Caesar 42 - Policy and Politics in CPSU Politburo: October 1964 to September 1967

8/2/2019 Caesar 42 - Policy and Politics in CPSU Politburo: October 1964 to September 1967

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APPROVE D FOR RELEASEDATE: JU N 2007I

D I R E C T O R A T E O FI N T E L L I G E N C E

Intelligence ReportPol icy a n d P o l i t ic s i n t he C P S U P o l i t b u r o :October 1964 t o S e p t e m b e r 1 96 7

(ReferenceTitle: CAESAR XXX)

3 1 August 1967R S S No. 0 0 2 1 / 6 7


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POLICY AND POLITICS I N THE CPSU POLITBURO:OCTOBER 1964 TO SEFWEMBER 1967

T h i s w o r k i n g p a p e r of t h e DDI/Spec ia l Resea rc h S t a f fexamines t h e i n t e r n a l p o l i t i c s of t h e h i g h e s t policy-makingbo dy i n t h e S o v i e t U ni on -- th e p o l i t b u r o of t h e CPSU c e n t r a lc om mi tt ee -- an d e x a m i ne s t h e p o l i c i e s a d v o c at e d by t h ev a r i o us p o l i t b u r o l e a d e r s .A l th ou gh t h i s s t u d y h a s n o t b ee n c o o rd i n a t e d . w i t ho t h e r o f f i c e s , t h e a u t h o r s , L e o n a r d P a r k i n s o n a n d C a r lL i n d e n , a r e g r a t e f u l t o c o l l e a g ue s i n o t h e r o f f i c e s ofthe Agency f o r t h e i r s u g g e s t i on s a nd , i n p a r t i c u l a r , fort h e r e v i ew of t h e d r a f t b yboth of OCI.T h e DDI/SRS would welcome fu r the r commen t on thes t u d y , a d d r e s s e d t o M r P a r k i n s o n or t o t h e A c t in g C h i efof t h e S t a f f ,


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Conc lus ions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iINTRODUCTION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1PART ONE: PATTERNS OF POLITICAL ALIGNMENT INTHE POLITBURO. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3Power And P o l i c y O r i e n t a t i o n s , . . . . . . . . . . . 3C o n s e r v a t i s m I n The P a r t y ' s General Line . . , . . . .6Brezhnev And The Power S t r u g g l e . . . . . . . . . . .10K o s y g i n ' s Problems. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .* 10S h e l e p i n ' s U n s u c c e s s f u l S t r u g g l e . . . . . . . . . 13S u s l o v ' s I n f l u e n c e . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16B r e z h n e v ' s P r o s p e c t s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17PART TWO: PATTERNS I N POLITBURO LEADERS POLICYREMARKS. . . - . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 9Brezhnev: H o s t i l i t y Abroad, D i s c i p l i n e A t Home. . -20The Hard Line Toward The U n i t e d S t a t e s . . . . . . 21Defens e And Vi gi lan ce A t Home . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2Kosygin: Coo per a t io n Abroad, R e f o r m A t Home . . . . 36

I m p r o v i n g R e l a t i o n s W i t h T h e U n i t e d S t a t e s . . . . 37Balanc ing The Domestic Economy . . . . . . . . . . 53Podgornyy: Fir mnes s Abroad, Well-Being A t Home . . - 5 7H o s t i l i t y T o w a r d America, Coope ra t i on W i t h Europe .58P e r s o n a l P r o s p e r i t y And P r o d u c ti o n . . . . . . . . 6 1S u s l o v : U.S. Main Fore i gn Danger , P ar ty " Impuri ty"Main Domestic Danger. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67She lep in: Mi l i t a nc y Abroad, The Hard Line A t Home . 7 1Polyansk iy : Re form A t Hom e , Caut io n Abroad. . . . . 7 5Voronov: Product ion And Pragmatism. . . . . . . . . 7 8Mazurov : Id eo lo g i ca l Di sc ip l i ne and Conse rva ti sm. . 79S h e l e s t : O r g a n i z a t i o n a l D i s c i p l i n e And D e fe n s e. . .82K i r i l e n k o : Reform And Well-Being " N O W " . . . . . . .83Pe l s he : The Cau t iou s Newcomer. . . . . . . . . . . 8 4C an d id at e (Non-Voting) Members: Andropov, Demichev,Kunayev, Grishin, Mzhavanadze, Rashidov,S h c h e r b i t s k i y , U s t i n o v , Masherov. . . . . . . . . 85CONCLUDING OBSERVATION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93


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C o n c l u s i o n sA m a j o r i t y of t h e p o l i t b u r o members have echoedG e n e r a l S e c r e t a r y B r e z hn e v ' s p o s i t i o n o n most f o r e i g nand domestic p o l i c y matters. The emphas is i n Brezhnev ' so v e r a l l p o s i t i o n is on t h e p e r s i s t e n c e of i n t e r n a t i o n a ldangers. He has p i c t u r e d U.S. l l imper ia l i sm" a s on t h e of-

f e n s i v e i n v a r i o u s p a r t s of t h e w o r l d , and has s t ressedt h e n e e d t o b u i l d S o v i e t s t r e n g t h t o i n c r e a s e t h e e f f e c t i v e -n e s s of S o v i e t p o l i c y i n t h e e x t e r n a l world . Some-membersof B r e z . h n e v ' s p o l i t b u r o m a j o r i t y have e n t h u s i a s t i c a l l yt a k e n u p h i s p la t f o r m , o the r s have l e n t h i m only lukewarms u p p o r t . However, t h e s a l i e n t f e a t u r e of t h i s m a j o r i t yis i t s complex m i x t u r e . T h a t i s , w h i l e c e r t a i n l e a d e r ss u p p o r t B r e z h n e v o n major p o l i c y m at te r s , t h e same leadershave chosen t o b ac k u p c e r t a i n k e y segments of PremierK o s y g i n ' s domest ic a n d f o r e i g n p o l i c i e s . Kosygin hass t r u c k optimistic notes o n l o ng - te rm i n t e r n a t i o n a l t r e n d s .H e h a s t e n d e d t o l e a v e more room f o r fu r t he r improvementof U . S . - S o v i e t r e l a t i o n s , a s a c o n d i t i o n f a v o r i n g majore f f o r t s a t overcoming economic imbalances a t home.DiveFgen t t r ea tment of t h e n a t u r e of t h e Vietnamwar h i g h l i g h t s t h e , c o n t r a s t i n g world o u t l o o k s of Brezhnevand Kosygin. Brezhnev h a s p i c t u r e d t h e Vietnam war aso n l y o n e of many obs tac le s b l o c k i n g a n y s u b s t a n t i a l i m -provement of r e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e Uni ted S t a t e s . I n h i sv a r i o u s speeches h e h a s p r e s e n t e d t h e Vietnam war a s asymptom r a t h e r t h a n a c a u s e of what he r e g a r d s a s a h i s -t o r i c a l p e r i o d o f " d an g er " a nd ll c om p li c at i on s l' i n i n t e r -n a t i o n a l a f f a i r s . On t h e o t h e r hand, t h e Vietnam war h a sbeen t h e c e n t r a l p r o b l e m f o r K o sy g in 's l i n e on f o r e i g np o l i c y i n g e n e r a l , a nd p o l i c y t ow ard t h e U n i t e d S t a t e si n p a r t i c u l a r . Th e i m pl e me n ta t io n of his major f o r e i g nand domest ic p o l i c i e s h a s s u f f e r e d r e v e r s a l s wh ic h h av e

c o i n c i d e d w i t h t h e i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n of t h e Vietnam con-f l i c t . T h e s e g o a l s , s u c h a s a r e d uc t i on i n t h e S o vi e tm i l i t a r y ' s s h a r e of t h e b u d g e t a n d a s u b s t a n t i a l e x pa n si o n


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of U.S.-Sovie t t r a d e , which he o u t l i n e d d u r i n g h i s f i r s tmonths a s premier , h av e b e en s i d e t r a c k e d , D ur in g t h e f i r s tfew months of h i s i ncumbency , Kosyg in ' s s t a t e men t s onS o v i e t a i d t o N o r t h Vi etn am f i t t e d h i s d e t e n t e - or i e n te do u t l o o k , w h i l e B re z h n e v ' s d i s p l a y e d a tendency t o minimizep r o s pe c t s f o r i mp ro vi ng r e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e United S ta t e s .For example, i n December 1964--before t h e stepped-up U.S.m i l i t a r y e f f o r t i n N o r t h and South Vietnam--Kosygin 's l i n eon a i d i n g t h e N o rt h was made c o n d i t i o n a l on what u n s p e c i f i e dl laggressorsll m i g h t do; B r e zh n ev ' s l i n e p o i n t e d l y t h r ea t -ened t o r e n d e m i t a r y a s s i s t a n c e t o t h e North o n t h eb as i s of what U.S. a i r c r a f t a n d n a v a l v e s s e l s had a l r e a d yd on e i n e a r l y Au gu st a n d mid-September 1964. Subsequen t ly ,Brezhnev r e p e a t e d l y debunked U.S. e f f o r t s t o b r i n g t h eVie tnam i s sue t o t h e n e g o t i a t i n g t a b l e , w h i l e Kosyginexpressed f a v o r f o r t h e e x p l o i t a t i o n o f o p p o r t u n i t i e s - t ocommence t a l k s . This ' pas t s p r i n g , K o s y g i n was i n d i r e c t l yc r i t i c i z e d f o r b e i n g " n ai ve " o n t h i s score by Brezhnev--ac o n s i s t e n t a d v oc a te f o r S o v i e t d ef en se i n t e r e s t s .Regard ing t h e matter of S o v i e t d e f e n s e a l l o c a t i o n s ,Kosygin h a s emploqed the Khrushchevian argument t h a t a nEast-West war " w o u l d i n e v i t a b l y be" thermonuclear andf a t a l f o r many c o u n t r i e s . B r e z h n e v h a s a r g u e d t h a t sucha war 9*cou ldbecome" thermonuclear and he has s toppeds h o r t of s p e l l i n g o u t t h e consequences . Brezhnev 's argu-ment is t h e one used by t h e S o v i e t m i l i t a r y high command

i n j u s t i f i c a t i o n of i t s e f f o r t t o expand t h e c o n v e n t i o n a lb ranches of t h e S o v i e t d e f e n s e force r a t h e r t h a n r e d u c et hos e f o r c e s w h i c h ( i n Kosygin 's v iew) would not be p u tt o u s e i n t h e East -West ca t acly sm. Accordingly , Brezhnevh a s placed g r e a t emphas i s on t h e p r i o r i t y development oft h e heavy indus t ry -de fense sec to r of t h e Soviet economyand ha s regar ded consumer we l l -be ing a s a fu t u re c o n s e q u -e n c e of i n d u s t r i a l and a g r i c u l t u r a l s u cc e ss e s . Kosyginon t h e o t h e r hand, h a s g e n e ra l l y p l a c e d c o n s u m e r w e l f a r ebefore d e f e ns e and he av y i n d u s t r y i n l i s t i n g t h e domestict a s k s of t h e p a r t y .The complex cha rac t e r of Brezhnev ' s ma jo r i ty i smani fes t ed by t h e o t h e r p o l i t b u r o l eader s ' t rea tmen t o f

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t h e s e n s i t i v e m at te r of r e s o u r c e a l l o c a t i o n s . *whi le Podgornyy, P olya nski y and Kir i le nko have (wi thv a r y i n g d e g r e e s of warmth) ge ne ra l l y hewed t o Brezhnev ' sh a rd l i n e to wa rd t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , t h o s e same threel e a d e r s make an a b o u t - f a c e w i t h r e g a rd t o Brezhnev ' sl i n e on t h e p r e f e r e n t i a l d ev el op me nt of t h e he av y-de fen sei n d u s t r i e s s ec to r . On t h e i s s u e o f i n d u s t r i a l p r i o r i t i e s ,s i x of t h e e leven po l i t bu ro members h av e c l e a r l y e x p r e ss e df a v o r for t he con t inued dominance of t h e h e a v y i n d u s t rysector --Br ezhnev, Su sl ov , She le pin , Voronov, Mazurov, andS h e l e s t ; f o u r h a ve f a vo r e d a more balanced economy--Kosygin,Podgornyy, Po lyans k iy , and Ki r i l enko ; on ly one , Pe l she ,has s k i r t e d t he p rob lem. And whi l e Voronov h a s s i d e d w i t ht h e "metal eaters ' ' on t h i s d o me st ic i s s u e , he has vo iced ,a lo ng w i t h Podgornyy and Po lyansk iy , Kosyg in ' s emphasison t h e i n f l u e n c e of domestic economic example f o r t h el lworld Communist r evo lut ion . ' '

