A.M. No. 133-J May 31, 1982

BERNARDITA R. MACARIOLA, complainant, vs.HONORABLE ELIAS B. ASUNCION, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Leyte, respondent.

Facts

Civil Case No. 3010 of the Court of First Instance of Leyte was a complaint for partition filed by plaintiffs Sinforosa R. Bales, et al., against Bernardita R. Macariola, defendant, concerning the properties left by the deceased Francisco Reyes, the common father of the plaintiff and defendant.

On June 8, 1963, a decision was rendered by respondent Judge Asuncion in Civil Case 3010, the decision in civil case 3010 became final for lack of an appeal, and on October 16, 1963, a project of partition was submitted and was then approved dated October 23, 1963.

Lot 1184-E, which is one of the lots subjected to partition, was sold on July 31, 1964 to Dr. Arcadio Galapon.

On March 6, 1965, Dr. Arcadio Galapon and his wife sold a portion of Lot 1184-E to Judge Asuncion and his wife, Victoria S. Asuncion, which particular portion was declared by the latter for taxation purposes.

On August 31, 1966, spouses Asuncion and spouses Galapon conveyed their respective shares and interest in Lot 1184-E to "The Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries Inc." Judge Asuncion and his wife Victoria S. Asuncion, was the President and Mrs. Asuncion as the secretary of the said “TRADERS”.

Complainant Bernardita R. Macariola filed on August 9, 1968 the instant complaint dated August 6, 1968 alleging that respondent Judge Asuncion violated Article 1491, paragraph 5, of the New Civil Code in acquiring by purchase a portion of Lot No. 1184-E which was one of those properties involved in Civil Case No. 3010 decided by him; that he likewise violated Article 14, paragraphs I and 5 of the Code of Commerce, Section 3, paragraph H, of R.A. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,

Issue

WON respondent Judge violated the said provisions and committed "acts unbecoming a judge."

Held

1. In Violation to Article 1491, Par 5 of the New Civil Code:

The prohibition in the aforesaid Article applies only to the sale or assignment of the property which is the subject of litigation to the persons disqualified therein. We have already ruled that "... for the prohibition to operate, the sale or assignment of the property must take place during the pendency of the litigation involving the property".

In the case at bar, when the respondent Judge purchased on March 6, 1965 a portion of Lot 1184-E, the decision in Civil Case No. 3010 which he rendered on June 8, 1963 was already final because none of the parties therein filed an appeal within the reglementary period; hence, the lot in question was no longer subject of the litigation.

2. In Violation to Article 14, paragraphs 1 and 5 of the Code of Commerce:

It is our considered view that although the foretasted provision is incorporated in the Code of Commerce which is part of the commercial laws of the Philippines, it, however, partakes of the nature of a political law as it regulates the relationship between the government and certain public officers and employees, like justices and judges.

Political Law has been defined as that branch of public law which deals with the organization and operation of the governmental organs of the State and define the relations of the state with the inhabitants of its territory. It may be recalled that political law embraces constitutional law, law of public corporations, administrative law including the law on public officers and elections. Specifically, Article 14 of the Code of Commerce partakes more of the nature of an administrative law because it regulates the conduct of certain public officers and employees with respect to engaging in business: hence, political in essence.

It is significant to note that the present Code of Commerce is the Spanish Code of Commerce of 1885, with some modifications made by the "Commission de Codificacion de las Provincias de Ultramar," which was extended to the Philippines by the Royal Decree of August 6, 1888, and took effect as law in this jurisdiction on December 1, 1888.

Upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United States and later on from the United States to the Republic of the Philippines, Article 14 of this Code of Commerce must be deemed to have been abrogated because where there is change of sovereignty, the political laws of the former sovereign, whether compatible or not with those of the new sovereign, are automatically abrogated, unless they are expressly re-enacted by affirmative act of the new sovereign.

By well-settled public law, upon the cession of territory by one nation to another, either following a conquest or otherwise, ... those laws which are political in their nature and pertain to the prerogatives of the former government immediately cease upon the transfer of sovereignty.

There appears no enabling or affirmative act that continued the effectivity of the aforestated provision of the Code of Commerce after the change of sovereignty from Spain to the United States and then to the Republic of the Philippines. Consequently, Article 14 of the Code of Commerce has no legal and binding effect and cannot apply to the respondent, then Judge of the Court of First Instance, now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals.

3. In violation to Paragraph H, Section 3 of Republic Act No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act:

Respondent Judge cannot be held liable under the aforestated paragraph because there is no showing that respondent participated or intervened in his official capacity in the business or transactions of the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc.

In the case at bar, the business of the corporation in which respondent participated has obviously no relation or connection with his judicial office. The business of said corporation is not that kind where respondent intervenes or takes part in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance.

It does not appear also from the records that the aforesaid corporation gained any undue advantage in its business operations by reason of respondent's financial involvement in it, or that the corporation benefited in one way or another in any case filed by or against it in court.

Furthermore, respondent is not liable under the same paragraph because there is no provision in both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions of the Philippines, nor is there an existing law expressly prohibiting members of the Judiciary from engaging or having interest in any lawful business.

It may be pointed out that Republic Act No. 296, as amended, also known as the Judiciary Act of 1948, does not contain any prohibition to that effect. As a matter of fact, under Section 77 of said law, municipal judges may engage in teaching or other vocation not involving the practice of law after office hours but with the permission of the district judge concerned.

In conclusion, while respondent Judge Asuncion, now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, did not violate any law in acquiring by purchase a parcel of land which was in litigation in his court and in engaging in business by joining a private corporation during his incumbency as judge of the Court of First Instance of Leyte, he should be reminded to be more discreet in his private and business activities,

because his conduct as a member of the Judiciary must not only be characterized with propriety but must always be above suspicion.

Javellana vs. The Executive Secretary

The Facts:Sequence of events that lead to the filing of the “Plebiscite” then “Ratification” Cases.

The Plebiscite CaseOn March 16, 1967, Congress of the Philippines passed Resolution No. 2, which was amended by Resolution No. 4 of said body, adopted on June 17, 1969, calling a Convention to propose amendments to the Constitution of the Philippines.

Said Resolution No. 2, as amended, was implemented by Republic Act No. 6132, approved on August 24, 1970, pursuant to the provisions of which the election of delegates to the said Convention was held on November 10, 1970, and the 1971 Constitutional Convention began to perform its functions on June 1, 1971.

While the Convention was in session on September 21, 1972, the President issued Proclamation No. 1081 placing the entire Philippines under Martial Law.

On November 29, 1972, the Convention approved its Proposed Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines. The next day, November 30, 1972, the President of the Philippines issued Presidential Decree No. 73, "submitting to the Filipino people for ratification or rejection the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention, and appropriating funds therefor," as well as setting the plebiscite for said ratification or rejection of the Proposed Constitution on January 15, 1973.

On December 7, 1972, Charito Planas filed a case against the Commission on Elections, the Treasurer of the Philippines and the Auditor General, to enjoin said "respondents or their agents from implementing Presidential Decree No. 73, in any manner, until further orders of the Court," upon the grounds, inter alia, that said Presidential Decree "has no force and effect as law because the calling ... of such plebiscite, the setting of guidelines for the conduct of the same, the prescription of the ballots to be used and the question to be answered by the voters, and the appropriation of public funds for the purpose, are, by the Constitution, lodged exclusively in Congress ...," and "there is no proper submission to the people of said Proposed Constitution set for January 15, 1973, there being no freedom of speech, press and assembly, and there being no sufficient time to inform the people of the contents thereof."

On December 17, 1972, the President had issued an order temporarily suspending the effects of Proclamation No. 1081, for the purpose of free and open debate on the Proposed Constitution.On December 23, the President announced the postponement of the plebiscite for the ratification or rejection of the Proposed Constitution. No formal action to this effect was taken until January 7, 1973, when General Order No. 20 was issued, directing "that the plebiscite scheduled to be held on January 15, 1978, be postponed until further notice." Said General Order No. 20, moreover, "suspended in the meantime" the "order of December 17, 1972, temporarily suspending the effects of Proclamation No. 1081 for purposes of free and open debate on the proposed Constitution."

Because of these events relative to the postponement of the aforementioned plebiscite, the Court deemed it fit to refrain, for the time being, from deciding the aforementioned cases, for neither the date nor the conditions under which said plebiscite would be held were known or announced officially. Then, again, Congress was, pursuant to the 1935 Constitution, scheduled to meet in regular session on January 22, 1973, and since the main objection to Presidential Decree No. 73 was that the President does not have the legislative authority to call a plebiscite and appropriate funds therefor, which Congress unquestionably could do, particularly in view of the formal postponement of the plebiscite by the President reportedly after consultation with, among others, the leaders of Congress and the Commission on Elections the Court deemed it more imperative to defer its final action on these cases.

"In the afternoon of January 12, 1973, the petitioners in Case G.R. No. L-35948 filed an "urgent motion," praying that said case be decided "as soon as possible, preferably not later than January 15, 1973."

The next day, January 13, 1973, which was a Saturday, the Court issued a resolution requiring the respondents in said three (3) cases to comment on said "urgent motion" and "manifestation," "not later than Tuesday noon, January 16, 1973." Prior thereto, or on January 15, 1973, shortly before noon, the petitioners in said Case G.R. No. L-35948 riled a "supplemental motion for issuance of restraining order and inclusion of additional respondents," praying:"... that a restraining order be issued enjoining and restraining respondent Commission on Elections, as well as the Department of Local Governments and its head, Secretary Jose Roño; the Department of Agrarian Reforms and its head, Secretary Conrado Estrella; the National Ratification Coordinating Committee and its Chairman, Guillermo de Vega; their deputies, subordinates and substitutes, and all other officials and persons who may be assigned such task, from collecting, certifying, and announcing and reporting to the President or other officials concerned, the so-called Citizens' Assemblies referendum results allegedly obtained when they were supposed to have met during the period comprised between January 10 and January 15, 1973, on the two questions quoted in

paragraph 1 of this Supplemental Urgent Motion."

