CONTENTS:

1. LANDBANK vs. ARANETA, GR 1617962. DAR vs. BERENGUER, GR 1540943. ALANGILAN REALTY vs. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, GR 1804714. REPUBLIC vs. LOPEZ, GR 1788955. DAR vs. PHILIPPINE COMMUNICATION SATELLITE, GR 1526406. ARNAIZ vs. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, GR 1706237. CASIMIRO DEVELOPMENT vs. MATEO, GR 1754858. NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY vs. DARAB, GR 1752009. ADRIANO vs. TANCO, GR 16816410. GALOPE vs. BUGARIN, GR 18566911. HEIRS OF REYES vs. GARILAO, GR 13646612. MAGO vs. BARBIN, GR 17392313. MAYLEM vs. ELLANO, GR 16272114. ANTONIO vs. MANAHAN, GR 17609115. LANDBANK vs. DARAB, GR 18327916. LANBANK vs. COLARINA, GR 17641017. LANDBANK vs. HEIRS OF HONORATO DE LEON, GR 16402518. LANDBANK vs. KUMASSIE PLANTATION, GR 17740419. DAR vs. TONGSON, GR 17167420. AGAPITO ROM ET AL vs. ROXAS & COMPANY INC., GR 16933121. ROXAS & COMPANY INC. vs. DAMBA-NFSW, GR 14954822. LANDBANK vs. HEIRS OF TRINIDAD S. VDA. DE ARIETA, GR 16183423. APO FRUITS CORPORATION vs. LANDBANK, GR 16419524. LANDBANK vs. SUNTAY, GR 15790325. LANDBANK vs. LISTANA, GR 16810526. SORIANO vs. REPUBLIC, GR 18428227. MENDOZA vs. GERMINO, GR 16567628. OCTAVIO vs. PEROVANO, GR 17240029. MONTANEZ vs. PARAD, GR 18314230. SEARBEMCO vs. DOLE PHILIPPINES, INC., GR 15404831. HEIRS OF SPS. VIDAD vs. LANDBANK, GR 16646132. CONCHA vs. RUBIO, GR 16244633. HEIRS OF CERVANTES vs. MIRANDA, GR 18335234. LAKEVIEW GOLF CLUB vs. LUZVIMIN SAMAHANG NAYON, GR 17125335. CREBA vs. SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM, GR 18340936. PVB vs. BASES CONVERSION DEVT AUTHORITY, GR 17308537. PO vs. DAMPAL, GR 17332938. RURAL BANK OF DASMARINAS vs. JARIN ET AL, GR 18077839. HACIENDA LUISITA INC. vs. LUISITA INDL PARK CORP., GR 171101

HACIENDA LUISITA INC vs LUISITA INDUSTRIAL PARK CORP, GR. 171101

FACTS:

On 1989, some 93% of the then farmworker-beneficiaries (FWBs) complement of Hacienda Luisita signified in a referendum their acceptance of the proposed HLIs Stock Distribution Option Plan (SODP). The SDOA was formally entered into by Tadeco, HLI, and the 5,848 qualified FWBs. This attested to by then DAR Secretary Philip Juico. The SDOA embodied the basis and mechanics of HLIs SDP, which was eventually approved by the PARC after a follow-up referendum conducted by the DAR, in which 5,117 FWBs, out of 5,315 who participated, opted to receive shares in HLI. On 1995, HLI applied for the conversion of 500 hectares of land of the hacienda from agricultural to industrial use, pursuant to Sec. 65 of RA 6657. The DAR approved the application subject to payment of three percent (3%) of the gross selling price to the FWBs and to HLIs continued compliance with its undertakings under the SDP, among other conditions.

On 1996, HLI, in exchange for subscription of 12,000,000 shares of stocks of Centennary, ceded 300 hectares of the converted area to the latter. Subsequently, Centennary soldthe entire 300 hectares for PhP750 million toLuisita Industrial Park Corporation (LIPCO), which used it in developing an industrial complex. Later, LIPCO transferred these 2 parcels to RCBCin payment of LIPCOs PhP431,695,732.10 loan obligations.LIPCOs titles were cancelled and new ones were issued to RCBC. Apart from the 500 hectares, another 80.51 hectares were later detached from Hacienda Luisita and acquired by the government as part of the Subic-Clark-Tarlac Expressway (SCTEX) complex. Thus, 4,335.75 hectares remained of the original 4,915 hectares Tadeco ceded to HLI.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Sec. 31 of RA 6657, which allows stock transfer in lieu of outright land transfer, unconstitutional?

HELD:

There is, thus, nothing unconstitutional in the formula prescribed by RA 6657. The policy on agrarian reform is that control over the agricultural land must always be in the hands of the farmers. Then it falls on the shoulders of DAR and PARC to see to it the farmers should always own majority of the common shares entitled to elect the members of the board of directors to ensure that the farmers will have a clear majority in the board. Before the SDP is approved, strict scrutiny of the proposed SDP must always be undertaken by the DAR and PARC, such that the value of the agricultural land contributed to the corporation must always be more than 50% of the total assets of the corporation to ensure that the majority of the members of the board of directors are composed of the farmers. The PARC composed of the President of the Philippines and cabinet secretaries must see to it that control over the board of directors rests with the farmers by rejecting the inclusion of non-agricultural assets which will yield the majority in the board of directors to non-farmers. Any deviation, however, by PARC or DAR from the correct application of the formula prescribed by the second paragraph of Sec. 31 of RA 6675 does not make said provision constitutionally infirm. Rather, it is the application of said provision that can be challenged. Ergo, Sec. 31 of RA 6657 does not trench on the constitutional policy of ensuring control by the farmers.

SORIANO vs. REPUBLIC, GR 184282

FACTS:

Spouses Soriano were the registered owners of two parcels of agricultural land located in Hijo, Maco, Compostela Valley Province. The first parcel had an area of 5.2723 hectares and was covered by TCT No. (T-8935) T-3120, while the second parcel had an area of 4.0887 hectares and was covered by TCT No. (T-2906) T-749. In October 1999, the two parcels of land were compulsorily acquired by the government pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657. The LBP made a preliminary determination of the value of the subject lands. Petitioners, however, disagreed with the valuation and brought the matter before the DARAB for a summary administrative proceeding to fix the just compensation.

On September 30, 2000, the DARAB rendered its decisions affirming the LBPs preliminary determination. Notices of the decisions were duly received by counsel for petitioners. But petitioners belatedly filed a petition before the RTC acting as SAC, for the fixing of just compensation. Thus, the DAR moved to dismiss the petition arguing that the petition was filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period provided in Section 11, Rule XIII of the 1994 DARAB Rules of Procedure.

On June 27, 2001, the RTC denied the motion to dismiss and declared that the "DARAB Rules of Procedure must give way to the laws on prescription of actions as mandated by the Civil Code." The DAR sought reconsideration of the order, but its motion was denied. Thus, the DAR lodged a petition for certiorari with the CA, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court. The CA granted the petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not an action to fix just compensation for lands placed under R.A. No. 6657 is outside the purview of the ordinary rules on prescription as contained in Article 1146 of the Civil Code.

HELD:

The court ruled that the RTC acted without jurisdiction in hastily dismissing said refiled Petition. Accordingly, the Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals assailing the dismissal should be granted.

Under the law, the Land Bank of the Philippines is charged with the initial responsibility of determining the value of lands placed under land reform and the compensation to be paid for their taking. Through notice sent to the landowner pursuant to 16(a) of R.A. No. 6657, the DAR makes an offer. In case the landowner rejects the offer, a summary administrative proceeding is held and afterward the provincial (PARAD), the regional (RARAD) or the central (DARAB) adjudicator as the case may be, depending on the value of the land, fixes the price to be paid for the land. If the landowner does not agree to the price fixed, he may bring the matter to the RTC acting as Special Agrarian Court. This in essence is the procedure for the determination of compensation cases under R.A. No. 6657. In accordance with it, the private respondents case was properly brought by it in the RTC, and it was error for the latter court to have dismissed the case. In the terminology of 57, the RTC, sitting as a Special Agrarian Court, has "original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners." It would subvert this "original and exclusive" jurisdiction of the RTC for the DAR to vest original jurisdiction in compensation cases in administrative officials and make the RTC an appellate court for the review of administrative decisions.

Consequently, although the new rules speak of directly appealing the decision of adjudicators to the RTCs sitting as Special Agrarian Courts, it is clear from 57 that the original and exclusive jurisdiction to determine such cases is in the RTCs. Any effort to transfer such jurisdiction to the adjudicators and to convert the original jurisdiction of the RTCs into appellate jurisdiction would be contrary to 57 and therefore would be void. What adjudicators are empowered to do is only to determine in a preliminary manner the reasonable compensation to be paid to landowners, leaving to the courts the ultimate power to decide this question.LANDBANK vs. ARANETA, GR 161796

FACTS:

At the heart of the controversy is a large tract of land with an area of 1,645 hectares, more or less, which was originally registered in the name of Alfonso Doronilla (Doronilla) under Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 7924 of the Rizal Registry.