Thus,

The compos i t ion o f Brezhnev ' s p o l i cy maj o r i ty be-comes f u r t h e r c o m pl i c a te d o n e xa mi ni ng e a c h i n d i v i d u a ll e a d e r ' s su pp or t f o r c e r t a i n p o l i t i c a l l y - r e l a t e d i s s u e s ,s u c h a s t h e a p p a r e n t e f f o r t t o c i r c u m s c r i b e t h e e x e c u t i v ea u t h o r i t y o f K o s y g i n' s C o un c il o f M i n i s t e r s by s t r e n g t h e n i n g

*The c h i e f r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s of t h e o t h e r p o l i t b u r o m e m -b e r s a re a s f o ll o w s: Podgornyy, Chairman of t h e Pres id iumof t h e USSR Supreme Soviet ( t h e t i t u l a r h e a d of s t a t e ) ;Polyansk iy , one o f two F i r s t Deputy Chairmen on Kosygin 'sC o u n c i l of M i n i s t e r s ( P o l y a n s k i y ' s c h i e f r e s p o n s i b i L i yis a g r i c u l t u r e ) ; K i r i l e n k o , member of t h e s e c r e t a r i a t o fthe CPSU Central Committee i n c h a rg e o f RSFSR p a r t y a f f a i r s ;Sus lov , a s e c r e t a r i a t member i n ch a rg e o f f o r e i g n a f f a i r sand ideo logy ; She lep in , a s e c r e t a r i a t member demotedi n J u l y t h i s y e a r t o head t h e S o v i e t t r a d e u n i o n o rg a n i -zation; Voronov, a member of t he Counc i l o f M inis t e r s andChairman of t h e S o v i e t Un io n' s l a r g e s t r e p u b l i c , t h e RSFSR;Mazurov, the o t h e r Firs t Deputy Chai rman of t h e Counci lof M i n i s t e r s ( Ma zu ro v' s c h i e f r e s p o n s i b i l i t y is i n d u s t r y ) ;S h e l e s t , t h e F i r s t S e c re t a r y of t h e U k ra i n i a n p a r t y ; a n dP e l s h e , i n c h a rg e of p a r t y con t ro l ( d i s c i p l i n e ) .


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cPodgornyy ' s pa r l i a men t , t he Supreme So v i e t , On t h i sscore , f o r e x am pl e , o n l y f i v e of t h e e l ev en f u l l p o l i t -buro members--Brezhnev, Padgornyy, Sh el es t , Sus lov andPelshe--have on t h e record e n d o r s e d p ro p o s a l s t o i n c r e a s et h e r o l e of t h e Supreme Sov ie t i n i t s d e a l i n g s w i th t h eCounc i l of M i n i s t e r s . T he l i n e- u p i n t h e o l i g a r c h y ont h e p a r l i a m e n t -v e r s u s -m i n i s t ry matter p e rh a p s best il-1 u s t r a ; t e s o n e t y p e of r e s t r a i n t i m p o s e d o n B re z h n e v ' sd r i v e f o r power. That i s , t h a t Brezhnev must ac t w i t hc a u t i o n because any move t h a t would r e s u l t i n s ud de nand major g a i n s i n h i s p e r so n a l power c o u ld p r e c i p i t a t ea d ve r se and ( p o l i t i c a l l y ) f a t a l r e a c t i o n by a m a j o r i t yi n t h e "c o l l e c t i v e " l e a d e r sh i p .a s t r a t e g i c a d va n ta g e o r g a n i z a t i o n a l l y ov e r h i s a c t u a la n d p o t e n t i a l competitors. A l l t h e s i g n s s u g g e st t h a t heh a s g r a d u a l l y s t r e n g t h e n e d h i s p o s i t i o n . The s i g n s alsos u g g e s t t h a t Brezhnev, a t l e a s t f o r t h e n e a r f u t u r e , w i l lc o n t i n u e h i s h a r d l i n e toward t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s ( b u t a v o i dh igh r i s k i n g e nu i ne c r i s e s ) a n d c o n t i n u e h i s e f f o r t t o -ward Western Europe aimed a t (1 ) removing t h e U.S. p re s e n c efrom Western Europe, (2) f r a g m e n t i n g NATO, (3) s t r e n g t h e n -i n g t h e S o v i e t p o s i t i o n and i n f l u e n c e i n t h e Warsaw P a c t ,and (4) expand ing CPSU i n f l u e n c e t h r o u g h t h e agency ofl o c a l p a r t i e s i n W e s t E ur ope an p o l i t i c s . I n t h i s c o n n e c t i o n ,Brezhnev h a s b e e n s p e a k i n g of t h e a p p l i c a b i l i t y of t h ep e a c e f u l c o e x i s t e n c e c on c e pt t o t h e European con t inen t ,d e s p i t e h i s t endency t o downplay t h e c o nc e pt i n g e n e r a land i n p a r t i c u l a r w i t h r e g a r d t o U.S . -Sov ie t re l a t ions .

The f a c t of t h e matter r e m a i n s t h a t B re z h n e v h a s

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I s r a e l ' s l i g h t n i n g - s w i f t a nd m a ss i ve v i c t o r y o v e rt h e Sov ie t -equ ipped Arab forces i n t h e r e c e n t Middle E a s tc r i s i s was o ne of t h o s e s u dd en an d i l l u s i o n - s h a t t e r i n ge x t e r n a l e v e n t s t h a t c a n ha ve a d e e p b u t u n p r e d i c t a b l eimpact o n t h e i n t e r n a l p o l i t i c s of t h e S o v i e t leader-s h i p . A t t h e l e a s t i t h a s a l r e a d y p ro d u c e d a n u n p re c e d e n t e dd e g r e e of t u r bu l e nc e and v i s i b l e s t r a i n w i t h i n t h e - po s t -Khrushchev o l i ga r chy . The l ea d in g g roup had succeededr e l a t i v e l y w e l l i n c on ve yi ng a p u b l i c image of e f f e c t i v e ,t ho ug h u n i n s p i r ed , " c o l l e c t iv i t y " d e s p i t e i n t e r n a l d i f -f e r e n c e s . T h ro u g h o u t t h e c r i s i s , i n d e e d , t h e r e was noc h an g e i n t h e l e a d e r s h i p ' s most n o t a b l e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c .I t was mili tant i n t h eo r y b u t c ar e f u l i n p r a c t i c e , h a r s hi n word b u t r e s t r a i n e d i n a c t i o n . I n t h e M id dl e E a s tc r i s i s M O S C O W ' S t o u g h s t a t e m e n t s a n d h a c k n e y e d d i a t r i b e sa g a i n s t I s r a e l and "imper ia l ism" were coun te r -ba lancedby Kosygin 's t a l k s w i t h P re s i d e n t J o h n s o n a t G l a s s b o roand t h e a v o i d a n c e of h i g h - r i s k i n t h e h e a t of t h e c r i s i s .T h i s p a t t e r n w a s roo ted b o t h i n t h e c l o s e d s y s t e m ofp o l i t b u r o * p o l i t i c s w h i c h emerged a f t e r K hr us h ch ev ' s f a l land i n t h e s t r o n g r e a c t i o n i n t h e p a r t y a p p a r a t u s a ndt h e s t a t e b u re a uc ra c y a g a i n s t K h rus h c he v 's b r a nd of i n-nova t ion , r i sk - t ak in g and dynamism. Such f a c t o r s havetended t o produce a k i n d of con ser vat i sm marked by a re-v i v a l of i d e o l o g i c a l o r t h o d o x y b u t n o t g e n u i n e m i l i t a n c y ,and a p o l i t i c s of c omp ro mi se , l o g - r o l l i n g , a nd c o a l i t i o namong t h e o l i g a r c h s . T he r e s u l t h a s been ac t ion by t h e

*The presidium of the CPSU Central C o m m i t t e e w a s re-named pol i tburo a t t h e 23rd Par ty Congress (29 March-8A p r i l 1966).

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i Il e a d e r s h i p i n t h os e p o l i c y a r e a s wh e r e i t s members havefound common denominators among themselves on p r a c t i c a lif n o t t h e o r e t i c a l g r ou n ds , b u t a l s o i n a c t i o n a n d c o n -s p i c u o u s stalemates i n many o t h e r s p h e r e s of p o l i c y a sw e l l . T h i s s t a t e of t h i n g s a nd t h e p r e v a i l i n g mood oft h e o l i g a r c h y came u n d er c h a l l e n g e d u r i n g t h e Middle Eastc r i s i s . Moscow p a r t y c h i e f Y eg or yc he v' s a p p a r e nt s a l l ya g a i n s t t h e t o p l e ade r s ' h a n d l i n g of t h e cr is is a t t h eJu ne 20-21 plenum--although a f i a sco f o r t h i s young m i l i -t a n t , who was sacked f o r h i s temeri ty*-- i s a symptom ofd i s a g r e e m e n t w i t h i n t h e p a r t y o ve r t h e d i r e c t i o n and ef-f e c t i v e n e s s o f p o st -K hr us hc he v p o l i c y .

The obvious and most d i f f i c u l t q u e s t i o n is whethert h e r e p e r c us s i o n s w i t h i n t h e l e a d e r s h i p of I s r ae l ' s suc-cess w i l l move Soviet p o l i t i c s off i t s p r e s e n t r e s t i n gp o i n t . No d i r e c t a n s w e r c a n be given f o r t h e s i m p l e r e a -s o n t h a t i t depends on t h e c o u r s e of f a c t i o n a l s t r u g g l e sw i t h i n t h e l e ad ing g roup . I t i s a time when the in tangi -b l e s of p o l i t i c s c a r ry more weight tha n normall y: whent h e p e r s u a s i v e n e s s of a l e a d e r , h i s a b i l i t y t o g r a s p un-e x pe ct ed o p p o r t u n i t i e s , h i s s k i l l i n t a c t i c a l maneuvera nd b u i l d i n g a w in ni ng f a c t i o n , h i s accumula t ed a s se t sand liabilities, and h i s luck a r e th ro wn i n t o t h e p o l i t i c a lbalzjnce. However, i t is p o s s i b l e t o some e x t e n t t o d i s c e r n

*On 27 June Yegorychev was r e p l a c e d by G r i s h i n , acandida te (non-vot ing) member of t h e pol i t buro . Thenon 11 Ju l y , Yegorychev 's presumed pa t ro n She lep in wasdemoted t o t h e t r a d e un i on c h i e f t a i n c y ( f or m er l y h e l db y Gri sh in ) . Anothe r member of S h e l e p i n ' s c l i q u e , KGBChief Semichastnyy, had been removed on 18 May ( i . e . ,p r i o r t o t h e Middle E a s t w a r ) .

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t h e o u t l i n e s of t h e l e ad e r sh i p c o n f l i c t , t h e i s s u e s a th an d, t h e p o l i c y c o u r s e s t h a t c o u l d be t a k e n , t h e s t r e n g t h sand weaknesses of t h e main con tenders , and whe r e v a r i o u sleaders s t a n d i n terms of p o l i c y , power a n d i n f l u e n c e .PART ONE: PATTERNS OF POLITICAL ALIGNMENT I N THE POLITBUROPOWER AND POLICY ORIENTATIONS

The s t r u g g l e under Khrushchev over t h e q u e s t i o nof whether "p o l i t i c s" and l f ideo logy i i on one hand , or"economics" on the o t h e r h an d, s h o u l d d et e rm i n e p o l i c ys t i l l r e m a i n s t h e u nd e rl yi n g i s s u e i n t h e post-Khrushchevl e a de r s hi p . T he c o n f l i c t d i v i d e s t h e members of . t h e lead-i n g g r o up r o u g h l y i n t o a n i d e o l o g i c al l y - o r i en t e d a nd a neconomica l ly -o r i en ted wing . Where Khrushchev gave t h elead t o " ec on omi cs " o v e r p o l i t i c s , t h e i d e o l o g i c a l l y -o r i e n t e d forces- - the d e f e n d e r s of t h e primacy of " p o l i t i c s "a n d " i d e o lo g y ** i n fo rm u l a t i n g t h e p a r t y g e n e r a l l in e- -ha vebeen p re -eminen t s i n c e Khrushchev' s f a l l . However, t h i sbroad d i v i s i o n of t h e l e a d e r s h i p i n t o two wings i s q u i t eloose , d e s p i t e i t s u s e f u l n e s s . Some f u r t h e r s u b -d i vi s i on smust be d i s t i n g u i s h e d if t h e post -Khrushchev pat tern ofl e a d e r s h i p p o l i t i c s is to be adequa te ly unders tood .

