Cover Page

1Back to Top

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

*BVMN is a network of watchdog organisations active in Greece and the Western Balkans including No NameKitchen, Rigardu, Are You Syrious, Mobile Info Team, Disinfaux Collective, Josoor, [re:]ports Sarajevo, InfoKolpa,Centre for Peace Studies, Mare Liberum, IPSIA, Collective Aid and Fresh Response.

F E B R U A R YR E P O R T2 0 2 1

In February 2021, the Border Violence Monitoring Network Network (BVMN)* collected 44 tes-timonies, accounting for the experience of 1133 people pushed back across borders in theBalkans. This report highlights the latest trends related to migration policing, offering aneye-level analysis of violent borders all the way from Turkey to Italy.

A particular feature of pushbacks during February was the use of urban policing as a meansof capturing and initiating removals. This report analyses pushbacks started from inlandcities in Albania and Hungary, showing how private accommodation sites are the target ofviolent raids which feed directly into cross-border pushbacks. Meanwhile, reception condi-tions in countries such as Serbia provide an adjoining analysis, showing the way the policingof urban spaces and internal transit represent an extension of border violence.

Reports from last month depict a continually high level of police violence and physical deter-rence at transit points across the region. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, respondents reported beingattacked by Croatian officers who had entered the territory illegally across the green border.Meanwhile, the fatal weaponization of the border landscape also continues, with a furtherdrowning occurring on the Glina river which sits between the two countries. Within thebroader context of adapted geography, this report also looks at fixed border installations likethe fence in Evros, discussing the way Greek defences, and repression on the Turkish side ofthe border, are driving more precarious river crossings.

Internal violence targeting people-on-the-move also persisted throughout February. A hor-rific attack carried out by members of the public in the Bosnian city of Bihać was the mostalarming example of this, and illustrated the way types of violence are being broadcast togarner anti-immigrant sentiment. These overt incidents connect up with a web of other at-tacks and infringements, as seen with the systematic squat clearances carried out in Februaryin the Una Sana Canton. This report also looks at the way mass evictions are a tool of internalbordering in Greece, seen in the recent targeting of asylum seeker accommodation.

In line with the updates from the land route, the report also looks at the physical and struc-tural violations being faced by people at maritime crossing points. Focus is given to both thesituation in regards to Adriatic pushbacks, and the internal process of racial profiling on fer-ries leaving Samos to mainland Greece. Alongside this is a glossary of testimonies recordedin the last month and a critical update on criminalisation of activists in Trieste.

2Back to Top

1 Executive Summary

3 General3 Reporting network3 Methodology3 Terminology3 Abbreviations

4 Trends in Border Violence4 Serious injury during Hungarian pushback5 Mass expulsions from Durrës, Albania6 Maritime removals to Patras7 Border incursions near Izačić

8 Update on the Situation8 Serbia

Internal transit loops

9 Bosnia-HerzegovinaSquat clearances and police violenceViolent attack in Bihać

11 CroatiaDrowning in the Glina river

12 ItalyActivists in Trieste criminalised

12 GreeceEvictions of accommodation across GreeceSamos: Unlawful travel bans and racial profiling

14 TurkeyDevelopments at the Greek-Turkish land border

15 Glossary of Reports, February 2021

17 Network Structure and Contact

TABLE OF CONTENTS

3Back to Top

REPORTING NETWORKBVMN is a collaborative project betweenmultiple grassroots organisations and NGOsworking along the Western Balkan Route andGreece, documenting violations at bordersdirected towards people-on-the-move. Themembers have a common website database,used as a platform to collate testimonies ofillegal pushbacks which are gatheredthrough interviews.

ABBREVIATIONSBiH - Bosnia and HerzegovinaHR - CroatiaSRB - SerbiaSLO - SloveniaROM - RomaniaHUN - HungaryITA - ItalyBGR - BulgariaMNK - North MacedoniaGRK - GreeceTUR - TurkeyEU - European Union

TERMINOLOGYThe term pushback is a key component ofthe situation that unfolded along the EUborders (Hungary and Croatia) with Serbia in2016, after the closure of the Balkan route.Push-back describes the informal expulsion(without due process) of an individual orgroup to another country. This lies in con-trast to the term “deportation”, which isconducted in a legal framework. Push-backshave become an important, if unofficial, partof the migration regime of EU countries andelsewhere.