On June 21, 1974, then President Marcos issued Proclamation 1283, carving out a wide expanse from the Watershed Reservation in Antipolo, Rizal and reserving the segregated area for townsite purposes, "subject to private rights, if any there be.

In 1978, the OSG filed with the then CFI of Rizal an expropriation complaint against the Doronilla property. Meanwhile, on 1979, Doronilla issued a Certification, copy furnished the Agrarian Reform Office, among other agencies, listing seventy-nine (79) "bona fide planters" he allegedly permitted to occupy a portion of his land. On 1987 or nine (9) years after it commenced expropriation proceedings, the OSG moved for and secured the dismissal of the expropriation case.

Earlier, or on March 15, 1983, J. Amado Araneta, now deceased, acquired ownership of the subject Doronilla property by virtue of court litigation. A little over a week later, he had OCT No. 7924 canceled and secured the issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. N-70860 in his name.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the disputed lots are covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988.

HELD:

The primary governing agrarian law with regard to agricultural lands, be they of private or public ownership and regardless of tenurial arrangement and crops produced, is now RA 6657. The provisions of RA 6657 apply only to agricultural lands under which category the Doronilla property, during the period material, no longer falls, having been effectively classified as residential by force of Proclamation 1637. It ceased, following Natalia Realty, Inc., to be agricultural land upon approval of its inclusion in the LS Townsite Reservation pursuant to the said reclassifying presidential issuance.

Before Proclamation 1637 came to be, there were already PD 27 tenant-farmers in said property. In a very real sense, the "private rights" belong to these tenant-farmers. Since the said farmer-beneficiaries were deemed owners of the agricultural land awarded to them as of October 21, 1972 under PD 27 and subsequently deemed full owners under EO 228, the logical conclusion is clear and simple: the township reservation established under Proclamation 1637 must yield and recognize the "deemed ownership rights" bestowed on the farmer-beneficiaries under PD 27. Another way of looking at the situation is that these farmer-beneficiaries are subrogated in the place of Doronilla and eventual transferee Araneta.

Section 4 of R.A. 6657 provides that CARL shall cover, regardless of tenurial agreement and commodity produced, all public and private agricultural lands. As to what constitutes agricultural land, it is referred to as land devoted to agricultural activity as defined in this Act and not classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land. The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission confirm this limitation. Agricultural lands are only those lands which are arable and suitable agricultural lands and do not include commercial, industrial and residential lands. "Indeed, lands not devoted to agricultural activity are outside the coverage of CARL. These include lands previously converted to non-agricultural uses prior to the effectivity of CARL by government agencies other than respondent DAR.

GALOPE vs. BUGARIN, GR 185669

FACTS:

Respondent owns a parcel of land located in Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija, while petitioner farms the land. Parties respective contentions are as follows: (a) respondent complained that she lent the land to petitioner in 1992 without an agreement, that what she receives in return from petitioner is insignificant, and that she wants to recover the land to farm it on her own; (b) petitioner countered that respondent cannot recover the land yet for he had been farming it for a long time and that he pays rent ranging from P4,000 to P6,000 or 15 cavans of palay per harvest.

Respondent filed a petition for recovery of possession, ejectment and payment of rentals before the DARAB, claiming that respondent lent the land to petitioner in 1991 and that the latter gave nothing in return as a sign of gratitude or monetary consideration for the use of the land. It was also claimed that petitioner mortgaged the land to Jose Allingag who allegedly possesses the land.

After due proceedings, the Provincial Adjudicator dismissed the petition and ruled that petitioner is a tenant entitled to security of tenure. On appeal, the DARAB disagreed with the Adjudicator and ruled that petitioner is not a de jure tenant. The DARAB ordered petitioner to pay rentals and vacate the land. Petitioner appealed, but the CA affirmed DARABs ruling that no tenancy relationship exists; that the elements of consent and sharing are not present; that respondents act of lending her land without consideration cannot be taken as implied tenancy; and that no receipts prove petitioners payment of rentals.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there exists a tenancy relationship between the parties.

HELD:

The court found the petition impressed with merit and held that the CA and DARAB erred in ruling that there is no tenancy relationship between the parties.

The essential elements of an agricultural tenancy relationship are: (1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; (2) the subject matter of the relationship is agricultural land; (3) there is consent between the parties to the relationship; (4) the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production; (5) there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and (6) the harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee.

Contrary also to the CA and DARAB pronouncement, respondents act of allowing the petitioner to cultivate her land and receiving rentals therefor indubitably show her consent to an unwritten tenancy agreement. An agricultural leasehold relation is not determined by the explicit provisions of a written contract alone. Section 5 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3844, otherwise known as the Agricultural Land Reform Code, recognizes that an agricultural leasehold relation may exist upon an oral agreement.

Thus, all the elements of an agricultural tenancy relationship are present. Respondent is the landowner; petitioner is her tenant. The subject matter of their relationship is agricultural land, a farm land. They mutually agreed to the cultivation of the land by petitioner and share in the harvest. The purpose of their relationship is clearly to bring about agricultural production. After the harvest, petitioner pays rental consisting of palay or its equivalent in cash. Respondents motion to supervise harvesting and threshing, processes in palay farming, further confirms the purpose of their agreement. Lastly, petitioners personal cultivation of the land is conceded by respondent who likewise never denied the fact that they share in the harvest.

LANDBANK vs SUNTAY, GR 157903

FACTS:

Respondent Suntay owned land situated in Sta. Lucia, Sablayan, Occidental Mindoro with a total area of 3,682.0285 hectares. In 1972, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) expropriated 948.1911 hectares of Suntays land pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27.

Petitioner Land Bank and DAR fixed the value of the expropriated portion at P4,497.50/hectare, for a total valuation of P4,251,141.68. Rejecting the valuation, however, Suntay filed a petition for determination of just compensation in the Office of the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD) of Region IV, DARAB, docketed as DARAB Case No. V-0405-0001-00; his petition was assigned to RARAD Mias.

After summary administrative proceeding, RARAD Mias rendered a decision fixing the total just compensation for the expropriated portion at P157,541,951.30. Land Bank moved for a reconsideration, but RARAD Mias denied its motion. Land Bank brought a petition for the judicial determination of just compensation in the RTC (Branch 46) in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro as a Special Agrarian Court, impleading Suntay and RARAD Mias. The petition essentially prayed that the total just compensation for the expropriated portion be fixed at only P4,251,141.67. Suntay filed a motion to dismiss mainly on the ground that the petition had been filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period as required by Section 11, Rule XIII of the Rules of Procedure of DARAB. After the RTC granted the motion to dismiss, Land Bank appealed to the CA, which sustained the dismissal. As a result, Land Bank came to the Court (G.R. No. 157903)

ISSUE:

Whether or not the RTC erred in dismissing the Land Banks petition for the determination of just compensation.

HELD:

The Court has declared that the original and exclusive jurisdiction to determine just compensation under Republic Act No. 6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, or CARL) pertains to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) as a Special Agrarian Court; that any effort to transfer such jurisdiction to the adjudicators of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) and to convert the original jurisdiction of the RTC into appellate jurisdiction is void for being contrary to the CARL; and that what DARAB adjudicators are empowered to do is only to determine in a preliminary manner the reasonable compensation to be paid to the landowners, leaving to the courts the ultimate power to decide this question.

Thus, the RTC erred in dismissing the Land Banks petition. It bears stressing that the petition is not an appeal from the RARAD final Decision but an original action for the determination of the just compensation for respondents expropriated property, over which the RTC has original and exclusive jurisdiction.

The procedure for the determination of just compensation cases under R.A. No. 6657, as summarized in Landbank v. Banal, is that initially, the Land Bank is charged with the responsibility of determining the value of lands placed under land reform and the compensation to be paid for their taking under the voluntary offer to sell or compulsory acquisition arrangement. The DAR, relying on the Land Banks determination of the land valuation and compensation, then makes an offer through a notice sent to the landowner. If the landowner accepts the offer, the Land Bank shall pay him the purchase price of the land after he executes and delivers a deed of transfer and surrenders the certificate of title in favor of the government. In case the landowner rejects the offer or fails to reply thereto, the DAR adjudicator conducts summary administrative proceedings to determine the compensation for the land by requiring the landowner, the Land Bank and other interested parties to submit evidence as to the just compensation for the land. A party who disagrees with the Decision of the DAR adjudicator may bring the matter to the RTC designated as a Special Agrarian Court for the determination of just compensation. In determining just compensation, the RTC is required to consider several factors enumerated in Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657. AGAPITO ROM ET AL vs ROXAS & COMPANY INC., GR 169331

FACTS:

Respondent sought the exemption of 27 parcels of land located in Barangay Aga, Nasugbu, Batangas, having an aggregate area of 21.1236 hectares and constituting portions of the land covered by TCT No. T-44664 from the coverage of CARP, pursuant to DAR Administrative Order (AO) No. 6, Series of 1994.

