CASE 1: Pajarillaga vs. CAFACTS: Private respondent Thomas T. Kalangeg filed with the RTC of Bontoc, Mt. Province,, a complaint for a sum of money with damages against petitioner Isidro T. Pajarillaga. On March 10, 1997, private respondent presented his first witness. At the next scheduled hearing, neither petitioner nor his counsel appeared despite notice. Upon private respondent’s motion, the trial court allowed him to present his remaining two witnesses subject to petitioner’s cross-examination on the next scheduled hearing on September 2, 1997. But when the case was called on that date, petitioner and his counsel were again absent.

Upon private respondent’s motion, the trial court declared petitioner to have waived his right of cross-examination and allowed private respondent to make a formal offer of evidence, which the trial court admitted. The trial court scheduled petitioner’s presentation of evidence but the petitioner moved to reset the hearing. The TC granted the motion. Five days before the scheduled hearing, the petitioner filed a Motion for Leave of Court to Take the Deposition of the Defendant Upon Written Interrogatories a. Petitioner resides in Manila which is more than four hundred (400) kilometers from Bontoc, Mt. Province; b. Petitioner is suffering from an illness which prohibits him from doing strenuous activities. 5. Private respondent opposed the motion.

On December 15, 1997, neither petitioner nor his counsel again appeared. Nonetheless, the trial court reset the case to January 12, 1998 for the presentation of petitioner’s evidence. The trial court denied petitioner’s motion. Petitioner’s MR: denied.

CA affirmed. a. Denial of petitioner’s motion was not tainted with grave abuse of discretion since the trial court gave petitioner full opportunity to present his evidence. b. Petitioner’s motion came much too late in the proceedings since private respondent has already rested his case c. The medical certificate which petitioner submitted to validate his allegation of illness merely contained a remark that the “patient is advised to avoid strenuous activity.” It did

not state that the travel from Manila to Mt. Province for the scheduled hearings was too strenuous to endanger petitioner’s health. d. The threats to petitioner’s life by private respondent’s relatives were belatedly alleged only in his motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE: WON the taking of petitioner’s deposition by written interrogatories is proper and should have been granted by the court.

HELD: NO.

RATIO: Deposition is chiefly a mode of discovery, the primary function of which is to supplement the pleadings for the purpose of disclosing the real points of dispute between the parties and affording an adequate factual basis during the preparation for trial. It should be allowed absent any showing that taking it would prejudice any party. It is accorded a broad and liberal treatment and the liberty of a party to make discovery is well-nigh unrestricted if the matters inquired into are otherwise relevant and not privileged, and the inquiry is made in good faith and within the bounds of law. It is allowed as a departure from the accepted and usual judicial proceedings of examining witnesses in open court where their demeanor could be observed by the trial judge, consistent with the principle of promoting just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding; and provided it is taken in accordance with the provisions of the Rules of Court, i.e., with leave of court if summons have been served, and without such leave if an answer has been submitted; and provided further that a circumstance for its admissibility exists. There is nothing in the Rules of Court or in jurisprudence which restricts a deposition to the sole function of being a mode of discovery before trial. Under certain conditions and for certain limited purposes, it may be taken even after trial has commenced and may be used without the deponent being actually called to the witness stand. There is no rule that limits deposition-taking only to the period of pre-trial or before it; no prohibition exists against the taking of depositions after pre-trial. There can be no valid objection to allowing them during the process of executing final and executory judgments, when the material issues of fact have become

numerous or complicated. There is really nothing objectionable, per se, with petitioner availing of this discovery measure after private respondent has rested his case and prior to petitioner’s presentation of evidence. To reiterate, depositions may be taken at any time after the institution of any action, whenever necessary or convenient. But when viewed vis the several postponements made by petitioner for the initial presentation of his evidence, his timing is suspect. The records show that petitioner stopped attending the hearings after private respondent presented his first witness. Petitioner offered no excuse for his and his counsel’s absences. Moreover, the trial court has set four (4) hearing dates for the initial presentation of his evidence. But he merely moved for its resetting without invoking the grounds. Petitioner has not sufficiently shown an “exceptional” or “unusual” case for us to grant leave and reverse the trial and appellate courts. o Under Section 4, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court, depositions may be used for the trial or for the hearing of a motion or an interlocutory proceeding, under the following (c) The deposition of a witness, whether or not a party, may be used by any party for any purpose if the court finds: (1) that the witness is dead; or (2) that the witness resides at a distance more than one hundred (100) kilometers from the place of trial or hearing, or is out of the Philippines, unless it appears that his absence was procured by the party offering the deposition; or (3) that the witness is unable to attend or testify because of age, sickness, infirmity, or imprisonment; or (4) that the party offering the deposition has been unable to procure the attendance of the witness by subpoena; or (5) upon application and notice, that such exceptional circumstances exist as to make it desirable, in the interest of justice and with due regard to the importance of presenting the testimony of witnesses orally in open court, to allow the deposition to be used. Petitioner’s claim of illness: the medical certificate submitted by petitioner merely contained a remark that the “patient is advised to avoid strenuous activity.” It was not alleged that the travel from Manila to Mt. Province for the scheduled hearings was too strenuous to endanger petitioner’s health. • While the rules on discovery are liberally constructed so as to ascertain truth and to expedite the disposal of

cases, the trial court may disallow a deposition if there are valid reasons for so ruling.