METHODOLOGYThe methodological process for these inter-views leverages the close social contact thatwe have as independent volunteers withrefugees and migrants to monitor push-backs at multiple borders. When individualsreturn with significant injuries or stories ofabuse, one of our violence reporting volun-teers will sit down with them to collect theirtestimony. Although the testimony collec-tion itself is typically with a group no largerthan five persons, the pushback groupswhich they represent can be as large as 50persons. We have a standardised frameworkfor our interview structure which blends thecollection of hard data (dates, geo-loca-tions, officer descriptions, photos of in-juries/medical reports, etc.) with open nar-ratives of the abuse.

GENERAL

4Back to Top

In February, BVMN members collected a tes-timony of a pushback involving a 23 year oldman from Iran who sustained a serious injuryto his leg during a police raid of the hotelwhere he was staying in Budapest (see 1.2).The respondent reported that he broke hisleg after jumping out of a window while try-ing to avoid apprehension by the Hungarianpolice. Officers stormed the accommodationat midnight, detaining around 20 people-on-the-move during the process with the use ofphysical violence. Unable to walk due to thefall, the injured respondent managed to hideat the rear of the building, before returningto his hotel room. Upon return he was forcedby the staff to pay for another night and forthe door lock broken by the officers duringthe raid.

The raiding of hotels suspected of hostingpeople-on-the-move seems to be an in-creasing practice across the region, as ana-lysed in another section of this report re-garding pushbacks from Albania. However,many specifics of the practice remain un-known and may vary across countries and lo-calities. In particular, it is unclear whetherhotel owners and landlords cooperate di-rectly with the police. What can be said is thatthese raids do bear many similarities to theforms of aggressive urban policing used byborder agencies across Europe in order to ar-rest, detain and remove undocumented peo-ple. While this urban aspect of pushbacks hasnot been previously explored in depth, re-search into fatalities caused by authoritiescarrying out formal deportations, such as theUK Border Force, show similar levels of severeinjury and death - with multiple incidents ofpeople jumping from windows or committingsuicide in order to evade capture and depor-tation.

In this recent case, despite evading the firstraid, the Hungarian police reportedly cameback two hours later, and escorted the re-spondent in an ambulance to Péterfy hospi-tal. Upon arrival, and in the presence of atranslator, the respondent asked for asylumand was told by the police officer:

“there is no asylum in Hungary”.The respondent was then examined and keptin the ward for three days, under constantguard of two police officers who confiscatedhis mobile devices. The respondent de-scribed how the officers present were gate-keepers to his care, and the doctors in theward had to ask their permission every timethey administered any medication. Afterthese three days, he was told that he neededsurgery. When he stated that he did not havethe financial means to cover the cost, he waspushed back to Serbia the next morning andmade to pay for crutches on the way to theborder.

Pushbacks of people in need of medical careare not isolated events and have been docu-mented by BVMN before, including the caseof a Moroccan man who was sent back toTurkey through the Evros river while he hadlarge pieces of exposed metal bolted in hisleg and was in need of further surgery. Thesereports raise questions about the role ofother civil institutions and societal actors inthe border regime. In particular, the invasionof medical spaces is of grave concern be-cause it may prompt vulnerable populationsto no longer seek life-saving medical sup-port. Combined with the attacks on hotels,the transit landscape and access to supportis increasingly weighted against people-on-the-move.

TRENDS IN BORDER VIOLENCESERIOUS INJURY DURING HUNGARIAN PUSHBACK

5Back to Top

MASS EXPULSIONS FROM DURRËS, ALBANIAIn February, BVMN also documented anemerging trend of hotel raids by the Albanianpolice, resulting in the pushback of groups toGreece. Based on multiple testimonies (see8.1, 8.2, & 8.3) involving approximately 200people, these events occurred in Durrës, aport city in western Albania. The cases evi-dence a strong pattern: at dawn, Albanianpolice arrive at the hotel, all people-on-the-move are cleared from the building, they areplaced into vans, brought to an informal siteon the Greek-Albanian border and pushedback.

The location at the centre of this practice, re-ferred to as the “Atlin Hotel”, appears to pro-vide low-cost lodging to people-on-the-move in the southern part of Durrës. Particu-larly in the winter months, access to suchaffordable shelter (reportedly a four-personroom costs €10.00 per night) is a vital life-line; offering warmth, electricity, and washingfacilities.

But in recent weeks this seemingly safe spacehas been upended. During the evictions, Al-banian police officers assemble in large num-bers and ready vans to load the hotel guests,alluding to the premeditated nature of theoperations. The police then seize people-on-the-move staying inside, rushing their exitand denying them time to gather their winterclothing, sleeping bags, money and evenpassports.