Respondent asserted that Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) covers only agricultural land which is defined under Section 3(c) thereof as "land devoted to agricultural activity x x x and not classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land." Respondent claimed that prior to the effectivity of the CARL, the lands subject of its application were already re-classified as part of the Residential Cluster Area. Petitioners likewise aver that since respondent had previously voluntarily offered to sell the subject parcels of land to the DAR, it can no longer withdraw the same from the CARPs coverage. Respondent refutes petitioners contention that a landowner can no longer withdraw his property from the coverage of CARP once he has voluntarily offered to sell the same to the DAR.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a voluntary offer to sell a land under the CARL may be subsequently withdrawn.

HELD:

The court upheld that DARs Order which granted respondents application for exemption. Aside from the fact that this Court in Roxas & Company, Inc. v. DAMBA-NFSW has already upheld the grant of a similar application which, notably, was supported by the same documents submitted in support of the application herein, our own review of the records of this case reveals that there was indeed no error on the part of the DAR in issuing said Order. The documents submitted by respondent to support its application for exemption as well as the Investigation Report of CLUPPI-II clearly show that the 27 parcels of land, specifically identified, were already re-classified as residential prior to the effectivity of the CARL. "Well-settled is the rule that findings of fact of x x x quasi-judicial bodies (like the DAR) which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are generally accorded not only great respect but even finality. They are binding upon this Court unless there is a showing of grave abuse of discretion or where it is clearly shown that they were arrived at arbitrarily or in utter disregard of the evidence on record.

Respondent had previously voluntarily offered to sell to the DAR Hacienda Caylaway, where the properties subject of this case are located. However, this offer to sell became irrelevant because respondent was later able to establish before the DAR that the subject 27 parcels of land were reclassified as non-agricultural (residential) by virtue of (Nasugbu) Municipal Zoning Ordinance No. 4 prior to the effectivity of the CARL on June 15, 1988. "In Natalia Realty, Inc. vs. Department of Agrarian Reform, it was held that lands not devoted to agricultural activity are outside the coverage of CARL including lands previously converted to non-agricultural uses prior to the effectivity of CARL by government agencies other than the DAR." This being the case, respondent is not bound by its previous voluntary offer to sell because the subject properties cannot be the subject of a VOS, they being clearly beyond the CARPs coverage.

ROXAS & COMPANY INC. vs. DAMBA-NFSW, GR 149548

The case involves three haciendas in Nasugbu, Batangas, namely, Palico, Banilad and Caylaway, owned by herein petitioner Roxas & Company, Inc. At issue there was the validity of the haciendas coverage under the CARP as well as Roxas application for their conversion from agricultural to non-agricultural use. For failure to observe due process, the acquisition proceedings over the haciendas were nullified. With respect, however, to the application for conversion, the Court held that DAR is in a better position to resolve the same, it being the primary agency possessing the necessary expertise on the matter. In its Decision dated December 17, 1999, this Court ordered the remand of the case to the DAR for proper acquisition proceedings and determination of Roxass application for conversion.ANTONIO vs. MANAHAN, GR 176091

FACTS:

Subject of the instant petition are two (2) parcels of agricultural land situated at Gitnang Bayan I, San Mateo, Rizal, with an aggregate area of 30,906 square meters, and registered in the name of private respondent Manahan under Original Certificate of Title Nos. 9200 and 9150 of the Rizal Provincial Registry.

Manahan and Antonio entered into a Leasehold Agreement whereby the latter undertook to cultivate the subject parcels for an annual rental of 70 cavans of dried, cleaned and good quality palay, each weighing 44 kilos.

Manahan filed complaints before the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) against Antonio, for such violations of the Leasehold Agreement as non-payment/remittance of the stipulated rentals despite demands.

Specifically denying the material allegations of the complaint, Antonio averred, among others, that he remitted the stipulated rentals regularly, except for the year 1993 when Manahan refused to accept the same.

Provincial Adjudicator rendered a decision in favor of Manahan. On appeal, DARAB ordered respondent to respect tenants peaceful possession and cultivation of the said land. However, DARAB subsequently set aside its initial ruling and reinstated PARADs decision. CA likewise upheld the same.

ISSUE:

Whether or not tenant petitioner is justified to be ejected from his peaceful possession and cultivation of the disputed land.

HELD:

An agricultural leasehold relationship is said to exist upon the concurrence of the following essential requisites: (1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; (2) the subject matter of the relationship is agricultural land; (3) there is consent between the parties to the relationship; (4) the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production; (5) there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and (6) the harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee. Once the tenancy relationship is established, the tenant is entitled to security of tenure and cannot be ejected by the landlord unless ordered by the court for causes provided by law. In recognition and protection of the tenants right to security of tenure, the burden of proof is upon the agricultural lessor to show the existence of the lawful causes for ejectment or dispossession.

The rule is settled that failure to pay the lease rentals must be willful and deliberate in order to be considered as ground for dispossession of an agricultural tenant. Perusal of the record shows that Antonios failure to pay and/or incurrence of shortages from the stipulated annual lease rentals of 70 Cavans of palay weighing 40 Kilos cannot be considered willful and deliberate. The foregoing disquisition notwithstanding, the Court found Antonios dispossession, however, still warranted by his repeated violations of the terms of the Leasehold Agreement which prohibited, among other matters, the cultivation of other plants on Manahans properties, the expansion of the tenants dwelling as well as the non-synchronized plantings and harvests thereon.

Fealty to the fact that "R.A. No. 3844 does not operate to take away completely every landowners rights to his land" or "authorize the agricultural lessee to act in an abusive or excessive manner in derogation of the landowners rights" impelled the court to uphold Antonios dispossession. "Although the agrarian laws afford the opportunity for the landless to break away from the vicious cycle of having to perpetually rely on the kindness of others, a becoming modesty demands that this kindness should at least be reciprocated, in whatever small way, by those benefited by them. Hence, the petition was denied.

CASIMIRO DEVELOPMENT vs. MATEO, GR 175485

FACTS:

The subject of this case is a registered parcel of land with an area of 6,693 square meters, more or less, located in Barrio Pulang Lupa, Las Pias City, that was originally owned by Isaias Lara, the respondents maternal grandfather. Upon the death of Lara, the property passed on to his children, and a grandson. The co-heirs effected the transfer of the full and exclusive ownership to one of the surviving sibling and who was the mother of herein respondent.

Thereafter, with the agreement of the entire Lara-Mateo family, a deed of sale covering the property was executed in favor of daughter Laura, who applied for land registration. After the application was granted, Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 6386 was issued in Lauras sole name.

In due course, the property now covered by OCT No. 6386 was used as collateral to secure a succession of loans. In the end, China Bank foreclosed the mortgage, and consolidated its ownership of the property after Pe failed to redeem. Thus, TCT No. (99527) T-11749-A was issued in the name of China Bank. Petitioner CDC and China Bank negotiated and eventually came to terms on the purchase of the property, with China Bank executing a deed of conditional sale for the purpose.

In the meanwhile, Felicidad died intestate. CDC brought an action for unlawful detainer in the MTC of Las Pias City against the respondents siblings and the other occupants of the property. Therein, the defendants maintained that the MTC did not have jurisdiction over the action because the land was classified as agricultural; that the jurisdiction belonged to the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB); that they had been in continuous and open possession of the land even before World War II and had presumed themselves entitled to a government grant of the land; and that CDCs title was invalid, considering that the land had been registered before its being declared alienable. MTC ruled in favor of CDC. On appeal, RTC resolved against CDC but CA found favor in it.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the title of Laura over the subject land is indefeasible.

HELD:

There is no doubt that the land in question, although once a part of the public domain, has already been placed under the Torrens system of land registration. The Government is required under the Torrens system of registration to issue an official certificate of title to attest to the fact that the person named in the certificate is the owner of the property therein described, subject to such liens and encumbrances as thereon noted or what the law warrants or reserves. The objective is to obviate possible conflicts of title by giving the public the right to rely upon the face of the Torrens certificate and to dispense, as a rule, with the necessity of inquiring further. The Torrens system gives the registered owner complete peace of mind, in order that he will be secured in his ownership as long as he has not voluntarily disposed of any right over the covered land.

The land in question has been covered by a Torrens certificate of title (OCT No. 6386 in the name of Laura, and its derivative certificates) before CDC became the registered owner by purchase from China Bank. In all that time, neither the respondent nor his siblings opposed the transactions causing the various transfers. In fact, the respondent admitted in his complaint that the registration of the land in the name of Laura alone had been with the knowledge and upon the agreement of the entire Lara-Mateo family. It is unthinkable, therefore, that the respondent, fully aware of the exclusive registration in her sister Lauras name, allowed more than 20 years to pass before asserting his claim of ownership for the first time through this case. Making it worse for him is that he did so only after CDC had commenced the ejectment case against his own siblings.