CASE 2: SALES vs. SABINOFACTS: Cyril A. Sabino filed an amended complaint for damages against, among others, Jowel Sales, driver of the vehicle involved in the accident which caused the death of respondent’s son, Elbert.

Before any responsive pleading could be filed, respondent, as plaintiff a quo, notified the defendants that he will take the deposition of one Buaneres Corral. The deposition on oral examination of Buaneres Corral was taken before the Clerk of Court of Pasig, in the presence and with the active participation of petitioner’s counsel, Atty. Roldan Villacorta, who even lengthily cross-examined the deponent.

Upon conclusion of her evidentiary presentation, respondent made a Formal Offer of Exhibits,6 among which are Exhibits “DD” and “EE.” Likewise offered in evidence as Exhibit “BB”7 is a certification from the Bureau of Immigration attesting to the May 28, 1996 departure for abroad of Buaneres Corral.

Petitioner opposed the admission of the deposition of Corral and even asked that they be expunged from the records on the ground that the jurisdictional requirements for their admission under Section 4, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court, were not complied with.

TC admitted depositions. MR denied. Petitioner went on certiorari to the CA imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in admitting in evidence the deposition in question. CA denied certiorari, hence this petition.

ISSUES: (1) WON the deposition should be admitted(2) WON the petitioner in cross-examining the deponent during the taking of his deposition waived any and all objections in connection therewith

HELD: (1) No, it shouldn’t be admitted. Caertification does not establish that he has not returned since then and is unavailable to be present in court to personally testify.(2) No, it wasn’t waived.

RATIO: (1) While depositions may be used as evidence in court proceedings, they are generally not meant to be a substitute for the actual testimony in open court of a party or witness. Stated a bit differently, a deposition is not to be used when the deponent is at hand. Indeed, any deposition offered during a trial to prove the facts therein set out, in lieu of the actual oral testimony of the deponent in open court, may be opposed and excluded on the ground of hearsay. However, depositions may be used without the deponent being called to the witness stand by the proponent, provided the existence of certain conditions is first satisfactorily established. Five (5) exceptions for the admissibility of a deposition are listed in Section 4, Rule 23, supra, of the Rules of Court. Among these is when the witness is out of the Philippines.

(2) As a rule, the inadmissibility of testimony taken by deposition is anchored on the ground that such testimony is hearsay, i.e., the party against whom it is offered has no opportunity to cross-examine the deponent at the time his testimony is offered. But as jurisprudence teaches, it matters not that opportunity for cross-examination was afforded during the taking of the deposition; normally, the opportunity for cross-examination must be accorded a party at the time the testimonial evidence is actually presented against him during the trial or hearing. In fine, the act of cross-examining the deponent during the taking of the deposition cannot, without more, be considered a waiver of the right to object to its admissibility as evidence in the trial proper. Participating in the taking of the deposition, but objecting to its admissibility in court as evidence, petitioner did not assume inconsistent positions. He is not, thus, estopped from challenging the admissibility of the deposition just because he participated in the taking thereof.

While errors and irregularities in depositions as to notice, qualifications of the officer conducting the deposition, and manner of taking the deposition are deemed waived if not objected to before or during the taking of the deposition, objections to the competency of a witness or the competency, relevancy, or materiality of testimony may be made for the first time at the trial and need not be made at the time of the taking of the deposition, unless they could be obviated at that point.

CASE 3: ROSETE VS. LIMFACTS: Respondents Juliano Lim and Lilia Lim filed a Complaint for Annulment, Specific Performance with Damages against AFP Retirement and Separation Benefits System (AFP-RSBS), Espreme Realty, Alfredo P. Rosete, Maj. Oscar Mapalo, Chito P. Rosete, BPI, and Register of Deeds of the Province of Mindoro Occidental.

It asked that the Deed of Sale executed by AFP-RSBS covering certain parcels of lands in favor of Espreme Realty and the titles thereof under the name of the latter be annulled; and that the AFP-RSBS and Espreme Realty be ordered to execute the necessary documents to restore ownership and title of said lands to respondents, and that the Register of Deeds be ordered to cancel the titles of said land under the name of Espreme Realty and to transfer the same in the names of respondents.

