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Arizona Debate Institute 2009 1 Fellows Canada DA Canada Soft Power DA Canada Soft Power DA.......................................................1 Canadian Soft Power 1NC....................................................2 US nuclear umbrella key to Canadian soft power.............................3 Canada Soft Power 1NC......................................................4 Canadian soft power key to solve Indo-Pak conflict.........................4 Canadian Soft Power High...................................................5 2NC Overlap Link...........................................................6 2NC Overlap Link...........................................................7 DA Solves Case.............................................................8 DA Solves Case.............................................................9 Canada Soft Power 2nc- I-Law..............................................10 Canada Soft Power 2nc- Quebec Secessionism................................11 Canada Soft Power 2NC- Quebec Secessionism................................12 Canada Soft Power 2nc- Quebec Secessionism................................13 Canada Soft Power 2NC- Quebec Secessionism................................14 Canada Soft Power 1nr- QS-NORAD...........................................15 Canada Soft Power 1nr- QS- Meltdown.......................................16 Canada Soft Power 1NR- QS- Meltdown.......................................17 Canada Soft Power 1nr- QS- Turns Leadership...............................18 AFF ANS- Soft Power Low...................................................19 AFF ANS...................................................................20 AFF ANS...................................................................21 AFF ANS...................................................................22 AFF ANS...................................................................23 AFF ANS...................................................................24 Canadian Soft Power Ineffective...........................................25

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Page 1: Canada Soft Power DA

Arizona Debate Institute 2009 1Fellows Canada DA

Canada Soft Power DA

Canada Soft Power DA...............................................................................................................................................1Canadian Soft Power 1NC..........................................................................................................................................2US nuclear umbrella key to Canadian soft power......................................................................................................3Canada Soft Power 1NC.............................................................................................................................................4Canadian soft power key to solve Indo-Pak conflict..................................................................................................4Canadian Soft Power High..........................................................................................................................................52NC Overlap Link.......................................................................................................................................................62NC Overlap Link.......................................................................................................................................................7DA Solves Case..........................................................................................................................................................8DA Solves Case..........................................................................................................................................................9Canada Soft Power 2nc- I-Law.................................................................................................................................10Canada Soft Power 2nc- Quebec Secessionism........................................................................................................11Canada Soft Power 2NC- Quebec Secessionism......................................................................................................12Canada Soft Power 2nc- Quebec Secessionism........................................................................................................13Canada Soft Power 2NC- Quebec Secessionism......................................................................................................14Canada Soft Power 1nr- QS-NORAD......................................................................................................................15Canada Soft Power 1nr- QS- Meltdown...................................................................................................................16Canada Soft Power 1NR- QS- Meltdown.................................................................................................................17Canada Soft Power 1nr- QS- Turns Leadership.......................................................................................................18AFF ANS- Soft Power Low......................................................................................................................................19AFF ANS..................................................................................................................................................................20AFF ANS..................................................................................................................................................................21AFF ANS..................................................................................................................................................................22AFF ANS..................................................................................................................................................................23AFF ANS..................................................................................................................................................................24Canadian Soft Power Ineffective..............................................................................................................................25

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Canadian Soft Power 1NC

Canadian influence now but fragile

Stephen Troope, Chancellor of UBC (Canada) “A Century Later, Aspiring to Global Influence” UBC Report Dec. 6, 2007

In the latter half of the 20th century Canada emerged as one of the world’s most successful societies, noted for its broadly shared commitment to social inclusion, its embracing of cultural diversity, its robust economy, and its strong public finances. Yet these successes are fragile, and could be undermined in the short term by Canada’s under-performance in social, economic, scientific and cultural innovation. Already, Canada’s performance on the measures of social development and productivity is falling in comparison to OECD leaders.

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US nuclear umbrella key to Canadian soft power

Atlas ‘7 Pierre, Director, The Richard G. Lugar Franciscan Center for Global Studies, Professor of Political Science at Marian University “Canada’s Soft Power” November 24 http://indistinctunion.wordpress.com/2007/11/24/canadas-soft-power/

Canada has long been held in high esteem internationally. While many people around the world have a love-hate relationship with the United States, Canada tends to inspire only positive feelings. This is in part because Canada never had the burden of superpower responsibilities during the Cold War and, thanks to the American nuclear umbrella, it was able to “free ride” on security and devote much of its resources and attention to “non-strategic” global issues like international humanitarian law, peacekeeping, and development in the Third World. Rather than focusing inward, Canada long ago made the deliberate choice to pursue its values internationally, under both Tory and Liberal governments.

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Canada Soft Power 1NC

Canadian soft power key to solve Indo-Pak conflict

Axworthy, 9/24/03, (Thomas, Chair of Asia-pacific foundation of Canada, National Post, www.tibet.ca/en/wtnarchive/2003/9/24_1.html)

Asia is the most dangerous place in the world. With Americans dying daily in Iraq; the Bush road map for Israel and Palestine in tatters; and the ghostly visage of Osama bin Laden broadcast to the world by al-Jazeera on the second anniversary of Sept. 11, threatening all of us with even worse horrors; it may be difficult to fathom that the greatest threats to peace and security reside outside the Middle East. But in this league of infamy, Asia leads the first division. The six-nation talks with North Korea, for example, have ended with nodiscernible progress and North Korea moving at full speed to expand its nuclear arsenal. Everything that George Bush went to war to prevent in Iraq is occurring irrefutably in North Korea: There a rogue regime has starved hundreds of thousands of its own citizens, attacked its neighbours, built a nuclear bomb, and trafficked with terrorists. North Korea is the world's most deadly problem. Right behind is the situation in Pakistan. The Pakistani intelligence service helped invent the Taliban; Islamists are honeycombed within the intelligence service and the armed forces. Pakistan has also developed nuclear weapons to protect itself in the 50-year conflict with India over Kashmir. Terrorists can either spark outrages in India hoping to bring about Armageddon in a nuclear war between India and Pakistan, or Islamists could promote a coup in Pakistan itself, putting a Taliban-style regime in power in Islamabad. The regime of President Pervez Musharraf presides over one of the world's most turbulent countries, and if you thought the Taliban in Afghanistan was a problem, what about if a similarly motivated group had its thumb on a nuclear trigger? In this Asian cauldron of animosity, one optimistic possibility is the emergence of a peaceful, engaged China. The Middle Kingdom has been the dominant player in Asia for 5,000 years, and in our time it has been a key ally of both North Korea and Pakistan. We are witnessing in the early years of the 21st century a China that is systematically turning away from the isolation and madness of the cultural revolution of Mao towards an engagement with its neighbours. This engagement is primarily economic. China's ascension to the World Trade Organization is of the utmost importance, but it is also strategic with China participating in the six-nation negotiations with North Korea. Encouraging China to take a constructive role in its own region is in the interests of us all. Canada might be able to play a small part in this engagement strategy. The National Post has recently run a foreign policy series with much debate about the utility of "hard views" and "soft power." Of course, you need both, and we need to invest more in both elements of power if we are to play a role in the world. With China, Canada does have some unique soft power assets.

