Cai Troubledwaters Whitepaper Webres

8/11/2019 Cai Troubledwaters Whitepaper Webres

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CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY INTERN

T R O U B L E D W A T E R S

EMANUELE LOBINA

Principal Lecturer at Public ServicesInternational Research Unit Business School,University of Greenwich

CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY INTERNATIONAL

Corporate Accountability International is a membershiporganization with a 37–year track record that protects humanrights, public health, and the environment from corporategreed and abuse around the world.

Public Services International Research Unit (PSIRU)investigates the impact of privatization and liberalizationon public services, with a specic focus on water, energy,waste management, health, and social care sectors. Other

research topics include the function and structure of publicservices, the strategies of multinational companies, and theinuence of international nancial institutions on publicservices. PSIRU is based in the Business School, Universityof Greenwich, London, UK.

Corporate Accountability International (formerly Infact) does notendorse, support, oppose or otherwise advocate the election ordefeat of any political candidate or party. Corporate AccountabilityInternational is a 501(c)(3) non-prot organization. Contributionsare tax-deductible as provided by law.

INTRODUCTIONGlobally, public water systems have a comparative

advantage over private water systems when it comesto fullling cities’ mandates to ensure equitable accessto water, improve public health, and benet the localenvironment. 1 In the U.S., like virtually everywhereelse in the world, the vast majority of water systemsare still publicly owned and operated. 2 Yet over thepast several decades, public officials have facedmounting pressure from the private water industry tomove away from public operations and toward formsof privatization. This pressure is very problematic.

In fact, there is a growing body of evidence documentingthe economic, social, and nancial risk that contractingwith the private water industry poses to cities. 3 At the same time, public officials and people aroundthe globe have experienced the failures of waterprivatization rsthand. As a result, privatization in allof its forms is deeply unpopular among voters and keyconstituencies wherever it takes place, 4 and the trendtoward remunicipalization of private water systems(returning previously privatized systems to local,public control) is rapidly intensifying.5

The response of private water corporations to theunpopularity and failure of water privatization hasbeen to wage a global PR campaign, in particular inthe U.S., to repackage water privatization in morepalatable terms. This campaign redenes waterprivatization as public-private partnerships (PPPs)to make private contracting or outsourcing moreappealing to mayors and other public officials. It

JUNE | 2014

TROUBLED WATERS:Misleading industry PR andthe case for public water





also adopts a marketing narrative full of promisesof private efficiency, private nance, and privateexpertise that some public officials nd convincing.But it’s a narrative that remains deafeningly silent onthe private sector’s failure to maintain its promises.

To implement these repackaged privatization models,transnational water corporations such as Veolia andSuez (and its U.S. subsidiary, United Water) rely notonly on misleading marketing materials, but alsoon their ability to interfere politically with publicdecisions at local, state, and federal levels.

Public decisions on who runs water systems are criticalbecause water supply and sanitation are essential publicservices, crucial for the welfare of local communities.Because water services are a natural monopoly, the

effects of these decisions are felt in the long term. 9 Public officials and community members shouldtherefore be fully aware of the problems with waterprivatization, as well as the opportunities offered byefficient and effective public water operations.10

Drawing on international evidence, this white paperreveals the reality behind the promised panacea ofwater privatization in all of its repackaged terms.The comparative analysis of the U.S. and international

experience with water privatization shows that: 1) Veoliaand Suez, the two major water transnational corporations,behave similarly in the U.S. and overseas, and 2) problemswith water privatization are systemic and not caused bylocal peculiarities. This white paper also exposes the

private water industry’s interference with public decisionsand its attempts to undermine the democratic governanceof water. It provides recommendations to public officials,calling on them to keep public water services in publichands and enhance democratic accountability, trans-parency, and public participation in decision-making.

“The public must have power indecisions regarding our public water

system. I would be wary of contractingwith any corporation that relies oncircumventing the public voice withbackdoor dealings to expand itsbusiness, especially when it comesto our most vital public service.”CHRISTINE INGRASSIA ALDERMAN, ST. LOUIS, MO

CASE STUDY:ST. LOUIS RESIDENTS REJECT VEOLIAFor nearly a year, St. Louis, MO residents made clear they rejected a proposed

Veolia contract with the city’s Water Division. They packed public hearingswith hundreds of people voicing their concerns over Veolia’s business practicesand water privatization schemes. Yet the proposed contract stayed on thetable. In the end, the mayor’s office tried and failed to push it through andcircumvent democracy.

To investigate the extent of Veolia’s political interference, Corporate Accountability International issued arequest for records under the Missouri Sunshine Law to the mayor’s office. These records revealed a coordinateddamage-control campaign involving the mayor’s staff and Veolia’s lobbyist, staff, and PR representatives. 6

Veolia created an entire website and issued virtual newsletters in an attempt to undermine the grassrootscoalition of concerned community members and organizations challenging its contract. 7 The corporationeventually raised the ire of key public officials, leading Veolia to withdraw its contract bid with the cityrather than face pending legislative action that could have further damaged its reputation. 8





Public water: Too important to delegateThere is a reason why at least 80 percent of the largestcities in the U.S. have kept water systems under publiccontrol since the turn of the 20th century. The samereason explains why public ownership of urban watersystems is predominant across other high-incomecountries and generally around the world. This reasonis the recognition by local governments that themanagement of water services is too important todelegate to the private sector. 11 Water systems are,by their nature, local monopolies. Delegating theiroperation to private corporations risks underminingtheir long-term sustainable management anddemocratic governance. No matter how the private

sector frames its intentions, its legally bound priorityis market development over community development,prot maximization over welfare maximization.12