Respondents filed a Notice to Take Deposition Upon Oral Examination giving notice that on June 18 and 20, 1997, they will cause the deposition of petitioners Oscar Mapalo and Chito Rosete. Petitioners filed an Urgent Ex Parte Motion and Objection to Take Deposition Upon Oral Examination. They argued that the deposition may not be taken without leave of court as no answer has yet been served and the issues have not yet been joined since their Answer was filed ex abudanti cautela.

Moreover, they contend that since there are 2 criminal cases pending before the City Prosecutors of Mandaluyong and Pasig involving the same set of facts as in the present case where respondent Juliano

Lim is the private complainant and petitioners are the respondents, to permit the taking of the deposition would be violative of their right against self-incrimination because by means of the oral deposition, respondents would seek to establish the allegations of fact in the complaint which are also the allegations of fact in the complaint-affidavits in the said criminal cases.

The lower court denied petitioners’ motion and objection to take deposition upon oral examination, and scheduled the taking thereof. MR was denied.

Petitioner’s argument: petitioners refuse to have their depositions taken in the civil case because they allegedly would be incriminating themselves in the criminal cases because the testimony that would be elicited from them may be used in the criminal cases. As defendants in the civil case, it is their claim that to allow their depositions to be taken would violate their constitutional right against self-incrimination because said right includes the right to refuse to take the witness stand.

ISSUE: WON the constitutional right against self incrimination of Mapalo and Rosete would not be violated by the taking of their deposition in the civil case filed in the LC although they are respondents in criminal cases filed by Lim involving the same or identical set of facts.

HELD: No.

RATIO: Only an accused in a criminal case can refuse to take the witness stand. The right to refuse to take the stand does not generally apply to parties in administrative cases or proceedings. The parties thereto can only refuse to answer if incriminating questions are propunded.

It is clear that only an accused in a criminal case can refuse to take the witness stand. The right to refuse to take the stand does not generally apply to parties in administrative cases or proceedings.

The parties thereto can only refuse to answer if incriminating questions are propounded. This Court applied the exception- a party who is not an accused in a criminal case is allowed not to take the witness stand—in administrative cases/ proceedings that partook of the nature of a criminal proceeding or analogous to a criminal proceeding. It is likewise the opinion of the Court that said exception applies to parties in civil actions which are criminal in nature. As long as the suit is criminal in nature, the party thereto can altogether decline to take the witness stand. It is not the character of the suit involved but the nature of the proceedings that controls.

In the case at bar, the case is civil it being a suit for Annulment, Specific Performance with Damages. In order for petitioners to exercise the right to refuse to take the witness stand and to give their depositions, the case must partake of the nature of a criminal proceeding. The case on hand certainly cannot be categorized as such. The fact that there are two criminal cases pending which are allegedly based on the same set of facts as that of the civil case will not give them the right to refuse to take the witness stand and to give their depositions. They are not facing criminal charges in the civil case. Like an ordinary witness, they can invoke the right against self-incrimination only when the incriminating question is actually asked of them. Only if and when incriminating questions are thrown their way can they refuse to answer on the ground of their right against self-incrimination. [Rosete vs. Lim, 490 SCRA 125(2006)]

CASE 4: SIME DARBY EMPLOYEES ASSOC VS. NLRCFACTS: Sime Darby Pilipinas (the Company) declared and implemented a lockout against all the hourly employees of its tire factory on the ground of sabotage and work slowdown. This after failed negotiations with Sime Darby Employees Association (the Union) for the remaining two years of their CBA. The Union contested the lockout before the DOLE-NLRC. Subsequently the company decided to sell its tire manufacturing assets and close the business.

As a result, all employees were terminated, including the petitioners. The company later found a buyer of its assets and business in Goodyear Philippines, Inc. Petitioners filed a complaint for Illegal Dismissal before the DOLE and later a complaint for Unfair Labor Practice (ULP), both cases eventually consolidated. The labor arbiter ordered the parties to submit their respective memorandum but instead of doing this, the Union filed an Appeal Memorandum with a petition for injunction and/or a TRO before the NLRC. The labor arbiter later dismissed the case for lack of merit. It found the lockout valid and legal, and justified by the incidents of continued work slowdown, mass absences, and consistent low production output, high rate of waste and scrap tires and machine breakdown. It also considered the mass termination of all the employees valid as an authorized termination of employment due to closure of the establishment, the company having complied with due process. Petitioners appealed the labor arbiter’s Decision to the NLRC which was also dismissed for lack of merit.

It also ruled that that the labor arbiter could not have lost jurisdiction over the case when petitioners appealed the former’s order since the order was interlocutory in nature and cannot be appealed separately. In the Court of Appeals, the petition was similarly denied. Petitioners reiterate that they were denied due process when they were dismissed right on the day they were handed down their termination letters, without the benefit of the thirty (30)-day notice as required by law, and invoke the Court’s ruling in Serrano v. NLRC; that the labor arbiter had lost jurisdiction over the issue when have already perfected their appeal to the NLRC; and that labor arbiter deprived petitioners of the chance to present their evidence during the formal trial.

