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C-sUAS Capability Development
Wing Commander Rob Wilson
SO1 Force Protection Capability Development – HQ AIR
OFFICIAL
OFFICIAL
MAA Class1 Maximum Take Off Weight
I(a) <200g
I(b) 200g to 2kg
I(c) 2kg – 20kg
I(d) 20kg-150kg
II 150Kg-600Kg
III >600Kg
2
1. For purpose of this brief, the term ‘small’ will be used to refer to Class I(a) to Class I(c) UAS inclusive.
Taxonomy
1. Although the term ‘sUAS’ roughly corresponds to NATO Class 1a to 1c (UAS with a maximum take-off
weight of less than 20Kgs), it actually refers to the platform’s signature (across all spectrums); a
signature that is so small that it cannot be detected or is deliberately filtered out as clutter by Air
Defence/Surveillance sensors.2. Medium/high altitude, long endurance
Propulsion system
Flight control system
Imagery system
Airframe
Ground control station
Power source (battery
pack)
Communications system
Internal memory and
removable media.
*Additional payload not shown.Aircraft shown is DJI Phantom 4 Pro
Diagonal Size (Propellers Excluded): 350 mm
Sat Nav
3Taxonomy
Propulsion system
Flight control system
Imagery system
Airframe
Ground control station
Power source (battery
pack)
Communications system
Internal memory and
removable media.
*Additional payload not shown.Aircraft shown is Skwalker X8
Wingspan: 2.12m
Sat Nav
4Taxonomy
Threat/risk
1. The utility and versatility of sUAS mean that there is not a single clearly defined Defence
sUAS threat/risk.
2. sUAS related technology (including propulsion, guidance and power-source) is evolving at an
unprecedented pace. This is exacerbated by the hostile actors’ ability to ‘mod’, ‘hack’ and DIY.
3. In addition to technological evolution, the enemy has shown the ability to adapt to our
countermeasures incredibly fast.
4. The components of the battlefield ‘improvised’ threat are generated through a network.
5. sUAS commonly store a significant amount of information that can be exploited to attack the
network and generate countermeasures.
6. While specialist GBAD and ABAD capabilities are vital, the size, range and ubiquity of the
threat mean that C-sUAS is a self/Force Protection challenge.
5Observations
C-sUAS and Air Defence6Observations
GS GBAD
CS GBAD
FP
Joint Air Defence Target SetThreat/risk
Range
Com
ple
xity
Class 1a and 1b UAS (<2kg)
Class 1c UAS (2-20kg)
Rockets, Artillery and Mortars*
Class 1d UAS (20-150 kg)
Tactical Air-to-surface Missiles and munitions
Tactical UAS/RPAS (>150 kg)
Cruise Missiles
Attack Helicopters
Fixed-wing (manned)Aircraft
Short Range Ballistic
Missiles
Medium & Long
Range Ballistic
Missiles
ABAD Target Set
Ballistic Missile
Defence
CEMA Target Set
• GBAD capabilities fall under the C2 of the AD Cdr. GBAD engagements will require
authorisation by the AD Cdr because of the potential for significant air-space collateral damage.
• FP capabilities do not fall under the C2 of the AD Cdr. Nevertheless, certain engagements
may require authorisation by the AD Cdr because of potential (although far less significant) for
air-space collateral damage.
• To avoid gaps in capability, it is essential that all Air Defence capability development is
centrally coordinated.
7
7. Each environment has unique characteristics that will drive a spectrum of differing requirement priorities. This is likely to preclude a single capability solution. Commonalities in requirement will require close coordination.
The Spectrum of Defence C-sUAS FP Requirements
Observations
Defence S&T/R&D
8. Through necessity (customer demand), DSTL focussed considerable effort on assessing high
TRL, COTS/MOTS solutions to the detriment of its lower TRL projects.
9. The numerous technologies involved in potential C-sUAS solutions meant that Defence R&D
was incoherent, stove-piped and slow. This was exacerbated by a lack of direction from the Front
Line Commands.
The C-sUAS market (Industry)
10. Limited innovation by the Defence industry was hampered by an uninformed and inconsistent
customer. Defence has given Industry minimal direction, and has not made it clear who to talk to.
11. The cost of trials and demonstrations has led to Industry fatigue.
12. The market is saturated by companies making unsubstantiated claims about the capabilities of
their products.