Indo-Pak conflict escalates to global nuclear war

Ghulam Nabi Fai Washington Times 7/8/01

The foreign policy of the United States in South Asia should move from the lackadaisical and distant (with India crowned with a unilateral veto power) to aggressive involvement at the vortex. The most dangerous place on the planet is Kashmir, a disputed territory convulsed and illegally occupied for more than 53 years and sandwiched between nuclear-capable India and Pakistan. It has ignited two wars between the estranged South Asian rivals in 1948 and 1965, and a third could trigger nuclear volleys and a nuclear winter threatening the entire globe. The United States would enjoy no sanctuary. This apocalyptic vision is no idiosyncratic view. The director of central intelligence, the Defense Department, and world experts generally place Kashmir at the peak of their nuclear worries. Both India and Pakistan are racing like thoroughbreds to bolster their nuclear arsenals and advanced delivery vehicles. Their defense budgets are climbing despite widespread misery amongst their populations. Neither country has initialed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, or indicated an inclination to ratify an impending Fissile Material/Cut-off Convention. The boiling witches' brew in Kashmir should propel the United States to assertive facilitation or mediation of Kashmir negotiations. The impending July 14-16 summit in New Delhi between President Musharraf and Indian Prime Minister A. B. Vajpayee featuring Kashmir on the agenda does not justify complacency.

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Canadian Soft Power High

Canada is leading now on the nuclear issue

Canada Nuclear Safety Commission ‘9 “IAEA Completes Review of Canada’s Nuclear Regulatory Regime” Press Release, June 12http://nuclearsafety.gc.ca/eng/mediacentre/releases/news_release.cfm?news_release_id=343

Today in Ottawa, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS) concluded its two-week mission to Canada. Peer review team leader, Shojiro Matsuura, and deputy team leader, Martin Virgilio, presented the team’s high-level findings to Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) President Michael Binder. The 21-member peer review team comprised of senior regulators recruited by the IAEA from 13 member countries,spent the past two weeks comparing Canada’s nuclear regulatory practices with international standards and equivalent good practiceselsewhere in the world.Team members interviewed government officials, CNSC staff and licensees, visited CNSC site and regional offices, observed inspections and a Commission Tribunal proceeding, and reviewed a variety of regulatory documents over the course of the mission. Overall, the review team has determined that Canada has a mature and well-established nuclear regulatory framework and that the nuclear regulator does an effective job in protecting the health, safety and security of Canadians and the environment. “We have always believed that we are doing our job well”, said Mr. Binder.“The review team’s findings demonstrate that the CNSC’s regulations and good practices compare favourably with those of our international counterparts. Our challenge now is to consider the review team’s suggestions and recommendations and move forward in implementing improvements in a timely manner.”

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2NC Overlap Link

Canada has historically gained soft leadership on the nuclear issue

Project Ploughshares ’99 Canadian disarmament advocacy group “Canada and nuclear weapons: recent developments”January

8 December - Foreign Affairs Minister Lloyd Axworthy calls for revision of NATO's nuclear policies as part of the updating of NATO's Strategic Concept document. Axworthy tells a NATO foreign ministers' meeting in Brussels that "Now more than ever, any discussion of using Alliance nuclear capabilities -- even in retaliation -- raises very difficult questions of means, proportionality and effectiveness that cause us significant concerns... Over seventy percent of Canadians support NATO and Canada's membership in the Alliance but 93 percent of Canadians expect Canada and its Allies to take the lead in working to eliminate nuclear weapons." 10 December - The Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade releases its report, Canada and the Nuclear Challenge: Reducing the Political Value of Nuclear Weapons for the Twenty-First Century. (See separate analysis of the report.) Senator Roche, the Canadian Council for International Peace and Security, Project Ploughshares, and the United Nations Association hold a press conference welcoming the report's recommendations. Still to come - The government is obliged to table a response to the report in the House of Commons by early May. Work on this response, continuing negotiations on the NATO Strategic Concept (scheduled for completion at the Washington Summit in April 1999), preparations for the UN talks (also set for April) to lay the groundwork for the year 2000 review of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and Canada's return to membership on the UN Security Council will place the future of Canada's nuclear weapons policies high on the government's policy agenda during the first few months of 1999.

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2NC Overlap Link

Policy-overlap with the US on the international arena devastates Canadian soft power

Klein ‘4 (Naomi, Canadian activist, journalist, and foreign relations author; “Canada Should Keep its Distance From United States Foreign Policy”, June 16, 2004, http://www.commondreams.org/views04/0616-03.htm )

It is a privilege not to be hated for your nationality, and we should not relinquish it lightly. George Bush has denied that privilege to his own people, and Stephen Harper would cavalierly strip it from Canadians by erasing what few small but important differences remain between Canadian and U.S. foreign policy. The danger posed by this act is not just about whether Canadians are safe when we travel to the Middle East. The hatred that Mr. Bush is manufacturing there, for the United States and its coalition partners, is already following the soldiers home. I have felt that hatred in Iraq, and trust me: We don't want to experience it here in Canada. Or don't trust me, trust the citizens of Spain, who decided in their March elections that they are not willing to accept the blowback from George Bush's wars, that they don't want these multiplying enemies to be their enemies too. Or the citizens of the United Kingdom, who just battered Tony Blair's Labour Party in last week's local elections, furious at being dragged into a war that has made them less safe. Or the citizens of Australia, who are about to send the same message to John Howard. Or even the citizens of the United States, 55 per cent of whom now disapprove of Mr. Bush's performance in Iraq, according to a recent Los Angles Times poll. Yet just as the rest of the world is finally saying "no more," Canadians are poised to elect a party that is saying "me too." The hawks in Washington like to paint Canada as a freeloader, mooching off their expensive military protection, the continent's weak link on terrorism. The truth is that around the world, it is blind government complicity with U.S. foreign policy, precisely the kind of complicity advocated by Mr. Harper, that is putting civilians in the line of terror. It is the United States that is the weak link. BeforeI went to Iraq, a seasoned war correspondent who had spent a year reporting from Baghdad gave me his best piece of security advice. "Stay away from Americans, they're bad for your health." He wasn't being anti-American (he's an American citizen and supported the war); he was just being practical. In Iraq, that advice means you don't want to ride in the U.S. convoys or embed with U.S. troops. You keep your distance and stay independent. At this perilous moment in history, the same principle applies at home: Canadian security depends on our ability to maintain meaningful sovereignty from the United States. Being inside the U.S. security fortress isn't a missile shield, it's a missile magnet. As long as the United States continues to act as a global aggressor, the best way for us to stay healthy is to stay as far away as from Americans as possible. With 8,890 kilometers of shared border, geographical distance is not an option. Fortunately, political distance still is. Let's not surrender it.

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DA Solves Case

Canadian soft power allows for international conflict resolution, means that aff impacts won’t escalate

Marriot and Carment , 200 3 (Koren, Worked with the Country Indicators for Foreign Policy project as a researcher, and David, Director of the Centre for Security and Defence Studies at Carleton University and Associate Professor at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, “Conflict Prevention in Canada: A Survey of Canadian Conflict Prevention Professionals”, September)

The overriding theme that appeared in several of the responses was that Canada should support the work of international and regional organizations. UNICEF stated that by using soft power, “Canada is in a strong position to champion international laws and treaties through the UN and other regional and international bodies”. CUSO’s response reflected similar views, stating; “Canada is respected internationally for being a promoter of peace and human security, and should continue this role. It should continue to work within multi-lateral frameworks, including the UN, ensuring rule of law is adhered to in all its conflict prevention and interventions. Canada should support the reform of the UN in order to make it a more effective international body capable of effecting positive change in today's world. Canada should be more active in ensuring that people around the world share equitably in its resources. Canada should promote human rights and democratic development in all its international dealings including in trade and development.” Theresa Dunn expressed a related opinion, saying she believes Canada is strategically placed to become a leader in conflict prevention through its role as peace builder and often impartial agent. She went on to say that because of Canada’s size and commitment to conflict resolution through collaboration “we are able to move internationally with knowledge and expertise”. These views are fairly representative of a major portion of the responses received.

