.S.306(1950).39.Id.at 312.19781WILLIAMANDMARYLAWREVIEWgrowingsignificanceof intangiblepropertycausedthe oldformstobelessappropriate.TheCourtthereforeconcluded:[T]herequirementsoftheFourteenthAmendmenttotheFed-eralConstitutiondonot dependuponaclassificationforwhichthestandardsaresoelusiveandconfusedgenerallyandwhich,beingprimarilyfor statecourtsto define,mayanddovaryfromstate to state.Withoutdisparagingthe usefulnessof distinctionsbetweenactionsin rem andthose in personam in manybranchesof law,or onother issues,orthe reasoningwhich underliesthem,wedonotrestthepowerof theStatetoresorttoconstructiveservicein thisproceedinguponhowitscourts or thisCourt mayregardthishistoricantithesis."Therefore,whetherthe action was nominally in remor in personam,certainfundamentaldueprocessrequirementswouldapply,man-dating ataminimumthatdeprivationof propertybyadjudication"beprecededbynoticeandopportunityfor hearingappropriatetothe natureof thecase.' 41 Thejurisdictionallabelthus wasrejectedasarigidguidetothetypeof noticerequired.In Mullane, the Courtcondemnedthe mechanismof noticesanc-tionedbythestatestatute,publicationinalocalpaperwithoutidentificationof persons knownto beaffected,as unlikelyto informbeneficiariesof the pendencyof the lawsuit.While personalservicewouldnotberequiredinallcircumstances,especiallyincasesin-volvingnonresidents,noticemustbegiventhat is"reasonablycal-culated,underallthecircumstances,toappriseinterestedpartiesof thependencyoftheactionandaffordthemanopportunitytopresenttheir objections.' 42 TheCourtemphasizedthat the methodof noticemust be suchas reasonablywould bechosenby onegenu-inelyseekingtonotifytherecipients.Althoughconcludingthatpublicationaloneaspermittedunderthe statestatutewould beinsufficientto notifythe beneficiariesoftheirrighttoparticipateinthelitigation,4"theCourtalsostated40.Id.at 312-13.41.Id.at 313.42.Id. at314(citations omitted).43.TheCourtdistinguishedamongdifferenttypesofbeneficiaries.Beneficiarieswhoseidentityorlocationcouldnot bediscoveredwithduediligencecouldbenotifiedpursuanttothe statutory provision, ascould those beneficiarieswhoseinterests wereconjectural or future.Knownbeneficiarieswithknownresidences,however,wereentitledtonoticereasonablycalculatedtoreachthem.Noticewasnot requiredtoreacheverybeneficiarybecauseof the[Vol.20:157QUASIINREMACTIONSexplicitly that publicationmight besufficient if combinedwithan-other means.Forexample,attachment or seizureof property by thestatecouldaffordadequatenoticetosatisfydueprocesswhenac-companiedbypublicationor posting."Indeed,theCourt permittedastatetoassumethat propertywithinthatstateeitherisintheowner'scareorin thecareof anagent,therebyassuring noticetotheowner,orhasbeenabandonedbytheowner,therebymakingnoticemeaningless."Ineffect,thisaspectofthe Mullane opinionretractspartof theCourt'searlierrejectionofthedistinctionbe-tween quasiin remandin personamactions:the purequasi in remaction involvesseizureof propertyand therefore,if accompaniedbypublication,would satisfy the Court's criteria for notice,whereas foranin personamactionsuchnoticewouldbeinsufficient.DespiteMullane's apparentretrenchmentwithrespecttojuris-dictionaldistinctions,within the decadethe Court reconsideredtheconceptsandin Hanson v.Denckla4"attemptedtosetfortha rea-sonedapproachforanalyzingthe"affiliatingcircumstances"with-outwhichcourtsmaynot exercisejurisdictionovera defendantorhisproperty.47 TheCourt'sanalysisinHanson beganbyadoptingthedefinitionsofjurisdictionfoundintheRestatementofJudg-ments. First, an in personam judgment "imposesa personal liabilityor obligationon onepersonin favor of another."Second,an in remjudgment"affectstheinterestsofallpersonsindesignatedprop-erty."Aninrem judgmenttheniscontrastedwitha quasiinremjudgment,which"affectsthe interestsof particular personsin des-ignatedproperty."Quasiin rem jurisdiction maybe separatedintotwoforms:quasiinremjurisdictionmaybeusedbyaplaintiffreasonable expectationthat those participatingin the proceedingswouldsafeguard theinter-estsof allmembersof theclass.Id.at 318,319.44.Id.at316.45.Id.46.357U.S. 235(1958).Hanson involvedclaims topart of thecorpus of a trust createdinDelawarebyasettlorwholaterbecamearesidentof Florida.Afterthesettlor'swillwasadmitted to probate in Florida,certain interestedparties sought a declaratoryjudgmentfromaFloridacourtconcerningtheeffectofaresiduaryclauseinthewillonaportionof theDelawaretrust. Variousdefendants,including potentialbeneficiariesand the Delaware trus-tee,werenotresidentsof Floridaand couldnot be servedpersonally there.Thepossibilitiesof quasiinremandinpersonam jurisdictionovernonresidents,thus,becamesignificant.47.Id.at246.1978]WILLIAMANDMARYLAWREVIEW"seekingtosecureapreexistingclaiminthesubjectpropertyandtoextinguishorestablishthenonexistenceofsimilarinterestsofparticularpersons;"or,alternatively,quasiin rem jurisdictionmayinvolvepropertyunrelatedtotheclaimsoftheplaintiffif"theplaintiffseekstoapplywhat heconcedestobethepropertyof thedefendanttothesatisfactionof aclaimagainsthim."4In Hanson, theCourt reliedsubstantiallyonhistoricalprecedentforitsanalysisof theavailabilityof quasiinremorinpersonamjurisdiction.Indeed,thebasicdescriptionof quasiin remjurisdic-tionas foundedon physicalpoweroverpropertylocatedwithinthestatewasderivedlargelyfromPennoyer.45 BecausethepartiesinHanson assumedthat theproperty,whichconsistedof trust assets,waslocatedoutof theforumstate,thestatecourt'squasiinremjurisdictioncouldexist onlybyvirtueof the state'spowerovertheprobate andconstruction of the residuary clauseof the will of astateresident.The Court,however,firmlyrejectedthe theorythat quasiin rem jurisdictiontoadjudicatethevalidityof thetrust couldrestonthe effect that such adecision might have on the size of the estatepassingunder thewill;otherwise,probatecourtscouldhavelimit-lesspower."Similarly,theCourtrejectedthesuggestionthattheresidenceof thedecedentcouldprovideajurisdictionalbasisoverinterestsof nonresidentsin property outside the forum state.5'Thus,the Court adheredto the traditional notions of quasi in remjurisdic-tion and refused to permit expansionof the underlying requirementsof propertyinstate.In its treatmentof in personam jurisdiction,theCourt in Hansonapplied the InternationalShoe minimumcontactstest, againderiv-ing jurisdictionalrestrictionsfromthe territoriallimits of astate'spower.5 2 Despitea trend towardexpandingin personamjurisdiction48.Id.at 246n.12.49.Id.at246&n.14.50.Id.at 248-49.TheCourtstated:Whatever theefficacy of a so-called"in rem" jurisdictionover assets admittedlypassingundera localwill,aState acquiresnoin rem jurisdictionto adjudicatethevalidityofinter vivosdispositionssimplybecauseitsdecisionmightaug-mentanestatepassingunderawillprobatedinitscourts.If suchabasisofjurisdictionweresustained,probatecourtswouldenjoynationwideserviceofprocesstoadjudicateinterestsinpropertywith whichneithertheState nor thedecedentcouldclaimanyaffiliation.51.Id.at 249-50.52.Id.at 250-55.