ISSUE: WON request for admission should be permitted

HELD: No, it shouldn’t be permitted.

RATIO: A request for admission is a remedy provided by Rule 26 of the Rules of Court, which allows a party to file and serve upon any

other party a written request for the admission of : (i) the genuineness of any material and relevant document described in and exhibited with the request; or (ii) the truth of any material and relevant matter of fact set forth in the request. Said request must be answered under oath within the period indicated in the request, otherwise the matters of which admission were requested should be deemed admitted. Petitioners claim that respondents, instead of filing an answer under oath, filed an unsworn reply/objection thereto. Thus, the admissions should be deemed admitted in their favor.

Petitioners’ Request for Admission does not fall under Rule 26 of the Rules of Court. A review of said Request for Admission shows that it contained matters which are precisely the issues in the consolidated cases, and/or irrelevant matters.

Rule 26 as a mode of discovery contemplates of interrogatories that would clarify and tend to shed light on the truth or falsity of the allegations in a pleading. That is its primary function. It does not refer to a mere reiteration of what has already been alleged in the pleadings.

The rule on admission as a mode of discovery is intended “to expedite trial and to relieve parties of the costs of proving facts which will not be disputed on trial and the truth of which can be ascertained by reasonable inquiry.” Thus, if the request for admission only serves to delay the proceedings by abetting redundancy in the pleadings, the intended purpose for the rule will certainly be defeated.

CASE 5: REPUBLIC VS. SANDIGANBAYAN FACTS: Private respondents Bienvenido R. Tantoco, Jr. and Dominador R. Santiago—together with Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, Bienvenido R. Tantoco, Sr., Gliceria R. Tantoco, and Maria Lourdes Tantoco-Pineda are defendants in a civil case. The case was commenced by the PCGG in behalf of the Republic. The complaint which initiated the action was “for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and damages,” and was avowedly

filed pursuant to Executive Order No. 14 of President Corazon C. Aquino.

After having been served with summons, Tantoco, Jr. and Santiago, instead of filing their answer, jointly filed a “MOTION TO STRIKE OUT SOME PORTIONS OF THE COMPLAINT AND FOR BILL OF PARTICULARS OF OTHER PORTIONS". The PCGG filed an opposition and the movants, a reply to the opposition. The Sandiganbayan, in order to expedite proceedings and accommodate the defendants, gave the PCGG 45 days to expand its complaint to make more specific certain allegations.

Tantoco and Santiago presented a “motion for leave to file interrogatories under Rule 25 of the Rules of Court” and Interrogatories under Rule 25. The PCGG responded by filing a motion to strike out said motion and interrogatories as being impertinent, “queer,” “weird,” or “procedurally bizarre as the purpose thereof lacks merit as it is improper, impertinent and irrelevant under any guise.

ISSUE:

HELD:

RATIO: The various modes or instruments of discovery are meant to serve (1) as a device, along with the pre-trial hearing under Rule 20, to narrow and clarify the basic issues between the parties, and (2) as a device for ascertaining the facts relative to those issues. The evident purpose is, to repeat, to enable the parties, consistent with recognized privileges, to obtain the fullest possible knowledge of the issues and facts before civil trials and thus prevent that said trials are carried on in the dark. To this end, the field of inquiry that may be covered by depositions or interrogatories is as broad as when the interrogated party is called as a witness to testify orally at trial. The inquiry extends to all facts which are relevant, whether they be ultimate or evidentiary, excepting only those matters which are privileged. The objective is as much to give every party the fullest

possible information of all the relevant facts before the trial as to obtain evidence for use upon said trial.

In line with this principle of according liberal treatment to the deposition-discovery mechanism, such modes of discovery as (a) depositions (whether by oral examination or written interrogatories) under Rule 24, (b) interrogatories to parties under Rule 25, and (c) requests for admissions under Rule 26, may be availed of without leave of court, and generally, without court intervention. The Rules of Court explicitly provide that leave of court is not necessary to avail of said modes of discovery after an answer to the complaint has been served. It is only when an answer has not yet been filed (but after jurisdiction has been obtained over the defendant or property subject of the action) that prior leave of court is needed to avail of these modes of discovery, the reason being that at that time the issues are not yet joined and the disputed facts are not clear.

On the other hand, leave of court is required as regards discovery by (a) production or inspection of documents or things in accordance with Rule 27, or (b) physical and mental examination of persons under Rule ,28, which may be granted upon due application and a showing of due, cause.