Canadian soft power means reduced risk of inter-state conflict

Namasivayam ‘1(Soft Power at the United Nations: A Compatible Marriage between Canada and the Security Council?, Reesha Namasivayam, M.A. Candidate, Conflict Analysis, The Norman Paterson School of International Affair, Carleton University, April 2001, Page: 1/2)

In a January 22, 1999 speech to the National Forum in Montreal, Quebec, then Minister of Foreign Affairs Lloyd Axworthy stressed that “greater emphasis on the security of people rather than just the security of states is at the heart of the foreign policy that Canada is pushing during its (current) tenure on the United Nations Security Council.”1 The vehicle through which this human security agenda would be advanced, both in the Council and internationally, was ‘soft power’. Soft power was also the conduit that would be utilized in order to pursue Canada’s principal objectives, delineated during the 1998 campaign for election to a two -year term as a non-permanent member, while on the Security Council. Those goals included Council leadership and effectiveness, making the Council mo re open, transparent and responsive and of course, human security.2 However, was the use of what Axworthy called ‘soft power’ effective in achieving Canadian goals while on the Security Council? Thus, can they even be on two opposite sides of the same coin in the pocket of the Security Council? In theory, the Security Council comes as close as any part of the UN in exercising hard power rather than soft power. Paul Knox has referred to the Council as “an inherently cautious and conservative organ.”3

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DA Solves Case

Canadian soft power solves aff impacts

Namasivayam ‘1(Soft Power at the United Nations: A Compatible Marriage between Canada and the Security Council?, Reesha Namasivayam, M.A. Candidate, Conflict Analysis, The Norman Paterson School of International Affair, Carleton University, April 2001, Page: 1/2)

However, Nye’s conceptualization of soft power appears very different from that of the one referred to by Minister Axworthy. Then Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lloyd Axworthy first unveiled his human security platform articulating the need for a stronger focus on soft power in Canadian foreign policy in an article written for International Journal in 1997. In the article, Axworthy argued that given the dramatic changes in the post Cold War era, such as the decline of inter-state warfare, increased transnational crime and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, a more humanized approach to security was required to address new security threats.15 A human security approach he advocated would include:Security against economic privation, an acceptable quality of life, and a guarantee of fundamental human rights…At a minimum, human security requires that basic needs are met, but it acknowledges that sustained economic development, human rights and fundamental freedoms, the rule of law, good governance, sustainable development and social equity are as important to global peace as arms control and disarmament.16 Moreover, Axworthy stressed that “lasting stability cannot be achieved until human security is guaranteed.”17

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Canada Soft Power 2nc- I-Law

Increased Canadian international influence spreads its respect for international lawSantarpia, 2004 (LCdr B.W, Master of Defence Studies at Canadian Forces College Taking the Fight to the Enemy: Terrorism and the Case for a Canadian Forces Expeditionary Orientation Syndicate 1/Groupe d’études 1 29 April)

Another important link between altruistic and self-interested agendas is their ultimate effect on the world.  The ultimate goal of the altruistic agenda is the betterment of the lives of the world's less fortunate citizens.  That betterment is contingent upon a more secure environment for them to pursue their own agendas and coincidently stability is an important goal of the national self-interest agenda.  A clear example of the crossover of altruism and self-interest exists with Canada's support for international law.  Most Canadians inherently believe that Canada should work to ensure that every person is treated fairly in accordance with the law.   At the same time a worldwide respect for the conventions of international law is essential to the stability of the world both inside and outside of Canada.  As a country of immigrants, including 579,600 Muslims, Canada would benefit from the perception that justice meted out to suspected terrorists was fair and based on international law.   Without a significant contribution to the war on terror, however, Canada will have no say in the form that the justice takes.  Equally, a worldwide respect for the legitimacy and efficacy of international law would serve Canada and Canadian citizens working abroad.

International law key to prevent extinctionDamrosch and Mullerson 1995 (Lori Fisler, Professor of Law – Columbia University; and Rein, Professor of International Law – King’s College-London) Beyond Confrontation: International Law for the Post-Cold War Era ed. By Damrosch, Danilenko, & Mullerson p. 2 WBW

A second reason for the growth of the role of international law is inextricably connected with the first. The threats of a thermonuclear catastrophe, universal ecological crisis, and acute economic problems in developing countries are of global concern and endanger the very existence of humanity. Resolution of these problems demands coordinated efforts of all states and peoples, which would be impossible to achieve without the aid of international norms, procedures, and institutions.

Absent international law aff impact claims are inevitableCharney and Danilenko 1995 (Jonathan, Professor of Law – Vanderbilt University; and Gennady, Professor of Law – University of California-Berkeley) Beyond Confrontation: International Law for the Post-Cold War Era ed. By Damrosch, Danilenko, & Mullerson p. 25 WBW

Faced with a number of global problems affecting the interests of every human being on this planet, the international community may find that a constitutional theory based on state consent presents unacceptable obstacles to necessary solutions. Such problems relate to the global environment, weapons of mass destruction, international terrorism, and basic human rights. If all states cannot be bound by international law that addresses these problems, truly effective solutions will be impossible, and the entire community will remain at risk. A principle obstacle to such solutions is the theory that states do not accept a norm, and particularly states that object to it, are not bound and remain free to behave as if the norm does not exist. In some situations, even a single state exception may directly undermine all potential solutions. Certainly, such an exception may encourage or even compel others to refuse to abide by it. While these interests may conflict with the consent rule, that rule has strong support in the fundamental idea that states are independent, sovereign, and autonomous.

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Canada Soft Power 2nc- Quebec Secessionism