[Vol.20:1571978] QUASIINREMACTIONSover nonresidents,53 theCourt notedthat thecontactsof the defen-dants withthe forumstate wereinsufficient to satisfy the minimumcontactstest.Severalfactorscontributedsignificantlyto thiscon-clusion,including thelackof businessorassetsin the forumstate,theabsenceof anyactor transactionin thestate,and thewant ofspeciallegislationreflectinga strong state interest.4 The unilateralactivity of theresidentdefendantswasinsufficient;someact musthaveoccurredbywhichthenonresidentdefendantspurposefullyavailedthemselvesof some benefitsfromthe forumstate.5 Finally,whetherastateisthemostconvenientforumoristhecenterofgravityof a disputemaybe relevantin decidingchoice-of-lawques-tions,but it is insignificantindeterminingthe validityof personaljurisdiction.8Thestatusof quasiinremjurisdictionremainedremarkablystaticforalmosta century.Theframeworkandrationaleset forthin Pennoyer wereadoptedwithlittlerevisioninsubsequentcases.Incontrasttothedevelopmentofinpersonamjurisdiction,thequasiinremcasesreaffirmedtheprincipleof Pennoyer thatstatecourtjurisdiction57 basedonthepresenceofpropertywithinthe53.See,e.g.,McGeev. InternationalLifeIns.Co.,355U.S.220(1957).54.357U.S.at251-53.55.Id.at253.AlthoughsomequestionpersistsastotheemphasistobeplacedonthelanguageinHanson requiring that thedefendantpurposefullyavailhimself of theprivilegeof conductingactivities in the forumstate, thisfactor was influentialin the Supreme Court'srecentdecisionin Kulkov.Superior Court,436 U.S.84,94(1978).Applyingthepurposefulact testofHanson, theCourtinKulkoconcludedthat adefendanthadnotpurposefullyavailed himself of the benefitsand protectionsof Californialawsimply by acquiescingin hisdaughter'swishthat shebepermittedtolivetherewithhermother.If, asinHanson, thecase involvedlitigation of an agreement havingno connection with the forum,and if no othercontactswiththeforumstatewerepresent,theCourtconcludedthatreasonablenessandfairnessprecludedinpersonamjurisdiction.56.357U.S.at 254.This positionhasbeen reaffirmedin Shaffer, 433U.S.at 215-16,andinKulkov.SuperiorCourt,436U.S.at98.57.Civil actionsbased on quasi in rem jurisdictioncould not be commencedby attachmentinoriginalactionsinthefederalcourtsuntil the1963amendmentsto rule4of theFederalRulesofCivilProcedure.TheAdvisoryCommitteenotesindicate that theamendmentwasintendedtopermituseinthefederalcourtsof stateproceduresbywhichpropertyof thedefendantisbrought withinthe court's custodyandappropriateserviceupon the defendantismade.Federaljurisdictionand venuerequirements,however,wereexpectedto limittheactualuseofthismethodofservice.SeeFED.R.Civ.P.4(e),AdvisoryComm.Notes(1963).Thisamendmentof rule 4was viewedonthe onehand asa correctionof an historicalanomaly,see, e.g.,Currie,Attachment and Garnishment in the Federal Courts, 59MicH.L.REv.337,338,380(1961),and,ontheotherhand,asapreservationofananachronisticdevice,see,e.g.,Carrington,supra note33,at303-09.WILLIAMANDMARYLAWREVIEWstatecouldbeassertedbyarrangingfortheseizureof thepropertyorotherwisebringingitunderthecourt'scontrol,accompaniedbysomeefforttonotifythedefendant.Althoughlimitedtotheprop-ertyseized,quasiinremjurisdictionwasanimportantmeansofobtainingahearingin theforumof theplaintiff'schoice.TheEffectsof Shaffer v.Heitner onQuasi in RemJurisdictionTheScopeofthe DecisionAfterthelqngperiodduringwhichquasiin remjurisdictionun-derwentlittlechange,8 theSupremeCourtin1977consideredwhetherquasi in rem jurisdiction should be subjected to a minimumcontactstest similartothatapplicabletopersonaljurisdiction.InShaffer v.Heitner,5 the Court unanimouslyconcludedthat amini-mumcontactsanalysis is necessary to quasi in rem jurisdiction. TheCourt,however,expresslyfounditunnecessaryto decidethe othersignificantissue presentedbythe case:whetherthe seizureof prop-erty to obtain quasi in remjurisdiction may be undertaken only withadequateproceduralsafeguards."InShaffer,aDelawarestatutepermittedthestate'scourtstoobtain jurisdictionbysequesteringorseizingthein-statepropertyof anonresidentdefendant."Uponthefilingof ashareholder'sde-rivativesuitagainstaDelawarecorporationanditsofficersanddirectors,the statecourt grantedamotionforan orderto sequestercertainstock,options,warrantsto purchasestock,andother intan-gibles belongingto nonresidentpast and presentofficersanddirec-torsoftheDelawarecorporation.62 Thisseizureofpropertywas58.In anexceptiontothisquiescent period,theCaliforniaSupremeCourtforeshadowedthefuturedevelopmentsin Shaffer when,in1957,it applieda contactsand fairnessanalysistodeterminethevalidityofanexerciseofquasiinremjurisdiction.Atkinsonv.SuperiorCourt,49Cal.2d338,316P.2d960(1957),appeal dismissed and cert.denied subnom.ColumbiaBroadcastingSys.,Inc.v.Atkinson,357U.S.569(1958).59.433U.S.186(1977).JusticeRehnquistdidnotparticipateintheconsiderationordecisionof thecase. Although JusticeBrennan dissentedin part, heconcurredinthe portionoftheopinionholdingtheminimumcontactstestapplicabletoquasiinremjurisdiction.60.Id.at 209-10.61.DEL.CODEANN.tit.10,366(1975).ThesequestrationstatuteandcasesthereunderwereanalyzedandcriticizedthoroughlyinanarticlecitedfavorablyinShaffer.Folk&Moyer,SequestrationIn Delaware:AConstitutionalAnalysis, 73COLUM.L. REv.749(1973).62.DEL.CODEANN.tit. 8,169(1975),providedthat, for attachmentandjurisdictionalpurposes,thesitusof stockissuedby aDelawarecorporationwasDelaware.ThisprovisionisuniquetoDelaware;otherstatesgenerallyfollowU.C.C.8-317(1),and requireseizureofthestockcertificatesforanattachmenttobevalid.[Vol.20:157QUASIINREMACTIONSthought necessary to provide the court with quasi in rem jurisdictionoverthe nonresidentdefendantsbecause the physicalabsenceof thedefendantsfromthe state *andthe lackof activities within thestategivingrisetothecauseofactionprecludedinpersonamjurisdic-tion.63 Thestatuterequiredthatthedefendantappearpersonallyafterseizureoftheproperty;ifhefailedtoappearorotherwisedefaulted,the froperty would besold to satisfy the plaintiff's claim.If, however,thedefendantenteredageneralappearance,thenhecouldpetitionthecourt forreleaseofthe property.Theseizureoftheproperty,thus,wasadevicenotonlytoobtainquasiinremjurisdictionbutalsotocompelanonresidenttosubmittoin per-sonamjurisdiction.NotwithstandingtheDelawareSupremeCourt'sconclusioninShaffer thattheminimumcontactsapproachwasinapplicabletoquasiin rem jurisdiction,64 the United StatesSupremeCourtdeter-minedthatallassertionsofstatecourtjurisdictionmustbesub-jectedtoaminimumcontactsanalysis.TheCourtreachedthisconclusionafterareviewofprecedent,beginningwithPennoyer.Although Pennoyer limited the assertionof in personam jurisdictionovernonresidents,itcontinuedtopermittheexerciseofquasiinremjurisditionovernonresidentsbasedontheseizureoftheirproperty within the state.Subsdquentmodificationsof in personamjurisdiction5 culminatedin theminimumcontactstest adoptedin63.Thecomplaintallegedthat certainactivitiesof thedefendantsinOregonresultedincivildamagesforantitrustviolationsand criminalfinesforcontemptconvictionsinotherproceedings.TheantitrustcasereachedtheSupremeCourtandhasbeenremandedforfurtherproceedings.GreyhoundCorp.v.Mt.HoodStages,Inc.,437U.S.322(1978).Foropinionsin