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Introduction As polar sea ice melts, more non-Arctic states are turning their attention to the

Arctic with both interest and concern. The opening up of new shipping routes and

access to resources including oil and gas offers economic potential, however, melting

sea ice also contributes to global warming and rising sea levels which will have a global

impact. Unfortunately accessing the comic potential in the Arctic, transportation and

resource extraction in particular, and protecting the Arctic environment are two goals

which often conflict. It is Canada’s best interest to work towards finding a way to

balance the economic development of the Arctic and environmental protection in the

region; Canada’s acknowledges this in current Arctic domestic and foreign policy.

Canada must balance these ambitions with the need to maintain and protect its

sovereign territory. Growing interest in the Arctic from non-Arctic states has the potential

for collaboration or conflict and identifying these opportunities and risks is essential for

economic development, environmental protection, and sovereignty.

China’s White Paper on Arctic policy is the most recent development emerging

from China’s growing interest in the region. China is not the only non-state to show such

an interest, but its status as a world power and the size of its economy make it arguably

the most noteworthy. The Arctic region already has two superpowers, the United States

and Russia, and a third powerful state could diminish Canada’s influence in the region.

Conversely, China could be a powerful ally if China supports Canada in disputes in the

region. Yang argues that based on China’s economic and political power China can play

a “leading and coordinating role in peace-keeping, rationally handling contradiction

between state sovereignty and the common heritage of mankind, balancing between

interests of the Arctic countries and those of the non-Arctic countries, and protecting the

fragile Arctic environment and common home of mankind.”1. Based on the Arctic

policies of Canada and China there are overlaps with regards to policy goals and

principles, however, there is also a potential for disputes. Identifying these opportunities

for cooperation and preparing for potential disputes with China is essential for Canada’s

Arctic aspirations. This paper explores to opportunities for cooperation; the Port of

Churchill, which could benefit from Chinese investments, and scientific research.

1 Yang 46, 2015

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Policy China published a “white paper” to “expound its basic positions on Arctic affairs”

and “to elaborate on its policy goals, basic principles and major policies and positions

regarding its engagement in Arctic affairs.”2 As a non-Arctic state China acknowledges,

they have no rights to territorial sovereignty in the region but claims other rights

including rights to research, navigation, and resource exploration and exploitation. The

white paper claims China is an “important stakeholder in Arctic affairs” and states the

goals of China’s Arctic policy are “to understand, protect, develop and participate in the

governance of the Arctic, so as to safeguard the common interests of all countries and

the international community in the Arctic, and promote sustainable development of the

Arctic”.3 The policy paper claims China is committed to “the existing framework of

international law” and “addressing various traditional and non-traditional security threats

through global, regional, multilateral and bilateral mechanisms, and to building and

maintaining a just, reasonable”.4

In 2010 Canada published the Statement on Canada's Arctic Foreign Policy

which put a strong emphasis on exercising sovereignty as the “first and most important

pillar towards recognizing the potential of Canada’s Arctic.”5 This position is supported

by academics, including Hubert who argues “Canadian Arctic sovereignty is a

requirement to allow for Canadian Arctic security.”6 According to the 2010 statement

Canada envisions the Arctic as a “stable, rules-based region with clearly defined

boundaries, dynamic economic growth and trade, vibrant Northern communities, and

healthy and productive ecosystems.” Aside from exercising sovereignty, Canada’s

Arctic policy commits to promoting economic and social development, protecting the

Arctic environment and empowering the peoples of the North by improving and

devolving governance.

The Arctic policies published by Canada and China suggest multiple

opportunities for collaboration between the two states. Both states emphasize the

2 State Council Information Office, 20183 State Council Information Office, 20184 Ibid5 Government of Canada, 20106 Huebert 196, 2011

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importance of adhering to international law and respecting the sovereignty of the Arctic

states. Economic and social development of the region is also in the interest of and a

priority or both states according to their respective policies. Protecting the Arctic

environment is another area where the two policies overlap. Identifying these

commonalities is probably the easiest part of developing Arctic relations, how the two

states turn these words into actions will be more challenging.