Canadian soft power is key to prevent a Quebec secessionChoudhry ‘7 -Faculty of Law and Department of Political Science @ the University of Toronto- 2007 (Sujit, “Does the World Need More Canada? The Politics of the Canadian Model in Constitutional Politics and Political Theory”, Forthcoming, International Journal of Constitutional Law, 19-22, http://www.cardozo.yu.edu/uploadedFiles/FLOERSHEIMER/Does%20the%20World%20Need%20More%20Canada%20paper%20draft%203.pdf) A sub-literature assumed that Canada was doomed, and that the country should turn to the difficult question of how secession could occur. Issues such as the debt, borders, citizenship, the rights of aboriginal peoples, the nature of the economic and political relationship between Canada and an independent Quebec, as well as the process of those negotiations (who would participate, what would be the nature of public involvement) were debated at countless conferences and workshops. Again, the titles tell much of the story. Books such as The Secession of Quebec and the Future of Canada; The Referendum Papers: Essays on Secession and National Unity; Two Nations, One Money?; Closing the Books: Dividing Federal Assets and Debt if Canada Breaks Up; Broken Links: Trade Relations after a Quebec Secession; Negotiating with a Sovereign Quebec; Tangled Web: Legal Aspects of Deconfederation; Dividing the House: Planning for a Canada Without Quebec; The Partition Principle: Remapping Quebec after Separation; Dual Independence: The Birth of a New Canada and the Re-birth of Lower Canada; Beyond Quebec: Taking Stock of Canada; Economic Dimensions of Constitutional Change; If Quebec Goes … The Real Costs of Separation; Plan B: The Future of the Rest of Canada; Québec-Canada: What Is the Path Ahead?; and most poignantly Can Canada Survive? Under What Terms and Conditions? Turned to the grim task of grappling with these questions. 71 In an important respect, English Canada was catching up with Quebec, which had before long turned its mind to the modalities of secession. In the wake of the failure of the Meech Lake Accord, the Quebec government struck the Commission on the Political and Constitutional Future of Quebec . One of the commission’s principal contributions to public debate within the province was in the form of a large number of original research studies which examined both the substance and process of Quebec secession. Moreover, these studies received widespread media coverage, and were debated widely in the national press. In fact, a large reason for the surge in interest in English Canada was precisely the fact that these issues had been discussed in Quebec for a long time. There are two important questions which need to be answered. The first is why Canada was in constitutional crisis for much of the 1990’s, and more precisely, what the exact character of the Canadian constitutional crisis was. I turn to this issue below. The20second is what the connection was between this debate – in which the future prospects for Canada looked dim indeed – and the rise of the Canadian model. The book titles listed above illustrate that the discussion over Canada’s future and the mechanics of taking it apart were far from marginal. On the contrary, they were at the very centre of academic and political discourse. Indeed, the country seemed to be able to talk about little else. And no Canadian could ever forget the near dissolution of the federation in 1995. So it is inconceivable that the proponents of the Canadian model could have been unaware of it. On the contrary, what I want to suggest is that many proponents of the Canadian model not only recognized the crisis gripping the Canadian constitutional order, but viewed the international promotion of the Canadian model as an important element in resolving problems at home. This link was first made by Pierre Trudeau, in an essay published in 1962, long before the near constitutional collapse of the 1990’s.72 In it, Trudeau responds to the case made by supporters of Quebec independence that every nation must necessarily have a state, by arguing that Canadian federalism should be preserved as something precious. For Trudeau, part of the reason for retaining multinational federalism is not only that it is right for Canada, but also that it is right for the world. Canadians should strive to ensure the survival of Canada so it can serve as an international role model, as a city on the hill, for countries facing the same linguistic and ethno national divisions which led to creation of the Canadian model in the first place. He writes:73It would seem, in fact, a matter of considerable urgency for world peace and the success of the new states that the form of good government known as democratic federalism should be perfected and promoted, in the hope of solving to some extent the world-wide problems of ethnic pluralism. …Canada should be called upon to serve as mentor, provided she has seen enough to conceive her own future on a grand scale. … Canada could become the envied seat of a form of federalism that belongs to tomorrow’s world. … Canadian federalism is an experiment of major proportions; it could become a brilliant prototype for the moulding of tomorrow’s civilization. To be clear, Trudeau is doing much more than highlighting a positive, incidental side effect to the success of the Canadian model. Rather, he makes the stronger claim that Canada’s success matters internationally because other countries face similar problems to Canada’s, and Canada’s potential influence as an international role model should serve not only as a21source of pride to Canadians, but also as a reason for Canadians to make its constitutional arrangements work. These themes were picked up and further developed nearly thirty years later by Charles Taylor.74 In an essay published in 1991, Taylor argues that Canada’s constitutional difficulties were traceable to the clash between two different visions of citizenship – one, captured and fuelled by the Charter, in which citizens consider themselves as bearers of constitutional rights and as equal members in the Canadian political community, unmediated by membership in any intermediate provincial political communities, and another, in which Quebecers view their membership in the Canadian political community as flowing from their membership in a constituent nation of Canada. For Taylor, the solution is to reject a model of uniform citizenship, and instead to opt for “deep diversity” as “the only formula on which a united federal Canada can be rebuilt”.75 But the case for deep diversity goes beyond Canada, because “in many parts of the world today the degree and nature of the differences resemble those of Canada” and so “the world needs other models to be legitimated in order to allow for more humane and less constraining modes of political cohabitation”.76 So Canada “would do our own and some other peoples a favour by exploring the space of deepdiversity”.77 After the failure of the Charlottetown Accord, and the near miss in the 1995referendum, Taylor continued to press the same themes, albeit with a greater sense of urgency and an acute awareness of the peril which Canada faced.78 Thus, “the principal threat” to Canada’s existence “comes from a problem which is in a sense everyone’s in this day and age” – that there are many more nations than states, that it would be impossible for each nation to have its own state, and so there needs to be some way for national groups to exist within the same state.79 “Canada’s inability to solve this problem, after what seemed like a promising start in favourable conditions,

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naturally causes consternation, and depressed spirits, abroad”, Taylor continues.80 If the Canadian model cannot work in Canada, it cannot work in circumstances which are far more difficult. Canada needs to try to make it work for the sake of the world. This is political theory doubling as constitutional therapy. So arguing for the success of the Canadian model was not just an academic endeavour. It was a political intervention in two different but interrelated arenas. It was an intervention in international politics, to offer a practical, viable model to deal with the issues of minority nationalism that were a source of political instability in ECE and beyond. It was also an intervention in domestic constitutional politics, to argue that Canada had hit upon one of the few workable solutions to the accommodation of minority nationalism within a liberal22democratic constitutional order. And there were multiple links between the two agendas. There was the argument made by Trudeau and Taylor, that Canada should make its constitutional arrangements work to help other countries. Foreign observers have often made this point. Charles Doran, writing on why Canadian unity matters to America, states that the “failure of the Canadian federal experiment … does not bode well for the ability of their democracies to establish political harmony among their own regional communities”, while conversely, success in Canada “will help to preserve democratic pluralism worldwide”.81Kofi Annan and Mikhail Gorbachev’s public interventions in the Canadian national unity debate demonstrate how important the success of the Canadian model was to the international community struggling with the destructive potential of nationalism. There are other links between the domestic and international political agendas. The promotion of the Canadian model abroad should be understood, at least in part, as an attempt to buttress support for the Canadian model at home, by instilling national pride. I think this is the way to make sense of the increasing prominence of the Canadian model in foreign policy. Canadian politicians have sought to place the Canadian model at the heart of Canadian foreign policy, by serving as a pillar of development assistance to deeply divided societies. The previous Liberal government’s International Policy Statement stated that development assistance should be focused on a few key areas, including the promotion of good governance, with “Canada’s commitment … to a federal system that accommodates diversity” as part of that agenda.82 Liberal MP Michael Ignatieff, in a speech to the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade in 2004, stated that Canada has “more institutional memory about the legislative and legal requirements for the accommodation of linguistic and religious diversity than any other mature democracy in the world” and has a “comparative advantage in the politics of managing divided societies”, and should translate its institutional experience into

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(Choudry continues w/o interrupting...)

advice for other countries struggling with similar issues.83Part of the motivation, no doubt, is to increase Canada’s influence abroad. Promoting the Canadian model is an exercise in what Joseph Nye has termed soft power, whereby a country “may obtain the outcomes it wants in world politics because other countries want to follow it, admiring its values, emulating its example, aspiring to its level of prosperity and openness.”84Jennifer Welsh has written that simply being a bilingual, federal state should be regarded as a core element of Canadian foreign policy.85 But there is a domestic agenda at work as well. As the prestige of the Canadian model is enhanced abroad, so too is its prestige at home. This convergence of the domestic and the international is best summed up by the phrase used by a leading Canadian bookseller to promote Canadian literature, “The World Needs More Canada” – the marketing pitch being that the international reputation of Canadian authors is an additional reason for Canadians to value that work.