LANDBANK vs. LISTANA, GR 168105

FACTS:

Respondent is the owner of a 246.0561-hectare land located at Inlagadian, Casiguran, Sorsogon, which was voluntarily offered for sale to the government under the (CARP) pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657.

Petitioner (LBP) valued the 240.9066 hectares for acquisition at P5,871,689.03. Since the respondent rejected the said amount, a summary proceeding for determination of just compensation was conducted by the (DAR). Respondent wrote LBP requesting the release of payment of the cash portion of the "accepted x x x 151.1419 has. with an equivalent valuation of P5,607,874.69." Consequently, a Deed of Transfer was executed by respondent over the said portion of his landholding in consideration of payment received from the transferee Republic of the Philippines consisting of cash (P1,078,877.54) and LBP bonds (P2,747,858.60).

DAR Provincial Adjudicator rendered a decision fixing the amount of just compensation at P10,956,963.25 for the entire acquired area of 240.9066 hectares. Almost a year later, petitioner filed before the RTC of Sorsogon, a petition for judicial determination of just compensation. Petitioner argued that the PARADs valuation is unacceptable. The trial court issued the order dismissing the petition for having been filed almost one year from receipt of the copy of the PARADs decision. The CA dismissed petitioners appeal from the SACs dismissal of its petition for judicial determination of just compensation for failure to adequately explain its failure to abide by the rules and "its loss of appellate recourse cannot be revived by invoking the mantra of liberality.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the SAC may take cognizance of the petition for determination of just compensation which is filed beyond the prescribed 15-day reglementary period after the PARAD rendered its valuation in a summary administrative proceeding.

HELD:

While a petition for the fixing of just compensation with the SAC is not an appeal from the agrarian reform adjudicators decision but an original action, the same has to be filed within the 15-day period stated in the DARAB Rules; otherwise, the adjudicators decision will attain finality. This rule is not only in accord with law and settled jurisprudence but also with the principles of justice and equity. Verily, a belated petition before the SAC, e.g., one filed a month, or a year, or even a decade after the land valuation of the DAR adjudicator, must not leave the dispossessed landowner in a state of uncertainty as to the true value of his property.

Although the land valuation cases decided by the adjudicator are now appealable to the Board, such rule could not change the clear import of Section 57 of RA No. 6657 that the original and exclusive jurisdiction to determine just compensation is in the RTC. Thus, Section 57 authorizes direct resort to the SAC in cases involving petitions for the determination of just compensation.

However, herein petitioner LBP admitted its "thoughtless" filing of the petition before the SAC more than 100 days after notice of the denial of its motion for reconsideration of the PARADs decision fixing the just compensation for the subject property. Petitioner did not offer any explanation for its tardiness and neglect, and simply reiterated the great prejudice to the agrarian reform fund with the erroneous inclusion in the PARADs valuation of the 151.1419 hectares already conveyed to the government.

DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM vs. PHILIPPINE COMMUNICATION SATELLITE, GR 152640

FACTS:

PHILCOMSAT is the owner of a parcel of land situated in Pinugay, Baras, Rizal, where its Philippine Space Communications Center (PSCC) is located. The PSCC, which principally consists of herein respondents satellite earth station, serves as the communications gateway of the Philippines to more than two-thirds of the world. Incidentally, the property had been planted with fruit trees, rice and corn by farmers occupying the surrounding areas of the PSCC.

Pursuant to the decree, the Ministry of National Defense promulgated the Revised Rules and Regulations to Implement P.D. No. 1845 dated 30 April 1982, as amended, Declaring the Philippine Earth Station (PES) Security Zone. In 1992, a Notice of Coverage was sent to PHILCOMSAT by petitioner DAR informing the former that the land in question shall be placed under CARPs compulsory acquisition scheme. PHILCOMSAT then wrote to DAR seeking an exemption of the subject property from CARP coverage, but the latter denied the same.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the subject property of PHILCOMSAT which had been declared a security zone under P.D. No. 1845, as amended by P.D. No. 1848, can be subjected to CARP.

HELD:

P.D. No. 1845, as amended by P.D. No. 1848, was issued way before the effectivity of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988. The law, in effect, by declaring the area a security zone, has granted to the Ministry of National Defense the control and administration of the same. Upon the passage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law which became effective on July 15, 1988, all public and private agricultural lands, and other lands of public domain suitable for agriculture, regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, were declared subject to its coverage.

Although the area in question which is included within the security zone is agricultural, the same should be exempt from CARP coverage by virtue of P.D. No. 1845, as amended, which, as stated earlier, declared the area to be a security zone under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of National Defense.

It is evident from the very wording of the law that the government recognized the crucial role of PHILCOMSATs operations to national security, thereby necessitating the protection of its operations from unnecessary and even anticipated disruption.

Section 10 of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law or R.A. No. 6657, as amended, provides that lands actually, directly and exclusively used and found to be necessary for national defense shall be exempt from the coverage of the Act. The determination as to whether or not the subject property is actually, directly, and exclusively used for national defense usually entails a finding of fact which this Court will not normally delve into. Suffice it to state, however, that as a matter of principle, it cannot seriously be denied that the act of securing a vital communication facilities is an act of national defense. Hence, the law, by segregating an area for purposes of a security zone for such facilities, in effect devoted that area to national defense.

PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK vs. BASES CONVERSION DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, GR 173085

FACTS:

BCDA filed several expropriation actions before the branches of the RTC of Angeles City for the acquisition of lands needed to construct the SCTEX. The defendants in this case are the registered owners of the expropriated lands that they acquired as beneficiaries of the CARP. Ten of these cases were raffled off to Branch 58 of the RTC of Angeles City.

Upon learning of the expropriation cases filed, PVB filed a motion to intervene and alleged that the properties actually belonged to Belmonte Agro-Industrial Development Corp. which mortgaged the lands to PVB in 1976. PVB bough the land upon foreclosure but was not able to consolidate ownership in its name. PVBs motion was denied on the ground that the intervention amounted to a third-party complaint that is not allowed in expropriation cases and that it will only serve to delay the proceedings. PVBs motion for reconsideration was also denied by the CA.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA erred in holding that PVB was not entitled to intervene in the expropriation cases before Branch 58 of the Angeles City RTC.

HELD:

PVB's point regarding the authority of the court in expropriation cases to hear and adjudicate conflicting claims over the ownership of the lands involved in such cases is valid. But such rule obviously cannot apply to PVB for the following reasons:1. At the time PVB tried to intervene in the expropriation cases, its conflict with the farmer beneficiaries who held CLOAs, EPs, or TCTs emanating from such titles were already pending before Angeles City RTC Branch 62, a co-equal branch of the same court. Branch 58 had no authority to pre-empt Branch 62 of its power to hear and adjudicate claims that were already pending before it.2. Of course, subsequently, after the CA dismissed PVB's petition on January 26, 2006, the latter filed a motion for reconsideration, pointing out that it had in the meantime already withdrawn the actions it filed with Branch 62 after learning from the decision of the Supreme Court inDepartment of Agrarian Reform v. Cuenca, that jurisdiction over cases involving the annulment of CLOAs and EPs were vested by Republic Act 6657 in the DARAB.

REPUBLIC vs. LOPEZ, GR 178895

FACTS:

Subject of this petition are four (4) parcels of land with an aggregate area of 160.1161 hectares registered in the name of Salvador N. Lopez Agri-Business Corporation. On 1991, Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) issued a Notice of Coverage to petitioner with regards to the aforementioned landholdings which were subsequently placed under Compulsory Acquisition pursuant to R.A. 6657. Petitioner filed with the Provincial Agrarian Reform Office (PARO) an Application for Exemption, as the said parcels of land with a total area of 110.5455 hectares are used for grazing and habitat of petitioners 105 heads of cattle, 5 carabaos, 11 horses, 9 heads of goats and 18 heads of swine, prior to the effectivity of the (CARL). The MARO then conducted an onsite investigation on the two parcels of land confirming the presence of the livestock as enumerated. The DAR Regional Director, after inspecting the properties, denied the application for exemption of Lots 1454-A and 1296 on the ground that it was not clearly shown that the same were actually, directly and exclusively used for livestock raising since in its application, petitioner itself admitted that it needs the lots for additional grazing area, and such was affirmed by the DAR on appeal. The application for exemption, however of the other two (2) parcels of land was approved. The CA partially granted the SNLABC Petition and excluded the two (2) parcels of land from coverage of the CARL.However, it upheld the Decisions of the Regional Director and the DAR Secretary denying the application for exemption with respect to Lots 1454-A and 1296. These lots were already covered by a new title under the name of the Republic of thePhilippines(RP T-16356).

ISSUE:

Whether the subject lands of SNLABC can be considered grazing lands for its livestock business and are thus exempted from the coverage of the CARL.