A t t h e extreme of t h e i d e o l o g i c a l l y - o r i e n t e d s i d eof t h e p o l i t i c a l s p e c t ru m a re t h e m i l i t a n t s who have beenl e d by She l ep i n up t o now and have included such youngerf i g u r e s a s t h e h a p l e s s Yegorichev. T h es e . 'young turks"have f a l l e n on bad d a y s of l a t e . Next i n or de r comes av e r y i n f l u e n t i a l , o l d - l i ne c o n se r v at i v e e le me nt bes t r e p r e -s e n t e d i n t h e p e r s o n o f t h e ideo logue Suslov . Brezhnevh a s defer red t o t h i s element and hac h i m s e l f r a t h e r con-s i s t e n t l y ad h e r ed t o a c o n s e r v a t i v e , i d e o l o g i c a l l y - o r i e n t e dp o s i t i o n . H e h a s b ee n c a r e f u l n o t t o expose h i m s e l f t ot h e vu lnerab i l i t i e s Khrushchev assumed when h e pursuedp o l i c y l i n e s w h i c h t ended t o a l i e n a t e p ar t y c o n s e r v at i v e sand t h e m i l i t a r y . On t h e o t h e r s i d e of cen te r Kosyg inh a s r e p r e s e n t e d t h e economics -orie nted and reform-mindede l e m e n t s i n t h e l e a d e r s h i p wh o are more concerned w i t h

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ct he ba l anced g rowth and mode rn i za t i on of t h e n a t i o n a leconomy th an wi t h r e vo lu t i on abroad . The more r a d i c a lK h r us h c he v ia n v a r i a n t o f r e f o r mi s m w h i c h e n v i s a g e d t h ep a r ty r a t h e r t han t h e gove rnment becoming t h e ma in economicmanager and which promoted bas ic and r a p i d s h i f t s i n a l -l o c a t i o n s f a v o r i n g co ns um er e co no mi cs h a s f a d e d from t h ep r e s e n t s c e n e . (Of c o u r se t h e r e are v a r i a t i o n s , e v e n i n -c o n s i s t e n c i e s , t h a t c o m p l i c a t e t h e placement of some m e m -bers of t h e l e a d i n g g ro u p i n t h e p o l i t i c a l s pe ctr um . More-o v e r , there a re a s i g n i f i c a n t number o f f e n c e - s t r a d d l e r s . )

The c a u t i o n of t h e l e a d e r s h i p m a j o r i ty b o t h i n t h eMiddle Eas t crisis and i n o t h e r s i t u a t i o n s is a r e f l e c t i o nof t h e i r awareness of t h e r e a l i t i e s of American power Is i n c e Cuba r a t h e r t h a n a n a t ta c hm e nt t o rTmoderat ionl l np o l i c y . E x c l u d i n g t h e m i l i t a n t s , b o t h t h e c o n s e r v a t l v e sand , t h e reform-minded members agree t h a t t h i s h a s n o tbeen a period t o t e s t t h e U n it ed S t a t e s by f o r c e or t h et h r ea t o f force. Nor is t h e m a j o r i t y d i s p o s e d t o al low , )S o v i e t power t o be d r a w n i n t o a d i r e c t c o n f r o n t a t i o n w i t ht h e U ni te d S t a t e s t h ro u g h t h e a c t i o n s of i t s c l i e n t s ,a s was unde rscored by i t s f l a t r e j e c t i o n of Nasser 'sa t t e m p t t o do j u s t t h i s .

H ow ev er , p a r t y c o n s e r v a t i v e s a re a t s e r i o u s oddsw i t h t h e reform-minded on w h a t g e n e ra l p o l i c y l i n e s h o ul dbe p u rs u ed i n r e s p on s e t o t h e American power advantage.F o r t h e c o n s e r v a t i v e t h i s i s a t i m e f o r k e ep in g o n e ' spowder dry and a t i m e f o r i n t e r n a l c o n s o l i d a t i o n w h i l eb u i l d i n g S o v ie t s t r e n g t h f o r t h e f u t u r e . D u r i n g t h i sp e r i o d t h e p a r t y c o n se r v at i v es a r e concerned w i t h preven t -i n g a ny b l u r r i n g o f t h e h o s t i l e d i v i d e b et ween t h e "enemy"and themsel ves . Thus , i t is n o t a t i m e f o r g e t t i n g a l on gw i t h t h e Uni t ed S ta t e s ; b u t n e i t h e r i s i t a t i m e f o r b r i n k -manship, or i n S o v i e t p a r l a n c e , l la dv e nt ur i sm . l'

.t i s w o r t h r e c a l l i n g i n t h i s c o n n e c t i o n t h a t Molotova n d e v e n S t a l i n were di sposed t o c a u t i o n . I t was Khrushchevwho w a s d i s p o s e d t o "adventurism." From t h e po in t o f v iewof t h e p a r t y c o n s e r v a t i v e , K h r us h ch ev ' s r i s k - t a k i n g n o tonly undermined t h e e f f i c a c y a nd c r e d i b i l i t y o f S o v i e tp o l i c y i n wor ld p o l i t i c s , b ut i n t h e Cuban cr is is evenendange red t he Sov ie t Union i t s e l f . On t h e o t h e r s i d eof t h e c o i n , B r e z h n e v s u g g e s t e d a t t h e 2 3 r d C o n g r e s s t h a tK h r u s h c h e v ' s c o n c e n t r a t i o n o n an over -ambit ious, consumer-

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o r i e n t e d domestic p o l i c y a l s o i n v o l v e d a n o t h e r k i n d ofa d ve n tu r is m -- t he n e g l e c t o f S o v i e t d e fe n s e s . Most re le-v a n t l y t o t h e p r e s e n t l e a d e r s h i p ' s c o n d u c t i n t h e r e c e n tMiddle E a s t c r i s i s , i t i s wo r th r e c a l l i n g t h a t t h e pre-s i d i u m ' s i n d i c t m e n t of Khrushchev i n October 1964 re-p o r t e d l y charged him w i t h t i dangerous rashness " i n t h eSuez cr i s i s of 1956 fo r " c o m m i t t i n g t h e Soviet armed forcest o a p o s s i b l e i n t e r v e n t i o n , b r in gi n g t h e c o u n t r y t h u s t ot h e b r i n k of war, w i t h o u t h a v i n g c o n s u l t e d w i t h s u f f i c i e n tc l a r i t y t h e h i g h e x e c u t i v e o r g a ns of t h e USSR." I t w a swidely rumored a t t h e t i m e of Khrushchev 's October 1964c e n t r a l committee l g t r i a l r i h a t Sus lov had d e l i v e r e d t h ei n d i c t m e nt . I n sum, c o n s e rv a t i v e p r i n c i p l e s demand t h a tm i l i t a n c y be tempered by a j u d i c i o u s w ei gh in g of a v a i l -a b l e r e s o u r c e s a n d of t h e a c t u a l o p p o r t u n i t i e s i n p ur su-i n g p o l i cy goals. For t h e p a r t y c o n s e r v a t i v e t h e c a r d i n a lv i r t u e s are p a t i e n c e and c a r e f u l c a l c u l a t i o n i n t h e s t r u g g l ew i t h t h e "c lass enemy" abroad.

The i l l - f i t t i n g t e r m "moderate" makes somewhat morese ns e when i t is a p p l i e d t o th e reform-minded and economics-o r i e n t e d w in g of t h e l e a d e r s h ip . Unlike t h e c o n s e r v a t i v e s ,t h e y see i n t e r n a l c on s o li d at i o n a s a prime g oa l i n i t s e l fd i c t a t e d b y p r e s s i n g i n t e r n a l n e e d s r a t h e r t h a n b y t h edemands of a l o n g - t e rm s t ru g g l e w i t h a n i n c r e a s i n g l y ag-g r e s s i v e i m p e r i a l i s m . They see a po l i cy of l i m i t e d accom-modation w i t h t h e United S t a t e s and t h e West as d e s i r a b l en o t so much f o r i t s own sake , b u t a s a c o n d i t i o n f a v o r i n gmajor e f f o r t s a t economic reform and a t overcoming i m -balances i n e co no mi c growth. While n o t r e n o u n c i n g s u p p o r to f r e v o l u t i o n i n t h e underdeveloped world , t h e y b a l k a tcommitments t h a t would inv olv e a c o n s t a n t d r a i n o n r e s o u r c e s -t h a t cou ld be used a t home, and t h e y emphasize t h e l i n eo n i n f l u e n c i n g t h e w o r ld r e v o l u t i o n t h ro u gh S o v i e t e co no mi c"example." Kosygi n ha6 been t h e l e ad in g r e p r e s e n t a t i v eof t h i s v i ewpo in t i n th e pos t -Khrushchev l eade rsh i p . Amongp o l i t b u r o members, he was t h e most e x p l i c i t e n do rs er oft h e "mutual concess ions" theme t h a t Khrushchev employedi n 1959-1960 and subsequen t ly used t o cover h i s backdownin Cuba ; he pressed a n a b o r t i v e p o li c y of "mutual example"i n re d uc i ng m i l i t a r y c os t s i n t h e mo nt hs a f t e r K h rus h c h ev ' sf a l l ; h e has s t r u c k o p t i m i s t i c n o t e s o n long-term worldt r e n d s w h i l e Brezhnev has s t ressed t h e p e r s i s t e n c e ofi n t e r n a t i o n a l d a ng e rs ; and h e c l e a r l y t e n ds t o l e a v e moreroom than Brezhnev f o r f u t u r e improvement of U. S.-Sovietr e l a t i o n s .

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CONSERVATISM IN THE PARTY'S GENERAL LINEWhi le t h e Kosygin-led economics-oriented win-g oft h e l e a d e r s h i p h a s n o t be en w i t ho u t i n f l u e n c e, i t h a s hadt o work w i t h i n t h e r e s t r i c t i v e c o n fi n es of a g e n e ra l p a r t yl i n e wh ic h h a s l a r g e l y b e en d e f i n ed by t h e p a r t y c o n s e r -v a t i v e s . T h e l a t t e r have had t h e m ain s a y i n f r a m i n gmajor p a r t y pronouncements . They have e s t a b l i s h e d t h eb r o a d c o n t e x t w i t h i n w h i c h f o r e i g n a n d domestic p o l i c y 1is made. A p r o n o u n c e d c o n s e r v a t i v e t r e n d h a s b e e n re-f l e c t e d i n t h e e d i t o r i a l s i n t h e p ar ty t h e o r e t i c a l j o u r n a lKommunist devoted t o t h e 5 0 t h a n n i v e r s a r y of t h e October 1R e v o l u t i o n a n d a l s o i n t h e c en t r a l committee's a n n i v e r s a r y