The historical problems with water privatization,and the recognition of the comparative advantageof public water operations explain why, today, publicwater prevails in the U.S. and globally.13 Yet thepressure on U.S. local governments to privatize theirwater services and involve the private sector in waterservice operations and nancing has mounted in the

last few decades. This pressure has been exacerbatedby federal scal policies, among other factors. Duringthe 1970s and early 1980s, U.S. federal funding forthe nation’s water systems constituted the largestnon-military public works program since the InterstateHighway System. Since that time, the percentage thefederal government has contributed to public watersystems has dwindled from 75 percent to below 10percent today. Local governments have striven toclose the gap, spending an all-time annual high of$111.4 billion in 2010.14 But these governments stillface the stress of budget decits, decient federaland state support, and an expanding need toreplace aging infrastructure and extend service toa growing population.

In response, private equity and water corporationsare rushing to offer “solutions” in direct competitionwith, and to the detriment of, public water systems.These solutions promise to deepen the problem andundermine long-term sustainable management and

democratic governance of public water systems.The fact that private water corporations pursue protmaximization under conditions of monopoly, and theinterest-seeking practices they adopt to maximizetheir prots, mean that involving the private sectoris a highly cost-ineffective way of investing in watersystems. 15 These issues had motivated U.S. localgovernments to gain control over water systemsbetween the 19th and the 20th century, 16 but therenewed pressures to privatize water call for renewedanalysis of the arguments in favor of water privatization.

The false promises of water privatizationThe private water industry promises greater privatesector efficiency, advanced and innovative technologicalsolutions, high-quality services, and private nancefor infrastructure development. 17 This industry and itssupporters promise that all this will help U.S. mayorsand other public officials better pursue the public interest.As a matter of fact, both in the U.S. and internationally,the reality of privatized water operations is starklydifferent from the myths of water privatization.

Chief among the arguments justifying private watercontracts is that private corporations are more efficientthan the public sector. In fact, Veolia’s consultingcontract model—which it failed to secure in St. Louisdue to challenges from public officials and a grassrootscoalition of community members and organizations—islargely based on the premise of superior private sectorefficiency.18 Recent studies have either found no signi-cant differences in efficiency or decreased efficiency—as

Prot rst: United Water has a history of avoiding payments for muchneeded infrastructure in its New Jersey contracts, including expensiveunderground pipes.

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d i t : J e r s e y J o u r n a

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FINDINGS:FALSE PROMISES FROM THE PRIVATE WATER INDUSTRY VS. REALITY

was the case in the United Kingdom (UK), where watersystems are predominantly private. 19 Also, privatecorporations perform no better on economic grounds,charging higher prices than public water utilities. 20 InFrance, the home country of Veolia and Suez, the priceof private water has proved 16 percent higher than public–sector–provisioned water. 21 And in the UK, the greatexperiment in water privatization of the last twodecades has resulted in price increases of 50 percent,

even as operating costs have remained unchanged. 22

A recent paper from the World Bank has found thatfor all the added efficiencies promised by the privatewater sector, from layoffs of utility workers to increasedbill collection, there is no evidence of higher privateinvestment in water systems or prices being lowered forratepayers. 23 Suez’s United Water, which is geographicallyconcentrated in New Jersey, has raised the ire of a

number of public officials for rate hikes in the wakeof Hurricane Sandy.24

The arguments in favor of water privatization alsoinclude the expectation that private water corporationswill contribute new sources of investment nance, butthis expectation is unrealistic. In fact, governmentsusually enjoy lower costs of raising investment nancecompared to the private sector. As observed in France,Italy, China, and the U.S., among other countries, privatewater corporations contribute negligible amounts ofprivate nance and seek opportunities to use publicinvestment nance. 25 In France, major infrastructureupgrades are typically nanced by local governments.Similarly, United Water “avoids paying for expensiveunderground pipes” in many of its contracts throughoutNew Jersey. 26 Also, because the private sector is notmore efficient than public water operators and has an

FALSE PROMISE:Private water corporations aremore efficient than the publicsector.

FALSE PROMISE:

Private water corporations performbetter on technical grounds thanthe public sector.

FALSE PROMISE:

The private water sector willopen the door to new sources ofinvestment to nance infrastructure.

REALITY:Studies show there is no signicantdifference in efficiency between theprivate and public sector.

REALITY:International evidence contradictsthis claim. The lowest leakage ratesin Europe are in the Netherlands andGermany, where the systems arenearly all run publicly.

REALITY:Both in the U.S. and internationally,private water corporations contributenegligible amounts of private nanceand actually seek opportunities touse public investment nance.





imperative of prot maximization, using privatecontracting is a highly cost-ineffective way todeliver investments in the water sector. 27 In otherwords, delivering the same level of investment

through the private sector will cost more thanthrough the public sector.

Private corporations perform no better on technicalgrounds. The lowest leakage rates in Europe are inthe Netherlands and Germany, where the systems arenearly all run publicly.28 Veolia deliberately allowedraw sewage into the river in Brussels as a way ofputting pressure on the city to pay more for operatingthe treatment plant. 29 In Chile, Suez has had to pay$4 million in compensation to people for the foulsmells from its sewage treatment plant. 30

U.S. experience with privatization mirrorsthat of high-income countries globallyThe concrete experience of U.S. cities and their sistercities in high-income countries dispels the myths ofwater privatization. The negative experiences of citiesfrom Atlanta to Milwaukee and Camden to Indianapolishave been mirrored in cities in countries from France toPortugal, Italy to China, and Germany to Canada. Waterprivatization has resulted in the contamination of watersupplies, rate hikes, a reduced quality of service, anddeep costs to cities saddled with unsatisfactory butlegally binding contracts.