HELD:InLuz Farms v. Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform, the Court declared unconstitutional the CARL provisions that included lands devoted to livestock under the coverage of the CARP. The transcripts of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 on the meaning of the word "agricultural" showed that it was never the intention of the framers of the Constitution to include the livestock and poultry industry in the coverage of the constitutionally mandated agrarian reform program of the government. Thus, lands devoted to the raising of livestock, poultry and swine have been classified as industrial, not agricultural, and thus exempt from agrarian reform.

Under the rules then prevailing, it was the (MARO) who was primarily responsible for investigating the legal status, type and areas of the land sought to be excluded; and for ascertaining whether the area subject of the application for exemption had been devoted to livestock-raising as of15 June 1988. As the primary official in charge of investigating the land sought to be exempted as livestock land, the MAROs findings on the use and nature of the land, if supported by substantial evidence on record, are to be accorded greater weight, if not finality. The Court generally accords great respect, if not finality, to factual findings of administrative agencies because of their special knowledge and expertise over matters falling under their jurisdiction. Hence, the Court looks with favor on the expertise of the MARO in determining whether livestock-raising on the Lopez lands has only been recently conducted or has been a going concern for several years already. Absent any clear showing of grave abuse of discretion or bias, the findings of the MARO - as affirmed by the DAR Regional Director - are to be accorded great probative value, owing to the presumption of regularity in the performance of his official duties.

MENDOZA vs. GERMINO, GR 165676

FACTS:

THE petitioner fileda complaint with the (MTC) of Sta. Rosa, Nueva Ecija against respondent Narciso Germino for forcible entry, claiming that they were the registered owners of a five-hectare parcel of land in Soledad, Sta. Rosa, Nueva Ecija (subject property). On his answer, respondent claimed, among others, that his brother, was the plaintiffs' agricultural lessee and he merely helped the latter in the cultivation as a member of the immediate farm household. After several postponements, the plaintiffs filed a motion to remand the case to the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), in view of the tenancy issue raised by respondent Narciso. The MTC issued an order remanding the case to the DARAB for further proceedings. PARAD found that the respondents were mere usurpers of the subject property, and ordered the respondents to vacate the subject property, and pay the plaintiffs 500 cavans of palay as actual damages. On appeal to DARAB, respondent argued that the case should have been dismissed because the MTC's referral to the DARAB was void with the enactment of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657. DARAB affirmed the PARAD decision. CA, however, set aside the DARAB decision and remanded the case to the MTC for further proceedings.

ISSUE:

Whether the MTC or the DARAB has jurisdiction over the case.

HELD:

The CA committed no reversible error in setting aside the DARAB decision. While we lament the lapse of time this forcible entry case has been pending resolution, we are not in a position to resolve the dispute between the parties since the evidence required in courts is different from that of administrative agencies.

It is a basic rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the allegations in the complaint.It is determined exclusively by the Constitution and the law. It cannot be conferred by the voluntary act or agreement of the parties, or acquired through or waived, enlarged or diminished by their act or omission, nor conferred by the acquiescence of the court. Well to emphasize, it is neither for the court nor the parties to violate or disregard the rule, this matter being legislative in character. Under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691, the MTC shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer. Furthermore, allegation of tenancy does not divest the MTC of jurisdiction.

Under Section 50 of R.A. No. 6657, as well as Section 34 of Executive Order No. 129-A, the DARAB has primary and exclusive jurisdiction, both original and appellate, to determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes involving the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, and other agrarian laws and their implementing rules and regulations.

An agrarian dispute refers to any controversy relating to, among others, tenancy over lands devoted to agriculture. For a case to involve an agrarian dispute, the following essential requisites of an agricultural tenancy relationship must be present: (1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant; (2) the subject is agricultural land; (3) there is consent; (4) the purpose is agricultural production; (5) there is personal cultivation; and (6) there is sharing of harvest or payment of rental.

APO FRUITS CORPORATION vs. LANDBANK, GR 164195

FACTS:

Petitioners are registered owners of five parcels of agricultural lands located in Davao Province, which they voluntarily offered to sell to the government. Upon initial valuation of the LBP, petitioners considered such as unreasonably low and inadequate as just compensation for the properties and thus rejected the valuation. DAR then requested LBP to deposit the amounts equivalent to the LBP valuations in the names of petitioners. Thereafter, new TCTs over the lands were issued in the name of the Republic of the Philippines, and CLOAs were subsequently issued to farmer-beneficiaries. Petitioners, then, filed a complaint for the determination of just compensation with the DARAB but despite the lapse of 10 years, the latter failed and refused to render decision on the valuation of the disputed lands, which prompted petitioners to proceed with the RTC as Special Agrarian Court for the determination of just compensation. The trial court set the just compensation to be paid and fixed the interest due on the balance of the compensation due at 12% per annum. CA reversed the decision on appeal.

ISSUE:

Under whose jurisdiction is the determination of the final just compensation proper?How is the value of just compensation determined?

HELD:

It is now settled that the valuation of property in eminent domain is essentially a judicial function which is vested with the RTC acting as Special Agrarian Court. The same cannot be lodged with administrative agencies and may not be usurped by any other branch or official of the government.

On the issue determination of just compensation, Section 17 of Republic Act No. 6657, which is particularly relevant, providing as it does the guideposts for the determination of just compensation, reads, as follows:Sec. 17. Determination of Just Compensation. In determining just compensation, the cost of acquisition of the land, the current value of like properties, its nature, actual use and income, the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declarations, and the assessment made by government assessors shall be considered. The social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farm-workers and by the Government to the property as well as the non-payment of taxes or loans secured from any government financing institution on the said land shall be considered as additional factors to determine its valuation.

The RTC provided the following elucidation in its assailed decision:The recommendation of the Commissioners Report for a value of P85.00 per sq.m. or P850,000.00 per hectare (sic) is founded on evidence. The schedule of market values of the City of Tagum as per its 1993 and 1994 Revision of Assessment and Property Classification (Exhibit "J-6" and "CC-6") give the lowest value for residential land at P100/sq.m. for 4th class residential land in 1993. In 1994, it gave the lowest value of P80.00/sq.m. for barangay residential lot. It appears that certain portions of the land in question have been classified as Medium Industrial District (Exhibit "J-4" and "CC-4"). The lowest value as for industrial land, 3rd class in a barangay is P130.00 sq.m. The average of these figures, using the lowest values in Exhibit "6" and "CC-6" yields the figure of P103.33 which is even higher by 22.2% than that recommended by the Commissioners. It is even of judicial notice that assessments made by local governments are much lower than real market value. Likewise, the value of the improvements thereon, not even considered in the average of P103.33. If considered, this will necessarily result in a higher average value.Thus, the value of just compensation as determined by the trial court is deemed proper and equitable.

LAKEVIEW GOLF AND COUNTRY CLUB vs. LUZVIMIN SAMAHANG NAYON, GR 171253

FACTS:

Petitioner was the registered owner of a 60-hectare parcel of land located Cavite, as evidenced by TCT No. T-11026. On July 6, 1991, the MARO issued a Notice of Coverage under the CARP of the subject property for acquisition and distribution to private respondents as farmer-beneficiaries. On March 17, 1992, the DAR Regional Director for Region IV served a Notice of Acquisition on petitioner.

Petitioner protested the coverage on the grounds that the subject property is not agricultural having been projected as a golf course prior to 1988, that the development for its conversion and utilization has already been commenced, that it is generally mountainous with major portions having a slope of over 18% and minimal topsoil, and that it has no tenant or farmworker since the alleged farmer-beneficiaries are mere intruders who entered the subject property after the enactment of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law in violation of Section 73 thereof. The DAR Secretary denied petitioners protest and directed to proceed with the acquisition of the subject property. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was denied. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which was dismissed for lack of merit. Petitioners petition for review with this Court was also denied.

Meanwhile, the DAR issued collective CLOA No. 00141945 in favor of private respondents, and was subsequently registered with the Register of Deeds of Cavite. Petitioner thereafter filed with the Office of the PARAD a petition for cancellation of certificates of land ownership award and reconveyance of the subject property. Private respondents prayed for the dismissal of the petition on the grounds of res judicata and lack of cause of action.

Respondents appealed to the DARAB, but the latter ruled that it has no jurisdiction to adjudicate regarding the issue of the coverage of the subject property under the CARP, the same being within the exclusive prerogative of the DAR Secretary.It also declared as valid the CLOA issued in favor of private respondents due to petitioners failure to overcome the presumption of regularity of official functions by government employees and officials.

ISSUE:

Does the DARAB have jurisdiction to adjudicate the issue regarding the coverage of the subject property under the CARP?

HELD:

It is settled that jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law.Section 50of R.A. No. 6657 and Section 17 of E.O. No. 229 vests in the DAR the primary and exclusive jurisdiction, both original and appellate, to determine and adjudicate all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform. Through E.O. No. 129-A, the President of the Philippines created the DARAB and authorized it to assume the powers and functions of the DAR pertaining to the adjudication of agrarian reform cases.