The catalyst for these acts remains unclear,though one respondent subject to a raid saidlocal law enforcement were acutely aware of

the hotel as a hosting space, and that priorinterventions had been made to remove cer-tain people-on-the-move seen as disruptive.Another respondent also alleged that theowner of the hotel was in direct contact withthe police, though as with the cases in Hun-gary this link is uncorroborated.

What is explicitly clear, is the violent outcomeof the raids. Groups removed from Durrës re-port being driven to mountainous areas onthe Greek-Albanian border and pushed back.One group of eight people ejected in this waydescribed trekking through the snow in T-shirts for three days, after being abandonedby Albanian officers. As BVMN has previouslyexplored in other border locations, this mim-ics a broader weaponisation of geographyagainst transit communities which placesthem at direct risk of hypothermia.

Violence punctuates every part of these inci-dents: whether it be the unannounced policeraids, collective expulsion at the green bor-der, or the long return journey within Greecewithout proper clothing. Perhaps most dis-couraging is the destabilisation of supposedspaces of respite (such as hotels/private ac-commodation), yet another example of theextension of pushbacks from the immediateborder area into the urban interior. Interro-gating these alterations in civilian architec-ture, and their growing role in policing andsurveillance, is key to understanding the waypushbacks interlock with other spheres ofpolicing and repression against people-on-the-move.

Port of Durrës on the Adriatic coast (Source:Exit News)

6Back to Top

MARITIME REMOVALS TO PATRASIn Patras, starting from the beginning of thenew year, there have been some changes es-pecially regarding attempted border cross-ings to Italy, the repression of these acts, andconsequently also in the approach of transitcommunities to this practice. In fact, sinceJanuary, the number of people reaching Italyhas drastically decreased, with one 20 daywindow seeing only three successful cross-ings. The cause of this is related to a resur-gence of the repressive tactics used insidethe port by Greek authorities, which in turnhas generated a climate of general fear andinsecurity. In some cases this has also led toan increase in registrations or asylum re-quests within Greece by the transit commu-nity in Patras, prompted by a growing con-cern over the viability of crossings in theAdriatic.

Even within the lull in crossings, a pushbackfrom Bari to Patras was recorded in February(see 7.1). The respondent, an Afghan minor,was able to disembark the “Superfast” ship hehad boarded in Greece, but on arrival wasstopped by Italian police in a park in the cityof Bari. He was searched by officers and iden-tified by means of his white card issued inGreece. After this, the minor was detained inthe police station for a short time, and forcedto sign documents in Italian without thepresence of a translator. Despite asking forasylum the respondent was ignored, and feltthat the officers took advantage of his inabil-ity to speak English.

In recent weeks, there has been a partialshift, with the later part of February seeingmore people attempting and achieving cross-ings. Yet this outlook has also been temperedby the alleged continuation of deep interior

pushbacks from the western port cities ofGreece to Turkey. Anecdotal evidence sharedby one minor states that in recent months,more people have been seized in the port ofIgoumenitsa and driven east across the Greekmainland to Turkey. It is also suggested thatsome people impacted in this process havealso been subject to prior returns from Italy,making these events lengthy chain push-backs. The risk of apprehension and removalto Turkey from the west of Greece has prece-dence, with a case from May 2020 detailingthe way people in Igoumenitsa were pushedback, even those with white cards.

Superfast vessel docked on the Adriatic sea(Source:BVMN)

7Back to Top

BORDER INCURSIONS NEAR IZAČIĆDespite increasing violence and pushbacksalong the Croatian border, people-on-the-move in Bihać (BiH) still try to cross in searchof a better life in the EU. On 21st February agroup were attempting such a journey, andhad stopped for a break in the forest close tothe border area in Izačić, intending to wait fornightfall. At dusk they were startled by agunshot and saw a dozen Croatian policeofficers in black uniforms and balaclavas en-tering Bosnian territory from three differentpoints. The group, frightened by the gun-shots, fled back towards Bihać, leaving alltheir personal belongings behind. Accordingto the respondent the officers, whoʼs uni-forms matched the description of Interventnadivision, captured two persons from thegroup before they could escape and beatthem inside of Croatian territory. The re-spondent stated that the two people had re-turned to their squat in the following days,and bore serious physical injuries from theultimate pushback.

This is not the first time that there have beenincidents where Croatian police have madeincursions into Bosnian territory. In 2019,local citizens of the Poljana area reportedCroatian officers firing guns across the bor-der while chasing a group of 27 people-on-the-move. A BVMN report, which corrobo-rated an investigation by news portal Zurnal,

also showed armed officers chasing transitgroups across the border, leading to an al-tercation with the BiH police. In an even moreovert transgression, the presence of Croatianpolice officers in civilian clothes was reportedin the area of Cazin. Despite the fact thatcurrent law states that no foreign police offi-cer, in an official vehicle, may enter BiH terri-tory unannounced, such incidents often oc-cur with little action taken against theCroatian authorities.