thecontempt adjudication,seeUnited Statesv.GreyhoundCorp.,370F. Supp.881(N.D.Ill.),aff'd,508F.2d529(7thCir.1974).64.361A.2d225,229(Del.1976).Other courtsrecentlyhadconsidered applyingamini-mumcontactstest toquasiinremjurisdiction.See,e.g.,Steelev.G.D.Searle& Co.,483F.2d339,347(5thCir.1973),cert.denied,415U.S.958(1974)(refusingtoapplyfullInternationalShoe minimumcontactstest although recognizingthat all typesof jurisdictionmustsatisfyrequirementsofjusticeandfairplay;presenceofdefendant'sdebtorwithinstatewheredebtor regularly did businesswas sufficientto establishquasi in rem jurisdictionoverdebt).65.See,e.g.,Hessv.Pawloski,274U.S.352(1927)(nonresident-motoriststatutorilyas-sumedto consentto appointmentofagent for serviceofprocess).TheCourtin Shaffer alsonoted that corporations doing business within a state wereassumed to consentto theappoint-mentofanagent.433U.S.at 201-03.Thistransformationof inpersonamjurisdictionwasachievedthroughtheuseofthelegalfiction"thattheout-of-statemotorist[orforeigncorporation],whichitwasassumedcouldbe excludedaltogether fromtheState's highways[orcommerce],hadbyusingthosehighways[orengaginginbusiness]appointedadesig-1978]WILLIAMANDMARYLAWREVIEWInternationalShoe, whichtheCourtin Shafferviewedasfocusingon "the relationship among the defendant, the forum,and the litiga-tion,ratherthanthemutuallyexclusivesovereigntyof theStatesonwhichtherules of Pennoyer rest."6 This relaxationof the prere-quisitesof in personamjurisdiction,however,wasnot accompaniedbyanalterationoftheconceptsofquasiinremjurisdiction.Despitetheappearanceof continuityinthequasiinremcases,theCourtinShafferobservedthatPennoyer hadbeenmodifiedindirectly.Throughtherequirementthat,asidefromthewarningprovidedbytheseizureitself,propertyownersbenotifiedbeforedispositionofpropertypursuanttoacourt'sjudgment,theCourthadrecognizedthataquasiin remjudgmentaffectednot onlythepropertybut the propertyowneras well.Moreover,in Mullane, theCourthaddeclinedtorelyonthedistinctionbetweeninremandinpersonamconceptsbecauseof the"elusive"natureof thestan-dardstobeimposed.7 ThesequalificationsforeshadowedtheCourt'sinquiryinShaffer intotheapplicabilityof InternationalShoe's standardof fairnessandsubstantialjusticetoquasiin remactions."Recognizingthat quasi in rem jurisdictionis premised not merelyupon jurisdictionoverproperty but upon jurisdiction over the inter-estsof persons in the property,the Court determinedthat the mini-mumcontactsstandardofInternational Shoewasapplicabletoquasiinremactions.TheCourtfurtherobservedthat, becauseallproceedingsare actuallyagainst persons, and not against things, theterms"inrem"and"quasiin rem"areonly shorthandexpressionsforthe interestsof persons inproperty."Thedue processconsidera-tions,embodiedintheminimumcontactstest,apply tothe inter-estsof personswhethertheactionisinpersonamorquasiin rem.Thatquasiinrem jurisdictionlimits theliabilityof thedefendantnatedstateofficialashisagenttoacceptprocess."Id. at 202.Useofthisfictionpermittedthecourtstoaccommodatethe"adventofautomobiles"andthe"realitiesofinterstatecorporateactivities"withinthetheoryofPennoyer. Id.66.433U.S.at 204.Onecommentatorhassuggestedthatthephrasingof theminimumcontactstestinShafferdepartsfrompriorcases,whichhadfocusedontherelationshipbetweenthedefendantandtheforumbut hadnot mentionedthelitigation.Fyr, Shaffer v.Heitner: The Supreme Court'sLatest Last Words On State Court Jurisdiction,26 EMORYL.J.739,763-64(1977).67.433U.S.at206(citingMullanev.CentralHanoverBank& TrustCo.,339U.S.306,312(1950)).68.Id.69.Id.at207& n.22.[Vol.20:157QUASIINREMACTIONStothevalueofthepropertyinvolveddoesnotrendermootthenecessityof determiningwhethertheexerciseof jurisdictionis con-sistentwiththeminimumcontactstestof dueprocess.71AlthoughtheCourtconcludedthattheminimumcontactstestappliestoallassertionsof jurisdiction,7'itleft unclearwhetherthetestasappliedtoquasiinremactionsisidenticaltothetestem-ployedinanalyzingin personamactions.TheCourtstated explic-itly that the presenceof property in the state providesa connectionamongthedefendant,theforum,and thelitigation.Indeed,if thecontroversyinvolvesa claim to the property forming the basisof thejurisdiction,theCourtstated that forthe statetolack jurisdictionwould be"unusual.72 This conclusionwasexplainedpartlybythedefendant'sexpectationof benefitingfromstateprotectionoftheproperty,bythestate'sinterestinassuringthemarketabilityofpropertyand thepeacefulresolutionof disputes,and bythelikeli-hoodthat relevantrecordsand witnesseswould be found within thestate.Similarly,if theclaimconcernsdutiesand rightsarisingoutof ownershipof the property,the presence of theproperty may beacontactfavoringjurisdiction.TheCourtthereforeobservedthatmanyquasiin remorpurelyinremactionswillbe unaffectedbyapplicationof theminimumcontactstest.According to the Court in Shaiffer, the minimum contactstest willhaveitsmost significanteffect if no relationship existsbetweenthejurisdictionalpropertyandtheclaim.Insuchcases,thepropertyalonewillbeinadequatetoprovideminimumcontactswiththestate;73 rather,other tiesmust beascertainedand evaluated.Thesecases,exemplified by Harrisand Shaffer, involve the use of propertysimplyasajurisdictionalexpedientintheabsenceof minimumcontactssufficienttopermitinpersonamjurisdiction.If,asinShaffer, the expresspurpose of the quasi in rem jurisdictionaldevice70.Id.at 207n.23(citingFuentesv.Shevin,407U.S.67,88-90(1972)).71.Id.at 212.Some commentatorshve questioned whether the Court meant to apply boththeminimumcontactsandthefundamentalfairnessaspectsof InternationalShoe.E.g.,Casad,Shaffer v.Heitner: AnEndto Ambivalence in Jurisdiction Theory?, 26U.KAN.L.REV.61(1977).Becausethe Court inShaffer referredto bothconcepts, however,itprobablyintendedtoincorporateboth.Ofcourse,Shafferitselfmayshapethetestappliedtoinpersonamjurisdictioninthefuture.72.433U.S.at 207.73.Id.at209.If thepresenceofpropertyindicatessufficientcontactswithinthestate,"thereis noneed to relyon the property as justifying jurisdictionregardlessof theexistenceof thosecontacts."Id.at 209n.31.1978]WILLIAMANDMARYLAWREVIEWistocompelthedefendant'spersonalappearance,theCourtthoughtitnecessarytoapplyauniformdueprocessstandard.TheCourtwasunpersuadedbythepurportedjustificationsforallowingquasiinremjurisdictionabsentminimumcontacts.Thedangerthatadefendantcouldremovehisassetsto astate in whichhecouldnotbesuedpersonallywasgenerallyinapplicableandcouldbeeliminatedsatisfactorilyeither by enforcinga judgmentinanotherstate underthe full faithandcreditclauseor by allowingaforeignattachmentprocedureto securethe propertyfor a judgmentin a proper forum.74 Moreover,applicationof the minimumcontactstest toquasiin remjurisdiction addedno uncertaintybecause,theCourtbelieved,the test couldbeappliedeasily inmostcases.Nordidthehistoryof jurisdictionfoundedsimply uponthe presenceofpropertywithin thestate justify violationsof the evolvingconstitu-tionalrequirementsof