Carol Gilligan Feminist Moral Theory

Moral Voices, Moral Selves: Carol Gilligan and Feminist Moral Theory by Susan J. HekmanReview by: Susan MendusFeminist Review, No. 58, International Voices (Spring, 1998), pp. 114-115Published by: Palgrave Macmillan JournalsStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1395686 .Accessed: 18/04/2014 05:40

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I Both the above books mark a view from a privileged class centre to the * periphery - and should be read as such.

a.

LA Parita Mukta o z

; Moral Voices, Moral Selves: Carol Gilligan and Feminist Moral Theory Susan J. Hekman Polity Press: Oxford, 1995 ISBN 0 7456 1502 3 ?11.95 Pbk ISBN 0 7456 1421 3 ?39.50 Hbk

The central thesis of Susan Hekman's book is that we should 'stop trying to get it right' in moral theory. She takes this to be the most important insight of Carol Gilligan's work and she also takes it to be the insight which contains most promise for the future development of feminist moral theory in general. Thus, despite their deep disagreements, both liberals and com- munitarians, universalists and relativists, justice theorists and care theorists are all, in the end, obsessed by the desire to get it right and this obsession serves, in Hekman's view, to obscure the most promising lines of development available to moral theory in the late twentieth century. Hekman begins with a summary and interpretation of the work of Carol Gilligan. Distancing herself from those who construe Gilligan as merely advocating the superiority of care over justice ('there is virtually no textual evidence for this claim in Gilligan's book' p. 3), she argues that, in fact, Gilli- gan's work suggests a radical re-conceptualization of what moral theory is or could become: 'her theory creates its own data and generates evidence that is relative to it; no theory-independent proof or disproof is possible' (p. 19). So, far from denying the truth of Kohlberg's research and insisting on the truth of her own conclusions, Gilligan is, in fact, offering a Kuhnian interpretation of her own findings. Even the debate between justice and care sparked by Gilligan's own early work is now revealed as sterile and mis- guided, since it supposes (unhelpfully) that there is a way of 'getting it right'. Indeed, Hekman goes further and, anticipating that the charge of relativism will be levied against this radical interpretation, she argues that the universalist-relativist debate is itself a symptom of the dominant mode of moral theory, a mode which Gilligan's work can help to discredit: 'in Gilli- gan's work, questions of relativism do not arise because it rests on an understanding of subjectivity that renders those questions irrelevant' (p. 40). What, then, is this sense of subjectivity, and how can it serve to render rela-

4 tivism irrelevant? Here Hekman is eclectic, and takes her cue from

I Both the above books mark a view from a privileged class centre to the * periphery - and should be read as such.

a.

LA Parita Mukta o z

; Moral Voices, Moral Selves: Carol Gilligan and Feminist Moral Theory Susan J. Hekman Polity Press: Oxford, 1995 ISBN 0 7456 1502 3 ?11.95 Pbk ISBN 0 7456 1421 3 ?39.50 Hbk

The central thesis of Susan Hekman's book is that we should 'stop trying to get it right' in moral theory. She takes this to be the most important insight of Carol Gilligan's work and she also takes it to be the insight which contains most promise for the future development of feminist moral theory in general. Thus, despite their deep disagreements, both liberals and com- munitarians, universalists and relativists, justice theorists and care theorists are all, in the end, obsessed by the desire to get it right and this obsession serves, in Hekman's view, to obscure the most promising lines of development available to moral theory in the late twentieth century. Hekman begins with a summary and interpretation of the work of Carol Gilligan. Distancing herself from those who construe Gilligan as merely advocating the superiority of care over justice ('there is virtually no textual evidence for this claim in Gilligan's book' p. 3), she argues that, in fact, Gilli- gan's work suggests a radical re-conceptualization of what moral theory is or could become: 'her theory creates its own data and generates evidence that is relative to it; no theory-independent proof or disproof is possible' (p. 19). So, far from denying the truth of Kohlberg's research and insisting on the truth of her own conclusions, Gilligan is, in fact, offering a Kuhnian interpretation of her own findings. Even the debate between justice and care sparked by Gilligan's own early work is now revealed as sterile and mis- guided, since it supposes (unhelpfully) that there is a way of 'getting it right'. Indeed, Hekman goes further and, anticipating that the charge of relativism will be levied against this radical interpretation, she argues that the universalist-relativist debate is itself a symptom of the dominant mode of moral theory, a mode which Gilligan's work can help to discredit: 'in Gilli- gan's work, questions of relativism do not arise because it rests on an understanding of subjectivity that renders those questions irrelevant' (p. 40). What, then, is this sense of subjectivity, and how can it serve to render rela-