At first glance, in the present case, it would appear that jurisdiction lies with the DARAB. The petition before the PARAD sought the cancellation of private respondents collective CLOA which had already been registered by the Register of Deeds of Cavite. However, the material averments of the petition invoking exemption from CARP coverage constrained the court to have a second look.

Significantly, the DAR Secretary had already denied petitioners protest and determined that the subject property was covered by the CARP. Such ruling was even affirmed by the Court of Appeals and this Court. Absent palpable error by these bodies, of which the Court finds none, their determination as to the coverage of the subject property under the CARP is controlling. Thus, petitioner cannot now invoke the jurisdiction of the DARAB to pass upon this issue under the guise of having the issued collective CLOA cancelled.

LANDBANK vs. HEIRS OF HONORATO DE LEON, GR 164025 FACTS:

Respondents are the heirs of the registered owner of an agricultural land situated at Nueva Ecija with an area measuring 36.1238 hectares. It was acquired by the DAR and placed under the coverage of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 27. Respondents received the notice of coverage sometime in 1988. DAR adopted petitioners exhibits, among them a DAR order for petitioner to pay respondents the amount of P195,971.60. Also submitted in evidence were a Certification showing that the total compensation in the amount ofP195,971.60 due respondents had been deposited in cash and bonds and a letter informing respondents that the balance of their claim remained atP706,754.00, inclusive of interest. In arriving at the amount of just compensation, the SAC used a value ofP175.00 or a total compensation value of P1,896,499.50, as the government support price forpalaybased on the certification by the provincial manager of the NFA in Cabanatuan City. Petitioner filed an appeal arguing that just compensation should be fixed based on the formula in P.D. No. 27 in relation to Executive Order No. 228, providing a government support price ofP35.00. Using the said formula petitioner prayed that just compensation be fixed atP706,754.90. Respondents questioned the authority of the Court of Appeals to give due course to the appeal, considering that the compromise judgment had not been set aside under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court. The Court of Appeals affirmed its jurisdiction to take cognizance of petitioners appeal.

ISSUE:

How is the value of just compensation determined in the instant case?

HELD:

On 15 June 1988, the CARL or R.A. No. 6657 was enacted to promote special justice to the landless farmers and provide a more equitable distribution and ownership of land with due regard to the rights of landowners to just compensation and to the ecological needs of the nation. Section 4 of the same act provides that the CARL shall cover all public and private agricultural lands including other lands of the public domain suitable for agriculture. Section 75 states that the provisions of P.D. No. 27 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229, and other laws not inconsistent with R.A. No. 6657 shall have suppletory effect. Furthermore, in Land Bank of the Philippines v. Heirs of Domingo, the Court stressed the duty of the Court to balance the interests of both the landowner and the farmer-beneficiaries, to wit: I. Section 9, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that no private property shall be taken for public use without just compensation. As a concept in the Bill of Rights, just compensation is defined as the fair market value of the property as between one who receives, and one who desires to sell.II. Section 4, Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution mandates that the redistribution of agricultural lands shall be subject to the payment of just compensation. The deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission on this subject reveal that just compensation should not also make an insurmountable obstacle to a successful agrarian reform. Hence, the landowners right to just compensation should be balanced with agrarian reform. In Land Bank v. Court of Appeals, we declared that it is the duty of the court to protect the weak and the underprivileged, but this duty should not be carried out to such an extent as to deny justice to the landowner whenever truth and justice happen to be on his side.When the passage of R.A. No. 6657 supervened before the payment of just compensation, the provisions of R.A. No. 6657 on just compensation would be applicable. Pertinently, Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657 provides:Sec. 17. Determination of Just Compensation.In determining just compensation, the cost of acquisition of the land, the current value of the like properties, its nature, actual use and income, the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declarations, and the assessments made by government assessors shall be considered. The social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers and by the Government to the property as well as the non-payment of taxes or loans secured from any government financing institution on the said land shall be considered as additional factors to determine its valuation.In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Celada, the Court ruled that the factors enumerated under Section 17, R.A. No. 6657 had already been translated into a basic formula by the DAR pursuant to its rule-making power under Section 49 of R.A. No. 6657. Thus, the Court held in Celada that the formula outlined in DAR A.O. No. 5, series of 1998 should be applied in computing just compensation.OCTAVIO vs. PEROVANO, GR 172400

FACTS:

Respondent filed a Complaint for Forcible Entry with Damages and Prayer for Immediate Issuance of TRO or Writ of Preliminary Injunction against petitioners, and (MARO) Dolores Dolores before the MTCC. In his complaint, respondent alleged he is the lawful and registered owner of lot subject of this case, comprising an area of 48,693 square meters, more or less.He averred that petitioners, upon the instruction and direction, and in connivance and conspiracy with Dolores, by threat, intimidation, strategy and stealth, entered the land, plowed it and started planting sugarcane plants inspite of efforts to prohibit them from trespassing on the property.

In their Answer, petitioners denied respondents allegations and argued that the land was voluntarily offered for sale by respondents mother, to the DAR. By reason of the Voluntary Offer to Sell (VOS), the landowner placed the land under the coverage of Republic Act No. 6657. They further alleged that they were among those identified and qualified as farmer-beneficiaries of the land. Accordingly, petitioners argue that respondents mother ceased to be the owner of the land and it is not true that respondent is still the lawful and registered owner of the landholding. Petitioners add that a Memorandum of Agreementwas executed between the landowner and the farmer-beneficiaries wherein they agreed that the farmer-beneficiaries are free to take possession and cultivate the landholding after payment was made to the landowner by the Land Bank of the Philippines. They posit that there is no iota of doubt that the landholding is within the coverage of CARP and it is only the PARAD which has original and exclusive jurisdiction to entertain any action as per Section 50,Rep. Act No. 6657. They argue that regular courts were already divested of their general jurisdiction to try agrarian reform matters, and the filing of the case is pure and simple harassment with the purpose of preventing or obstructing the implementation of the CARP.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the case is an ejectment suit within the exclusive jurisdiction of the trial court or an agrarian dispute within the exclusive jurisdiction of the DAR.

HELD:

UnderBP 129,as amended by R.A. 7691, the MTC shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer. Under Section 50 of R.A. 6657, the DAR is vested with primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform. Under Section 3(d) of Rep. Act No. 6657, an agrarian dispute refers to any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes concerning farmworkers associations or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements.It includes any controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired under this Act and other terms and conditions of transfer of ownership from landowner to farmworkers, tenants and other agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or lessor and lessee.It refers to any controversy relating to, interalia, tenancy over lands devoted to agriculture.

DARAB ruled thatcomplainants-appellants were not recognized as farmer-beneficiaries of the subject landholding.Their continued possession thereof was through stealth.Even if they were not identified as farmer-beneficiaries and not awarded any CLOA,they arrogated unto themselves the portions of the subject landholding.As admitted by them in the hearing, they came into the land on the premise that they are farmer-beneficiaries.Without waiting for an award of any CLOA, complainants-appellants occupied the landholding.In the process, expropriating the property of the landowner without due process of law, prejudicing the rights of the landowner and the legitimate farmer-beneficiaries who were duly awarded with CLOA.The acts of the complainants-appellants are similar to that of land grabbing. The agrarian reform law is not enacted to give license to anybody to grab somebody elses land. Neither is it enacted to protect the land grabbers or the squatters. Petitioners argument that the case involves an agrarian matter divesting the regular courts of jurisdiction therefore has no merit. They are not farmer-beneficiaries but mere usurpers of the land. Clearly, therefore, the action is one for ejectment and the MTCC has jurisdiction over it.

LANDBANK vs. KUMASSIE PLANTATION, GR 177404

FACTS:

Kumassie Plantation Company Incorporated (KPCI) is the registered owner of 802.2906 hectares of agricultural land situated in Davao del Sur. In 1982, KPCI and Philippine Cocoa Corporation (PCC) entered into a contract of lease whereby the former agreed to lease the said land together with the improvements thereon to the latter for a period of 25 years beginning 15 May 1982. Subsequently, PCC executed a deed of assignment transferring all its rights as lessee under the said contract of lease to Philippine Cocoa Estates Corporation (PCEC).

A portion of the aforementioned land, measuring 457.9952 hectares, planted with coconuts and cocoa (subject land), was compulsorily acquired by the DAR, for distribution to farmer-beneficiaries pursuant to Republic Act No. 6657.The DAR then requested the LBP to determine the value of the subject land. LBP pegged the value of the subject land atP19,140,965.00 or equivalent toP41,792.94 per hectare. DAR offered to KPCI said amount as compensation for the subject land, but it was rejected by the latter for being "unreasonably low." Despite the rejection, the amount was deposited by LBP, upon the instructions of DAR, in the name and for the account of KPCI. KPCI withdrew from LBP the entire amount in cash and bonds.