On the same date January 15, 1973 the Court passed a resolution requiring the respondents in said case G.R. No. L-35948 to file "file an answer to the said motion not later than 4 P.M., Tuesday, January 16, 1973," and setting the motion for hearing "on January 17, 1973, at 9:30 a.m." While the case was being heard, on the date last mentioned, at noontime, the Secretary of Justice called on the writer of this opinion and said that, upon instructions of the President, he (the Secretary of Justice) was delivering to him (the writer) a copy of Proclamation No. 1102, which had just been signed by the President. Thereupon, the writer returned to the Session Hall and announced to the Court, the parties in G.R. No. L-35948 inasmuch as the hearing in connection therewith was still going on and the public there present that the President had, according to information conveyed by the Secretary of Justice, signed said Proclamation No. 1102, earlier that morning.

Thereupon, the writer read Proclamation No. 1102 which is of the following tenor:____________________________"BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES"PROCLAMATION NO. 1102"ANNOUNCING THE RATIFICATION BY THE FILIPINO PEOPLE OF THE CONSTITUTION PROPOSED BY THE 1971 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION."WHEREAS, the Constitution proposed by the nineteen hundred seventy-one Constitutional Convention is subject to ratification by the Filipino people;"WHEREAS, Citizens Assemblies were created in barrios, in municipalities and in districts/wards in chartered cities pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 86, dated December 31, 1972, composed of all persons who are residents of the barrio, district or ward for at least six months, fifteen years of age or over, citizens of the Philippines and who are registered in the list of Citizen Assembly members kept by the barrio, district or ward secretary;"WHEREAS, the said Citizens Assemblies were established precisely to broaden the base of citizen participation in the democratic process and to afford ample opportunity for the citizenry to express their views on important national issues;"WHEREAS, responding to the clamor of the people and pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 86-A, dated January 5, 1973, the following questions were posed before the Citizens Assemblies or Barangays: Do you approve of the New Constitution? Do you still want a plebiscite to be called to ratify the new Constitution?"WHEREAS, fourteen million nine hundred seventy-six thousand five hundred sixty-one (14,976,561) members of all the Barangays (Citizens Assemblies) voted for the adoption of the proposed Constitution, as against seven hundred forty-three thousand eight hundred sixty-nine (743,869) who voted for its rejection; while on the question as to whether or not the people would still like a plebiscite to be called to ratify the new Constitution, fourteen million two hundred ninety-eight thousand eight hundred fourteen (14,298,814) answered that there was no need for a plebiscite and that the vote of the Barangays (Citizens Assemblies) should be considered as a vote in a plebiscite;"WHEREAS, since the referendum results show that more than ninety-five (95) per cent of the members of the Barangays (Citizens Assemblies) are in favor of the new Constitution, the Katipunan ng Mga Barangay has strongly recommended that the new Constitution should already be deemed ratified by the Filipino people;"NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers in me vested by the Constitution, do hereby certify and proclaim that the Constitution proposed by the nineteen hundred and seventy-one (1971) Constitutional Convention has been ratified by an overwhelming majority of all of the votes cast by the members of all the Barangays (Citizens Assemblies) throughout the Philippines, and has thereby come into effect."IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the Republic of the Philippines to be affixed."Done in the City of Manila, this 17th day of January, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy-three.(Sgd.) FERDINAND E. MARCOS"President of the Philippines"By the President:"ALEJANDRO MELCHOR"Executive Secretary"_________________________________

The Ratification Case

On January 20, 1973, Josue Javellana filed Case G.R. No. L-36142 against the Executive Secretary and the Secretaries of National Defense, Justice and Finance, to restrain said respondents "and their subordinates or agents from implementing any of the provisions of the propose Constitution not found in the present Constitution" referring to that of 1935. The petition therein, filed by Josue Javellana, as a "Filipino citizen, and a qualified and registered voter" and as "a class suit, for himself, and in behalf of all citizens and voters similarly situated," was amended on or about January 24, 1973. After reciting in substance the facts set forth in the decision in the plebiscite cases, Javellana alleged that the President had announced "the immediate implementation of the New Constitution, thru his Cabinet, respondents including," and that the latter "are acting without, or in excess of jurisdiction in implementing the said proposed Constitution" upon the ground: "that the President, as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, is without authority to create the Citizens Assemblies"; that the same "are without power to approve the proposed Constitution ..."; "that the President is without power to proclaim the ratification by the Filipino people of the proposed Constitution"; and "that the election held to ratify the proposed Constitution was not a free election, hence null and void."

The Issue:

1. Is the issue of the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 a justiciable, or political and therefore non-justiciable, question?

2. Has the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention been ratified validly (with substantial, if not strict, compliance) conformably to the applicable constitutional and statutory provisions?

3. Has the aforementioned proposed Constitution acquiesced in (with or without valid ratification) by the people? (acquiesced - "permission" given by silence or passiveness. Acceptance or agreement by keeping quiet or by not making objections.)

4. Are petitioners entitled to relief?

5. Is the aforementioned proposed Constitution in force?

The Resolution:

Summary: The court was severely divided on the following issues raised in the petition: but when the crucial question of whether the petitioners are entitled to relief, six members of the court (Justices Makalintal, Castro, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra) voted to dismiss the petition. Concepcion, together Justices Zaldivar, Fernando and Teehankee, voted to grant the relief being sought, thus upholding the 1973 Constitution.

Details:1. Is the issue of the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 a justiciable, or political and therefore non-justiciable, question?

On the first issue involving the political-question doctrine Justices Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee and myself, or six (6) members of the Court, hold that the issue of the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 presents a justiciable and non-political question. Justices Makalintal and Castro did not vote squarely on this question, but, only inferentially, in their discussion of the second question. Justice Barredo qualified his vote, stating that "inasmuch as it is claimed there has been approval by the people, the Court may inquire into the question of whether or not there has actually been such an approval, and, in the affirmative, the Court should keep hands-off out of respect to the people's will, but, in negative, the Court may determine from both factual and legal angles whether or not Article XV of the 1935 Constitution been complied with." Justices Makasiar, Antonio, Esguerra, or three (3) members of the Court hold that the issue is political and "beyond the ambit of judicial inquiry."

2. Has the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention been ratified validly (with substantial, if not strict, compliance) conformably to the applicable constitutional and statutory provisions?

On the second question of validity of the ratification, Justices Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee and myself, or six (6) members of the Court also hold that the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention was not validly ratified in accordance with Article XV, section 1 of the 1935 Constitution, which provides only one way for ratification, i.e., "in an election or plebiscite held in accordance with law and participated in only by qualified and duly registered voters.

Justice Barredo qualified his vote, stating that "(A)s to whether or not the 1973 Constitution has been validly ratified pursuant to Article XV, I still maintain that in the light of traditional concepts regarding the meaning and intent of said Article, the referendum in the Citizens' Assemblies, specially in the manner the votes therein were cast, reported and canvassed, falls short of the requirements thereof. In view, however, of the fact that I have no means of refusing to recognize as a judge that factually there was voting and that the majority of the votes were for considering as approved the 1973 Constitution without the necessity of the usual form of plebiscite followed in past ratifications, I am constrained to hold that, in the political sense, if not in the orthodox legal sense, the people may be deemed to have cast their favorable votes in the belief that in doing so they did the part required of them by Article XV, hence, it may be said that in its political aspect, which is what counts most, after all, said Article has been substantially complied with, and, in effect, the 1973 Constitution has been constitutionally ratified."Justices Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra, or three (3) members of the Court hold that under their view there has been in effect substantial compliance with the constitutional requirements for valid ratification.

3. Has the aforementioned proposed Constitution acquiesced in (with or without valid ratification) by the people?

On the third question of acquiescence by the Filipino people in the aforementioned proposed Constitution, no majority vote has been reached by the Court.Four (4) of its members, namely, Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra hold that "the people have already accepted the 1973 Constitution."Two (2) members of the Court, namely, Justice Zaldivar and myself hold that there can be no free expression, and there has even been no expression, by the people qualified to vote all over the Philippines, of their acceptance or repudiation of the proposed Constitution

under Martial Law. Justice Fernando states that "(I)f it is conceded that the doctrine stated in some American decisions to the effect that independently of the validity of the ratification, a new Constitution once accepted acquiesced in by the people must be accorded recognition by the Court, I am not at this stage prepared to state that such doctrine calls for application in view of the shortness of time that has elapsed and the difficulty of ascertaining what is the mind of the people in the absence of the freedom of debate that is a concomitant feature of martial law." 88Three (3) members of the Court express their lack of knowledge and/or competence to rule on the question. Justices Makalintal and Castro are joined by Justice Teehankee in their statement that "Under a regime of martial law, with the free expression of opinions through the usual media vehicle restricted, (they) have no means of knowing, to the point of judicial certainty, whether the people have accepted the Constitution."

4. Are petitioners entitled to relief?

On the fourth question of relief, six (6) members of the Court, namely, Justices Makalintal, Castro, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra voted to DISMISS the petition. Justice Makalintal and Castro so voted on the strength of their view that "(T)he effectivity of the said Constitution, in the final analysis, is the basic and ultimate question posed by these cases to resolve which considerations other than judicial, an therefore beyond the competence of this Court, 90 are relevant and unavoidable." 91Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Zaldivar, Fernando, Teehankee and myself voted to deny respondents' motion to dismiss and to give due course to the petitions.

5. Is the aforementioned proposed Constitution in force?

On the fifth question of whether the new Constitution of 1973 is in force:Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra hold that it is in force by virtue of the people's acceptance thereof;Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Makalintal, Castro, Fernando and Teehankee cast no vote thereon on the premise stated in their votes on the third question that they could not state with judicial certainty whether the people have accepted or not accepted the Constitution; andTwo (2) members of the Court, namely, Justice Zaldivar and myself voted that the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention is not in force; with the result that there are not enough votes to declare that the new Constitution is not in force.ACCORDINGLY, by virtue of the majority of six (6) votes of Justices Makalintal, Castro, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra with the four (4) dissenting votes of the Chief Justice and Justices Zaldivar, Fernando and Teehankee, all the aforementioned cases are hereby dismissed. This being the vote of the majority, there is no further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being considered in force and effect.

It is so ordered.

DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO vs. COMELEC(G.R. No. 127325 - March 19, 1997)Facts:P r i v a t e   r e s p o n d e n t   A t t y .   J e s u s   D e l f i n ,   p r e s i d e n t   o f   P e o p l e ’ s   I n i t i a t i v e   f o r  R e f o r m s , Modernization and Action (PIRMA), filed with COMELEC a petition to amend the constitution to liftthe term limits of elective officials, through People’s Initiative. He based this petition on Article XVII,Sec. 2 of  the 1987 Constitution, which provides for the  right of the people to  exercise the power todirectly propose amendments to the Constitution. Subsequently the COMELEC issued an order  directing the publication of the petition and of the notice of hearing and thereafter set the case for  hearing. At the hearing, Senator Roco, the IBP, Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang Konstitusyon, PublicInterest Law Center, and Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino appeared as intervenors-oppositors. Senator Roco filed a motion to dismiss the Delfin petition on the ground that one which is cognizableby the COMELEC. The petitioners herein Senator Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Isabel Ongpinfiled this civil action for prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court against COMELEC and theDelfin petition rising the several arguments, such as the following: (1) The constitutional provision onp e o p l e ’ s i n i t i a t i v e t o a m e n d t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n c a n o n l y b e i m p l e m e n t e d b y l a w t o b e p a s s e d b y Congress. No such law has been passed; (2) The people’s initiative is limited to amendments to theConstitution, not to revision thereof. Lifting of the term limits constitutes a revision, therefore it isoutside the power of people’s initiative. The Supreme Court granted the Motions for Intervention.Issues:(1) Whether or not Sec. 2, Art. XVII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision.(2) Whether or not COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 regarding the conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution is valid, considering the absence in the law of specific provisions onthe conduct of such initiative.(3) Whether the lifting of term limits of elective officials would constitute a revision or anamendment of the Constitution.Held:S e c .   2 ,   A r t   X V I I   o f   t h e   C o n s t i t u t i o n   i s   n o t   s e l f   e x e c u t o r y ,   t h u s ,   w i t h o u t   i m p l e m e n t i n g legislation the same cannot operate. Although the Constitution has recognized or granted the right,the people cannot exercise it if Congress does not provide for its implementation.The portion of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 which prescribes rules and regulations on theconduct

of initiative on amendments to the Constitution, is void. It has been an established rule thatw h a t   h a s   b e e n   d e l e g a t e d ,   c a n n o t   b e   d e l e g a t e d   ( p o t e s t a s   d e l e g a t a   n o n   d e l e g a r i   p o t e s t ) .  T h e delegation of the power to the COMELEC being invalid, the latter cannot validly promulgate rules and regulations to implement the exercise of the right to people’s initiative.T h e l i f t i n g o f t h e t e r m l i m i t s w a s h e l d t o b e t h a t o f a r e v i s i o n , a s i t w o u l d a f f e c t o t h e r   provisions of the Constitution such as the synchronization of elections, the constitutional guaranteeof equal access to opportunities for public service, and prohibiting political dynasties. A revisioncannot be done by initiative. However, considering the Court’s decision in the above Issue, the issueof whether or not the petition is a revision or amendment has become academic.

Lambino vs COMELEC

Facts

On 15 February 2006, petitioners in G.R. No. 174153, namely Raul L. Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado ("Lambino Group"), with other groups and individuals, commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition to change the 1987 Constitution. On 25 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition under Section 5(b) and (c) and Section 7 of Republic Act No. 6735 or the Initiative and Referendum Act ("RA 6735").

The Lambino Group alleged that their petition had the support of 6,327,952 individuals constituting at least twelveper centum (12%) of all registered voters, with each legislative district represented by at least three per centum (3%) of its registered voters. The Lambino Group also claimed that COMELEC election registrars had verified the signatures of the 6.3 million individuals.

The Lambino Group's initiative petition changes the 1987 Constitution by modifying Sections 1-7 of Article VI (Legislative Department) and Sections 1-4 of Article VII (Executive Department) and by adding Article XVIII entitled "Transitory Provisions." These proposed changes will shift the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary form of government. The Lambino Group prayed that after due publication of their petition, the COMELEC should submit the following proposition in a plebiscite for the voters' ratification.

On 31 August 2006, the COMELEC issued its Resolution denying due course to the Lambino Group's petition for lack of an enabling law governing initiative petitions to amend the Constitution.

The Lambino Group prays for the issuance of the writs of certiorari and mandamus to set aside the COMELEC Resolution of 31 August 2006 and to compel the COMELEC to give due course to their initiative petition. The Lambino Group contends that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due course to their petition.

Issues

1) WON the Initiative Petition filed by Lambino Group complied with requisites stated in Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on Direct Proposal by the People.

2) WON the Initiative Petition is considered an Amendment or Revision to the Constitution.3) WON the Initiative Petition violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution Disallowing Revision

through People’s Initiative.4) WON COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing Lambino Group’s Initiative.

Held

1) The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on Direct Proposal by the People

The essence of amendments "directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition" is that the entire proposal on its face is a petition by the people. This means two essential elements must be present.

A. The people must author and thus sign the entire proposal. No agent or representative can sign on their behalf.

B. As an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied in a petition.

These essential elements are present only if the full text of the proposed amendments is first shown to the people who express their assent by signing such complete proposal in a petition. Thus, an amendment is "directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition" only if the people sign on a petition that contains the full text of the proposed amendments.

The full text of the proposed amendments may be either written on the face of the petition, or attached to it. If so attached, the petition must state the fact of such attachment. This is an assurance that every one of the several millions of signatories to the petition had seen the full text of the proposed amendments before signing. Otherwise, it is physically impossible, given the time constraint, to prove that every one of the millions of signatories had seen the full text of the proposed amendments before signing.

Moreover, "an initiative signer must be informed at the time of signing of the nature and effect of that which is proposed" and failure to do so is "deceptive and misleading" which renders the initiative void.

Atty. Lambino expressly admitted that they printed only 100,000 copies of the draft petition they filed more than six months later with the COMELEC. With only 100,000 printed copies of the petition, it would be physically impossible for all or a great majority of the 6.3 million signatories to have seen the petition before they signed the signature sheets. The inescapable conclusion is that the Lambino Group failed to show to the 6.3 million signatories the full text of the proposed changes.

In any event, the Lambino Group's signature sheets do not contain the full text of the proposed changes, either on the face of the signature sheets, or as attachment with an indication in the signature sheet of such attachment. The failure to so include the text of the proposed changes in the signature sheets renders the initiative void for non-compliance with the constitutional requirement that the amendment must be "directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition." The signature sheet is not the "petition" envisioned in the initiative clause of the Constitution.

(Note: Kaluoy ni Lambino! Sayang iyang 6.3 Million signatories unia wala pd diay g-attach ang petition sa sign sheets so na void nuon. T.T)

2) The Petition is considered a Revision and not an Amendment.

Revision broadly implies a change that alters a basic principle in the constitution, like altering the principle of separation of powers or the system of checks-and-balances. There is also revision if the change alters the substantial entirety of the constitution, as when the change affects substantial provisions of the constitution. On the other hand, amendment broadly refers to a change that adds, reduces, or deletes without altering the basic principle involved. Revision generally affects several provisions of the constitution, while amendment generally affects only the specific provision being amended.

(Note: Please take time to memorize the two tests! )

Court’s developed a two-part test to determine:

A. The QUANTITATIVE TEST asks whether the proposed change is "so extensive in its provisions as to change directly the 'substantial entirety' of the constitution by the deletion or alteration of numerous existing provisions." The court examines only the number of provisions affected and does not consider the degree of the change.

B. The QUALITATIVE TEST inquires into the qualitative effects of the proposed change in the constitution. The main inquiry is whether the change will "accomplish such far reaching changes in the nature of our basic governmental plan as to amount to a revision." Whether there is an alteration in the structure of government is a proper subject of inquiry. Thus, "a change in the

nature of [the] basic governmental plan" includes "change in its fundamental framework or the fundamental powers of its Branches." A change in the nature of the basic governmental plan also includes changes that "jeopardize the traditional form of government and the system of check and balances."

Under both the quantitative and qualitative tests, the Lambino Group's initiative is a revision and not merely an amendment. Quantitatively, the Lambino Group's proposed changes overhaul two articles - Article VI on the Legislature and Article VII on the Executive - affecting a total of 105 provisions in the entire Constitution. Qualitatively, the proposed changes alter substantially the basic plan of government, from presidential to parliamentary, and from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature.

A change in the structure of government is a revision of the Constitution, as when the three great co-equal branches of government in the present Constitution are reduced into two. This alters the separation of powers in the Constitution. A shift from the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary system is a revision of the Constitution. Merging the legislative and executive branches is a radical change in the structure of government.

By any legal test and under any jurisdiction, a shift from a Bicameral-Presidential to a Unicameral-Parliamentary system, involving the abolition of the Office of the President and the abolition of one chamber of Congress, is beyond doubt a revision, not a mere amendment. On the face alone of the Lambino Group's proposed changes, it is readily apparent that the changes will radically alter the framework of government as set forth in the Constitution

3) Yes, the Initiative Violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution Disallowing Revision through Initiatives.

A people's initiative to change the Constitution applies only to an amendment of the Constitution and not to its revision. In contrast, Congress or a constitutional convention can propose both amendments and revisions to the Constitution.

(Note: That is why we needed to determine first whether the petition was an Amendment or Revision which is the 2nd issue above. Worthy to note that Lambino Group’s petition was considered a Revision thus Sec Art II of the Constitution states that ONLY the Congress or a ConCom can propose Revisions. The People’s Initiative is LIMITED ONLY TO AMENDMENTS making Lambino Group’s petition VOID. Right?! )

There can be no mistake about it. The framers of the Constitution intended, and wrote, a clear distinction between "amendment" and "revision" of the Constitution. The framers intended, and wrote, that only Congress or a constitutional convention may propose revisions to the Constitution. The framers intended, and wrote, that a people's initiative may propose only amendments to the Constitution.

4) COMELEC did Not Commit Grave Abuse of Discretion in Dismissing Lambino Group’s Initiative.

In dismissing the Lambino Group's initiative petition, the COMELEC en banc merely followed this Court's ruling in Santiago and People's Initiative for Reform, Modernization and Action (PIRMA) v. COMELEC. For following this Court's ruling, no grave abuse of discretion is attributable to the COMELEC. On this ground alone, the present petition warrants outright dismissal.

Thus, this Court must decline to revisit Santiago. This Court must avoid revisiting a ruling involving the constitutionality of a statute if the case before the Court can be resolved on some other grounds. Such avoidance is a logical consequence of the well-settled doctrine that courts will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute if the case can be resolved on some other grounds.