8Observations
Potential ‘solutions’
13. C-sUAS effects can be delivered from surface, airborne (including sUAS) and space
based platforms.
14. Most of the current technological solutions on offer:
– Are unsuitable for the near-peer battlefield;
– Are ineffective in an urban environment;
– Are static in nature;
– Would be overmatched by a swarm/mass attack;
– Are operator intensive;
– Commonly rely on detecting and attacking active data links;
– Are unable to discern threats;
– Have a short range.
9Observations
Observations
The MOD
15. The nature of the threat and the range of technologies,
techniques and disciplines that can be used to defeat it, have
led to duplication of effort and conflicts over funding and
‘ownership’ of the problem set.
16. Duplication of C-sUAS effort has also occurred across
Govt, international partnerships and the Defence industry.
17. Until our C-sUAS core equipment programmes deliver,
the UK will rely on the Urgent Capability Requirement (UCR)
process, the current application of which is sub-optimal.
18. Our current approach to core equipment procurement is
insufficiently agile to match the tempo of threat evolution. (Figure 1)
19. The overlap between C-sUAS and sUAS development is
not being managed effectively. (Figure 2)
Figure 1.
Figure 2.
DCDS Mil Cap
Defence C-sUASWG
(Hd Jt Plans)
Policy
Global Issues
(AH BMD Pol)
MSE FP Pol
DSR
DCDC Legal
Understand
DI
(SO2 Land ISTAR)
Counter Threat Networks
MSE CTN
(SO1 Targets -Space)
Shape the Airspace
(Prevent ignorant and reckless use)
DSR
(AH Policing &
Phys Sy)
RAF Safety Centre
Cap Dev
Air Cap
JFC
MAB
Cap C4ISR (Land ISR)
Army
Cap GM
C-ISTAR
CEMA
Air Manoeuvre
Royal Navy
MarCap
Naval Support
RAF
Force Protection
ISTAR
Cyber
Def C-sUAS RICDSTL
C-UAS Air Hub
DE&SDefence
Innovation Unit
FP Trg & Doctrine
AWC
(SO1 Doctrine)
DCDC
MWC
LWC
RAF FP Centre
MTMC
Defeat the Device
UK CT Ops
PSyA Army
PSyA RAF
PSyA RN
Def Nuc Sy
8 RAF FP Wg
7 ADG
International Partners
US
(DTRA)
Australia
JCITTF
USAFE
C-sUAS Community of Interest
C-sUAS Rapid Innovation Cell
• A C-sUAS focussed cell within the UAS CDC.
• Formally established in Jan 19 (IOC by Mar 20), the RIC will deliver outputs including:
• The establishment and management of a single C-sUAS T&E protocol, compatible with international partners
(draft protocol agreed in principle with DTRA);
• Design and build a transportable Test and Evaluation Facility;
• Establishment of a Defence sUAS threat/signature library;
• The management of a ‘shared’ Defence database of tested C-sUAS systems (providing a UCR Accelerator
and support to Defence exports);
• The delivery of a regular assessment of the state of the art for C-sUAS technology as well as a development
forecast;
• Act as the single point of contact for C-sUAS industry (and Defence sUAS cap dev);
• The creation and maintenance of a Defence C-sUAS portal;
• In partnership with DSTL, the development of a published, common open architecture interface (SAPIENT),
threat library, data storage system and user interface;
• SME support to the FLCs as they develop specific CONEMPS, CONOPS etc.
• The RIC model is entirely dependent upon the support of the UK’s defence industry. Participation in RIC’s
T&E events relies on UK industry partners making a significant financial investment without an MOD
commitment to purchase their products.
• To make it worth their while, it is essential that the MOD, with the agreement of defence industry partners,
employs the database as an objective and credible source of information to support defence exports
wherever we can.
12
• The mission of the Hub is to develop, demonstrate and evaluate the military utility of
emerging technology and concepts to defeat advanced UAS.
• It provides unifying purpose, leadership and management of DSTL’s C-UAS related R&D
through its ‘sub-challenges’, which are formally endorsed by the Def C-sUAS Working
Group.