In contrast to these earlier cases, the latestincursion of Croatian officers into Bosnianterritory marks a new escalation of pushbackpractices. Rather than pushing people-on-the-move into Bosnian territory, it appearsthat Croatian authorities carried out a “pre-emptive” pushback. In the process, HR policenot only violated Bosnian territory before anyborder crossing had taken place, but they, ina bitter irony, appeared to have brought peo-ple-on-the-move into Croatian territory inorder to physically harm them before push-ing them back. The practice of the Croatianpolice to selectively enforce and ignore bor-der ʻrulesʼ in order to facilitate the EUʼ exclu-sionary regime, often in blatant violation ofinternational law, is a clear sign that theserules primarily serve to reinforce existingpower structures.

8Back to Top

UPDATE ON THE SITUATIONSERBIAINTERNAL TRANSIT LOOPS

It is not hard to spot who, among the people-on-the-move who gather in Park LukeĆelovića in Belgrade, Serbia, has recentlycome back from the Romanian border. Somehave walked for 24-36 hours, their shoes areworn away, and their trousers are covered inmud. Others return to Belgrade with taxisthat were waiting for them in Serbian townsalong the border and charge extortionateamounts of money for a ride back to the city.Few have jackets, as the Romanian police of-ten take them and even burn them (see 2.1),before pushing them back to Serbia. All showsigns of exhaustion and fatigue.

No matter how traumatic the pushback theywere subject to, the goal remains to recuper-ate as fast as possible and return to the bor-der again. Among other things, this involvesobtaining a jacket and an appropriate pair ofshoes, as well as a phone (for those who canafford it). Those with the means to do so maytry the “game” twice a week. Making theprocess of pushbacks all the more cyclicaland draining.

In the intervening period, people take whatrest they can in improvised shelters aroundthe city. A large number of the transit groupsin Park Luke, and around the bus station ofBelgrade, prefer to stay out of official camps.Most of them defer to squats around thepark, or even under bridges, for the few daysthat are necessary to recover the inventory ofitems stolen or destroyed by the Romanianpolice.

This turn-around is not quick, however, forpeople that suffered injuries at the border -often causing lasting damage to their mobil-ity. Unfortunately, it is not rare to see brokenfeet or leg injuries, which force people intoextended stays in Belgrade. With extremelynarrow access to healthcare, recovery is oftenonly partial, and longer and more painfulthan it should be. Material deprivation, lackof adequate accommodation, barriers to in-ternal transit and lack of medical support allform contours of the slow violence of push-backs, which makes itself felt long after theincident.

Luke Ćelović Park in Belgrade (Source: zvucnamapabeograda)

9Back to Top

SQUAT CLEARANCES AND POLICE VIOLENCEAt sunrise on 24 February, in Bihać, anotherlarge eviction took place by local specialforces in coordination with the Service forForeign Affairs of BiH (SFA). Special Forcesofficers went to two abandoned buildings,known as “Krajina Metal” and the “Dom Pen-sioniera”, with black vans, police jeeps andfive buses, removing hundreds of people whohad been using them as temporary shelter.About 200 people were transferred to campLipa, which since the fire in December, hasnow come under direct management of theSFA.

Una Sana Canton (USC) police spokesperson,Ale Šiljdedić, stated that the relocation toLipa was action was taken to ensure betterliving conditions for the transit communityforced to live in dilapidated structures.Šiljdedić added that people will be housed atthe Lipa camp "where they are provided withhot meals, clothes and shoes, and living con-ditions in heated areas, medical care andpersonal hygiene areas". But conditions in

camp Lipa are no better than in the squats.The camp is overcrowded, many tents lackbeds and the meals provided are insufficient.In terms of sanitary conditions there is also amajor deficit, with only a dozen chemical toi-lets for more than a thousand people. Butaside from the poor amenities, the camp alsoembodies a lack of autonomy that leads manyto reside in squats - not least to avoid thecontrol of access, space and resources by theSFA and police.

Those taken to Lipa in late February wereheld in an area near the SFA office, whilesome were registered for camp ID cards. Butby late morning on the same day, most hadtaken the road to Bihać and returned to thesquats. However, observers noted that in theaftermath, a significant rise in controls hadbeen implemented. For instance, the aban-doned factory of Krajina Metal, was con-trolled for days by local police and SpecialForces who prevented journalists, humani-tarian organisations and activists from enter-ing.