"Theses ."* The Theses p rov ide a comprehens ive s t a t ementof t h e p a r t y ' s c u r r e n t ge n e r a l l i n e and g iv e a c lear ex-p r e s s i on i n d o c t r i n a l f or mu la s of t h e c o n s e r v a t i v e ' p l a t -form. The Theses w e r e approved a t t h e June 1967 plenumof t h e p a r t y w h i c h d e a l t w i t h t h e Middle E a s t c r i s i s .They were undoubtedly drawn up w e l l i n a d va n ce of t h ec r i s i s - - t h o u g h t h e y were o b v i o u s l y a l t e r e d i n p l a c e s t ot a k e t h e c r i s i s i n t o a cc ou nt . I t is s t i l l p e r h a p s r ' a t h e re a r l y t o t e l l w h e t h e r t h e impact of t h e c r i s i s o n Leader-s h i p p o l i t i c s h a s been s uc h a s to p r o d u c e s i g n i f i c a n ts h i f t s of l i n e i n o ne way or a n o t h e r . So f a r t h e r e h a sb ee n n o s i g n of new e l e m e n t s i n r e gi m e s t a t e m e n t s s i n c et h e cr i s i s . N e v e r t h e l e s s , a n a c q u a i n t an c e w i t h t h e b a s i cf o r m u l a t i o n s of t h e Theses can p rov ide a use fu l gaugea g a i n s t w h i c h f u t u r e s i g n s o f chan ge or c o n t i n u i t y i nl i n e c an be measured.T h e c e n t r a l committee T h e s e s mark t h e 50 y e a r s ofS o v i e t r u l e w i t h a r a t h e r somber p i c t u r e o f a wo r ld f u l lof dangers . They o f f e r l i t t l e more t o t h e S o v i e t c i t i z e n r yt h a n t h e p r o s p e c t of a lon g and b i t t e r s t r u g g l e of in-d e f i n i t e d u ra t io n w i t h a wi ly c l a s s enemy. Gone from t h eTheses is a n y t r a c e of t h e Khrushchevian theme t h a t "Com-munism" is j u s t a r o u n d t h e c o r n e r i n t h e USSR a l o n g w i t h

*The pe rvas iveness of t h i s t r e n d i s made f u r t h e r e v i d e n tb y t h e r e v i s i o n e a r l y t h i s yea r of t h e Handbook f o r Secre-t a r i e s of Pr imary P a r t y O r g a n i z a t i o n s .e f f e c t , i n s t r u c t t h e l ow -l ev el p a r t y s e c r e t a r i e s t o g i v ef i r s t p l a c e t o "ideology" a nd " p o l i t i c s " a nd n o t t o pro-d u c t i o n q u e s t i o n s i n t h e i r p a r t y a c t i v i t i e s . N o n e t h e l e s s ,t h e r e v i s i o n s c a l l f o r "more e f f e c ti v e " c o n t r o l ov e r t h eeconomic appa ra tus i n v i e w of t h e f r ee r hand "economicLeaders" have b e e n g i v e n u n d e r t h e 1965 economic r e f o r m s .


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t h e idea t h a t t h e Sovie t peop l e would b e e n t e r i n g a n e raof p e a c e a n d p l e n t y b y 1 98 0. I n s t e a d , t h e T h e s es d w e l lon t h e l o n g d r aw n- ou t n a t u r e an d t h e c o m p l e x i t y of t h ep r o c e s s of building Communism. Rather t h an t y i n g p a r t yp o l i c y t o a b l u e p r i n t f o r t h e f u t u r e , t h e Theses r e f l e c tt h e l e a d e r s h i p ' s stress on t h e I'immedia te" and *%m.resolvediitasks f a c i n g t h e p a r t y a t home a n d , i n e f f ec t , s a y t h a tt h e r e is n o s h o r t c u t t o Communism.The postponement of t h e Communist utopia a t homei s i m p l i c i t l y b u t u nm i st a ka b ly c on n ec te d i n t h e Thesesw i t h t h e b u rd e ns of t h e c l a s s s t r u g g l e abroad. Accord-i n g t o t h e T h e s e s t h e i n c r e a s e d a g g r e s s i v e n e s s of i m -p e t i a l i s m t h e w o r l d ove r , Ameri can impe r i a l i sm i n par-t i c u l a r , is r e s p o n s i b l e f o r a p e r i o d of i n t e n s i f i e d i n t e r -n a t i o n a l t e n s i o n . The T h es e s do n o t s u g g e s t t h a t t h i sc o n d i t i o n is t emppra ry bu t t h a t i t a r i s e s from a funda-menta l h i s t o r i c a l f acto r- -name ly t he sha r pen i ng of t h eg e n e r a l e c o n o m i c c r i s i s of w o r l d c a p i t a l i s m . A c c o r d i n gt o t h i s theme, t h e i m p e r i a l i s t s a r e l e d t o t ake desperatemeasure s t o p r ev e nt f u r t h e r d e t e r i o r a t i o n of t h e i r pos i -t i o n s . As a consequence , t h e y p u r s u e " a d v e n t u r i s t f tp o l i c i e s i n w or ld p o l i t i c s . The U . S . i n v o l v em en t i n V i e t -nam i s c i t e d a s a s ymp t om of t h e cr is is . Whi le t h e Thesess p e a k of i m pe r i a l i sm ' s i n c r e a s i n g i n n e r w e ak n e ss e s, t h edocument does n o t s u g g e s t t h a t t h e enemy h a s become a ne a s y mark. R a t h e r , a c c o r d i n g t o t h e Theses , c a p i t a l i s tm o no p o li e s h a v e u n i t e d a n d j o i n e d t h e i r power t o t h a t oft h e s t a t e and have been ab le t o mount menacing counter-a t t a c k s o n t h e r e vo lu t i on a r y movement a t v a r io u s p o i n t sa round t h e w o r l d .On t h e b a s i s of t h i s p e r s p e c t i v e , t h e Theses un-a m b i g u o u s l y s u b o r d i n a t e welfa re g o a l s t o t h e main bus ines sof i n c r e a s i n g t h e economic and m i l i t a r y "migh t" of t h ecoun t ry . The Thes es r e a s s e r t t h e l i n e t h a t na r rowing t h egap be tween consumer and heavy i n du s t r i a l p roduc t i on re-mains dependen t on t h e p r e f e r e n t i a l d ev el op me nt of heavyi n d u s t r y . O n e of t h e "main conclusions*' of t h e p a s t 50y e a r s , a c c o r d i n g t o t h e Theses , i s t h e pr imary impor t anceof b u i l d i n g S o v i et m i l i t a r y s t r e n g t h as a " rea l c o u n t e r -ba l ance" t o an ag gr es s i ve imper ia l i sm. Where Khrushchev


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once emphasized building Communism a t home--to s uc h a ne x t e n t t h a t Molotov accused him of n e g l e c t i n g t h e p a r t y ' sw or l d- wi d e r e v o l u t i o n a r y g o a l s -t h e T h e s e s stress t h e " i n -d i v i s i b i l i t y " of t h e p a r t y ' s i n t e r n a t i o n a l a nd n a t i o n a laims. H enc e t h e T h e s e s c l o s e l y t i e building Communismi n t h e USSR w i t h t i p p i n g t h e b a l an c e of f o r c e s a g a i n s timper ia l ism a n d p r o v i d i n g t h e b a s i s fo r the wor ld -widev i c t o r y of socialism abroad. . ,T h e c o n s e r v a t i v e t e n o r of t h e T h e s e s is p e r h a p snowhere more a p p a r e n t t h a n i n t h e i r r e v i s e d f o r mu l a ti o nof t h e "state-of-the-whole people" (or " a l l p e o p l e s ' s t a t e " )doc t r i n e o r i g i n a l l y i n t ro d u ce d u n de r K hru sh che v a t t h e22nd R a r t y C o n gr e s s i n 1961. Khrushchev in te r twinedt h a t d o c t r i n e w i t h t h e p r o s p e c t of i n c r e h s i n g i n t e r n a lr e l a x a t i o n a nd d e c r e a s i n g e x t e r n a l d an ge r a s t h e S o v i e tUnion moved toward Communism. A t t h e t i m e of t h e 23rdCongress l a s t y e a r t h e r e were c l e a r s i g n s t h a t t h e d o c t r i n ewas under c r i t i c a l r e a p p r a i s a l .i g n o r e d a t t h e c o n g r e s s a n d i n t h e May Day s l o g a n s . TheTheses now present 'a r e f o r m u l a t i o n of t h e d o c t r i n e wh i chf i t s i n more harmoniously w i t h t h e p re s en t p o l i t i c a l l i n e .I t was c o n s p i c u o u s l y

T h e K h r u a c h e v i a n version of the all-peoples' statewas f o c u s e d almost e n t i r e l y o n i t s domestic f u n c t i o n s .The p r e s e n t v e r s i o n g i v e s e q u a l em phas i s t o t h e S o v i e ts t a t e ' s e x t e r n a l a nd r e v o l u t i o n a r y f u n c t i o n s . The T h e s esadd t h e t h e m e s t h a t t h e a l l - p e o p l e s ' s t a t e " c o n t i n u e s t h ecause" of t h e d i c t a t o r s h i p of t h e p r o l e t a r i a t a n d " w a g e sc l a s s war'' t o g e t h e r w i t h o t h e r s o c i a l i s t s t a t e s a g a i n s ti m p e r i a l i s m i n t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l a r e n a . Thus t h e c o n t i n u i t yof t h e d o c t r i n e of t h e a l l - p e o p l e s ' s t a t e w i t h t h e d i c t a t o r -s h i p of t h e p r o l e t a r i a t d o c t r in e i s u n d e r s c o r e d r a t h e rt h a n t h e Khrushchevian idea t h a t t h e S o v i e t s t a t e hade n t e r e d a new stage w h i c h marked t h e end of t h e p r o l e t a r i a nd i c t a t o r s h i p i n t h e USSR.

The i n f l u e n c e of S u s l o v ' s t h i n k i n g i n t h e r e v i s i o nis u n m i s t a k a b l e . H e w a s a t odds w i t h Khrushchev on t h eq u e s t i o n of t h e S o v i e t s t a t e before the 22nd Congress .H e had promoted t h e c o n c e p t t h a t t h e USSR and b loc func-t i o n e d a s a d i c t a t o r s h i p of t h e p r o l e t a r i a t f o r t h e world

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r e vo lu t i on a r y movement bu t f a i l e d t o g e t t h i s n o t i o ni n t o t h e n e w P a r t y Program a t t h e 22nd Congress. How-e v e r , h e d i d h av e some su cc es s i n t on i ng down Khru-s h c h e v ' s l i n e t h a t t h e S o v i e t s t a t e was now "witheringawayt1 i n s o f a r a s i t s i n t e r n a l r o l e was concerned.* Nowin t h e T h e s e s S u s l o v seems t o have gained b o t h p o i n t s .The Theses re-emphasize t h e S o v i e t s t a t e ' s r e v o l u t i o n a r ym i s s i o n abroad a nd s a y n o t h i n g a b o u t t h e wi the r ing awayof t h e s t a t e a t home. R a t h e r , t h e T h e s e s stress t h eargument t h a t t h e s t a t e must be f u r t h e r d e v e l o p e d a s t h eway t o " p u b l i c s e lf - ru l e" - -a l i n e t h a t b e a r s k i n s h i p w i t hwhat t h e Y u g o s l a v ' s r i d i c u l e d a s S t a l i n ' s t h e o ry o f " t h es t a t e t h a t d o e s n ' t w i t h e r . "In harmony w i t h t h e renewed emphasis on t h e exter -n a l r e v o l u t i o n a r y f u n c t i o n of t h e S o v i e t s t a t e a s wella s on t h e n e e d f o r a s t r o n g s t a t e i n t e r n a l l y is a d i l u t e dn e o - S t a l i n i s t f o r m u l a ti o n o n t h e contemporary ideologica ls t r u g g l e . ( I n t h e 1930 ' s , S t a l i n i n t r o d u c e d t h e t h e s i st h a t t h e domest ic c l a s s war i n c r e as e s i n i n t e n s i t y a s t h eSovie t Union proceeds toward t h e b u i l d i n g of social ism.S t a l i n ' s t h e s i s , whic h w a s used t o j u s t i f y h i s p u r g e s i nt h e 1 9 3 0 1 s , came under h a r s h a t t a c k bp Khrushchev i nt h e 1 9 5 6 "secret" s p e e c h a nd a g a i n a t t h e 1961 P a r t y