KPCI filed with the RTC, acting as a Special Agrarian Court, a Complaint against LBP and the DAR for determination and payment of just compensation, and implored the RTC to render judgment fixing the just compensation for the subject land atP160,000.00 per hectare, or equivalent to a total amount ofP73,279,232.00, less the amount which KPCI had previously withdrawn from LBP. RTC valued the subject land at P100,000.00 per hectare. The appellate court sustained the finding of the trial court.

ISSUE:

Whose computation of just compensation is valid: that of the LBP or the RTC?

HELD:

The procedure for the determination of compensation cases under Republic Act No. 6657, as devised by this Court, commences with the valuation by the LBP of the lands taken by the State from private owners under the land reform program.Based on the valuation of the land by the LBP, the DAR makes an offer to the landowner through a written notice.In case the landowner rejects the offer, a summary administrative proceeding is held and, afterwards, depending on the value of the land, the PARAD, RARAD, or DARAB, fixes the price to be paid for the said land.If the landowner still does not agree with the price so fixed, he may bring the matter to the RTC, acting asSpecial Agrarian Court.In the process of determining the just compensation due to landowners, it is a necessity that the RTC takes into account several factors enumerated in Section 17 of Republic Act No. 6657, as amended, to wit:Sec. 17.Determination of Just Compensation. In determining just compensation, the cost of acquisition of the land,the current value of like properties, its nature, actual use and income, the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declarations, and the assessment made by government assessorsshall be considered. Thesocial and economic benefitscontributed by the farmers and the farmworkers and by the Government to the property as well as thenon-payment of taxes or loanssecured from any government financing institution on the said land shall be considered as additional factors to determine its valuation.

Special agrarian courts must resolve just determination cases judiciously and with utmost observance of Section 17 of Republic Act No. 6657 and the administrative orders issued by the DAR to implement said statutory provision. The special agrarian court cannot ignore, without violating Republic Act No. 6657, the formula provided by the DAR for the determination of just compensation. Thus, the Court rejected the valuation fixed by the RTC because it failed to follow the DAR formula.

MAYLEM vs. ELLANO, GR 162721

FACTS:

Since 1963, Bonifacio Abad had been tenanting a piece of private agricultural land less than a hectare in size (0.8497 hectare) and situated in Santiago City, Isabela under a leasehold agreement he had entered into with petitioners husband and the latters parents. Eight months before Segundinos demise, the property was awarded to Abad by operation of P.D. 27. An emancipation patent was issued by virtue of two certificates of land transfer. It appears that petitioner had instituted a certain Morsiento as tenant-farmer to cultivate the subject land after Abad surrendered his possession,and that petitioner had been attempting to spare her landholdings from the operation of the agrarian reform laws. Petitioner refused to return possession of the property. It came to Abads knowledge that the same was mortgaged to a third person, so he filed a Complaintfor recovery of possession with the Provincial Adjudicator of DAR. On appeal, the DARAB adopted the findings and conclusions of the Provincial Adjudicator. Undaunted, petitioner lodged an appeal with the Court of Appeals (CA), but to no avail. The appellate court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the decision of the DARAB.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Abad is justifiably disposed of possession of the subject land on his alleged abandonment of such.

HELD:

Abandonment or neglect, as a ground for the cancellation of an emancipation patent or certificate of land award, according to Castellano vs. Spouses Francisco,requires a clear and absolute intention to renounce a right or a claim, or to abandon a right or property coupled with an external act by which that intention is expressed or carried into effect.

Intention to abandon, as held inCorpuz v. Grospe,implies a departure, with the avowed intent of never returning, resuming or claiming the right and the interest that have been abandoned. It consists in any one of these conditions: (a) failure to cultivate the lot due to reasons other than the non-suitability of the land to agricultural purposes, for at least two (2) calendar years, and to pay the amortizations for the same period; (b) permanent transfer of residence by the beneficiary and his family, which has rendered him incapable of cultivating the lot; or (c) relinquishment of possession of the lot for at least two (2) calendar years and failure to pay the amortization for the same period.None of the instances cited above obtains in this case.

As found by the Court of Appeals, it is thus implausible that the surrender of the land by Abad could be interpreted as abandonment in contemplation of the law, in view of the understanding between him and petitioner that the surrender of possession would be merely temporary. Suffice it to say that the allegation of abandonment is negated by the undisputed fact that Abad actually demanded the return of the property to him after the lapse of the one-year period. Indeed, petitioners act of dispossessing Abad of the land awarded to him was merely calculated to impair the latters vested right of ownership.

More importantly, as holder of an emancipation patent, Abad is bound by the proscription against transfers of land awards to third persons, which is prohibited by law. Paragraph 13 of P.D. No. 27 materially states:As a final note, it is useful to reiterate the appellate courts conclusion that the registration of Abads emancipation patents with the Register of Deeds in accordance with law had indeed put petitioner on notice of the fact that Abad had already acquired a vested right of ownership of the landholding under the agrarian reform law.

DAR vs. TONGSON, GR 171674

FACTS:

Respondent is the owner of four parcels of agricultural land located in Davao City. Since the properties were primarily devoted to rice and corn under a system of lease-tenancy agreement, the same were brought under the coverage of PD 27, otherwise known as Tenants Emancipation Decree.

Sometime in 1988, the petitioner offered to pay respondentP9,000.00 per hectare for three of her properties. Respondent, however, did not act on the offer as she was then leaving for the United States for her husbands medical treatment. In 1989, upon her return to Davao, respondent was surprised to learn that, except for the portions devoted to orchards and planted with coconuts, all her properties were taken over by petitioner.

Respondent alleged that petitioner summarily took her properties without any notice and had fixed the acquisition cost for the same atP1,500.00 per hectare andP800.00 per hectare. Lastly, respondent alleged that petitioner subsequently issued Emancipation Patents to the farmer-beneficiaries. Petitioner denied the allegations and averred that the properties were placed under the coverage of the agrarian reform program; hence, not summarily taken. Likewise, petitioner claimed that respondent was notified of the proceedings when they made the initial offer to her. Lastly, petitioner claimed that the acquisition cost was arrived at based on PD 27 in relation to EO 228, and that the subsequent issuance of Emancipation Patents was part of the implementation of the program. Respondent thereafter filed a Petitionfor the determination of just compensation before the Special Agrarian Court (SAC) of Davao City.

The SAC, in the determination of just compensation, applied the provisions of PD 27 and EO 228. On appeal, CA ruled that RA 6657, was applicable in the determination of just compensation.

ISSUE:

In the determination of just compensation, what law shall govern: PD 27 or RA 6657?

HELD:

Clearly, PD 27 and RA 6657 provide different factors for the computation of just compensation. The former uses average crop harvest as a consideration, whereas, the latter uses the current value of like properties, its nature, actual use and income, the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declarations, and the assessment made by government assessors as factors for consideration in determining just compensation.

In the case at bar, it is undisputed by the parties that the lands were acquired under PD 27. Moreover, it is also undisputed that just compensation has not yet been settled prior to the passage of RA 6657. The issue, once the subject of a number of cases, has finally been settled by this Court in recent years. It has been ruled that, if just compensation was not settled prior to the passage of RA 6657, it should be computed in accordance with the said law, although the property was acquired under PD 27.

MONTANEZ vs. PARAD, GR 183142

FACTS:

Petitioner was the owner of two (2) parcels of land with an aggregate area of 35.5998 hectares, both located at Negros Occidental. In October 1999, the DAR caused the publication of a Notice of Land Coverage for Negros Occidental,and later, the DAR notifiedpetitioner that her property, to the extent of 32.4257 hectares, has been placed under CARP and offered to compensate her the amount of PhP 5,592,3001.60 based on the valuation ofthe Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP), subject to price adjustment to conform to the actual area coverage. Albeit petitioner rejected the offer, LBP later issued in her favor a certification of deposit, in cash and in bonds, corresponding to the amount aforestated. DAR secured from the Negros Occidental Registry the cancellation of petitioners titles and the issuance, in lieu thereof, titles in the name of the Republic. Later on the same day, CLOAswere issued. Evidently, such notations on the CLOAs were erroneous, the aggregate land area stated in the CLOAs being larger than what was reflected in the titles whence the CLOAs emanate.In any event, said CLOAs were registered in the name of, and delivered to, individual respondents as CARP beneficiaries.Petitioner forthwith filed a PetitionPARAB for the annulment/cancellation of titles in view of the CLOAs on the ground of irregular and anomalous issuance thereof. However, said petition was denied. Therefrom, petitioner went straight to the CA via a petition for certiorari under Section 54 of RA 6657. Public respondents sought the dismissal of this recourse on the ground of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies. CA, on the holding that the petitioner is entitled to the rectification of the technical error referred to above, but that the DAR is the proper office to effect the correction, rendered a decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner failed to observe the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.