dueprocess;75 quasiin remjurisdictionbeingessentiallyjurisdictionbasedonpersons'interestsinthings,theconclusionthatconstitutionalprotectionsapplyfollowedlogically.TherationalebywhichtheCourtsupporteditsconclusionthattheminimumcontactstestappliestoalljurisdictionalassertionspreservesthepossibilitythatthistestasappliedtoquasiinremjurisdictionmaydiffersomewhatfromthatusedinexamininginpersonam jurisdiction.Thetest may beviewedasunitary,with thepresenceof propertysimplyanadditionalcontactto beweighedinthebalance.Alternatively,thepresenceofpropertymaybemorethan just anotherfactor;instead,itmaycreatea nearpresumptionofadequatecontactsexceptwhenthepropertybearsnorelation-shiptothelitigation.TheCourtwas"notentirelyclear"withrespecttowhichviewitadopted.71ApplyingInternationalShoe to thequasiinremjurisdictionob-tainedpursuantto theDelawarestatute, theCourtconcludedthatminimumcontactsdidnotexist.TheonlyconnectionwithDela-warewasthepresenceof thestockin that state;thiscircumstancewasthe resultof auniquestatelawestablishingthesitusof stock74.Seeid.at 210.75.TheCourt referred toSniadach v.Family Fin.Corp.,395 U.S. 337,340 (1969),exempli-fyingtheCourt'sinsistenceoncomplyingwithdueprocessstandardsnotwithstandinghis-toricpatterns.433U.S.at 212.76.433U.S.at 219(Stevens,J.,concurringin thejudgment).[Vol.20:157QUASIINREMACTIONSofa domesticcorporationasDelaware."No Delawarestatutepur-portedto protectthestateinterestin regulatingconductof corpo-ratefiduciariesby establishingjurisdictionoverthem.8 Moreover,withrespecttothat goal,thesequestrationstatutewasoverinclu-sivebyreachinganynonresidentowningstockand underinclusiveby reachingonly thosedirectorswhoownedstockor other propertyin the state. Finally, no demonstrationwas made that Delaware wasafairforumforthe litigation;thedefendantshad no contactswiththestatetojustifyjurisdictionoverthem.Absentsufficientcon-tacts,the majority concluded,due process requireda determinationthatthestatecourtlackedjurisdictionovertheaction.Althoughconcurringin the judgment,Justice Powelland JusticeStevenswould havereserveddecisionon whetherownershipof cer-tainproperty,such as real estate,by itself might provideminimumcontactswiththestate,therebyavoidinguncertaintieswithintheInternationalShoestandard,whilepreservingthedueprocessre-quirements.79 JusticeStevensalsoquestionedthescopeof thema-jority's opinion."Moreover,he would not invalidateother exercisesofquasiinremjurisdictionifthepropertyownerhadadequatenoticeof the controversyand of the possibilityof suit based on localactivities.JusticeStevensvieweddueprocessprotectionasessen-tiallyarequirementofnotice:' noticeof theparticularclaimandnoticethat certainactivitiescouldresult in jurisdiction arisingin aforeignstate.ApplyingthisformulatotheDelawarecase,JusticeStevensagreedwiththemajority'sjudgmentthatdueprocesswasnot satisfied.8'Although Justice Brennan joined theCourt's opinion insofaras itheldthatthe International Shoe testappliedtoalltypesofstatecourt jurisdiction,he objectedsharplyto the applicationof the testtotheDelawarecase.Hebelievedthatbecausetheissueof theexistenceof minimumcontactswas not litigated in the state courts,itshould not havebeendecided bytheSupremeCourt.82 Forcedto77.DEL.CODEANN.tit. 8, 169(1975).78.Inan attempttoconformto theShaffer requirements,in1977the legislatureaddedaprovision, DEL.CODEANN.tit. 10, 3114(Supp. 1978),which deemsacceptanceof a positionasofficerordirectorofaDelawarecorporationasconsenttotheappointmentof anagentwithinthestate forserviceofprocess.See433U.S.at216.79.433U.S.at 217(Powell,J.,concurring).80. Id. at219(Stevens,J.,concurringinthe judgment).81. Id. at217-19.82.Id. at220-22(Brennan,J.,concurringinpartanddissentinginpart).1978]WILLIAMANDMARYLAWREVIEWexpresshisviewontheexistenceofminimumcontacts,JusticeBrennanconcludedthatinashareholders'derivativeactionthestate courthad jurisdictionover the directorsand officersof acorpo-rationincorporatedinthestate.Thestateinterestsinprovidingrestitutionto local corporationswhosefiduciarieshave acted impro-perly,inregulatingcorporatefiduciaries,and in providingaforumfor supervising state-charteredentities werethe strong reasons citedbyJusticeBrennanforallowingjurisdictionoverashareholders'derivativesuit.83 Byacceptingtheirpositionswithacorporationchartered by the state, the directorsnot only enjoyed the protectionsaffordedbystate laws,butcorrespondinglysubjected themselvestothestate's jurisdictionoversuitsconcerningtheir fiduciarystatus.Thus, accordingto Justice Brennan, the minimumcontacts test wassatisfied.84Thedifferingviewsof theJustices-allof whomagreethattheprinciplesof InternationalShoe applytoquasiin remjurisdictionbutwhodisagreeastotheseconcepts'applicationtocategoriesofcasesor toparticularcircumstances-indicatethatShaffer cannotbeexpectedtoanswerallquestionsregardingjurisdiction.Thede-terminationthata principlegovernsissignificant;thearticulationofthatprincipleanditsbearingonparticularcases,however,re-quiresmoreintensiveconsiderationthan onecasecan provide.Fu-turecases undoubtedlywill requireareworkingof the basicShafferprinciple.The Future ofQuasi InRemJurisdictionAfterShafferv.HeitnerAlthoughShaffer alteredmarkedlythe natureandavailabilityofquasiin remjurisdictionbyrequiringtheapplicationof themini-mumcontacts test, itnonethelesspreserved this form of jurisdictionasapossiblealternativetoin personamjurisdiction.Therationaleforsustainingquasiin rem jurisdiction,and the reasonsthat wouldinduceaplaintiff to use this jurisdictionaldevice,therefore,becomeimportant.TheShaffer opinioncontainsno explicitsuggestionthat quasiinremjurisdictionis nolongeravailable.Rather,theCourtenumer-atedthecriteriathatmustbemetbeforequasiinrem jurisdictioncanbeexercised, andthus stronglyimpliedthat this jurisdictional83.Id.at 223-24.84.Id. at228.[Vol.20:15719781 QUASIINREMACTIONSdevice remainsviable.The minimumcontactstest is simplya stan-dardthatmust besatisfiedmuchasanyother proceduralrequire-ment must befulfilled.Outright abolitionin quasiin rem jurisdic-tion was not onlyunnecessaryin Shaffer, but also would havebeenparticularlyinappropriateunlessallthevariousfunctionsof quasiin remjurisdictionwereevaluatedand rejected.'5Impositionof the requirementthat quasiin rem jurisdictionsat-isfytheminimumcontactstest, however,mayreducesubstantiallyany necessity for or advantage in invokingquasi in rem jurisdiction.Assumingthat thetest forminimumcontactsis thesamefor bothquasiinremandinpersonamjurisdiction,contactssufficienttoqualify for one jurisdictionalform will satisfy the other;the plaintiffcouldbasehisactiononeither.No longerdoesa primaryrationaleforquasiinremjurisdiction-theabsenceofarequirementthatconnectionsexistbetweenthedefendant,theforum,andtheclaim-remainan incentiveto use that jurisdictional form.Becausein personamjurisdictiondoesnot limit damagesto the valueof thepropertyseizedbutpermitsunlimitedpersonalliability,inper-sonamjurisdictionappearssuperior,atleastfromaplaintiff'sperspective.Moreover,fromthe viewpointof judicialeconomyandefficiency,in