The Port of Churchill: History and ContextOver a thousand kilometres north of Winnipeg, on the coast of the Hudson Bay,

there is a town that is home to 899 Manitobans and what used to be Canada’s only

Arctic deep-water port.7 Today Churchill faces many of the problems communities in

Canada’s North are struggling with; “inadequate infrastructure and resources needed to

maintain a functioning city in this climate; social problems resulting from isolation from

other communities; lack of access to health care and parental care; alcohol abuse; and

perceived social discrimination against indigenous populations.”8 All of these issues

must be addressed if Canada wishes to achieve the governments “vision for the north in

which self-reliant individuals live in healthy, vital communities, manage their own affairs

and shape their own destinies.”9

The harbour facilities in Churchill have been “occasionally utilized” since the 17th

century, and in 1670 the Hudson’s Bay Company established a trading post.10 In the

19th century, the idea of a deep-water port on the Hudson Bay was “conceived as a

great nation-building enterprise, a more direct route to Europe, and a strategic gateway

giving Canada an indisputable claim to the Arctic.”11 The townsite of Churchill itself was

“planned as an essential part of the port pattern”, however, indigenous peoples had

previously lived in the area.12

7 Stats Can8 Michel Montsion 308, 20159 Government of Canada 200910 Shrode 54,11 Scott Gilmore; Macleans12 Shrode 56, Michel Montsion 306

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Between the 1950s and 1980s shipments of grain from Churchill averaged at

573,000 tonnes per year, however, these numbers began to decline and continued to so

until the port’s closure in 2016.13 In 1937 Shrode claimed it was “improbable” that the

township of Churchill would ever be more than a “lonely frontier settlement” but in the

1960s Churchill experienced a natural resource extraction boom and a demographic

boom.14 Between 1961 and 1966 population growth reached almost 20 percent and,

port traffic was expected to increase by 40% by 1940.15 Unfortunately for the people of

Churchill, these predictions were incorrect and eighty-five years after the first shipment

of wheat left the port in 1931 the port was shut down and Canada lost it’s only Arctic

deep-water port.

The Port of Churchill and the Polar Silk RoadIn 2013 a Federal-Provincial Task Force identified a number of opportunities and

challenges facing Churchill. The report identified the opportunity to increase the volume

and variety of grain shipped through the port. To make the most of this opportunity

further investment in infrastructure and according to the report these investments could

come from international sources. The report goes on to say:

The end of the CWB monopoly has seen the emergence of new international

grain companies in Canadian markets. Many of these players do not own

assets on the West Coast or in the Great Lakes system, giving rise to

potential partnership opportunities with OmniTRAX, especially if their

business interests fall within the Churchill catchment area. As well, there

exists the potential for these players to construct new storage and handling

facilities at the port. The additional capacity could lead to increased exports

of bulk agricultural commodities.16

When the report was published, OmniTRAX owned all the handling and storage

facilities. The report claimed that if other companies invested in handling and storage

facilities “the owners would have a vested interest in shipping through the Port on an

13 Michel Montsion 30614 Shrode, 54, Michel Montsion 30815 Michel Montsion 30816 Federal-Provincial Task Force on the Future of Churchill 7, 2013

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ongoing basis rather than opportunistically.”17 A barrier to such investments, according

to the report, was the need for new investors to negotiate with OmniTRAX or build on

land outside of the privately-owned port and the “need to negotiate agreements for

access to both rail and Port services.” Now that OmniTrax has closed its force there is

no need to negotiate with OmniTRAX and even more of a need for investments.

Although this report predates the closure of the port by three years, it suggests an

openness to foreign investments in the Port of Churchill from the federal and provincial

governments.

The need for investment in transport infrastructure in Churchill was recognized

long before the 2013 Federal-Provincial Task Force report. In a 2002 study on the

sustainable development of Churchill Newton et al. claimed; “If the Hudson Bay Port

Company is to be sustainable in the future, it must increase its shipping.”18 Newton et al.

identified transportation and tourism as important sectors of the Churchill economy and

argued the both would benefit from improved port infrastructure.19 The Manitoban

government had previously shown interest in securing Chinese investments in the Port

of Churchill. In 2011 the Manitoban government met with consul general and other

officials from the Chinese consulate in Toronto and gave them a tour of the town and

port. The chairman of the board of the Churchill Gateway Development Corporation

Lloyd Axworthy said the Chinese officials were “interested.”20 While this visit did not

result in any Chinese investments in the port, it shows some degree of interest and

support from both governments.