(Note: The Court do not revisit and decide on cases which is already done. Moot and Academic nah na! lol :p)

To Conclude,

The Constitution, as the fundamental law of the land, deserves the utmost respect and obedience of all the citizens of this nation. No one can trivialize the Constitution by cavalierly amending or revising it in blatant violation of the clearly specified modes of amendment and revision laid down in the Constitution itself.

This Court cannot betray its primordial duty to defend and protect the Constitution. The Constitution, which embodies the people's sovereign will, is the bible of this Court. This Court exists to defend and protect the Constitution. To allow this constitutionally infirm initiative, propelled by deceptively gathered signatures, to alter basic principles in the Constitution is to allow a desecration of the Constitution. To allow such alteration and desecration is to lose this Court's raison d'etre.

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition in G.R. No. 174153.

TOLENTINO VS. COMELECG.R. No. L-34150, October 16 1971, 41 SCRA 702

FACTS:The 1971 Constitutional Convention came into being by virtue of two resolutions of the Congress approved in its capacity as a constituentassembly convened for the purpose of calling a convention to proposeamendments to the Constitution. After election of delegates held on November 10, 1970, the Convention held its inaugural session on June 1, 1971. In the morning of September 28, 1970, the Convention approved Organic Resolution No. 1 which is entitled as, "A RESOLUTION AMENDING SECTION 1 OF ARTICLE V OF THE CONSTITUTION SO AS TO LOWER THE VOTING AGE TO 18." On September 30, 1971, the COMELEC "resolved" to follow the mandate of the Convention, that it will hold the said plebiscite together with the senatorial elections on November 8, 1971 .

Petitioner, Arturo Tolentino, filed a petition for prohibition, its main thrust being that Organic Resolution No. 1 and the necessary implementing resolutions subsequently approved have no force and effect as laws in so far as they provide for the holding of a plebiscite co-incident with the senatorial elections, on the ground that the calling and holding of such a plebiscite is, by the Constitution, a power lodged exclusively in Congress as a legislative body and may not be exercised by the Convention, and that, under Article XV Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution, the proposed amendment in question cannot be presented to the people for ratification separately from each and all other amendments to be drafted and proposed by the Constitution.

ISSUE:Whether or not the Organic Resolution No. 1 of the 1971Constitutional Convention violative to the Constitution.

HELD:NO. All the amendments to be proposed by the same Convention must be submitted to the people in a single "election" or plebiscite. In order that a plebiscite for the ratification of a Constitutionalamendment may be validly held, it must provide the voter not only sufficient time but ample basis for an intelligent appraisal of the nature of the amendment per se but as well as its relation to the other parts of the Constitution with which it has to form a harmonious whole. In the present context, where the Convention has hardly started considering the merits, if not thousands, of proposals to amend the existing Constitution, to present to the people anysingle proposal or a few of them cannot comply with this requirement.

Magallona vs ErmitaFACTS:In March 2009, Republic Act 9522, an act defining the archipelagic baselines of the Philippines was enacted – the law is also known as the Baselines Law. This law was meant to comply with the terms of the third United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), ratified by the Philippines in February 1984.Professor Merlin Magallona et al questioned the validity of RA 9522 as they contend, among others, that the law decreased the national territory of the Philippines hence the law is unconstitutional. Some of their particular arguments are as follows:a. the law abandoned the demarcation set by the Treaty of Paris and other ancillary treaties – this also resulted to the exclusion of our claim over Sabah;b. the law, as well as UNCLOS itself, terms the Philippine waters a “archipelagic” waters which, in international law, opens our waters landward of the baselines to maritime passage by all vessels (innocent passage) and aircrafts (overflight), undermining Philippine sovereignty and national security, contravening the country’s nuclear-free policy, and damaging marine resources, in violation of relevant constitutional provisions;c. the classification of the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG), as well as the Scarborough Shoal (bajo de masinloc), as a “regime of islands” pursuant to UNCLOS results in the loss of a large maritime area but also prejudices the livelihood of subsistence fishermen.ISSUE: Whether or not the contentions of Magallona et al are tenable.HELD: No. The Supreme Court emphasized that RA 9522, or UNCLOS, itself is not a means to acquire, or lose, territory. The treaty and the baseline law has nothing to do with the acquisition, enlargement, or diminution of the Philippine territory. What controls when it comes to acquisition or loss of territory is the international law principle on occupation, accretion, cession and prescription and NOT

the execution of multilateral treaties on the regulations of sea-use rights or enacting statutes to comply with the treaty’s terms to delimit maritime zones and continental shelves.The law did not decrease the demarcation of our territory. In fact it increased it. Under the old law amended by RA 9522 (RA 3046), we adhered with the rectangular lines enclosing the Philippines. The area that it covered was 440,994 nautical miles2. But under 9522, and with the inclusion of the exclusive economic zone, the extent of our maritime are increased to 586,210 nautical miles2.  (See image below for comparison)If any, the baselines law is a notice to the international community of the scope of the maritime space and submarine areas within which States parties exercise treaty-based rights.

Anent their particular contentions:a. The law did not abandon the Sabah claim. This is evident on the provision of Section 2 of RA 9522:Section 2. The definition of the baselines of the territorial sea of the Philippine Archipelago as provided in this Act is without prejudice to the delineation of the baselines of the territorial sea around the territory of Sabah, situated in North Borneo, over which the Republic of the Philippines has acquired dominion and sovereignty.b. UNCLOS may term our waters as “archipelagic waters” and that we may term it as our “internal waters”, but the bottom line is that our country exercises sovereignty over these waters and UNCLOS itself recognizes that. However, due to our observance of international law, we allow the exercise of others of their right of innocent passage. No modern State can validly invoke its sovereignty to absolutely forbid innocent passage that is exercised in accordance with customary international law without risking retaliatory measures from the international community.c. The classification of the KIG (or the Spratly’s), as well as the Scarborough Shoal, as a regime of islands did not diminish our maritime area. Under UNCLOS and under the baselines law, since they are regimes of islands, they generate their own maritime zones – in short, they are not to be enclosed within the baselines of the main archipelago (which is the Philippine Island group). This is because if we do that, then we will be enclosing a larger area which would already depart from the provisions of UNCLOS – that the demarcation should follow the natural contour of the archipelago.

Nevertheless, we still continue to lay claim over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal through effective occupation.NOTES: Under UNCLOS and the baselines law, we have three levels of maritime zones where we exercise treaty-based rights:a. territorial waters – 12 nautical miles from the baselines; where we exercise sovereigntyb. contiguous zone – 24 nautical miles from the baselines; jurisdiction where we can enforce customs, fiscal, immigration, and sanitation laws (CFIS).c. exclusive economic zone – 200 nautical miles from the baselines; where we have the right to exploit the living and non-living resources in the exclusive economic zoneNote: a fourth zone may be added which is the continental shelf – this is covered by Article 77 of the UNCLOS.

Costitutional Law: Cabanas v Pilapil 58 SCRA 94, July 25, 1974 MELCHORA CABANAS, plaintiff-appellee, vs.FRANCISCO PILAPIL, defendant-appellant.

Facts: Deceased Florentino Pilapil, the husband of Melchora Cabanas and the father of Millian Pilapil, left an insurance having his child as the beneficiary and authorized his brother, Francisco Pilapil, to act as trustee during his daughter’s minority. The lower court decided to give the mother of the child the right to act as trustee while her child is a minor citing the appropriate provisions in the Civil Code. The welfare of the child is the paramount consideration here, and the mother resides with the child so she is the rightful trustee. The judiciary pursuant to its role as an agency of the State parens patriae, called for the mother to take responsibility. The defendant appealed for the case. He claims the retention of the amount in question by invoking the terms of the insurance policy. He is the rightful trustee of the insurance policy.

Issue: Whether the mother or the uncle should be entitled to act as a trustee of a minor beneficiary of the proceeds of an insurance policy from her deceased father? Whether the trial court erred in its decision to give the right to the mother?

Ruling: The decision is affirmed with costs against the defendant-appellant. The provisions of Article 320 and 321 of the Civil Code became the basis of the decision. The former provides that “the father, or in his absence the mother, is the legal administrator of the property pertaining to the child under parental authority. If the property is worth more than two thousand pesos, the father or mother shall give a bond subject to the approval of the Court of First Instance." The latter provides that "The property which the unemancipated child has acquired or may acquire with his work or industry, or by any lucrative title, belongs to the child in ownership, and in usufruct to the father or mother under whom he is under parental authority and whose company he lives; ...

With the added circumstance that the child stays with the mother, not the uncle, without any evidence of lack of maternal care, the decision arrived at can stand the test of the strictest scrutiny. The appealed decision is supported by another cogent consideration. It is buttressed by its adherence to the concept that the judiciary, as an agency of the State acting as parens patriae, is called upon whenever a pending suit of litigation affects one who is a minor to accord priority to his best interest This prerogative of parens patriae is inherent in the supreme power of every State, whether that power is lodged in a royal person or in the legislature, and has no affinity to those arbitrary powers which are sometimes exerted by irresponsible monarchs to the great detriment of the people and the destruction of their liberties." What is more, there is this constitutional provision vitalizing this concept. It reads: "The State shall strengthen the family as a basic social institution." 10 If, as the Constitution so wisely dictates, it is the family as a unit that has to be strengthened, it does not admit of doubt that even if a stronger case were presented for the uncle, still deference to a constitutional mandate would have led the lower court to decide as it did.

The trust, insofar as it is in conflict with the above quoted provision of law, is pro tanto null and void. In order, however, to protect the rights of the minor, Millian Pilapil, the plaintiff should file an additional bond in the guardianship proceedings, Sp. Proc. No. 2418-R of this Court to raise her bond therein to the total amount of P5,000.00." 5

G.R. Nos. 138395-99            July 18, 2002

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.CIPRIANO RADAM, JR., defendant-appellant.

FACTS:

The Accused-appellant CIPRIANO RADAM, JR., the stepfather of Ma. Elena O. de Guzman,was sentenced to death of raping her five (5) times successively in a span of six (6) hours.That on or about the 12th day of June 1995, between 10:00 o’clock in the evening to 4:00 o’clock in the morning, more or less, at Brgy.Binalayan, Maripipi, Biliran Province, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, said accused CiprianoRadam, Jr., a step-father, taking advantage of his superior strength, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously cover the mouth of Ma. Elena O. de Guzman, a fourteen year old lass, with a handkerchief and tie her two hands together and have carnal knowledge of the complainant against her will.