* A t t h e 1961 Co n g r e s s , b o t h Suslov and Khrushchev s t a t e dt h a t t h e d i c t a t o r s h i p of t h e p r o l e t a r i a t had f u l f i l l e di t s m i s s i o n of b u i l d i n g "socia l i sm," and t h a t t h e pro le t -a r i a n d i c t a t o r s h i p had b e e n t r a n s f o r m e d i n t o t h e " s t a t eo f t h e whole peopleg1whose m i s s i o n was t o build "Communism." -But Sus lov conc luded (1 ) t h a t s t a t e appa ra tus would bes t r e n g t h e n e d d u r i n g t h e pe r iod of t h e " s t a t e of t h e wholepeople" and (2) t h a t t h e s t a t e would c rea t e t h e "mater ia la n d t e c h n i c a l b a s e of Communism." Khrushchev h e l d (1)t h a t t h e e x i s t i n g s t a t e appara tus would w i t h e r d u r i n g t h ep e r i o d of t h e s t a t e of t h e whole people and (2 ) t h a t t h ep a r t y wo ul d be c a l l e d upon t o c r e a t e t he m a t e r i a l and t e c h -n i c a l base of Communism. The pa r t y p rogram, adop t ed a tt h e 1 96 1 C o ng r es s , r e f l e c t e d S u s l o v ' s more c o n s e r v a t i v ec o n c l u s i o n s o n t h e " s t a t e of t h e whole people. '"

-9-*


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, .Congress by Mikoyan, a fo rm e r c o n f i d a n t of Khrushchev 'swho l o s t h i s p res id ium membersh ip and Supreme Sov ie t cha i r -manship i n December 1965.)t h e i d e o lo g i c al s t r u g g l e h as become * lex t remely acu t e"i n t he ex te rna l w o r l d , w a rn t h a t t h e g r e a t e r t h e successeso f , s o c i a l i s m t h e more i n s i d i o u s become t h e e f f o r t s of t h ei m p e r i a l i s t s t o l u r e the people away from Marxism-Leninismand i n f e c t t hem wi t h **bourgeo i s deo logy . i i Hence t h e p a r t yfaces a l l se r io us l l t a s k i n f i g h f i n g . t h e i n f l u e n c e of " a l i e nmorals and t r a d i t i o n s I 1 and overcoming **negat ivemanifes-t a t i o n s i n t h e c o n sc i o us n e ss a nd b eh a vi o r of t h e p eo pl e. "Here, of course, is a n i n d i ca t i o n of t h e d e e p d i s t u r b a n c ew i t h i n t h e p a r t y a p p a r a t u s o v e r We st er n i n f l u en c e i n t h eUSSR. The above formula a l so o b v i o u s l y r e l a t e s to t h eregime's t r o u b l e s with t h e uncowed l i b e r a l i n t e l l e c t u a l swho are s e e n a s b e i n g c o r ru p t e d b y l l i n d i v i d u a l i s m l l - a n d* * apo1 t ca1 a t i udes .

T he T h e s es , a s s e r t i n g tlja't-

..

BREZHNEV AND THE POWER STRUGGLEKosygin' s Problems

The predominance of c o n s e rv a t i v e t he mes i n t h e T h e s e su n d e r s c o re s o n c e more t h e handicap Kosygin faces i n . l e a d -e r s h i p p o l i t i c s . A t presen t Kosyg in and h i s s u p p o r t e r sdo not hold t h e h i g h ground w h i c h g i v e s i t s o c c u p i e r s t h ep ri me a d v a n ta g e i n d e f i n i n g t h e p a r t y l i n e . T h i s g ro un dof course is the CPSU cent ra l commit tee se c r e t a r i a t andis now h e l d by Brezhnev and Susl ov. The Thes es were un-d o u b t e d l y d r a f t e d under t h e i r d i r e c t s u p e rv i s i o n - - a s t h ec o n t e n t s of t h e document suggests . Whi le t h i s d o e s n o tmean t h a t Kosygin h a s no t succeeded i n having any of h i sp o s i t i o n s on s p e c i f i c q u es t i o n s i n co r po r at ed i n t o p a r t ydocuments--for example, t h e T h es es sect ion on "economicre fo rml*- - i t does r e f l e c t t h e f a c t t h a t Kosygin 's v iewshave taken a d i s t i n c t l y s ec on da ry p l ac e . B ut i f h i s viewsa re t o make r e a l headway, command t h e a t t e n t i o n of t h eo f f i c i a l d o m , a n d be a d o p t e d i n o t h e r t h a n p i e c e m e a l f a s h i o n ,he and h i s s u p p o r t e r s mu st be i n a p o s i t i o n t o shape t h e b a s i cfo rm u l a t i o n s of t h e g e n e r a l l i n e a s w e l l . S u c h . i n c i d e n t s a s t h e


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.:..> . ,

" h a r d e n i n g " b y TASS t h r o ug h e d i t o r i a l a l t e r a t i o n s of Kosy-g i n ' s s t a t e m e n t s a t a 25 J un e 1 9 67 p r e s s c o n f e r e n c e i nN e w Y ork --m ost l i k e l y u n d e r g u i d a n c e from t h e s e c r e t a r i a t - -u n d e r l i n e s h i s p r e d i c a m e n t . *

Er e r hnev K o s yg in

* S e e a h e a d , p a g e 42 a n d 4 3 , for a d i s c u s s i o n of t h eh i g h l i g h t s of t h e TASS c e n s o r s h i p of K o s y g i n ' s p r e s s c on -f erence r e m a r k s .

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Many observers (and they may be correc t ) have beenp e r s u a d e d - t h a t K os yg in a s a l ong- t ime t echnoc ra t h a s n e i t h e ra c q u i r e d t h e s k i l l no r is d i s p o s e d b y c h a r a c t e r t o l a l t e rt h e s i t u a t i o n by f a c t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l s t r u g g l e and t o aima t u l t i m a t e l y a c q u i r i n g B re zh ne v' s j o b . I n d e e d , t h e r ehave been f e w s i g n s t h a t h e h a s been engaged i n such a ne f f o r t .However , Brezhnev h as of t e n acted as i f h e r e g a r d e d . .Kosygin a s a competitor r a t h e r t h a n a t r u s t e d col laborator .(Evidence f o r t h i s p r op o si t i o n i s examined a t l e n g t h i np a r t t w o of t h i s r ep o r t . ) F u r th e r , q u i t e a s i d e from t h e Ap e r s o n a l m o t i v e s of Brezhnev and Kosygin, t h e d i v i s i o n

of e x e c u t i v e a u t h o r i t y between them is a s o u r c e ofc le av a ge w i t h i n t h e l e a d e r s h i p s t r u c t u r e i t s e l f . qddt o t h i s t h e many i n d i c a t i o n s t h a t t h e t w o l eade r s don o t see e y e t o e y e o n p o l i c y and t h e f a c t t h a t K os yg inis a l e a d e r w i t h h i s own base of power and not a dependentof B re zh ne v, and t h e p o t e n t i a l f o r c o n f l i c t is i n t e n s i f i e d .Khrushchev solved t h e problem of s h a r e d r u l e by downingMalenkov, the n backing Bu lga nin ' s appointment t o t h e p o s t ,an d f i n a l l y t a k i n g on t h e p o s t h im se l f i n a d d i t io n t o hisp a r t y j o b , a f t e r Bulganin had gone over t o t h e "an t i -pa r ty"o p p o s i t i o n i n 1957. Brezhnev m i g h t be tempted t o do t h esaple , but here he would have t o move ca re fu l l y so a s n ott o a r o u s e t h e f e a r and p rovoke t h e oppo s i t i o n of h i s fel lowo l i g a r c h s i n t h e " c o l l e c t i v e l e ade r sh i p" a g a i n s t h i s d r i v efo p power. W h i l e i t mus t r ema in con j ec tu ra l , BrezhnevFay have a l r ea dy con t empla t ed a s t e p i n t h i s d i r e c t i o nwere c i r c u l a t e d i n Moscow on t h e eve of t h e August SupremeS o v i e t t h a t Kosygin was ready t o r e s i g n . *

l

I l a s t y e a r , b u t t h e n t h o u g h t b e t t e r of i t , when rumors

*Rumors t h a t Premier Kosygin is t o be removed were re-p o r te d ly c i r c u l a t i n g a g a in i a h i g h government c i r c l e s i i iMoscow, a c c o r d i n g t o a l a t e J u l y p i e c e of i n fo rma t ionpassed t h rough a subsource ( de s c r i be d a s f a i r l y r e l i a b l e )from a S o v i e t eco no mic o f f i c i a l i n E a st B e r l i n . Accord-i n g t o t h e r e p o r t , K o sy g in ' s e x p e ct e d re mo va l is due t os e v e r e d i f f e r e n c e s (which t h e r e p o r t d i d n o t e l a b o r a t e .upon) between Kosygin and Brezhnev occasioned by t h e( f o o t n o t e c o n t i n u e d o n page 13)

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,

The f a c t of t h e m a t t e r remains , however , t h a t Brezh-nev h o l ds t h e main t r a c k i n t h e p o l i t i c a l a r en a of t h el e a d e r s h i p . H e h a s someth ing of a s t r a t e g i c a d v a n t a g eo r g a n i z a t i o n a l l y o v er h i s a c t u a l a nd p o t e n t i a l compefi tors .I f a n y t h i n g , a l l t h e s i g n s sugges t t h a t h e h as s t e a d i l ys t r e ng t h en e d h i s p o s i t i o n , e s p e c i a l l y i n view of t h e mani-f e s t d e c l i n e of S h e l e p i n a n d h i s e n to u ra g e i n t h e p a s te i g h t e e n m o n th s .S h e l e p i n ' s U n s u c c e s s f u l S t r u g g l e

Up t o now, a t l e a s t , B r e z h n e v r a t h e r c l e a r l y h a sr e g a r de d S h e l e p i n r a t h e r t h a n Ko sy gin a s a more immediateand more d a n g e r o u s r i v a l f o r power. Some of t h e maJorr e a s o n s f o r Brezhnev 's judgment a r e q u i t e e v i d e n t . S h e l e p i nr e p r e s e n t e d a t h r e a t from w i t h i n t h e p a r t y a p p a r a t u s ,n o t f r o m w i t h o u t a s is t h e case with Kosygin. H e hademerged f r o m Khrushchev ' s fa l l - - in w h i c h h e p layed a k e yro l e - - i n a p o s i t i o n of s t r e n g t h s e c o n d o n l y t o Brezhnev sw i t h i n t h e p a r t y . H e had a foot i n b o t h t h e p re s i d i u m(now pol i tburo) and t h e s e c r e t a r i a t , was deputy premier

( f o o t n o t e c o n t i n u e d from page 12)f o rm er ' s r e c e n t v i s i t t o t h e U ni te d S t a t e s . D e s p i t e t h ef a c t t h a t t h e s o u r c e s of ru m o rs c a n n o t b e -e a s i l y p i n n e ddown, i t s h o u l d n o t be f o r g o t t e n t h a t rumor-spreading isa time-worn d e v i c e i n f a c t i o n a l p o l i t i c s . T he formerB u l g a r i a n Premier Yugov and h i s f a c t i o n , f o r example,were accused by t h e v i c t o r i o u s Z h i v k o v f a c t i o n of h a v i n gs p re a d ru m o rs of Z hi vk ov 's impe nding f a l l a t a c e r t a i nj u n c t u r e . I t is t empt ing t o s p e c u l a t e , t h e r e f o r e , t h a tS h e l e p i n ' s f a c t i o n was b e h i n d a n o t h e r f l u r r y of rumorsi n t h e summer of 1965 t h a t Brezhnev was abou t t o f a l l .

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. . . .