China intends to “jointly build a "Polar Silk Road” in order to “facilitate

connectivity and sustainable economic and social development of the Arctic.”21 China

has already made a number of investments in road, rail and shipping infrastructure,

across North and Central Asia to facilitate this project. The Khorgos-Aktau railway,

which connects the Chinese city of Khrogos on the China-Kazakstan border to the

Caspian Sea port of Aktau, received investment from the Kazakhstani and Chinese

17 Ibid18 Newton et al. 28519 Ibid 20 Rabson, np21 State Council Information Office, 2018

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governments.22 In 2015 the state-controlled China Railway Group signed a contract with

Russia's state-owned JSC Russian Railways to build a 770 kilometer high-speed rail

between the Russian cities of Moscow and Kazan.23 China also played a significant role

in the development of the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway.24 The Khrogos

Gateway, “a dry port on the China-Kazakh border that is seen as a key cargo hub on

the new Silk Road”, received more than $600m over five years from China’s Jiangsu

province.25 China has committed to and followed through with its vision to invest in the

Polar Silk Road, including investments in infrastructure in other states.

China is very open to investing foreign ports and harbours to further it’s economic

and political goals. The Financial Times and Kings College London conducted a study

of China’s growing dominance of the sea and naval transportation. China owns or has

invested in ports on every continent.26 In 2010 one-fifth of world’s top 50 container ports

“had some degree of Chinese investment”, by 2015 this number had risen to two thirds.

Ports which have received Chinese investments have handled 67 per cent of global

container volumes.27 The furthest North any Chinese company has ventured with their

investments is Stockholm, and no investments have been made in Arctic ports.28

COSCO, a state-owned Chinese shipping company, “expressed strong interest in

developing an Arctic deep-water port on the Northern Dvina River.”29

The Port of Churchill and the natural resource opportunities in the surrounding

area may be an attractive investment opportunity for China. It would connect the Polar

Silk Road to North America, reducing the time and cost of shipping between the two

continents. Shipping times between Canada and major ports in Asia and Europe would

be significantly reduced by using the Northwest Passage. Using the Northwest Passage

would reduce shipping times by over 7,500km between Rotterdam and Yokohama,

3,500km between Shanghai and Rotterdam, and 3,850 kilometres between Shanghai

22 Farchy, Kynge, Campbell and Blood (How China rules the waves), 2017 23 Farchy, Kynge, Campbell and Blood (2016)24 Ibid25 Ibid26 Farchy, Kynge, Campbell and Blood (2017) 27 Ibid28 Ibid29 Sevunts, np.

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and New York.30 China predicted that 5 per cent of China’s international trade would be

using Arctic routes by 2020.31 Stephens argues that China “will not only want to play a

role in determining the future of Arctic shipping lanes but will demonstrate its capacity to

do so.”32 Chinese investments in the Port may also improve Chinese-Canadian relations

and help establish a partnership in the Arctic. Stephens argues the Northwest Passage

trade route has the potential to “alter, and improve, the course of Canada’s relations in

the Asia-Pacific region.”33

The success and growth of Chinese shipping companies relies on travel through

strategic chokepoints and, according to the director of the Quebec Council of

Geopolitical Studies Frédéric Lasserre, China may have concerns about the U.S.

blocking their access due to a political incident or conflict.34 China has run into a number

of conflicts with Asian states over their naval actions and Ping and Lanteigne claim that

these conflicts are further incentives to pursue Arctic shipping.35 Lasserre claims

China’s interest in the Arctic is one way for them to “diversify its portfolio of trade

routes.”36 Byers sees potential for Chinese investments in resource industries in Russia

or Canada’s Arctic lands.37 The Chinese-owned Nunavik Nickel Mine in Quebec shows

China’s openness to investing in Canada’s North.38

The Port of Churchill, China and National Security While foreign investment could help develop infrastructure in the North, it must

be done with caution with regards to national security. China has not invested in ports

around the world for purely economic motivations; there is an “inherent duality” to

China’s investments according to Abhijit Singh, a senior fellow at the Observer

Research Foundation in New Delhi. Singh claims China’s investments “are ostensibly

commercial but quickly upgradeable to carry out essential military missions.”39

30 Stephens, 331 Stephens, 432 Stephens, 633 Stephens, 134 Sevunts, 2017 35 Ping and Lanteign 836 Sevunts, 201737 Sevunts, 201738 Sevunts, 201739 Farchy, Kynge, Campbell and Blood (2017)

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In 2012 state-owned China Merchants Group invested nine billion dollars in the

Port of Djibouti. These investments funded a variety of infrastructure upgrades including

“the construction of a liquefied natural gas terminal, a wharf for livestock and a trade

logistics park.”40 Four years later Beijing began the construction of an overseas military

base in Djibouti.41 A spokesperson for China’s foreign ministry claimed the naval base

was “necessary to have nearby and efficient logistical support” for Chinese vessel

deployed in the region.The Port of Gwadar in Pakistan is a similar to the Djibouti case.