4 tivism irrelevant? Here Hekman is eclectic, and takes her cue from 11 11


postmodernism, from feminist theory and from theorists of race and eth- ' nicity. By drawing on their different insights she hopes to construct and defend a 'discrusive subject' which is 'neither relational, feminist, post- modern, nor a product of theories of race and ethnicity, yet which borrows from each of these discourses' (p. 109). This, however, is a dangerous strat- egy for, as Hekman acknowledges, it might be thought that a concrete identity is necessary in order to ground identity politics and that, without such an identity, we run the risk of philosophical nihilism and political im- potence. Ultimately, however, she denies that this is so, urging rather that the acknowledgement of different voices and different sources of oppression can be politically empowering. It can make us aware of the need to distinguish between different sources of oppression and it can also enable us to resist the homogenizing tendencies of identity politics. Hekman's book is a tour de force of feminist theory. Although its title suggests that this will be simply another book about Gilligan and the justice-care debate, it is, in fact, very much more than that. Gilligan's work is given a sophisticated reading which then serves as a jumping-off point for a discussion which ranges widely (and deeply) across the intellectual background of modern moral theory, the liberal-communitarian debate, postmodernism, theories of race and ethnicity, and much more besides. In all these areas Hekman displays extensive knowledge and deep philosophical insight. My only (rather ironic) complaint is that, in-the end, Hekman gets it wrong. Despite the repeated protestations that Gilligan's framework renders objections to relativism redundant, it was never clear to me exactly how it does this. To put the point at its most brutal, feminism in general and feminist political theory in particular begin from the contention that women have been and continue to be oppressed. It asserts that there is an important sense in which the great dead moral philoso- phers of the western tradition 'got it wrong' and are continuing to get it wrong. Of course, the fact that it is possible to get it wrong does not entail that there is a single way of getting it right, but it does suggest that if the multiplicity of different voices is not to disintegrate into a mere cacoph- ony of dissonant noises, something other, and more, than the mere cel- ebration of difference will be necessary. Hekman clearly thinks that she has provided this, but despite my sympathy with her project, and my admira- tion for its execution, I remain unpersuaded. I still yearn to get it right, and see this as an indispensable concomitant of Hekman's excellent cri- tique of those in the dominant tradition who have so demonstrably got it wrong.

Susan Mendus 115


Article Contentsp. 114p. 115

Issue Table of ContentsFeminist Review, No. 58, International Voices (Spring, 1998), pp. 1-152Front MatterWhen the Earth Is Female and the Nation Is Mother: Gender, the Armed Forces and Nationalism in Indonesia [pp. 1-21]Metaphors of Inscription: Discipline, Plasticity and the Rhetoric of Choice [pp. 22-43]Understanding Women in Scotland [pp. 44-65]Citizens of Their World: Australian Feminism and Indigenous Rights in the International Context, 1920s and 1930s [pp. 66-84]Weird Lullaby: Jane Campion's "The Piano" [pp. 85-101]ReviewsReview: untitled [pp. 102-107]Review: untitled [pp. 107-110]Review: untitled [pp. 111-112]Review: untitled [pp. 112-114]Review: untitled [pp. 114-115]Review: untitled [pp. 116-117]Review: untitled [pp. 118-119]Review: untitled [pp. 120-121]Review: untitled [pp. 121-124]Review: untitled [pp. 124-132]Review: untitled [pp. 133-137]Review: untitled [pp. 137-139]Review: untitled [pp. 140-142]

Back Matter [pp. 143-152]

Documents

Carol Gilligan Feminist Moral Theory