CASE 6: Dasmariñas Garments vs. Reyes/American Pres. FACTS: APL sued Dasmariñas Garments for sum of money at the hearing. Instead of presenting its witness, APL filed a motion praying that it intended to take the depositions of some Taiwan nationals. The lower court granted the deposition which was in compliance with the rules on taking of testimony by deposition upon written interrogatories under ROC. CA affirmed.

ISSUE: WON a party could present its evidence by taking the deposition of its witness in a foreign jurisdiction before a private entity.

HELD: Yes

RATIO: Depositions are chiefly a mode of discovery. They are intended as a means to compel disclosure of facts resting in the knowledge of a party or other person which are relevant in some suit or proceeding in court. Depositions are principally made by law to the parties as a means of informing themselves of all the relevant facts; they are not therefore generally meant to be a substitute for the actual testimony in open court of a party witness. Leave of court is not necessary where the deposition is to be taken before a secretary or embassy or legation, consul gen. etc., and the defendants answer has already been served. Depositions may be taken at any time after the institution of any action, whenever necessary or convenient. There is no rule that limits deposition. Taking only to the period of pre-trial or before it; no prohibition against the taking of deposition after pre-trial… the law authorizes the taking of depositions before or after an appeal is taken from the judgment of RTC “to perpetuate their testimony for use in event of further proceedings in court… or during the process of execution of a final and executor judgment.”

CASE 7: AYALA LAND VS. TAGLEFACTS: The case is for the nullification of Contract to Sell Real Properties, Cancellation of Annotations on Transfer Certificates of Title and Damages was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Imus, Cavite City, by ASB Realty Corporation (ASB) and E. M. Ramos and Sons, Inc. (EMRASON) against Ayala Land, Inc. (ALI), Emerito B. Ramos, Jr., et al.

ASB alleged that EMRASON, a real estate company which owns real estate properties in Cavite City, with a total area of 372 hectares, entered into a Letter-Agreement with ASB for the conditional sale of 65% of the said land for a consideration of P400,000,000.00 payable in five installments. However, ASB received a letter from the children of Emerito Ramos, Sr., informing them that they entered into a Contract to Sell said real estate properties with ALI. ASB confirmed the contract of the Ramos children with ALI when it found out that the same was annotated on the Transfer Certificates of Title of the real estate properties in dispute.

Plaintiff ASB subsequently filed a Motion for Leave to take testimony by deposition upon oral examination of Emerito Ramos, Sr., citing Section 4(c), Rule 24 of the Revised Rules of Court stating that Emerito Ramos, Sr. was already 87 years old and although he was of sound mind there is always the possibility that he may not be able to testify on plaintiff’s behalf in the course of the trial on the merits. ASB then obtained the deposition upon oral examination of Emerito Ramos, Sr. on six different occasions. Upon termination of Emerito Ramos, Sr.’s direct testimony by deposition, both plaintiffs and defendants agreed that the cross-examination.

ALI filed a “Motion to Resolve Objections (In deposition proceedings with Omnibus Motion)” on the propriety, admissibility and conformity of the deposition proceedings to the Rules. Specifically, ALI sought rulings on its objections to leading questions, violations of the best-evidence rule, rule on presentation of secondary evidence, incompetence of the deponent, opinion rule, manner of presentation of evidence, and testimonies not forming part of the offer. As a consequence, the trial court cancelled the scheduled cross-examination of Emerito Ramos, Sr.’s deposition.

Trial court directed the setting of the cross-examination of the deponent. ALI filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order setting the hearing of the case for cross-examination, which the trial court denied. The trial court again directed that the cross-examination of Emerito Ramos, Sr., be scheduled. Before the scheduled date, ALI filed a Manifestation and Motion praying that the date set be cancelled and re-scheduled to another date. The trial court reset the hearing. Thereafter, ALI filed before the CA a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with urgent application for Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction to restrain the public respondent, Judge Lucenito Tagle, from implementing the Order and to declare null and void and expunging the entire deposition proceedings.

CA denied petition of ALI. MR was also denied. Emerito Ramos, Sr. died. Plaintiff then filed before the trial court a motion to introduce in

evidence the deposition of Emerito Ramos, Sr. The motion was opposed by ALI. ASB filed its Reply. ALI thereafter filed its Rejoinder and ASB its Sur-rejoinder. The trial court issued its Order admitting in evidence the deposition of Emerito Ramos, Sr. MR was denied. ALI again elevated the case to the Court of Appeals by way of Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. CA dismissed the petition for lack of merit. ALI filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was opposed by private respondents ASB and EMRASON. The motion was denied.

ISSUE: WON THE ALLEGED DEPOSITION OF THE WITNESS EMERITO M. RAMOS, SR. IS ADMISSIBLE

HELD: Yes, it is.

RATIO: The trial court permitted the taking of Emerito Ramos, Sr.’s deposition chiefly because of his advance age which ground is considered valid and justified under the Rules of Court.