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A :,

. . .

of t h e C o u n c i l of M i n i s t e r s a n d c h i e f of t h e p a r t y - s t a t ec o n t r o l a p p a r at u s (a u n i q ue o r g a n i z a t i o n w i t h a grea t :p o t e n t i a l fo r exerc i s ing power ove r bo thn the o f f i c i a ldom '.of p a r t y a n d s t a t e ) and had a protege (Semichas tnyy) im - .s t a l l e d a s head of t h e . K G B a s w e l l as a coterie of fol-lowers i n i n f l u e n t i a l p o s i t i o n s i n t h e p a r t y ap pa ra tu s.N o t on ly Brezhnev , b u t p robab ly o th e r s e n i o rl e a d c r s , saw a common da ng er i n t h e y o u t h f u l , m i l i t a n ta nd a m b i t i o u s S h e l e p in . S h e l e p i n a p p a r e n t l y had n o tt a ke n h i s c o l l e a g u e s ' c on c er n s u f f i c i e n t l y i n t o a cc ou ntand moved too q u i c k l y a n d b o l d l y t o ga in power . Dur ingt h e summer of 1965, i n a ny case, t h e rumors t h a t S h e l e p i n

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was s c h em i ng a nd i n t r i g u i n g t o g e t B r e z h n e v' s j o b werefol lowed b y l e a d e r s h i p a c t i o n c u r b i n g h i s ( S h e le p i n' s )power. I n December 1965 t h e p a r t y -s t a t e c o n t r o l a ge nc ywhich h e had headed was a b o l i s h e d a n d b y t h e t i m e of t h e23rd P a r t y C o n gr e ss he was d e p r i v e d of a d i r e c t r o l e i ncadre a p p o i n t m e n t s i n t h e p a r t y .T he c i r c u m s t a n t i a l e v i d en c e s u g g e s t s t h a t ' S h e l e p i nwas a p r i n c i p a l i n what w a s e v i d e n t l y a b o l d b u t a b o r t i v ea t t a c k on Brezhnev ' s hand l ing o f t h e Middle E a s t cr is isa t t h e J u n e 1967 plenum. This a f f a i r l e d n o t o n l y t o t h eo u s t e r of Sh e l ep in ' s p re sumed a l l y Yegorychev a s head oft h e Moscow p a r t y b u t t o h i s own demotion t o ch i e f of t h et r ade u ni on s- -a n a c t i o n t h a t most p r o b a b l y p o r t e n d s h i sremoval from t h e s e c r e t a r i a t , a n d , p o s s i b l y , h i s e v e n t u a ldowngrading from vo ting-member s t a t u s o n t h e p o l i t b u r o .However, t h e Yegorychev a f f a i r may have been l e s s a pr imec a u s e t h a n a p r e t e x t f o r Brezhnev t o t a k e o n e s t e p f u r t h e ri n h i s g r a d u a l e f f o r t t o d i s p o s e of h i s a d v er s a r y. B e fo r et h e Middle Eas t c r i s i s broke Brezhnev had a l ready succeededi n f o r c i n g S em ic ha st ny y o u t a s KGB c h i e f - - h e r e S v e t l a n aS t a l i n ' s d e f e ct io n came a s a windf al l --an d moving a n (ap-p a re n t) a l l y , t h e party s p e c i a l i s t i n S o v i e t b l o c a f f a i r s ,Andropov , i n to h i s p l ac e. The l a t t e r a c t i o n n o t o n l ys t r e n g t h e n e d B r e zh n ev ' s g r i p on t h e p o l i c e a p p a r a t u s , b u ta l o n g w i t h A nd ro po v' s e l e v a t i o n i n t o t h e p o l i t b u r o a s acan d id a t e member, r a i s e d t h e p o l i t i c a l s t a t u s of t h a tagency t o i t s h i g h e s t p o i n t s i n c e 1953, when i t s u f f e r e da m a j o r r e d u c t i o n of i t s p o w e r s a f t e r B e r i a ' s e x e c u t i o n .T h u s , i n t h i s c o n n e c t i o n , i t i s d i f f i c u l t t o c r e d i t t h ei d e a o f f e r e d r e c e n t l y by some W e s t e r n a n a l y s t s t h a t Brezh-nev still f a c e s a major t h r e a t from t h e S h e l e p i n forceso t h e r t h a n p e r h a p s i n t h e s e n s e t h a t t hey may su rv iv e t of i g h t a n o t h e r da y. R a t h e r , Brezhnev seems to have succeededt o a l a r g e d e g r e e i n d e f u s i n g t h e t h r e a t from h i s m o s td a n g e r o u s c h a l l e n g e r .

ha s been a d i s t i n c t c le av ag e i n t h e p o l i c y o u t l o o k s ofBrezhnev and Kosygin, t h e n o t a b l e a s p e c t of t h e Brezhnev-S h e l e p i n r i v a l r y h a s been t h a t b o t h s o u g h t t o occupy mucht h e same po l i t i c a l g round- -wi t h t h e d i f f e r e n c e t h a t S h e l e p i n

I t is i m p o r t a n t t o keep i n mind t h a t w h i l e t h e r e

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h a s t a k e n a more c l e a r - c u t m i l i t a n t s t a n d , B rezh nev a .f u z z i e r p o s i t io n . I n s h o r t , S h e l e p i n h a s b e e n h o l d i n go u t t h e promise t o t h e i d e o l o g i c a l l y - o r i e n t e d w i n g of t h ep a r t y t h a t he cou ld do what Brezhnev was c l a i m i n g t o dow i t h greater dynamism and e f f i ca cy . Brezhnev ha s , r e pe a t -e d l y r e p r e s e n t e d h i s p o l i c y as one which would increaset h e l l e f f e c t i v e n e s s i ' of p a r t y e f f o r t s i n t h e s t r u g g l ea g a i n s t t l i mp e r i al i s m' l a n d i n b u i l d i n g e co no mi c a n d m i l i -t a r y s t r e n g t h a t home--implying a c o n t r a s t w i t h t h e a l l egeds a l l y a g a i n s t t h e l e a d e r s h i p ' s c a u t i o u s act ions i n t heMiddle E a s t c r i s i s - - u n d e r t a k e n , p e r h a p s , w i t h S h e l e p i n ' sbless ing--added up t o accus ing Brezhnev h i m s e l f of i n e f -f e c t i v e n e s s , of propounding a hard l i n e w it h ou t t ee th . .V u l n e r a b i l i t y t o this c o m p l a i n t of t h e p a r ty m i l i t a n t re-mains a b a s i c weakness of t h e k i n d o f c a u t i o u s n e s s 4 3 r e zh -nev h a s adopted so f a r . While Brezhnev none the l e s s ha ss t r en g t h en e d h i s g r i p on t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n a l p o s i t i o n s i nt h e l e a d e r s h i p , h e is u n d o u b te d l y s e e k i n g f o r w ays ofmaking more c r e d i b l e h i s emphas i s on making pa r ty po l i cyl 1e f f e c t v e . '

i n e p t i t u d e of Khrushchev i an po l i c y . Yegorychev ' s app a re n t - I

W i t h t h e s u c c e s s i v e de fea t s t h e S h e l e p i n f a c t i o nh a s su ff e r ed , Brezhnev would now seem t o e n j o y more,elbowroom and be i n a b e t t e r p o s i t i o n t o c o n s o l i d a t e h i s c on -s e r v a t i v e l i n e . B ut how he s h a l l move r e m ai n s i n q u e s t i o n .I n v o l v ed i n t h e answer a re both t h e d i s p o s i t i o n of f o r c e sw i t h wh i ch Brezhnev mus t r eckon wi th in t h e l e a d i n g g r o u pand t h e v er y d i f f i c u l t matter of h i s own matives and in-c l i n a t i o n s a s a leader .S u s l o v ' s I n f l u e n c e

*D e s p i t e S h e l e p i n ' s d e c l i n e , t h e r e r ema ins t h e power-f u l i n f l u e n c e exercised by S u s l o v on t h e s i d e of t r a d i t i o n -a l i sm. W h i l e p r o b a b l y n o t a d i r e c t c o n t e n d e r f o r Brezh-n e v ' s p o s i t i o n , he c a n a c t a s a s t r o n g r e s t r a i n i n g i n f l u -ence on t h e T@neral Z4ecretary from h i s p o s i t i o n i n t h e secre-

on broad i d e o l o g i c a l g r o u n d s , h e probab ly cons i de r s t hemimmature and adven tur i s t as o t he r s e n i o r l e a d e r s who a l s ot a r i a t . While Susl ov would be close t o t h e y o u n g m i l i t a n t s . r

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may agree t h a t t hey need t o be h e l d i n c h e c k . On t h e o t h e rhand , he p ro b a b l y does n o t w an t them d r i v e n c o m p l e t e l yfrom t h e f i e l d , inasmuch as t h e young m i l i t a n t s may bec o n s i d e r e d a u s e f u l check t o Brezhnev ' s expans ion of power.Moreover, he a l s o s t a n d s gu ar d a g a i n s t a ny d i l u t i o n oft h e b a s i c c o n s e rv a t i s m of t h e o v e r a l l p a r t y p o l i t i c a ll i n e . Brezhnev may a l s o be c u r r e n t l y h e l d back by ap u r e l y t a c t i c a l considerat ion--much as was Khrushchev i nh i s s t r u g g l e a g a i n s t M alenkov i n 1 95 4 a nd e a r l y 1955.To move too obv ious ly away from t h i s c o ns e r v at i v e- l e a ni n gs t a n c e , w ould i n e v i t a b l y make i t appear a s i f he were"me-tooing" Kosygin . Fu rt he r , t h e s t r e n g t h of conse rva-t i v e o p i n i o n w i t h i n t h e p a r t y , may make i t impruden t inB re z h n e v ' s e y e s t o c h a n g e l i n e .

F i n a l l y , B r e z h n e v ' s r a t h e r c o n s i s t e n t i d e n t i f i c a -t i o n w i t h t h e i d e o l o g i c a l l y -o r i e n t e d w i n g of t h e p a r t ys i n c e K h ru s hc h ev ' s f a l l may a r i s e from p e r s o n a l c o n v i c t i o na s w e l l a s f r o m h i s judgment of t h e b a l a n c e of forces w i t h -i n t h e regime. So f a r , a t l e as t , h e h a s shown no s ignof s h i f t i n g f r o m h i s p o s i t i o n s a s a r e s u l t of h i s d e f e a tof S h e l e p in a nd c o n c u r r e n t g a i n s i n o r g a n i z a t i o n a l s t r e n g t h .H i s J u l y 1967 speech t o m i l i t a r y g r ad u at e s some t w o weeksa f t e r t h e June plenum w a s a n e m p h a t i c r e s t a t e m e n t of h i sp r e v i o u s l i n e . H e f i t t e d t h e I s r a e l i - A r a b w a r i n t o t h ep i c t u r e h e h a s drawn of c o o rd i n a t e d a t t e m pt s by t h e " i m -p e r i a l i s t s , " e s p e c i a l l y t h e Americans, t o r e g a i n l o s tp o s i t i o n s t hr o ug h c o un t e r- a t t ac k s a g a i n s t t h e r e v o l u t i o n -a r y movement. H e r e j ec t ed t h e n o t i o n t h a t t h e cr i s i s wast h e r e s u l t of n a t i o n a l s t r i f e between I s r a e l and t h e Arabs t a t e s . H e p r o f e s s e d t o see i t a s another engagement int h e world-wide c l a s s s t r u g g l e a n d a s s e r t e d t h a t t h e "ar-rogance" of t h e i m p e r i a l i s t s r e q u i r e d " s t i l l grea te r" a t -t e n t i o n t o b u i l d i n g S o vi e t m i l i t a r y s t r e n g t h .B re z h n e v ' s P ro s p e c t s

Brezhnev , i n any case , h a s t h r e e broad o p t i o n s f o rh i s f u t u r e c ou rs e: (1) a turn toward a h igh risk m i l i t a n c yi n f o r e i g n a f f a i r s , (2) c o n t i n u i n g h i s p r e s e n t h a r d l i n etoward t h e United S t a t e s b u t a v o i d i n g b r in k ma n sh i p i n g e n u i n e

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c r i s e s , and (3) s e e k i n g a more r e l a x ed r e l a t i o n s h i p w i tht h e Uni ted S t a t e s a n d g i v i n g greater a t t e n t i o n to i n t e r -n a l problems.Th e f i r s t c o u r s e h a s been re j ec t ed by Brezhnev andt h e p r e s s u r e s i n i t s favor have been reduced f o r now b y .S h e l e p i n ' s s t e a d y d e c l i n e . C o r r es p o n di n g l y, movement to -ward t h e t h i r d o p t i on is now easier f o r Brezhnev but t h e

a s a d e t e r r e n t a s l o n g a s he remains premier . The pros-p e c t a t l e a s t f o r t h e n ea r f u t u r e a c t u a l l y seems t o f4vora c o n t i n u a n c e o f t h e second course perhaps w i t h some veer-i n g t o one s i d e o r ' t h e o t h e r . A t t h e same time, t h i q ,course l e a v e s some room f o r f l e x i b i l i t y i n de ve lo pi ngs t r a t e g i e s f o r v a r i o u s l o c a l s i t u a t i o n s . B r e z h n e v hase v i d e n t l y be en t r y i n g t o d e v e l o p s u c h a s t r a t e g y towardWestern Europe aimed a t drawing Europe away from i t s as-s o c i a t i o n s w i t h t h e U ni te d S t a t e s an d i n c r e a s i n g S o v i e tp o l i t i c a l l e v e r a g e i n t h e area. I n this connec t ion ,Brezhnev has been speaking of t h e a p p l i c a b i l i t y o f t h ep e a c e f u l c o e x i s t e n c e c o n c e p t t o t h e European con t inen t ,d e s p i t e h i s t endency t o d ownpl ay t h e c o n c e p t i n g e n e ra land i n p a r t i c u l a r w i t h regard t o U.S.-Sovie t re la t ions .