Since 2002, more than 20 U.S. municipalities havetaken back control of their water systems from privatewater operators like Veolia and Suez, including majorU.S. cities like Atlanta and Indianapolis31—even as thecorporations continue to promote these failures assuccess stories. Water remunicipalization in the U.S.is part of a global trend, with more than 100 cases ofremunicipalization in high-, middle-, and low-incomecountries. 32 This trend is particularly accelerating inhigh-income countries where 45 cases have occurredsince 2000 with 28 in the last ve years alone. 33 Paris,notably the international headquarters to both Veoliaand Suez, has led the charge to remunicipalize, savingtens of millions of dollars since returning its watersystem to public control. 34

The unpopularity of water privatization is such that theNetherlands has made water privatization illegal. 35 In2011, 27.6 million Italian citizens voted overwhelminglyagainst water privatization in a national referendum. 36

In 2013, nearly 1.9 million citizens across 28 EuropeanUnion Member States signed a European Citizens’Initiative called for putting a halt to water privatization. 37 The upshot to this: U.S. public officials should be waryto import private water “solutions” that have failedsister cities across the Global North, not to speak ofthe even more dire failings across the Global South. 38

“Water supplies and infrastructure

are, fundamentally, a public servicethat require strong accountability,transparency, and public trust. As such,it is critical that decisions regardingwater resources and infrastructurebe conducted in the public sector.Privatizing public water systems carriessubstantial risk to the managementand sustainability of water resources

and infrastructure.” MAYOR RALPH BECKER SALT LAKE CITY, UT

Public-Private Partnerships:New packaging, still private waterGiven the deep-seated unpopularity of water privatizationand the track record of its failure, corporations areinnovating new ways to sell cities their services.

Under the promise of private expertise, Veolia andother water corporations are increasingly enteringinto consulting projects. Even in cities like New York;Washington, D.C.; and Los Angeles, where great prideis taken in providing high quality water services underpublic management, public money is being spent onconsulting contracts with Veolia in the name of improvingoperations and management. But the private waterindustry has a track record of poor service quality,





unjustied tariff increases, cuts on investments, legaldisputes, and contract renegotiations that tie cities tothe long-term loss of precious nancial resourcesand the loss of public control over water management. 39 This track record of unsavory business practices,which is typical of PPPs and other forms of waterprivatization, should cast a warning for municipalgovernments considering outsourcing their waterservices to private operators.

That’s why in St. Louis, where a proposed consultingcontract received deeper scrutiny from the publicand local elected officials than in prior cases, Veoliawas forced to withdraw its proposed contract afterfacing enormous pressure from public officials anda grassroots coalition of concerned communitymembers and organizations. 40

In addition, however innocuous they might appearto local authorities, consulting contracts are door-openers for deeper forms of privatization—frommanagement to lease contracts and concessions.Consulting contracts have led to deeper private watermanagement in cities like Pittsburgh, PA, and a studyof Veolia’s proposed consulting contract in St. Louisrevealed that the proposed contract would have madeVeolia the owner of all the ideas for improving the St.Louis City Water Division, allowing it to control thedivision itself. It would have also allowed Veolia todeny the application of Missouri’s Sunshine Law,putting the corporation’s commercial interests aheadof the public interest in freedom of information. 41

Private equity rms, like Table Rock Capital andKohlberg Kravis Roberts (KKR), are also partneringwith Veolia and with Suez’s United Water to secure

lucrative concession contracts. Table Rock, inparticular, is actively seeking out municipalitieswith laws conducive to privatization, infrastructurethat will not prove costly to repair and maintain,and a population adequate to support a full returnon investment. 42 Table Rock’s most recent “success”has been the city of Rialto, CA. The city’s concessiondeal with Table Rock and Veolia was facilitated bya $170 million upfront investment, which ratepayers

will pay for with interest.43 Bayonne, NJ has entered asimilar deal with KKR and United Water. These corporationsand their equity partners are energetically promoting thePPPs in Rialto and Bayonne to public officials before thelong-term consequences of these contracts are feltby municipal governments and local communities.

Policy interference: The precursor to privatizationThe success of private corporations to secure suchdeals hinges on the industry’s continued ability toinuence the rewriting of water policy to favor its ownprot interests, as well as access and inuence overpublic officials outside of public scrutiny.

At the U.S. federal level, Suez’s United Water and former

RWE subsidiary American Water are lobbying to amendInternal Revenue Service tax code to lift caps on theissuance of tax-exempt bonds that support publicnancing for private water projects. 44 Congress iscurrently considering legislation, supported by the privatewater industry, in both the House of Representativesand the Senate, which would codify these industry-favoring changes into law. 45 The private water industryaims to access tax-exempt bonds to subsidize corporateprots with public money and to weaken its greatestcompetitor in the U.S.: publicly controlled and managedwater systems. The implementation of these changeswould further destabilize the long-term nancialviability of public water systems, as their access topublic funds would be restricted further.

The private water industry aggressively lobbied forthe passage of the Water Infrastructure Finance andInnovation Act (WIFIA), which makes cheap federalnance available to private corporations so that theycan help municipal governments invest in water services.