The court finds that the testimony of Elena deserves full faith and credit. First, she had no motive to falsely accuse the appellant under whose care she practically grew up and whom she considered as her substitute father. Appellant himself admitted that he had close ties with Elena and Reynaldo whom he treated as his own children. Second, as Elena’s testimony of defloration is corroborated by the physical findings of penetration, there is sufficient foundation to conclude that there was carnal knowledge. Finally, no decent young woman would, in her right mind, fabricate a story of rape, sully her reputation and bring disgrace to herself and her family unless she is motivated by a desire to seek justice for the indignity she suffered.

After trial, the lower court found the accused guilty on all five (5) counts of qualified rape and imposed on him the supreme penalty of death.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the accused can appeal to the court that his death sentenced could lower to reclusion perpetua.

RULING:

Yes. The appeal is partly meritorious. The higher court finds the appellant guilty not for qualified rape but for five (5) counts of simple rape and hold that the trial court erred in imposing the death penalty.THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN BEING OVERZEALOUS IN HASTILY IMPOSING DEATH PENALTY, WITHOUT TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION THAT THE FIRST JUDGE, THE HON. BRICCIO T. AGUILOS, JR. WAS THE ONE WHO TRIED AND HEARD THE TESTIMONY OF THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT, MA. ELENA DE GUZMAN WHICH WAS UNCORROBORATED AND THE HON. ENRIQUE C. ASIS WAS THE ONE WHO RENDERED THE DECISION AFTER HEARING ONLY THE TESTIMONIES OF THE DEFENSE WITNESSES.

Because under the Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code. 

When and how rape is committed. — Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:

1. By using force or intimidation;

2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and

3. When the woman is under twelve years of age, even though neither of the circumstances mentioned in the two next preceding paragraphs shall be present.

The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.

Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.

When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has become insane, the penalty shall be death.

When rape is attempted or frustrated and a homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion thereof, the penalty shall be likewise death.

When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a homicide is committed, the penalty shall be death. (As amended by R.A. 2632, approved June 18, 1960, and R.A. 4111, approved June 20, 1964).

Although the rape of a girl under 18 years of age by the common-law spouse of the victim’s mother is punishable by death, this penalty cannot be imposed on appellant as a different relationship was alleged in the Information and the victim’s minority was not proved by independent evidence.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED, subject to the modification that the appellant CIPRIANO RADAM, JR. is found guilty only of five (5) counts of simple rape and his sentence to death penalty is reduced to reclusion perpetua for each count because he did not used deadly weapon or kill the victim.

********

In relation to Political Law, this case is in relation to the Doctrine of ParensPatriae.

Parenspatriae is Latin for "parent of the nation." In law, it refers to the public policy power of the state to intervene against an abusive or negligent parent, legal guardian or informal caretaker, and to act as the parent of any child or individual who is in need of protection. For example, some children, incapacitated individuals, and disabled individuals lack parents who are able and willing to render adequate care, thus requiring state intervention.

The parenspatriae doctrine has had its greatest application in the treatment of children, mentally ill persons, and other individuals who are legally incompetent to manage their affairs. The state is the supreme guardian of all children within its jurisdiction, and state courts have the inherent power to intervene to protect the best interests of children

whose welfare is jeopardized by controversies between parents. This inherent power is generally supplemented by legislative acts that define the scope of child protection in a state.RECENT JURISPRUDENCE – LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS

PCGG v. SANDIGANBAYAN, et. al.

GR No. 151809-12, 12 April 2005, En Banc (Puno, J.)

“Matter” is defined any discrete, isolatable act as well as identifiable transaction or conduct involving a particular

situation and specific party, and not merely an act of drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or agency procedures,

regulations or laws, or briefing abstract principles of law. The act of advising the Central Bank, on how to proceed with the

said bank’s liquidation and even filing the petition for its liquidation with the CFI of Manila is not the “matter”

contemplated by Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

On July 17, 1987, pursuant to its mandate under Executive Order No. 1 of then President

Corazon C. Aquino, the PCGG, on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, filed with the

Sandiganbayan a complaint for “reversion, reconveyance, restitution, accounting and damages” against

respondents Lucio Tan, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos and others referred

to as dummies of the Marcoses. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 0005 of the Sandiganbayan

(Second Division). In connection therewith, the PCGG issued several writs of sequestration on

properties allegedly acquired by the above-named persons by means of taking advantage of their close

relationship and influence with former President Marcos. Shortly thereafter, respondents Tan, et al. filed

with this Court petitions for certiorari, prohibition and injunction seeking to, among others, nullify the

writs of sequestration issued by the PCGG. After the filing of the comments thereon, this Court

referred the cases to the Sandiganbayan (Fifth Division) for proper disposition.

In all these cases, respondents Tan, et al. are represented by their counsel Atty. Estelito P.

Mendoza, who served as the Solicitor General from 1972 to 1986 during the administration of former

President Marcos. The PCGG opined that Atty. Mendoza’s present appearance as counsel for

respondents Tan, et al. in the case involving the sequestered shares of stock in Allied Banking Corp. runs

afoul of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility proscribing former government lawyers

from accepting “engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened

while in said service.”

ISSUES:

Whether or not the present engagement of Atty. Mendoza as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. in Civil

Cases Nos. 0096-0099 violates the interdiction embodied in Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility

HELD:

The petition is denied.

The key to unlock Rule 6.03 lies in comprehending first, the meaning of “matter” referred to in

the rule and, second, the metes and bounds of the “intervention” made by the former government

lawyer on the “matter.” The American Bar Association in its Formal Opinion 342, defined “matter” as

any discrete, isolatable act as well as identifiable transaction or conduct involving a particular situation

and specific party, and not merely an act of drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or agency

procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing abstract principles of law.

Beyond doubt, the “matter” or the act of respondent Mendoza as Solicitor General involved in

the case at bar is “advising the Central Bank, on how to proceed with the said bank’s liquidation and

CALLADO vs IRRI

FACTS: Petitioner, was employed as a driver at the IRRI from April 11, 1983 to December 14, 1990. On February 11, 1990, while driving an IRRI vehicle on an official trip to the NAIA and back to the IRRI, petitioner figured in an accident. Upon investigation, the petitioner was terminated from his job.1 Petitioner then filed a complaint on December 19, 1990 before the Labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal, illegal suspension and indemnity pay with moral and exemplary damages

and attorney's fees. Private respondent then invoked immunity from legal process by virtue of Article 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1620.2 The Labor Arbiter cited an Order issued by the IRRI on August 13, 1991 to the effect that "in all cases of termination, respondent IRRI waives its immunity”. So the Labor Arbiter ordered the reinstatement of the petitioner and the payment of his full wages.3 However, NLRC found that IRRI did not waive its immunity, ordered the aforesaid decision of the Labor Arbiter set aside and the complaint dismissed. Hence, this petition where it is contended that the immunity of the IRRI as an international organization granted by Article 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1620 may not be invoked in the case at bench inasmuch as it waived the same by virtue of its Memorandum on "Guidelines on the handling of dismissed employees in relation to P.D. 1620."4

ISSUE:

WON the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) waived its immunity from suit in this dispute

RULING:

No. IRRI's immunity from suit is undisputed. The petitioner's reliance on the Memorandum with "Guidelines in handling cases of dismissal of employees in relation to P.D. 1620" is misplaced. In cases involving dismissed employees, the Institute may waive its immunity. This signifies that such waiver is discretionary on its part. The court agrees with private respondent IRRI that this memorandum cannot be considered as the express waiver by the Director-General. Presidential Decree No. 1620, Article 3 provides that “the Institute shall enjoy immunity from any penal, civil and administrative proceedings, except insofar as that immunity has been expressly waived by the Director-General of the Institute or his authorized representatives.” The courts may not exercise their jurisdiction so as not to embarrass the executive arm of the government in conducting foreign relations.

Thus, the petition for certiorari is dismissed.

Fooottnootes

1. On the incident: IRRI's Human Resource Development Department Manager informed the Petitioner of the findings of their preliminary investigation.

(1) Driving an institute vehicle while on official duty under the influence of liquor;(2) Serious misconduct consisting of your failure to report to your supervisors the failure of your vehicle to start because of a problem with the car battery which, you alleged, required you to overstay in Manila for more than six (6) hours, whereas, had you reported the matter to IRRI, Los Baños by telephone, your problem could have been solved within one or two hours;(3) Gross and habitual neglect of your duties.

2. Presidential Decree No. 1620, Article 3 provides:Art. 3. Immunity from Legal Process. The Institute shall enjoy immunity from any penal, civil and administrative proceedings, except insofar as that immunity has been expressly waived by the Director-General of the Institute or his authorized representatives. It is a recognized principle of international law and under our system of separation of powers that diplomatic immunity is essentially a political question and courts should refuse to look beyond a determination by the executive branch of the government, and where the plea of diplomatic immunity is recognized and affirmed by the executive branch of the government as in the case at bar, it is then the duty of the courts to accept the claim of immunity upon appropriate suggestion by the principal law officer of the government . . . or other officer acting under his direction. Hence, in adherence to the settled principle that courts may not so exercise their jurisdiction . . . as to embarass the executive arm of the government in conducting foreign relations, it is accepted doctrine that in such cases the judicial

department of (this) government follows the action of the political branch and will not embarrass the latter by assuming an antagonistic jurisdiction.

3. Labor Arbiter’s order:WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering respondent to reinstate complainant to his former position without loss or (sic) seniority rights and privileges within five (5) days from receipt hereof and to pay his full backwages from March 7, 1990 to October 31, 1991, in the total amount of P83,048.75 computed on the basis of his last monthly salary.

4. "Guidelines in handling cases of dismissal of employees in relation to P.D. 1620" (1983, issued by former Director-General3) Waiving immunity under P.D. 1620If the plaintiff's attorney or the arbiter, asks if IRRI will waive its immunity we may reply that the Institute will be happy to do so, as it has in the past in the formal manner required thereby reaffirming our commitment to abide by the laws of the Philippines and our full faith in the integrity and impartially of the legal system.

(STATCON :) NOTE: THIS is not a declaration of waiver for all cases. This is apparent from the use of the permissive term "may" rather than the mandatory term "shall" in the last paragraph of the memo. Certainly the memo cannot be considered as the express waiver by the Director General as contemplated by P.D. 1620, especially since the memo was issued by a former Director-General. This was meant for internal circulation and not as a pledge of waiver in all cases arising from dismissal of employees.