Brezhnev ' s problem a s a l e a d e r , even more so nowthan before , h a s been h i s d i f f i c u l t y i n m ai n ta i ni n g f or wa rdmomentum f o r h i s f o r e i g n a n d domestic programs. H e rodet o power on t h e wave of r e a c t io n i n t h e o l i g a r c h y t o Khru-s h c h e v i a n l e a d e r s h i p , b u t t h e t i m e has l on g s i n c e p a s twhen Khrushchev provided a co nv en ie nt whipping-boy. Brezh-nev must take t h e r a p when things go wrong.* I t is j u s t

f a c t t h a t K o sy gi n h a s so f a r p r e e m p t e d t h i s l i n e a c t s - 6

* A s i f he were i n s e ar c h of a scapegoat , Brezhnev wento u t of h i s way t o d e f e n d p o l i t b u r o p o l i c y d u r i n g t h e Arab-I s r a e l i war; he d i d no t de fend pas t Soviet- f o r t h eMiddle E a s t i n h i s 5 J u l y a d d r e s s . I n t h i s connection--andi n wha t appeared t o be a c l a s s i c KGB e f f o r t t o t r y t o s h i f tt h e blame of a g l a r i ng f a i l u r e from t h e i r u l t i m a t e boss,Brezhnev, t o h i s compet i to r , Kosygin--a known KCl3 a g e n tclaimed i n t h e wake of t h e Arab-Israeli war t h a t t h e di smalf a i l u r e of t h e UAR t o meet Sov ie t exp ec t a t i ons **may pu tKosygin i n a bad po si t i on ." One month l a t e r t h e same KGBagent seemed t o prov ide an apo log ia i n Brezhnev' s de fense .T he a g en t s t a t e d t h a t t h e USSR "would prefer an Egypt whichi s d e f e a t e d b u t remains a s o c i a l i s t c o u n t ry t o a v i c t o r i o u sEgypt w h i c h would become a c a p i t a l i s t c o u nt r y and no l o ng e rneed Sov ie t a id . " -18-


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a s t r u e o f a Soviet Communist l eade r a s o the r leaders--ifn o t more s o - - t ha t he m u s t s u s t a i n t h e a p p e a ra n c e of forwardmovement i n h i s p o l i c y . O t h e r w i s e h e c a n become p r e y t oo t h e r p r e t e n d e r s t o power around him.f o r example, came a f t e r h i s own program had been founder-ing . His Cuban venture , t w o y e a r s e a r l i e r , i t s e l f w a s adesperate a t tempt t o r e s to re momentum t o h i s l e a d e r s h i p . )Whi le t h e Midd l e Ea s t s e tb a c k w a s n o t h i s "Cuba," t h eoutcome of t h a t war d i d no t he l p Brezhnev . The problemof forward movement remains.

(Khrushchev ' s f a l l ,

PART TWO: PATTERNS I N POLITBURO LEADERS' POLICY STATEMENTSThe f o l l o wi n g t e x t u a l a n a l y s i s of t h e p u b l i c spe-eches of S o v i e t leaders r e v e a l s bas ic d i f f e r e n c e s o nmajor f o r e i g n a nd domestic p o l i c y i s s u e s . The a n a l y s i sr e v e a l s a r e m a rk a b l e degree of c o n s i s t e n c y i n t h e in -d i v i d u a l t r e a t m e n t of major i s s u e s by t h e leaders . Pat-t e r n s e me rg e w h i c h permi t t h e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of d i s t i n c tp o l i c y p r e f e r e n ce s of t h e i n d i v i d u a l S o v i e t p o l i c y -m a k e r ,w h i c h , i n t u rn , t h r o w s l i g h t o n K re m l i n p o l i c y c l e a v a g e s .(The p a t t e r n s a l s o s e r v e a v i t a l p o l i t i c a l f un ct io n w i t h -i n t h e Soviet power envi ronment-- that i s , t h e communica-t i o n of a n i n d i v i d u a l l e a d e r ' s l i n e t o t h e lower-rankingp a r t y and government members.)

I t is a p p a r e n t t h a t , a s i n t h e p a s t , speeches a r ef r e q u e n t l y s u b j e c te d t o c o o r d i n a t i o n b y members of t h ep o l i t b u r o . T h e e a r l y November revo lu t ion ann ive rsa rya d d r e s s e s appear t o be h e a v i l y c o o rd i n a t e d . B ut o t h e rs pe ec he s, i n p a r t i c u l a r t h e a nn ua l e l e c t i o n speechesf o r t h e Supreme Sov ie t (pa r l i amen t ) speeches a t t h e p a r t ycongresses and p lenums and a t Supreme Sov ie t sess ions d i s -p l a y c o n s i d e r a b l y d i v e r g e n t f o r m u l a t i o n s o n v a r i o u s i s s u e s .And on t h e w h o l e , t h e c o n s c i o u s e f f o r t a t p r e s e n t i n g ac o o r d i n a t e d l i n e makes t h e d i f f e r e n c e s t h a t d o a p p e a r t h emore n o t i c e a b l e .

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.The f o l l o w i n g s e c t i o n , w hi ch c o n c e n t r a t e s p r im a ra y

se--examines t h e p a t t e r n s d e r iv e d from t h e p o l i t b u r o lea5n p o l i c y i s s u es - r a th e r t h an o n p o l i t i c a l a l i gn m en t se r s t r e m a r k s s i n c e t h e f a l l of Khrushchev.BREZHNEV: HOSTILITY ABROAD, DISCIPLINE AT HOME

. ,F r o m t h e o u t s e t of h i s incumbency Brezhnev h as de-v e lo p ed h i s p o l i c y l i n e s a r ou n d t h e theme t h a t t h e S o v i e tUnion must face a world f u l l of d a n g e r s for an i n d e f i n i t ef u t u r e . H e t h u s h a s t a c i t l y b u t u nm is ta ka bl y d i s s o c l a t e dh i m s e l f from Khrushchev 's o p t i m i s t i c themes of a s t e a d y ,if uneven , t r end of d e c l i n i n g d a n g e r of war a n d t h e pros-p e c t of l lremoving war from t h e l i f e of soc ie ty .11 Brezhnevh a s s o u g h t t o g i v e new l i f e t o t h e s e n s e of e x t e r n a l d a ng erw h i c h h a s a n i m a t e d S o v i e t p o l i t i c s but which was d u l l e db y K h r u s h c h e v i a n d o c t r i n e s . While n o t g o i n g so f a r a6t o renounce Khrushchev 's pronouncement t h a t t h e l l c a p i t a l -i s t enc i rc l ement '* of t h e USSR has ended, he h a s s o u g h tt o prov ide some th ing of a f u n c t i o n a l e q u iv a l en t of t h a td i s c a r de d d o c t r i n e by s t r e s s i n g t h a t t he Sov i e t Unionremains in I ta hostile capi tali st environment."Where Khrushchev turned t h e p a r t y toward i n t e r n a li d e o l o g i c a l g o a l s f o c u s s i n g t h e new party program moreon building Communism a t home t h a n o n r e v o l u t i o n abroad,Brezhnev so f a r has chosen a more t r a d i t i o n a l c o u r s e .H e h a s t r i e d t o draw t h e p a r t y ' s a t t e n t i o n back towardsi t s e x t e r n a l i d e o l o g i c a l p u r p o s e s - - t o w a r d t h e " a n t i -i m p e r i a l i s t s t r u g g l e , ' 1 t o r e s t o r i n g un f ty i n t h e communist -movement and among bloc s t a t e s . Corre sponding ly , he stressest h e pr imary need t o d e v e l o p t h e economic and defens ivel 'might l l of t h e S o v i e t U ni on i n order t o cope w i t h t h e"world-wide aggre s s iveness '1 of i m p e r i a l i s m , e s p e c i a l l yof t h e United S t a t e s .

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cA. The Hard Line Toward t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s

Unl ike Kosyg in, Brezhnev p i c t u r e s t h e Vietnam w a ra s o n l y o n e of many o b s t a c l e s b l o c k i n g a n y s u b s t a n t i a li m p r o v e m e n t o f r e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e U ni te d S t a t e s . I n h i sv a r i o u s s p e e c h e s h e h a s p r e s e n t e d t h e Vietnam war a s asymptom r a t h e r t h a n a c a u s e of what h e regards a s a h i s -t o r i c a l p e r i o d o f " da ng e r" a nd l l c o mp l i c at i o n si i i n i n t e r -n a t i o n a l a f f a i r s . The u n d e r l y i n g c a u se i n B re zh ne v' sview is U.S. "imper ia l ism" w h i c h he p i c t u r e s a s b e i n g o nt h e o f f en s i ve i n v a ri o u s p a r t s of t h e world . T h e r e c e n tArab-Israel i war i s s e e n s i m p l y a s a n ot h er f r o n t i n t h ec u r r e n t i m p e r i a l i s t o f f e n s i v e . In s h o r t , Brezhnev hast ak en r a d i c a l l y d i f f e r e n t s i t u a t i o n s and made them f i ti n t o h i s s i m p l i s t i c c o n c e p t i o n of a n i m p e r i a l i s t mwterp l a n .

Brezhnev has d i sp l ayed a c o n s i s t e n t t e n d e n c y t om i n i m i z e p r o s p e c t s f o r i mp ro vi ng r e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e Uni t edS t a t e s . T h i s t en de nc y was e v i d e n t e v e n p r i o r t o t h es t e ppe d up Amer ican i nvo lvement i n Vietnam i n ea r l y 1965.W i t h i n t h r e e weeks of Khrushchev 's p o l i t i c a l d e m i s e ,Brezhnev deva lued t he coex i s t enc e theme. The peace fu lc o e x i s t e n c e l i n e so h e a v i l y stressed and s i n g l e d o u t b yh i s predecessor now appeared f a r down t h e l i s t on a s i x -p o i n t f o r e i g n p o l i c y f o r mu la w h i c h s u b o r d i n a t e d coexis t -e n c e t o o t h e r S o v i e t e x t e r n a l goa l s . T h i s major changewas i n t r o d u c e d u n d e r t h e g u i s e of c o n t i n u i t y , b u t i t in -vo lved a s i g n i f i c a n t r e s h u f f l i n g of p r i o r i t i e s i n p o l i cyi n wh i ch t h e t h e m e s of a n t i - i m p e r i a l i s t s t r u g g l e and na-t i o n a l l i b e r a t i o n rose w h i l e t h e theme of p r e v e n t i n g aworld w a r f e l l . Brezhnev c a l l e d f o r :

g u a r a n t e e i n g p e a c e f u l c o n d i t i o n s f o r cons r u c t i n gsocialsm and communism, f o r s t r en gt he ni ng t h e u n i t yand cohes ion o f t h e s o c i a l i s t c o u n t r i e s , t h e i r f r i e n d -s h i p and brothe rhood; a c o u r s e d i r e c t e d towards sup-p o r t of r e v o l u t i o n a r y l i b e r a t i o n m ovements, towarde v e r y p o s s i b l e d e v e l o p m e n t of s o l i d a r i t y and coopera-t i o n w i t h t h e i ndependen t s t a t e s of A s i a , A f r i c a , a n dL a t i n America, toward a f f i r m a t i o n of t h e p r i n c i p l e so f p e a c e f u l c o e x i s t e n c e w i t h c a p i t a l i s t s t a t e s , towardt h e d e l i v e r a n c e of mankind f r o m w o r l d war.


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c.. . .

. .. . .

. . . ,I... .