The port is owned, financed and built by China and, although there is no plan for a

permanent Chinese naval base, “Chinese traffic both commercial and naval will grow to

this region”, according to a senior Pakistani diplomat.42 Research conducted by the

Financial Times identified seven ports that China is using as “dual purpose” ports for

commercial and naval purposes, four of these were “confirmed” and three were

“possible.”43 Aside from Gwadar and Djibouti, the other confirmed dual purpose ports

are located in Seychelles and the South China Sea atolls. China has also acquired a

controlling stake in one of Europe’s largest ports, Port of Piraeus in Greece and has

“signalled a merging of commercial and strategic agendas”, in 2015 the port hosted a

Chinese warship.44

It is reasonable for Canadians, especially those living in the Arctic, to be

concerned about the national security implications of foreign investment. Although the

port was previously owned by an American company, the nature of China’s political and

economic system and the pattern of behaviours with regards to Chines investment and

ownership of ports represent a different set of concerns than the previous owners.

These concerns should be taken into account by both the federal and provincial

governments. Despite these concerns, there is reason to believe that investment in the

Port of Churchill is unlikely to follow the pattern of the ports of Gwadar, Piraeus and

Djibouti. Pakistan, Greece and Djibouti have weaker economies than Canada, making

foreign investment a more attractive option even if it may potentially compromise

national security. The Port of Churchill is located on Hudson Bay which is considered

40 Ibid41 Ibid42 Farchy, Kynge, Campbell and Blood (2017) 43 Ibid44 Ibid

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Canadian internal waters by “historic title.” The ports of Gwadar, Piraeus and Djibouti

are closer to international waters which makes them more useful for strategic or naval

purposes. Canada has made it explicitly clear through their existing Arctic policy that

protecting and promoting Canadian sovereignty is a fundamental part of Canada’s

Arctic policy. Similarly China has committed to respecting the sovereignty of the Arctic

states.

If Canada accepts foreign investment in the Port of Churchill, Chinese or

otherwise, Canada can maintain it’s sovereignty by investing infrastructure that

promotes Canadian sovereignty. Stephens argues that “for Canada to play a meaningful

role with Asia based on its Arctic presence, it will need to invest in building the

infrastructure in the North that will allow it to exercise sovereignty through providing vital

services like meteorological forecasting and search and rescue.”45 These sort of

investments are necessary for the safety and wellbeing of Arctic communities

regardless of the status of the Port. Stephen acknowledges that Canada cannot

influence the “rate of sea-ice reduction or the weather, [or] the geography” of the

Northwest Passage but they can “make the necessary investments so that human

infrastructure is in place to complement whatever changes nature may bring.”46 These

sort of investments are not just needed to protect Canadian sovereignty but also

contribute to other aspects of Canada’s Arctic vision including promoting economic and

social development, protecting the environment, and improving governance.

Alternative Opportunities of Cooperation The Port of Churchill is not the only opportunity for Canadian-Chinese

collaboration in the Arctic. There are a number of areas of research which may interest

both states including climate change, environmental protections, natural resources and

transportation feasibility. Both states are involved wit the Arctic Council and have

acknowledged it’s importance in their respective policies. Given Canada’s history of

using international organizations to promote Canadian foreign policy, peace and

diplomacy the Arctic Council is another opportunity for Canadian-Chinese cooperation.

45 Stephens 1446 Ibid, 15

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China has acknowledged the importance of understanding how climate change

will effect the Arctic and protecting the Arctic environment in it’s Arctic Policy and there

is an Arctic element to China’s climate policy. According to Heggelund “an Arctic

dimension exists in domestic climate policy, although the link is not direct.”47 A sizeable

body of scientific literature shows “the Arctic region as having great influence on China’s

climate, environment, agricultural production, as well as economic and social

development.”48 Many of Asia’s major cities are located along coastlines or on river

deltas which makes them particularly vulnerable to sea level rising.49 The Organization

for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) published a report which

identified the top 20 port cities that will be affected by coastal flooding by 2070 and four

of these were in China.50 Although melting sea ice is a one of the reasons for China’s

growing interest in the Arctic as it opens up new shipping routes it may also create

problems for China. It is in all states best interests to have a better understanding of

how the melting sea ice may affect the global climate and therefor there is an incentive

for China to engage in climate change focused research.