The proposal is paradoxical, since the primary cause ofthe difficulties faced by local governments with investingin public water systems is restricted access to federalnance. In fact, in the last 40 years, U.S. municipal wateroperators have been subject to increasingly restrictivefederal scal policies—rst with the replacement offederal grants with State Revolving Funds, and then withthe reduction in the amounts of loans disbursed by theState Revolving Funds.46





At the state level, corporate policy interferenceis limiting democratic oversight and accountabilityof private water projects. Nowhere is this clearer thanin the state of New Jersey, where Suez’s United Water

is most geographically concentrated. The corporationhas lobbied against bills requiring it to notify communitieswhen it plans to raise rates, 47 to alert communitiesdirectly in the event of boil water notices, 48 and tokeep local governments better apprised of the statusof local water supplies. 49 And in 2013, GovernorChristie vetoed a bill50 that would have “establishe[d]procedures and standards regarding public serviceprivatization contracts” and oversight to protectmunicipal governments from being swindled. 51

Governor Christie’s close relationship with a seniorpartner at one of United Water’s primary lobbying rmspoints to the reach of the private sector’s lobbying. 52

At the local level, Veolia, Suez’s United Water, andother water corporations have a long track recordof attempting to secure private water concessionsbehind closed doors or with minimal public discourse.Access to the nation’s mayors and local public officialsoften begins in forums like the U.S. Conference ofMayors and National League of Cities, where

corporations pay dues that afford the industry ahigh level of lobbying access and visibility outsideof media and public scrutiny.

Through these forums, water industry lobbyistsposition themselves as experts and trustworthypartners, but mayors should be cautious about relyingon those marketing presentations for information onthe industry’s track record. It is a marketing narrativefull of appealing promises to address the complexchallenges of delivering quality water services with

limited access to nancial resources, but it doesn’tmatch the private sector’s record of failures to maintainits promises. It is forums like these that have led toinstances like in Stockton, CA where OMI/ThamesWater, Inc. lobbied the city council to sign a 20-yearprivate water concession just two weeks before a ballotinitiative could have required a public vote on theprivatization. It took ve years of infrastructure neglect,contract non-compliance, and lengthy legal proceedingsfor the Stockton community to reclaim public control. 53

True solutions for navigating today’stroubled watersThe empirical evidence on the performance andconduct of private water corporations like Veolia

and Suez in the U.S. and globally shows that waterprivatization is not the solution, it is the problem.In order to achieve strategically important sustainabledevelopment objectives, U.S. public officials shouldinstead avail themselves of the comparative advantageof the public sector.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

The following recommendations

are offered to U.S. public officialsat federal, state, and local levels:Enhance democratic accountability, transparency,and public participation in decision-making onreforming, managing, and nancing water supplyand sanitation services. Lack of accountability,transparency, and participation are typical problemswith water privatization.54 If a decision cannot bedefended in public and receive the support of thepublic, it is not a decision t for a democracy.

Strengthen public water operations and adoptbest practices for in-house restructuring.International experience shows that themost effective water operators are found inthe public sector. As the public sector is notsubject to the prot maximization imperative, itoffers the possibility of reinvesting all the availableresources for the welfare of local communities. 55

Expand opportunities for municipal governments

and public water operators to access inexpensiveand reliable public investment nance. Publicnance is the least expensive way to invest inwater systems. 56 Public water operators enjoy theadvantage of managerial exibility and democraticcontrol. 57 Using public operations and public nanceis the most cost-effective way to deliver sustainablewater development objectives. 58





1 Lobina, E., Hall, D. (2008) The comparative

advantage of the public sector in the developmentof urban water supply, in Progress in DevelopmentStudies , 8(1), pp. 85-101; Lobina, E. (2013) Remediableinstitutional alignment and water service reform:Beyond rational choice, in International Journalof Water Governance , 1(1/2), pp. 109-132; Hall, D.,Lobina, E. (2007) Water as a Public Service.PSIRU Reports, commissioned by Public ServicesInternational, January 2007 (http://www.psiru.org/sites/default/les/2007-01-W-waaps.pdf).

2 Hall, D., Lobina, E. (2009) Water Privatization, inArestis, P., Sawyer, M. (eds.) Critical Essays on thePrivatization Experience, International Papers inPolitical Economy Series, Basingstoke and NewYork: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 75-120; Hall, D.,Lobina, E. (2008) Water Privatisation,PSIRU

Reports , April 2008 (http://gala.gre.ac.uk/1704/1/PSIRU_Report_(9820)_-_2008-04-W-over.pdf).

3 Lobina, E., Hall, D. (2003) Problems with privatewater concessions: a review of experience. PSIRUReports , June 2003 (http://www.psiru.org/reports/2003-06-W-over.doc); Lobina, E. (2006)D21: WaterTime case study - Grenoble, France,Deliverable D21, 10 March 2006. Research Projecton “Decision making in water systems in Europeancities” (WATERTIME), European Commission, 5thFramework Programme, 2002-2005. ContractNo. EVK4-2002-0095 (http://www.watertime.net/docs/WP2/D21_Grenoble.doc); Hall, D., Lobina,E. (2008) From a private past to a public future? -the problems of water in England and Wales.PSIRU Reports, commissioned by the GMB union,

November 2007 (http://gala.gre.ac.uk/2946/1/PSIRU_Report_9757_2008-02-W-UK.pdf); Lobina,E. (2013) Remediable institutional alignment andwater service reform: Beyond rational choice, inInternational Journal of Water Governance , 1(1/2),pp. 109-132.