Quebec secessionism causes Russia nuclear strike and superpower warLamont ‘94-President of American Trust for the British Library-1994 (Lansing, “Breakup: The Coming End of Canada and the Stakes for America” , p. 237-9) Economic Reform has collapsed throughout Russia. Widespread despair over soaring prices, injured pride over Russia’s loss of stature, and disgust with Moscow’s leadership boil over. A cabal of so-called “Reds” and “Browns” –unreconstructed former communist officials and neo-Facist militants- sweeps the Yeltsin reformers from office. In the name of restoring social order and adverting total economic ruin, the leaders of the coup establish an authoritarian provisional government backed by key elements of the disaffected military. The new government resents the Western for its Cold War triumph and humiliation of the Soviet Union, resents the infatuation with Western culture and consumer products. It especially resents the United States for having won the arms race and reduced Russia to a beggar nation, then acting niggardly in its response to Russian requests for massive economic aid. The Russians who have always regarded Canada as a less vehemently anti-Soviet bal ance against the United States in the continental partnership, particularly resent Canada's fracturing after Quebec's separation and the prospect of its pieces eventually attaching to the U.S. empire. Russian-North American relations move from - tepid-to subfreezing. The new hardliners running the Kremlin reassess Russia's arsenal of Bear and Blackjack long-range bombers, its nearly 1,200 air-launchable cruise missiles. They reanalyze the strategic value of the Arctic, whose jigsawed desert of ice conceals not only an estimated 500 billion barrels of oil but lurking nuclear-armed submarines. Then, the Russians order a sequence of air borne reconnaissance missions to hard-probe the Arctic and North Amer ican defenses. Somewhere on the eastern end of the Beaufort Sea, 30,000 feet above the approaching Parry Islands, a Russian Bear-H intercontinental bomber prepares to enter North American airspace clandestinely. The turboprop bomber, a bright red star on its side, has averaged 400 miles per hour since it left its base in Siberia and headed over the polar icecap. It carries inside its bulky frame eight AS-X-15 cruise missiles, each a little over 20 feet long, each packing a nuclear warhead with more than five times the power of the Hiroshima bomb. As it wings over Canadian territory, high enough so that air resistance is minimal, the Bear approxi mates the flight mode of a glider, moving silently through the ether except for short irregular bursts of acceleration from its engines. The bomber is some 200 miles off Canada 's Arctic coast when the ultrasensitive radars of the North Warning System's CAM-M site at Cambridge Bay pick it up. CAM-M instantly relays the raw data on the unknown aircraft or "bogie" to NORAD'-s—Region Operations Control Center (ROCC) at _ North Bay. In the operations room of the center's subterranean complex, 600 feet deep in a Laurentian mountain, the "ass opers" (Air Surveil lance Operators) start a 3 1/2-minute sequence to establish whether the bogie is a military or civil aircraft, friend or foe, and the nature of its flight path and probable destination. The Bear does not respond to ROCC requests to identify itself. The ass opers within seconds have established some basic information on the bogie: military, unfriendly, Bear-Hotel class, and on a flight path pointing generally toward Winnipeg and Minneapolis. What the ass opers do not know is whether the Bear is carrying nuclear weapons, its intentions, and whether it is the vanguard of a possibly larger-attack force. At the command post on the floor above the operations room, the commanding. major general and two deputies quickly assess the ass opers' data and order fighter-interceptors to scramble from an airfield at Paved Paws' nearest Forward Operation Location. They also

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Canada Soft Power 2NC- Quebec Secessionism

notify NORAD's central U.S. command post in Cheyenne Moun tain, Colorado. A pair of CF-18 Hornets, attached to the Alouettes, the 425th Tactical Fighter Squadron based in Bagotville, Quebec, race into the skies and somewhere above Victoria Island lock their radars onto the approaching Bear. One of the jets springs a fuel leak and turns back. The other, armed with six AIM-9 Sidewinder missiles and a 20-millimeter rapid -fire can non, intercepts the intruder and buzzes it at close range. The young fran cophone pilot gets no response to his repeated demands that the Russians confirm whether they are carrying a nuclear payload. He frantically radios his base command for instructions and zooms in for a closer look at the bomber, narrowly avoiding the Bear's tail on the pass. The Bear's pilot takes immediate evasive action, banking his plane steeply at the same time he finally identifies himself and his payload in angry, almost threatening tones. For one fearful moment intruder and interceptor seem transfixed in uncertainty, hovering above the icy barrens of Victoria Island. The Hornet pilot prepares to respond with a warning burst from his cannon. The fuming pilot of the Bear considers activating the ejector cartridges that would thrust a single silvery cruise into the blue, streaking along its computer programmed flight path toward a NORAD target. Then discipline and cold sense reassert themselves. The Bear makes a shuddering 180-degree turn and heads homeward. The Hornet lingers several minutes to track the Bear's retreat before it, too, swings back toward its base.

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Canada Soft Power 1nr- QS-NORAD

Quebec secession destroys NORAD. Lamont, 1994 (Lansing, Time Correspondent and President of American Trust for the British Library, Breakup, p. 236)

America's foremost concern, however, would be the impact of a diminished Canada on continental security, the fact that Washington regards uninhibited access to Canadian territory, airspace, and waters as critical to U.S. defense. An independent, territorially sensitive Quebec could seriously complicate continental security arrangements affecting the use of its airspace, landing, and refueling privileges, the status of NORAD francophone units in Quebec, and the free flow of international shipping through the Quebec end of the St. Lawrence Seaway. The disbanding and relocation to Canada of its Armed Forces based in Quebec, for instance, would cause considerable disarray in Canada's operational effectiveness and its ability to meet its NORAD obligation s. A compromised tripartite NORAD command, including Quebec, would hardly appeal to the Pentagon, but remains a distinct possibility. Of graver import would be the will and capability of Canada itself to continue supporting the North American defense structure. With its ongoing debt crisis, its traditional aversion to U.S. military initiatives, and the fading of the Soviet threat, Canada might reduce even further its NORAD and NATO commitments .NORAD prevents accidental/inadvertent nuclear war. CIMBALA, ’99 (STEPHEN J, professor of political science at the Pennsylvania State University Delaware County Campus, ARMED FORCES & SOCIETY, Vol. 25, No. 4)A second requirement for the avoidance of accidental/inadvertent war is the validity of warning and attack assessment. Leaders must have confidence that they can distinguish between false and true warnings of attack. They must also expect, once received valid warning of attack, that they will have time to respond appropriately. U.S. nuclear warning and attack assessment evolved during the Cold War into a tightly coupled system of warning sensors, analysis and fusion centers, communications links, commanders, and command posts. The nerve center of U.S. Cold War warning and assessment was NORAD, located in an underground and hardened shelter complex at Cheyenne Mountain, Colorado. Even after the Cold War, NORAD is the chef d'oeuvre of the elaborate U.S. warning system for surprise attack.

A single accidental launch would kill billions in global nuclear war. PR Newswire, 4-29- 98

An 'accidental' nuclear   attack would create a public health disaster of an unprecedented scale, according to more than 70 articles and speeches on the subject, cited by the authors and written by leading   nuclear   war experts, public health officials, international peace organizations, and legislators . Furthermore, retired General Lee Butler, Commander from 1991-1994 of all U.S. Strategic Forces under former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell, has warned that from his experience in many "war games" it is plausible that such an attack could provoke a   nuclear   counterattack that could trigger full-scale   nuclear   war with billions of casualties worldwide.      The authors describe the immediate effects of an " accidental"   launch from a single Russian submarine that would kill at least six to eight million people in firestorms in eight major U.S. cities.   With hospitals destroyed and medical personnel killed, and with major communications and transportation networks disrupted, the delivery of emergency care would be all but impossible, according to Forrow and his colleagues.

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Canada Soft Power 1nr- QS- Meltdown

Secession destroys the power-grid causing a black-outWhitley, ‘96 (John, Editor of New World Order Intelligence Update, New World Order Intelligence Update, http://www.inforamp.net/~jwhitley/pr1.htm)

Since 1991, THE NEW WORLD ORDER INTELLIGENCE UPDATE has been warning that Quebec will separate from Canada abruptly via a Unilateral Declaration of Independence, igniting a three-way civil war betwen French-Canadian regular and militia regiments, the Canadian Armed Forces, and the native peoples of Quebec. The Cree, who hold title to two-thirds of Quebec territory, and who refuse to secede with Quebec, are vitually certain at that time to sabotage the massive Quebec Hydro James Bay generating facility, which sits on their land, and which - through the Eastern seaboard grid - provides light, heat and power for the whole eastern U.S. seaboard.

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Canada Soft Power 1NR- QS- Meltdown

A blackout will tax nuclear power safety systems and risks a catastrophic meltdown.