BOSNIA-HERZEGONIVA

Special police evicting people from Dom Pensioniera in central Bihać (Source:Altreconomia)

10Back to Top

While the scale of these evictions was signifi-cant, they are neither new nor isolated inci-dents. Across the border area, people-on-the-move face continual pressure on theiraccess to shelter, with many cases of policeviolence occurring during raids on aban-doned buildings. One incident recorded byBVMN from 21st January illustrates theseabuses. A group of 17 men and one minor(from Yemen and Morocco) were waiting inan abandoned house in the border area, rest-ing before continuing onto Croatia. Sud-denly, two police cars arrived, carrying twoBosnian officers in dark uniforms and twoplain clothes officers. The officers orderedthe inhabitants of the house to each pay 50€, before stealing their power banks andphones – the good ones the police put intotheir own pockets, the bad ones they de-stroyed. The officers also searched the peo-ple for weapons and found one nail clipperowned by the minor. The respondent de-scribed how the officers punished him forhaving this “weapon” by beating him to thepoint where he reportedly lost conscious-ness. When his companions asked to assist

the minor, the officers denied the supportand shouted “We will finish you!”, whilepointing handguns at the group.

The inhabitants were then ordered to un-dress and lay down on the floor, with theirhands folded behind their heads. Lying inthis position, the police started beating themon the back with fists and batons. Whilebeating and insulting the people on the floor,the respondent said that the police officerswere dancing and singing, deriving enjoy-ment from the situation.

“After the police were gone, we laidthere for 15 more minutes withoutmoving because we were so afraid thatif we started moving, they would comeback at us and punish us for moving”.These incidents show that eviction practicesare not meant to provide vulnerable popula-tions with more sustainable living arrange-ments, but are better understood as violencedesigned to make life unbearable for people-on-the-move.

VIOLENT ATTACK IN BIHAĆOn 10th February 2021, two men were bru-tally attacked in Bihać by a local group whosemembers claimed to be “taking revenge” fora clash that had occurred earlier betweenmembers of the transit community and localpeople. Alvir Gverić was among the localpeople involved in the prior fight, and hisbrother, Mirhad Gverić, was alleged to havebeen looking for “justice” when he led agroup of others in this horrific ambush. Ac-cording to the investigators, Mirhad Gverićalready had a criminal record, having beenpreviously convicted and prosecuted for “vi-olent behavior,” and “attempts to smugglemigrants.”

In a video taken by the aggressors and de-scribed in the article by Istraga, it is possibleto identify “at least five people beating twomigrants, who are begging for help, withtheir fists, legs and batons.” “ʻYou're going tobeat our children,ʼ the man said,” whilerecording one of the victims lying on theground. The performative nature of this inci-dent stands out, as it was recorded withphones and later posted on social media bythe attackers themselves, with the message:"those who defend migrants in public shouldsee this.”Demonstrative acts of extreme violence likethis are not restricted to Bosnia-Herzegov-

ina. In May 2020 in Serbia, a man drove hiscar into a migrant reception center in Obren-ovac (Belgrade), filming himself live on face-book while shouting racist messages againstpeople-on-the-move. In addition, these in-cidents of internal violence by the publicneed to be understood in the context of thesystemic violence exhibited by authoritiesagainst people-on-the-move both withincountries and in border areas. Such behaviorby authorities serves to legitimize vigilanteactions. As stated by Transbalkanska Soli-darnost, it is a serious and continuous con-cern for human rights and justice that:

"[n]o person registered on the Una-Sana Canton territory, but also in otherparts of Bosnia and Herzegovina, hasbeen punished so far for violenceagainst migrants. Does this mean thatthe authorities support the violenceagainst migrants?"

11Back to Top

DROWNING IN THE GLINA RIVER

On 14th February 2021, the body of a Turk-ish person was found in the river Glina, whichmarks part of the border between Croatiaand BiH. As Total Croatia News reports, theman was among a transit group that at-tempted to cross the Glina river two nightsearlier. Nighttime darkness made it difficultto gauge the waterʼs depth. In addition, ex-tremely low temperatures may have contrib-uted to the manʼs death. His body was ulti-mately found by Croatian officials and thecase was handed over to the State Prosecu-torʼs Office of BiH.