Engaging with China on research could help both states and the region at large

better prepare for future challenges and is a likely be less controversial then acceptation

Chinese investments in Canadian infrastructure. Goodsite et al. argue that it could

promote peace in the region because “where there is scientific collaboration, there is

less risk of military conflict and that the Arctic.”51 Goodsite et al. claim that research

centres can minimize “conflict potential in the Arctic under conditions of a triad of

climate change, globalization and geopoltics.”52 Goodsite et al. specifically point out the

importance of engaging with Asian states on Arctic research, arguing that “Arctic

science plays an important role in integrating rising Asian powers in the region in a non-

conflictual and non-provoking way.”53

China’s history of Arctic research predates both it’s Arctic Policy and joining of

the Arctic Council. Scientific research has made up most of China’s involvement in the

47 Heggelund et al,, 14348 Ibid,14049 Ho, 3550 Ibid, 3751 Goodsite et al. 64552 Ibid 64353 Goodsite et al. 648

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Arctic and the majority of that research has focused on environmental issues China’s

environmental research has focused on aerial physics, climate change, ecology, and

marine aspects.54 In 2004 they established the Yellow River Station in Svalbard and

China has complete five successful multidisciplinary research expeditions.55 The State

Oceanic Administration launched a research project in 2007 which focused on several

areas including climate change and the 12th Five Year Plan released by the

government included a “special project of comprehensive investigation and evaluation

of the Antarctic and Arctic environment, the largest study in China’s three-decade

history of polar studies.”56

China’s history of Arctic research has included a considerable amount of

collaboration with other Arctic states, intergovernmental organizations and non-

governmental organizations. As a non-Arctic state a certain amount of cooperation is

often necessary for China to engage in research; permission from a coastal state is

necessary for marine science research according to the UNCLOS (Art. 238). At the

2011 International Berlin Conference on Arctic issues, which focused on Arctic Science,

International Law and Climate Change, the Executive Director of China Institute for

Marine Affairs and Judge of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, Dr, Gao,

discussed China’s perspective on marine science research (MSR). Dr. Gao recognized

the importance of the international law provided by UNCLOS but also emphasized the

importance of access to MSR to non-Arctic states.57 In addition to the cooperation

necessary under international law China and Chinese researchers has been invited to,

joined, and contributed to various intergovernmental and non-governmental

organizations with a focus on research. In 1996 China joined the Arctic Science

Committee, and NGO “composed of international science groups participating in Arctic

scientific research” and in 2005 they were invited to join Ålesund Science Managers

Committee, an organization “enhance cooperation and coordination between research

activities in Ny-Ålesund.”58

54 Heggelund et al. 14155 Ibid, 14256 Ibid, 14357 Wasum-Rainer, 15458 Ibid, 144

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The opportunities for cooperation on environmental research are not tied to a

specific location like the Port of Churchill, however, Churchill already has a research

community and facilities available. The Churchill Northern Studies Centre, founded in

1976, is an independent, non-profit research and education facility. The centre provides

accommodation, logistical support and educational programming to researchers. In

other Arctic states local communities that have opposed Chinese investments in

commercial projects have been open to engaging with China on research. Nubo Huang,

a Chinese real estate developer, expressed an interest in developing a tourist resort in

North-East Iceland which was met with “enormous uproar in Iceland and wild

speculation of covert Chinese naval installations.”59 In the same region the two states

are “cooperating harmoniously on establishing the China-Iceland Aurora Observatory.” 60 Sino-Canadian research collaboration based out of Churchill could increase and

diversify employment opportunities. If Churchill becomes a home for international

collaboration on research the increase in population and infrastructure development

necessary to facilitate research could contribute to the local economy.