As defined, the term “deposition” is sometimes used in a broad sense to describe any written statement verified by oath. In its more technical and appropriate sense, the meaning of the word is limited to written testimony of a witness given in the course of a judicial proceeding in advance of the trial or hearing upon oral examination. A deposition is the testimony of a witness, put or taken in writing, under oath or affirmation, before a commissioner, examiner or other judicial officer, in answer to interlocutory and cross-interlocutory, and usually subscribed by the witnesses. [A]nd the purposes of taking depositions are to: 1) Give greater assistance to the parties in ascertaining the truth and in checking and preventing perjury; 2) Provide an effective means of detecting and exposing false, fraudulent claims and defenses; 3) Make available in a simple, convenient and inexpensive way, facts which otherwise could not be proved except with great difficulty; 4) Educate the parties in advance of trial as to the real value of their claims and defenses thereby encouraging settlements; 5) Expedite litigation; 6) Safeguard against

surprise; 7) Prevent delay; 8) Simplify and narrow the issues; and 9) Expedite and facilitate both preparation and trial.

Deposition is chiefly a mode of discovery, the primary function of which is to supplement the pleadings for the purpose of disclosing the real points of dispute between the parties and affording an adequate factual basis during the preparation for trial. The liberty of a party to avail itself of this procedure, as an attribute of discovery, is “well-nigh unrestricted if the matters inquired into are otherwise relevant and not privileged, and the inquiry is made in good faith and within the bounds of the law.” Depositions may be taken at anytime after the institution of any action, whenever necessary or convenient.

On the objection of ALI owing to the lack of signature of the deponent, it should be noted that a deposition not signed does not preclude its use during the trial. A deponent’s signature to the deposition is not in all events indispensable since the presence of signature goes primarily to the form of deposition. The requirement that the deposition must be examined and signed by the witness is only to ensure that the deponent is afforded the opportunity to correct any errors contained therein and to ensure its accuracy. In any event, the admissibility of the deposition does not preclude the determination of its probative value at the appropriate time. The admissibility of evidence should not be equated with weight of evidence. The admissibility of evidence depends on its relevance and competence while the weight of evidence pertains to evidence already admitted and its tendency to convince and persuade.

This Court has observed that the trial court has painstakingly gone over every objection of ALI contained in its Motion dated 30 January 1995 and ruled on every single objection in the Order dated 05 May 1995 and these objections were again taken up in the Order of the trial court dated 07 September 1995. On this point, we find no compelling reason to disturb the conclusions arrived at by the trial court. It has been repeatedly held that the deposition-discovery rules are to be accorded a broad and liberal treatment and the liberty of a party to make discovery is well-nigh unrestricted if the matters

inquired into are otherwise relevant and not privileged, and the inquiry is made in good faith and within the bounds of the law, as in the case at bar.

CASE 8: Hyatt Industrial Manufacturing Corp. v. Ley Construction FACTS: Respondent LCDC filed a complaint for specific performance and damages against petitioner Hyatt claiming that Hyatt reneged in its obligation to transfer 40% of its share of a real property despite respondent’s full payment of the purchase price and that Hyatt failed to develop the said property in a joint venture, despite LCDC's payment of 40% of the pre-construction cost. Respondent filed an amended complaint impleading Princeton as additional defendant claiming that Hyatt sold the property in fraud of defendant. LCDC filed a second amended complaint adding as defendant Yu He Ching, alleging that LCDC paid to Hyatt through Yu. Responsive pleadings were filed and LCDC filed notices to take depositions. During the scheduled depositions, Hyatt and Yu prayed that all settings for depositions be disregarded and pre-trial be set instead, contending that the taking of depositions only delay the resolution of the case. RTC agreed and on the same day ordered all depositions cancelled and pre-trial to take place. LCDC moved for reconsideration, RTC denied. While pre-trial proceeded with the refusal of LCDC to enter in pre-trial, Hyatt, Yu and Princeton moved to declare LCDC non-suited, which the RTC granted. Defendant filed an appeal, which the CA granted. Hyatt and Princeton filed their respective motions for reconsideration which the CA denied, which leads to this petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE: WON the CA erred in remanding the case to the trial court and order the deposition-taking to proceed.

HELD: No.