HELD:

Following the lessons ofPaatandAsia International Auctioneers, Inc., the denial of the instant petition is clearly indicated. It bears to stress at the outset that, as aptly observed by the CA, there is no challenge from either of the parties to the jurisdiction of the PARAB or the provincial agrarian adjudicator to take cognizance of the basic petition of petitioner for annulment/cancellation of titles.Just as well. For, the DARAB and its regional and provincial adjudication boards have jurisdiction to adjudicate all agrarian disputes and controversies or incidents involving the implementation of CARP under RA 6657 and other agrarian law and their implementing rules and regulations. Such jurisdiction of DARAB includes cases involving the issuance, correction, and cancellation of CLOAs and EPs which are registered with the Land Registration Authority.For the purpose of applying the rule on exhaustion, the remedies available to the petitioner are clearly set out in theDARAB 2003 Rules of Procedure, which took effect on January 17, 2004. Under Section 1.6, Rule II, the adjudicator shall have primary and exclusive jurisdiction to determine and adjudicatex x xcasesx x xinvolving the correction,x x xcancellation, secondary and subsequent issuances of [CLOAs] and [EPs] which are registered with the Land Registration Authority. According to the succeeding Section 2 in relation to Rule XIV, the proper remedy from an adverse final resolution, order, or resolution on the merits of the adjudicator is an appeal to the DARAB Proper which, among others, require the filing of a notice of appeal and payment of an appeal fee. And from thedecision of the DARAB Proper, an appeal may be taken to the CA pursuant to Rule XV.

Given the above perspective, the CA acted correctly and certainly within its sound discretion when it denied, in its amended decision, petitioners petition for certiorari to nullify the PARADs decision. Under the grievance procedure set forth in the DARAB Rules of Procedure, PARAD Alegarios decision was appealable to the DARAB Proper. The CAs appellate task comes laterto review the case disposition of the DARAB Proper when properly challenged.MAGO vs. BARBIN, GR 173923

FACTS:

Respondent filed with the PARAD of Camarines Norte an action for Cancellation of Emancipation Patents, Disqualification of Tenant-Beneficiary, Repossession and Damages, alleging that she is the owner in fee simple of the subject irrigated Riceland, with an area of 4.7823 hectares, and that petitioners were tenants of the subject landholding. Respondent further alleged that petitioners violated the terms of their leasehold contracts when they failed to pay lease rentals for more than two years, which is a ground for their dispossession of the landholding. On the other hand, petitioners alleged that the subject landholding was placed under the Operation Land Transfer program of the government pursuant to PD 27. Respondents original title was then cancelled and the subject landholding was transferred to petitioners who were issued Emancipation Patents by the DAR. The Transfer Certificates of Title issued to petitioners emanating from the Emancipation Patents were registered with the Registry of Deeds. Petitioners averred that prior to the issuance of the Emancipation Patents, they already delivered their lease rentals to respondent. They further alleged that after the issuance of the Emancipation Patents, the subject landholding ceased to be covered by any leasehold contract.

DARAB held that when the subject landholding was placed under the Operation Land Transfer, the tenancy relationship between the parties ceased and the tenant-beneficiaries were no longer required to pay lease rentals to the landowner. However, when petitioners entered into an agreement with respondent for a direct payment scheme embodied in theDeeds of Transfer, petitioners obligated themselves to pay their amortizations to respondent who is the landowner. CA held that the mere issuance of an Emancipation Patent to a qualified farmer-beneficiary is not absolute and can be attacked anytime upon showing of any irregularity in its issuance or non-compliance with the conditions attached to it. The Emancipation Patent is subject to the condition that amortization payments be remitted promptly to the landownerand that failure to comply with this condition is a ground for cancellation.

ISSUE:

Whether or not herein petitioners violated the emancipation patent.

HELD:

The Court has already ruled that the mere issuance of an emancipation patent does not put the ownership of the agrarian reform beneficiary beyond attack and scrutiny.Emancipation patents issued to agrarian reform beneficiaries may be corrected and cancelled for violations of agrarian laws, rules and regulations. In fact, DAR Administrative Order No. 02, series of 1994, which was issued in March 1994, enumerates the grounds for cancellation of registered Emancipation Patents or Certificates of Landownership Award. There is no substantial evidence on record that the petitioners had remitted the amortizations due to the landowner in accordance with their agreed direct payment scheme embodied in their deeds of transfer. In view thereof, the Court has no recourse but to sustain the findings of fact of the agency below.

Well-settled is the rule that only questions of law can be raised in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. The factual findings of the Court of Appeals are conclusive and cannot be reviewed on appeal, provided they are based on substantial evidence.More so in this case where the findings of the Court of Appeals coincide with those of the DARAB, an administrative body with expertise on matters within its specific and specialized jurisdiction.

In the first place, the Emancipation Patents and the Transfer Certificates of Title should not have been issued to petitioners without full payment of the just compensation. Under Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 266,the DAR will issue the Emancipation Patents only after the tenant-farmers have fully complied with the requirements for a grant of title under PD 27. Although PD 27 states that the tenant-farmers are already deemed owners of the land they till, it is understood that full payment of the just compensation has to be made first before title is transferred to them.Thus, Section 6 of EO 228 provides that ownership of lands acquired under PD 27 may be transferred only after the agrarian reform beneficiary has fully paid the amortizations. In this case, both the Court of Appeals and the DARAB found that petitioners have not fully paid the amortizations for the land granted to them. The PARAD had a similar finding when it recommended that the proper recourse of respondent is to file a claim for just compensation. Clearly, the cancellation of the Emancipation Patents issued to petitioners is proper under the circumstances.

RURAL BANK OF DASMARIAS vs. JARIN ET AL, GR 180778 FACTS:

Respondents were awarded Certificates of Land Transfer (CLT) over portions of a parcel of land in Dasmarias, Cavite. Before respondents could be issued Emancipation Patents (EP), they obtained a loan from petitioner, in whose favor they executed a Real Estate Mortgage, the owner thereof Campos, executed a Special Power of Attorney in respondents favor authorizing them to encumber the farm lots. Respondents undertook to surrender their EPs as soon as they were released. In 1990, respondents obtained additional loans from RBDI, secured by a mortgage over the same farm lots. Respondents failed to settle their loans, hence, the mortgages were foreclosed and RBDI purchased the farm lots as the highest bidder. As at that time the EPs were still not yet issued, respondents authorized RBDI to receive them.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a CLT or an EP can be transferred other than through hereditary succession or to the government.

HELD:

Upon the promulgation of Presidential Decree No. 27 onOctober 21, 1972, petitioner was DEEMED OWNER of the land in question.As of that date, he was declared emancipated from the bondage of the soil.As such, he gained the rights to possess, cultivate, and enjoy the landholding for himself.Those rights over that particular property were granted by the government to him and to no other.To insure his continued possession and enjoyment of the property, hecould not, under the law, make any valid form of transferexceptto the government or by hereditary succession, to his successors.x x x The prohibition against transfers to persons other than the heirs of other qualified beneficiaries stems from thepolicy of the Government todevelop generations of farmers to attain its avowed goal to have an adequate and sustained agricultural production.With certitude, such objective will not see the light of day if lands covered by agrarian reform can easily be converted for non-agricultural purposes.

Respondents farm lots subject of the mortgages are thus not subject to foreclosure, except by the Land Bank, because foreclosure contemplates the transfer of ownership over the mortgaged lands

HEIRS OF REYES vs. GARILAO, GR 136466

FACTS:

Petitioners are the registered co-owners of a parcel of land known consisting of an area of 99.1085 hectares and situated in Bataan. Said property was originally owned by the spouses Antonia Reyes and the late Aurelio Reyes (Aurelio), who died in January 21, 1972 (before the effectivity of Presidential Decree No 27). Upon the death of Aurelio, said property passed by succession to petitioners, who divided the same as shown above. On September 21, 1988, emancipation patents were issued to respondents as farmer-beneficiaries over the entire landholding in question. On August 2, 1993, petitioners lodged a petition for the cancellation of the emancipation patents issued to the respondents before the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board San Fernando, Pampanga. Earlier, however, petitioners filed with the DAR, their respective applications for retention at five (5) hectares each, pursuant to Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6657, or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 (RA No. 6657).

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioners right to retention of portions of their landholdings is not foreclosed by any vested right that farmer-beneficiaries may claim.

HELD:

In order to understand the case at bar, this Court shall hereunder discuss the various laws and administrative order pertinent to herein petition and their relation to one another. PD No. 27 decreed the emancipation of tenants from the bondage of the soil, transferring to them the ownership of the land they till. To achieve its purpose, the decree laid down a system for the purchase by tenant-farmers, long recognized as the backbone of the economy, of the lands they were tilling. Owners of rice and corn lands that exceeded the minimum retention area were bound to sell their lands to qualified farmers at liberal terms and subject to conditions. Mor