.. ,

B r e z hn e v ' s s i x - p o i n t " g e n e r a l co u r s e" o f S o v i e t f o r e i g np o l i c y was r e p e a t e d almost verbatim two-and-one-halfy e a r s l a t e r i n t h e CPSU c e n t r a l committee T h e s e s o n t h e5 0 t h a n n i v e r s a r y of the Communis t revolut ion.A n o t a b l e o m i s s i o n from B r e z h n e v ' s f o r m u l a t i o n s o nS o v i e t f o r e i g n p o l i c y h a s b e e n a n y a s s e r t i o n of the Khru-s h ch e v ia n c o r o l l a r y t h a t t h e p o l i cy of c o e x i s t e n c e i n v o l v e d

t o give t h e d o c t r i n e of c o e x i s t e n c e a m i l i t a n t cast . Andi n December 1964 he began t o r e d e f i n e t h e t h e m e of coexist-ence i n a d e f e n s i v e , n e g a t i v e form: " J u s t b e c au s e w e . a r e 4c o n v i n c e d supporters of p e a c e f u l c o e x i s t e n c e , w e r e s o l u t e l ya n d i m p l a c a b l y speak o u t a g a i n s t those who want t o v i o l a t et h i s p e a c e f u l c o e x i st e nc e . W g i v e a r e b u f f t o t h e pro-v o c a t i o n s of t h e i m p e r i a l i s t s and t o t h e i r e n c r o a c b e n t so n t h e p e a c e f u l l i f e of t h e p e o p l e s of t h e s o c i a l i s t coun-t r i e s , o n t h e freedom and independence of t h e p e o p l e s ofA s i a , A f r i c a , a n d L a t i n America.n The tone of m i l i t a n c ywas p r e s e n t i n h i s f i r s t major f o r e i g n p o l i c y s p ee c h (6November 1964) ; he s t ressed t h a t " in implement ing t h ep o l i c y of p e a c e f u l c o e x i s t e n c e we base o u r s e l v e s o n t h emight of t h e c o u n t r i e s of t h e s o c i a l i s t c a m p . " He c3m-bined t h i s s t a t e m e n t w i t h t h e a s s e r t i o n t h a t " w e s h a l l ,m a i n t ai n o u r d e f e n s e p o t e n t i a l on t h e h i g h e s t p o s s i b l el e v e l" - - t he s t r o n g e s t p r e s i d i u m - l e v el pl e d g e f o r s u p p o r tt o t h e S o v i e t m i l i t a r y d u r i n g 1 9 6 4 . T h e s e s t a t e m e n t s s e tt h e p a t t e r n f o r B r ez h ne v 's p o s i t i o n on f o r e i g n p o l i c yr i g h t u p t o t h e p r e s e n t .

. .m u t u a l c o n c e s s i o n s . R a t h e r , Brezhnev has been d i sposed . I

Renewed Emphasis On The World RevolutionBrezhnev ' s upgrad ing of t h e l i n e o n s u p p o r t i n gn a t i o n a l l i b e r a t i o n movements was combined w i t h h i s f a i l -u r e t o m en ti on Kh ru s hc he v' s s t r i c t u r e s a g a i n s t a t t e m p t st o e x p o r t r e v o l u t i o n . * W it hi n a month of h i s assumpt ion

* T h i s l i n e h a s n o t d i s a p p e a r e d e n t i r e l y . I t h a s ap-p e a re d i n t h e key "consensus" spe eches , t h a t i s , i n P o ly -a n s k i y ' s 6 November 1965 re vo lu t i on a r y ann i ve r sa r y speech( i n t h e wake of t h e a b o r t i v e I n d o n e s i a n c o u p ) a n d P e l s h e ' s6 November 196 6 sp ee ch on t h e same o c c a s i o n .

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of power, h e f o l l ow e d u p h i s f o r m u l a t i o n s w i t h a c t i o n sw h i c h c l e a r l y p or te nd ed a d e t e r i o r a t i o n of r e l a t i o n s w i t ht h e Uni t ed S t a t e s .t h e c a l l f o r a " s i n g l e a n t i - i m p e r i a l i s t f r o n t " t o c o u n t e rw h a t h e s a i d were U.S. "encroachments" on s o c i a l i s t s t a t e sand underdeve loped s t a t e s i n A s i a, A f r i c a a nd L a t i n America.(3 December 1964 Kreml in speech)

And d u r i n g t h i s p e r i o d h e s ou n de d

The most obv ious move i n t h i s d i r e c t i o n a t t h e t i m ewas M O S C O W ' S d e c i s i o n t o s en d m i l i t a r y s u p p or t t o t h e Con-golese rebels a l l e g e d l y i n r e sp on se t o t h e U.S.-Belgiumr e sc u e e f f o r t a t S t a n l e y v i l l e (now K i s an g a n i) i n l a t eNovember 1964. The on ly ge ne ra l ly comparable pr ev io usSo vi e t move t o d i r e c t l y a i d i n d i g e n o u s f o r c e s came d u r i n gt h e 1960-1962 phase of K hr us hc he vi an b e l l i c o s i t y towardt h e West when mi l i t a ry equ ipment was s e n t t o comba tan t si n Laos . The a i d t o t h e Congolese r ebe l s was accompaniedby a v i t r i o l i c a nt i- U. S. p r op ag an d a a t t ack as w e l l a s byS o v i e t - s t a g e d d e m o n s t r a t i o n s a t t h e U.S. embas sy i n Moscow.I n h i s 3 December speech Brezhnev made t h e f i r s t p r e s i d i u m -l e v e l a t t a c k by t h e p os t- Kh ru sh ch ev l e a d e r s h i p a g a i n s tt h e Johnson Adm ini s t r a t i on. Brezhnev charged t h a t " t h eb l o o d y s l a u g h t e r p e r p e t r a t e d i n Co ng ol es e t ow ns b y t h eB e lg i a n p a r a t r o o p s , b ro ug ht i n U.S. a i r c r a f t w i t h t h e bless-i n g of t h e W h i t e House and w i t h t h e a p p r o v a l of t h e NATOC o u n c i l , is a s t r i k i n g example of t h e c o l l e c t i v e p i r a c yby t h e c o l o n i a l i s t s . 1 1 He went on to a l l u d e t o S o v i e tarmed s u p p o r t of A f r i c a n s , who, h e s a i d , were n o l o n g e r"unarmed" i n t h e f a c e of t h e i m p e r i a l i s t s .

An emer gin g div er ge nc e between Brezhnev and Kosyginon t h e q u e s t i o n of w o r l d r e v o l u t i o n w a s r e f l e c t e d i nKos ygin 's comments i n l a t e 1964 on t h e Congo c r i s i s . I nh i s c om pr eh en si ve d i s c u s s i o n of S o v i e t f o r e i g n p o l i c y a tt h e Supreme Sovie t on 9 December 1964, Kosygin, unl ikeBrezhnev, made n o a l l u s i o n s t o s t r e n g t h e n i n g t h e Congoleser e b e l s and c l a im ed o n l y t h a t t h e "world t1--ra ther t h a n t h eUSSR i n pa r t i cu l a r - -was "profoundly i nd ignan t ' ove r t h ea c t i o n s of " c e r t a i n [unnamed] Weste rn powers ." ( T h i swas t h e same speech i n w h i c h Kosygin ca l l ed f o r a p o l i c yof mutual example between t h e U n it e d S t a t e s a nd t h e S o v i e tUnion i n r e d u c i n g m i l i t a r y b u d ge t s. )

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. .

T h a t these e a r l y d i f f e r e n c eB were n o t m e r e l y t i e dt o a s p e c i f i c s i t u a t i o n b u t e n t a i l ed d i s t i n c t o u t lo ok swas under sco red a t t h e 23rd P a r t y Co n gr e ss i n 1966.* .Kosy-g in a ssumed a more pragmatic, Brezhnev a more orthodox' p o s i t i o n r e g a rd i n g t h e goal of wor ld r ev o lu t io n . Kosyg inc i t e d - L e n i n a s a u t h o r i t y f o r t h e s t a t e m e n t t h a t t h e S o v i e tUnion "exercises i t s c h i e f i n f l u e n c e on world r e v o l u t i o nt h r o u g h i t s economic po l i c y , 11 and he p r e d i c t e d t h a t suc-cess i n t h e 1966-70 e co no mi c p l a n would " s e c u r e f u r t h e r .changes on t h e world s c en e i n f a vo r of peace and soci41ism1 'and wou ld i f unques t iona b ly exert a f a r - r e a c h i n g i n f l u e n c eon t h e w o rl d s i t u a t i o n . " D i v er g i ng from Kosyg in ' s emphasison winn ing the world by "example ," Brezhnev ' s Congressreport d i d n o t refer t o Sov ie t economic po l i cy a s t h el l ch ie f ' l or bas ic c o n t r i b u t i o n t o world r e v o l u t i o n . R a t h e r ,Brezhnev fo r ecas t t h a t s u c c e ss i n t h e 1966-70 economic .p l a n w oul d s e r v e t o " c o n s o l i d a t e t h e u n i t y of t h e worlds o c i a l i s t sys tem, i t wou ld i nc rea se t h e S o v i e t U n i o n ' seconomic and defense m i g h t a nd , l a s t l y , would b o l s t e r i t si n t e r n a t i o n a l pres t ige .

. +

The Congo cr is is was n o t , of cou r se , t h e o n l y s i t u a -t i o n Br ez hn ev e x p l o i t e d t o j u s t i f y his deve lop ing hardl i n e toward t h e ' u n i t e d S t a t e s d u r i n g t h e f i r s t months ofh i s l e a d e r s h i p . (But t h a t m a t t e r , l i k e U . S . a c t i on s i nt h e Dominican Republ ic beg inni ng i n A p r i l 1965, w a s useda s a n e le me n t i n Br e zh n ev ' s p o r t r a y a l of U.S. a g g r e s s i v e -n e s s o n a l l f r o n t s . ) Of c o u r s e , t h e i s su e o f Vie tnamwas soon t o become ano t he r example c i t e d by Brezhnev ins u p p o r t of h i s h a rd l i n e toward t h e United S t a t e s .

C h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y , i t was Brezhnev who i n i t i a t e dt h e post-Khrushchev condemnation of U.S. a c t i o n s i n N o r t hand South Vie tnam (6 November 1964 speech) and who f i r s tspoke of S o v i e t r e a d i n e s s t o e x t e n d m i l i t a r y a i d t o N o r t hVietnam (3 December 1964 speech)--well i n advance of t h e

*For a good examina t ion o f t h i s i s s ue a t t h e 23rd P a r t y .,Congress see "Conf l ic t and Consensus in t h e S o v i e t Lead-'' ( S o v i e t D i v i s i o n . OCI memorandum of 27 Februa ryI I

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I I

a c t u a l i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n of t h e Vietnam war i n F eb ru ar y1965. (The co n t r a s t s between Brezhnev and Kosygin onV i e t n a m e s e - r e l a t e d i s s u e s w i l l be d i s c us s e d i n t h es e c t i o n d e a l i ng w i t h K os yg in 's p o l i c y p o s i t i o n s . )Renewed Em phas i s On The U.S. ll Th re at il i n Europe

Brezhnev, however, has n o t t r e a t e d Vietnam a s t h ec e n t r a l i s s u e f o r S o v i e t f o r e i g n p o l i c y . H e h as g i v e np a r t i c u l a r a t t e n t i o n t o U.S. m i l i t a r y a c t i v i t y a nd sup-p os e d i n t e n t i o n s i n E ur op e- -r at he r t h a n d w e l l i n g on U.S.a c t i v i t y i n S ou th ea st Asia and elsewhere. H e h a s drummedu p a p i c t u r e of a " s e r i o u s ' th reat" to b o t h S o v i e t a n dg e n e r a l E ur ope an i n t e r e s t s ra ised by U.S. c o l l u s i o n w i t hWest German "revanchism." T h i s l i n e seems t o be i n t e n d e dto a d v a n c e f o u r goals of Sov ie t po l i cy emphas ized ' .byBrezhnev: (1) removing t h e U.S. p re s e n c e from WesternEurope, (2) fragmenting NATO, (3) s t r e n g t h e n i ng t h e S o v i e tp o s i t i o n an d i n f l u e n c e i n t h e Warsaw group ing , and (4)expand ing CPSU i n f l u e n c e t hr ou gh t h e agency of l oc a lp a r t i e

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Caesar 42 - Policy and Politics in CPSU Politburo: October 1964 to September 1967