personamjurisdictionis preferablebecauseitpermits85.Onecommentatorhas suggestedthat no substantial reason existsto retain the conceptof quasiin rem jurisdiction.Fyr, supra note66,at 762-63.Fyr observed that the termsquasiin remand in remdevelopedasa meansof describingthe"extent of jurisdiction whichcouldbeexercisedunderthepresenceformula."Id.at762(emphasisinoriginal).Basedonthisobservation,hestatedthat"[t]hecontactsformuladoesnotrequiretheseclassifications.Whatever thenatureof thecontact,jurisdiction under the InternationalShoe.basedformulaisalwaysinpersonam."Id.Questioningthe utilityof quasiinremafterShaffer, Fyrcon-cludedthat "[s]incehenceforthall jurisdictionmustbebasedonminimumcontacts,itishardtoseewhyastatehavingaccesstothebroadestformof jurisdictionwouldelecttorequireitscourtstoproceedunderatheorythat would limitthe scopeof recovery."Id.at762-63.This viewispremature,asis thepropositionthat quasiin rem jurisdictionhasbeeneradicated.See,e.g.,Olsen,Shaffer v.Heitner: ASurveyof Its EffectsonWashingtonJurisdiction, 13GoNz.L. REV.72,80 (1977)("The immediateeffect ofShaffer is, ofcourse,toeradicatethe conceptof quasiinremjurisdiction.").Althoughquasiinremjurisdictionpossibly may becomeananachronism,somesubstantialfunctions forquasiin remjurisdic-tiontoperformmay wellremain;toeliminatequasiinremjurisdictionsimplybecauseofthe requirementthat all formsof jurisdiction satisfy minimumcontacts analysis would betoignoreall otheraspectsofthe differentiationof jurisdiction.TheRESTATEMENT(SECOND)OFJunoiDMrrrs8, Commentbat65(Tent.Draft No.5,1978)indicatesthat thetraditionalterminologyremainshelpful,at least to show thetypes of relationshipsupon which jurisdic-tionis based. Finally, even if quasi in remjurisdiction becomesunnecessary,well-establishedprinciple;of federal jurisdiction and federalismmay deter the Supreme Court fromabolishingitinstateproceedings.WILLIAMANDMARYLAWREVIEWbindingresolutionoftheentireclaiminonecase.Unlesscounter-vailingadvantagesforquasiinrem jurisdictionexist,theapplica-tionofauniformminimumcontactstestmayhavethepracticaleffectof underminingtheusefulnessofquasiinremjurisdiction.Onecountervailingadvantageofquasiinrem jurisdictionisthesecurityitprovidesforaplaintiff.Therequiredseizureorotherjudicialcontrolof the property benefitsthe plaintiff by insuring thesafetyofthepropertypendingsuitbypreventingitsremovalorotherdisposition,therebypreserving the plaintiff'sability to collectdamagesshouldhebeawardedjudgment.Althoughquasiinremjurisdictionlimitstheamountofthepotentialjudgmenttothevalueof the propertyseized,if that valueexceeds the claimor if thedefendantisjudgment-proofbutfortheassetsseized,thislimita-tionmaybeinsignificant.Moreover,theaddedsecurityaffordedbythe seizureof propertywhichaccompaniesquasiin remjurisdictionmaybeasufficientlycompellingreasonfor aplaintiffto preferquasiin remjurisdictionif theplaintiff believesthat thedefendantmaysquanderhisassetspendingsuitandtherebybecomeunabletosatisfythejudgment.Alternativesecuritydevices,however,areavailabletoaplaintiffevenif jurisdiction is in personam:the plaintiff can request that thecourtorderthe defendant not to removeassets fromthe state;alter-natively,afterjudgmentisrendered,theplaintiffcanenforcethejudgmentinanotherstateinwhichthedefendant'sassetscanbefound.These alternatives,however,may not beaseffectivein somecircumstancesas a seizureof assets at the initiation of the litigation.Anotherfarlesssignificantrationaleforinvokingquasiinrem,ratherthanin personam,jurisdictionconcernsthelimitedres judi-cata effectof a quasiin rem judgment.Aplaintiff withaweak caseconceivablymightprefer to bringseveralquasiin rem suits,hopingtoprevailinone.Judgmentsagainsthiminothersuitscouldnotbeused to bar further suits if the defendantfailedto makea generalappearance."Thisapproachisimplausible,however,becausere-peatedlitigationinvolvessignificant costsfor aplaintiff.Moreover,thisrationalewouldnotpromote judicialefficiencyandeconomy.Although the minimumcontactstest constitutionallymay permit86.See RESTATEMENT(SECOND)OFJUDGMENTS75,Commentcat 210-11(Tent. Draft No.1,1973)(criticizingtheabsenceofabartosubsequentactionsbytheplaintiff).SeealsoDevelopments inthe Law-State-Court Jurisdiction, 73HARV.L.REV.909,954-55(1960).[Vol.20:157QUASIINREMACTIONSthestatestoexerciseinpersonamjurisdictionovercertainclaimsagainst nonresidentsarising fromtheir activitieswithin thestate,"7a particularstatemayhavechosennottoexerciseits jurisdictionstatutorilytothefullextentconstitutionallypossible.Undersuchcircumstances,quasiinremjurisdictionoverin-statepropertyre-lated to theclaimmay betheonly formof jurisdiction availabletothe plaintiff in that state. Moreover,even if a state'slong-arm stat-utearguablypermitsinpersonamjurisdiction,aplaintiffmaychooseto usequasiinremjurisdiction toavoidpotentialproblemsof interpretingthe scopeof the long-arm statute.8 Assuming a com-pletelyuniformminimumcontactstest for all forms of jurisdiction,aplaintiffthusconceivablymightprefer,orberequiredbystate-imposedlimitations,toassertquasiinremjurisdiction.Thefundamentalquestion,assumedin the foregoingarguments,is whetherShaffer requirestheapplicationof auniformminimumcontactstesttothetwoformsof jurisdiction,or whetheritallowsdifferenceseitherin the test itself or in itsapplication.Theopiniondoesnotpurporttodelineateanydifferenceinthetest;indeed,languageintheopinionsuggeststhatthetestis thesame.81If thecourtintendedto varythe formof the test, thedistinctionsshouldhavebeenenunciatedclearly.Furthermore,theCourt'sreasoningin applyingtheminimumcontactstest toquasi in rem jurisdictionseemstocompeltheconclusionthat thesametest isto beusedinbothquasiinremandin personamactions.Anydifference,there-fore,wouldseemtoarise fromthe applicationof the test to the twoformsof jurisdictionand notfromthenatureofthetest itself.Inadditiontotheviabilityofquasiinremjurisdictionasan87.See note35supra.88.See Lebowitzv. Forbes Leasing& Fin.Corp.,456 F.2d979(3d Cir.),cert. denied, 409U.S.843(1972)(suggesting that aplaintiff maychoose quasiin rem jurisdiction ratherthanuseastatelong-armstatuteif thepotentialexistedforlengthylitigationconcerningtheapplicabilityof thestatutetothedefendant).89.See433U.S.at206,207,209,211,212.Because"'jurisdictionoverathing,'isacustomaryellipticalwayof referringto jurisdictionoverthe interestsof personsin athing,"the Courtconcluded that "[t]hestandard for determining whetheranexerciseof jurisdictionovertheinterestsofpersonsisconsistentwiththeDueProcessClauseistheminimum-contactsstandardelucidatedin InternationalShoe."Id.at 207.Observing that applicationof International Shoe to bothin remandinpersonamjurisdictionwould affect the quasiinrem categoryof litigation most significantly,theCourt nonethelessdeclaredthat "if adirectassertion of personal jurisdictionover thedefendantwould violatethe Constitution,itwouldseem that anindirect assertionof that jurisdictionshould beequally impermissible."Id.at209.Seealso textaccompanyingnote76supra.1978]WILLIAMANDMARYLAWREVIEWalternativeto