RATIO: A deposition should be allowed, absent any showing that taking it would prejudice any party. It is accorded a broad and liberal treatment and the liberty of a party to make discovery is well-nigh

unrestricted if the matters inquired into are otherwise relevant and not privileged, and the inquiry is made in good faith and within the bounds of law. It is allowed as a departure from the accepted and usual judicial proceedings of examining witnesses in open court where their demeanor could be observed by the trial judge, consistent with the principle of promoting just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding; and provided it is taken in accordance with the provisions of the Rules of Court, i.e. , with leave of court if summons have been served, and without such leave if an answer has been submitted; and provided further that a circumstance for its admissibility exists. The rules on discovery should not be unduly restricted, otherwise, the advantage of a liberal discovery procedure in ascertaining the truth and expediting the disposal of litigation would be defeated. Indeed, the importance of discovery procedures is well recognized by the Court. Trial courts are directed to issue orders requiring parties to avail of interrogatories to parties under Rule 45 and request for admission of adverse party under Rule 26 or at their discretion make use of depositions under Rule 23 or other measures under Rule 27 and 28 within 5 days from the filing of the answer. The parties are likewise required to submit, at least 3 days before the pre-trial, pre-trial briefs, containing among others a manifestation of the parties of their having availed or their intention to avail themselves of discovery procedures or referral to commissioners. Deposition is chiefly a mode of discovery, the primary function of which is to supplement the pleadings for the purpose of disclosing the real matters of dispute between the parties and affording an adequate factual basis during the preparation for trial

CASE 9: SIME DARBY VS. CACHECK case 4.

CASE 10 SECURITY BANK VS. CAFACTS: Petitioner Security Bank Corporation (SBC) is a domestic banking corporation. It is one of the defendants in Civil Case No. Q-97-30330 entitled Spouses Agustin P. Uy and Pacita Tang Sioc Ten vs Security Bank Corporation, Domingo P. Uy and the Ex-Oficio City

Sheriff of Quezon City, for injunction and damages with an application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction.Plaintiffs Spouses Agustin P. Uy and Pacita Tang Sioc Ten sought to enjoin Security Bank Corporation (SBC for brevity) and the Ex-Oficio Sheriff of Quezon City from proceeding with the extra-judicial foreclosure of a mortgage over a piece of property registered under the respondent spouses’ names located in Quezon City .

SBC filed its answer with compulsory counterclaim and cross-claim while defendant Uy filed his answer with compulsory counterclaim and crossclaim. SBC filed its answer to defendant Domingo Uy’s cross-claim. Before filing his answer to defendant SBC’s cross-claim, defendant Uy filed an Omnibus Motion (Production of Documents and Suspension and/or Extension of Time to File Answer to Cross-claim) on the ground that all documents, papers and instruments made and executed by SBC on the evaluation, processing and approval of the loans of Jackivi Trading Center, Inc., the real estate mortgages (REM) and the Special Power of Attorney (SPA) themselves must first be produced before he prepare and file the answer to SBC’s cross-claim. SBC filed its opposition to the motion of Domingo Uy. In return defendant Domingo Uy filed a motion to admit reply with the reply attached and on June 3, 1997 SBC filed its rejoinder.

Trial court denied the omnibus motion. MR was also denied. On the other hand, plaintiffs also filed their Motion (For Production, Inspection and Copying of Documents) praying for the issuance of an order directing SBC to produce and allow them to inspect and copy the original and additional mortgage contracts executed by Jackivi Trading Center, Inc. and/or Jose Tanyao.

Defendant SBC opposed the motion by filing its Consolidated Opposition to the spouses’ Motion for Production, Inspection and Copying of Documents and Urgent Motion for a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction. Respondent spouses filed their reply to the consolidated opposition of SBC.

SBC filed a motion for partial reconsideration of the Order, claiming that said order [did] not explain the basis for requiring it to produce the requested documents, and that there was no good cause for their production, hence, it cannot be compelled to produce the same.

CA: The motion for production filed by the respondents spouses Uy and Pacita Tang Sioc Ten is likewise for good cause, it being necessary for a full determination of the issues

ISSUE: WON Motions [For Production, Inspection and Copying of Documents] of Respondents Spouses should be granted

HELD: Yes, the CA did not err in granting the motions.

RATIO: The CA noted that the documents would enable Respondent Uy to “intelligently prepare his defenses against the cross-claim of petitioner SBC,” and not merely to formulate his answer. Likewise, we agree with the appellate court that the Motion of Spouses Agustin Uy and Pacita Tang Sioc Ten was for a good cause, because the said documents were “necessary for a full determination of the issues raised in the case.

In sum, the Court held that the said Rule aims to enable the parties to inform themselves, even before the trial, of all the facts relevant to the action, including those known only to the other litigants. Through this procedure, “civil trials should not be carried on in the dark.”—We quote: “x x x Indeed, it is the purpose and policy of the law that the parties before the trial if not indeed even before the pre-trial should discover or inform themselves of all the facts relevant to the action, not only those known to them individually, but also those known to their adversaries; in other words, the desideratum is that civil trials should not be carried on in the dark; and the Rules of Court make this ideal possible through the deposition-discovery mechanism set forth in Rules 24 to 29. The experience in other jurisdictions has been that ample discovery before trial, under proper regulation, accomplishes one of the most necessary ends of modern procedure: it not only eliminates unessential issues from trials thereby

shortening them considerably, but also requires parties to play the game with the cards on the table so that the possibility of fair settlement before trial is measurably increased,

As just intimated, the deposition-discovery procedure was designed to remedy the conceded inadequacy and cumbersomeness of the pre-trial functions of notice-giving, issue-formulation and fact revelation theretofore performed primarily by the pleadings. “The various modes or instruments of discovery are meant to serve (1) as a device, along with the pre-trial hearing under Rule 20, to narrow and clarify the basic issues between the parties, and (2) as a device for ascertaining the facts relative to those issues. The evident purpose is, to repeat, to enable the parties, consistent with recognized privileges, to obtain the fullest possible knowledge of the issues and facts before civil trials and thus prevent that said trials are carried on in the dark.”