4 Hall, D., Lobina, E., de la Motte, R. (2005) Publicresistance to privatisation in water and energy, inDevelopment in Practice, Volume 15, Numbers 3 &4, June 2005, pp. 286-301 (http://www.psiru.org/reports/2005-06-W-E-resist.pdf).

5 Lobina, E. (2013) List of water re-municipalisationsworldwide, November 2013.PSIRU Reports,December 2013 (http://www.psiru.org/sites/default/les/2013-W-Remunicipalisationswater.

pdf); Hall, D., Lobina, E., Terhorst, P. (2013)Re-municipalisation in the early 21st century: waterin France and energy in Germany, in InternationalReview of Applied Economics , 27(2), pp. 193-214;Hall, D. (2012) Re-municipalising municipal servicesin Europe. PSIRU Report commissioned by theEuropean Federation of Public Service Unions(EPSU), May 2012, revised November 2012(http://www.psiru.org/sites/default/les/2012-11-Remun.docx).

6 This information was gathered through theMissouri Sunshine Law § 610.023 et seq. CorporateAccountability International requested informationfrom the Office of Mayor Francis G. Slay on August6th, 2013.

01_29-01_30_Veolia working through Mayor

office to neutralize opposition (2013, January29-30 http://www.stopcorporateabuse.org/troubled-waters The email conversation availableat the above URL was between Catherine Werner,St. Louis Sustainability Director; Stephen Sieg-fried, Director of Business Development, VeoliaWater North America; Julie Hauser, CompanyPresident for Hauser Group; John J. Temporiti,Polsinelli Shughart LLP, (serving as counsel anda registered lobbyist for Veolia); Matt Demo,Communications Director, Veolia Water NorthAmerica; Eddie Rothe, Director of Operations,St. Louis and Jeff Rainford, Mayor Slay’s Chiefof Staff.

7 See: http://stl-water-future.com/

8

Ways and Means Committee, (October, 2013),Board Bill No. 216, (https://stlouis-mo.gov/internal-apps/legislative/upload/boardbill/BB216-wd182.pdf )

9 Lobina, E., Hall, D. (2010) Public Water Supplies,in Warf, B. (ed.)Encyclopedia of Geography. Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications, Vol. 5, pp.2315-2319.

10 Lobina, E., Hall, D. (2008) The comparativeadvantage of the public sector in the developmentof urban water supply, in Progress in DevelopmentStudies , 8(1), pp. 85-101.

11 Hall, D., Lobina, E. (2007) Water as a PublicService. PSIRU Reports , commissioned by Public

Services International, January 2007 (http://www.psiru.org/sites/default/les/2007-01-W-waaps.pdf); Melosi, M.V. (2000) The SanitaryCity: Urban Infrastructure in America from theColonial Times to the Present. The John HopkinsUniversity Press; Juuti P.S., Katko, T.S. (eds)(2005) Water, Time and European Cities: Historymatters for the Futures. Research Project on“Decision making in water systems in Europeancities” (WATERTIME), European Commission, 5thFramework Programme, 2002-2005. ContractNo. EVK4-2002-0095 (http://www.watertime.net/Docs/WP3/WTEC.pdf).

12 Lobina, E. (2013) Remediable institutionalalignment and water service reform: Beyondrational choice, in International Journal of Water

Governance , 1(1/2), pp. 109-132.13 Hall, D., Lobina, E. (2007) Water as a PublicService.PSIRU Reports, commissioned by PublicServices International, January 2007 (http://www.psiru.org/sites/default/les/2007-01-W-waaps.pdf); Melosi, M.V. (2000) The Sanitary City: UrbanInfrastructure in America from the Colonial Timesto the Present. The John Hopkins University Press;Juuti P.S., Katko, T.S. (eds) (2005) Water, Time andEuropean Cities: History matters for the Futures.Research Project on “Decision making in watersystems in European cities” (WATERTIME), EuropeanCommission, 5th Framework Programme, 2002-2005. Contract No. EVK4-2002-0095 (http://www.watertime.net/Docs/WP3/WTEC.pdf).

14 Anderson, R. F.,Gatton D., Sheahan J. (2013)

Growth in Local Government Spending on PublicWater and Wastewater – But How Much ProgressCan American Households Afford? The U.S. Conferenceof Mayors (http://www.usmayors.org/publications/media/2013/04-water-localcosts.pdf).

15 Lobina, E., Hall, D. (2003) Problems with privatewater concessions: a review of experience. PSIRUReports , June 2003 (http://www.psiru.org/reports/2003-06-W-over.doc); Hall, D., Lobina,E. (2012) Financing water and sanitation: publicrealities. PSIRU Reports, March 2012 (http://www.psiru.org/sites/default/les/2012-03-W-nance.docx); Hall, D., Lobina, E. (2009) Public policyoptions for nancing sewerage systems, in Castro,J. E. and Heller, L. (eds.) Water and SanitationServices: Public Policy and Management. London:

Earthscan, pp. 88-105.16Hall, D., Lobina, E. (2007) Water as a PublicService.PSIRU Reports, commissioned by PublicServices International, January 2007 (http://www.psiru.org/sites/default/les/2007-01-W-waaps.pdf); Melosi, M.V. (2000) The Sanitary City: UrbanInfrastructure in America from the Colonial Timesto the Present. The John Hopkins University Press;Juuti P.S., Katko, T.S. (eds) (2005) Water, Time andEuropean Cities: History matters for the Futures.Research Project on “Decision making in watersystems in European cities” (WATERTIME), EuropeanCommission, 5th Framework Programme, 2002-2005. Contract No. EVK4-2002-0095 (http://www.watertime.net/Docs/WP3/WTEC.pdf).