in personamjurisdiction,Shaffer preservesthe possi-bility that quasi in rem jurisdiction, otherwiseinadequate under theminimumcontactstheory,mightbeconstitutionallypermissibleifnootherforumisavailable."InatleastonecaseaftertheCourt'sdecisionin Shaffer, propertyunrelatedto the plaintiff'sclaimswasheldto bea sufficientbasis for quasiin remjurisdiction. In Louringv.Kuwait Boulder Shipping Co.,"' the courtpermitted garnishmentofadebtowedbytheplaintiff,aConnecticutcorporation,to thedefendant,a Kuwaitcorporation,to establish quasiin rem jurisdic-tion overtheplaintiff'sclaim for anunrelatedsum,withoutapply-ingtheminimumcontactstest. Theabsenceof astate inwhichinpersonamjurisdictionoverthedefendantcouldbeobtainedwasimportant to thecourt'sdecision.Moreover,the court believedthatminimumcontactsadequatetosupportquasiinremjurisdictionprobablywereestablished,eveniftheywereinadequateunderInternationalShoe.12 The courtthus apparentlyinterpretedShafferto allowatwo-tierminimumcontactsanalysis,reservingalessde-mandingtestforquasiinremjurisdiction.Similarly,if the plaintiffs claim relatesto title or other incidentsof ownershipof propertywithinthe stateownedbythedefendant,theCourtindicatedthattheminimumcontactstest wouldalmostalwaysbesatisfied.Arguably,suchcasesinvolveapresumptionofminimumcontactsadequateto support the exerciseof quasiin remjurisdiction.Thesecontacts,moreover,alsomaybesufficienttojustifytheassertionofin personamjurisdictionundermanystatelong-armstatutes.9 3Theexistencewithinastateof propertyownedbyadefendantmaygiverisetosufficientexpectationsordutiesof thedefendantto justifyrequiring himto defend a suit, at least to the extent of thevalueoftheproperty.Theseexpectationsmaybeadequatemini-mumcontactstosatisfythetestadoptedinShaffer. Principlesoffairnessmaynot be offendedif the judgmentis limitedto thevalue(90.433U.S.at211n.37.91.455F.Supp.630(D.Conn.1977).92.Id.at 633.That the garnisheehad actedasthe agent for the defendantwithin thestateandthat thedefendant'schief executiveofficerhadmet withthegarnisheeseveraltimesinthegarnishee'sConnecticutofficesconstitutedcontactsadequateforquasiinrem jurisdic-tion.Thecourtsuggested parentheticallythat thesecontactsalso mightsatisfy InternationalShoe.93.See note35supra.[Vol.20:157QUASIINREMACTIONSof theproperty,thoughthecontactsmaybe insufficientto justifytheimpositionofgeneralliability.4 Thus,evenifthedefendant'sonlyconnectionwiththeforumstateis theownershipof property,instancesmayoccurinwhichthedefendantmayreasonablyberequiredtodefend aquasi in remactiongroundedsolelyupon thatcontact.Such asituationmayarisein cases,typifiedby Seider v.Roth,15in which thedefendant'sonly propertywithin the state is an insur-ancepolicy,locatedin thatstatemerelybyvirtueof theinsurer'sresidence.Thiscontactarguablyissufficienttosupportquasiinremjurisdictionbutinadequatetojustifytheexerciseofinper-sonamjurisdiction.Theunderlyingquestion,however,ishowthislink with the statecan qualify under the minimumcontacts test forquasiinremjurisdiction,butcannotunderthesametestforinpersonamjurisdiction.Perhapsthelanguageof the"reasonable-ness"test adoptedin InternationalShoe providesananswer.Thattestrequiresthataparticularexerciseof jurisdictionnotoffend"traditionalnotionsof fairplayand substantialjustice,"and thattheassertedjurisdictionbe"reasonable"underthecircum-stances.If liabilityis limited to the valueof the propertyinvolved,aparticularjurisdictionalclaimmaybemore"reasonable"andacceptablethanifliabilitywerenotlimited.Thelimitationonliabilityrequiredunderquasiin remjurisdiction thereforemay bea factor to be consideredin applyingthe InternationalShoe test. Inasituationsuchasthat presentedin Seider, forexample,adefen-dant reasonablymaybeexpectedtodefendalawsuit based ontheownershipof an insurance policy issued by an insurer doing businesswithin the forumstate, but only if his liability is limited to the valueof the policy.The defendant'sexpectations with regard to that prop-ertyand thelimitation onhisliability togethermay justify subject-94.Onecommentatorhas suggestedthat Shaffer implies that the limitationof liability tothe value of property seizedshould not cause the requirementof substantivedue process, theminimumcontactstest,to vary.The SupremeCourt, 1976Term,91HARv.L. REv.70,158(1977).Thepassagein Shaffertowhichthearticlerefers,433U.S.at207n.23,however,simplyindicates that minimumcontactsanalysisis essentialregardlessof thevalue of prop-erty;thatpassageshouldnotbe readnecessarilytomeanthat thelimitationonliabilitycannotbe consideredas afactor withinthe minimumcontactsanalysis.See 4C.WnxGirr&A.MILLER,FEDERALPRACTICEANDPROCEURE:CIviL1123(1969& Supp.1978)(outliningadvantagesof alimitedappearancein quasiinrem actions);Smit,The Enduring Utility ofInRemRules: ALasting Legacy of Pennoyer v.Neff, 43BROOKLYNL. Rv. 600,620-22,627-29(1977)(supportingthepropositionthatfairnessisaffectedbylimitedliability).95.17N.Y.2d111,216N.E.2d312,269N.Y.S.2d99(1966).1978]WILLIAMANDMARYLAWREVIEWinghimtoquasiinrem jurisdiction,eventhoughtheseinterestswouldbeinsufficienttowarrantinpersonamjurisdiction.Thevalidityofobtainingjurisdictionoveranonresidentdefen-dantbyattachinga liabilityinsurancepolicyissuedtohimbyaninsurerdoingbusinessintheforumstatehasbeenlitigatedfre-quentlyafter theCourt'sdecisionin Shaffer."5 InO'Connor v.Lee-HyPaving Co.,9"theSecondCircuitreaffirmedthe Seider doctrineafterexaminingitundertheminimumcontactstestadoptedinShaffer.Writingforthecourt,JudgeFriendlyreiteratedthedis-tinction he had made in Minichiello v.Rosenberg" between jurisdic-tion basedon the attachmentof an insurance policyand jurisdictionarisingfromtheattachmentofpropertywhollyunrelatedtotheclaim,typifiedby Harrisv.Balk."9 AlthoughShaffer clearly rejectedthe jurisdictionalseizureof a Harris-type debt, JudgeFriendly con-cludedthat inthe usualSeider casea"judgment wouldmean sim-plythatliability policies,onwhichappellantscouldnot havereal-ized forany purposeother than to protectthemselvesagainst lossesto others,will beappliedto theveryobjectivefor whichtheywereprocured."'' Thus,while Shaffer requiredadeeperinquiry intotheattachmentof theinsurancepolicy,itdidnot mandateautomaticrejectionof Seider; instead,itpromptedashift infocusfromthatadoptedin Minichiello, whichhad reliedheavilyon Harris,to morefundamentalissuesof dueprocess."'96.See,e.g.,thecasescitedinSavchukv.Rush,272N.W.2d888,891(Minn.1978).97.579 F.2d194(2d Cir.),cert. denied, 47U.S.L.W.3386(U.S.Dec.4,1978)(No. 78-410).98.410F.2d106,118(2dCir.1968),cert. denied, 396 U.S.844(1969).Construing Seider,theSecondCircuit in Minichiello upheldas constitutionala New York statute that permittedjurisdictionbasedontheattachmentof anonresidentdefendant'sinterestinaninsurancepolicyissuedbyaninsurerdoingbusinessintheforumstate.Theplaintiff,aNewYorkresident,brought suit inNew Yorkto recoverforinjuriessufferedin anaccident in Pennsyl-vania.Thedefendant,Rosenberg,aresidentofPennsylvania,wasinsuredbyacompanydoingbusinessinNewYork.99.198U.S.215(1905);seenote22supra &accompanyingtext.100.579F.2dat 199(quotingMinichiellov.Rosenberg,410F.2dat118).101.EarlierinthesameparagraphfromwhichthecourtinO'Connor quoted,thestate-ment wasmade that theargumentconcerning the burdenon a nonresident to defenda foreigncauseof actionin astate simply becauseof theinsurer'sbusinesswas"unpersuasivesolongas Harris v.Balk.. .stands."410 F.2dat 118.The dissentin Minichiello characterizedthemajority asrelying stronglyon Harris. Id. at 120.In casessubsequent to Seider, the New YorkstatecourtsalsohavereliedonHarris. See,e.g.,Simpson v.Loehmann,21N.Y.2d305,234N.E.2d669,287N.Y.S.2d633(1967).InSimpson,however,thecourtalso focusedontheoverallfairnessandontheinterestsof thepartiesandthestate.