It is clear that courts are given wide latitude in granting motions for discovery in order to enable parties to prepare for trial or otherwise to settle the controversy prior thereto.

“What is chiefly contemplated is the discovery of every bit of information which may be useful in the preparation for trial, such as the identity and location of persons having knowledge of relevant facts; those relevant facts themselves; and the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and location of any books, documents, or other tangible things. Hence, ‘the deposition-discovery rules are to be accorded a broad and liberal treatment. No longer can the time-honored cry of ‘fishing expedition’ serve to preclude a party from inquiring into the facts underlying his opponent’s case. Mutual knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered by both parties is essential to proper litigation. To that end, either party may compel the other to disgorge whatever facts he has in his possession. The deposition-discovery procedure simply advances the stage at which the disclosure can be compelled from the time of trial to the period preceding it, thus reducing the possibility, of surprise

Petitioner points out that a party may be compelled to produce or allow the inspection of documents if six procedural requisites are complied with, viz.: “(a) The party must file a motion for the production or inspection of documents or things, showing good cause therefor; (b) Notice of the motion must be served UT all other parties of the case; (c) The motion must designate the documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible things which the party wishes to be produced and inspected; (d) Such documents, etc are not privileged; (e) Such documents, etc constitute or contain evidence material to any matter involved in the action; and (f) Such documents, etc are in the possession, custody or control of the other party.”

The rule is that courts, in passing upon a motion for discovery, should be liberal in determining whether the documents in question are relevant to the subject matter of the action. To repeat, the rule on discovery “requires the parties to play the game with cards on the table so that the possibility of fair settlement before trial is measurably increased.”

CASE 11: SOLIDBANK VS. GATEWAYFACTS: Gateway obtained 4 foreign currency denominated loans from petitioner Solid Bank as capital for its manufacturing operations. The loans were secured by Promissory notes and by assignment to Solid Bank of all the proceeds of Gateway's Back-end Services Agreement with Alliance Semiconductors. However, Gateway failed to pay its obligations despite repeated demands from the petitioner. This prompted petitioner to file a complaint for collection of sum of money. 

 During the trial, Petitioner filed a motion for the production and inspection of documents after learning that Gateway already received proceeds of its Back-end agreement with Alliance. The motion called for the inspection of all books of accounts, financial statements, receipts, checks, vouchers, and other accounting records. The court granted the motion.  Subsequently, after a couple of postponements, Gateway was only able to produce the billings

and not all the other documents. The Court chastised it for not exerting due diligence in procuring the required documents and it ordered that those not produced shall be deemed established in accordance with Solid Bank's claim. 

Gateway filed a petition for certiorari before the CA to nullify the 2 orders of the lower court. CA granted the petition and ruled that the motion to produce and inspect failed to comply with Sec. 1, Rule 27 of the Ruled of Court. Hence this petition. 

ISSUE: WON the motion for production and inspection complied with Sec. 1, Rule 27 of the Rules of Court 

HELD: NO (Petition denied).

RATIO: Rule 27 of the Revised Rules of Court permits "fishing" for evidence, the only limitation being that the documents, papers, etc., sought to be produced are not privileged, that they are in the possession of the party ordered to produce them and that they are material to any matter involved in the action. A fishing expedition no longer precludes a party from prying into the facts underlying his opponent's case. However, fishing for evidence has its limitations. 

Solidbank's motion was fatally defective and violates Sec. 1 Rule 27 due to its failure to specify with particularity the documents it required Gateway to produce. Simply, the motion called for a blanket inspection, too broad and too generalized in scope. Its request that "all documents pertaining to, arising from, in connection with or involving the Back-end Services Agreement" ask for a promiscuous mass of documents.

A motion for production and inspection of documents should not demand a roving inspection of a promiscuous mass of documents. The inspection should be limited to those documents designated with sufficient particularity in the motion, such that the adverse party can easily identify the documents he is required to produce. 

Since it is Solid Bank who asserted that Gateway already received payment from its Back-end Agreement with Alliance, then the burden of proof is on its side. Burden of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by law. Throughout the trial, the burden of proof remains with the party upon whom it is imposed, until he shall have discharged the same.