Public Citizen ‘3 (www.citizen.org/documents/bigblackout.pdf.)

Consider the dangers that exist when everything is operating normally; they are only exacerbated during a blackout, Nuclear power plants operate under enormous pressure, heat and stress, in addition to the unique interactions that radiation causes within the plants' complex array of parts. This partially explains why so many U.S. reactors are perpetually at risk of a serious accident, long before their initial 40-year license term has ended. From steam generator tubes to emergency cooling pumps to reactor vessel heads (top and bottom), there is a constant supply of crises: · The degradation and rupture of steam generator tubes at nuclear reactors has been a problem at U.S. reactors since at least 1975, when there was a spontaneous tube rupture at the 5-yearold Point Beach reactor in Wisconsin. The NRC describes steam generator tubes as serving "an important safety role because they constitute one of the primary barriers between the radioactive and non-radioactive sides of the plant . For this reason, the integrity of the tubing is essential in minimizing the leakage of water between the two 'sides' of the plant." Steam generator tube rupture can "cascade," wherein a break in one tube triggers ruptures in adjacent tubes. If severe, a cascade could precipitate a nuclear meltdown at a reactor . At a 1988 conference, former NRC Commissioner Kenneth Rogers, speaking about the effects of aging U.S. nuclear plants, said: "Degradation (of the steam generator tubes) would decrease the safety margins so that, in essence, we have a 'loaded gun,' an accident waiting to happen ."

This would cause extinction

Earth Island Journal ‘2, March 22, 20 02

The intense radioactive heat within today's operating reactors is the hottest anywhere on the planet. Because Indian Point has operated so long, its accumulated radioactive burden far exceeds that of Chernobyl. The safety systems are extremely complex and virtually indefensible. One or more could be wiped out with a small aircraft, ground-based weapons, truck bombs or even chemical/biological assaults aimed at the work force. A terrorist assault at Indian Point could yield three infernal fireballs of molten radioactive lava burning through the earth and into the aquifer and the river. Striking water, they would blast gigantic billows of horribly radioactive steam into the atmosphere. Thousands of square miles would be saturated with the most lethal clouds ever created, depositing relentless genetic poisons that would kill forever. Infants and small children would quickly die en masse. Pregnant women would spontaneously abort or give birth to horribly deformed offspring. Ghastly sores, rashes, ulcerations and burns would afflict the skin of millions. Heart attacks, stroke and multiple organ failure would kill thousands on the spot. Emphysema, hair loss, nausea, inability to eat or drink or swallow, diarrhea and incontinence, sterility and impotence, asthma and blindness would afflict hundreds of thousands, if not millions. Then comes the wave of cancers, leukemias, lymphomas, tumors and hellish diseases for which new names will have to be invented. Evacuation would be impossible, but thousands would die trying. Attempts to quench the fires would be futile. More than 800,000 Soviet draftees forced through Chernobyl's seething remains in a futile attempt to clean it up are still dying from their exposure. At Indian Point, the molten cores would burn uncontrolled for days, weeks and years. Who would volunteer for such an American task force? The immediate damage from an Indian Point attack (or a domestic accident) would render all five boroughs of New York City an apocalyptic wasteland. As at Three Mile Island, where thousands of farm and wild animals died in heaps, natural ecosystems would be permanently and irrevocably destroyed . Spiritually, psychologically, financially and ecologically, our nation would never recover. This is what we missed by a mere 40 miles on September 11. Now that we are at war, this is what could be happening as you read this. There are 103 of these potential Bombs of the Apocalypse operating in the US. They generate a mere 8 percent of our total energy. Since its deregulation crisis, California cut its electric consumption by some 15 percent. Within a year, the US could cheaply replace virtually all the reactors with increased efficiency. Yet, as the terror escalates, Congress is fast-tracking the extension of the Price-Anderson Act, a form of legal immunity that protects reactor operators from liability in case of a meltdown or terrorist attack. Do we take this war seriously? Are we committed to the survival of our nation? If so, the ticking reactor bombs that could obliterate the very core of our life and of all future generations must be shut down.

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Canada Soft Power 1nr- QS- Turns Leadership

Quebec secession destroys U.S. leadership and makes soft power less effectiveLamont, ‘94 (Lansing, Time Correspondent, Breakup, p. 229)

Most assuredly, the United States would lose a valued ally in an increasingly turbulent world, would see the North American partnership weakened and future relations with Canada cast in doubt. The U nited S tates would also confront to its north a prickly new nation of Quebec with dubious allegiances and an uncertain course. Canada's dissolution, if it comes, would not present the same dangers it might have twenty years ago when the separatists first came to power in Quebec. Then, the loss of a united Canada would have been a strategic blow to the Western alliance as it sought to maintain a solid front against Soviet expansion. The end of the Cold War has reduced the military dangers of a northern breakup, just as free trade has mitigated the economic perils. But the rupture of Canada would still put at risk many of America's commercial and continental defense arrangements, while entailing substantial costs to its export economy and foreign policy . Canada's relia bility as our closest NATO and North American stalwart would be the first big casualty. No superpower like America can give full focus to, and effectively exercise, its worldwide leadership responsibilities with insecurity or turmoil in its backyard . Over the long term, a wounded Canada would act less boldly and swiftly in North America 's interests , and would take fewer risks in the international arena. U.S. designs in the hemisphere-for more dependable security structures in Central America arid the Caribbean, say, or for more durable democracies in the southern cone- would be that much more difficult to accomplish without Canada's committed support . A fractured Canada would gradually lose its international Boy Scout image, which U.S. diplomats have found immeasurably helpful. When America has wished some other power to take the lead on initiatives where U.S. credibility was weak, it has frequently used Canada as a stalking horse because, as one U.S. diplomat put it, 'They can do things that we can't."

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AFF ANS- Soft Power Low

Canadian soft power low—laundry list

Hirst ‘9 Jeremy, Canadian International Council Administrator “Canada's global influence wanes” Winnipeg Free Press, June 4 http://www.canadianinternationalcouncil.org/blogs/opeds/canadasglo

A projection by Jim O'Neill, head of Global Economics Research for Goldman Sachs International in London, shows that by 2050, China's economy will be more than twice as large as that of the United States. He stresses that the international American-based bank is not saying that's how the world will be, but it could be. Predictions are notoriously unreliable and the further forward the predictions are, the less reliable they are. What is undeniable, however, are the shifts in world economic power that have happened already. Eight years ago, O'Neill gained fame in economic circles for coining the acronym "BRIC". It stands for Brazil, Russia, India and China. O'Neill suggested that these four countries were the powerhouses of the future. In some ways, they already are. In a presentation to the Vancouver branch of the Canadian International Council last week, O'Neill suggested that within four years the economies of the four BRIC countries together would exceed that of the United States and that it was those countries that were leading the world out of recession. The world economic order is changing very quickly. At the same conference, Debra Steger, a law professor at the University of Ottawa, said the economic world was "at a really transformational point in history." World financial institutions, however, The World Bank, The International Monetary Fund, summit meetings of rich nations, are all constructed on what used to be: a world economic order ruled by the United States, Europe and Japan with Canada as a minor, but still significant player. According to the Goldman Sachs 2050 projections, Canada will rank 16th in world economic output: still important, but less so than today. Economic power and diplomatic influence, however, are not the same thing. Canada has traditionally pulled above its weight in world affairs. The concern of ex-diplomats, former politicians and some academics now is that as the world changes, Canada is less engaged than it used to be and is losing influence at a crucial time. Jeremy Kinsman, one of Canada's foremost diplomats, former ambassador to Russia and high commissioner in London, spoke to the Vancouver conference of Canada's international record of "objectivity and helpfulness." No longer. "No one in Ottawa is trying," he said. "There are virtually no relationships." The Harper government has increased military spending, but reduced spending on foreign affairs and aid. "Why the double standard?" asked former Progressive Conservative prime minister Joe Clark. "Why are we prepared to accept more of our share of the military burden than we are of the diplomatic and development burdens?" At times at the two-day conference, it felt as though many academics, former politicians and diplomats were acting like a foreign service in exile, despairing of a government that with the exception of Arctic sovereignty and Afghanistan has turned inward. Clark and Kinsman both spoke of how Canada was losing what had become a precious national asset: its outgoing foreign affairs policies. Kinsman complained that the reduction in money for arts groups to travel abroad was spoiling Canada's image; Clark of a failure to lead the kind of initiatives against land-mines and blood diamonds this country had pursued in the past. Others spoke of Canada's dismal performance on cutting greenhouse gases; and how its failure to live up to the Kyoto protocol had damaged our credibility. All of this cannot be laid at the door of the Harper government. What the former politicians, diplomats and academics are saying is that the lack of international engagement of the present government has reduced rather than improved our standing. Canada is emerging from the present economic crisis far stronger than most. Our banking system is the envy of the world, but our influence in bringing about change to the world financial regulatory system and to world economic institutions is not nearly as strong as it could be. In the World Trade Organization, where Canada had for years been a voice or calm and reason, Canada's place has been taken by Australia. As the world economic summits have moved from the influence of the old group of rich countries, the G8, to the broader G20 group, which includes the BRIC countries, Canada's influence has waned.