[Vol.20:157QUASIINREMACTIONSApplying Shaffer, the SecondCircuit in O'Connor concludedthatsustainingtheSeider jurisdictionaldevicewouldnotbeunfairorviolativeofthedueprocessowingtoeithertheinsureror thein-sured,thenominaldefendant.Inpersonamjurisdictionovertheinsurervalidlycouldbebasedonits regularconductofbusinesswithinthestate.ThecourtthusconcludedthatShafferdidnotaffectthe priordecisionin Minichiello, whichhad upheldan asser-tionof jurisdictionoveranonresidentinsuredmotoristwhosein-surer did businessin the forumstate.02 With respect to the insured,who wasonly a nominaldefendant in view of the insurer'sobligationunderthe policytodefendand topayany judgment,3 the limita-tion of the judgment to the amount of the policy and the preclusionof anycollateralestoppeleffectaffordedadequateprotection.0 4Resultssimilarto -those obtainedin O'Connor have beenreachedintwootherrecentcases.InSavchukv.Rush,'5 onremandfromtheUnitedStatesSupremeCourt,theMinnesotaSupremeCourtconcludedthat attachmentof an insurance company'sobligation todefendandindemnifya nonresidentinsuredsatisfiedtheduepro-cessstandardsofShafferand International Shoe.Thejudgmentimposed in that casewas limited to the policy's faceamount;more-over,the plaintiffswereresidentsof the forumstate, andadequatenoticewasprovidedthedefendant-insured.Thecourtenumeratedseveralfactorssignificantinsustainingthevalidityof theattach-ment statute. The asset attached-theinsurer's obligation to defendandindemnifytheinsured-wasrelateddirectlytotheclaim.In-deed,the asset had no independentsignificance or value apart fromthelitigation.Becauseitdeterminedtherightsandobligationsoftheinsurer,theinsured,and,practicallyspeaking,thevictim,thepolicyitself wasthefocusof thelitigation.6 Thestate,moreover,102.579F.2dat200-01.103.Thecourtcontinuedtoanalogizethe situationto that of adirect action statute.Id.at 201,199nn.5 &7,206n.18.104.Id.at201-02.ThecourtreliedontheRESTATEMENT(SECoND)OFJUDGMENTS68.1(Tent. Draft No.4,1977),88(Tent. Draft No.2,1975),and75(c)(Tent. Draft.No.1,1973),and ontheemphasisgivenfair playin Shaffer for itsconclusionsasto thepreclusionof collateralestoppeleffects.105.272N.W.2d888(Minn.1978),cert. granted, 47U.S.L.W.3543(U.S.Feb.20,1979)(No.78-952).106.Id.at 892.Thiscommentappearsratheroverstated,becausemuchof the focusisliabilityfortheaccident,apartfromdutiesunder thepolicy.1978]WILLIAMANDMARYLAWREVIEWhadaninterestinenablingresidentplaintiffsto recoverinalocalforum."'7 Finally,thebalanceof interestsbetweentheinsurerandthe nominaldefendant,and the limitationof liability to the amountofthepolicy,minimized"thetraditional'jurisdictionalbias'infavorof the nominaldefendant."'' 8 Consideringthe relationshipbe-tween the defendingparties,the litigation,and the forumstate, thecourtconcludedthattheminimumcontactstestwassatisfied.09Applyinga Shaffer analysis,theNewYorkCourtof Appeals,inarecentpercuriamopinioninBaden v.Staples,""alsohasreaf-firmedSeider. CitingO'Connor, the courtin Baden overruled judg-mentsofseverallowercourtsinNewYork,whichhadheldthatShafferoverturnedSeider. "Thoselowercourt decisionshadcon-struedSeider asatraditionalquasiinremcasesimilartoHarrisand,whileignoring the contactsof the insurancecompany,the realpartyin interest,hadfoundinadequatecontactsbetweenthe non-residentinsuredandthe forumstate, therebydefeating jurisdictionunderShaffer.Thealreadyprolificdebate2 overthevalidityof Seider inlightofShafferdoubtlesswillcontinue."3 TherecentdecisionbytheSupreme Courtto reviewthis issue in Savchuk will produce perhapsinthenext yearnotonlyaresolutionof thecontinuedviabilityof107.Id.at891-93.108.Id.at893.109.This conclusionassertedly conformed to thecourt's policyof extendingits jurisdictionto"themaximumlimitsconsistentwithdueprocess."Id.110.45N.Y.2d889,383N.E.2d110,410N.Y.S.2d808(1978).111.See, e.g.,Attanasiov. Ferre,93Misc.2d661,401N.Y.S.2d685 (Sup.Ct.1977);Katzv. Umansky,92Misc.2d285,399N.Y.S.2d412(Sup.Ct.1977);Wallacev.TargetStore,Inc.,92Misc.2d454,400N.Y.S.2d478(Sup.Ct.1977);Kennedyv.Deroker,91Misc.2d648,398N.Y.S.2d628(Sup.Ct.1977).112.See,e.g.,Silberman,Shaffer v.Heitner: The End of an Era, 53N.Y.U.L.REV.33,90-101(1978);Williams,TheValidityof Assuming Jurisdictionbythe Attachment of Auto-mobile Liability Insurance Obligations: The ImpactofShafferv.Heitner Upon Seider v.Roth, 9 RuT.-CAm.L.J.241(1977);Note, Shaffer v.Heitner'sEffect on Pre-JudgmentAttach-ment, JurisdictionBasedon Property, and NewYork'sSeider Doctrine: HaveWeFinallyGiven up the Ghost of the Res?,27BUFFALOL.REv.323,340-60(1978);Note,The Constitu-tionality ofSeider v.Roth AfterShafferv.Heitner, 78COLUM.L.Rav.409(1978);Note,Shaffer v.Heitner: NewConstitutional Questions Concerning Seider v.Roth,6HOFSTRA L.REv.393(1978).113.Shaffer didnotrefertotheSeider cases,leavingtheissueopenforlowercourtstoconsider. Afootnoteto Shaffer indicated that to theextentolder cases wereinconsistent withtheopinionthey wereoverruled.433U.S.at 212n.39.WhetherSeider andits progenymaybecharacterizedas"inconsistent"is subjecttodifferinginterpretation.[Vol.20:157QUASIINREMACTIONSSeider but also afurther elaborationof the elementsof quasiin remjurisdiction.ForpurposesofthisArticle,theissueisimportantbecauseseveralappellatecourtshavesustainedthis verypeculiartypeofquasiinremjurisdiction.Somecourtsandcommentatorshavesuggestedthat Seider couldsurvivethroughconsiderationofthe directactionand thein personamaspectsof the insurer's rela-tionshiptothecauseofaction,butnotasatruequasiinremaction.'Theapparentsurvivalof Seider nonethelesssupportsonetypeof jurisdiction,basedontheattachmentofanasset,thatissustainable under a minimumcontacts analysis if liability is limitedto thevalueof thepropertyseized.AuthorityafterShaffer otherthantheliabilityinsurancecasesalsosupportstheconclusionthat,becausetheminimumcontactstest maybe applieddifferentlyto quasiin rem jurisdiction than toin personamjurisdiction,theformerwillcontinueto beexercised.Tworecentcases,decidedbycourtsintheSecondCircuit,haveupheldquasiinremjurisdictionbasedontheattachmentofanunrelateddebtowedtoanonresidentdefendantbyacorporationdoingbusinessinthe. forumstate.In Intermeat,Inc. v.American Poultry, Inc.,"'5 the Second Circuitappliedthe minimumcontactsanalysistoanassertionof quasi inrem jurisdiction.Notingthatthe state's test