(Working) ConclusionThe growing interest of non-Arctic states in the Arctic has caused some concern

amongst Arctic states. China has not been exception to this and has arguably caused

the most concern. A significant amount of Canada’s territory is in the Arctic, it is

important to Canada’s national identity and it is home to many of Canada’s indigenous

population; given all these factors the security, sustainability and wellbeing of the Arctic

is incredibly important to Canada. As more states, and states more powerful than

Canada, turn their attention to the Arctic Canada must be prepared. In December 2016

Justin Trudeau announced a new Arctic Policy Framework would be developed in the

upcoming years. In order to develop this framework the federal government is engaging

in discussions with with Indigenous, territorial and provincial partners. One of the goals

of this process is to identify opportunities to for partnerships with a variety of groups,

including non-Arctic states.

59 Goodsite et al. 64960 Ibid

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Given China’s interests in the Arctic and Canada’s opens to working partnering

with non-Arctic states Canada should remain open to the possibility of Chinese

investment in Canadian Arctic infrastructure. Canada must do so with a a degree of

caution given China’s pattern of blurring the lines between economic and strategic

developments. Any foreign investment, Chinese or otherwise, should only be accepted

if it is not a risk to national security or a threat to Canada’s sovereignty. Local

communities, indigenous peoples and the environment should all be considered when

considering foreign investments.

Another way in which Canada could engage with China in the Arctic is through

research and environmental protection. This less controversial opportunity would not

just benefit the two states but could help all Arctic and non-Arctic states better

understand the Arctic, climate change and environmental protection. Although pursuing

this opportunity may be less likely to face pushback the same considerations should be

taken into account. National security and Arctic sovereignty and the needs of local

communities and indigenous peoples should be considered when deciding how to

pursue scientific cooperation.

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Works Cited Goodsite, M. E., Bertelsen, R. G., Pertoldi-Bianchi, S. C., Ren, J., Watt, L. V., & Johannsson, H. (2015). The role of science diplomacy: a historical development and international legal framework of arctic research stations under conditions of climate change, post-cold war geopolitics and globalization/power transition. Journal of Environmental Studies and Sciences,6(4), 645-661. doi:10.1007/s13412-015-0329-6

Government of Canada; Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada. (2018, February 19). Toward a new Arctic Policy Framework. Retrieved from https://www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/1499951681722/1499951703370

Heggelund, G. et al. (2016). China’s climate policy: does an Arctic dimension exist? In Advances in Polar Science

Ho, J. (2011). The Arctic Meltdown and Its Implication for Ports and Shipping in Asia. In Arctic Security in an Age of Climate Change (pp. 33-43). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Huebert, R. (2011). Canada and the Newly Emerging International Arctic Security Regime. Arctic Security in an Age of Climate Change. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Kynge, J., Campbell, C., Kazmin, A., & Bokhari, F. (2016, September 13). One belt, one road. Financial Times. Retrieved from https://ig.ft.com/sites/special-reports/one-belt-one-road/

Kynge, J., Campbell, C., Kazmin, A., & Bokhari, F. (2017, January 12). How China Rules the Waves. Financial Times. Retrieved from https://ig.ft.com/sites/china-ports/

Lasserre, F. (2010). China and the Arctic: Threat or Cooperation Potential for Canada. In China Papers.

Rabson, M. (2011). Manitoba looks to China to save Port of Churchill. In The National Post. Retrieved from nationalpost.com/news/canada/manitoba-looks-to-china-to-save-port-of-churchill

Sevunts, L. (2016). China’s Arctic Road and Belt Gambit. In Radio Canada International. Retrieved from: http://www.rcinet.ca/eye-on-the-arctic/2016/05/18/arctic-shipping-canada-trade-asia/

State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, “China’s Arctic Foreign Policy,” 26 January 2018, available at: http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-01/26/c_136926498.htm

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Stephens, H. (2016). The Opening of the Northern Sea Routes: The Implications for Global Shipping and for Canada’s Relations with Asia. In The School of Public Policy Research Papers. University of Calgary Press.

Wasum-Rainer, S., Winkelmann, I., & Tiroch, K. (2012). Arctic science, international law and climate change: legal aspects of marine science in the Arctic Ocean: papers from the international conference at the German Federal Foreign Office in cooperation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland, Berlin, 17/18 March 2011. Heidelberg: Springer.

Yang, J. (2015). The Arctic Governance and the Interactions between Arctic and Non-Arctic Countries. In Asian countries and the Arctic future (pp. 35-50). New Jersey: World Scientific.