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Canada soft power low—Israel support

Hamm and Bhalla ‘9 Nancy and Suresh, co-chairs of the Canada Committee of Human Rights Watch “Human Rights Watch: Ottawa's bias in Middle East erodes Canada's credibility” July 3http://www.rabble.ca/news/2009/07/human-rights-watch-ottawas-bias-middle-east-erodes-canadas-credibility

Our country has long been recognized as a global leader in human rights and commitment to international law, wielding moral authority much larger than its size.   But our government’s unreserved support for the conduct of Israel’s recent military actions in Gaza has eroded Canada’s hard-won credibility and moral standing. In its statements about the conflict, the Canadian government focused exclusively on Israel’s right to defend itself, disregarding its serious violations of international humanitarian law. After a mortar attack that killed close to 40 civilians near a United Nations-operated school in the Jabalya refugee camp, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Peter Kent was quick to react. “Hamas has a terrible responsibility for this,” he said, while admitting that he didn’t know the details of the attack. Human Rights Watch has documented serious violations of the laws of war on both sides.

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Canada wants us to disarm- there’s zero way acquiescing hurts their leadership or soft power AND they view it compatible with deterrence which means they’d pursue the same policies—their link evidence is about how it historically developed not the effect of the plan

Chyba ‘8 Christopher F. Chyba is a professor of astrophysics and international affairs at Princeton University and served on the National Security Council staff in the first Clinton administration. “Time for a Systematic Analysis: U.S. Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Proliferation” July 31, 2008 http://www.armscontrol.org/print/3469

A recent advisory commission to the IAEA, chaired by former Mexican President Ernesto Zedillo and including members from 17 other countries, concluded that "progress toward disarmament, or the lack of it, will deeply affect the success of the IAEA's nonproliferation mission" and warned that many non-nuclear-weapon states are reluctant to implement the 1997 Model Additional Protocol, phase out HEU, or enter into multilateral fuel-cycle arrangements without further progress on nuclear disarmament. [30] Diplomats of U.S. allies, including Australia, Canada, Germany, and Japan, have "resoundingly" stated in anonymous interviews that progress in disarmament measures, taken to include the CTBT and FMCT, would make it easier for them to work for progress on nonproliferation with the developing countries represented by the Nonaligned Movement. [31] The same message was concluded from a broader survey of written material complemented with individual and group discussions conducted by SAIC. [32] Note that Australian and Japanese officials have also indicated the importance of the U.S. extended deterrent. This either illustrates different views co-existing within a government's bureaucracies or shows that these countries view at least some important steps in nuclear disarmament as compatible with maintaining a credible extended deterrent.

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The US-India nuclear deal takes out both their links- Canada not only wasn’t a disarm leader, but endorsed and pursued the negotiations

Regehr ‘9, Ernie, CIGI Fellow and co-founder of Project Ploughshares, adjunct associate professor of Peace and Conflict Studies at Conrad Grebel University College, University of Waterloo. “Canada-India nuclear cooperation a few steps closer” http://www.cigionline.org/blogs/2009/3/canada-india-nuclear-cooperation-few-steps-closer

“Canada has abdicated its historic leadership role in the establishment and maintenance of the global nuclear non-proliferation norm,” Douglas Shaw, an international affairs expert at George Washington University in Washington, D.C., said in an e-mail. “As the first state to choose not to build an independent nuclear arsenal, Canada's behaviour plays an essential role in defining this standard of globally responsible sovereignty.” Shaw maintained that any India-Canada deal on peaceful nuclear co-operation erodes “both Canada's global leadership role and the international nuclear non-proliferation regime.” Mr. Regehr said he can't fault the Conservatives for looking out for Canada's commercial interests. “I don't blame Canada for, in the end, going with the consensus that emerged at the Nuclear Supplier Group,” he said. “I think where Canada was a huge disappointment is that it withdrew itself entirely from the debate . . . . It communicated volumes to other states: Here we have a staunch non-proliferation advocate being quiet on the question.”

Acquiescing the NATO on the nuclear posture takes out both links and uniqueness—Canada is not a leader on the nuclear issue—their soft power is tanked

Middle Power Initiative ‘8 Global Security Institute “Restoring Canada's Nuclear Disarmament Leadership” February, http://www.gsinstitute.org/mpi/archives/000338.html

The seminar considered the new report of Canada World’s Poll, principally sponsored by The Simons Foundation, showing that 88 percent of Canadians think nuclear weapons make the world a more dangerous place and would support the elimination of nuclear weapons through an enforceable agreement. Special attention was paid to the incoherence and contradiction between Canada supporting the “unequivocal undertaking” to the total elimination of nuclear weapons required by the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and Canada’s continued allegiance to NATO’s policies stating that nuclear weapons are “essential.” Concern was expressed during the seminar that NATO’s policies for the retention of nuclear weapons are now trumping the NPT’s legal obligations for nuclear disarmament. The government’s own website, stating that Canada’s nuclear policy now must be consistent with NATO’s policies, calls into question whether the NPT is still the central instrument in which Canada’s nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament policy is rooted. A strong call was made for Canada to work with Germany and Norway in their current efforts to overhaul NATO’s outdated policies, particularly as set out in its Strategic Concept, for retention of nuclear weapons.