17

Hall, D., Lobina, E. (2006)Pipe Dreams. The failure of the private sector to invest in waterservices in developing countries . London: PublicServices International and World DevelopmentMovement (http://www.psiru.org/sites/default/les/2006-03-W-investment.pdf).

18 Veolia (2012)Proposal for Professional Services for Water Utility Operational Efficiency and ValueCreation Analysis — St. Louis Water Division .Business proposal by Veolia Water North AmericaOperating Services, LLC, 7 September 2012 (http://stl-water-future.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/St-Louis-PROP-20120903.pdf).

19 Bel, G., Warner, M. E. (2008) Does privatizationof solid waste and water services reduce costs?

A review of empirical studies, inResources,Conservation and Recycling , 52(12): pp. 1337–1348;Bel, G., Fageda, X., Warner, M. (2010) Is PrivateProduction of Public Services Cheaper Than PublicProduction? A Meta-Regression Analysis of SolidWaste and Water Services, in Journal of Policy

Analysis and Management , 29(3): pp. 553–577;Hall, D., Lobina, E. (2005) The relative efficiencyof public and private sector water. PSIRU Reports,October 2005 (http://www.psiru.org/sites/default/les/2005-10-W-effic.doc).

20 Ruester, S., Zschille, M. (2010) The impactof governance structure on rm performance:An application to the German water distributionsector, in Utilities Policy, 18(3), pp. 154-162;

ENDNOTES





Martínez-Espiñeira, R., García-Valiñas, M.Á.,

González-Gómez, F. (2009) Does PrivateManagement of Water Supply Services ReallyIncrease Prices? An Empirical Analysis in Spain,in Urban Studies, 46(4), pp. 923–945; Lobina,E., Hall, D. (2007) Experience with private sectorparticipation in Grenoble, France and lessonson strengthening public water operations, inUtilities Policy , 15, pp. 93-109.

21 Chong, E., Huet, F., Saussier, S., Steiner, F.(2006) Public-Private Partnerships and Prices:Evidence from Water Distribution in France,in Review of Industrial Organization , Vol. 29,pp. 149–169.

22 Saal D., Parker D., and Weyman-Jones T.(2007) Determining the contribution of technical

change, efficiency change and scale change toproductivity growth in the privatized English andWelsh water and sewerage industry: 1985–2000.J Prod Anal (2007) 28, pp. 127–139; Tinson, A.,Kenway, P. (2013) The Water Industry: A Caseto Answer. Report by the New Policy Institute,May 2013. London: UNISON (http://npi.org.uk/les/8213/7545/1688/Water_industry_a_case_to_answer_unison_version.pdf).

23 Gassner, K., Popov, A., Pushak, N. (2009)Does private sector participation improveperformance in electricity and water distribu-tion?, PPIAF Trends and policy options , No. 6.Washington, DC: The World Bank (http://www.ppiaf.org/sites/ppiaf.org/les/publication/ebook-Trends%20Policy%20Options-6-PSP%20

water%20electricity%20-%20KGassner%20APopov%20NPushak.pdf).

24 Miller, P. A. (2013) Township Officials, ResidentsBlast United Water Toms River At Rate Hearing, inBerkley Patch , 22 February 2013 (http://berkeley-nj.patch.com/groups/politics-and-elections/p/rate-hearing).

25 Lobina, E., Hall, D. (2007) Experience withprivate sector participation in Grenoble, France andlessons on strengthening public water operations,inUtilities Policy , 15, pp. 93-109; Lobina, E. (2005)D11: WaterTime case study - Arezzo, Italy,Wa-terTime Deliverable D11, 4 March 2005. ResearchProject on “Decision making in water systems inEuropean cities” (WATERTIME), European Com-

mission, 5th Framework Programme, 2002-2005.Contract No. EVK4-2002-0095 (http://www.watertime.net/docs/WP2/D11_Arezzo.doc); ClarkeAnnez, P. (2006) Urban infrastructure nance fromprivate operators: What have we learned fromrecent experience?, World Bank Policy ResearchWorking Paper 4045. Washington, D.C.: World Bank(https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/9019/wps4045.pdf?sequence=1).

26 Glorioso, C. (2013, September 25). I-Team: PrivateWater Company Avoids Paying for New Mains.NBCNew York . (http://www.nbcnewyork.com/investiga-tions/Water-Contracts-United-Water-Municipal-Contracts-I-Team-225068882.html?akmobile=o).

27 Hall, D., Lobina, E. (2012) Financing water and

sanitation: public realities. PSIRU Reports, March2012 (http://www.psiru.org/sites/default/les/2012-03-W-nance.docx); Lobina, E. (2013) Remediableinstitutional alignment and water service reform:Beyond rational choice, in International Journal ofWater Governance , 1(1/2), pp. 109-132.

28 Lobina, E., Hall, D. (2013) Water Privatisationand Remunicipalisation: International Lessons forJakarta. PSIRU Reports, prepared for submissionto Central Jakarta District Court Case No. 527/Pdt.G/2012/PN.Jkt.Pst, November 2013 (http://www.psiru.org/sites/default/les/2014-W-03-JAKARTANOVEMBER2013FINAL.docx).