This tragic yet entirely preventable deathneeds to be seen in the context of the equallypreventable disaster that is playing out inBiHʼs North-Western Una Sana Canton. Fol-lowing the closure of camp Bira in Bihać, theoutbreak of a huge destructive fire in Lipa,and a wider deterioration of medical servicesand other support systems in USC, people-on-the-move have an ever narrowing tenurewithin the canton. For many, this means con-tinuing attempts to cross the border withCroatia, despite the added challenges of win-ter. During and after the crossing, practicesby Croatian authorities, especially the ever-present fear of pushbacks, are forcing peo-ple-on-the-move along ever more remote

CROATIA

The Glina river bordering HR and BiH (Source:Total Croatia News)

paths, prompting many transit groups toford rivers rather than cross bridges, even ifmembers of the groups are unable to swim.In addition, the frequent removal and burn-ing of clothes by Croatian officials increasesthe risk of hypothermia and subsequent ill-nesses for transit groups -- a risk that is ex-acerbated by winter temperatures. This latestdeath was not a tragic accident. It was causedby the interaction of a hostile environment inBiH and brutal border practices by Croatianauthorities.

12Back to Top

In Trieste, at dawn on the 23rd February2021, the Italian police broke into the homeof Gian Andrea Franchi and Lorena Fornasir,which also acts as the headquarters of theLinea d'Ombra ODV association, which since2019 has been involved in supporting peo-ple-on-the-move arriving from the Balkanroute. The officers notified Gian Andrea ofthe charge, aiding illegal immigration forprofit, which represents a baseless slur onthe work of Linea d'Ombra and part of awider trend of criminalisation of solidarity.

The authorities confiscated telephones, acomputer and a hard disk, as well as some ofthe association's accounting books. The ac-cusation centres on an episode dating backto July 2019 where Gian Andrea helped anIranian Kurdish family, who had already beenin Trieste, by welcoming them into his homeand helping them to withdraw money sent byrelatives through the Western Union service.

The outrage felt after this slanderous attackhas raised a wave of solidarity towards Gian

Andrea, Lorena and Linea dʼOmbra, from allover Italy and the Balkans. With the samecharges, thousands of people who stand insolidarity with people-on-the-move could beinvestigated for simple gestures of assis-tance. In fact, police raids against activists isa growing phenomena, and was replicated onthe evening of 1st March, when four mem-bers of Mediterranea - the association thatowns the Mare Jonio rescue boat - were alsocharged with aiding and abetting illegal im-migration.

In protest against the criminalization of soli-darity and in support of Gian Andrea and thefour of the Mediterranea, the Linea dʼOmbraassembly launched a statement that collectednearly 1,200 signatures in just four days. To-gether with ASGI and Caterina Bove, ap-pointed legal representative, the legal de-fense of the Trieste based activist is currentlybeing prepared. As noted by Gian Andrea ina statement, this is primarily a political bat-tle, and not one based on upholding the law.

EVICTIONS OF ACCOMMODATION ACROSS GREECEGREECE

With the end of the Filoxenia program,through which the International Organisationfor Migration (IOM) hosted asylum seekers/refugees in Athens, Thessaloniki, andCorinth, 6,898 people are now at risk of evic-tion. Many of those accommodated withinthese structures are in the final stages of theasylum process, waiting for their ID cardsand travel documents. The process to obtainsuch documents can take months if notyears, while making it more complicated forpeople to legally work, rent a flat, or obtainhealth insurance. Stuck in administrativelimbo, unable to leave Greece, and held backby structural failures that make it difficult tointegrate and be self-sufficient in Greece, therisk for street homelessness and further ex-ploitation is dangerously high.

Towards the end of February, several IOMhotels in Thessaloniki and Athens wereforcibly evicted. In Thessaloniki, people wereforced to board busses to go to Athens, andtold in some cases by IOM staff to “go to Vik-toria Square [Athens] to protest'', alluding toa similar situation that occurred in the sum-mer of 2020, when hundreds of families oc-

cupied the square, and were routinely at-tacked by police. In Athens, the Achillion Ho-tel was forcibly evicted, with police draggingout those who refused to leave.

The weekend of the 26th of February, severalfamilies slept again on Viktoria Square. Asthe number of families in the square grewfrom Friday to Sunday police presence andharassment increased, against both people-on-the-move and those expressing solidar-ity. On Sunday night (28th February), thefamilies were taken to Amygdaleza detentioncentre by the police. There is no legal basisfor their detention and no information hasbeen given on the duration they will be held.They were not informed where they were go-ing, and when the police were asked, theysaid the people would be taken to a camp,and would be given housing after. This hasnot occurred to date.

In addition to mass evictions by the IOM,smaller NGOs which provide housing are fol-lowing suit to evict people-on-the-move.This appears to be partially due to increased

ACTIVISTS IN TRIESTE CRIMINALISEDITALY

13Back to Top

People on the street in Corinth (Source:Popular Rally of Corinth)

pressure by the Greek Government on NGOsoperating in the field of migration, and par-tially, it may reflect changes in the ap-proaches of larger actors/institutional ap-proaches to migration and asylum in Greece.