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NATO aquiescence takes out the DA

The Star ‘7 (Canadian Newspaper) Anthony Salloum, writer “Canada edges toward deadly nuclear embrace” Nov. 21http://www.thestar.com/comment/article/278311

In other words, Prime Minister Stephen Harper has decided that NATO's nuclear deterrence policy reigns supreme. At the urging of anti-nuclear organizations such as the Canadian Pugwash Group, last spring then-foreign affairs minister Peter MacKay reported to Parliament that he had raised concerns about NATO's reliance upon nuclear weapons at a meeting of the alliance. Then the government shifted tactics, and a few weeks later then-defence minister Gordon O'Connor told Parliament: "We are a member of NATO and we stand by NATO's policies. NATO, at this stage, has no policy of disarming from nuclear weapons." Not surprisingly, the old policy supporting "the complete elimination of nuclear weapons" was changed on the foreign affairs department website to say that Canada's policy is "consistent with our membership in NATO." But the reason for this shift may have less to do with NATO itself than with acquiescence to the United States' interests in keeping the door open to a renewal of nuclear weapons testing. Equally worrisome this year was Canada's reticence to put its name behind a motion to prevent nuclear weapons testing. Last year, Canada co-sponsored a resolution calling for a Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). In October, Canada failed to co-sponsor the resolution that stressed "the vital importance and urgency of signature and ratification, without delay and without conditions, to achieve the earliest entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty." Thankfully, the resolution passed, 166 in favour to only one opposed (United States) with four abstentions (Colombia, India, Mauritius, Syria). Ultimately, Canada voted in favour, but could Canada's decision not to co-sponsor the resolution, as it had done in the past, be related to the U.S. plan to develop new nuclear weapons? This is a troublesome shift in Canada's policy on nuclear disarmament. One can trace its beginnings to 2005 when the Liberals, trying to curry favour in Washington, started getting cold feet on nuclear disarmament. In her book Holding the Bully's Coat, Linda McQuaig notes positively that, by 2005, Canadian leadership over several years had led to 13 other countries breaking ranks with their NATO allies and voting with Canada in support of a resolution aimed at ending the deadlock that is paralyzing the UN's Conference on Disarmament. Consistent with its leadership, Canada announced its intention to support another important nuclear disarmament resolution at the UN First Committee, the body responsible for disarmament. Canada's support of the creative and inspired initiative was intended to try to break the impasse on disarmament talks by proposing new, ad hoc committees that would bypass the deadlock. But with hours to go, Canada pulled the plug on supporting the UN resolution, and as a result other countries followed suit. The reason: Paul Martin's government succumbed to intense pressure from the White House. McQuaig notes, "tragically, the moment had been lost." While Martin's failing may have been an aberration, Stephen Harper's Conservatives may be making a more permanent policy shift.

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Soft power is ineffective at preventing conflict

Blatt ‘4 Dan, “Review: Soft Power by Joseph Nye” FUTURECASTS online magazinewww.futurecasts.com Vol. 6, No. 9, 9/1/04.http://www.futurecasts.com/book%20review%206-4.htm

The dispute between advocates of multilateralism and unilateralism is covered at some length by Nye. Multilateralism can be a prescription for paralysis and ineffectiveness, but unilateralism can create opposition that greatly increases the costs of action. In addition, there is always a major price to pay in terms of loss of soft power influence whenever allies are ignored or disdained.   Europe is currently taking the lead in trying the multilateral soft power approach with respect to Iranian nuclear weapons programs. This is entirely appropriate, since Europe has significant trade ties with Iran and considerably more applicable soft power influence than the U.S.   So far, the results have been less than reassuring - but hopefully success will be achieved in the end. Failure in this important matter would constitute a significant setback for multilateralism and reliance on soft power. The performance of the U.N. in Darfur and the NATO allies - other than the U.S. and British - in Afghanistan and Kosovo, unfortunately leaves much to be desired. It is indeed hard to sell reliance on multilateralism when the pertinent agencies are so pitifully ineffective.

Canadian soft power fails at resolving conflicts—peacekeeping proves

Nunez ‘4 “Canada's Global Role: A Strategic Assessment of its Military Power”Authors: Joseph R Nunez; ARMY WAR COLL CARLISLE BARRACKS PA, Storming Media Pentagon Reports, January 1http://www.stormingmedia.us/55/5546/A554684.html

Abstract: Even before 2001, Canada was out of synch in its global vision. Ottawa's peacekeeping orientation was no match for failed states and terrorism. While soft power may be an effective foreign policy approach in this millennium, it is largely ineffective without significant hard power to back it up. And the truth is that today Canada has little hard power. A country that cannot muster and deploy even one self-sufficient brigade to global hot spots is not going to be taken very seriously, and is certainly not a middle power by military measure. In concrete terms, it is certainly wise for Canada to further institutionalize its partnership with the United States in defense of North America. Joining Northern Command would accomplish this, particularly since NORAD is decreasing in importance. Formally joining Northern Command, just as Canada did with NORAD, would confirm that the relationship between Canada and the United States is a model of liberal interdependency suitable for emulation. Democracy, capitalism, and security cooperation can keep the neighboring states strong and successful allies. Ottawa clearly benefits by working closer in defense matters with Washington it can gain significant improvements in training, lift, logistics, and technology, not to mention respect. These benefits will enable the country to quickly deploy a well-trained and equipped military force to global hot spots and sustain them properly. Additionally, such cooperation demonstrates that Canada can provide valuable leadership in the Americas. But Ottawa should understand that Washington needs competent allies -- ones that possess a modicum of hard power.

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Canadian Soft Power Ineffective

Darfur proves that Canadian soft power is both ineffective and low now

Wright ‘6 David, European Institute, “Canada: Soft Power Won’t Do It in Afghanistan – or Darfur” European Affairs, Fall/Winter 2006

Would that we had a simpler world: one in which conflicts end cleanly, the UN Security Council authorizes intervention by well meaning peacekeepers, and former antagonists step back, lay down their arms and welcome them. And the peacekeepers are accompanied by aid workers and civil-society experts who rebuild democratic governments and viable economies. And everyone lives happily ever after. Sadly, the world does not work like that. Conflicts tend not to end cleanly. The choices governments must make in dealing with international crises are very difficult, often between a bad alternative and a worse one. The risks of intervention are huge in terms of both human life and political life. And of course there are risks of inaction, too; but those are much harder to measure. In Canada, there is considerable debate about our current deployment of 2,300 soldiers in southern Afghanistan. Casualties are mounting and the purpose of the mission, with its focus on security in the dangerous Kandahar area, is being challenged. Another debate continues in Canada over the world’s failure to take meaningful action in Darfur and what should be done about it. Let me start with some very basic questions: 1. Should force ever be used to confront leaders who are killing their own people? 2. Should democratic countries ever use military force as part of their efforts to combat terrorism? 3. Should Canada ever be engaged militarily abroad in the pursuit of its own interests and values? Unhesitatingly, I say yes to all these questions. But that’s the easy part. The harder part lies in deciding on what military engagements are to be taken: Where and for how long? With what mandate? With what mission? With what resources? In 1999, when NATO countries debated the decision to take military action to combat then-Yugoslav leader Slobodan Milosevic’s ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, I remember we asked one of these very basic questions: “Can a dictator be permitted to kill his own people?” NATO answered that question by launching air strikes against Milosevic. It decided “in practice” to act, even though it could not agree on the “theory.” The then-19 members of the alliance had differing reasons in deciding to act. There was no unifying legal basis for their action. The UN Security Council had not explicitly authorized the use of force: Russia would have vetoed it. Yet NATO acted – rightly and successfully, in my view. Secretary-General Kofi Annan said at the time: “No government has the right to hide behind national sovereignty in order to violate the human rights and fundamental freedoms of its people.” But many were troubled by the lack of a common set of rules to govern such actions, necessary as they may have been. After Kosovo, the UN General Assembly, spurred by Canadian leadership on the issue, set up an International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. That commission developed the concept of the responsibility to protect. The main theme was that “states have a responsibility to protect their own citizens from avoidable catastrophes – from mass murder and rape, from starvation – but when they are unwilling or unable to do so, that responsibility must be borne by the broader community of states. There must be no more Rwandas.” The “responsibility-to-protect” doctrine has been widely, although not universally, supported. And a very obvious case has been staring us in the face for over three years – Darfur. Darfur has been called a “genocide.” An estimated 200,000 people have died. The Government of Sudan is complicit in this tragedy. If ever there was a classic case for responsibility to protect, Darfur is it. Yet action to date has been shamefully weak.