29 Hall, D. (2010) More public rescues for moreprivate nance failures - a critique of the EC

Communication on PPPs, PSIRU Reports, March2010 (http://www.psiru.org/reports/2010-03-PPPs.doc); Lobina, E. (2013) Remediable institutionalalignment and water service reform: Beyondrational choice, in International Journal of WaterGovernance , 1(1/2), pp. 109-132.

30 Business News Americas (2009) Report: AguasAndinas ned over US$4mn, will appeal ruling,Business News Americas, 6 May 2009 (http://www.bnamericas.com/story.jsp?sector=4&noticia=477048&idioma=I&source=).

31Multiple sources. Go to: http://www.stopcorporateabuse.org/troubled-waters

32 Lobina, E., Hall, D., Popov, V. (2014) List of water

remunicipalisations in Asia and worldwide – As ofApril 2014. PSIRU Briengs, commissioned by PSI forpresentation at the Civil Society Panel Discussion3, 47th Annual Meeting of the Board of Governorsof the Asian Development Bank (Astana, Kazakhstan,4 May 2014) (http://www.adb.org/annual-meeting/2014/csp).

33 ibid

34 Pigeon, M. (2012) Une eau publique pour Paris:Symbolism and Success in the Heartland of PrivateWater. In Pigeon, M., McDonald, D. A., Hoedeman,O., Kishimoto, S. (eds.), Remunicipalisation: PuttingWater Back into Public Hands, 24-39. Amsterdam:Transnational Institute (http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/les/download/remunicipalisation_

book_nal_for_web_0.pdf); Sinaï, A. (2013) L’eauà Paris: retour vers le public. July 2013. Paris: Eaude Paris. ISBN: 978-2-95306663-4-0 (http://www.eaudeparis.fr/uploads/tx_edpevents/LivreRemunicipalisation_01.pdf).

35 Hall, D., de La Motte, R. (2004) Making waterprivatisation illegal: - new laws in Netherlandsand Uruguay November 2004. PSIRU Reports,November 2004 (http://www.psiru.org/reports/2004-11-W-crim.doc).

36 Lobina, E. (2012) Turning the Tide: Italy’sreferendum against water privatisation.PSIRU Report , commissioned by the European

Federation of Public Service Unions, July 2012;

Dugard, J., Drage, K. (2012) Shields and Swords:Legal Tools for Public Water. Municipal ServicesProject Occasional Paper No. 17, June 2012(http://www.municipalservicesproject.org/sites/municipalservicesproject.org/les/publications/OccasionalPaper17_Dugard-Drage_Shields_and_Swords_Legal_Tools_Public_Water_June2012.pdf).

37 Right2Water (2013) 1,857,605 signatures deliveredto national authorities, News, Water is a HumanRight campaign, 23 October 2013 (http://www.right2water.eu/news/1857605-signatures-delivered-national-authorities).

38 Lobina, E., Hall, D. (2013) Water Privatisationand Remunicipalisation: International Lessons forJakarta. PSIRU Reports, prepared for submission

to Central Jakarta District Court Case No. 527/Pdt.G/2012/PN.Jkt.Pst, November 2013 (http://www.psiru.org/sites/default/les/2014-W-03-JAKARTANOVEMBER2013FINAL.docx).

39 Lobina, E. (2005) Problems with Private WaterConcessions: A Review of Experiences and Analysisof Dynamics, in International Journal of WaterResources Development, Vol. 21, No. 1, pp. 55-87;Lobina, E., Hall, D. (2000) Public Sector Alterna-tives to Water Supply and Sewerage Privatization:Case Studies, in International Journal of WaterResources Development , Vol. 16, No. 1, pp. 35-55(http://www.psiru.org/sites/default/les/9908--W-U-Pubalt.doc).

40 Lussenhop, J. (2013). Veolia Water Withdraws

From Contract with City of St. Louis,The RiverfrontTimes , 29 October 2013 (http://blogs.riverfronttimes.com/dailyrft/2013/10/veolia_withdraws_contract_proposal_st_louis_water_division.php).

41 Missouri Coalition for the Environment (2013,February 28) Veolia Water Contract EffectivelyPrivatizes Water Operations, Threatens PublicAccountability Provisions of Sunshine Law (https://www.moenviron.org/index.php/news/110-2013-2-28-news-release).

42 Global Water Intelligence (2014) US waterconcessions’ crooked growth path. Volume15 (Issue 2), (2014) pp. 16 (http://www.globalwaterintel.com/archive/15/2/general/

us-water-concessions-crooked-growth-path.html).43 Food & Water Watch (2013)Borrowing Trouble:Water Privatization Is a False Solution for MunicipalBudget Shortfalls . Food & Water Watch report(http://documents.foodandwaterwatch.org/doc/BorrowingTrouble.pdf#_ga=1.129648072.590144236.1400074695).