SUPPLEMANTARY NOTES (source: chanrobles)

1. POLITICAL LAW; INTERNATIONAL LAW; INTERNATIONAL RICE RESEARCH INSTITUTE (IRRI); IMMUNE FROM SUIT. — IRRI’s immunity from, suit is undisputed. Presidential Decree No. 1620, Article 3 provides that the Institute shall enjoy immunity from any penal, civil and administrative proceedings, except insofar as that immunity has been expressly waived by the Director-General of the Institute or his authorized representatives. The grant of immunity to IRRI is clear and express waiver by its Director-General is the only way by which it may relinquish or abandon this immunity.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; REASON. — We held that" (t)he raison d’etre for these immunities is the assurance of unimpeded performance of their functions by the agencies concerned. The grant of immunity from local jurisdiction to . . .and IRRI is clearly necessitated by their international character and respective purposes. The objective is to avoid the danger of partiality and interference by the host country in their internal workings. The exercise of jurisdiction by the Department of Labor in these instances would defeat the very purpose of immunity, Which, is to shield the affairs of international organizations, in accordance with international practice, from political pressure or control by the host country to the prejudice of member States of the organization, and to ensure the unhampered performance of their functions."

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ABSENCE OF EXPRESS WAIVER IN CASE AT BENCH. — On the matter of waiving its immunity from suit, IRRI had, early on, made its position clear. Through counsel, the Institute wrote the Labor Arbiter categorically informing him that the Institute will not waive its diplomatic immunity. In the second place, petitioner’s reliance on the Memorandum with "Guidelines in handling cases of dismissal of employees in relation to P.D. 1620" dated July 26, 1983, is misplaced. From the last paragraph of the foregoing quotation, it is clear that in cases involving dismissed employees, the Institute may waive its immunity, signifying that such waiver is discretionary on its part. We agree with private respondent IRRI that this memorandum cannot, by any stretch of the imagination, be considered the express waiver by the Director-General. The memorandum, issued by the former Director-General to a now-defunct division of the IRRI, was meant for internal circulation and not as a pledge of waiver in all cases arising from dismissal of employees. Moreover, the IRRI’s letter to the Labor Arbiter in the case at bench made in 1991 declaring that it has no intention of waiving its immunity, at

the very least, supplants any pronouncement of alleged waiver issued in previous cases.

THE HOLY SEE vs. THE HON. ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, JR., as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 61 and STARBRIGHT SALES ENTERPRISES, INC.G.R. No. 101949 December 1, 1994

FACTS: Petitioner is the Holy See who exercises sovereignty over the Vatican City in Rome, Italy, and is represented in the Philippines by the Papal Nuncio; Private respondent, Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc., is a domestic corporation engaged in the real estate business.This petition arose from a controversy over a parcel of land consisting of 6,000 square meters located in the Municipality of Paranaque registered in the name of petitioner. Said lot was contiguous with two other lots registered in the name of the Philippine Realty Corporation (PRC).The three lots were sold to Ramon Licup, through Msgr. Domingo A. Cirilos, Jr., acting as agent to the sellers. Later, Licup assigned his rights to the sale to private respondent.In view of the refusal of the squatters to vacate the lots sold to private respondent, a dispute arose as to who of the parties has the responsibility of evicting and clearing the land of squatters. Complicating the relations of the parties was the sale by petitioner of Lot 5-A to Tropicana Properties and Development Corporation (Tropicana).private respondent filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 61, Makati, Metro Manila for annulment of the sale of the three parcels of land, and specific performance and damages against petitioner, represented by the Papal Nuncio, and three other defendants: namely, Msgr. Domingo A. Cirilos, Jr., the PRC and Tropicanapetitioner and Msgr. Cirilos separately moved to dismiss the complaint — petitioner for lack of jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity from suit, and Msgr. Cirilos for being an improper party. An opposition to the motion was filed by private respondent.the trial court issued an order denying, among others, petitioner’s motion to dismiss after finding that petitioner “shed off [its] sovereign immunity by entering into the business contract in question” Petitioner forthwith elevated the matter to us. In its petition, petitioner invokes the privilege of sovereign immunity only on its own behalf and on behalf of its official representative, the Papal Nuncio.

ISSUE:Whether the Holy See is immune from suit insofar as its business relations regarding selling a lot to a private entity

RULING:The Republic of the Philippines has accorded the Holy See the status of a foreign sovereign. The Holy See, through its Ambassador, the Papal Nuncio, has had diplomatic representations with the Philippine government since 1957 (Rollo, p. 87). This appears to be the universal practice in international relations.There are two conflicting concepts of sovereign immunity, each widely held and firmly established. According to the classical or absolute theory, a sovereign cannot, without its consent, be made a respondent in the courts of another sovereign. According to the newer or restrictive theory, the immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with regard to public acts or acts jure imperii of a state, but not with regard to private acts or acts jure gestionisIf the act is in pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an incident thereof, then it is an act jure imperii, especially when it is not undertaken for gain or profit.In the case at bench, if petitioner has bought and sold lands in the ordinary course of a real estate business, surely the said transaction can be categorized as an act jure gestionis. However, petitioner has denied that the acquisition and subsequent disposal of Lot 5-A were made for profit but claimed that it acquired said property for the site of its mission or the Apostolic Nunciature in the Philippines. Private respondent failed to dispute said claim.Lot 5-A was acquired by petitioner as a donation from the Archdiocese of Manila. The donation was made not for commercial purpose, but for the use of petitioner to construct thereon the official place of residence of the Papal Nuncio. The right of a foreign sovereign to acquire property, real or personal, in a receiving state, necessary for the creation and maintenance of its diplomatic mission, is recognized in the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (Arts. 20-22). This treaty was concurred in by the Philippine Senate and entered into force in the Philippines on November 15, 1965.The decision to transfer the property and the subsequent disposal thereof are likewise clothed with a governmental character. Petitioner did not sell Lot 5-A for profit or gain. It merely wanted to dispose off the same because the squatters living thereon made it almost impossible for petitioner to use it for the purpose of the donation. The fact that squatters have occupied and are still occupying the lot, and that they stubbornly refuse to leave the premises, has been admitted by private respondent in its complaintPrivate respondent is not left without any legal remedy for the redress of its grievances. Under both Public International Law and

Transnational Law, a person who feels aggrieved by the acts of a foreign sovereign can ask his own government to espouse his cause through diplomatic channels.Private respondent can ask the Philippine government, through the Foreign Office, to espouse its claims against the Holy See. Its first task is to persuade the Philippine government to take up with the Holy See the validity of its claims. Of course, the Foreign Office shall first make a determination of the impact of its espousal on the relations between the Philippine government and the Holy See (Young, Remedies of Private Claimants Against Foreign States, Selected Readings on Protection by Law of Private Foreign Investments 905, 919 [1964]). Once the Philippine government decides to espouse the claim, the latter ceases to be a private cause.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED and the complaint in Civil Case No. 90-183 against petitioner is DISMISSED.

THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA, HIS EXCELLENCY AMBASSADOR SOERATMIN, and MINISTER COUNSELLOR AZHARI KASIM, petitioners, vs. JAMES VINZON

G.R. NO. 154705. June 26, 2003

FACTS:

Petitioner, Republic of Indonesia, represented by its Counsellor, Siti Partinah, entered into a Maintenance Agreement in August 1995 with respondent James Vinzon, sole proprietor of Vinzon Trade and Services. The equipment covered by the Maintenance Agreement are air conditioning units and was to take effect in a period of four years. When Indonesian Minister Counsellor Kasim assumed the position of Chief of Administration in March 2000, he allegedly found respondent’s work and services unsatisfactory and not in compliance with the standards set in the Maintenance Agreement. Hence, the Indonesian Embassy terminated the agreement in a letter dated August 31, 2000. Respondent filed a complaint claiming that the aforesaid termination was arbitrary and unlawful. Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss assailing that Republic of Indonesia, as a foreign sovereign State, has sovereign immunity from suit and cannot be sued as a party-defendant in the Philippines.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the trial court’s decision that petitioners have waived their immunity from suit by using as its basis the abovementioned provision in the Maintenance Agreement.

RULING:

The SC GRANTED the petition.

The rule that a State may not be sued without its consent is a necessary consequence of the principles of independence and equality of States. The mere entering into a contract by a foreign State with a private party cannot be construed as the ultimate test of whether or not it is an act jure imperii or jure gestionis. Such act is only the start of the inquiry. A sovereign State does not merely establish a diplomatic mission and leave it at that; the establishment of a diplomatic mission encompasses its maintenance and upkeep. Hence, the State may enter into contracts with private entities to maintain the premises, furnishings and equipment of the embassy and the living quarters of its agents and officials. It is therefore clear that petitioner Republic of Indonesia was acting in pursuit of a sovereign activity when it entered into a contract with respondent for the upkeep or maintenance of the air conditioning units, generator sets, electrical facilities, water heaters, and water motor pumps of the Indonesian Embassy and the official residence of the Indonesian ambassador.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA vs. REYESPetition for Certiorari to Annul & Set Aside RTC Cavite Branch 22 Resolution, 1993

FACTS:

• Respondent Nelia Montoya, an American Citizen, worked as an ID checker at the US Navy Exchange (NEX) at the US Military Assistance Group (JUSMAG) headquarters in Quezon City. She’s married to Edgardo Montoya, a Filipino-American serviceman employed by the US Navy & stationed in San Francisco. • Petitioner Maxine is an American Citizen employed at the JUSMAG headquarters as the activity exchange manager. • Jan. 22, 1987 – Montoya bought some items from the retail store Bradford managed, where she had purchasing privileges. After shopping & while she was already at the parking lot, Mrs. Yong Kennedy, a fellow ID checker approached her & told her that she needed to search her bags upon Bradford’s instruction. Montoya approached Bradford to protest the search but she was told that it was to be made on all JUSMAG employees on that day. Mrs. Kennedy then performed the search on her person, bags & car in front of Bradford & other curious onlookers. Nothing irregular was found thus she was allowed to leave afterwards.• Montoya learned that she was the only person subjected to such search that day & she was informed by NEX Security Manager Roynon that NEX JUSMAG employees are not searched outside the store unless there is a strong evidence of a wrong-doing. Montoya can’t recall any circumstance that would trigger suspicion of a wrong-doing on her part. She is aware of Bradford’s propensity to suspect Filipinos for theft and/or shoplifting. • Montoya filed a formal protest w/Mr. Roynon but no action was taken. • Montoya filed a suit against Bradford for damages due to the oppressive & discriminatory acts committed by petitioner in excess of her authority as store manager. She claims that she has been exposed to contempt & ridicule causing her undue embarrassment & indignity. She further claims that the act was not motivated by any other reason aside from racial discrimination in our own land w/c is a blow to our national pride & dignity. She seeks for moral damages of P500k and exemplary damages of P100k. • May 13, 1987 – Summons & complaint were served on Bradford but instead of filing an answer, she along with USA government filed a motion to dismiss on grounds that: (1) this is a suit against US w/c is a foreign sovereign immune from suit w/o its consent and (2) Bradford is immune from suit for acts done in the performance of her official functions under Phil-US Military Assistance Agreement of 1947 & Military Bases Agreement of 1947. They claim that US has rights, power & authority w/in the bases, necessary for the establishment, use & operation & defense thereof. It will also use facilities & areas w/in bases & will have effective command over the facilities, US personnel, employees, equipment & material. They further claim that checking of purchases at NEX is a routine procedure observed at base retail outlets to protect & safeguard merchandise, cash & equipment pursuant to par. 2 & 4(b) of NAVRESALEACT SUBIC INST. 5500.1. • July 6, 1987 – Montoya filed a motion for preliminary attachment claiming that Bradford was about to leave the country & was removing & disposing her properties w/intent to defraud her creditors. Motion granted by RTC.• July 14, 1987 – Montoya opposed Bradford’s motion to dismiss. She claims that: (1) search was outside NEX JUSMAG store thus it’s improper, unlawful & highly-discriminatory and beyond Bradford’s authority; (2) due to excess in authority and since her liability is personal, Bradford can’t rely on sovereign immunity; (3) Bradford’s act was committed outside the military base thus under the jurisdiction of Philippine courts; (4) the Court can inquire into the factual circumstances of case to determine WON Bradford acted w/in or outside her authority. • RTC granted Montoya’s motion for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment and later on issued writ of attachment opposed by Bradford. Montoya allowed to present evidence & Bradford declared in default for failure to file an answer. RTC ruled in favor of Montoya claiming that search was unreasonable, reckless, oppressive & against Montoya’s liberty guaranteed by Consti. She was awarded P300k for moral damages, P100k for exemplary damages & P50k for actual expenses. Bradford filed a Petition for Restraining Order. SC granted TRO enjoining RTC from enforcing decision. • Montoya claims that Bradford was acting as a civilian employee thus not performing governmental functions. Even if she were performing governmental acts, she would still not be covered by the immunity since she was acting outside the scope of her authority. She claims that criminal acts of a public officer/employee are his private acts & he alone is liable for such acts. She believes that this case is under RP courts’ jurisdiction because act was done outside the territorial control of the US Military Bases, it does not fall under offenses where US has been given right to exercise its jurisdiction and Bradford does not possess diplomatic immunity. She further claims that RP courts can inquire into the factual circumstances & determine WON Bradford is immune. 

ISSUES/RATIO:

1. WON the case is under the RTC’s jurisdiction - YES

Intervention of a third party is discretionary upon the Court. US did not obtain leave of court (something like asking for Court’s permission) to intervene in the present case. Technically, it should not be allowed to intervene but since RTC entertained its motion to dismiss, it is deemed to have allowed US to intervene. By voluntarily appearing, US must be deemed to have subjected itself to RTC’s jurisdiction. 

2. WON RTC committed a grave abuse of discretion in denying Bradford’s motion to dismiss. - NO

Petitioners failed to specify any grounds for a motion to dismiss enumerated in Sec. 1, Rule 16, Rules of Court. Thus, it actually lacks cause of action. A cause of action is necessary so that Court would be able to render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer in the complaint. A motion to dismiss w/c fails to state a cause of action hypothetically admits the truth of the allegations in the complaint. RTC should have deferred the resolution instead of denying it for lack of merit. But this is immaterial at this time since petitioners have already brought this petition to the SC. 

3. WON case at bar is a suit against the State. - NO

Doctrine of state immunity is expressed in Art. XVI, Sec. 3 of the 1987 Constitution. This immunity also applies to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in discharge of their duties since it will require the state to perform an affirmative act such as appropriation of amount to pay damages. This will be regarded as a case against the state even if it has not be formally impleaded. But this is not all encompassing. It’s a different matter where the public official is made to account in his capacity as such for acts contrary to law & injurious to rights of plaintiff. State authorizes only legal acts by its officers. Action against officials by one whose rights have been violated by such acts is not a suit against the State w/in the rule of immunity of the State from suit. The doctrine of state immunity cannot be used as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice. It will not apply & may not be invoked where the public official is being sued in his private & personal capacity as an ordinary citizen. This usually arises where the public official acts w/o authority or in excess of the powers vested in him. A public official is liable if he acted w/malice & in bad faith or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction. (Shauf vs. CA) Also, USA vs. Guinto declared that USA is not conferred with blanket immunity for all acts done by it or its agents in the Philippines merely because they have acted as agents of the US in the discharge of their official functions. In this case, Bradford was sued in her private/personal capacity for acts done beyond the scope & place of her official function, thus, it falls w/in the exception to the doctrine of state immunity. 

4. WON Bradford enjoys diplomatic immunity. - NO

First of all, she is not among those granted diplomatic immunity under Art. 16(b) of the 1953 Military Assistance Agreement creating the JUSMAG. Second, even diplomatic agents who enjoy immunity are liable if they perform acts outside their official functions (Art. 31, Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations). 

HELD: Petition denied. TRO lifted.

EPG CONSTRUCTION VS VIGILAR March 16, 2001

FACTS:( 1 9 8 3 )   T h e   h e r e i n   p e t i t i o n e r s - c o n t r a c t o r s ,   u n d e r   c o n t r a c t s   w i t h  D P W H , constructed 145 housing units but coverage of construction and funding under the saidcon t r a c t s w as on l y fo r 2 /3 o f   eac h hous i ng  un i t .  Th rough the ve rba l r eques t and assurance of then DPWH Undersecretary Canlas, they undertook additional constructionsfo r   t he   compl e t i on  o f   t he  p ro j ec t ,   bu t   sa id   add i t i ona l   cons t ruc t ions  we re  no t i s sue d  payment by DPWH.Wi t h a f avo rab l e r ec ommenda t ion f rom the D P WH As s t . S ec re t a ry fo r Lega l Affairs, the petitioners sent a demend letter to the DPWH Secretary. The DPWH Auditor did not object to the payment subject to whatever action COA may adopt.(1992) Through the request of then DPWH Secretary De Jesus, the DBM releasedthe a moun t fo r pa ymen t bu t ( 1996 ) r e s ponden t DP WH S ec re t a ry V ig i l a r den i ed the money claims prompting petitioners to file a petition for mandamus before the RTCwhich said trial court denied. Hence, this petition.Am ong  o the r s ,   r e s ponden t s ec r e t a ry   a rgues   t ha t   t he   s t a t e  may  no t   be   sue d invoking the constitutional doctrine of Non-suability of the State also known as the RoyalPrerogative of Dishonesty.

ISSUE:Whether or not the Principle of State Immunity is applicable in the case at bar.

HELD:The p r i nc ip l e   o f s t a t e imm un i ty f i nds no   app l i ca t i on   in t h i s c a s e .  Unde r   t he circumstances, respondent may not validly invoke the Royal Prerogative of Dishonestyand h ide  unde r t he   s t a t e ’ s   c loa k  o f i nv inc ib i l i t y aga i n s t   su i t .  Cons i de r ing   tha t   t h i s  principle yields to certain settled exceptions. The rule is not absolute for it does not saythat the state may not be sued under any circumstance.  The doctrine of governmentalimm un i ty f rom su i t c a nno t s e rve a s an i n s t rumen t fo r pe rpe t r a t i ng a n i n ju s t i c e on a c i t i z en .   I t i s j u s t a s i mpor t a n t t ha t t he r e be f i de l i t y t o l ega l no rms on the pa r t o f   officialdom if the rule of law is to be maintained. The ends of justice would be subvertedif we were to uphold, in this instance, the state’s immunity from suit.This court - as the staunch guardian of the citizen’s rights and welfare- cannotsa nc t i on an i n j u s t i c e s o pa t en t on i t s f ace , a nd a l l ow i t s e l f t o be a n i n s t rumen t o f   pe rpe t r a t i on   the r e o f .   Ju s t i c e a nd   equ i t y s t e rn ly dema nd   tha t   t he s t a t e ’ s c loa k  o f   i nv inc ib i l i t y   aga i n s t   su i t   be   sh r e d   in   t h i s   pa r t i cu l a r   i n s t anc e   and   tha t  pe t i t i one r s - contractors be duly compensated, on the basis of quantum meruit, for construction doneon the public works housing projectPetition GRANTED.

Republic v Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 155832)

FACTS: 

Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) Commissioner Daza gave written authority to two lawyers to sequester any property, documents, money, and other assets in Leyte belonging to Imelda Marcos. A sequestration order was issued against the Olot Resthouse in Tolosa, Leyte. Imelda Marcos filed a motion to quash claiming that such order was void for failing to observe Sec. 3 of the PCGG Rules and Regulations. The Rules required the signatures of at least 2 PCGG Commissioners.

The Republic opposed claiming that Imelda is estopped from questioning the sequestration since by her acts ( such as seeking permission from the PCGG to repair the resthouse and entertain guests), she had conceded to the validity of the sequestration. The Republic also claims that Imelda failed to exhaust administrative remedies by first seeking its lifting as provided in the Rules; that the rule requiring the two signatures did not yet exist when the Olot Resthouse was sequestered; and that she intended to delay proceedings by filing the motion to quash.

Sandiganbayan granted the motion to quash and ruled that the sequestration order was void because it was signed not by the 2 commissioners but by 2 agents. Hence the certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether or not the sequestration order is valid.

HELD:No. The Order is not valid. Under Sec. 26, Art 18 of the Constitution, a sequestration order may be issued upon a showing of a prima facie case that the properties are ill-gotten wealth. When the court nullifies an Order, the court does not substitute its judgment for that of the PCGG. 

In the case, the PCGG did not make a prior determination of the existence of the prima facie case. The Republic presented no evidence to the Sandiganbayan. Nor did the Republic demonstrate that the the 2 PCGG representatives were given the quasi-judicial authority to receive and consider evidence that would warrant a prima facie finding. The Republic's evidence does not show how the Marcoses' acquired the property, what makes it “ill-gotten wealth”,and how Ferdinand Marcos intervened in its acquisition.