As the weather gets warmer and more evic-tions are planned and are carried out, thereis increasing concern that hundreds if notthousands will be sleeping in the streets thisspring and summer.

SAMOS: UNLAWFUL TRAVEL BANS AND RACIAL PROFILINGSince the introduction of Covid-19 measuresin November 2020, travel restrictions havebeen imposed on the entire Greek territory.Despite these restrictions, Samos, contrarilyto the rest of the Administrative District ofNorthern Aegean, had been explicitly ex-cluded from the travel ban, due to the ʻstateof emergencyʼ that has been in place sincethe 6.6 magnitude earthquake on 30th Octo-ber.

For Samos, this exemption means that sup-porting documents, such as proof of address,permanent residence or reason of travel, arenot required to travel in and out of the island.However, there have been multiple incidentsof unlawful travel bans imposed on individu-als within the refugee and migrant commu-nity. People with refugee status who have thelegal right to leave Samos and wish to travelto mainland Greece via ferry, have beenforced by the Hellenic Coast Guard to showsupporting documents when travelling, andeventually banned from boarding the ferrydespite holding a valid ticket. Additionally,

the tickets were not reimbursed when peoplewere unlawfully banned from leaving Samos.

It is important to note that there are no sim-ilar requirements for Greek nationals and EUcitizens. This differentiation of treatment bythe authorities towards the refugee and mi-grant community constitutes direct discrimi-nation through racial profiling. This discrim-ination violates individuals access to goods,services and rights and is unlawful underboth Greek Law 4443/2016 and EU CouncilDirective 2000/43/EC. Racial profiling, asexemplified by the unlawful travel bans im-posed on the refugee and migrant commu-nity, also violates the right to equality beforethe law and protection against discrimina-tion. Yet the practice continues to this day, inspite of the official complaints made by legalactors on the island.

14Back to Top

DEVELOPMENTS AT THE GREEK-TURKISH LAND BORDERAt the end of January, the construction of thenew fence on the land border between Greeceand Turkey, initially announced by the Greekgovernment in August 2020, was completed.In October 2020, a government spokesper-son specified the barbed wire fence erectedin 2012 was fortified with a new, higher fenceerected behind the old one. This was donealong a 10km stretch around the bordercrossing Kastanies/Pazarkule, where thou-sands of people had been stranded in March2020 following the dispute over the EU-Turkey deal. In addition, a surveillance sys-tem, including thermal cameras, has nowbeen installed. As yet, it is still unclearwhether the planned 26km long extension ofthe fence has now been completed. Mean-while, the largest part of the 200km borderremains without a fence, divided geographi-cally by the Evros/Meriç river.

While many groups report that the Turkishborder forces still do not prevent and often-times even facilitate crossings to Greecealong the Evros/Meriç river, several people-on-the-move have reported to BVMN mem-ber Josoor that their attempt to climb the

TURKEY

fence at the land border had been thwartedby Turkish forces. One group reported thatthey had successfully climbed the fence butwere apprehended by Greek soldiers shortlyafter. In a new development, this group wassubsequently not detained (as in most cases),but rather pushed back directly at the officialborder crossing of Kastanies/Pazarkule.

Despite the erection of the new fence, cross-ings have increased significantly over thecourse of the last month, which is believed tobe due to the warmer weather. Subsequently,BVMNs field teams operating in the area haverecorded a more than two-fold increase inpushbacks from Greece to Turkey. The useof Evros/Meriç islands (see 11.6), describedin the November report, has been continuallypresent in testimonies from February. Mean-while the alleged involvement of Frontexpersonnel (see 11.2) being present duringand involved in pushbacks in the area hasbeen present in many testimonies collectedthroughout February. This illustrates thecontinuation of a trend which was increas-ingly documented in the last part of 2020 byBVMN members.

Fence on the Greek-Turkish border (Source:Josoor)

15Back to Top

GLOSSARY OF REPORTS, AUGUST 2020

GLOSSARY OF REPORTS, FEBRUARY 2021In February 2021, BVMN gathered testi-monies of 44 pushbacks, impacting 1133people-on-the-move. Those affected bythese incidents included men, women, chil-dren with guardians and unaccompaniedchildren. They also represent a wide demo-graphic, including people from Afghanistan,Bangladesh, Pakistan, Iran, Morocco, Tunisia,Algeria, Palestine, Syria, Iraq, Kurdistan, So-malia and Chad.