44DeVeaux, E.M. (2012) Letter to the HonorableBarbara Boxer and the Honorable John Mica.United Water and Sustainable Water InfrastructureCoalition letter to the Chairman of the Committeeon Environment and Public Works, Unites StatesSenate, and the Chairman of the Committee on





Transportation and Infrastructure, U.S. House

of Representatives, 21st May 2012 (http://sustainablewaterinfrastructure.org/images/PAB_SWIC_ltr_conferees_May_2012.pdf); DeVeaux,E.M. (2012) Letter to the Honorable Peter Kingand the Honorable Nita Lowey. United Water andSustainable Water Infrastructure Coalition letter tothe Chairman and Ranking Member of the HurricaneSandy Recovery Task Force, Unites States Houseof Representatives, 11 December 2012 (http://sustainablewaterinfrastructure.org/images/SWIC_Support_Recovery_PAB_AMT_Dec_11_12_nal.pdf);US House of Representatives (2013) Testimonyof Mr. Robert Iacullo, Executive Vice President,United Water, Regarding Water and WastewaterInfrastructure. Testimony in front of the Committeeon Appropriations Subcommittee on Interior, Envi-ronment, and Related Agencies, 16 April 2013

Sustainable Water Infrastructure Coalition (n.d.)Who we are, Sustainable Water InfrastructureCoalition website, accessed 9 April 2014 (http://sustainablewaterinfrastructure.org/home.html).

45 S.2345 — 113th Congress (2013-2014) SustainableWater Infrastructure Investment Act of 2013Sponsored by Sen. Menendez, Robert [D-NJ](Introduced 05/15/2014) and H.R.4237 — 113thCongress (2013-2014) Sustainable Water InfrastructureInvestment Act of 2014 Sponsor: Rep. Duncan, JohnJ., Jr. [R-TN-2] (Introduced 03/13/2014).

46 Corporate Accountability International (2012)Public Water Works! The case for prioritizing ourmost essential public service, pp. 7-9 (http://www.stopcorporateabuse.org/sites/default/les/

resources/public-water-works.pdf).47 New Jersey Election Law EnforcementCommission (2012, Oct 10) Governmental AffairsAgent Quarterly Report FORMQ-4, Michael Turner,Registration #1895-1, (http://www.elec.state.nj.us/pdffiles/gaa_qtr/GAA_3rd_Qtr_2012.pdf)

48 ibid

49 New Jersey Election Law EnforcementCommission (2012, April 5) Governmental AffairsAgent Quarterly Report FORMQ-4, JosephDeSanctis, Registration #433-15, (http://www.elec.state.nj.us/pdffiles/gaa_qtr/GAA_1st_Qtr2012.pdf).

50 State of New Jersey Office of the Governor

(2013) Governor Chris Christie Takes Action onPending Legislation, State of New Jersey Office ofthe Governor Press Releases, 28 June 2013 (http://www.state.nj.us/governor/news/news/552013/approved/20130628f.html).

51 New Jersey Election Law EnforcementCommission (2013, July 9) Governmental AffairsAgent Quarterly Report FORMQ-4, JosephDeSanctis, Registration #433-15, (http://www.elec.state.nj.us/pdffiles/gaa_qtr/GAA%202nd%20Qtr%202013.pdf ).

52 Margolin, J. (2010) Powerful lobbyist who touredOhio with Gov. Christie says trip was personal, notprofessional, in New Jersey On-Line, 3 October2010 (http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2010/10/

powerful_lobbyist_touring_ohio.html).53 Food & Water Watch (2009) The Price ofPrivatization: Stockton CA, Food & Water WatchFact Sheets, 3rd December 2009 (http://documents.foodandwaterwatch.org/doc/Stockton.pdf#_ga=1.268903475.354203188.1402141300).

54 Lobina, E., Hall, D. (2003) Problems with privatewater concessions: a review of experience. PSIRUReports , June 2003 (http://www.psiru.org/reports/2003-06-W-over.doc).

55 Lobina, E., Hall, D. (2013) Water Privatisationand Remunicipalisation: International Lessons forJakarta. PSIRU Reports, prepared for submissionto Central Jakarta District Court Case No. 527/

Pdt.G/2012/PN.Jkt.Pst, November 2013 (http://www.psiru.org/sites/default/les/2014-W-03-JAKARTANOVEMBER2013FINAL.docx); Lobina,E., Hall, D. (2008) The comparative advantageof the public sector in the development of urbanwater supply, in Progress in Development Studies ,8(1), pp. 85-101; Lobina, E. (2013) Remediableinstitutional alignment and water service reform:Beyond rational choice, in International Journalof Water Governance, 1(1/2), pp. 109-132; Hall,D., Lobina, E. (2007) Water as a Public Service.PSIRU Reports, commissioned by Public ServicesInternational, January 2007 (http://www.psiru.org/sites/default/les/2007-01-W-waaps.pdf).

56 Hall, D., Lobina, E. (2012) Financing water and

sanitation: public realities. PSIRU Reports, March2012 (http://www.psiru.org/sites/default/les/2012-03-W-nance.docx); Hall, D., Lobina, E.(2009) Public policy options for nancingsewerage systems, in Castro, J. E. and Heller, L.(eds.) Water and Sanitation Services: Public Policyand Management. London: Earthscan, pp. 88-105.

57 Lobina, E. (2013) Remediable institutionalalignment and water service reform: Beyondrational choice, in International Journal ofWater Governance, 1(1/2), pp. 109-132.

58Hall, D., Lobina, E. (2007) Water as a PublicService.PSIRU Reports, commissioned by PublicServices International, January 2007 (http://www.psiru.org/sites/default/les/2007-01-

W-waaps.pdf).





Emanuele Lobina is Principal Lecturer, Public Services International ResearchUnit (PSIRU), Business School, University of Greenwich, UK (www.psiru.org). He joined PSIRU in 1998 and has written extensively on the international experiencewith water service reform. He is regularly commissioned research work byand provides policy advice to international organizations, central and localgovernments, professional associations, trade unions, and civic organizations.



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