for in personamjuris-dictionwasmorestringent than thatof InternationalShoe test be-causeitrequiredthedefendanttobetransactingbusinessinthestate,thecourt definedtheconstitutionaltest as whetherthe rela-tionships between the plaintiff, the defendant,and the forum makeit fair,reasonable,and just to requirethedefendanttodefendthequasiin remaction."6 Minimumcontactswith New York sufficienttopermitquasiinremjurisdictioninanactionarisingoutof thedefendant'scommercein that state wereestablishedby several fac-tors."7 The contractat issue in the suit had substantial connections114.See,e.g.,O'Connor v.Lee-HyPaving Corp.,437 F. Supp. 994,1002(E.D.N.Y. 1977),affl'd, 579 F.2d 194 (2dCir.),cert. denied, 47 U.S.L.W.3386 (U.S.Dec. 4,1978)(No.78-410);Note,Shaffer v.Heitner'sEffecton PreJudgmentAttachment, JurisdictionBased on Prop-erty, and NewYork's Seider Doctrine:Have WeFinally Given Up the Ghost of the Res?,27BUFFALOL.REv.323,346-57(1978);Note,TheConstitutionality ofSeider v.Roth AfterShaffer v.Heitner, 78COLUM.L.REv.409,424-27(1978).115.575F.2d1017(2dCir.1978).Thelowercourtheldthat,althoughnoinpersonamjurisdictionexisted,quasiin remjurisdictioncould be asserted.TheSecondCircuitdid notdecidewhetherin personamjurisdictioncould beassertedin thecircumstancesof thecase.116.Id.at 1022-23.117.Id.at 1023.1978]WILLIAMANDMARYLAWREVIEWwith New York and had been mailedfrom that state by the plaintiff.Thedebtor,whoseobligationtothedefendantwasattached,wasdoingbusinessinNewYork.Moreover,thedefendantmadefre-quentpurchasesthroughNewYorkcompanies,andhiscontractsoftenprovidedthat thearbitrationof disputestakeplaceinNewYork.In Feder v.Turkish Airlines,"'aDistrictCourtfortheSouthernDistrict of New Yorkconcludedthatattachment of abank accountin NewYorkprovidedvalidquasiin rem jurisdictionsatisfyingtheminimumcontactstest,althoughthedefendant'sconnectionwiththeforumwasinsufficienttopermitin personamjurisdiction.Thecaseinvolvedawrongfuldeathaction,broughtbythedecedent'sNewYorkexecutors,thatarosefromacrashofthedefendant'splanein Turkey. Thecourt evaluatedthe defendant'sties with NewYork,consistingof aNewYorkbank accountused forout-of-statepurchasesof airplanepartsand afreightforwardingcontractwithaNewYorkcorporation.Thesecontactswouldhavebeeninsuffi-cient to establish in personam jurisdiction;the court,however,con-cludedthatthey weresufficient to justify quasiin rem jurisdiction.Althoughthepropertyattachedhadnoconnectionwiththeplain-tiffs claim,theNew Yorkbank accountwas voluntarilyandknow-inglyestablishedbythedefendanttofacilitateits business.Afterplacingtheburdenonthedefendanttoshowwhytheattachmentshouldbevacated,thecourtconcludedthattheestablishmentofthe bankaccountwas acontactsufficient forquasi in rem jurisdic-tion, as suggestedin Justice Stevens'concurringopinionin Shaffer.The defendanthad takenaffirmative action with respect to its prop-erty consistent with requiring it to defenda suit against the propertyin NewYork;thus,thecasewasdistinguishablefromboth Shafferand Harris."'Thesecasesdemonstratethesurvival of quasi in rem jurisdictionandindicatethat quasiin rem jurisdictionmaybeconstitutionallypermissible in certaincircumstancesin whichin personamjurisdic-118.441F.Supp.1273(S.D.N.Y.1977).119.Id.at1278-79.Inafootnote,thecourtsuggestedthat Shaffershouldbereadasrequiringthat theminimumcontactsbetweenthedefendantandtheforumrelatetothepropertyattached;otherwise,transitoryunrelatedcontactsunforeseeablymightresultinquasiin remjurisdiction.Id.at 1279n.5.See also LimeInt'lCorp.v.Bankin LiechtensteinAktiengesellschaft,F.Supp.-,77(Civ.5499-CSH(S.D.N.Y.,filedJune29,1978)(upholdingattachmentofbankaccountafterapplicationofminimumcontactstest).[Vol.20:157QUASIINREMACTIONStionisnot.Theyshow,moreover,thatinsomesituationsastatemayhavechosentorestrictthescopeofinpersonamjurisdictionbut not that of quasiin rem jurisdiction.For the foreseeable future,therefore,quasiinremjurisdictionwillremainaviablejurisdic-tionalalternative.Becausetheminimumcontactstest of InternationalShoe is notacarefullydelineatedtest,but ratherdependsoncase-by-casede-velopment,theapplicationof the testtoquasiinrem jurisdictionalsowillbenefitfromfurtherjudicialconstruction.AlthoughShaffer leaves unansweredimportant questionsabout the nature ofquasiin rem jurisdiction,1 21it does not eliminate the needto inquireintotheproceduraldueprocesslimitationsonthisdevice,whichwillbeexploredin the followingsectionsin thecontextof propertyseizurestoacquirejurisdiction.PARTII.PROCEDURALDUEPROCESSINPREJUDGMENTPROPERTYSEIZURECASESPrejudgmentattachmentand garnishmentprocedures havebeenrequiredtocomportwiththedueprocessclauseof thefourteenthamendment for adecade.Although substantial questionsexist bothastothenatureof theproceduralprotectionsnecessaryandastotheextenttowhichthedueprocessclauseisapplicabletothesecases,noticeandanopportunityforahearingclearlymustbeaf-fordedto adefendantat someearlystage in mostcasesof prejudg-mentseizureofproperty.Inapplyingproceduraldueprocessprotectionstoprejudgmentseizuresof propertyinattachmentand garnishmentcases,theSu-premeCourt has not defined clearlythe circumstancesunder whichtheprotectionswouldpertaintoseizuresofpropertyforjurisdic-tionalpurposes.Severalcasesdiscussedbelowhaveindicated thatdifferentconsiderationsare relevantif property isseized to acquirejurisdictionthanif propertyisseizedmerelyasasecuritydevice.Thesedifferences,however,havenot beenarticulatedwell.Nor did120.Shaffer also may have significant effectson in personam jurisdiction, such as requiringthatminimumcontactsanalysisbeappliedtocasesinwhichjurisdictionisbasedon thedefendant'stransient presence.See RESTATEMENT(SECOND)OFJuDoMENTs7,Commentaat 50-51(Tent. Draft No.5, 1978);id. 8,comment aat 63-64.Theimplications of Shafferfor inremproceedingsin admiraltyarediscussed in Note,Maritime Attachment and Arrest:Facing a Jurisdictional and ProceduralDue Process Attack,35WASH.&LEEL.Rav.153(1978);Note, Due Process in Admiralty Arrest and Attachment, 56 Tax. L. REV.1091(1978).19781WILLIAMANDMARYLAWREVIEWtheCourtresolvethis issueinShaffer;rather,it explicitlyrefusedto provideananswer.Solongasquasiinrem jurisdictionremainsviable,however,thisimportantquestionmustbeconsidered.TheRecent Background: Sniadach toCalero-Toledo.Proceduraldueprocessguaranteeswerefirst appliedto prejudg-mentseizuresofassetsinSniadach v.Family Finance Corp.,'2'whichconcernedaprejudgmentgarnishmentofwagesinpartialsatisfactionof adebtevidencedbya promissorynote.A Wisconsinstatutepermittedseizureof wagesuponthe issuanceof asummonsbytheclerkof thecourtattherequestofthecreditor,servicebythe creditor onthe garnishee,andsubsequentserviceof a summonsand complainton the debtor.Alth6ughthe debtorcouldrecover hiswithheldwagesafterasuccessfultrialonthemerits,duringthependencyof suit hewasdeprivedof the wageswithoutpriornoticeor any opportunityto beheard.'2 TheSupremeCourt held that thisdeprivationofpropertyviolatedthefourteenthamendment'sdueprocessclause becausethedebtor wasa stateresidentsubjectto inperson