-10 pushbacks to Serbia (1 chain fromSlovenia, 2 from Croatia, 4 from Hungary,and 3 from Romania)-18 pushbacks to Bosnia-Herzegovina (3chains from Slovenia, and 15 from Croatia)-7 pushbacks to Greece (1 from Italy, 3 fromAlbania, 1 from North Macedonia, and onechain from Serbia)-9 pushbacks to Turkey (all directly fromGreece)

LINK INCIDENT RECORDED GROUP DEMOGRAPHIC

HUNGARY TO SERBIA1.1 4th February 5th February 8 Afghanistan1.2 7th February 13th February 1 Morocco1.3 17th February 20th February 2 Afghanistan1.4 27th February 27th February 30 Afghanistan, Iran

ROMANIA TO SERBIA2.1 30th January 2nd February 10 Iran, Afghanistan2.2 23rd January 31st January 17 Afghanistan, Pakistan2.3 1st February 3rd February 18 Afghanistan

SLOVENIA TO SERBIA3.1 27th January 29th January 5 Afghanistan

CROATIA TO SERBIA4.1 3rd February 5th February 3 Afghanistan4.2 4th February 5th February 3 Afghanistan

SLOVENIA TO BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA5.1 24th January 13th February 1 Morocco5.2 6th January 2nd February 20 Bangladesh5.3 6th February 23rd February 4 Morocco

CROATIA TO BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA6.1 9th February 18th February 7 Iran, Afghanistan6.2 18th January 8th February 3 Iran6.3 28th January 9th February 6 Afghanistan, Pakistan6.4 30th January 3rd February 3 Morocco6.5 2nd February 21st February 14 Afghanistan6.6 2nd February 9th February 80 Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran6.7 3rd February 17th February 2 Algeria6.8 6th February 9th February 10 Afghanistan, Pakistan6.9 7th February 9th February 5 Afghanistan, Pakistan

16Back to Top

LINK INCIDENT RECORDED GROUP DEMOGRAPHIC6.10 9th February 10th February 6 Bangladesh6.11 13th February 18th February 40 Afghanistan, Pakistan6.12 15th February 16th February 4 Afghanistan, Pakistan6.13 16th December 17th February 4 Morocco6.14 4th November 20th February 4 Bangladesh6.15 26th February 27th February 5 Afghanistan

ITALY TO GREECE7.1 14th February 17th February 1 Afghanistan

ALBANIA TO GREECE8.1 18th January 16th February 11 Syria, Morocco, Algeria,

Tunisia8.2 19th February 25th February 40 Morocco, Algeria8.3 20th February 3rd March 50 Palestine, Syria, Egypt, Alge-

ria, MoroccoSERBIA TO GREECE

9.1 15th June 3rd February 25 MoroccoNORTH MACEDONIA TO GREECE

10.1 15th January 25th January 6 Tunisia10.2 12th February 15th February 4 Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia

GREECE TO TURKEY11.1 27th January 9th February 4 Palestine, Somalia11.2 4th February 5th February 60 Afghanistan, Pakistan,

Palestine, Syria, Morocco,Tunisia

11.3 5th February 10th February 100 Afghanistan, Pakistan,Bangladesh, Palestine, Syria,Iraq, Morocco, Tunisia, So-

malia, Chad11.4 11th February 15th February 120 Syria, Algeria11.5 12th February 13th February 17 Afghanistan, Palestine, Syria,

Morocco, Algeria11.6 16th February 17th February 50 Afghanistan, Syria, Morocco,

Algeria, Sudan, Kurdistan11.7 17th February 18th February 140 Afghanistan, Syria, Morocco,

Algeria, Tunisia11.8 18th February 20th February 130 Syria, Iraq, Morocco, Algeria

11.9 18th February 19th February 60 Afghanistan, Syria, Morocco,Algeria

FIND ALL REPORTS ON THE DATABASE HERE

17Back to Top

NETWORK STRUCTURE AND CONTACT

B O R D E R

N E T W O R K

BVMN is based on the horizontal participation ofmember organisations in the field of documenta-tion, advocacy, media and litigation. The Networkreceives funds through charitable grants and do-nations from supporters. The funds primarilycover transport subsidies for volunteers in thefield and staff costs.

To follow more from the Border Violence Moni-toring Network, check out our website for the en-tire testimony archive, previous monthly reportsand regular news pieces. To follow us on socialmedia, find us on Twitter handle @Border_Vio-lence and on Facebook. For further informationregarding this report or more on how to becomeinvolved please email us at mail@bordervio-lence.eu. For press and media requests pleasecontact: press@borderviolence.eu

V I O L E N C EM O N I T O R I N G