• The current sub-challenges are:
1. Multi-sensor and effector integration;
2. Incoming drone intent;
3. Neutralisation of Air/Ground (IDF) UAS networks;
4. Automated detect, track and identify;
5. C-UAS at extended range;
6. Post ECM effectors;
7. C-UAS “on the move”;
8. Swamping and Swarm defeat;
9. Urban DTI and defeat.
13Defence Science and Technology
Delegation of Responsibility
Exploitation
R&D
T&E
Procurement
Coordination
C-sUAS Capability Development
Wing Commander Rob Wilson
SO1 Force Protection Capability Development – HQ AIR
OFFICIAL
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A Briefing to C-sUAS Suppliers
Mr Peter Clarke
C-sUAS Equipmentfor UK MoD
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MoD C-sUAS Rapid Procurement Model
Tested
Equipment
List
Competition
UCR/EP
Requirement
Performance
Testing
Purchase
Testing of Mature Products for Future Procurements
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C-sUAS Equipment DLOD
Testing of Mature Products for Future Procurements
S&T to Address Technology Gaps
OCDs
Bristow
C-sUAS S&T Challenges
TRL 1-7
TRL 8-9
Tested
Equipment
List Catalogue of
Security
Equipment
Industry IRAD
Protected Base
Mobile Vehicle
Static Vehicle
Hunter/Killer Drone
Foot Patrol
Hunter/Killer Drone
Helicopter
Unattended
Devices
C-sUAS Rapid Innovation CellFramework Concept
MEANS
Regular Testing of 7 types of high TRL (COTS/MOTS) equipment:
1. C-sUAS equipment suitable for deployment on a Land base;
2. C-sUAS equipment suitable for deployment on a ship;
3. Man wearable/portable C-sUAS equipment suitable for urban and rural operations;
4. C-sUAS equipment on vehicles (on-the-move and static operations);
5. Hunter-killer C-sUAS drones;
6. Unattended C-sUAS equipment;
7. C-sUAS interventions from air/space platforms.
Def C-sUAS WG will prioritise equipment type(s) for each Test Cycle
(PJHQ during a phase of UCRs, then wider Defence for Core EPs)
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MoD C-sUAS Testing Process
Tested
Equipment List
Product
Questionnaire
Review of
Capability
Overarching
Procurement
Process
Announcement
Factory
Checks
Field Test &
Trial
Gain an understanding of - Product Maturity- Product Scope
Through Evidence Based Responses
Desired Equipment Type(e.g. Ship-based, manpack…)
• This process will be repeated• MoD-side activities are funded• Industry activity is unfunded• Core Ts & Cs to be agreed early in the process
Continuous
Market
Engagement
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Potential Candidates for Testing
Complete Integrated C-sUAS Systems
Components of C-sUAS Systems
Across all 7 equipment types/environments
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Potential Candidates for Testing
Complete Integrated C-sUAS Systems
Components of C-sUAS Systems, including:
• C2/Fusion processing
• Radar
• RF (ESM) Sensors/Systems
• EO/IR Cameras
• Video Processing (detection, tracking, classification)
• Lidar
• Acoustic
• RF Jammers
• Net Launchers
• Ammo/guns with specific C-sUAS applicability
• Laser dazzle
• High Power Laser & RF Weapons
• Other novel sensors & effectors
Across all 7 equipment types/environments
Compliant with a published* MoD Interface Specification
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Open Interface Specification for MoD C-sUAS Components
Network
C2, Tracking &
Fusion
Key: MoD Items
Industry Items
Sensors
UI
Threat Library /
Classifier
Database
Low Collateral
Effectors
….interfaces based upon the Dstl SAPIENT ICD
Industry Components will be tested in an Integrated System Environment
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Important Features of a C-sUAS System
1. High levels of automation
2. Rapidly Upgradeable
3. Open Libraries
4. Open Interfaces (MoD C-sUAS Interface Specification)
5. Excellent human factors – very simple to use by a non-specialist
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Ts&CsPublished
Testing Programme Timescales (May 19 – May 20)
Further Test cycles planned for 2020
Integration & Test Facility Prep
Dec 19
Industry Register an Interest (at any time)
Mar 20
Review &Factory Tests
Field Testing
May 20
Will include both Complete Systems + ComponentsWill not include Airborne and High Collateral Effectors
Tested
Equipment
List
Product
QuestionnaireC-sUAS ICD Published
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www.UASCDC.com
provided without prejudice or commitment