As regards the issue on estoppel, a void order produces no effect and cannot be validated under the doctine of estoppel. The Court cannot accept the view that Imelda should have first sought the lifiting of the sequestration order. Being void, the Sandiganbayan has the power to strike it down on sight.

*Decision of Sandiganbayan affirmed and orders the annotation of lis pendens on the title of the Olot Resthouse with respect to the claim of the Republic in another civil case.

REPUBLIC vs. HIDALGO

FACTS:

The Republic of the Philippines, thru the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition

under Rule 65 of the Rules of Courtand set aside the decision dated August 27, 2003 and other related issuances of the

Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 37in its Civil Case No. 99-94075. In directly invoking the Court’s original

jurisdiction to issue the extraordinary writs of certiorari and prohibition, without challenge from any of the respondents, the

Republic gave as justification therefor the fact that the case involves an over TWO BILLION PESO judgment against the

State, allegedly rendered in blatant violation of the Constitution, law and jurisprudence

The judgment was for a celebrated case regarding what is known as the “Arlegui property”, a 4,924.60sqm lot, near the

Malacanan Palace complex. On this lot stands now stands the Presidential Guest House which was home to two (2)

former Presidents of the Republic and now appears to be used as office building of the Office of the President. This

property was wrested from its owner, Tarcila Mendoza on July 1975 when a group representing to be from the

Presidential Security Group of the then President Marcos, forcibly entered their home and forced her to turn over to them

her owner’s copy of the title for their property. Fearing for their lives, she gave in to the order and she and her family

vacated the property. The property’s ownership was transferred to the Republic of the Philippines through a deed of sale

allegedly executed by Mendoza and her husband in favor to the Republic.

In July 1999, Mendoza filed a petition for the “Arlegui property” for reconveyance and the corresponding declaration of

nullity of a deed of sale and title against the Republic, the Register of Deeds of Manila and one Atty. Fidel

Vivar.Eventually, the trial court rendered a judgment by default for Mendoza and against the Republic. To the trial court,

the Republic had veritably confiscated Mendoza’s property, and deprived her not only of the use thereof but also denied

her of the income she could have had otherwise realized during all the years she was illegally dispossessed of the same.

The court found her claim that the deed of sale executed in July 1975 was fictitious and ordered the Republic to pay

Mendoza a reasonable compensation or rental for the use or occupancy of the subject property in the sum of FIVE

HUNDRED THOUSAND (P500,000.00) PESOS a month with a five (5%) per cent yearly increase, plus interest thereon at

the legal rate, beginning July 1975 until it finally vacates the same. The Republic was ordered to pay Mendoza, the sum of

ONE BILLION FOUR HUNDRED EIGHTY MILLION SIX HUNDRED TWENTY SEVEN THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED

EIGHTY EIGHT (P1,480,627,688.00) PESOS, representing the reasonable rental for the use of the subject property, the

interest thereon at the legal rate, and the opportunity cost at the rate of three (3%) per cent per annum, commencing July

1975 continuously up to July 30, 2003, plus an additional interest at the legal rate, commencing from this date until the

whole amount is paid in full as well as to pay the plaintiff attorney’s fee, in an amount equivalent to FIFTEEN (15%) PER

CENT of the amount due to the plaintiff.

The Republic filed a subsequent plea for reconsideration but was denied by the court twice. The twin denials were

followed by several orders from the court, with the decision declared final and executory on December 17, 2003. Hence

the Republic’s petition for certiorari.On January 22, 2007, when this case was called for the purpose, both parties

manifested their willingness to settle the case amicably, for which reason the Court gave them up to February 28, 2007 to

submit the compromise agreement for approval. Following several approved extensions of the February 28, 2007

deadline, the OSG, on August 6, 2007, manifested that it is submitting the case for resolution on the merits owing to the

inability of the parties to agree on an acceptable compromise.In this recourse, the petitioner urges the Court to strike down as a nullity the trial court’s order declaring it in default and the judgment by default that followed.

The Republic, in its petition, claims that there was grave abuse of discretion to lack or in excess of jurisdiction, are the

orders and processes enumerated by the court after the rendition of the default judgment.

ISSUE

To the petitioner, the respondent judge committed serious jurisdictional error when he proceeded to hear the case and

eventually awarded the private respondent a staggering amount without so much as giving the petitioner the opportunity

to present its defense. Did the court manifest grave abuse of discretion that amounted to lack or in excess of jurisdiction in

its decision?

RULING

From July 1975 when the PSG allegedly took over the subject property to July 2003, a month before the trial court

rendered judgment, or a period of 28 years, private respondent’s total rental claim would, per the OSG’s computation, only

amount to P371,440,426.00. In its assailed decision, however, the trial court ordered the petitioner to pay private

respondent the total amount of over P1.48 Billion or the mind-boggling amount of P1,480,627,688.00, to be exact,

representing the reasonable rental for the property, the interest rate thereon at the legal rate and the opportunity cost.

This figure is on top of the P143,600,000.00 which represents the acquisition cost of the disputed property. All told, the

trial court would have the Republic pay the total amount of about P1.624 Billion, exclusive of interest, for the taking of a

property with a declared assessed value of P2,388,900.00. This is not to mention the award of attorney’s fees in an

amount equivalent to 15% of the amount due the private respondent.

In doing so, the respondent judge brazenly went around the explicit command of Rule 9, Section 3(d) of the Rules of

Court which defines the extent of the relief that may be awarded in a judgment by default, i.e., only so much as has been

alleged and proved. The court acts in excess of jurisdiction if it awards an amount beyond the claim made in the complaint

or beyond that proved by the evidence. While a defaulted defendant may be said to be at the mercy of the trial court, the

Rules of Court andcertainly the imperatives of fair play see to it that any decision against him must be in accordance with

law.

Given the above perspective, the obvious question that comes to mind is the level of compensation which – for the use

and occupancy of the Arlegui property - would be fair to both the petitioner and the private respondent and, at the same

time, be within acceptable legal bounds.

The decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila dated August 27, 2003 insofar as it nullified TCT No. 118911 of

petitioner Republic of the Philippines and ordered the Register of Deeds of Manila to reinstate private respondent Tarcila

L. Mendoza’s TCT No. 118527, or to issue her a new certificate of title is AFFIRMED.

The assessment of costs of suit against the petitioner is, however, nullified, costs not being allowed against the Republic, unless otherwise provided by law. The assailed trial court’s issuance of the writ of execution against

government funds to satisfy its money judgment is also nullified. It is basic that government funds and properties may not be seized under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy such judgments.

Citing the case of Republic v. Palacio, it teaches that a judgment against the State generally operates merely to liquidate

and establish the plaintiff’s claim in the absence of express provision; otherwise, they can not be enforced by processes of

law.

It is MODIFIED in the sense that for the use and occupancy of the Arlegui property, petitioner Republic is ordered to pay

private respondent the reasonable amount of P20,000.00 a month beginning July 1975 until it vacates the same and the

possession thereof restored to the private respondent, plus an additional interest of 6% per annum on the total amount

due upon the finality of this Decision until the same is fully paid.

The respondent court’s assailed decision of August 27, 2003 insofar as it ordered the petitioner Republic of the

Philippines to pay private respondent Tarcila L. Mendoza the sum of One Billion Four Hundred Eighty Million Six Hundred

Twenty Seven Thousand Six Hundred Eighty Eight Pesos (P1,480,627,688.00) representing the purported rental use of

the property in question, the interest thereon and the opportunity cost at the rate of 3% per annum plus the interest at the

legal rate added thereon is nullified.

CASE DIGEST OF NHA VS. HEIRS OF GUIVELONDO

Topic: Execution/Garnishment

NHA vs. Heirs of Guivelondo

Facts:

Ø  NHA filed with RTC of Cebu Branch 11 a complaint as amended regarding the eminent domain against Heirs of Guivelondo docketed as civil case.

Ø  The petitioner alleged that defendant heirs et. al were the rightful private owners of the land which the petitioner intends to develop a socialized housing project.

Ø  The respondent heirs filed a manifestation of waiving their objections to petitioners power to expropriate their properties, thereafter trial court declares plaintiff has a right to expropriate the properties of the defendant heirs and appointed 3 commissioners who ascertain  the just compensation of the said properties be fixed at 11, 200.00 php.  per square meter.

Ø  Petitioner NHA filed 2 motion for reconsideration that assails inclusion of lots 12, 13 and 19  as well as the amount of just compensation, however the respondents filed a motion for reconsideration of the trial courts partial judgment . but the trial court issued an omnibus order to deny the motion of respondent granting the petitioner’s motion and of just compensation.

Ø  Petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari. Thereafter, heirs filed a motion for execution since the trial court move for the entry of the partial judgment as modified by the omnibus order.

Ø  The Court of Appeals rendered dismissal of the petition for certiorari on the ground of partial judgment and omnibus order became a final and executory when petitioner failed to appeal.

Ø  The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but then it was denied by the court. The courts of appeals serve on petitioner for a notice of levy pursuant to writ of Execution and a Notice of third garnishment from the Land bank of the Philippines.

ISSUE:

1.       Whether or not the state can be compelled and coerced by the courts to continue with its inherent power of eminent domain.

2.       Whether or not judgment has become final and executory and if estoppel or laches applies to government.

3.       Whether or not writs of execution and garnishment may be issued against the state in an expropriation where in the exercise of power of eminent domain will not serve public use or purpose

Ruling:

Ø  The state as represented by the NHA for housing project can continue its inherent power of eminent domain provided that the just compensation for the property sought is taken. After the rendition of such order the plaintiff shouldn’t be permitted to dismiss or discontinue such proceedings except on such terms of the court be equitable.

Ø  The order was final after the non-appealing of the petitioner as the lawful right to expropriate the properties of respondent heirs of Guivelondo.

Ø  Petitioner NHA are not exempt from garnishment or execution, although it is public in character since it is arbitrary and capricious for a government entity to initiate expropriation proceedings that seize a private owner’s property.

Ø  Petition was DENIED and the trial court’s decision denying petitioner’s motion to dismiss expropriation proceeding was AFFIRMED. Its injunctive relief against the levy and garnishment of its funds and personal properties was also DENIED. The temporary Restraining Order was LIFTED.